



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

### Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

### About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>



3 2044 009 710 781



C 1387.35.15 (2)

**HARVARD COLLEGE  
LIBRARY**



**FROM THE BEQUEST OF  
JAMES WALKER**

**(Class of 1814)**

***President of Harvard College***

***"Preference being given to works in the Intellectual  
and Moral Sciences"***











6

THE  
DIVINE LEGATION  
OF  
MOSES DEMONSTRATED.

BY  
THE RIGHT REVEREND  
WILLIAM WARBURTON, D. D.,  
LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER.

---

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,  
AN ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE, WRITINGS, AND CHARACTER OF THE AUTHOR.

BY RICHARD HURD, D. D.,  
LORD BISHOP OF WORCESTER.

A NEW EDITION IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

✓  
J  
LONDON:

PRINTED FOR THOMAS TEGG AND SON, 73, CHEAPSIDE;  
R. GRIFFIN AND CO., GLASGOW; T. T. AND H. TEGG, DUBLIN:  
ALSO, J. AND S. A. TEGG, SYDNEY AND HOBART TOWN.

---

MDCCCXXXVII.

1972.48

C1387.35.15(2)

✓

NEWCASTLE COLLEGE LIBRARY

1873; March 22.  
Walker Bequest.

1972.48  
C1387.35.15(2)

GLASGOW:

PRINTED BY GEORGE BROOKMAN.

# CONTENTS OF VOLUME SECOND.

## BOOK IV.

	PAGE
SECT. III.—The high antiquity of Egypt proved from scripture:—And from the ancient Greek historians, supported and confirmed by scripture. In the course of this inquiry the rise and progress of the art of medicine is treated of and explained,	1
SECT. IV.—The high antiquity of Egypt proved from their hieroglyphics. Their nature, original, and various kinds, explained. Proved to be the original of the art of oneirocritic, or interpretation of dreams, and likewise of brute worship. In this inquiry is contained the history of the various modes of information by speech and writing: and of the various modes of ancient idolatry, in the order they arose from one another,	23
SECT. V.—Sir Isaac Newton's chronology of the Egyptian empire confuted, and shown to contradict all sacred and profane antiquity, and even the nature of things. In the course of this dissertation, the causes of that infinite confusion in the ancient Greek history and mythology are inquired into and explained,	90
SECT. VI.—Proves that Moses was skilled in all the learning of Egypt, and the Israelites violently inclined to all their superstitions.—That the ritual law was instituted partly in opposition to those superstitions, and partly in compliance to the people's prejudices.—That neither that ritual nor Moses's learning is any objection to the divinity of his mission—but a high confirmation of it. In which Herman Witsius's arguments to the contrary are examined and confuted; and the famous prophecy in the twentieth chapter of Ezekiel explained and vindicated against the absurd interpretation of the rabbins and Dr Shuckford,	138
NOTES on the Fourth Book,	196

## BOOK V.

THE NATURE OF THE JEWISH THEOCRACY EXPLAINED: AND THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE PROVED NOT TO BE IN, NOR TO MAKE PART OF, THE MOSAIC DISPENSATION.

SECT. I.—Little light to be got from the systems of Christian writers,—or the objections of deists,—or from the rabbins,—or from the cabalists, concerning the true nature of the Jewish republic. The Hebrew people separated from the rest of mankind not as favourites, but to preserve the knowledge of the true God amidst an idolatrous world—Vindicated from the calumnious falsehoods of the poet Voltaire,	235
SECT. II.—Proves the Jewish government to be a theocracy.—This form shown to be necessary: there being no other, by which opinions could be justly punished by civil laws: and without such laws against idolatry, the Mosaic religion could not be supported.—The equity of punishing opinions under a theocracy, explained. Bayle censured.—Foster confuted.—The theocracy easily introduced, as founded on a prevailing notion of tutelary deities.—An objection of Mr Collins to the truth of revelation examined and confuted.—The easy introduction of the theocracy, it is shown, occasioned as easy a defection from the laws of it.—The inquiry into the reason of this leads to an explanation of the nature of the Jewish idolatry.—Lord Bolingbroke's accusation of the law of Moses examined and exposed,	245
SECT. III.—Treats of the duration of the theocracy.—Shown to have continued till the coming of Christ.—The arguments of Spencer and Le Clerc to the contrary examined.—The prophecy of Shiloh explained: the bishop of London's discourse upon it examined and confuted,	280
SECT. IV.—The consequences of a theocracy considered.—Shown that it must be administered by an extraordinary providence, equally dispensing temporal rewards and punishments, both to the community and to particulars.—That scripture gives this representation of God's government.—And that there are many favourable circumstances in the character of the Jewish people, to induce an impartial examiner to believe that representation to be true,	300

2. 2. 26  
C. 387 25 15 (2)

NEWARD COLLEGE LIBRARY

1878; March 22.  
Walker Bequest.

1-167  
21

GLASGOW:  
PRINTED BY GEORGE PEDDERMAN

## CONTENTS OF VOLUME SECOND.

### BOOK IV.

	PAGE
SECT. III.—The high antiquity of Egypt proved from scripture:—And from the ancient Greek historians, supported and confirmed by scripture. In the course of this inquiry the rise and progress of the art of medicine is treated of and explained,	1
SECT. IV.—The high antiquity of Egypt proved from their hieroglyphics. Their nature, original, and various kinds, explained. Proved to be the original of the art of œneirocritic, or interpretation of dreams, and likewise of brute worship. In this inquiry is contained the history of the various modes of information by speech and writing: and of the various modes of ancient idolatry, in the order they arose from one another,	23
SECT. V.—Sir Isaac Newton's chronology of the Egyptian empire confuted, and shown to contradict all sacred and profane antiquity, and even the nature of things. In the course of this dissertation, the causes of that infinite confusion in the ancient Greek history and mythology are inquired into and explained,	90
SECT. VI.—Proves that Moses was skilled in all the learning of Egypt, and the Israelites violently inclined to all their superstitions.—That the ritual law was instituted partly in opposition to those superstitions, and partly in compliance to the people's prejudices.—That neither that ritual nor Moses's learning is any objection to the divinity of his mission—but a high confirmation of it. In which Herman Wurstius's arguments to the contrary are examined and confuted; and the famous prophecy in the twentieth chapter of Ezekiel explained and vindicated against the absurd interpretation of the rabbins and Dr Shuckford,	138
NOTES on the Fourth Book,	196

### BOOK V.

THE NATURE OF THE JEWISH THEOCRACY EXPLAINED: AND THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE PROVED NOT TO BE IN, NOR TO MAKE PART OF, THE MOSAIC DISPENSATION.

SECT. I.—Little light to be got from the systems of Christian writers,—or the objections of deists,—or from the rabbins,—or from the cabalists, concerning the true nature of the Jewish republic. The Hebrew people separated from the rest of mankind not as favourites, but to preserve the knowledge of the true God amidst an idolatrous world—Vindicated from the calumnious falsehoods of the poet Voltaire,	235
SECT. II.—Proves the Jewish government to be a theocracy.—This form shown to be necessary: there being no other, by which opinions could be justly punished by civil laws: and without such laws against idolatry, the Mosaic religion could not be supported.—The equity of punishing opinions under a theocracy, explained. Bayle examined.—Foster confuted.—The theocracy easily introduced, as founded on a prevailing notion of tutelary deities.—An objection of Mr Collins to the truth of revelation examined and confuted.—The easy introduction of the theocracy, it is shown, occasioned as easy a defection from the laws of it.—The inquiry into the reason of this leads to an explanation of the nature of the Jewish idolatry.—Lord Bolingbroke's accusation of the law of Moses examined and exposed,	245
SECT. III.—Treats of the duration of the theocracy.—Shown to have continued till the coming of Christ.—The arguments of Spencer and Le Clerc to the contrary examined.—The prophecy of Shiloh explained: the bishop of London's discourse upon it examined and confuted,	280
SECT. IV.—The consequences of a theocracy considered.—Shown that it must be administered by an extraordinary providence, equally dispensing temporal rewards and punishments, both to the community and to particulars.—That scripture gives the representation of God's government.—And that there are many favourable circumstances in the character of the Jewish people, to induce an impartial examiner to believe that representation to be true,	300



SECT. V.—Shows, that as temporal rewards and punishments were the proper sanction of the Jewish law, so, there were no other; Moses entirely omitting the doctrine of a future state.—That this omission was not accidental, but designed; and of a thing well known by him to be of high importance to society.—Proved from several circumstances in the book of Genesis,—and from the law of punishing the crimes of parents on their posterity, which was to supply the want of the doctrine of a future state.—The nature and equity of this law explained, and defended against unbelievers.—It is then shown that as Moses taught not the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, so neither had the ancient Jews any knowledge of it.—Proved from the books of the Old Testament, . . . . .	323
SECT. VI.—Proves the same point from the books of the New Testament.—What notion the early Jews had concerning the soul, explained, . . . . .	338
APPENDIX and NOTES to the Fifth Book, . . . . .	348

## BOOK VI.

CONTAINS AN EXAMINATION OF ALL THE TEXTS BROUGHT FROM THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS TO PROVE A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS DID MAKE PART OF THE MOSAIC DISPENSATION.

SECT. I.—States the question,—shows the adversaries of this work to have much mistaken it.—And that the true state of the question alone is a sufficient answer to all objections, . . . . .	377
SECT. II.—Enters on an examination of the texts brought from the Old Testament;—first from the book of Job—which is proved to be an allegoric poem, written on the return from the captivity, and representing the circumstances of the people of that time.—The famous words, ‘I know that my Redeemer liveth,’ &c., shown to signify, in their literal sense, the hopes of a temporal deliverance only, . . . . .	382
SECT. III.—Contains an examination of the rest of the texts urged from the Old Testament, . . . . .	431
SECT. IV.—Contains an examination of the texts produced from the New Testament, in which the nature of the apostolic reasonings against the errors of Jewish converts is explained and illustrated, . . . . .	449
SECT. V.—The agreement of the proposition of no future state in the Mosaic dispensation, with the Seventh Article of the church of England evinced.—That the old fathers looked for more than transitory promises, illustrated in the famous case of Abraham,—where it is proved that the command to offer Isaac was merely an information, in a representative action instead of words, of the redemption of mankind by the great sacrifice of Christ.—Shown how this interpretation overturns all the infidel objections against the truth of this part of Abraham’s history, . . . . .	465
SECT. VI.—To support the foregoing interpretation, the original, nature, and use of typical rites and secondary senses in prophecies are inquired into,—In the course of which inquiry, the principles of Mr Collins’s book concerning the grounds and reasons of the Christian religion are examined and confuted,—and likewise the reasoning of Dr Sykes against all double senses of prophecies in his book, entitled, The Principles and Connexion of Natural and Revealed Religion, &c.—The use and importance of these questions to the subject of the Divine Legation explained.—The conclusion of the argument,—with a recapitulation of it, . . . . .	493
APPENDIX and NOTES on the Sixth Book, . . . . .	555

## BOOK VII.

BEING AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN THE TRUE NATURE AND GENIUS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

INTRODUCTION, . . . . .	592
CHAPTERS I. to VI., . . . . .	607
NOTES, . . . . .	690

THE  
DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES  
DEMONSTRATED.

---

BOOK IV. CONTINUED.—SECT. III.

THE first proposition is, *that the Egyptian learning, celebrated in scripture, and the Egyptian superstition there condemned, were the very learning and superstition represented by the Greek writers as the honour and opprobrium of that kingdom.*

To prove this, I shall in the first place show, both by external and internal evidence, the just pretensions which Egypt had to a superior antiquity: and then examine the new hypothesis of Sir ISAAC NEWTON against that antiquity.

It is confessed on all hands, that the Greek writers concur in representing Egypt as one of the most ancient and powerful monarchies in the world. In support of what they deliver, we may observe, that they have given a very particular account of the civil and religious customs in use from the most early times of memory: customs of such a kind, as show the followers of them to have been most polite and powerful.—Thus stands the Grecian evidence.

But to this it may be replied, that the Greeks are, in all respects, incompetent witnesses, and carry with them such imperfections as are sufficient to discredit any evidence; being, indeed, very *ignorant*, and very *prejudiced*. As this made them liable to imposition: so, falling, as we shall see, into ill hands, they actually were imposed on.

Their *ignorance* may be fairly collected from their age; and from the authors of their intelligence. They all lived long after the times in question; and, though they received indeed their information from Egypt itself; yet, for the most part, it was not till after the entire destruction of that ancient empire, and when it was now become a province, in succession, to Asiatic and European conquerors: when their ancient and public records were destroyed; and their very learning and genius changed to a conformity with their Grecian masters: who would needs, at this time of day, seek wisdom from Egypt, which could but furnish them with their own; though, because they would have it so, disguised under the stately obscurity of an Eastern cover.\*

\* See Div. Leg. book iii. sect. 4.

Nor were their *prejudices* less notorious. They thought themselves Autocthones, the original inhabitants of the earth, and indebted to none for their advantages. But when knowledge and acquaintance with foreign nations had convinced them of their mistake; and that, so far from owing nothing to others, they owed almost every thing to Egypt; their writers, still true to their natural vanity, now gave the post of honour to these, which they could no longer keep to themselves; and complimented their new instructors with the most extravagant antiquity. What the Greeks conceived out of vain-glory, the Egyptians cherished—to promote a trade. This country was long the mart of knowledge for the eastern and western world: and as nothing so much recommends this kind of commodity as its age, they set it off by forged records, which extended their history to a most unreasonable length of time: accounts of these have been conveyed to us by ancient authors, and fully confuted by the modern.—Thus stands the objection to the Grecian evidence. And, though I have no business to determine in this question, as the use I make of the Greek authority is not at all affected by it; yet I must needs confess that, were there no writings of higher antiquity to confirm the Grecian, their testimony would be very doubtful: but, could writings of much higher antiquity be found to contradict it, they would deserve to have no credit at all.

Whatever therefore they say of the high antiquity of Egypt, unsupported by the reason of the thing, or the testimony of holy scripture, shall never be employed in this inquiry: but whatever reason and scripture seem to contradict, whether it serve the one or other purpose, I shall always totally reject.

The unanimous agreement of the Greek writers in representing Egypt as the most ancient and best policied empire in the world, is, as we say, generally known and acknowledged.

I. Let us see then, in the first place, what REASON says on this matter.

There is, if I be not much mistaken, one circumstance in the situation of Egypt, which seems to assert its claim to a priority amongst the civilized nations; and consequently to its eldership in arts and arms.

There is no soil on the face of the globe so fertile, but what, in a little time, becomes naturally effete by pasturage and tillage. This, in the early ages of the world, forced the unsettled tribes of men to be perpetually shifting their abode. For the world lying all before them, they saw a speedier and easier relief in removing to fresh ground, than in turning their thoughts to the recovery\* of the fertility of that already spent by occupation: for it is necessity alone to which we are indebted for all the artificial methods of supplying our wants.

Now the plain of Egypt having its fertility annually restored by the periodic overflowings of the Nile, they, whom chance or choice had once directed to sit down upon its banks, had never after an occasion to

\* See note E, at the end of this book.

remove their tents. And when men have been so long settled in a place, that the majority of the inhabitants are become natives of the soil, the inborn love of a country has, by that time, struck such deep roots into it, that nothing but extreme violence can draw them out. Hence, civil policy arises; which, while the unsettled tribes of mankind keep shifting from place to place, remains stifled in its seeds.

This, I apprehend, if rightly considered, will induce us to conclude, that Egypt was very likely to have been one of the first civilized countries on the globe.

II. Let us see next what SCRIPTURE has said in support of the same truth.

1. So early as the time of Abraham we find a king in Egypt of the common name of Pharaoh:\* which would induce one to believe, that the civil policy was much the same as in the times of Joseph and Moses: and how perfect it then was, will be seen presently. This kingdom is represented as abounding in corn, and capable of relieving others in a time of famine:† which no kingdom can do, where agriculture has not been improved by art, and regulated by a civil policy. We see the splendour of a luxurious court, in the princes who resided in the monarch's household: amongst whom, we find some (as the most thriving trade for royal favour) to have been procurers to his pleasures:‡ nor were the presents made by Pharaoh to Abraham, at all unworthy of a great king.§ An adventure of the same sort as this of Abraham's with Pharaoh, happened to his son Isaac with Abimelech; which will instruct us in the difference between an Egyptian monarch, and a petty roitelet of the Philistines. Abimelech is described as little different from a simple particular,|| without his guards, or great princes: so jealous and afraid of Isaac's growing power, that he obliged him to depart out of his dominions;¶ and, not satisfied with that, went afterwards to beg a peace of him, and would swear him to the observance of it.\* \*

2. The caravan of Ishmaelite merchants, going from Gilead to Egypt,†† brings us to the second scripture-period of this ancient monarchy. And here their camel-loads of spicery, balm and myrrh, and their traffic in young slaves,‡‡ commodities only for a rich and luxurious people, sufficiently declare the established power and wealth of Egypt. We find a captain of Pharaoh's guard; a chief butler, and a baker.§§ We see in the vestures of fine linen, in the gold chains, and state-chariots given to Joseph,||| all the marks of luxury and politeness: and in the cities for laying up of stores and provisions,¶¶ the effects of wise government and opulence. Nor is the policy of a distinct PRIESTHOOD, which is so circumstantially described in the history of this period, one of the least marks of the high antiquity of this flourishing kingdom. It is agreed, on all

\* Genesis xii. 15.

† Ver. 10.

‡ The princes also of Pharaoh saw her, and COMMENDED HER BEFORE PHARAOH; and the woman was taken into Pharaoh's house.—Gen. xii. 15.

§ Gen. xii. 16.

|| Ib. chap. xxvi. 7, 8.

¶ Ver. 16.

\* \* Ver. 26, et seq.

† Chap. xxxvii. 25.

‡‡ Ver. 28.

§ § Chap. xxxix. xl.

|| | Chap. xli. 42, 43.

¶ ¶ Chap. xli.

hands, that there was such an institution in Egypt, long before it was known in any other parts of the east. And if what Diodorus Siculus intimates to be the original of a distinct priesthood, be true, namely the growing multitude of religious rites, we see the whole force of this observation. For multiplicity of religious rites is generally in proportion to the advances in civil life.

3. The redemption of the Hebrews from their slavery is the third period of the Egyptian monarchy, recorded in scripture. Here, the building of treasure cities,\* and the continual employment of so vast a multitude, in only preparing materials† for public edifices, show the vast power and luxury of the state. Here too we find a fixed and standing militia‡ of chariots; and, what is more extraordinary, of cavalry:§ in which kind of military address the Greeks were unskilled till long after the times of the Trojan war. And indeed, if we may believe St Paul, this kingdom was chosen by God to be the scene of all his wonders, in support of his elect people, for this very reason, that through the celebrity of so famed an empire, the power of the true God might be spread abroad, and strike the observation of the whole habitable world.—*For the scripture saith unto Pharaoh, Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might shew my power in thee; and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth.*||

To this let me add, that scripture every where, throughout these three periods, represents Egypt as an entire kingdom under one monarch;¶ which is a certain mark of great advances in civil policy and power: all countries, on their first egression out of barbarity, being divided into many little states and principalities; which, as those arts improved, were naturally brought, either by power or policy, to unite and coalesce.

But here let me observe, such is the ceaseless revolution of human affairs, that that power which reduced Egypt into a monarchy, was the very thing which, when it came to its height, occasioned its falling back again under its *Reguli*. Sesostris, as Diodorus Siculus informs us, divided the lower Egypt to his soldiery, by a kind of feudal law, into large patrimonial tenures. The successors of this militia, as Marsham reasonably conjectures,\*\* growing powerful and factious, set up, each leader for himself, in his own patrimonial nome. The powerful empire of the Franks, here in the west, from the same causes, underwent the same fate, from the debility of which it did not recover till these latter ages.

Thus invincibly do the Hebrew records †† support the Grecian evidence for the high antiquity of Egypt. And it is further remarkable, that the later inspired writers of the sacred canon confirm this concurrent testimony, in the constant attributes of *antiquity* and *wisdom*, which, upon all occasions, they bestow upon the Egyptian nation. Thus the prophet Isaiah, in denouncing God's judgments against this people:—

\* Exod. i. 11.

† Exod. v. 14.

‡ Ch. xiv. 7.

§ Ver. 9.

|| Rom. ix. 17.

¶ See Gen. xli. 41, 43, 45, 46, 55. xlvii. 20. and Exod. passim.

\*\* Can. Chron. p. 446.

†† See note F, at the end of this book.



"Surely the princes of Zoan are fools, the counsel of the WISE counsellors of Pharaoh is become brutish: how say ye unto Pharaoh, I am the son of the WISE, the son of ANCIENT KINGS? Where are they? where are thy WISE MEN? and let them tell thee now, and let them know what the Lord of hosts hath purposed upon Egypt."\*

But the Greek writers do not content themselves to tell us, in a vague and general manner, of the high antiquity and power of Egypt, which in that case was little to be regarded; but they support the fact of which their books are so full, by a minute and circumstantial account of INSTRUCTIONS, civil and religious, said to be observed by that people from the most early times, which, in their very nature, speak a great and powerful people; and belong only to such as are so. Now this account sacred scripture remarkably confirms and verifies.

1. The PRIESTHOOD being the primum mobile of the Egyptian policy, we shall begin with that. Diodorus Siculus thus describes its state and establishment:—"The whole country being divided into three parts; the first belongs to the body of priests; an order in the highest reverence amongst their countrymen, for their piety to the gods, and their consummate wisdom, acquired by the best education, and the closest application to the improvement of the mind. With their revenues they supply all Egypt with public sacrifices; they support a number of inferior officers, and maintain their own families: for the Egyptians think it utterly unlawful to make any change in their public worship; but hold that every thing should be administered by their priests, in the same constant invariable manner. Nor do they deem it at all fitting that those, to whose cares the public is so much indebted, should want the common necessities of life: for the priests are constantly attached to the person of the king, as his coadjutors, counsellors, and instructors, in the most weighty matters.—For it is not amongst them as with the Greeks, where one single man or woman exercises the office of the priesthood. Here a body or society is employed, in sacrificing and other rites of public worship; who transmit their profession to their children. This order, likewise, is exempt from all charges and imposts, and holds the second honours, under the king, in the public administration."†

Of all the colleges of the priesthood, Herodotus tells us, that of HELIOPOLIS was much famed for wisdom and learning:‡ and Strabo says

\* Isaiah xix. 11, 12.—See note G, at the end of this book.

† Τῆς δὲ χάρις ἀπάσης εἰς τρία μέρη διηρημένης, τὴν μὲν πρώτην ἔχει μερίδα τὸ σύστημα τῶν ἱερέων, μεγίστης ἱερωσύνης τυγχάνον παρὰ τοῖς ἰσχυρίαις, διὰ τι τὴν εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσίβειαν, καὶ διὰ τὸ πλείστην εὐνοίαν τοὺς ἄνδρας τούτους ἐκ παιδείας εὐσφίρεισθαι. Ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν προσόδων τὰς τι θυσίας ἀπάσας τὰς κατ' Αἴγυπτον συντελοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς ὑπερίτας τρέφουσι, καὶ ταῖς θύαις χρήμας χρηματοῦσι· ὥστε γὰρ τὰς τῶν θεῶν τιμὰς φέροντο διὸν ἀλλάττειν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ παραπλησίως συντελεῖσθαι· ὥστε τοὺς πάντων προβουλευομένους, ἰδίως εἶναι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. Καθόλου γὰρ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων οὗτοι προβουλευόμενοι συνδιατρέβουσι τῷ βασιλεῖ, τῶν μὲν συνεργῶν, τῶν δὲ ἐπιστητῶν καὶ διδάσκαλων γινόμενοι—οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ παρὰ ταῖς Ἑλλήσιν, εἰς ἑνὸς ἢ μίας γυναικὸς τὴν ἱερωσύνην παρὶέλθουσι, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν θεῶν θυσίας καὶ τιμὰς διατρέβουσι, καὶ ταῖς ἰγγύτοις τὴν ὁμοίαν τοῦ βίου προαίρουν παραδίδουσι. Εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι πάντων τι ἀσιταῖς, καὶ δωτεριόεντες μετὰ τὸν βασιλεῖα ταῖς τι δόξαις, καὶ ταῖς ἱξουσίαις. Bibl. Hist. p. 46. Steph. ed.

‡ Οἱ γὰρ Ἑλισιοπολῖται λίγονται Αἰγυπτίῳ εἶναι λογιώτατοι—Lib. ii. cap. 3.

that, in his time, very spacious buildings yet remained in that place; where, as the report ran, was formerly the chief residence of the priests, who cultivated the studies of philosophy and astronomy.\*

Thus these three celebrated historians; whose account, in every particular, is fully confirmed by MOSES; who tells us, that the Egyptian priests were a distinct order in the state, and had an established landed revenue; that when the famine raged so severely that the people were compelled to sell their lands to the crown for bread, the priests still kept theirs, unalienated, and were supplied gratis.† Diodorus's account, which gives us the reason of this indulgence, confirms the scripture-history, and is fully supported by it: for there we see, not only the reverence in which the order was held, but the public uses of religion, to which two thirds of their revenues were applied, kept Pharaoh from attempting on their property. Again, MOSES supports what Diodorus says of the public and high employment of the priests (who were privy counsellors and ministers of state), where speaking of the priest of ON,‡ he calls him *chohen*, which, as J. Cocceius shows in his lexicon,§ signifies as well the friend and privy-counsellor of the king, as a priest; and accordingly, the *Chald. Paraphr.* calls him *princeps On*. The word often occurs; and, I imagine, was borrowed from the Egyptian language; the Hebrews having no order of priesthood before that instituted by MOSES. This further appears from the name *coes*,|| given to the priests of the *Samothracian mysteries*, plainly a corruption of *coen* or *chohen*. The mysteries in general, we have shown,¶ were derived from Egypt, and particularly those of Ceres or Isis, at Eleusis: now, in Samothrace, the mysteries were of Ceres and Proserpine, as at Eleusis.\*\* Lastly, MOSES confirms Herodotus's and Strabo's account of the superior learning and dignity of the Heliopolitan college. When Joseph was exalted to the prime ministry, he tells us, that Pharaoh married him to a daughter of the priest of ON;†† which the Septuagint and vulgar Latin rightly interpret HELIOPOLIS: that the king was then in a disposition to do Joseph the highest honours, is plain from the circumstances of the story; and that he principally consulted his establishment in this alliance, appears

\* 'Εν δὲ τῇ Ἡλιουπόλει καὶ οἴκους ἰδομεν μεγάλους, ἐν οἷς διέτριβον οἱ ἱερεῖς μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τέχνην κατεσκεύαζαν ἱερῶν γεγονέναι φασὶ τὸ παλαιόν, φιλοσόφων ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἀστρονομικῶν.—Geogr. lib. xvii.

† Only the land of the priests bought he not: for the priests had a portion assigned them of Pharaoh, and did eat their portion which Pharaoh gave them; wherefore they sold not their lands.—Gen. xlvii. 22.

‡ Gen. xlv. 20.

§ *Chohen*, proprie et ex vi vocis, qui accedit ad regem, et eum, qui summus est. Ideo explicationis ergo adjungitur tanquam etymologiae evolutio, Exod. xix. 22. "Sacerdotes qui accedunt ad 'Jehovam.'"—Non, quod vox *Chohen* notet *primum*, ut vult Kimchius, sed quod notet *primos accedentium*—Certe in Ægypto fuerunt tales, et his alimonia a rege debebatur.

|| Κοῖης, ἱερεὺς Καβίρων.—Hesych.

¶ Div. Leg. book. ii. sect. 4.

\*\* Μνησθῆναι δὲ ἐν τῇ Σαμοθράκῃ τοῖς Καβίροις, ὡς Μνασίας φησὶ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα. Τίτταρις δ' εἰσὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν, Ἀξίρος, Ἀξίόπεσσα, Ἀξίόπεσσος. Ἀξίρος μὲν οὖν ἴσται ἡ Δημήτηρ. Ἀξίόπεσσα δὲ ἡ Περσιφόνη Ἀξίόπεσσος δὲ ὁ Ἀδης ὁ δὲ προστάθμιος τίταρτος Κάσμιλος ὁ Ἐρμῆς ἴσται, ὡς ἴσται Διονυσόδωρος.—Schol. in Apoll. Argon. lib. i. ver. 917.

†† Gen. xlv. 20.

from the account given us by these Greek historians. We see the public administration was in the hands of the priesthood; who would unwillingly bear a stranger at the head of affairs. The bringing Joseph therefore into their family, and order,\* which was hereditary, was the best expedient to allay their prejudices and envy. And this Pharaoh did most effectually, by marrying him into that caste which was then of greatest name and credit amongst them.

I will only observe, that this superior nobility of the priests of *On* seems to have been chiefly owing to their higher antiquity. Heliopolis, or the city of the sun, was the place where that luminary was principally worshipped; and certainly, from the most early times: for Diodorus tells us, that *the first gods of Egypt were the sun and moon*;† the truth of which, all this, laid together, remarkably confirms. Now if we suppose, as is very seasonable, that the first established priests in Egypt were those dedicated to the sun at *On*, we shall not be at a loss to account for their titles of nobility. Strabo says, they were much given to astronomy; and this too we can easily believe: for what more likely than that they should be fond‡ of the study of that system, over which their god presided, not only in his *moral*, but in his *natural* capacity? For whether they received the doctrine from original tradition, or whether they invented it at hazard, which is more likely,§ in order to exalt this their visible god, by giving him the post of honour, it is certain they taught that the sun was in the centre of its system, and that all the other bodies moved round it, in perpetual revolutions. This noble theory came, with the rest of the Egyptian learning, into Greece (being brought thither by Pythagoras; who, it is remarkable, received it from CEnuphis, a priest of Heliopolis);|| and, after having given the most distinguished lustre to his school, it sunk into obscurity, and suffered a total eclipse throughout a long succession of learned and unlearned ages: till these times relumed its ancient splendour, and immovably fixed it on the most unerring principles of science.

II. Another observable circumstance of conformity between the Greek historians and MOSES, is in their accounts of the RELIGIOUS RITES of Egypt. Herodotus expressly tells us, that the Egyptians esteemed it a profanation, to sacrifice any kind of cattle, except swine, bulls, clean calves, and geese;¶ and, in another place, that heifers, rams, and goats were held sacred,\*\* either in one province or in another: though not from any adoration paid in these early times to the *living animal*. I

\* See note H, at the end of this book.

† See note I, at the end of this book.

‡ See note K, at the end of this book.

† See Div. Leg. book ii.

§ See Div. Leg. book i.

¶ Ταῦτα γὰρ οὐδὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἰσθῆναι, καὶ ἱερῆσαι βοῶν, καὶ μίσχαν, ὅτε δὲ καθαροὶ ἴωσι, καὶ χυρίων, καὶ δὲ οὗτοι ἀνθρώποις θύουσιν;—Lib. ii. cap. 45.

\*\* — τὰς βοῆς τὰς θηλίας Αἰγύπτῳ πάντες ὁμοίως σίβονται προβάτων πάντων μάλιστα μακρῶν.—cap. xlii.—Ὅσα μὲν δὲ Διὸς Θηβαίου ἱερῆται ἱερὸν, ἢ νομῶ τοῦ Θηβαίου ἱερῶν, οὗτοι μὲν πάντες ὅλας ἀσυχόμενοι, αἰγὰς θύουσιν. Θιοὺς γὰρ δὲ οὐ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀπαντες ὁμοίως Αἰγύπτῳ, σίβονται, πλὴν Ἰσθῆς τί καὶ Ὀσίριδος. τὸν δὲ Διόνυσον ὡς αἰγῶν ἀσυχόμενοι, οὗτοι δὲ αἰγῶν ἀσυχόμενοι, ὡς θύουσιν.—Cap. xlii.

shall show hereafter that the Egyptians at first only worshipped their figures or images. However picture-worship must needs make the animals themselves sacred, and unfit for sacrifice. Now here again, in confirmation of this account, we are told by scripture, that when Pharaoh would have had Moses to sacrifice to God, in the land of Egypt, according to his own family rites, the prophet objected,—*It is not meet so to do; for we shall sacrifice the abomination of the Egyptians to the Lord our God: lo shall we sacrifice the abomination of the Egyptians before their eyes, and will they not stone us?* \* And if Herodotus came any thing near the truth in his account of the early superstition of Egypt, the Israelites, we see, could not avoid sacrificing the abomination, *i. e.* the gods of the Egyptians. And with what deadly hatred and revenge they pursued such imaginary impieties, the same Herodotus informs us, in another place.†

III. To come next to the CIVIL ARTS of Egypt.—Concerning their practice of physic, Herodotus says, that it was divided amongst the faculty in this manner: “Every distinct distemper hath its own physician, who confines himself to the study and cure of that alone, and meddles with no other: so that all places are crowded with physicians: for one class hath the care of the eyes, another of the head, another of the teeth, another of the region of the belly, and another of occult distempers.”‡ After this, we shall not think it strange that Joseph’s physicians are represented as a number—*And Joseph commanded his servants, the physicians, to embalm his father: and the physicians embalmed Israel.*§ A body of these domestics would now appear an extravagant piece of state, even in a first minister. But then, we see, it could not be otherwise, where each distemper had its proper physician: so that every great family, as well as city, must needs, as Herodotus expresses it, swarm with the faculty: and a more convincing instance of the grandeur, luxury, and politeness of a people, cannot, I think, be well given. But indeed it was this circumstance for which the Egyptian nation was peculiarly distinguished, not only by the earliest Greek writers (as we shall see hereafter), but likewise by the holy prophets. There is a remarkable passage in Jeremiah, where, foretelling the overthrow of Pharaoh’s army at the Euphrates, he describes Egypt by this characteristic, her skill in medicine. *Go up into Gilead, and take balm, O virgin the daughter of Egypt: in vain shalt thou use many medicines; for thou shalt not be cured.*|| The prophet delights in this kind of imagery, which marks out a people by its singularities, or pre-eminence. So again, in this very chapter: EGYPT, says he, *is like a FAIR HEIFER, but destruction cometh: it cometh from the north. Also her hired men are in the midst of her like FATTED BULLOCKS, for they also are turned back and are fled away to-*

\* Exod. viii. 26.

† Lib. ii. cap. 65.

‡ Ἡ δὲ ἰατρικὴ κατὰ τὰς εἰς διδασκται μὴς τοῦτο ἵκαστος ἰατρός ἐστι, καὶ οὐ πλείων. Πάντα δ’ ἰατρῶν ἐστι πλῆθος. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ, ὀφθαλμῶν ἰατροὶ κατιστάσι· οἱ δὲ, κεφαλῆς· οἱ δὲ, ἀόντων· οἱ δὲ, κατὰ νηδύν· οἱ δὲ, τῶν ἀφανίων νοσούντων.—Lib. ii. cap. 84.

§ Gen. i. 2.

|| Jerem. xlv. 11.

gether.\* For the worship of Isis and Osiris, under the figure of a cow and a bull, and afterwards by the animals themselves, was the most celebrated in all the Egyptian ritual.

But a learned writer, frightened by the common panic of the high antiquity of Egypt, will needs show, the art of medicine to be of much later original†. And to make room for his hypothesis, he contrives to explain away this direct testimony of Herodotus, by a very uncommon piece of criticism. This is the substance of his reasoning, and in his own words:—"We read of the Egyptian physicians in the days of Joseph; and Diodorus represents them as an order of men not only very ancient in Egypt, but as having a full employment in continually giving physic to the people, not to cure, but to prevent their falling into distempers. Herodotus says much the same thing, and represents the ancient Egyptians as living under a continual course of physic, undergoing so rough a regimen for three days together, every month, that I cannot but suspect some mistake, both in him, and Diodorus's account of them in this particular. Herodotus allows them to have lived in a favourable climate, and to have been a healthy people, which seems hardly consistent with so much medicinal discipline as he imagined them to go through, almost without interruption. The first mention we have of physicians in the sacred pages shows indeed that there was such a profession in Egypt in Joseph's time, and Jacob was their patient; but their employment was to embalm him after he was dead; we do not read that any care was taken to give him physic whilst alive; which inclines me to suspect that the Egyptians had no practice for the cure of the diseases of a sick bed in these days: we read of no sick persons in the early ages. The diseases of Egypt, which the Israelites had been afraid of, were such as they had no cure for; and any other sicknesses were then so little known, that they had no names for them.—An early death was so unusual, that it was generally remarked to be a punishment for some extraordinary wickedness. Moses informs us, that the physicians embalmed Jacob; many of them were employed in the office, and many days' time was necessary for the performance, and different persons performed different parts of it, some being concerned in the care of one part of the body, and some of the other: and I imagine this manner of practice occasioned Herodotus to hint, that the Egyptians had a different physician for every distemper, or rather, as his subsequent words express, for each different part of the body: for so indeed they had, not to cure the diseases of it, but to embalm it when dead. These, I imagine, were the offices of the Egyptian physicians in the early days. They were an order of the ministers of religion. The art of curing distempers or diseases was not yet attempted.—We may be sure the physicians practised only surgery until after Homer's time;—for we read in him, that their whole art consisted in extracting arrows, healing wounds, and preparing anodynes.—In the days of Pythagoras, the learned began to

\* Jerem. xlv. 20, 21.

† See note L, at the end of this book.



form rules of diet for the preservation of health, and to prescribe in this point to sick persons, in order to assist towards their recovery. And in this Strabo tells us, consisted the practice of the ancient Indian physicians. They endeavoured to cure distempers by a diet regimen, but they gave no physic. Hippocrates—began the practice of visiting sick-bed patients, and prescribed medicines with success for their distempers. This, I think, was the progress of physic.—*And it must evidently appear from it, that the Egyptians could have no such physicians in the days of Moses as Diodorus and Herodotus seem to suppose.*”<sup>\*</sup> So far this writer. But if it be made appear, that the very contrary of every thing here advanced be the truth; I shall hope, that what Herodotus and Diodorus, conformable to scripture, do not *seem to suppose*, but directly and circumstantially to affirm, may be admitted for certain.

He tells us, first, “that Diodorus represents the Egyptian physicians as administering physic to the people in the early times, *not to cure, but to prevent their falling into distempers.*” One would conclude, from his manner of expression, that the historian had said they did not administer to the infirm, but to the healthy only; which gives us the idea of a superstitious kind of practice, by charms and amulets: and so indeed the writer is willing we should think of it. *I should imagine*, says he, *that their ancient prescriptions, which Diodorus and Herodotus suppose them so punctual in observing, were not medicinal, but religious purifications.* p. 361. Let Diodorus then speak for himself: “They prevent distempers,” say he, “and keep the body in health by refrigerating and laxative medicines; by abstinence and emetics; sometimes in a daily regimen, sometimes with an intermission every three or four days: for they hold a superfluity in all food, as usually taken; and that it is the original of distempers: so that the above-mentioned regimen removes the cause, and greatly contributes to preserve the body in a state of health.”<sup>†</sup> Here we have a very rational theory, and expert and able practice; this prescribing to prevent distempers, being, as amongst us, the result of the physician’s long experience in his art: for the regimen, we see, was intermitted or continued according to the habit and constitution of the patient.

*But the Egyptians being a healthy people, and living under a favourable climate, could not have occasion*, says the learned writer, *for so much physic*; therefore he will *suspect their accounts*. I have observed, that these accounts are a proof of that grandeur, luxury, and politeness, which sacred and profane history ascribe to this people, and which so many other circumstances concur to make credible. Now a too great repletion, the effect of a luxurious diet, would certainly find employment

<sup>\*</sup> The sacred and profane History of the World connected, vol. ii. ed. 2. pp. 359, 360, 361, 364—367.

<sup>†</sup> Τὰς δὲ νόσους προκαταλαμβάνοντες διακρίνουσι τὰ σώματα πλεγμαῖς, καὶ ποτίμοις τισὶ καθαρευρίαις, καὶ νηστιαῖς καὶ ἱρίαις, ἵνασι μὲν κατ’ ἐκείνην ἡμέραν, ἵνασι δὲ τρεῖς ἢ τέσσαρες ἡμέρας διαλύποντες. φασὶ γὰρ, πάσης τροφῆς ἀναδοσίης, τὸ πλεον εἶναι περιττόν· ἀφ’ οὗ γινώσθαι τὰς νόσους. ὅστις τὴν προσημῖαν διακρίαν ἀναιροῦσαι τὰς ἀρχὰς τῆς νόσου, μάλιστα δὲ παρασκευάσαι τὴν ὑγίαν.—Bibl. lib. i. p. 52.

for the whole tribe of evacnants, as we may see by the various experience of our own times, notwithstanding all the advantages of climate and constitution. And let me observe, and it seems to be decisive, that the very establishment of this principle of the Egyptian physic, that *all distempers arise from a too great repletion*, fully evinces them to be a very luxurious people: for a nation accustomed to a simple and frugal diet, could never have afforded sufficient observations for the invention of such a theory.

*It is true, he owns, we hear of physicians in Joseph's family, who embalmed his father Jacob; but we do not read they gave him any physic while alive.*—Nor do we read that Jacob had any other distemper than old age; and, I suppose, Hippocrates himself would scarce have prescribed to that—*But we read of no sick persons in the early ages.* A plain man would have thought this a good reason why we read of no medicines administered. Though no man, who considers the nature of scripture history, will think this any proof that there were *no sick persons in those early ages.*—But further, *the diseases of Egypt which the Israelites had been afraid of, were such as they had no cure for*, Deut. xxviii. 27, and from hence is inferred the low estate of medicine in these early times. One would reasonably suppose the authority here quoted, to support this observation, had informed us that these were natural diseases, which submitted not to the rude practice of that time. But we are surprised to find that they are supernatural punishments which the prophet is here denouncing in case of disobedience: and providence would have defeated its own purpose, in suffering these to be treatable by the common rules of art:—“But it shall come to pass, if thou wilt not hearken to the voice of the Lord thy God,—The Lord will smite thee with the botch of Egypt, &c. whereof thou canst not be healed.”\* That very *botch* or *boil*, which God had, in their behalf, miraculously inflicted on the Egyptians, by the ministry of this prophet; as appears by the following words of God himself: “If thou wilt,” says he, “diligently hearken to the voice of the Lord thy God, &c. I will put none of these diseases upon thee which I have brought upon the Egyptians: for I am the Lord that healeth thee.”†—*And all other sicknesses*, this learned writer says, *were then so little known, that they had no name for them.* For which we are referred to the following words of the same denunciation, “Also every sickness and every plague which is not written in the book of this law, them will the Lord bring upon thee till thou be destroyed.”‡ This seems as if the writer considered the law of Moses in the light of *Salmon's Dispensatory*, in which we reasonably suppose every disease and remedy without name or mention, to be unknown.—And still further, *An early death*, says he, *was so unusual, that it was generally remarked to be a punishment for some wickedness:* and for this we are sent to the xxxviiiith chapter of Genesis.—It seems then it was the rarity of the fact, which made men believe the evil to be

\* Deut. xxviii. 15, 27.

† Exod. xv. 26.

‡ Deut. xxviii. 61.

a punishment. Till now I imagined, it was the sense of their being under an extraordinary providence: it is certain at least, that the book of Genesis as plainly represents the patriarchs, as the book of Deuteronomy represents their posterity to be under that dispensation: and I hope, ere long, to prove these representations true. If then we hear in scripture of little sickness but what is delivered as the effect of divine vengeance, no believer, I persuade myself, will ascribe this opinion to ignorance, superstition, or an unusual appearance, though pagan writers be ever so much accustomed to talk in that strain,\* but will own it to be the necessary consequence of an extraordinary providence. The truth is, diseases were then, as now, common in the world at large; but the infliction of them, or an exemption from them, amongst the people of God, made part of the sanction of that economy under which they lived:—"Ye shall serve the Lord your God," says MOSES, "and he shall bless thy bread and thy water, and I will take SICKNESS away from the midst of thee."† And again, "Thou shalt be blessed above all people,—and the Lord will take away from thee all SICKNESS."‡ But there are of these divines who read their Bible, and readily talk of the extraordinary providence there represented, yet argue in all questions arising from sacred history as if there were indeed no such thing.

The learned writer goes on: *the physicians embalmed Jacob, many of them were employed in the office, and many days' time was necessary for the performance, and different persons performed different parts of it, some being concerned in the care of one part of the body, and some of the other.*—This account is pretended to be taken from Diodorus: how the latter part came in, or how it can be true, unless the body were cut in pieces to be embalmed, is not easy to conceive: but we know it was embalmed entire; and Diodorus says nothing of *some being concerned in the care of one part of the body, and some of the other.* His plain, intelligible account is this: that different persons performed different parts of the operation; one marked the place for incision; another cut; a third drew out the entrails; a fourth salted the body; a fifth washed; and a sixth embalmed it.—But the learned writer's addition to the account seems for the sake of introducing the extraordinary criticism which follows.

*And I imagine, says he, this manner of practice occasioned Herodotus to HINT that the Egyptians had a different physician for every distemper, or rather, as the subsequent words express, for each different part of the body: for so indeed they had, not to cure the diseases of it, but to embalm it when dead.*—What he means by Herodotus's *hinting*, I can hardly tell: for had the historian been to give his evidence in a court of justice, it is impossible he should have delivered himself with more precision. Let us hear him over again: "Every distinct DISTEM-

\* Eodem auctore [Homero] disci potest, morbos tum ad iram deorum immortalium re-  
latos esse; et ab iisdem opem posci solitam.—Celsus de Medicina, lib. i. præf.

† Exod. xxiii. 25.

‡ Deut. vii. 14, 15.

PER [ΝΟΥΣΟΣ] hath its own physician, who confines himself to the study and cure of that, and meddles with no other; so that all places are crowded with physicians: for one class hath the care of the eyes, another of the head, another of the teeth, another of the region of the belly, and another of OCCULT DISTEMPERS [ΑΦΑΝΕΩΝ ΝΟΥΣΩΝ.]” Notwithstanding all this, by *every distemper*, is meant, it seems, *each part of a dead body*: death, indeed, has been often called a *remedy*, but never, I believe, a *disease*, before.—But the *subsequent words*, he says, *lead us to this sense*. The reader will suspect by this, that I have not given him the whole of the account: but the *subsequent words*, whereby our author would support his interpretation, are the beginning of a new chapter about funeral rites:—*As to their mournings for the dead, and funeral rites, they are of this kind,\* &c.* Now because Herodotus speaks next of their *obsequies*, which, methinks, was methodical enough, after his account of their physicians, this writer would have the foregoing chapter an anticipation of the following; and the historian to treat of his subject before he comes to it.—He goes on:—*For so indeed they had [i. e. a different physician for each different part of the body] not to cure the diseases of it, but to embalm it when dead.* How comes he to know this? Doth scripture inform him that they had a different physician for every different part of a dead body? No. They are only the Greek writers (in his opinion) misunderstood, who are supposed to say it. But why will he depend so much upon them in their account of funeral rites, and so little in their account of physicians? Scripture, which says they used embalming, and had many physicians, is equally favourable to both accounts: but it may be, one is, in itself, more credible than the other. It is so; but surely it is that which tells us they had a different physician to every different distemper; for we see great use in this; it being the best, nay perhaps the only expedient of advancing medicine into a science. On the other hand, what is said of the several parts assigned to several men, in the operation of embalming, appears, at first view, much more wonderful. ’Tis true, it may be rendered credible; but then it is only by admitting the other account of the Egyptian practice of physic, which the learned writer hath rejected: for when each disorder of the body had a several physician, it was natural, it was expedient, that each of these who were the embalmers likewise should inspect that part of the dead corpse to which his practice was confined; partly to render the operation on the dead body more complete, but principally, by an anatomical inspection, to benefit the living. On this account every interment required a number, as their work was to be divided in that manner which best suited the ends of their inspection. It is true, subsequent superstitions might introduce various practices in the division of this task amongst the operators, which had no relation to the primitive designs.

*These I imagine*, concludes our writer, *were the offices of the Egyp-*

\* Εἴηεν δὲ καὶ ταφαὶ εἰς αὐτὸν, τὸν αὐτὸν.—Lib. ii. cap. 85.

*tian physicians, in the early days; there were an order of the ministers of religion.*—He then employs some pages (pp. 361—364) to prove that the Egyptian physicians were an order of religious; and the whole amount comes to this, that their practice was intermixed with superstitions; a circumstance which hath attended medicine through all its stages; and shall be accounted for in the progress of this inquiry.—But their *office of embalming* is likewise much insisted on: for this being part of the Egyptian funeral rites, and funeral rites being part of their religion; the consequence is, that these were religious ministers. The physicians had indeed the care of embalming; and it was, as we have hinted above, a wise designation, if ever there was any: for, first, it enabled the physicians, as we have observed, to discover something of the causes of the ἀφανέων νόσων, the *unknown* diseases, which was the district of one class; and, secondly, to improve their skill by anatomical inquiries into the cause of the *known*, which was the business of the rest. Pliny expressly says, it was the custom of their kings to cause dead bodies to be dissected, to find out the origin and nature of diseases; of which he gives a particular instance: \* and Syncellus, from Manetho, relates, that books of anatomy were written in the reign of the second king of the Thinites.—But to make their employment, in a sacred rite, an argument of their being an order of religious, would be just as wise as to make the priests of the church of *Rome*, on account of their administering *extreme unction*, an order of physicians. But though the learned writer's arguments to support his fanciful opinions be thus defective, yet what he imagined in this case is very true; these physicians were properly an order of the ministers of religion; which (though it make nothing for his point, for they were still as properly physicians) I shall now show by better arguments than those of system-makers, the testimonies of antiquity.—In the most early times of the Egyptian monarchy there was no accurate separation of science † into its distinct branches. The scholiast on Ptolemy's Tetrabiblus expressly tells us, that their ancient writings did not treat separately of medicine, astrology, and religion, but of all these together: ‡ and Clemens Alexandrinus says, that of forty-two books of Mercury, which were the bible of the Egyptians, six and thirty contained all their philosophy; and were to be well studied by the several orders of the priesthood, which he before mentions; the other six, which related entirely to medicine, belonged to the παστοφόροι, i. e. such as wore the cloak; § and these, as in another place, he tells us, were an order of

\* ——— Crudos [raphanos] medici suadent ad colligenda acris viscerum dandos cum sale jejunis esse, atque ita vomitionibus præparant meatum. Tradunt et præcordiis necessarium hunc succum: quando phthisim cordi intus inhaerentem, non alio potuisse depelli compertum sit in EGYPTO, REGIBUS CORPORA MORTUORUM AD SCRUTANDOS MORBOS INSECANTIBUS.—Nat. Hist. lib. xix. cap. 5.

† See Div. Leg. book i.

‡ Οἱ Αἰγύπτῳ οὐκ ἰδίᾳ μὲν τὰ Ἰατρικὰ, ἰδίᾳ δὲ τὰ Ἀστρολογικὰ, καὶ τὰ Τίλιστικὰ, ἀλλὰ ἅμα πάντα συνέγραψαν.

§ — δύο μὲν οὗν καὶ τισσαράκοντα αἱ πάντοτε ἀναγκαῖαι τῇ Ἑρμῇ γιγνώσκει βίβλοι· αὗται μὲν γὰρ, τὴν πᾶσαν Αἰγυπτίῳ περιχούσας φιλοσοφίαν, αἱ προσημαίνονται ἱερμανθάνουσι· τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς ἔξ, οἱ ΠΑΣΤΟΦΟΡΟΙ, ἱατρικὰς εἰσας, &c.—Lib. vi. Strom.

ministers of religion: \* and even in Greece, the art of medicine being brought thither from Egypt, went in partnership, during the first ages, with philosophy; though the separation was made long before the time which Celsus assigns to it, † as we shall see presently. Thus it appears that these artists were properly both priests and physicians, not very unlike the monk and friar physicians of the late ages of barbarism.

Our author now proceeds to the general history of physic. Let us see if he be more happy in his *imagination* here. *We may be sure, says he, the physicians practised only surgery till after Homer's time.*—What must we say then to the story of Melampus, ‡ who learned the art of physic and divination in Egypt; § and cured Proetus's daughters of an atrabilaire disorder, with hellebore, a hundred and fifty years before the Argonautic expedition? But why not *till after the time of Homer*, who wrote not of his own time, but of the Trojan, near three hundred years before; and this in a kind of work which requires decorum, and will not suffer a mixture of later or foreign manners to be brought into the scene? the writer, therefore, at least should have said, till after the Trojan times. But how is even this supported? *Why we read in Homer, that their whole art consisted in extracting arrows, healing wounds, and preparing anodynes*; and again, where Idomeneus says to Nestor, *That one physician is worth many other men, for extracting arrows, and applying lenitives to the wound*;

ἱατροὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἀντάξις ἄλλων,  
ἴός τ' ἱατάρων, ἰπὶ τ' ἥπια φάρμακα πάσσειν.||

Homer's speakers rarely talk impertinently. Idomeneus is showing the use of a physician in an army: now, surely, his use on these occasions consists in healing wounds. The poet therefore chose his topic of recommendation with good judgment; and we may be certain, had he spoken of the use of a physician in a peaceable city, he had placed it in the art of curing distempers: and this is no *imagination*: we shall see presently that he hath in fact done so. In the mean time let me ask, what there is in this passage, which in the least intimates that *the whole art consisted in extracting arrows, and applying anodynes*. But Pliny says so, ¶ who understands Homer to intimate thus much. What then? is not Homer's poem still remaining; and cannot we see, without

\* — ΠΑΥΣΑΝΟΠΟΣ Β, ὃ τε ἄλλοι τῶν ἱεροποιούντων περὶ τὰ τέμνειν, σιμνὸν διδασκῶν, &c. —Pind. Hb. iii. cap. 2. From this passage we understand, that it was an inferior order of the priesthood which practised physic; for such were those who sacrificed.

† Hippocrates Coss, primus quidem ex omnibus memoria dignis, ab studio sapientiae disciplinam hanc separavit.—De Med. lib. i. præf. He adds, we see, to save his credit, *ex omnibus memoria dignis*; taking it for granted, that those who were not remembered, were not worth remembering.

‡ See Div. Leg. book i. § See note M, at the end of this book. || Il. xi. ver. 514, 515.

¶ Medicina—Trojanis temporibus clara—vulnerum tamen duntaxat remediis. Nat. Hist. lib. xxix. cap. 1. Celsus too talks in the same strain:—Quos tamen Homerus non in pestilentia, neque in variis generibus morborum aliquid attulisse auxilii, sed vulneribus tantummodo ferro et medicamentis mederi solitos esse proposuit. Ex quo apparet has partes medicinarum solum ab his esse tentatas, easque esse vetustissimas.—De Medicina, lib. i. Præf.



Pliny, what inference the rules of good sense authorize us to draw from the poet's words? The general humour of antiquity, which was strangely superstitious with regard to this father of the poets,\* may be some excuse for Pliny in concluding so much from his silence; for Homer was their bible; and whatsoever was not read therein, nor could be expressly proved thereby, passed with them for apocryphal. But let us, whose veneration for Homer rises not quite so high, fairly examine the nature of his first great work. This, which is an entire scene of war and slaughter, gave him frequent occasion to take notice of outward applications, but none of internal remedies; except in the history of the pestilence; which being believed to come in punishment from the gods, was supposed to submit to nothing but religious atonements: not to say, that it was the chirurgical part of healing only that could be mentioned with sufficient dignity. The Greeks were large feeders, and bitter railers; for which excesses, I suppose, Machaon, during the ten years' siege, administered many a sound emetic and cathartic: but these were no proper ornaments for an epic poem. I said, his subject did not give him occasion to mention inward applications; nor was this said evasively, as shall now be shown from his second poem, of a more peaceable turn; which admitting the mention of that other part of the art of medicine, the use of internal remedies, he has therefore spoken in its praise. Helen is brought in, giving Telemachus a preparation of opium; which, the poet tells us, she had from Polydamna, the wife of Thon the Egyptian, whose country abounded with medicinal drugs, many of which were salubrious, and many baneful; whence the physicians of that land were more skilful than the rest of mankind.

Τοῖα Διὸς θυγάτηρ ἔχει φάρμακα μιτίοντα,  
 Ἐσθλὰ, τὰ οἱ Πολύδαμνα πόρην Θῶνις παρέκοιτις  
 Αἰγυπτίῃ, τῇ πλεῖστα φίρμ' ἑίδωκες ἄρουρα  
 φάρμακα, πολλὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ μιμνῆσθαι, πολλὰ δὲ λυγρὰ.  
 Ἰητρὸς δὲ ἱκαστος ἰπισταμένος περὶ πάντων  
 Ἀνθρώπων ἢ γὰρ Πασιότις εἴσι γενέσθης.†

Here then is an express testimony much earlier than the time of Homer, for the Egyptian physicians practising more than surgery; which was the thing to be proved.

Our author goes on: *In the days of Pythagoras the learned began to form rules of diet for the preservation of health, and to prescribe in this point to sick persons.* This is founded on the rules of diet observed in the Pythagoric school. There seems to be something strangely perverse in this writer's way of arguing;—In the case of the Egyptian regimen, though it be expressly delivered by the Greek writers as a

\* —Homerum poetam multiscium, vel potius *cunctorum rerum adprime peritum*.—And again: *Ut omnis vetustatis certissimus auctor* Homerus docet. This was said by Apuleius, a very celebrated Platonic philosopher, in a juridical defence of himself before a proconsul of Africa.

† Odyss. lib. iv. ver. 227, et seq. Clarke on this place of Homer observes that Pliny, lib. xxv. cap. 1, quotes this passage as ascribing a knowledge of medicinal herbs to the Egyptians before Lower Egypt was inhabited.

medicinal one, yet by reason of some superstitions in it, our author will have it to be *a religious observance*; on the contrary, this Pythagoric regimen, though it be generally represented, and even by Jamblichus himself, as a superstitious practice, yet by reason of its healthfulness, he will have to be *a course of physic*.

He proceeds:—HIPPOCRATES began the practice of visiting sick-bed patients, and prescribed medicines with success for their distempers. For which Pliny is again quoted; who does indeed say he was the founder of the clinic sect: but it is strange he should say so; since Hippocrates himself, in numerous places of his writings, has informed us that it was founded long before. His tract *De diæta in acutis* begins in this manner: “Those who have collected what we call the CNIDIAN SENTENCES, have accurately enough registered the various symptoms or affections in the several distempers, with the causes of some of them: thus far might be well performed by a writer who was no physician, if so it were, that he carefully examined each patient about his several affections. But what a physician should previously be well instructed in, and what he cannot learn from his patient, that, for the most part, is omitted in this work; some things in this place, others in that; several of which are very useful to be known in the art of judging by signs. As to what is said of judging by signs, or how the cure should be attempted, I think very differently from them. And it is not in this particular only that they have not my approbation: I as little like their practice in using so small a number of medicines; for the greatest part they mention, except in acute distempers, are purgatives, and whey, and milk for the time. Indeed, were these medicines proper for the distempers to which they direct them to be applied, I should think them worthy of double praise for being able to attain their purpose so easily; but this I do not apprehend to be the case: however, those who have since revised and new-modeled these sentences, have shown much more of the physician in their prescriptions.”\* From this long passage we may fairly draw these conclusions: 1. That there was a physic-school at Cnidus: this appears from the sentences collected under its name. 2. That the Cnidian school was derived from the Egyptian: this appears from their use of evacuants, in all but acute distempers. 3. That it was now of considerable standing; having had a reform in the teaching of more able practitioners. 4. And lastly, which is most to the point, that the

\* Οἱ ἐγγράψαντες τὰς ΚΝΙΔΙΑΣ καλῶμεναι ΓΝΩΜΑΣ, ὡς αὖ μὲν πάσχουσιν οἱ πάροντες ἐν ἰατρικῇ τῶν νοσημάτων, ὁρῶς ἔγραψαν, καὶ ὡς αὖ ἵνα ἀπὸ βαίνειν αὐτῶν καὶ ἄχρη μὲν ταῦτα καὶ μὴ ἰατρὸς διδόναιτο ὁρῶς ἐγγράψαι, ἢ ἢ παρὰ τῶν καμνόντων ἰατροῦ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς, ὡς αὖ πάσχουσιν. Οὐδὲν δὲ προκαταμαθὴν διὰ τὸν ἰατρὸν, μὴ λείποντος τοῦ πάροντος, ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς ἐνταῖς. Ἄλλα ἐν ἄλλοις, καὶ ἰσχυρὰ ἵνα ἴοντα ἐν τῇμαρσι. Οὐδὲν δὲ ἐν τῇμαρσι λείποντα ὡς χρὴ ἵαται ἰατρικῇ, ἐν ταῖς ἐνταῖς πολλὰ ἰατρικῇ γινώσκω, ἢ ὡς ἐκείνη ἰατρικῇ καὶ ὡς μόνον διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἰατρικῇ, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ὁλίγουσι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ταῖς ἀπείροις ἰατρικῇ ταῖς γὰρ πλείονα ἀπείροις ἰατρικῇ, πλὴν τῶν ὅξωσιν νοσήσιν, φάρμακα ἰατρικῇ δίδοναι, καὶ ἄχρη, καὶ γάλα, ἐν τῇ ὅξωσιν πιπίσκου. Ἦν μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἦν, καὶ ἀρμόζοντα ταῖς ἀπείροις, ἢ ὡς ἀπὸ ταῖς δίδοναι, πολλὰ δὲ ἀξιώτερα ἰατρικῇ ἦν, ὅτι ὁλίγα ἴοντα ἀνταρτικὰ ἴοντα. ὡς αὖ ὡς αὐτοῖς ἴοντα οἱ μὲν ταῖς ὅξωσιν ἰατρικῇ ἀπείροις ἰατρικῇ δὲ ἐν τῇμαρσι ταῖς ἀπείροις ἰατρικῇ.



physicians of this school were of the clinic sect; it being impossible they should compose such a work as Hippocrates here criticizes, without a constant attendance on the sick-bed: and therefore Hippocrates was not the founder of this sect, as Pliny, and our author after him, supposed. —But, for the established state of physic, its study as an art, and its practice as a profession, when Hippocrates made so superior a figure, we have the full evidence of Herodotus, his contemporary; who tells us, that in the time of Darius Hystaspis the physic school at Crotona was esteemed by the Greeks first in reputation; and that, at Cyrene, second;\* which both implies, that these were of considerable standing, and that there were many others: and if GALEN may be believed, who, though a late writer, was yet a very competent judge, there were many others:† so that Hippocrates was so far from being the first that visited sick-beds, and prescribed with success in distempers, that he was not even the first amongst the Greeks. The truth of the matter is this, the *divine old man* (as his disciples have been wont to call him) so greatly eclipsed all that went before him, that, as posterity esteemed his works the canon, so they esteemed him the father of medicine: and this was the humour of antiquity. The same eminence in poetry made them regard Homer as the founder of his art, though they who penetrate into the perfection of his compositions, understand that nothing is more unlikely. But what is strange in this matter is, that the writer should think it evidence enough to bring in Pliny speaking of Hippocrates as the first amongst the Greeks who prescribed to sick-beds with success, for the confutation of Herodotus (contemporary with Hippocrates) in what he says of the pharmaceutic part of medicine, as an ancient practice in Egypt.

But all the writer's errors in this discourse seem to proceed from a wrong assumption, that the diætic medicine was, in order of time, before the pharmaceutic: and the greater simplicity of the first method seems to have led him into this mistake:—*In the days of Pythagoras*, says he, *the learned began to form rules of diet for the preservation of health; and in this consisted the practice of the ancient Indian physicians; they endeavoured to cure distempers by a diet regimen, but they gave no physic. Hippocrates began the practice of visiting sick-bed patients, and prescribed medicines with success for their distempers. This, I think, was the progress of physic.*—I hold the matter to be just otherwise; and that, of the three parts of medicine, the CHIRURGIC, the PHARMACEUTIC, and the DIÆTETIC; the *diætic* was the last in use; as the *chirurgic* was, in all likelihood, the first. In the early ages of long life and temperance, men were still subject to the common accidents of wounds, bruises, and dislocations; this would soon raise *surgery* into an art: agreeably to this supposition, we may observe, that Sextus Empiri-

\* — ἰγίνετο γὰρ ὅτι τῶτο ὅτι πρῶτοι μὲν Κροτωνῆται ἰατρῶν ἐλίσσονται ἀπὸ τῆν Ἑλλάδα ὡς, δεύτεροι δὲ, Κυρηναῖοι.—Lib. iii. cap. 131.

† Meth. Medendi, lib. i.

can derives *ιατρικῆς*, a physician, from *ιᾶς*, a dart or arrow; the first attack upon the human species being of this more violent sort. Nor was *pharmacy* so far behind as some may imagine; nature itself often eases a too great repletion by an extraordinary evacuation; this natural remedy (whose good effects as they are immediately felt, are easily understood) would teach men to seek an artificial one, when nature was not at hand to relieve. But the very early invention of pharmacy is further seen from that superstition of antiquity, which made medicine the *gift of the gods*. For, what medicine do they mean? It could not be setting a fracture, or closing the lips of a wound; much less a regular diet. It could be nothing then but pharmacy; and this, both in the invention and operation, had all the advantages for making its fortune. First, it was not the issue of study, but of chance; the cause of which is out of sight: but what men understand not, they generally ascribe to superior agency. It was believed, even so late as the time of Alexander,\* that the gods continued to enrich the physical dispensatory. Secondly, there was something as extraordinary in the operation as in the invention. Pharmacy is divided into the two general classes of evacuants and alteratives: the most efficacious of these latter, commonly called *specifics*, not working by any visible effects of evacuation, do their business like a charm. Thus, as the general notion of the divine original of medicine made the patient very superstitious,† so the secret operation of alteratives inclined the practiser to the same imbecility. Hence it is that so much of this folly hath overrun the art of medicine in all ages. Now the bestowing the origin of pharmacy in this manner, is abundantly sufficient to prove its high antiquity; for the ancients gave nothing to the gods of whose original they had any records: but where the memory of the invention was lost, as of seed-corn, wine, writing, civil society, &c., there, the gods seized the property, by that kind of right, which gives strays to the lord of the manor.‡

But now the diætic medicine had a very low original, and a well-known man for its author; a man worth a whole dozen of heathen gods, even the great HIPPOCRATES himself: and this we learn from the surest evidence, his own writings. In his tract *de Veteri Medicina*, he expressly says, that MEDICINE *was established from the most early times*; § meaning, as the context shows, *pharmacy*: but where he speaks soon after in the same tract of the *diætic medicine* (which he calls *τιχρηή ιατρικῆ*, as the pharmaceutic above, *ινατρικῆ* substantively) he says, *the ART OF MEDICINE was neither found out in the most early times, nor sought*

\* Cicero de Divin. lib. ii. cap. 66.

† Diis primum inventores suos assignavit, et cœlo dicavit; necnon et hodie multifariam ab omnibus medicina petitur.—Plin. Nat. Hist. lib. xxix. Proœm.

‡ The Rabbins, amongst their other pagan conceits, adopted this; and taught that God himself instructed Adam in the art of medicine;—"Et ductus Adam per omnes paradisi semitas vidit omne lignum, arbores, plantas, et lapides, et docuit eum Dominus omnem naturam eorum, ad sanandum omnem dolorem et infirmitatem."—R. Ebenezer. Which, however, shows their opinion of the high antiquity of the art.

§ ——— *ινατρικῆ* ἢ ὅλως ὀνόματι *ινατρικῆς*. cap. iii.



close girt likewise, and undergoing the same discipline. When this is over, they carry the body to be salted; there are men appointed for this business, who make it their trade and employment:—They first of all draw out the brain, with a hooked iron, through the nostrils, &c.—after this they hide it in nitre for the space of SEVENTY DAYS, and longer it is not lawful to keep it salted.”\* Diodorus agrees with Herodotus in all the essential circumstances of mourning and embalming. In this last he seems to vary in one particular: “They then anoint the whole body with the gum or resin of cedar, and of other plants, with great cost and care, for ABOVE THIRTY DAYS; and afterwards seasoning it with myrrh, cinnamon, and other spices, not only proper to preserve the body for a long time, but to give it a grateful odour, they deliver it to the relations,” &c.† All this operose circumstance of embalming, scripture history confirms and explains: and not only so, but reconciles the seemingly different accounts of the two Greek writers, concerning the number of days, during which the body remained with the embalmers: “And the physicians,” says Moses, “embalmed Israel; and FORTY DAYS were fulfilled for him (for so are fulfilled the days of those which are embalmed) and the Egyptians mourned for him THRESCORE AND TEN DAYS.”‡ Now we learn from the two Greek historians, that the time of mourning was while the body remained with the embalmers, which Herodotus tells us was seventy days: this explains why the Egyptians mourned for Israel threescore and ten days. During this time the body lay in nitre; the use of which was to dry up all its superfluous and noxious moisture;§ and when, in the compass of thirty days, this was reasonably well effected, the remaining forty, the *ἰφ’ ἡμέρας πλείους*; τῶν τριάκοντα of Diodorus, were employed in anointing it with gums and spices to preserve it, which was the proper embalming. And this explains the meaning of *the forty days which were fulfilled for Israel, being the days of those that are embalmed*. Thus the two Greek writers are reconciled; and they and scripture mutually explained and supported by one another.

But if it should be said, that though MOSES here mentions embalming, yet the practice was not so common as the Greek historians represent it, till many ages after; I reply that the company of Ishmaelitish merchants with their camels bearing spicery, balm, and myrrh, to carry down into Egypt,|| clearly shows, that embalming was at this time become a general practice.

\* Ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα σφίσι, ὡς αὖτις τοῖσι αἰ ἀπογίνηται ἐκ τῶν οἰκησίων ἀνθρώπων, τοῦ τις καὶ λόγος ἂν τοῦ θανάτου γινώσκῃ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν οἰκησίων τοῦτον κατ’ ὅν ἐκλάσσει τὴν κεφαλὴν πηλῷ ἢ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀποσπᾷ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος αἰσχροῦ τοῦ νεκροῦ, αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως στρεφόμενος, τύπτονται ἰσχυρομένους, καὶ κατασκευάζουσιν τοὺς μολοὺς ἐν δὲ σφίσι αἱ προσήκουσαι πᾶσαι. ἰτίεσθαι δὲ αἱ ἄνθρωποι τύπτονται, ἰσχυρομένοι καὶ ὅπως ἴσως δὲ ταῦτα ποιῶσιν, αὐτὰ ἐς τὴν ταρίχευσιν κομίζουσιν. Εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ κατεργασταί, καὶ τὴν ἰσχύν ἔχοντες ταῦτα.—πρῶτον μὲν σκαλῷ σιδηρῷ διὰ τῶν μυλωνίων ἐξάγουσι τὸν ἐγκέφαλον, &c.—ταῦτα δὲ ποιῶσιν, ταρίχευσιν λίτρῃ, κρήναντες ἡμέρας ἑβδομήκοντα· τλιῶναι δὲ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἐργασίη.—Lib. ii. cap. 85, 86.

† Καθόλου δὲ οὗτο τὸ σῶμα τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κεδρίῳ καὶ τισιν ἄλλοις ἰτιμελίας ἀξιοῦσιν ἰφ’ ἡμέρας πλείους ὡς ἐργασίη, ἵνα τα σμύρνη καὶ κιννάμωμον, καὶ τὰς δυναμίδας μὴ μόνον πολὺν χρόνον τηρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἰδιον ταρίχευται διακρίνοντες, παραδίδουσι τοῖς συγγενέσι.—Lib. i. Bibl. p. 58.

‡ Gen. i. 2, 3. Ἰ Τὰς δὲ εἰρήνας τὸ γένος κατατάκω.—Herodot. p. 119. || Gen. xxvii. 25

On the whole, what stronger evidence can any one require of a rich and powerful monarchy, than what hath been here given?—scripture describes Egypt under that condition, in the times of the patriarchs, and the egression of their posterity: the Greek writers not only subscribe to this high antiquity, but support their testimony by a minute detail of customs and manners then in use, which could belong only to a large and well policed kingdom; and these again are distinctly confirmed by the circumstantial history of MOSES.

But it is not only in what they agree, but likewise in what they differ, that sacred and profane accounts are mutually supported, and the high antiquity of Egypt established. To give one instance: Diodorus expressly tells us that *the lands were divided between the king, the priests, and the soldiery* ;\* and MOSES (speaking of the Egyptian famine and its effects) as expressly says, that *they were divided between the king, the priests, and the people*.† Now as contrary as these two accounts look, it will be found, upon comparing them, that Diodorus fully supports all that MOSES hath delivered concerning this matter. MOSES tells us, that before the famine, all the lands of Egypt were in the hands of the king, the priests, and the people; but that this national calamity made a great revolution in property, and brought the whole possessions of the people into the king's hands; which must needs make a prodigious accession of power to the crown. But Joseph, in whom the offices of minister and patriot supported each other, and jointly concurred to the public service,‡ prevented for some time the ill effects of this accession, by his farming out the new domain to the old proprietors, on very easy conditions. We may well suppose this wise disposition to continue till that *new king arose, who knew not Joseph* ;§ that is, would obliterate his memory, as averse to his system of policy.¶ He, as appears from scripture, greatly affected a despotic government; to support which, he first established, as I collect, a standing militia; and endowed it with the lands formerly the people's; who now became a kind of villains to this order, which resembled the Zaims and Timariots of the Turkish empire; and were obliged to personal service: this, and the priesthood, being the orders of nobility in this powerful empire; and so considerable they were, that out of either of them, indifferently, as we observed before, their kings were taken and elected. Thus the property of Egypt became at length divided in the manner, the Sicilian relates: and it is remarkable, that from this time, and not till now, we hear in scripture of a standing militia,¶ and of the king's six hundred chosen chariots, &c.

\* Lib. i. Bibl. † Gen. xlvii. ‡ See note N, at the end of this book. § Exod. i. 8.

¶ In this sense is the phrase frequently used in scripture, as Judges ii. 10.—“And there arose another generation after them, which *knew not* the Lord, nor yet the works which he had done for Israel.”—Here, *knew not*, can only signify *despised, set at naught*.

¶ Exod. xiv. 8, 9.

## SECT. IV.

HAVING thus proved the high antiquity of Egypt from the concurrent testimony of sacred and profane history ; I go on, as I proposed, to evince the same from internal evidence ; taken from the original use of their so much celebrated HIEROGLYPHICS.

But to give this argument its due force, it will be necessary to trace up hieroglyphic writing to its original ; which a general mistake concerning its primeval use hath rendered extremely difficult. The mistake I mean, is that which makes the hieroglyphics to be invented by the Egyptian priests, in order to hide and secrete their wisdom from the knowledge of the vulgar\* : a mistake which hath involved this part of ancient learning in much obscurity and confusion.

L. Men soon found out two ways of communicating their thoughts to one another ; the first by SOUNDS, and the second by FIGURES : for there being frequent occasion to have their conceptions either perpetuated, or communicated at a distance, the way of figures or characters was next thought upon, after sounds (which were momentary and confined), to make their conceptions lasting and extensive.

The first and most natural way of communicating our thoughts by marks or figures, is by tracing out the images of things. So the early people, to express the idea of a man or horse, delineated the form of those animals. Thus the first essay towards writing was a mere picture.

1. We see an example of this amongst the MEXICANS, whose only method of recording their laws and history, was by a picture-writing.† Joseph Acosta tells us, that, when the inhabitants of the sea-shore sent expresses to Montezuma with news of the first appearance of the Spanish navy on their coasts, the advices were delineated in large paintings, upon cloth.‡ The same writer gives us, in another place, a more particular account of this sort of painting : “ One of our company of Jesus,” says he, “ a man of much experience and discernment, assembled in the province of Mexico the ancients of Tuscuco, Tulla, and Mexico : who, in a long conference held with him, showed him their records, histories, and calendars ; things very worthy notice, as containing their figures and hieroglyphics, by which they painted their conceptions in the fol-

\* See note O, at the end of this book.

† In difetto di lettere usarono gl' ingegnosi Mexicani figure, e *geroglifici*, per significare le cose corporee, che han figura ; e per lo rimanente, altri caratteri propri : e in tal modo segnavano, a prò della posterità, tutte le cose accadute. Per ragion d' esempio per significare l' entrata degli Spagnuoli dipinsero un' uomo col cappello, e colla veste rossa, nel segno di casa ch' era proprio di quell' anno. Giro del mondo del Dottor D. Gio. Fr. Gemelli Careri, t. sesto. Ar<sup>o</sup>. Nuova Spagna, cap. vi. p. 37.

‡ — Quando era caso de importancia lleuauana a los Sennores de Mexico pintado el negocio de que les querian informar: como lo hizieron quando aparecieron los primeros navios de Espannoles, y quando fueron a tomar a Toponchan. Acosta's Hist. of the Indies, Madr. 1603. 4to. lib. vi. cap. 10.—Con este recado fueron a Mexico los de la costa lleuando pintado en unos panos todo quanto auian visto, y los navios, y hombres, y su figura, y juntamente las piedras que los auian dado.—Lib. vii. cap. 24.



lowing manner: things that have a bodily shape were represented by their proper figures; and those which have none, by other significative characters: and thus they writ or painted every thing they had occasion to express.—For my own satisfaction I had the curiosity to inspect a paternoster, an avemaria, the creed, and a general confession,\* written in this manner by the Indians: — To signify these words, *I a sinner confess myself*, they painted an Indian on his knees before a religious in the act of one confessing; and then for this, *To God almighty*, they painted three faces adorned with crowns, representing the Trinity; and, *To the glorious virgin Mary*, they delineated the visage of our lady, with half a body, and the infant in her arms; *To St Peter and St Paul*, two heads irradiated, together with the keys and sword, &c.—In Peru I have seen an Indian bring to the confessional a confession of all his sins written in the same way, by picture and characters; portraying every one of the ten commandments after a certain manner.”†

There is yet extant a very curious specimen of this American picture-writing, made by a Mexican author: and deciphered by him in that language, after the Spaniards had taught him letters; the explanation was afterwards translated into Spanish, and, from thence, into English. Purchas has given us this work engraved, and the explanations annexed. the manner of its coming into his hands is curious.‡ It is in three parts; the first is a history of the Mexican empire; the second, a tribute-

\* *Acosta's* words are,—*Y symbolo y la confession general*; which Purchas has translated, —and symbol or general confession of our faith. This is wrong: by *la confession general* is meant a general confession of sins, a formulary very different from the *creed*.

† Una de los de nuestra Compañia de Jesus, hombre muy platico y diestro, junto en la provincia de Mexico a los Ancianos de Tuscuco, y de Tulla, y de Mexico, y confirió mucho non ollos, y le mostraron sus Librerias, y sus Historias, y Kalendarios, cosa mucho de Ver. Porque tenian sus figuras, y Hieroglyficas con que pintauam los cosas en esta forma, que los cosas que tenian figuras, las ponian con sus propias Ymages, y para las cosas que no auia Ymagen propia tenian otros caracteres significatiuos de aquello, y con este modo figurauam quanto queriam—e yo he visto para satisfazerme en esta parte, las Oraciones del Pater Noster, y Ave Maria, y Symbolo, y la Confession general, en el modo dicho de Indio:—Par significar Aquella palabra, *Yo pecador me confesso*, pintan un Indio hincado de rodillas a los pies de un Religioso; como que se confiesa: y luego para aquella, *A Dios todo poderoso*, pintan tres caras con sus coronas, al modo de la Trinidad; y a la gloriosa *Virgen Maria*, pintan un rostro de nuestra Sennora, y medio cuerpo con un Ninno; y a *San Pedro y a San Pablo*, dos cabeças con coronas, y unas llaues, y una espada.—Por la misma forma de pinturas y caracteres, vi en el Piru escrite la confession que de todos sus pecados un Indio traya para confessarse. Pindando cada uno de los diez mandamientos por cierto modo.—Lib. vi. cap. 7.

‡ ‘Reader, I here present thee with the choicest of my jewels, &c.—a politic, ethic, ecclesiastic, economic history, with just distinction of time.—The Spanish governor having, with some difficulty, obtained the book of the Indians, with Mexican interpretations of the pictures (but ten days before the departure of the ships) committed the same to one skilful in the Mexican language, to be interpreted; who in a very plain style, and verbatim, performed the same. This history thus written, sent to Charles V. emperor, was, together with the ship that carried it, taken by French men of war; from whom Andrew Thevet, the French king’s geographer, obtained the same. After whose death master Hakluyt (then chaplaine to the English embassadour in France) bought the same for twenty French crowns; and procured master Michael Locke, in Sir Walter Raleigh’s name, to translate it. It seems that none were willing to be at the cost of cutting the pictures, and so it remained amongst his papers till his death: whereby (according to his last will in that kind) I became possessour thereof, and have obtained, with much earnestness, the cutting thereof for the press.’—Purchas’s Pilgr. pp. 1065, 1066. See Plate I.



roll of the several tributes which each conquered town or province paid into the royal treasury; and the third, a digest of their civil law, the largest branch of which was, *de jure patrio*.

This was the first, and most simple way of recording their conceptions;\* obvious to every one, and common not only to the North as well as South Americans, but to all mankind.†

II. But the inconveniencies attending the too great bulk of the volume in writings of this kind, would soon set the more ingenious and better civilized people upon contriving methods to abridge their characters: and of all the improvements of this kind, that which was invented by the EGYPTIANS, and called HIEROGLYPHICS, was by far the most celebrated. By this contrivance, that writing, which amongst the Mexicans was only a simple painting, became in Egypt a pictured character.‡

This abridgment was of three kinds; and, as appears from the more or less art employed in the contrivance of each, made by due degrees; and at three different periods.

1. The first way was, *to make the principal circumstance in the subject stand for the whole*. Thus when they would describe a battle, or two armies in array, they painted (as we learn from that admirable fragment of antiquity, the hieroglyphics of Horapollo) *two hands, one holding a shield, and the other a bow*;§ when a tumult, or popular insurrection,—*an armed man casting arrows*;|| when a siege,—*a scaling ladder*.¶ This was of the utmost simplicity; and, consequently, we must suppose it the earliest way of turning painting into an hieroglyphic; that is, making it a picture-character. And this is what we shall hereafter distinguish by the name of the CURIOLGIC HIEROGLYPHIC.

2. The second, and more artful method of contraction, was by putting the instrument of the thing, whether real or metaphorical, for the thing itself. Thus an *eye*, eminently placed, was designed to represent God's omniscience;\*\* an *eye and sceptre*, to represent a monarch;†† a *sword*, their cruel tyrant Ochus;‡‡ and a *ship and pilot*, the governor of the universe.§§ And this is what we shall call the TROPICAL HIEROGLYPHIC.

3. Their third, and still more artificial method of abridging picture-writing, was, *by making one thing to stand for, or represent another*,

\* Quant aux caracteres, ils n'en avoient point: et ils y suppleoient par des especes d' hieroglyphes.—Charlevoix of the Northern Americans, vol. v. p. 292. Lafitau gives us a specimen of these hieroglyphics. See Plate II.

† The same kind of characters Stahlenberg found upon rocks in Siberia in the province of Permia, and near the river Jenesei. Of which he has given a drawing. See Plate III. The author de Vet. Lit. Hunn. Scyth. p. 15, seems to admire this natural expression of things, as some uncommon stretch of invention. "Miratus ego sæpe fui caupones idiotas (nempe in Hungaria) istis, quibus aliquid credere hujusmodi ficto caractere inter debitores non subscribere tantum, sed longioris etiam temporis intervallo post, non secus, quam si alphabetario scribendi genere adnotati fuissent, promere, debitamque summam et rationes indicare potuisse; ita si debitor miles est, rudri quadam linea frameam aut pugionem pingebant; si faber, malleum aut securim: si auriga, flagrum, atque sic porro."

‡ See Plate IV.

§ Horapoll. Hierogl. lib. ii. cap. 5.—Ed. Corn. De Pauw, Traj. ad Rhen. 1727. 4to.

|| Id. lib. ii. cap. 12.

¶ Id. lib. ii. cap. 28.

\*\* Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. v.

†† Plutarch Is. et Ovir.

‡‡ Id. ib.

§§ Jamblichus. See note P, at the end of this book.

where any quaint resemblance or analogy, in the representative, could be collected from their observations of nature, or their traditional superstitions. And this was their SYMBOLIC HIEROGLYPHIC.

Sometimes it was founded in their observations on the form, or on the real or imaginary natures and qualities, of beings. Thus the universe was designed by a *serpent in a circle*, whose variegated spots signified the stars;\* and the sunrise by the *two eyes of the crocodile*, because they seem to emerge from its head;† a widow who never admits a second mate, by a *black pigeon*;‡ one dead of a fever, contracted by the over great solar heat, by a *blind scarabæus*;§ a client flying for relief to his patron, and finding none, by a *sparrow and owl*;|| a king inexorable, and estranged from his people, by an *eagle*;¶ a man who exposes his children through poverty, by an *hawk*;\*\* a wife who hates her husband, or children who injure their mother, by a *viper*;†† one initiated into the mysteries, and so under the obligation of secrecy, by a *grasshopper*,‡‡ which was thought to have no mouth.

Sometimes, again, this kind of hieroglyphic was derived from the popular superstition. Thus he who had borne his misfortunes with courage, and had at length surmounted them, was signified by the *Hyæna*,§§ because the skin of that animal, used as a defence in battle, was supposed to make the wearer fearless and invulnerable.

But it is not from analogy alone (the force of which will be seen more fully as we proceed), nor yet from the nature of the thing only (which in these inquiries is indeed the safest guide), that we conclude the hieroglyphics now described to be an improvement of an earlier picture-writing used by the Egyptians, and resembling that of the Americans. Ancient history records the fact. We are told, in that exquisite fragment of Sanchoniatho, preserved by Eusebius, that “the god Taautus, having imitated Ouranus’s art of picture-writing,||| drew the portraits of the gods Cronus, Dagon, and the rest, and delineated the sacred characters which formed the elements of this kind of writing:¶¶ for Cronus, particularly, he imagined these symbols of royalty, four eyes, two before, and two behind; of which, two were closed in slumber; and on his shoulders, four wings, two stretched out, as in the act of flight, and two contracted, as in repose. The first symbol signified that Cronus watched though he reposed, and reposed though he watched; the second symbol of the wings signified, in like manner, that even when stationed he flew about, and, when flying, he yet remained stationed. To each of the other gods he

\* Horap. Hierogl. lib. i. cap. 2.

† Lib. i. cap. 68.

‡ Lib. ii. cap. 32.

§ Lib. ii. cap. 41.

|| Lib. ii. cap. 51.

¶ Lib. ii. cap. 56.

\*\* Lib. ii. cap. 99.

†† Lib. ii. cap. 59 and 60.

‡‡ Lib. ii. cap. 55.

§§ Lib. ii. cap. 72.

||| The original is, *Πρὸ δὲ τοῦτον Διὸς Τάαυτος μιμησάμενος τὸν Οὐρανὸν*, which Vigerus thus translates, *Taautus vero Deus cum jam ante cæli imaginem efflueret*; and Cumberland, *But before these things the god Taautus having formerly imitated or represented Ouranus*:—This is wrong, *μιμησάμενος τὸν Οὐρανὸν* signifies here, imitating the art, or practice, or example of Ouranus; not painting his figure. So Plutarch de Fort. Alex. *Ἡεκαλία ΜΙΜΟΡΜΑΙ καὶ Πίεσις ζῆλον*.

¶¶ See note Q, at the end of this book.

gave two wings on their shoulders,\* as the satellites of Cronus in his excursions; who had likewise two wings on his head, to denote the two principles of the mind, *reason* and *passion*.”† Here we see that Ouranus practised a kind of picture-writing, which Taautus afterwards improved: Taautus, or Thoth, was the Egyptian Mercury; on which name and family all the inventions of the various kinds of writing were very liberally bestowed: this, here mentioned, as the improvement of Taautus, being the very hieroglyphics above described: and that, as before practised by Ouranus, the same with the simple American paintings.

Such then was the ancient Egyptian hieroglyphic ‡; and this the second mode of invention for recording men’s actions and conceptions; not, as hath been hitherto thought, a device of choice for secrecy, but an expedient of necessity, for popular use.

III. But the obscurity which attended the scantiness of hieroglyphic characters, joined to the most enormous bulk of picture volumes, set men upon contriving a third change in this kind of writing: of which the CHINESE have given us a famous example.

We have just observed, that the ancient Egyptian hieroglyphic was an improvement on a yet more ancient manner, resembling the rude picture-writing of the Mexicans; and that it joined contracted and arbitrarily instituted marks to images. The CHINESE writing at length went still further; it threw out the images, and retained only the marks; which they increased to a prodigious number. In this writing, every distinct idea has its proper mark; and is, like every real character, whether formed by *analogy* or *institution*, common to divers neighbouring nations, of different languages. § The shapes and figures of several of these marks,

\* Conformably to this account, the Etruscans and Greeks occasionally gave wings to the images of all their deities.

† Πρὸ δὲ τούτων Διὸς Τάαυτος μμησάμενος τὸν Οὐρανὸν, τῶν Διὸν ὄψας, Κρόνου τι καὶ Δαγῶνος, καὶ τῶν λατῶν διενύπνου τοὺς ἱεροὺς τῶν στοιχείων χαρακτῆρας· ἐπεισέεισι δὲ καὶ τῷ Κρόνῳ παρὰ τὸν βασιλείας, ὅρματα εἰσάρα ἐν τῶν ἱεροσθίων καὶ τῶν ἐπισθίων μιστῶν δύο δὲ ἰσχυρὰ μύσση, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄμων περὶ εἰσάρα, δύο μὲν ὡς ἰστάμενα, δύο δὲ ὡς ὑφαιμένα· τὸ δὲ σφύλλον δὲ, ἰσχυρὰ Κρόνος καμάρμενος ἔβλισσι, καὶ ἰγρηγορῶς ἐκαμᾶτο· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν περὶ ὁμοίαι, ὅτι ἀναπαύμενος ἴστατο, καὶ ἰστάμενος ἀνιπνᾶτο· τοῖς δὲ λατοῖς Διῶς, δύο ἐκάστη περὶ ὁμοίαι ἐπὶ τῶν ἄμων, ὡς ὅτι δὲ συνίσταντο τῷ Κρόνῳ· καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς, περὶ ὁμοίαι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡγεμονικωτάτου καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως.—Præp. Evang. lib. i. cap. 10.

‡ See note R, at the end of this Book.

§ —pero lo que se escribe en ella, en todas las lenguas se entiende, porque aunque las Provincias no se entienden de palabra unas a otras, mas por escrito si, porque las letras o figuras son unas mismas para todos, y significan lo mismo, mas no tienen el mismo nombre ni prononciacion, porque como he dicho son para denotar cosas y no palabras, assi como en el exemplo de los numeros de guarismo que puse, se puede facilmente entender. De aqui tambien procede, que siendo los Japones y Chinas, Naciones y lenguas tan diferentes leen y entienden los unos las escrituras de los otros; y si hablas sen lo que leen, o escriben, poco ni mucho no se entenderian. Estas pues son las letras y libros que usan los Chinos tan alabados en el mundo, &c.—Acosta, lib. vi. cap. 5.

Les Caracteres de la Cochinchine, du Tongking, du Japon sont les mêmes que ceux de la Chine, et signifient les mêmes choses, sans toutefois que ces peuples en parlant, s’expriment de la même sorte. Ainsi quoique les langues soient très-différentes, et qu’ils ne puissent pas s’entendre les uns les autres en parlant; ils s’entendent fort bien en s’écrivant, et tous leurs livres sont communs. Ces Caracteres sont en cela comme des chiffres d’arithmétique: plusieurs nations s’en servent: on leur donne différens noms; mais ils signifient par tout la même chose—l’on compte jusqu’à quatre vingt mille de ces Caracteres.—Du Halde, Descr. de l’ Empire de la Chine, tom. ii. p. 226. fol. ed.

however now disguised, do yet betray their original to be from picture and images ; as the reader may perceive by casting his eye on the specimen given us by Kircher ; \* for, that it is only a more contracted and refined hieroglyphic, we have the concurrent testimony of the best writers on the arts and manners of this famous people ; who inform us how their present writing was deduced, through an earlier hieroglyphic, from the first simple way of painting the human conceptions.†

But it may be worth our while to consider more particularly, the origin and introduction of these **ARBITRARY MARKS** ; the last advance of hieroglyphics towards *alphabetic writing*. We may observe, that substances, and all visible objects, were at first very naturally expressed by the images of the things themselves ; as moral modes and other ideal conceptions of the mind were more aptly represented by marks of arbitrary institution : for it required variety of knowledge, and quickness of

\* *China illustrata*, p. 227, et *Œdipi Ægyptiaci Theatrum Hieroglyphicum*, p. 12. See Plate V.

† *Primo siquidem ex omnibus rebus mundialibus primos Sinae characteres suos construxisse, tum ex chronicis ipsorum patet, tum ipsa characterum forma sat superque demonstrat ; siquidem non secus ac Ægyptii ex animalibus, volucris, reptilibus, piscibus, herbis, arborumque ramis, funiculis, filis, punctis, circulis, similibusque characteres suos, aliâ tamen et aliâ ratione dispositos formabant. Posteriores vero Sinae rerum experientia doctiores, cum magnam in tanta animalium plantarumque congerie confusionem viderent, characteres hujusmodi variè figuratos, certis punctorum linearumque ductibus æmulati, in breviorum methodum concinnârunt, quâ et in hunc usque diem utuntur.—Porro litteras Sinae nulla ratione in alphabeti morem, uti cæteris nationibus consuetum est, dispositas, neque voces ex literis et syllabis compositas habent, sed singuli characteres singulis vocibus et nominibus respondent ; adeoque tot characteribus opus habent, quos res sunt, quas per conceptum mentis exponere volunt.—Kircheri *China Illustrata*, p. 226.*

Au lieu d' alphabet ils se sont servis au commencement de leur monarchie, de *hieroglyphes*. Ils en peignent au lieu d'écrire ; et par les images naturelles des choses qu'ils formoient sur le papier ils tâchoient d'exprimer et de communiquer aux autres leurs idées. Ainsi pour écrire un oiseau, ils en peignoient la figure ; et pour signifier un forêt, ils representoient plusieurs arbres ; un cercle vouloit dire le soleil, et un croissant la lune. Cette manière d'écrire étoit non seulement imparfaite, mais encore très incommode.—Ainsi les Chinois changerent peu à peu leur écriture, composèrent des figures plus simples, quoique moins naturelles, &c.—*Le Comte, Nouv. Memoires sur l' Etat Present de la Chine*, Tome prem. p. 256. Amst. 1698. 12mo.

Des le commencement de leur monarchie, ils communiquoient leurs idées, en formant sur le papier les images naturelles des choses qu'ils vouloient exprimer ; ils peignoient, par exemple, un oiseau, des montagnes, des arbres, des lignes ondoyantes, pour exprimer des oiseaux, des montagnes, un forêt, et des rivières. Cette manière d'expliquer sa pensée étoit fort imparfaite, et demandoit plusieurs volumes pour exprimer assez peu des choses. D'ailleurs il y avoit une infinité d'objets, qui ne pouvoient être représentés par la peinture.—C'est pourquoi insensiblement ils changerent leur ancienne manière d'écrire : ils composèrent des figures plus simples, et en inventèrent plusieurs autres, pour exprimer les objets, qui ne tombent point sous les sens. Mais ces caracteres plus modernes ne laissent pas d'être encore de vrais hieroglîfes. Premièrement parce qu'ils sont composés de lettres simples, qui retiennent la même signification des caracteres primitifs : autrefois, par exemple, ils representoient ainsi le soleil par un cercle ○ et l'appelloient *Gé* ; ils le representent maintenant, par cette figure ☐ qu'ils nomment pareillement *Gé*. Secondement, parce que l'institution des hommes a attaché à ces figures la même idée, que ces premiers symboles presentoient naturellement, et qu'il n'y a aucune lettre Chinoise qui n'ait sa propre signification, lorsqu'on la joint avec d'autres. *Tsai*, par exemple, qui veut dire, *malheur, calamité*, est composé de la lettre *mien*, qui signifie *maison*, et de la lettre *ho*, qui signifie *feu*, parce que le plus grand malheur est de voir sa maison en feu. On peut juger par ce seul exemple, que les caracteres Chinois n'étant par des lettres simples, comme les nôtres, qui separement ne signifient rien, et n'ont de sens que quand elles sont jointes ensemble ; ce sont autant de hieroglîfes, qui forment des images, et qui expriment les pensées.—Du Halde, t. ii. p. 227.

fancy, to design these latter ideas by analogic or symbolic figures; which therefore can be supposed no other than an after-thought of a people more than ordinary ingenious, as the Egyptians, and who, aiming to set a price upon their ingenuity, made their meaning mysterious and profound.

We shall see presently, that as all nations, in their ruder state, had hieroglyphic images or analogic or symbolic figures for marking things; so had they likewise simple characters or notes of arbitrary institution, for *mental conceptions*. But, commonly, that sort only which they most cultivated, or for which they were principally famous, happened to be transmitted to posterity. Thus the Mexicans are remembered for their hieroglyphic paintings only; and the Peruvians for their knotted cords. But we are not therefore to conclude that the Mexican writing had no arbitrary marks,\* or that the Peruvians had no hieroglyphic paintings.† Real characters of both kinds had, at different periods, been cultivated in China, if we may credit the concurrent relations of the missionaries. In ancient Egypt, indeed, where hieroglyphic figures were so successfully cultivated as to give that general name to real characters, the use of marks by institution is more obscurely noticed. And for this a reason will be assigned. Martinus Martinius, in his History of China, tells us,‡ they had two sorts of characters; the one, marks by institution, which had been substituted instead of knotted cords, once in use amongst them, as in Peru, but much more intricate than the Peruvian knots: their other characters were figures resembling the Egyptian hieroglyphics, and representing the *things* they were designed to express. Now as the Chinese improved in arts and empire, it is natural to suppose they would much increase their marks by institution. The growing number of these characters, the sciences to which they were applied, and their commodious and expeditious use, would tempt them even to change their analogic figures into marks by institution, till their whole writing became of this sort. It is now such: and that the change was produced in the manner here represented, we may collect from the words and scheme of Martinus on the other side.§

But to all this it may be said, How then came it to pass, that Egypt, which had the same imperial fortune in a long flourishing dominion, should be so far from changing their analogic figures into arbitrary marks, that their arbitrary marks were almost lost and absorbed in analogic figures? For such arbitrary marks they had, as we may collect from their monuments, where we find them intermixed with proper hieroglyphics; and from Apuleius, where we see them described

\* Joseph Acosta, as we see above, expressly says, that "the Mexicans represented those things, which had bodily shape, by their proper figures, and those which had none, by other significative characters." —las cosas que tenian figuras las ponian con sus proprias ymagines; y para las cosas que no avia ymagen propria tenian otros caracteres significativos de aquello.

† The same Acosta says expressly, that, besides their *quippos* or strings variously knotted and coloured, they had paintings like the Mexicans.—Lib. vi. c. 8.

‡ Idem imperator [Fo-hi] Sinicos characteres reperit, quos loco nodorum adhibuit, sed ipsi nodis intricatiores.—Sin. Hist. lib. i.

§ See Plate VI.

in his account of the sacred book or ritual of the mysteries of Isis. “De opertis adyti profert quosdam libros, litteris ignorabilibus prænotatos: partim FIGURIS CUIUSCEMODI ANIMALIUM, concepti sermonis compendiosa verba suggerentes; partim NODOSIS, ET IN MODUM ROTÆ TORTUOSIS, capreolatimque condensis apicibus, a curiositate profanorum lectione munita:” the very same species of writing with that of the Chinese, described by Martinius, and almost in the same words: “Fohius characteres reperit, quos loco nodorum adhibuit; sed ipsi nodis intricatiores.”

Now this opposite progress in the issue of hieroglyphic writing, in Egypt and China, may, I think, be easily accounted for by the different genius of the two people. The Egyptians were extremely inventive: and, what is often a consequence of that humour, though here other things contributed to promote it, much given to secrecy and mysterious conveyance: while the Chinese are known to be the least inventive people upon earth; and not much given to mystery. This difference in the genius of the two nations would make all the difference in the progress of hieroglyphic writing amongst them. I have observed that the easiest, and most natural expression of the abstract conceptions of the mind, was by arbitrary marks: but yet the most ingenious way of representing them was by analogic or symbolic figures; as omniscience, by an *eye*; ingratitude, by a *viper*; impudence, by the *river-horse*. Now the Egyptians, who were of a lively imagination, and studious of natural knowledge, though at first, like the Chinese, they expressed mental ideas by arbitrary marks, yet, as they improved their inventive faculties by use, they fell naturally into this method of expressing them by analogic or symbolic figures; and their love of mystery disposed them to cultivate it: for these figures necessarily make the character mysterious, as implying in the inventor, and requiring in the user, a knowledge of physics; whereas arbitrary marks lie open to all, as requiring no knowledge but that of the institution. Hence we have a plain reason how it happened, that the Egyptian hieroglyphics, from very early times, consisted principally of symbolic and analogic marks, and that those Chinese hieroglyphics were turned altogether into marks; by institution. For as the Egyptians had soon learned to express abstract ideas by analogic signs, so the Chinese were at last drawn to express even material things by arbitrary marks.

In a word, the Chinese method of thus conducting hieroglyphic writing through all its changes and improvements, from a picture to a simple mark, was the occasion that the missionaries, who considered the history of their *writing* only by parts, have given us such different accounts of it. Sometimes they represent it like the Mexican pictures; sometimes like the knotted cords of the Peruvians; sometimes as approaching to the characters found upon the Egyptian obelisks; and sometimes again as of the nature of the Arabic marks for numbers. But each man speaks only of the monuments of which he himself had got information; and these differed according to their age and place. He, whose attention was taken up with the most ancient only of the Chinese monuments, did not



hesitate to pronounce them hieroglyphics, like the Egyptian; because he saw them to be analogic or symbolic signs, like the Egyptian; he who considered only the characters of later use denied them to be like the Egyptian, because he found them to be only marks by institution.

These imperfect accounts have misled the learned into several mistakes concerning the general nature and use of hieroglyphics themselves. Some supposing it of their nature to be *obvious marks* of institution; and others, that it required a very *comprehensive knowledge* of physics to be able to compose them.

M. Freret, speaking of the Chinese characters, says, "Selon eux [les Chinois] ces anciens caractères étoient tous fondés sur des raisons philosophiques. Ils exprimoient la nature des choses qu'ils signifioient: ou du moins la déterminoient en désignant les rapports de ces mêmes choses avec d'autres mieux connues."\* But he doubts whether entire credit is to be given to their accounts; for he observes, that "La construction d'une pareille langue demande une parfaite connoissance de la nature et de l'ordre des idées qu'il faut exprimer, c'est-à-dire, *une bonne métaphysique*, et, peut-être même *une système complet de philosophie*.—Les Chinois n'ont jamais eu rien de pareil." He concludes, therefore, that the Chinese hieroglyphics "n'ont jamais eu qu'en rapport d'INSTITUTION avec les choses qu'elles signifient." This is strange reasoning. To know whether the ancient Chinese characters were founded on philosophic relations, does not depend on their having a true system of physics and metaphysics, but on their having a system simply, whether true or false, to which to adapt those characters: thus, that part of the Egyptian physics which taught, that the viper tore its way through its mother's entrails, and that the skin of the hyæna preserved the wearer invulnerable, served full as well for hieroglyphical uses, as the soundest part of their astronomy, which placed the sun in the centre of its system.

Again, others have denied the Chinese characters to be properly hieroglyphics, because they are arbitrary marks and not analogical. P. Parennin says, "Les caracteres Chinois ne sont hieroglyphes qu'improprement. — Ce sont des signes *arbitraires* qui nous donnent l'idée d'une chose, non par aucun rapport qu'ils aient avec la chose signifiée, mais parce qu'on a voulu par tel signe signifier telle chose. — En est-il de même des hieroglyphes Egyptiens?" P. Gaubil says, — "On voit l'importance d'une histoire critique sur l'origine et les changements arrivés à plusieurs caractères Chinois qui sont certainement hieroglyphes. D'un autre côté, il y a des caractères Chinois, qui *certainement ne sont pas hieroglyphes*. Une histoire de ceux-ci seroit aussi importante." These fathers, we see, suppose it essential to hieroglyphic characters, that they be analogic or symbolic signs; and finding the more modern Chinese writing to be chiefly composed of arbitrary marks, or signs by institution, they concluded that the Chinese characters were

\* Mem. de l'Acad. t. vi. p. 609.



not properly hieroglyphics. Whereas, what truly denotes a writing to be hieroglyphical is, that its marks are signs for THINGS; what denotes a writing not to be hieroglyphical, is, that its marks are signs for WORDS. Whether the marks be formed by *analogy* or *institution*, makes no alteration in the nature of the *writing*. If they be signs for *things*, they can be nothing but hieroglyphics; if they be signs for *words*, they may be, and I suppose always are, alphabetic characters; but never can be hieroglyphics. However, it is but justice to these learned fathers to observe, that one of them, from whom the others might have profited, appears to have a much clearer conception of this matter.—“*La nature des hieroglyphes*,” says he, “n’est pas d’être des figures naturelles des choses qu’ils signifient, mais seulement de les représenter ou naturellement, ou par l’institution des hommes. Or tous les lettres Chinoises, ou sont des figures naturelles, comme les anciennes, du soleil, de la lune, ou autres semblables, ou sont des figures destinées pour signifier quelque chose, comme sont toutes celles qui signifient des choses qui n’ont aucune figure; comme l’ame, la beauté, les vertus, les vices, et toutes les actions des hommes et des animaux.”\*

On the whole, therefore, we see that, before the institution of letters to express SOUNDS, all characters denoted only THINGS; 1. By *representation*. 2. By *analogy* or *symbols*. 3. By *arbitrary institution*.—Amongst the Mexicans, the first method was principally in use: the Egyptians chiefly cultivated the second: and the Chinese, in course of time, reduced almost all their characters to the third. But the empires of China and Egypt long flourishing in their different periods, had time and inclination to cultivate all the three species of hieroglyphic writing: only with this difference; the Egyptians beginning, like the Mexicans, with a picture, and being ingenious and much given to mystery, cultivated a species of hieroglyphics most abounding in signs by analogy, or symbols; whereas the Chinese, who set out like the Peruvians with a knotted cord,† and were less inventive, and without a secret worship, cultivated that species which most abounds in marks of arbitrary institution.‡

In a word, all the barbarous nations upon earth, before the invention or introduction of letters, made use of hieroglyphics, or signs for things, to record their meaning: the more gross, by *representation*; the more subtle and civilized, by *analogy* and *institution*.

Thus we have brought down the general history of writing, by a gradual and easy descent, from a PICTURE to a LETTER; for Chinese marks which participate of Egyptian hieroglyphics on the one hand, and of alphabetic letters on the other (just as those hieroglyphics partook equally of Mexican pictures and Chinese characters) are on the very border

\* P. Magaillans, Relat. de la Chine.

† Les premiers inventeurs de l’écriture Chinoise, en s’attachant à des signes, qui n’ont qu’un rapport d’institution avec les choses signifiées, ont suivi le génie de la nation Chinoise; qui même avant Fo-hi, c’est à dire, dans la plus profonde antiquité, se servoit de cordes nouées en guise d’écriture.—Mem. de l’Acad. tom. vi. Freret.

‡ See note S, at the end of this book.

of letters; an ALPHABET invented to express *sounds* instead of *things* being only a compendium of that large volume of arbitrary marks.

Some alphabets, as the Ethiopic and Coptic,\* have taken in hieroglyphic figures to compose their letters; which appears both from their shapes and names. The ancient Egyptian did the same, as a learned French writer hath shown in a very ingenious and convincing manner.† But this is seen even from the names which express letters and literary writing in the ancient languages: thus the Greek words ΣΗΜΕΙΑ and ΣΗΜΑΤΑ signify as well the images of natural things as artificial marks or characters; and ΓΡΑΦΩ is both to paint and to write. The not attending to this natural and easy progress of hieroglyphic images from pictures to alphabetic letters, made some amongst the ancients, as Plato and Tully, when struck with the wonderful artifice of an ALPHABET, conclude that it was no human invention, but a gift of the immortal gods.

Here then we see the first beginnings of hieroglyphics amongst the Mexicans, and the end of them amongst the Chinese; yet we never find them employed in either of these places for *mystery* or concealment: what there was of this practice, therefore, in the middle stage of their cultivation amongst the Egyptians, we must needs conclude had some private or peculiar cause, unrelated to their general nature.

But the course of the Mexican empire was too short to improve a picture into an hieroglyphic; and the Chinese, which, in its long duration, hath brought this picture down, through hieroglyphics, to a simple mark, or character, hath not yet (from the poverty of its inventive genius,‡ and its aversion to foreign commerce) been able to find out an abridgment of those marks, by letters; it was the old and well established monarchy of Egypt, so propitious to arts and civil policy, which carried the PICTURE, through all the stages of its improvement, quite down to LETTERS, the invention of this ingenious people.§

Now such a general concurrence in the method of recording the thoughts, can never be supposed the effect of chance, imitation, or partial purposes; but must needs be esteemed the uniform voice of nature, speaking to the first rude conceptions of mankind: for the reader may be pleased to observe, that not only the Chinese of the east, the Mexicans of the west, and the Egyptians of the south, but the Scythians likewise of the north (not to speak of those intermediate inhabitants of the earth, the Indians, Phœnicians, Ethiopians, Etruscans, &c.) all used the same way of writing by picture and hieroglyphic.||

But to show still clearer, that it was nature and necessity, not choice and artifice, which gave birth and continuance to these several species

\* See note T, at the end of this book.

† See note U, at the end of this book.

‡ See note X, at the end of this book.

§ *Primi per figuras animalium Aegyptii sensus mentis effingebant; et antiquissima monumenta memoriae humanae impressa saxis cernuntur, et litterarum semet inventores exhibent; inde Phœnicas, quia mari præpollebant intulisse Græciæ, gloriamque adeptos, tanquam repererint, quæ acceperant.*—Taciti An. lib. xi. cap. 14.

|| See note Y, at the end of this book.

of hieroglyphic writing, we shall now take a view of the rise and progress of its sister art, the art of SPEECH; and having set them together and compared them, we shall see with pleasure, how great a lustre they mutually reflect upon one another; for, as St Austin elegantly expresses it, *Signa sint VERBA VISIBILIA; verba, SIGNA AUDIBILIA.*

I. LANGUAGE, as appears from the nature of the thing, from the records of history, and from the remains of the most ancient languages yet remaining, was at first extremely rude, narrow, and equivocal:\* so that men would be perpetually at a loss, on any new conception, or uncommon accident, to explain themselves intelligibly to one another; the art of enlarging language by a scientific analogy being a late invention: this would necessarily set them upon supplying the deficiencies of speech by apt and significant SIGNS.† Accordingly, in the first ages of the world, mutual converse was upheld by a mixed discourse of words and ACTIONS; hence came the eastern phrase of *the voice of the sign*;‡ and use and custom, as in most other affairs of life, improving what had arisen out of necessity, into ornament, this practice subsisted long after the necessity was over; especially amongst the eastern people, whose natural temperament inclined them to a mode of conversation, which so well exercised their vivacity, by motion; and so much gratified it, by a perpetual representation of material images. Of this we have innumerable instances in holy scripture: as where the false prophet pushed with horns of iron, to denote the entire overthrow of the Syrians:§ where Jeremiah, by God's direction, hides the linen girdle in a hole of the rock near Euphrates; where he breaks a potter's vessel in sight of the people; puts on bonds and yokes; and casts a book into Euphrates:|| where Ezekiel, by the same appointment, delineates the siege of Jerusalem on a tile; weighs the hair of his beard in balances; carries out his household stuff; and joins together the two sticks for Judah and Israel.¶ By these actions the prophets instructed the people in the will of God, and conversed with them in signs: but where God teaches the prophet, and, in compliance to the custom of that time, condescends to the same mode of instruction, then the significative action is generally changed into a vision, either natural or extraordinary: as where the prophet Jeremiah is bid to regard the rod of the almond-tree, and the seething pot; the work on the potter's wheel, and the baskets of good and bad figs;\*\* and the prophet Ezekiel, the ideal scene of the resurrection of dry bones.†† The significative action, I say, was, in this case, generally

\* See note Z, at the end of this book.

† If this be true, it must be the case at all times, and in all places, where language remains within those narrow bounds. Thus Lafiteau, speaking of the savages of North America, observes, *Ils parlent autant du GESTE que de la voix.*—*Mœurs des Sauvages*, vol. i. p. 482, 4to edit.

‡ Exod. iv. 8. And not for the reason given by Le Clerc on the place, ideoque earum [prodigiis] tribuitur, cum eorum opera Deus, non minus ac voce, suum hunc prophetam esse significaret.

§ 1 Kings xxii. 11.

|| Jer. xlii. xix. xxvii. li.

¶ Ezek. iv. v. xii. xxxvii. 16.

\*\* Ib. i. xviii. xxiv.

†† Ib. xxxvii. 2.

changed into a vision; but not always. For as sometimes, where the instruction was for the people, the significative action was, perhaps, in vision: so, sometimes again, though the information was only for the prophet, God would set him upon a real expressive action, whose obvious meaning conveyed the intelligence proposed or sought. Of this, we shall give, at the expence of infidelity, a very illustrious instance.\* The excellent Maimonides, not attending to this primitive mode of information, is much scandalized at several of these actions, unbecoming, as he supposed, the dignity of the prophetic office; and is therefore for resolving them in general into supernatural visions, impressed on the imagination of the prophet;† and this, because some few of them may, perhaps, admit of such an interpretation. In which he is followed by Christian writers,‡ much to the discredit, as I conceive, of revelation; and to the triumph of libertinism and infidelity;§ the actions of the prophets being delivered as realities; and these writers representing them as *mean, absurd, and fanatical, and exposing the prophet to contempt.*¶ But what is it they gain by this expedient? The charge of absurdity and fanaticism will follow the prophet in his visions, when they have removed it from his waking actions: for if these actions were absurd and fanatical in the real representation, they must needs be so in the imaginary; the same turn of mind operating both asleep and awake.¶ The judicious reader therefore cannot but observe that the reasonable and true defence of the prophetic writings is what is here offered: where we show, that information by action was, at this time, and place, a very familiar mode of conversation. This once seen, all charge of absurdity, and suspicion of fanaticism, vanish of themselves: the *absurdity* of an action consists in its being extravagant and insignificant; but use and a fixed application made these in question both sober and pertinent: the *fanaticism* of an action consists in a fondness for unusual actions and foreign modes of speech; but those in question were idiomatic and familiar. To illustrate this last observation by a domestic example: when the sacred writers talk of being *born after the Spirit*, of being *fed with*

\* See the case of Abraham, book vi. sect. 5.

† More Nevochim, p. ii. cap. xlv. which chapter he thus entitles, *Quod opera ea, quæ propheta dicunt se fecisse, non fuerint facta reverà et externè, sed tantum in visione prophetiæ*; and then goes on:—Scias ergo, quemadmodum in somnio accidit, ut homini videatur ac si in hanc vel illam regionem profectus esset, uxorem in ea duxisset, ac ad tempus aliquod ibi habitasset, filium, quem N. appellârit, et qui talis aut talis fuerit, ex ea suscepisset: ita se quoque rem habere in illis parabolis prophetarum, quas vident aut faciunt in visione prophetiæ. Quicquid enim docent parabolæ illæ de actione aliquâ et rebus, quas propheta facit, de mensura et spatio temporis inter unam et alteram actionem, de profectione ex uno loco in alium: Illud omne non est nisi in visione prophetica, nequaquam verò sunt actiones veræ et in sensus incurrentes, licet quedam partes præcisè et absolutè commemorantur in libris prophetarum.

‡ Vid. Joannis Smith, *Theol. Cantab. Dissertationem de Prophetia et Prophetis exærol.* Joannis Clerici, cap. vi. and his late followers.

§ See note A A, at the end of this book. || See note B B, at the end of this book.

¶ “Prophetic dreams and visions were so very lively,” says a learned writer, “and affected the imagination with such force, that the prophet himself could not at the time distinguish such visions from realities. Something of this kind we experience in our dreams and reveries.”—See Diss. on Balaam, p. 193.

*the sincere milk of the word, of putting their tears into a bottle, of bearing testimony against lying vanities, of taking the veil from men's hearts, and of building up one another; they speak the common, yet proper and pertinent phraseology of their country; and not the least imputation of fanaticism can stick upon these original expressions. But when we see our own countrymen reprobate their native idiom, and affect to employ only scripture phrases in their whole conversation, as if some inherent sanctity resided in the eastern modes of expression, we cannot choose but suspect such men far gone in the delusions of a heated imagination. The same may be said of significative actions.\**

But it is not only in sacred story that we meet with the mode of *speaking by action*. Profane antiquity is full of these examples; and it is not unlikely but, in the course of our inquiry, we shall have occasion to produce some of them: the early oracles in particular frequently employed it, as we learn from an old saying of Heraclitus: *That the king whose oracle is at Delphi, neither speaks nor keeps silent, but reveals by signs.*†

Now this way of expressing the thoughts by ACTION, perfectly coincided with that of recording them by PICTURE. There is a remarkable case in ancient story, which shows the relation between *speaking by action* and *writing by picture*, so strongly, that we shall need no other proof of the similar nature of these two forms. It is told by Clemens Alexandrinus: *They say, that Idanthura, a king of the Scythians (as Pherecydes Syrius relates the story), when ready to oppose Darius, who had passed the Ister, sent the Persian a symbol instead of letters, namely, a mouse, a frog, a bird, a dart, and a plough.*‡ Thus this message being to supply both speech and writing, the purport of it was, we see, expressed by a composition of *action* and *picture*.

II. As speech became more cultivated, this rude manner of speaking by action was smoothed and polished into an APOLOGUE or *fable*; where the speaker, to enforce his purpose by a suitable impression, told a familiar tale of his own invention, accompanied with such circumstances as made his design evident and persuasive: for language was yet too narrow, and the minds of men too undisciplined, to support only abstract reasoning and a direct address. We have a noble example of this form of instruction in the speech of Jotham to the men of Shechem; in which he upbraids their folly, and foretells their ruin, in choosing Abimelech for their king. As this is not only the oldest, but the most beautiful§

\* See Clem. Walker's story of the fanatic soldier with his five lights.—Hist. Indep. part ii. p. 152.

† Οὔτι λόγῳ, οὔτι πύπτῳ, ἀλλὰ σημαίνει. Plut. περὶ τοῦ μὴ χεῖρ ἱμμεῖσθαι, p. 992, which being a less precise and more equivocal mode of information, excellently well fitted the trade of oracles. The Lacedemonians [see Herodotus in Thalia] preferred it to speech for another reason, viz. to hinder their being misled by the illusions of oratory.

‡ Φασὶ γὰρ καὶ Ἰδάνθουραν τῶν Σκυθῶν βασιλῆα, ὡς ἱστορεῖ Φηροκύδης ὁ Σύριος, Δαρείῳ διαβάσει τὸν Ἰστρον πόλεμον ἀπυλοῦντα πῆμψαι σύμβολον ἀπὸ τῶν γραμμάτων, μῦν, βάτραχος, ὄρνις, ἰστὸν, ἄροτρον.—Strom. lib. v. p. 567.

§ See note C C, at the end of this book.

apologue of antiquity, I shall need no excuse for transcribing it: "The trees went forth on a time to anoint a king over them, and they said unto the olive-tree, reign thou over us. But the olive-tree said unto them, should I leave my fatness, wherewith, by me, they honour God and man, and go to be promoted over the trees? And the trees said to the fig-tree, come thou and reign over us. But the fig-tree said unto them, should I forsake my sweetness, and my good fruit, and go to be promoted over the trees? Then said the trees unto the vine, come thou, and reign over us. And the vine said unto them, should I leave my wine, *which cheereth God and man*, and go to be promoted over the trees? Then said all the trees unto the bramble, come thou, and reign over us. And the bramble said unto the trees, if in truth ye anoint me king over you, then come and put your trust in my shadow; and if not, let fire come out of the bramble, and devour the cedars of Lebanon."\*

How nearly the *apologue* and *instruction by action* are related, may be seen in the account of Jeremiah's adventure with the Rechabites;† an instruction partaking of the joint nature of *action* and *apologue*.

This was the birth of the FABLE; a kind of speech which corresponds, in all respects, to *writing by hieroglyphics*, each being the symbol of something else understood. And, as it sometimes happened, when an hieroglyphic became famous, it lost its particular signification, and assumed a general one; as the *caduceus*, for instance, which was, at first, painted only to denote the pacific office of Hermes, became, in time, to be the common symbol of league and amity: so it was with the *apologue*; of which, when any one became celebrated for the art and beauty of its composition, or for some extraordinary efficacy in its application, it was soon converted and worn into a PROVERB. We have a fine instance of this in the message of Jehoash to Amaziah, "Saying, *The thistle that was in Lebanon sent to the cedar that was in Lebanon, saying, Give thy daughter to my son to wife: and there passed by a wild beast that was in Lebanon, and trode down the thistle.* Thou hast indeed smitten Edom, and thine heart hath lifted thee up: glory of this, and tarry at home: for why shouldest thou meddle to thy hurt, that thou shouldest fall, even thou, and Judah with thee?"‡ Where we see plainly that this satiric *apologue* of the thistle and cedar was now become a proverb: of a like kind is that of the prophet; *Howl, fir-tree, for the cedar is fallen*;§ to denote the danger of the lower people, when their superiors cannot withstand the civil tempest.

III. But as speech improved into an art, the *apologue* was contracted into a SIMILE, in which men consulted closeness as well as brevity; for here the subject itself being still kept in sight, there was no need, as in the *apologue*, of a formal application: and how easily the *apologue* slid into the *similitude*, we may see by the following passage of Jeremiah, which, being something between both these forms of speech, communicates of either's nature: *The Lord called thy name a green-olive-tree,*

\* See note DD, at the end of this book.

† Ch. xxxv.

‡ 2 Kings xiv. 9, 10.

§ Zech. xi. 2.



*fair and of goodly fruit : with the noise of a great tumult he hath kindled fire upon it, and the branches of it are broken,\* &c.* This way of speaking by simile, we may conceive to answer to the *Chinese marks* or characters in writing.

Again, as from such *marks* proceeded the abbreviated method of *alphabetic letters*, so from the simile, to make language still more expedite and elegant, came the METAPHOR; which is indeed but a simile in little: for men so conversant in *matter* still wanted sensible images to convey abstract ideas. The steps by which the *simile* was contracted into the *metaphor*, may be easily traced by a careful perusal of the prophetic writings; there being no mode of speech more common than that compounded of both; where the *simile* is just about to be forsaken, and the *metaphor* to be received. In this manner are God's judgments denounced against the king of Assyria: "Therefore thus saith the Lord God, because thou hast lifted up thyself in height, and he hath shot up his top amongst the thick boughs, and his heart is lifted up in his height; I have therefore delivered him into the hand of the mighty one of the heathen:—and strangers, the terrible of the nations, have cut him off, and have left him: upon the mountains and in all the valleys his branches are fallen, and his boughs are broken by all the rivers of the land, and all the people of the earth are gone down from his shadow, and have left him. Upon his ruin shall all the fowls of heaven remain, and all the beasts of the field shall be upon his branches. To the end that none of all the trees by the waters exalt themselves for their height, neither shoot up their top amongst the thick boughs."† Quintilian considering this matter in an inverted order, yet makes an observation, where he speaks of *metaphors*, much to our purpose—*Continuus [usus] vero in allegoriam et ænigmata exit.‡* That is, as the allegory may, by degrees, be contracted into a metaphor, so the metaphor, by beating long upon it, may be drawn back again into an allegory.

As the *simile* slid into a *metaphor*, so the metaphor often softened into a simple EPITHET, which soon discharged all the colouring of the figure. This is observable in the words *decrepit*,§ *capricious*, and a great many others, when applied either to the body or mind. Which being first used in *simile*, then in *metaphor*, at length, by frequent use in *epithet*, lost the very memory of their original.||

Thus we see the common foundation of all these various modes of WRITING and SPEAKING, was a PICTURE or IMAGE, presented to the *imagination* through the eyes and ears; which being the simplest and most universal of all kinds of information (the first reaching those who could not decipher the arbitrary characters of an alphabet; and the latter instructing those who were yet strangers to abstract terms), we must needs conclude to be the natural inventions of rude necessity.

\* Jer. xi. 16.

† Ezek. xxxi. 10, et seq.

‡ Lib. viii. cap. 6.

§ DECREPITUS. Comparatio vitæ nostræ cum lucerna nota fuit Latinis, ut patet ex decrepitorum senum nuncupatione.—Prim. Scal. p. 48.

|| See note E E, at the end of this book.



And here it may not be amiss to repeat an observation made before, that the primitive and more simple way of expression, whether in *writing* or *speaking*, did not always straight grow into disuse on the invention of a more improved manner. Thus we see in scripture, the way of *speaking* by action was still used after the introduction of the apologue; and the apologue, after that of the simile and metaphor. And so again in *writing*; the first and simplest hieroglyphics continued to be used in Egypt (as we shall see) long after the refinement of them into those more artful ones called *symbolical*; and these, after that further improvement into characters or *marks* resembling the Chinese, and even after the invention of *letters*.

But how, as in these several modes of speech, so in the several forms of writing, men made a virtue of necessity, and turned that into ornament and mystery, which had its birth in poverty, and was brought up in simplicity and plainness, is to be our next inquiry.

It is now, I suppose, apparent, that the hitherto received opinion, that the Egyptians invented hieroglyphics to *conceal* their knowledge, and render it mysterious, is altogether without foundation. However, as it is very certain they did, at length, *employ* hieroglyphic writing to such a purpose, it will be proper to examine how this came about; how one of the simplest and plainest means of instruction came to be converted into one of the most artificial and abstruse.

To support what we have to say on this head with proper authority, it will be necessary to produce two important passages from Porphyry and Clemens Alexandrinus, concerning the several natures and kinds of Egyptian writing. On these, we shall regulate our discourse; which will, in its turn, contribute to illustrate these passages, hitherto, as we conceive, very imperfectly understood.

But it will be proper first of all to give the reader a general idea of the several natures and kinds of Egyptian writing, according to the order of time in which each was invented and improved; and for the truth, as well as perfect intelligence of the account, refer him to the whole of the discourse.

Egyptian writing was of four kinds: the first, **HIEROGLYPHIC**, and this twofold: the more rude, called *curiologic*; and the more artificial, called *tropical*: the second, **SYMBOLIC**; and this likewise was twofold; the more simple, and the more mysterious; that *tropical*, this *allegorical*. These two kinds of writing, namely, the hieroglyphic and symbolic (which went under the generic term of *hieroglyphics*, distinguished into *proper*, and *symbolic* hieroglyphics), were not composed of the letters of an alphabet, but of marks or characters which stood for **THINGS**, not words. The third **EPISTOLIC**, so called, as we shall see, from its being first applied to *civil* matters: and the fourth and last, **HIEROGRAMMATIC**, from its being used only in *religious*. These two last kinds of writing, namely, the epistolic and hierogrammatic, expressed **WORDS**, and were formed by the letters of an alphabet.

We come now to the passages in question. Porphyry, speaking of Pythagoras, tells us: that *he sojourned with the priests in Egypt, and learnt the wisdom and the language of the country, together with their three sorts of letters, the EPISTOLIC the HIEROGLYPHIC, and the SYMBOLIC; of which the HIEROGLYPHIC expressed the meaning of the writer, by an imitation or picture of the thing intended to be expressed; and the SYMBOLIC, by allegorical enigmas.\** Clemens is larger and more explicit:—*Now those who are instructed in the Egyptian wisdom, learn first of all the method of their several sorts of letters; the first of which is called EPISTOLIC; the second SACERDOTAL, as being used by the sacred scribes; the last, with which they conclude their instructions, HIEROGLYPHICAL. Of these different methods, the one is in the plain and common way of writing by the first elements of words, or letters of an alphabet; the other by SYMBOLS. Of the symbolic way of writing, which is of three kinds; the first is that plain and common one of imitating the figure of the thing represented; the second is by tropical marks; and the third, in a contrary way, of allegorizing by enigmas. Of the first sort, namely, by a plain and direct imitation of the figure, let this stand for an instance:—to signify the sun, they made a circle; the moon, a half circle. The second, or tropical way of writing, is by changing and transferring the object with justness and propriety:† this they do, sometimes by a simple change, sometimes by a complex multifarious transformation; thus they leave engraven‡ on stones and pillars the praises of their kings, under the cover of theologic fables. Of the third sort, by enigmas, take this example: the oblique course of the stars occasioned their representing them by the bodies of serpents; but the sun they likened to a scarabæus, because this insect makes a round ball of beast's dung, and rolls it circularly, with its face opposed to that luminary.§*

Thus these two ancient Greeks: but both of them being in the general mistake concerning the original of the Egyptian hieroglyphics, it is no wonder their accounts should be inaccurate and confused. The first mistake common to both, and the natural consequence of that false principle, is making the EPISTOLARY writing first, in order of time, || which was indeed the last. For that this was their sentiment appears from Clemens calling hieroglyphic writing *ἑστέατην καὶ τελευταίαν*, the last and most perfect kind. The second common mistake is their counting but three sorts of writing, when, indeed, there were four; as is discoverable even from their own reckoning: Porphyry naming *epistolic, hieroglyphic, and symbolic*; Clemens, *epistolic, sacerdotal, and hieroglyphical*; the first leaving out *sacerdotal*, which the second supplies; and the second *symbolic*, which the first supplies. Their other mistakes are peculiar to

\* See note F F, at the end of this book.

† See note H H, at the end of this book.

|| See note K K, at the end of this book.

‡ See note G G, at the end of this book.

§ See note I I, at the end of this book.

each: Clemens errs most in enumerating the several sorts; and Porphyry in explaining their several natures.

This latter writer names the three sorts, *epistolic*, *hieroglyphic*, and *symbolic*; and this was not much amiss, because the fourth, the *hierogrammatic*, or *sacerdotal*, not differing from the *epistolic* in its nature, but only in its use, he comprised it, we may suppose, under the *generic* term of *epistolic*: but when he comes to explain the nature of the *symbolic*, which is performed two ways, *tropically* and *allegorically*, he quite omits the first, and insists only on the latter.

Clemens, on the other hand, gives us these three kinds, the *epistolic*, the *sacerdotal* or hierogrammatical, and the *hieroglyphical*. Here *epistolic* is used as a specific term, and *hieroglyphical* as a *generic*; just contrary to Porphyry, who, in his enumeration, employs them the other way: but then, as to their nature, Clemens says, the *epistolic and sacerdotal were by letters of an alphabet, and the hieroglyphic by symbols*: the first part of the explanation is exact. We have observed that Porphyry judiciously omits to explain epistolary writing, as supposing it to be well known: but Clemens, who adds to epistolary, *sacerdotal*, a way of writing, though like the epistolary, by an alphabet, yet being confined to the use of the priests, not so well known, he with equal judgment explains their nature: but the latter part of his account, where he says hieroglyphic writing was by symbols, making *symbolic*, which is a specific term, to be equivalent to hieroglyphical, which he uses generically, is an unlucky blunder; of which this is the consequence, that proceeding to divide *symbolic*, as a generic term, into three sorts, *curiologic*, *tropical*, and *allegorical*; he falls into a direct contradiction: τῆς δὲ συμβολικῆς, says he, ἡ μὲν κυριολογῆται κατὰ μίμησιν, *the first kind of symbolic writing is by a plain and simple imitation of the figure of the thing intended to be represented*; which is directly contrary to the very nature of a symbol; a symbol being the representation of one thing by the figure of another. For instance, it was the bull Apis, and not the picture or image of Osiris, that was the *symbol* of Osiris: Clemens therefore, we conceive, should have said—*hieroglyphics* were written *curiologically* and *symbolically*; that the *curiologic hieroglyphics* were by *imitation*; the *symbolic*, by *conversion*; and that, of this *conversion*, there were two kinds, the *tropical* and *allegorical*; and then all had answered to his foregoing division. For the rest, he explains the nature of *curiologic* and *symbolic hieroglyphics* with sufficient exactness; save that the first instance he gives of *allegoric symbols* seems to belong to the *tropical*.

Thus we see how these writers contribute to the correcting one another's mistakes. What is necessary for the further clearing up their accounts, which, obscure as they are, are the best that antiquity will afford us, shall be occasionally considered as we go along.

Let us next inquire how HIEROGLYPHICS came to be employed for the *vehicle of mystery*.

1. The Egyptians, in the beginnings of their monarchy, wrote like all other infant nations, in a kind of universal character by picture; of which rude original essays, we have yet some traces remaining amongst the *hieroglyphics of Horapollo*; who tells us, that the ancient Egyptians painted a *man's two feet in water* to signify a *fuller*,\* and *smoke ascending upwards* to denote *fire*.† But to render this rude invention less incommodious, they soon devised the more artful way of putting one single figure for the mark or representative of several things; and thus made their picture an **HIEROGLYPHIC**.

This was the first improvement of that rude and barbarous way of recording men's ideas; and was practised in a twofold manner: the one more simple, by putting the principal part for the whole; the other more artificial, by putting one thing, of resembling qualities, for another. The first species was the **CURIOLOGIC HIEROGLYPHIC**; the second, the **TROPICAL HIEROGLYPHIC**; the latter of which was a gradual improvement on the former; as appears both from the nature of the thing, and from the records of antiquity. Thus the *moon* was sometimes represented by a *half circle*, sometimes by a *cynocephalus*.‡ The overflowings of the Nile, sometimes by a spreading *water in heaven and earth*, sometimes by a *lion*; § (a hieroglyphic, we may suppose, invented after they had learnt a little astronomy): a *judge*, sometimes by a *man without hands, holding down his eyes*, || to denote the duty of being unmoved by interest or pity: sometimes by a *dog near a royal robe*; ¶ for they had a superstition that a dog, of all animals, was only privileged to see the gods; and it was an old custom for their judges to behold and examine their kings naked. Now in all these instances we see the first hieroglyphic is *curiological*; the second, *tropical*.

The Egyptians therefore, employed, as we say, the *proper hieroglyphics* to record, openly and plainly, their laws, policies, public morals, and history; and in a word, all kinds of civil matters.

(1.) This is seen from those remaining monuments of old Egyptian wisdom, the **OBELISKS**.\* That very ancient one of Rameses, now standing before the pontific palace in Rome, and first erected to adorn the city of Heliopolis, is full of hieroglyphic characters; these Hermapion translated into Greek; and part of his translation is preserved in Ammianus Marcellinus. By which it appears, that the writings on this obelisk contained only a panegyric on Rameses, and a history of his conquests. But this was not the subject of one only, but of all the obelisks in general.†† We have seen already, and shall see further what Clemens Alexandrinus hath observed to this purpose. Diodorus saith, that *Sesostris erected two obelisks of very durable stone, each*

\* Horap. lib. i. cap. 65.

† Lib. ii. cap. 16.

‡ Lib. i. cap. 14.

§ Lib. i. cap. 21. || Plutarch. Is. et Osir.—Diod. Sic. lib. i.

¶ Horap. lib. i. cap. 40.

\*\* See note L L, at the end of this book.

†† O Ægypte, Ægypte, religionum tuarum solæ supererunt fabulæ, et æque incredibiles posteris suis; solaque supererunt verba LAPIDIBUS incisa, TUA FACTA NARRANTIBUS.—Apuleius, Elmenh. ed. p. 90.

twenty cubits high ; on which he engraved the number of his forces, the particulars of his revenue, and a catalogue of the nations he had conquered.\* At Thebes, Strabo telleth us, there were certain obelisks with inscriptions recording the riches and power of their kings, and the extensiveness of their dominion, stretching into Scythia, Bactria, India, and the country now called Ionia ; together with the multitude of their tributes, and the number of the soldiery, which consisted of a million of men :† and Proclus assureth us, that the Egyptians recorded all singular events, memorable actions, and new inventions on columns, or stone pillars.‡ Tacitus is more particular than the rest : for, speaking of Germanicus's voyage into Egypt, and his curiosity in examining its antiquities, he saith : *Mox visit veterum Thebarum magna vestigia ; et manebant structis molibus litteræ Ægyptiæ, priorum opulentiam complexæ ; jusque à senioribus sacerdotum patrium sermonem interpretari, referebat habitasse quondam septingenta millia ætate militari : atque eo cum exercitu regem Rhamsen Libya, Æthiopia, Medisque et Persis, et Bactriano, ac Scythia potitum. Quasque terras Syri Armenique et contigui Cappadoces colunt, inde Bithynum, hinc Lycium ad mare imperio tenuisse. Legebantur et indicta gentibus tributa, pondus argenti et auri, numerus armorum equorumque, et dona templis ebur atque odores, quasque copias frumenti et omnium utensilium quæque natio penderet, haud minus magnifica, quam nunc, vi Parthorum, aut potentia Romana, jubentur.*§ But to obviate at once all the cavils of Kircher against this concurrent testimony, I observe, in the last place, that it receives the fullest confirmation from that excellent treatise of Horapollo, which consists chiefly of the ancient and proper hieroglyphics ; all of them relating to civil life, and altogether unfit for the abstruse speculations of philosophy and theology.

(2.) This is further seen from that celebrated inscription on the temple of Minerva at Saïs, so much spoken of by the ancients ; where an infant, an old man, a hawk, a fish, and a river-horse, expressed this moral sentence, *All you who come into the world, and go out of it, know this, that the gods hate impudence.* The excellent Stillingfleet, who was in the common opinion that the Egyptians invented hieroglyphics to *secret* their profound wisdom, and that this inscription at Saïs was part of that wisdom, pronounces sentence from hence, on all their mystic learning in general :—"Certainly," says he, "this kind of learning deserves the highest form amongst the *difficiles nugæ* ; and all these hieroglyphics put together will make but one good one, and should be

\* Δύο δὲ λίθους ὀβελίσκους ἐν τοῦ σκληροῦ λίθου, πηχῶν τὸ ὕψος εἴκοντι πρὸς ταῖς ἱερὰς, ἐφ' ὧν ἐπιγράψι τότε μέγας τῆς δυνάμει καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν προσόντων, καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν κατακτημένων ἰνῶν.—Lib. i. p. 37. S. E.

† — ἐν δὲ ταῖς θύραις ἐπὶ τῶν ὀβελίσκων ἀναγραφὰι δηλοῦσαι τὸν πλοῦτον τῶν τότε βασιλέων, καὶ τὴν ἐκτετακταμένην, ὡς μέχρι Σκυθῶν, καὶ Βακτριῶν, καὶ Ἰνδῶν, καὶ τῆς νῦν Ἰωνίας διατετακταμένην καὶ φέρουσαν πλῆθος, καὶ στρατιᾶς περὶ ἱερὰς μυριάδας.—Lib. xvii.

‡ Λιγυστίας, δι' ἧς καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τῆς μνήμης αὐτῆς ἴσα πάρεστιν· ἡ δὲ μνήμη, διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας αὐτῆς ἀπὸ τῶν στελεῶν, ἐν αἷς ἀπιγράφοντο τὰ παραδόξα, καὶ τὰ θαύματος ἔχοντα γεγονότα, ὥστε ἐν πράξει, ὥστε ἐν ὑπόθεσιν.—Procl. in Timæum, lib. i. p. 31. f.

§ Annal. lib. ii.

for—*labour lost*.”\* But there might be much knowledge in their mystic learning, whatever becomes of the hieroglyphical inscription at Saïs; which was indeed no part of that learning, but a plain and public admonition in the proper hieroglyphic; so far from being a *difficult trifle*, to be secreted, that it was a very plain and important truth to be read and understood by the people; as appears from the place where it was engraved, the vestibule of a public temple.

And here KIRCHER’s visionary labours on this subject might have been pitied, had he discovered in any of his voluminous writings on the hieroglyphics, the least regard to truth or probability. This learned person had collected a fact from antiquity, which the notoriety of it will not suffer us to call in question, namely, that *the old Egyptians committed their profound and secret wisdom to the seal of hieroglyphics*. Egyptian wisdom was a matter of moment. But the learned Jesuit did not duly consider, whether any of the vehicles of that wisdom were yet in being; much less did he reflect that the same antiquity which tells us they had much profound wisdom, tells us likewise, that it was all collected in their sacerdotal† books, books long since lost; and that the ancient monuments of stone still remaining, were records of another nature. However, inflamed with the glory of a discoverer, he launches out in search of this unknown world; guided by some of the latest Greek writings, in conjunction with the earliest Egyptian hieroglyphics. The Greek writings indeed pretended (though very impudently‡) to ancient Egyptian wisdom; but these hieroglyphics constantly disclaimed it:§ by this direction he steered at large: and it is pleasant to see him labouring through half a dozen folios with the writings of late Greek Platonists, and the forged books of Hermes, which contain a philosophy, not Egyptian, to explain and illustrate old monuments, not philosophical. While Hermapion, Diodorus, Strabo, Proclus, Tacitus, and Pliny, are carefully avoided as false lights, which would drive him upon rocks and shallows.—But to proceed.

2. Thus far went the two species, of the *proper* hieroglyphic; which, in its last stage of the tropical, touched upon SYMBOLS (of which we are now to speak) they having this in common, that each *represented one thing by another*; in this they differed, that the *tropical hieroglyphic* was employed to divulge; the *tropical symbol*, to secrete: for all the several modes of writing by THINGS having had their progressive state, from less to more perfection, they easily fell into one another; so that there was but little difference between the *proper* hieroglyphic in its last state, and the *symbolic* in its first. For this method of contriving *tropical hieroglyphics*, by similar properties, would of itself produce refinement and nice inquiry into the more hidden and abstruse qualities

\* Orig. Sacr. lib. ii. cap. ii. p. 79.

† See Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. vi.

‡ Book iii. sect. 4.

§ Thus in one place he expresses himself:—Plerique ferè Herodotum, Diodorum, Plinium secuti, obeliscos non nisi historicas regum veterum commemorationes continere opinati sunt; quod tamen falsum esse, ex dictis luce meridiana clarius patet.—Pp. 269, 270, of his Œdip. Egypt. t. iii.



of things; which meeting at the same time with a temper now much turned to speculation\* on matters of theology and philosophy, would as naturally introduce a new species of zoographic writing, called by the ancients **SYMBOLIC**, and employed for **SECRECY**;† which the high speculations, conveyed in it, required; and for which it was well fitted by the enigmatic quaintness of its representations.

As the proper hieroglyphics were of two kinds, *curiological* and *tropical*, so were **SYMBOLS**; the more natural, simply **TROPICAL**; the more artificial, **ENIGMATICAL**.

(1.) **TROPICAL** symbols were made by employing the less known properties of things. The quality was sometimes used for the sake of a fanciful resemblance; as a *cat* stood for the *moon*, because they observed the pupil of her eye to be filled and enlarged at the full moon, and to be contracted and diminished during its decrease:‡ sometimes it was founded on the natural history of an animal; as a *serpent* represented the *divine nature*, on account of its great vigour and spirit, its long age and revirescence.§ How easily the *tropical hieroglyphic* fell into the *tropical symbol*, we may see by the following instances: *eternity* was sometimes expressed by the sun and moon, sometimes by the basilisk;|| *Egypt*, sometimes by the crocodile, sometimes by a burning censer with a heart upon it:¶ where the simplicity of the first representation and the abstruseness of the latter, in each instance, show, that the one was a *tropical hieroglyphic* employed for communication; the other a *tropical symbol* contrived for secrecy.

(2.) **ENIGMATICAL** symbols were formed by the mysterious assemblage of different things, as in the *caduceus*; or of the parts of different animals, as in a *serpent with a hawk's head*;\*\* or of things and animals together, as in a *serpent with a hawk's head in a circle*:†† the change of the *tropical* into the *enigmatic* symbol is seen in this. To signify the sun, they sometimes‡‡ painted a *hawk*, and this was *tropical*; sometimes a *scarabæus with a round ball in its claws*, and this, as we see in Clemens, was of the *enigmatic* kind. Thus at length, though by insensible degrees, these characters, called *enigmatic symbols*, became immensely distant from those called *curiologic hieroglyphics*: to conceive this, the reader need only cast his eye on two of the most celebrated of the Egyptian hieroglyphics employed to denote the *universal nature*; namely, the *Diana Multimammia*;§§ and the *winged globe with a serpent issuing from it*;||| the first is in the very simplest style, of a *curiologic hieroglyphic*; the other mysterious assemblage is an *enigmatic symbol*: but, under

\* Τάσους, δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι θεὸν προσαγορεύουσι, σοφία διαιτηγὰν παρὰ τοῖς Φοίνεσι, πρῶτος τὰ κατὰ τὴν διορίβειαν ἐν τῇς τῶν χυδαίων ἀπειρίας, εἰς ἐπιστημονικὴν ἱμπερίαν διέταξεν.—Sanch. apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. i. cap. 10.

† See note M M, at the end of this book.

‡ Αἱ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι αὐτοῦ κέραι πληροῦνται μὲν καὶ πλατύνονται δεκαῶσι ἐν πανσέλην, λεπταίνονται δὲ καὶ μακρογῶν ἐν ταῖς μινύσει τοῦ ἄστρου.—Plut. de Is. et Os.

§ Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. i. cap. 10. || Horap. lib. i. cap. i. ¶ Lib. i. cap. 22.

\*\* Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. i. cap. 10. †† Ibid. ‡‡ Horap. lib. i. cap. 6.

§§ See note N N, at the end of this book.

||| See the Bembine table.

the first figure, we must observe that the *universal nature* was considered *physically*; under the latter, *metaphysically*; agreeably to the different genius of the times in which each was invented.

But this was not all: the Egyptian hieroglyphic, in passing from an instrument of open communication, to a vehicle of secrecy, suffered another and more remarkable change. We have observed before, that the early Egyptian hieroglyphics resembled, in this, the Mexican, that what things had bodily form were generally represented by figures; what had not, by marks or characters.. Which we find verified in the most ancient of the Egyptian obelisks yet remaining. The reader need but cast his eye into Kircher, to see how exactly their hieroglyphics in this point resembled the *American*, published by Purchas, not only in their use, which, as Purchas\* and Diodorus† say, were to record the number of their troops, the particulars of their revenue, and the names of their conquered towns and provinces; but likewise in their forms and figures. But when now every thing was directed to secrecy and mystery, *modes* as well as *substances* were painted by *images*.‡ Thus *openness* was expressed by a hare, § *destruction* by a mouse, || *uncleanness* by a wild goat, ¶ *impudence* by a fly, \*\* *knowledge* by an ant, †† *aversion* by a wolf, ‡‡ *anger* by a cynocephalus, §§ &c. And to make the matter still more mysterious, one animal was made to represent many and very contrary moral modes; thus the *hawk* signified sublimity, humility, victory, excellence, ||| &c. On the contrary, and for the same reason, one thing was represented by many and various hieroglyphics; sometimes for an addition, out of choice, to confound the vulgar; sometimes for a change, out of necessity, when a hieroglyphic by long or frequent use was become vulgar or common.

Now the ancient Greeks, though they saw this to be a different species of writing from the proper hieroglyphic, and accordingly, as we find by Porphyry, distinguished them into two kinds, *hieroglyphical* and *symbolical*, yet confounding their original, in supposing both invented out of choice, have not accurately distinguished either their different natures or uses: they took it for granted that the *hieroglyphic*, as well as *symbol*, was a mysterious representation; and, what was worse, a representation of speculative notions in philosophy and theology; whereas it was used only in public and open writings, to register their civil policy and history:—These mistakes involved the whole history of hieroglyphic writing in infinite confusion.

But it is now time to speak of an alteration, which this change of the subject and manner of expression made in the *DELINEATION* of hieroglyphic figures. Hitherto the animal or thing representing was drawn out graphically; but when the study of philosophy (which had occasioned *symbolic* writing) had inclined their learned to write much, and variously; that exact manner of delineation would be as well too tedious as too voluminous: by degrees, therefore, they perfected another character, which

\* See p. 119. † See p. 146. ‡ See pp. 123, 124. § Horap. lib. i. cap. 26.  
 || Cap. 50. ¶ cap. 49. \*\* cap. 51. †† cap. 52. ‡‡ lib. ii. cap. 22.  
 §§ lib. i. cap. 14. ||| cap. 6.

we may call the *running-hand* of hieroglyphics, resembling the Chinese writing, which being at first formed only by the outlines of each figure,\* became at length a kind of marks. One natural effect which this running-hand would, in time, produce, we must not omit to mention; it was, that the use would take off the attention from the *symbol*, and fix it on the *thing signified*; by which means the study of symbolic writing would be much abbreviated, the reader or decipherer having then little to do, but to remember the power of the symbolic mark: whereas before, the properties of the thing or animal employed as a symbol were to be learned; in a word, this, together with their other *marks* by *institution*, to design mental ideas, would reduce the characters to the present state of the *Chinese*. And these were properly what the ancients call *HIEROGLYPHICAL*: † used afterwards on subjects which had employed the ancient hieroglyphic, as we may see by what follows. Dr Robert Huntington, in his *Account of the Porphyry Pillars in Egypt*, ‡ tells us, there are yet some ancient monuments remaining of this kind of writing;—"The Franks," says he, "call these pillars *Aguglias*, and the English, in particular, *Cleopatra's needles*; but the inhabitants content themselves with the general name of pillars. They have no bases or pedestals above ground; and if they ever had any, they must needs be very deep in the earth. The hieroglyphic characters, wherewith they are engraven, are probably the aboriginal Egyptian letters, long become obsolete, and they resemble the Chinese characters, each whereof represents a word, or rather an entire sentence; besides they seem to be written the same way, namely "from top to bottom." Apuleius, § speaking of his initiation into the mysteries of Isis, describes the sacred book or ritual (which we find was written partly in *symbolic*, and partly in these *hieroglyphic* characters of arbitrary institution, resembling the Chinese) in this manner: "He [the hierophant] drew out certain books from the secret repositories of the sanctuary, written in unknown characters, which contained the words of the sacred formula, compendiously expressed, partly by *FIGURES* of animals, and partly by certain *MARKS* or *notes*, intricately knotted, revolving in the manner of a wheel, and crowded together and curled inward like the tendrils of a vine, || so as to hide the meaning from the curiosity of the profane." ¶ The characters here described may be seen in almost every compartment of the *Bembine table*, between the larger human figures; and likewise on several of the *obelisks*, where they are disposed in the same manner. As we find these characters mixed with the *symbolic*, in the ritual of Apuleius; so in the *Bembine table* we find them mixed both with the *proper hieroglyphic* and the *symbolic*.

\* See note O O, at the end of this book.

† See note P P, at the end of this book.

‡ Philos. Trans. No clxi. p. 624.

§ Metamorphosis, lib. ii.

|| For a specimen of the marks thus described, see Plate IX. fig. 1.

¶ *De opertis adyti profert quosdam libros, litteris ignorabilibus prænotatos: partim figuris cunctis animalium, concepti sermonis compendiosa verba suggerentes; PARTIM NODOSIS, ET IN MODUM ROTÆ TORTUOSIS, CAPREOLATIMQUE CONDENSIS APICIBUS, et curiositate profanorum lectione munita.*

3. And now this contracted manner of hieroglyphic writing, called *hierographical*, will lead us, by an easy step, to the *third* species, called by Porphyry and Clemens the **EPISTOLIC**: for now we are come to one of those links of the chain which served to connect *hieroglyphic marks* and *alphabetic letters*; the first of which contained *curiologic* or *symbolic* signs of things; the other comprised signs of words by *arbitrary institution*. For those hieroglyphic marks which were **SIGNS OF THINGS BY ARBITRARY INSTITUTION**, partook of the proper hieroglyphics in being *signs for things*, and of alphabetic letters in being *signs by institution*. And the contrivance of employing these arbitrary marks to design all the primitive sounds of the human voice was inventing an *alphabet*. This was what the Egyptians called their **EPISTOLIC** writing. And, this, let me observe, the ancients agree, was invented by the **SECRETARY OF AN EGYPTIAN KING**. A circumstance which will much conduce to the discovery of the cause of its original.

Now, as it is evident that every kind of hieroglyphic writing, when employed in public business to convey the royal commands to leaders of armies and distant governors, must be unavoidably attended with the inconveniencies of imperfect and obscure information, it was natural for our *secretary* to set himself upon contriving a remedy: and this he found in the invention of the letters of an alphabet; serving to express *words*, not *things*; whereby all the inconveniencies of imperfect information, so fatal in nice conjunctures, were avoided, and the writer's mind delivered with the utmost clearness and precision: which too had this further advantage, that as the government would endeavour to keep their invention to themselves, **LETTERS OF STATE** were, for some time, conveyed with the security of our modern ciphers:\* and thus, being at first appropriated to the use of the cabinet, literary writing naturally acquired the name of **EPISTOLARY**;† which if you will not allow, no reasonable account, I think, can be given of its title.

That this was, indeed, the fact, appears from Plato's account of Theuth's **INVENTIONS**. He tells us that when Theuth came to consult his master, king Thamus, about communicating his discoveries to the people, *παρὰ τοῦτον ἔλθων ὁ Θεὺς τὰς τέχνας ἐπιδείξει, καὶ ἔφη δεῖν διαδοθῆναι τοῖς ἄλλοις Αἰγυπτίοις*, the king declared particularly against communicating the invention of **LETTERS**. But the reason he gives for the prohibition, we see, was not the principal and more immediate, as it rarely is amongst politicians, but only a secondary, and more remote; namely, a regard to the interests of hieroglyphic learning; for the king tells his *secretary*, that, if this secret should be divulged, men's attention would be called away from **THINGS**, to which hieroglyphics, and the manner of explaining them, necessarily attached it, and be placed in exterior and arbitrary

\* It was an ancient custom, as Diodorus tells us, for the kings of Egypt to read all the letters of state, themselves.—"Ἐσθὶν μὲν γὰρ ἱγερὸντα λαβεῖν αὐτὸν ἴδω πρῶτον τὰς πανταρχίας ἀποσταλμένας ἱστοτάς, ἵνα δύναται πάντα κατὰ τρόπον χρηματίζειν καὶ πράττειν εἰδὼς ἀκριβῶς ἕκαστα τῶν κατὰ τὴν βασιλίαν συντιλουμένων.—P. 44.

† See note Q Q, at the end of this book.

SIGNS, which would prove the greatest hinderance to the progress of knowledge.\* What is still more pleasant, and in the true genius of politics, even the reason given was thought fit to be disguised: for though there might be some truth in this; yet, without doubt, the chief concern of the Egyptian priests was to continue themselves useful; which they would be, while science lay concealed in *hieroglyphics*.

Thus the reader finds, that the very contrary to the common opinion is the true; that it was the *first literary writing*, not the *first hieroglyphical*, which was invented for *secrecy*. In the course of time, indeed, they naturally changed their use; *letters* became common, and *hieroglyphics* hidden and mysterious.

But now it may be said, that though the progress from a *picture* to a simple *mark* hath been traced out, step by step, and may be easily followed, till we come to that untried ground where ART takes the lead of nature, the point where *real* characters end, and the *literary* begin; yet here, art seeing a precipice before her, which seems to divide the two characters to as great a distance as at first setting out, she takes so immense a leap as hath been thought to exceed all human efforts: which made Tully say, *Summæ sapientiæ fuisse sonos vocis,† qui infiniti videbantur, paucis literarum notis terminare;‡* and many of the ancients to believe that LITERARY WRITING was an invention of the gods.

However, if we would but reflect a little on the nature of sound, and its unheeded connexion with the objects of sight, we should be able to conceive how the chasm closed, and how the passage from a *real* to a *literary* character was begun and smoothed out.

While the picture, or image of the thing represented, continued to be objected to the sight of the reader, it could raise no idea but of the thing itself. But when the *picture* lost its form, by being contracted into a *mark* or *note*, the view of this mark or note would, in course of time, as naturally raise, in the mind, the *sound* expressing the idea of the thing, as the idea itself. How this extension, from the idea to the sound, in the use of the real character first arose, will be easily conceived by those who reflect on the numerous tribe of words in all languages, which is formed on the sound emitted by the thing or animal.§

Yet the use to which this new connexion might be applied, would never be thought of till the nature of human sounds had been well studied.

But when men had once observed (and this they could not but observe early and easily, by the brute and inarticulate sounds which they were perpetually hearing emitted) how small the number is of primitive sounds,

\* Τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν μαθόντων λάτρε μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρίξει, μνήμη; ἀμιλιτησία: ἄτι διὰ πίστιν γραφῶν ἔχουσιν οὐκ ἄλλοτρίων τύπων οὐκ ἴδουσι αὐτοὺς ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἀναμιμνησκομένους: οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ, ἀλλ' ὁπαμνήσιος φαρμακὸν εἶρε, σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν οὐκ ἀλήθειαν παρέχουσιν.—Phaed.

† See note R R, at the end of this book. ‡ Tusc. i. 25.

§ For example, (to use the words of St Austin) when we say in Latin, *cris tinnitum, equorum hinnitum, ovium balatum, tubarum clangorem, stridorem catenarum*, perspicis hæc verba ita sonare, ut res quæ his verbis significantur. This class of words the Greeks designated by the name of ὀνοματοποιία.

and how infinite the words are which may be formed by varied combinations of those simple sounds, it would naturally and easily occur to them, that a very few of those *marks*, which had before casually excited the sensation of those simple sounds, might be selected and formed into what has been since called an alphabet, to express them all: and then, their old accustomed way of combining primitive sounds into words, would as naturally and easily direct them to a like combination of what were now become the simple marks of sound; from whence would arise LITERARY WRITING.

In the early language of men, the simple, primitive sounds would be used, whether out of choice or necessity, as significative of words or terms, to denote the most obvious of those things with which they perpetually conversed. These sounds, without arbitrary institution, would incite the idea of the thing, sometimes, as its *audible image*, sometimes, as its *natural representative*. Therefore the old *marks* for things, to which words of this original belonged, would certainly be first thought of for the figures of those *alphabetic* letters by the ingenious inventor of this wonderful contrivance. And, in fact, this which appears so natural has been found to be actually the case: the most early *alphabets* being framed from the outlines of those figures in the real characters, which, by use, in their *hieroglyphic* state, had arrived at the facility of exciting, in the mind, the SOUND as well as THING.\*

4. But this *political* alphabet, as at first it was, soon occasioned the invention of another called SACRED: for the priests having a share in the government, must have an early communication of the secret; and being now immersed in deep philosophy, they would naturally employ, in their hidden doctrines, a method so well adapted to convey abstract speculations with exactness and precision. But the various uses of an alphabet in civil business not permitting it to continue long a secret, when it ceased to be so, they would as naturally invent another alphabetic character for their *sacred* use: which from that appropriation was called HIEROGRAMMATICAL.

That the Egyptian priests had such a *sacred alphabetic character*, we are informed by Herodotus:—"The Greeks," says he, "write their letters, and make their computations with counters, from the left to the right; the Egyptians, on the contrary, from the right to the left.—They use two sorts of letters, one of which they called *sacred*, the other *popular*."† Diodorus is yet more express; "the PRIESTS," says he, "taught their sons two sorts of letters, the one called *sacred*, the other, the common and *popular*."‡ Clemens Alexandrinus goes still farther, and describes the very books in which this *sacred alphabet* was principally

\* Plate VIII.

† Γράμματα γράφουσι καὶ λογίζονται ψάφουσι, "Ἕλληνες μὲν, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀριστερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ φέροντες τὴν χυρὰ, Αἰγύπτῳ δὲ, ἀπὸ τῶν δεξιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀριστερά.—ἀφασίαισι δὲ γράμμασι χρίονται καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἱερὰ, τὰ δὲ, δημοτικὰ καλεῖται.—Lib. ii. cap. 36.

‡ Παιδίσκουσι δὲ τοὺς υἱοὺς οἱ μὲν ἱερῆς γράμματα διττὰ, τὰ τε ἱερὰ καλεόμενα, καὶ τὰ κοινοῖς ἔχοντα τὴν μάθησιν.—P. 51.



employed: and as the place, where he explains this matter, is very curious, and contributes to the farther illustration of the subject, I shall consider it more at length. It hath been shown that Clemens, in the passage quoted above, understood what he called the *sacerdotal*, 'IEPATIKHN, to be an *alphabetic* character. Now the same writer speaking in another place\* of the forty-two books of Hermes, which contained all the civil and religious science of the Egyptians, informs us, that ten of these books were called *sacerdotal*, and were the particular study of the chief priest, —πρωτάτης τοῦ ἱεροῦ τὰ 'IEPATIKA καλούμενα : βιβλία ἱερὰ καὶ ἱερογράμματα. These ten, therefore, were written in a *sacred alphabetic character*; though, as we learn from him in the same place, all the various kinds of *sacred characters* were employed in the composition of these forty-two books; for some were written in hieroglyphics; as he tells us, where he speaks of the sacred scribe, whose business it was to study those called *hieroglyphical*, —τοῦτον τὰ τε 'IEPOΓΛΥΦΙΚΑ καλούμενα. And, what is very remarkable, we find the subject of these to be of a popular and civil nature, such as cosmography, geography, the simple elements of astronomy, the chorography of Egypt, the description of the Nile, † &c. conformable to what has been laid down concerning the use and application of the most early hieroglyphics. Others again of these books were written in *symbols*, particularly those two which the chanter had in care:—ὁ ὑδὸς ἐν τι τῶν τῆς μουσικῆς ἐπιφειρόμενος ΣΥΜΒΟΛΩΝ· τοῦτον φασὶ δύο βιβλίου ἀνελθόναι διὰ ἐκ τοῦ 'Ερμού. Here then we have all the three species of sacred writing, the *hieroglyphic*, the *symbolic*, and the *hierogrammatic* or *sacerdotal*; the last of which, as we hold, was by letters of an *alphabet*.

But an ALPHABET for secrecy, and consequently different from the vulgar, was a thing in use amongst the priesthood of almost all nations. Philo Biblius, in Eusebius, speaking of Sanchoniatho's history, tells us, that the author composed it by the assistance of certain records which he found in the temples written in AMMONEAN LETTERS, ‡ not understood by the people: these Ammonean letters Bochart explains to be such as the priests used in sacred matters. § Diogenes Laertius informs us, from Thrasyllus, that Democritus wrote two books, the one of the *sacred letters of the Babylonians*, the other of the *sacred letters of the city Meroë*: ¶ and concerning these last, Heliodorus saith, that the Ethiopians

\* Strom. lib. vi. pp. 633, 634, edit. Colon. 1688.

† — σὺν τῇ γεωγραφίᾳ, καὶ γινωσκίᾳ, τῆς τάξεως τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ τῆς σελήνης, καὶ σὺν τῇ αὐτῇ πλανητικῇ χειρογραφίᾳ, καὶ τῇ τῆς Αἰγύπτου, καὶ τῆς τοῦ Νείλου διαγραφῇ. —Ibid.

‡ — ὁ δὲ συμβολὴν τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδύτων ἐνδεύουσιν ἀποκρύφους Ἀμμωνίαν γράμμασι συγκαταστήσας, αἱ δὲ οὖν αἱ πᾶσι γινώσκονται. —Præp. Evang. lib. i. cap. 9.

§ Ammonæorum, i. e. Ammanim—Abenezra in Levit. xxvi. 30. Tempia facta ad cultum solis. Quod verissimum; sol enim Hebræis est amma, unde amman templum solis, quæm solum cæli dominum crediderunt prisci Phœnices. Sanchoniathon, τοῦτον γὰρ (τὸν ἥλιον) διὰ τὸν ἱερωτικὸν λόγον οὐρανοῦ κύριον. Itaque hic præcipue cultus. Tamen, crescente superstitione, crediderim nomen Ammanim etiam ad alia delubra pertinuisse. Itaque hæc Ammonæorum seu Ammanim sunt literæ templorum, literæ in sacris receptæ.—Geogr. Sacr. par. ii. lib. ii. cap. 17.

¶ See note S S, at the end of this book.

had two sorts of letters, the one called *regal*, the other *vulgar*; and that the regal resembled the *sacerdotal* characters of the Egyptians.\* Theodoret, speaking of the Grecian temples in general, says that they had certain forms of letters for their own use, called *sacerdotal*; and† Fourmont, and others, suppose that this general custom prevailed among the Hebrews also.‡ Which opinion, a passage in Irenæus seems to support.§

And now we shall know how to deal with a strange passage|| of Manetho in Eusebius. This historian assures his reader, “that he took his information from pillars in the land of Seriad, inscribed by Thoyth the first Hermes, with *hierographic letters* in the *sacred dialect*; and translated, after the flood, out of the sacred dialect, into the Greek tongue, with *HIEROGLYPHIC letters*, and deposited in volumes by Agathodæmon, the second Hermes, father of Tat, in the Adyta of the Egyptian temples.” The original is in these words: ‘Εκ τῶν Μανθεῶ τοῦ Σερίου, ὃς ἐπὶ Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Φιλαδέλφου ἀρχιερεὺς τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ εἰδῶτων χρηματίσας ἐκ τῶν τῇ Σηριαδικῇ γῇ κεμένων στήλων ἱερᾶ, φησί, διαλέκτῃ καὶ ἱερογραφικοῖς γράμμασι κεκαρακτηρισμένων ὑπὸ Θεῶθ τοῦ πρώτου Ἑρμοῦ καὶ ἑρμηνευθεῖσιν μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς διαλέκτου εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνίδα φωνὴν γράμμασιν ἹΕΡΟΓΛΥΦΙΚΟΙΣ καὶ ἀποτεθεισῶν ἐν βιβλοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀγαθοδαίμονος τοῦ δευτέρου Ἑρμοῦ, πατρὸς δὲ τοῦ Τάτ ἐν τοῖς αἰνύτοις τῶν ἱερῶν Αἰγυπτίων.¶ Stillingfleet objects, with reason, to the absurdity of translating into the Greek tongue with hieroglyphic characters: and the author of the *Connections* well seeing that by γράμμασιν ἱερογλυφικοῖς must be understood an alphabetic character, says the words should not be translated *hieroglyphics*, but, *sacred letters*:\*\* he might as well have said *Gothic letters*, ἱερογλυφικά being always used by the ancients to denote characters for *things*, in opposition to alphabetic letters, or characters, composing *words*. It is certain the text is corrupt; as may be seen, 1. From the word γράμμασιν (which in strict propriety signifies the *letters of an alphabet*) its being joined to ἱερογλυφικοῖς, which denotes a species of *marks* for things. 2. From the mention of a *sacred dialect*, ἱερὰ διάλεκτος (of which more hereafter); for if these records were written in a *sacred dialect*, it is plain the character employed must be *alphabetic*; and so indeed it is expressed to be in the words ἱερογραφικοῖς γράμμασι, which immediately follow; and if, out of this dialect, it were translated into another, must not alphabetic characters be still employed? And

\* Ἐπιλεγόμεν τὴν ταυτίαν γράμμασιν Αἰθιοπικοῖς, οὐ δημοτικοῖς, ἀλλὰ βασιλικοῖς ἱστιγμένῃ, καὶ τὰς Αἰγυπτίαν ἹΕΡΑΤΙΚΟΙΣ ΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΙΣ ὀνομαζόμεναι.—Lib. iv.

† Ἐν ταῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς ναοῖς ἴδωσι τινὲς ἡσαν χαρακτῆρες γραμμάτων, οἷς ἹΕΡΑΤΙΚΟΤΣ προσεφάριον.—In Genes. Qu. 61.

‡ Cette coutume de la plupart des nations orientales, d’avoir des caracteres sacres, et des caracteres profanes ou d’un usage plus vulgaire, étoit aussi chez les Hebreux.—Reflex. Crit. vol. i. p. 36.

§ Antiquæ et primæ Hebræorum literæ, quæ SACERDOTALES nuncupatæ, decem quidem fuerenumero.—Adver. Hæc. lib. ii. cap. 41.

|| See Stillingfleet’s Orig. Sac. book i. chap. ii. sect. 11. and Mr Shuckford’s Connections, vol. i. ed. 2. p. 247.

¶ Euseb. Chron. ed. Scal. Amst. 1658. p. 6.

\*\* Connection of the Sacred and Profane History, vol. i. p. 274, and vol. ii. p. 234.

now we see not only that the present reading is wrong, but are led, by this last observation, to the right; the passage being without all question to be read thus:—μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμόν ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς διαλέκτου εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνίδα φωνὴν γράμμασιν ἹΕΡΟΓΡΑΦΙΚΟΙΣ καὶ ἀποτιθεῖσθαι ἐν βίβλοις, καὶ γράμμασιν ἹΕΡΟΓΡΑΦΙΚΟΙΣ, in speaking of the translation, being the very words just before employed in speaking of the original; and with great propriety: for *ιερογραφικὰ* was used by the ancients as a generic term, to signify as well *sacred letters* composing *words*, as *sacred marks* standing for *things*; *ιερολυφικὰ* not so, but denoting only *marks for things*: so that the plain and sensible meaning of the passage is, that a work, written by the first Hermes, in the *sacred dialect*, and *sacred letters*, was translated, by the second Hermes, into the *Greek dialect*; the original *sacred letters* being still employed. And the reason is evident; the Greek translation was for the use of the Egyptians: but such would be soonest invited to the study of a foreign dialect when written in their own letters: a common inducement for translators into a foreign language, to preserve the original character. Besides, this version was not for the Egyptians in general, but for the priests only; and therefore their peculiar character was preserved.

We now begin to see that the whole extravagance in this account, which made it rejected by the critics with so much contempt, is only in the high antiquity given to the fact; and this, the very circumstance of the fact refutes: for it not only tells us of *sacred alphabetic letters*, which we have shown to be of late use amongst the Egyptians, but likewise of a *sacred dialect*, which certainly was still later: and, if I be not much mistaken, a passage in Herodotus will lead us to the time when this translation was made. The historian tells us, that when Psammitichus, by the assistance of the Ionians and Carians, had subdued all Egypt, he placed these Greek adventurers on both sides of the Nile; where he assigned them lands and habitations, and sent among them Egyptian youths to be instructed in the Greek language; from whence sprung the state-interpreters for that tongue:\* Thus far the historian; from whose account of Psammitichus's project it appears, that his purpose was to establish a constant intercourse with the Grecian nations. The youth picked out for interpreters were, without question of the priesthood, all letters and learning residing in that order; which had likewise a great share in the public administration. And now the priesthood having the Greek tongue amongst them, which its use in public affairs would make them diligently cultivate; where was the wonder that, about this time, some of these interpreters, *ερμηνίαι*, should employ themselves in translating the *sacred* Egyptian records into the Grecian language?

\* —Τῶν δ' ἱεροῦ καὶ τοῦ Κασίου, τοῖσι συγκαταργασαμένοισι αὐτῷ, ὁ Ψαμμίτιχος δίδωσι χεῖρας ἱουδαῖοις ἀντίοις ἀλλήλων, τοῦ Νείλου τὸ μέσον ἔχοντας.—καὶ δὴ παῖδας παρίστασι αὐτοῖσι Αἰγυπτίους, τὴν Ἑλλάδα γλῶσσαν ἐκδιδάσκειν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων ἐκμαθόντων τὴν Ἑλλάδα γλῶσσαν, οἱ οὖν Ἑρμηνίαι ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ γίνονται.—Euterp. lib. ii. cap. 154. Hence it appears, that the learned Dr Prideaux was mistaken when he said—*But the worst of it is, the ancient Egyptians did not speak Greek; the Ptolemies first brought that language amongst them.*—Connection, part ii. lib. i. p. 12.

But then as to the precise time of the invention of EGYPTIAN LETTERS, it can never be so much as guessed at; because *hieroglyphics* continued to be in use long after that time; particularly on their public monuments, where we find no appearance of alphabetic characters. However, that *letters* were very early, we have shown above, as well from other circumstances, as from this, the giving the invention of them to the gods.\*

Those who are for deriving all civil improvements from the line of *Abraham*, of course, bestow upon it the invention of an ALPHABET. But as this fancy is only amongst the loose ends of an hypothesis, without any foundation in scripture, these critics differ much about the time. Some suppose *letters* to have been in use amongst the patriarchs; and, by them, transmitted to the Egyptians; but there are such strong objections to this opinion (to mention no other than the patriarch's sending verbal messages where it was more natural, as well as more expedient to send them written), that others have thought proper to bring down the time to that of MOSES,† when GOD, they say, taught him the use of *alphabetic* letters, in the exemplar of the two tables written, as the text assures us, *with the finger of GOD*. But how, from words, which at most only imply that the ten commandments were miraculously engraved as well as dictated, it can be concluded that letters were then first invented, I have not logic enough to find out. A common reader would be apt to infer from it, that letters were now well known to the Israelites, as GOD had thought fit to deliver the first elements of their religion in that kind of writing; I say, he would be thus apt to infer, though MOSES had never spoken of them on other occasions (which he hath done) as of things in familiar use:‡ but if GOD was indeed the revealer of the artifice, how happened it that the history of so important a circumstance was not recorded? for, as we shall see presently, the *memory* of it would have been one of the strongest barriers to idolatry.

However, though I think it next to certain that MOSES brought letters, with the rest of his learning, from Egypt, yet I could be easily persuaded to believe that he both enlarged the alphabet, and altered the shapes of the letters.§

(1.) The Hebrew alphabet, which he employed in the composition of the Pentateuch, is considerably fuller than that which Cadmus brought into Greece. Cadmus was of Thebes in Egypt; he sojourned in Syria, and went from thence into Greece: his country shows that his letters were Egyptian; and this, their difference in number from the Hebrew, sufficiently confirms; Cadmus having only sixteen, and the Hebrews two and twenty.

(2.) That MOSES likewise altered the shape of the Egyptian letters I think probable; all hieroglyphic writing was absolutely forbidden by the second commandment, and with a view worthy the divine wisdom; hieroglyphics being, as we shall see hereafter, the great source of their idola-

\* See pp. 32, 33, of this volume.

† See note U U, at the end of this book.

‡ See note T T, at the end of this book.

§ See note X X, at the end of this book.

tries and superstitions. But now alphabetic letters (which henceforth could be only used amongst the Hebrews) being taken by the Egyptians\* from their hieroglyphic figures, retained, as was natural, much of the shapes of those characters: to cut off therefore all occasion of danger from symbolic images, Moses, as I suppose, altered the shapes of the Egyptian letters, and reduced them into something like those simple forms in which we now find them. Those who in much later ages converted the northern pagans to the Christian faith observed the same caution. For the characters of the northern alphabet, called Runic, having been abused to magical superstition, were then changed to the *Roman*.—Tantas in his *Runis* (says Sheringham) latere virtutes Gothi ante fidem susceptam rati sunt, ut sive hostium caput diris sacrandum, sive pestis morbique amoliendi, sive aliud opus suscipiendum se incantationibus *Runisque* muniebant—Post fidem vero susceptam *Runæ*, qui incantationibus præstigiisque magicis in tantum adhibitæ fuerint, adeo fastidiri cœperunt, ut multi libri, multaque antiqua monumenta exinde præpostero zelo dejecta atque deleta sunt: unde historia Getica magnum detrimentum clademque accepit. Tandem vero, teste Loccenio, Sigfridi episcopi Britannici opera (papa etiam Romano suam operam præstante) eò res devenit ut *Runæ* in Sueciâ, A. D. M L., penitus abolerentur; et characteres Latini substituerentur.†

This account will reconcile the differing systems of Marsham and Renaudot; one of whom contends,‡ that the letters which Cadmus brought into Greece were Egyptian: the other, that they were Phenician;§ and both of them appeal to the authority of Herodotus; who says plainly, “that the *alphabet brought by Cadmus into Greece was Egyptian*; and yet, speaking of the three most ancient inscriptions in Greece, he says, *they were in Phenician characters*, which very much resembled the Ionic:” for if what has been here supposed be allowed, then the alphabet which Cadmus carried with him was doubtless of Moses’s invention, as to the *form*, but Egyptian, as to the *power*. It may be just worth observing, that Renaudot’s discourse is full of paralogisms, which this solution detects.

(3.) To this let me add another consideration. The vowel-points (as seems now to be generally agreed on) were added since the Jews ceased to be a nation. The Hebrew language was originally, and so continued to be for a long time, written without them. Now if God first taught Moses an alphabet, can we believe that the vowels would have been thus generally omitted? But suppose Moses learned his alphabet of the Egyptians, and only made it fuller, and altered the form of the letters, we may easily give a good account of the omission. The Egyptian alphabet, as we observed, was invented for precision, and used for secrecy. Both ends were answered by an alphabet with hardly any vowels.

\* See p. 26 of this volume.

‡ Can. Chron.

† De Ang. Gent. Orig. pp. 292, 293.

§ Sur l’Origine des Lettres Grecques.

Thus we see that the form of alphabetic characters was a matter of much importance to the Hebrews, as to the integrity of their religion. If therefore God was the immediate author of them, it is difficult to suppose that Moses could omit to record the history of their invention; such a history being the best sanction to recommend their use; and the best security against a return to the idolatrous practice of hieroglyphic writing; to which this people, so fond of Egyptian manners, were violently inclined.

But we have not yet done with Manetho; the last circumstance opening the way to another discovery of great importance in the Egyptian antiquities: for by this passage we find they had not only *sacred characters and letters*, but a *sacred DIALECT* or *language* also; for what he here calls *ἱερὰ διάλεκτος*, in another place (where he interprets a certain word in this language) he calls *ἱερὰ γλῶσσα*.<sup>\*</sup> It might perhaps be imagined that this *sacred dialect* was only the more ancient Egyptian language; which being now grown into disuse, was preserved amongst the priesthood: but if we consider the small and slow change to which the Eastern languages were subject; especially that of a people who admitted so little of foreign manners, we can scarce believe this to have been the case. Besides, the *sacred dialect* was used for secrecy (being known only to the priests) which could never be the condition of a national language, how obsolete soever we may suppose it to be grown. All this considered, I take the *sacred dialect* to have been a language of their own framing: and one of their latest expedients for keeping their science to themselves. We have shown how, for the sake of exactness, as they grew more speculative, they invented an alphabet to express their conceptions by marks for *words*, instead of marks for *things*: but the simple mystery of a peculiar alphabet, employed in a common tongue, would be soon detected; they therefore, as now it appears, invented a peculiar language for the use of their alphabet; and thus, under a double cover, effectually secured their hidden science. The way of framing the *sacred dialect*, I suppose, to be this: they called things by the names of their hieroglyphical representatives: thus *ΥΚ* in the Egyptian tongue signifying a serpent; and a serpent, in their hieroglyphics, denoting a king,† *ΥΚ*, as Manetho informs us above, signified a king in the *sacred dialect*: and in this manner, their hieroglyphics became a sufficient fund for a new language.

On the whole then, it appears that the Egyptian priests had these three methods of secreting their recorded knowledge; by **HIEROGLYPHIC SYMBOLS**, by a **SACERDOTAL ALPHABET**, and by a **SACRED DIALECT**. In explaining their several natures, and distinguishing them from the *proper hieroglyphic*, I have endeavoured to disembroil a subject which

<sup>\*</sup> Ἐκαλῶτε δὲ τὰ σύμπεπαι αὐτῶν ἱεροὺς ΥΚΣΩΣ, τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι βασιλῆς πομίνης· τὸ γὰρ ΥΚ καὶ ἹΕΡΑΝ ΓΛΩΣΣΑΝ βασιλῆα σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ ΣΩΣ πομὴν ἔστι, καὶ πομίνης κατὰ τὸν ΚΟΙΝΗΝ ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΝ, καὶ οὕτω συντιθέμενοι ᾗ γίνεται ΥΚΣΩΣ.—Apud Joseph. cont. Ap. lib. i. cap. 14.

† Hieropolit., lib. i. cap. 50, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64.



seems to have perplexed even the ancients themselves; who, in their accounts of the Egyptian literature, perpetually confound the several species of *sacred writing* with one another. What greatly contributed to this confusion, I presume, was the sacerdotal practice of promiscuously using, in one and the same book or literary monument, the several various species of *sacred writing*; that is to say, the *proper hieroglyphic*, the *symbolic*, and the *hierogrammatic*; as was done in composing the Bembine table, and the mystic ritual described by Apuleius.

Thus we find how it happened that that which had its origin in *necessity*, came, in time, to be employed for *secrecy*, and was at length improved into an *ornament*. But now, in the incessant revolutions of things, this imagery, which was at first invented for open communication, and was from thence converted into mystery, at length resumed its primitive use; and, in the flourishing ages of Greece and Rome, was employed in their monuments and medals as the shortest and plainest method of conveying men's conceits; and a *SYMBOL*, which, in Egypt, was pregnant with profound wisdom, was in those places the vocabulary of the people.

To illustrate these several changes and revolutions, we shall once again take up our instance from *LANGUAGE* (which still, in all its minuter alterations and improvements, ran parallel with *WRITING*); and show, how the original expedient, to communicate our thoughts in converse, the rude effort of *necessity*, came in time, like the first hieroglyphics, to be turned into *mystery*, and afterwards improved into the arts of *elegance* and *persuasion*.

1. It hath been already shown, in the fable of Jotham, how the *apologue* corresponded to the *proper Egyptian hieroglyphic*; and was invented only to present a sensible image to the unimproved conception of the hearer.

As the change of the object, which the fable introduced, made it exactly answer to the *tropical hieroglyphic*; so that sort of *PROSOPOPOEIA*, which the fable much employed, representing a multitude under the image of one, made it equally correspond with the *curiological hieroglyphic*.

2. But now, in after-times, either when men began to affect mystery, or their subject to require secrecy, they gradually changed the *apologue* or fable, by quaint and far-fetched allusions, into a *PARABLE*, on set purpose to throw obscurity over the information; just as the *tropical hieroglyphic* was turned into the *tropical symbol*. We find innumerable instances of this mode of speech in scripture: thus God by the prophet Ezekiel:—"Son of man, utter a *PARABLE* unto the rebellious house, and say unto them, thus saith the *LORD GOD*, set on a pot, set it on, and also pour water into it: gather the pieces thereof into it, even every good piece, the thigh and the shoulder, fill it with the choice bones. Take the choice of the flock, and burn also the bones under it, and make it boil well, and let them seethe the bones of it therein."\*

\* Ezek. xxiv et. 3, seq.

And in this manner was the *parable* employed both amongst the orientalist and Greeks: and thus the Jews understood it, as appears by the complaint of the prophet: “Ah, LORD! they say of me, doth he not speak PARABLES?”\* and by this denunciation of our LORD himself; “unto you it is given to know the *mysteries* of the kingdom of God; but to others in PARABLES; that seeing they might not see, and hearing they might not understand.”† And thus that great master of Grecian eloquence, Demetrius Phalereus, explains it: “the allegory is used,” says he, “as a covering and disguise to the discourse.”‡

3. We have observed, that the *symbol*, the more it receded from the proper hieroglyphic, the more it became obscure; till it divided itself, at length, into two sorts, the *tropical* and the *enigmatical*; just so again it was with the *parable*, which, answering to the *tropical symbol*, grew more and more mysterious, till it became a RIDDLE; and this again exactly corresponded to the *enigmatical* hieroglyphic.

This, in sacred scripture, is called a DARK SAYING, κατ' ἐξοχήν. For the nature of God's dispensation required enigmas: and the genius of those times made them natural. The prophet Ezekiel will furnish us with an example:—“And the word of the LORD,” says he, “came unto me, saying, Son of man, put forth a RIDDLE, and speak a *parable* unto the house of Israel; and say, Thus saith the LORD GOD, a great eagle with great wings, long winged, full of feathers, which had divers colours, came unto Lebanon, and took the highest branch of the cedar; he cropt off the top of his young twigs, and carried it into a land of traffic,” &c. § In the interpretation of these *riddles* consisted much of the old eastern wisdom, according to the observation of the wise man: “A man of understanding,” says he, “shall attain unto wise counsels; to understand a proverb and the interpretation; the words of the wise and their DARK SAYINGS.”|| It was the custom too, as we learn from scripture, ¶ and it lasted long, as we learn from Josephus,\*\* for the sages of those times to send or offer RIDDLES to each other, for a trial of sagacity, to the exposition of which, rewards and penalties were annexed; †† so that the present of a *riddle* was sometimes only a stratagem for a booty: hence, the *understanding dark sentences* became proverbial amongst the Hebrews to signify the arts of fraud and deceit; as may be collected from the character given by Daniel of Antiochus Epiphanes: “and in the latter time of their kingdom, when the transgressors are come to the full, a king of fierce countenance and UNDERSTANDING DARK SENTENCES shall stand up.” ††

\* Ezek. xx. 49.

† Luke viii. 10.

‡ —ὥσπερ συγκαλύμματα τοῦ λόγου, τῇ ἀλληγορίᾳ κίχρηται.—De Eloc. sect. 100.<sup>o</sup>

§ Ch. xvii. 2, et seq.

|| Prov. i. 5, 6.

¶ Judges xiv. 12, 13, 14.

\*\*—καὶ σοφίσματα διὰ καὶ λόγους ΑΙΝΙΓΜΑΤΩΔΕΙΣ διηκίμψατο πρὸς τὸν Σολομῶνα ὁ τῶν Τυρίων βασιλεὺς, παρακαλῶν ἵππας αὐτῷ τούτους σαφηνίσαι, καὶ τῆς ἀπορίας τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ζητημάτων ἀπαλλάξαι· τὸν δὲ, διπλὸν ὄντα καὶ συνιστὸν οὐδὲν τούτων παρεῖλθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντα καὶ πᾶσιν ἐν λογισμῷ, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν τὴν διάνοιαν ἐφώτισαι.—Antiq. Jud. lib. viii. cap. 5.

†† Διὸς—τὸν δὲ τυραννῶντα Ἱεροσολύμων Σολομῶνα κίμψαι, φησὶ, πρὸς τὸν Εἰραμὸν ΑΙΝΙΓΜΑΤΑ, καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν ἀξιοῦντα· τὸν δὲ, μὴ δυναθὲν διακρίναι, τῷ λόγῳ χρημάτων ἀποτίναται.—Id. ib.

†† Chap. viii. ver. 23.

The mysterious cover to this kind of wisdom made it (as always such a cover will) the most high-prized accomplishment: so when the psalmist would raise and engage the attention of his audience, he begins his song in this manner: "Hear, all ye people; give ear, all ye inhabitants of the world: both low and high, rich and poor together. My mouth shall speak of wisdom, and the meditation of my heart shall be of understanding. I WILL INCLINE MINE EAR TO A PARABLE; I WILL OPEN MY MOUTH SAYING UPON THE HARP."\* For as a great critic in sacred and profane learning rightly observes upon the place: *Psalmi hujus auctor, quo auditores attentos reddat, his promittit se de rebus maximis, et in quibus summa sapientia posita sit, dicturum; et in carmine hoc componendo artem quam potuit maximam adhibuit, ut materia dignum redderet.*†

And as, in the improved art of WRITING by *symbols*, the Egyptians (as well to give it the air of learning and elegance, as to cloud it with a variegated obscurity) studied all the singular *properties of beings*, and their *relations*, in order to fit them for representatives of other things; so in the art of SPEAKING, men soon began to adorn those modes of information just now mentioned with *tropes and figures*; till at length posterity began to doubt about the original of *figurative expression*; even as they had doubted about the original of *hieroglyphic painting*: whereas, in truth, the former, like the latter, owed its birth to mere want and rusticity; that is, a want of words, and rusticity of conception. To give an instance of the first want, in the PLEONASM; of the latter, in the METAPHOR: for eastern speech abounds with these *figures*; they constitute its pride and beauty; and to excel in them, consists the art of their orators and poets.

(1.) The *pleonasm* evidently arose from the narrowness of a simple language: the Hebrew, in which this figure abounds, is the scantiest of all the learned languages of the east: *Amant* (says Grotius) *Hebræi verborum copiam; itaque rem eandem multis verbis exprimunt.*‡ He does not tell us the reason; but it is seen above, and appears to be the true: for when the speaker's phrase comes not up to his ideas (as in a scanty language it often will not), he naturally endeavours to explain himself by a repetition of the thought in other words; as he whose body is straitened in room is never relieved but by a continual change of posture. We may observe this to happen frequently in common conversation; where the conception of the speaker is stronger than his expression. The most scanty language therefore will be always fullest of repetitions, which is the only *copia* in *that* which Grotius speaks of.

(2.) The *metaphor* arose as evidently from rusticity of conception, as the *pleonasm* from the want of words. The first simple ages, uncultivated, and immersed in sense, could express their rude conceptions of

\* Psal. xlix. 4.

† Psalmorum liber in versiculos metricè divisus, &c.—Ed. Hare, Episc. Cices. p. 265.

‡ In Hab. ii. 1.

abstract ideas, and the reflex operations of the mind, only by material images; which, so applied, become *metaphors*. This, and not the warmth of a florid and improved fancy, as is commonly supposed, was the true original of figurative expression. We see it even at this day in the style of the American savages, though of the coldest and most phlegmatic complexions, such as the Iroquois of the northern continent; of whom a learned missionary says: "They affect a lively close expression, like the Lacedemonians; yet for all that their style is *figurative*, and wholly *metaphorical*."\* Their phlegm could only make their style concise, not take away the figures; and the conjunction of these different characters in it, shows plainly that *metaphors* were from necessity, not choice. The very same character, in other words, Diodorus gives of the style of the ancient Gauls: *In conversation, says he, they use the utmost brevity, attended with a highly figurative obscurity: their speech abounds with a licentious kind of synecdoche, which leaves much to the hearer to unriddle and divine; and also with hyperboles.*†

But we need not these far-fetched examples. He who will only reflect on what is so common as generally to escape reflection, may observe, that the common people are always most given to speak in figures. Cicero observed this long ago, where encouraging the use of *metaphors*, even in the simpler style, he says,—*Translatione fortasse crebrior, qua frequentissime sermo omnis utitur non modo urbanorum, sed etiam rusticorum. Siquidem est eorum, gemmare vites, sitire agros, letas esse segetes, luxuriosa frumenta. Nihil horum parum audacter, sed aut simile est illi unde transferas: aut, si res suum nullum habet nomen, docendi causa sumptum, aut ludendi videtur.*‡ Hence too, the people's delight in that other figure of speech, PROVERBS, a passion not stronger in our own times than in those of Aristotle; who observes *οἱ Αἰποικοὶ μάλιστα ἰνὸς μωττυποὶ εἰσὶν*. And the gross images under which proverbial truths in all languages are conveyed, show they only delighted in their own inventions: for, to the people, it is certain, we are altogether indebted for this species of instruction.

It is true, when gross conception met with a warm imagination which delighted in painting strong and lively images, and was improved by exercise and use, figurative expression would be soon adorned with all the flourishes of wit. For WIT consists in using strong *metaphoric images* in uncommon yet apt allusions: just as ancient Egyptian wisdom did in *hieroglyphic symbols* fancifully analogized. Plato perhaps had something of this in his thoughts (if he had not, he had hardly any thing so good) when he observed to Alcibiades, that the *people was an excellent master of language*.§

Thus we see it has ever been the way of men, both in *speech and writing*, as well as in clothes and habitations, to turn their wants and necessities into parade and ornament.||

\* See note Y Y, at the end of this book.

‡ Orator, cap. xxiv.

|| See note B B B, at the end of this book.

† See note Z Z, at the end of this book.

§ See note A A A, at the end of this book.

4. In the first parallel between *speech* and *writing*, we have compared *metaphors* to the *letters of an alphabet*; and how well the parallel runs may be further seen from hence: the Egyptians had, as has been shown, two sorts of alphabetic letters, the one *popular*, the other *sacerdotal*; so had the ancients in general two sorts of *metaphors*; one *open* and *intelligible*, another *hidden* and *mysterious*. The prophetic writings are full of this latter sort. To instance only in the famous prediction of Balaam: *There shall come a STAR out of Jacob, and a sceptre shall rise out of Israel*.\* This prophecy may possibly in some sense relate to David; but, without question, it belongs principally to Jesus: the metaphor of a *sceptre* was common and popular, to denote a ruler, like David; but the *star*, though it also signified, in the prophetic writings,† a temporal prince or ruler, yet had a secret and hidden meaning likewise: a *star* in the Egyptian hieroglyphics denoted GOD:‡ and how much *hieroglyphic writing* influenced the *eastern languages* we shall see presently. Thus GOD, in the prophet Amos, reproving the Israelites for their idolatry on their first coming out of Egypt, says: “Ye have borne the tabernacle of your *Molock*, and *Chiun* your images, THE STAR OF YOUR GOD, which ye made to yourselves.”§ *The star of your GOD* is a sublime figure to signify *the image of your GOD*; for a *star* being employed in hieroglyphics to signify GOD, it is used here with great elegance; to signify the material image of a GOD: the words, *the star of your GOD*, being only a repetition, so usual in the Hebrew tongue, of the preceding, *Chiun your images*. Hence we conclude that the metaphor here used by Balaam of a *star* was of that abstruse mysterious kind; and is so to be understood; and consequently that it related only in the mysterious sense to CHRIST, the eternal Son of GOD.

We have observed how *symbols*, which came from open *hieroglyphics*, lost their mysterious nature, and recovered again their primitive use in the flourishing ages of Greece and Rome. Just so again it was with the *parable*; which coming from the simple *apologue*, often returned to its first clearness, and became a proverb plain and intelligible to all. “In that day,” says the prophet Micah, “shall one take up a *parable* against you,”¶ &c. “Shall not all these,” says Habakkuk, “take up a *parable* against him, and a taunting *proverb* against him, and say,”¶ &c.

Thus WRITING and LANGUAGE, throughout all their various modes, ran exactly the same fortune: invented out of necessity, to communicate men’s thoughts to one another; they were continued out of choice, for mystery and ornament; and they ended at last as they began, in the way of popular information.

Hitherto we have considered the *relation* only as they stand in an independent parallel; but as they are only two different ways of communicating the same conceptions, they must needs have a mighty influence

\* Numb. xxiv. 17.

† Ἄστρον τὰς Αἰγυπτίων γραφόμενον ΘΕΟΝ σημαίνει.—Hieropol. Hierog. lib. ii. cap. 1.

‡ Chap. v. 25, 26.

|| Chap. ii. 4.

† Dan. viii. 10.

¶ Ib. ver. 6.

upon one another. To explain this in the manner it deserves would require a volume; and as a properer place may be found for it, when we come to consider the objections to the *style of scripture*, it will be sufficient just to touch upon it at present.

(1.) The influence *language* would have on the first kind of writing, which was *hieroglyphical*, is easy to conceive. Language, we have shown, was, out of mere necessity, highly figurative, and full of material images; so that when men first thought of recording their conceptions, the writing would be, of course, that very picture which was before painted in the fancy, and from thence delineated in words: even long after, when figurative speech was continued out of choice, and adorned with all the invention of wit, as amongst the Greeks and Romans, and that the genius of the simpler *hieroglyphic* writing was again revived for ornament, in EMBLEMS and DEVICES, the poetic habit of personalizing every thing, filled their coins, their arches, their altars, &c. with all kinds of imaginary beings. All the qualities of the mind, all the affections of the body, all the properties of countries, cities, rivers, mountains, became the seeds of living things: for,

— as IMAGINATION bodied forth  
The forms of things unknown, the *artist's hand*  
Turn'd them to shape, and gave to airy nothing  
A local habitation and a name.\*

(2.) The reciprocal influence *hieroglyphic writing* would have on *language* is as evident. The Chinese, we have seen, used this kind of writing, as well as the Egyptians; and the character given of their language is entirely correspondent: "The style of the *Chinese*, in their compositions," says Du Halde, "is MYSTERIOUS, *concise*, ALLEGORIC, and sometimes *obscure*. They *say much in few words*. Their expressions are lively, animated, and thick sown with *bold comparisons*, and *noble metaphors*."† Their style, we see, was *concise* and *figurative*; the very character, as we have seen, of all the barbarous nations upon earth, both ancient and modern; for nature is ever uniform. The cold phlegmatic temper of the Chinese made their style short and *laconic*; the use of hieroglyphics made it *figurative*; and from this mixture it became *obscure*: but had those remote inhabitants of the east and west possessed the warm imagination of the proper Asiatics, then had their language, like that of the people spoken of above, abounded with *pleonasm*s instead of *laconisms*. The old Asiatic style, so highly figurative, seems likewise, by what we find of its remains, in the prophetic language of the sacred writers, to have been evidently fashioned to the mode of ancient hieroglyphics, both *curiologic* and *tropical*. Of the first kind are the figurative expressions of *spotted garments*, to denote iniquity; an

\* Shakspeare.

† Le stile des Chinois dans leurs compositions est *mysterieux*, concis, *allegorique*, et quelquefois obscur. Ils disent beaucoup de choses en peu de paroles. Leurs expressions sont vives, animées et semées de comparaisons hardies, et de metaphores nobles.—Destr. de l'Empire de la Chine, t. II. p. 227. Paris, 1735.



*intoxicating draught*, to signify error and misery; the *sword and bow*, a warrior; a *gigantic stature*, a mighty leader; *balance, weights and measures*, a judge or magistrate; *arms*, a powerful nation, like the Roman. Of the second kind, which answers to the *tropical* hieroglyphic, is the calling empires, kings, and nobles, by the names of the *heavenly luminaries*, the *sun, moon, and stars*; their temporary disasters or entire overthrow, denoted by *eclipses and extinctions*; the destruction of the nobility, by *stars falling from the firmament*; hostile invasions, by *thunder and tempestuous winds*; and leaders of armies, conquerors, and founders of empire, by *lions, bears, leopards, goats, or high trees*. In a word, the prophetic style seems to be a SPEAKING HIEROGLYPHIC.

These observations will not only assist us in the intelligence of the Old and New Testament, but likewise vindicate their character from the illiterate cavils of modern libertines, who have foolishly mistaken that colouring for the peculiar workmanship of the speaker's heated imagination, which was the sober established language of their times; a language which God and his Son condescended to employ, as the properest vehicle of the high mysterious ways of providence, in the revelation of themselves to mankind.

But to come to a conclusion. We must observe in the last place, that, besides the many changes which the ancient Egyptian *hieroglyphics* underwent, they at length suffered a very perverse corruption. It hath been already seen, how the MYSTERIES, that other grand vehicle of *Egyptian wisdom*, degenerated into *magic*: just so it happened with the HIEROGLYPHICS; for their characters being become, in a proper sense, sacred, as will be explained hereafter, it disposed the more superstitious to engrave them upon gems, and wear them as amulets or charms. But this abuse seems not to have been much earlier than the established worship of the god Serapis; which happened under the Ptolemies; and was first brought to the general knowledge of the world by certain Christian heretics,\* and natives of Egypt, who had mingled a number of pagan superstitions with their Christianity. These gems, called ABRAXAS, frequently to be met with in the cabinets of the curious, are engraven with all kinds of hieroglyphic characters. For this abusive original, we have the testimony of Rufinus the ecclesiastical historian, contemporary with St Jerome: *who can reckon up, says he, the horrid superstitions practised at Canopus? where under pretence of interpreting the SACERDOTAL LETTERS, for so they call the ancient Egyptian characters, a public school may be almost said to be opened for the teaching magical arts.*† Hence these characters came to be called *Chaldaic*, the Chaldeans being particularly addicted to magic. So Cassiodorus, speaking of the obelisks in the Roman circus, which were brought from Egypt, calls the

\* See note C C C, at the end of this book.

† —*Canopi quis enumeret superstitionis flagitia? Ubi prætextu SACERDOTALIUM LITERARUM, ita enim appellant antiquas Ægyptiorum literas, magicæ artis erat pene publica schola.* —Eccles. Hist. lib. ii. cap. xxvi.

inscriptions on them *Chaldaica signa* :\* to the *abraxas* afterwards succeeded TALISMANS:† which (mixed, like the other, with the dotages of judicial astrology) are held in high reverence to this day, in all Mahometan countries. And here let me observe, that from the low date of these kinds of charms may be seen the impertinence of what Sir John Marsham brings from late Greek and Roman writers, to confront and discredit the mysterious elevation of the brazen serpent in the wilderness.‡

But what must we think of KIRCHER, who hath mistaken these superstitions for the ancient Egyptian wisdom: and setting up with this magic, and that other of the *mysteries*, which the later Platonists and Pythagoreans had jumbled together, in the production of their fanatic philosophy, soon engrossed, in imagination, all the treasures of antiquity?§ However, to be just, it must be owned that he was misled by the ancients themselves; some of whom imagined that the very first *hieroglyphics* were tainted with this magical pollution, just as some moderns would have the first *mysteries* to be corrupted by debauched practices. So Lucan, speaking of the times before alphabetic writing, says,

Nondum flumineas Memphis contexere Biblos .  
Noverat, et saxis tantum, volucresque feræque  
Sculptaque servabant MAGICAS animalia LINGUAS.

Here, we see, the *abuse* and the *invention* are made coëval. An extravagant error, which the least attention to the history of the human mind and the progress of its operations might have prevented.

To conclude, I have here presumed to dispute an unquestioned proposition, *that the Egyptians invented hieroglyphics for the sake of secrecy*. It will be well if the evidence of the reasoning may excuse the singularity of the paradox. This is certain, the subject hath long remained in obscurity; and as certain, that I have, some how or other, been able to throw a little scattered light into the darkest corners of it. Whether the common opinion occasioned the obscurity, and the notion here advanced has contributed to remove it, is left for the candid reader to determine.||

\* *Ubi sacra priscorum Chaldaicis signis, quasi literis, indicantur.*—Lib. iii. ep. 51, et lib. iii. ep. 2.

† See note D D D, at the end of this book. ‡ See note E E E, at the end of this book.

§ The following are three of his six *postulata* on which he founds his whole interpretation of the Egyptian *hieroglyphics*:—

1. *Hieroglyphica Ægyptiorum doctrina nihil aliud est quam arcana de Deo, diviniæque Ideis, Angelis, Dæmonibus, cæterisque mundanarum potestatum classibus ordinibusque scientia, saxis potissimum insculpta.*

5. *Hieroglyphica symbola non tantum sublimium erant significativa sacramentorum; sed et naturalem quandem efficaciam habere credabantur, tum ad genios bonos quibuscum occultum, et in abdita naturæ abyso latentem sympathiam habere putabantur, attrahendos; tum ad contrarios et antitechnos genios, ob eorundem cum iis antipathiam, coercendos profligandosque.*

6. *Hieroglyphica symbola nihil aliud quàm prophylactica quædam signa, omnium malorum arerruncativa, ob mirificum catenarum mundulium consensum connexionemque, esse existimantur.*—(Edip. Ægypt. t. iii. p. 4. || See note F F F at the end of this book.

AND now to apply this matter to the proof of our proposition; for this long discourse on *hieroglyphic writing* is particularly given to deduce from its nature, origin, and use, an internal argument for the high antiquity of *Egyptian learning*.

Let us see then how the evidence stands: the true Egyptian learning, which the early Greek sages brought from thence to adorn their own country, was, by the concurrent testimony of these writers, all contained in *hieroglyphics*. They record a simple fact; and, in a fact of this nature, they could not be deceived; though in the causes of it they well might; and, as we have shown, indeed were.—But hieroglyphic-writing thus invented, was improved into a contrivance to record their secret wisdom, long before an *alphabet* was found out; and yet an alphabet was of so high and almost immemorial antiquity as to pass for an invention of the gods: and consequently to deceive some men into an opinion that *letters* were prior in time to *hieroglyphics*.\*

To this it may be objected, “that, as I pretend *hieroglyphics* were not invented for secrecy, but afterwards turned to that use, and even employed in it, long after the invention of alphabetic letters, it might very well be, that this profound learning, which all agree to have been recorded in *hieroglyphics*, was the product of ages much below the antiquity inquired after.”

Now, not to insist upon the Grecian testimony, which makes the *learned hieroglyphics* coeval with the first race of kings; I reply, and might well rest the matter on this single argument,—That if at the invention of *letters*, much high-prized learning had not been contained in *hieroglyphics*, but only plain memorials of civil matters, no plausible reason can be given why the Egyptians did not then discontinue a way of writing so troublesome and imperfect. It hath been shown, that in the very early ages of the world, all nations, as well as the Egyptian, used to record the succession of time and revolutions of state in *hieroglyphic* characters: but, of these, none, besides the Egyptians, continued to write by marks for things, after the invention of *letters*. All others immediately dropt their hieroglyphics on the discovery of that more commodious method. The reason of which is plain; all others were totally unlearned in those periods of their existence preceding the knowledge of letters; consequently, as their hieroglyphics were employed in nothing but to record the rude annals of their history, they had no inducement to continue them: but at this remarkable era, Egypt was very learned: and hieroglyphics being the repositories of its learning, these monuments would be in high veneration, and that veneration would perpetuate their use. There is but one example perhaps in the world, besides the Egyptian, where a people’s learning was *first* recorded in *hieroglyphic* characters; and this one example will support our argument: the people I mean are the CHINESE; who, as the missionaries assure us, bear such esteem and reverence for their *ancient character*, that, when they find it curiously

\* See note G G G, at the end of this book.

written, they prefer it to the most elegant painting, and purchase the least scrap at an excessive price: they will not, we are told, apply the paper even of any common book, on which these characters are written, to a profane or vulgar use; and their joiners and masons do not dare to tear a printed leaf which they find pasted to the wall or wainscot.\* Now if, at length, these people should be prevailed on to use the more excellent way of writing with the letters of an alphabet, can any one doubt but that their mandarins would still continue these venerable hieroglyphic characters in their works of science and religion? Thus, what we see would be the case here was without all question the case of the Egyptians; characters become the vehicle of such treasures of learning must be in the highest reverence: and, indeed, the name of *hieroglyphics*, under which they were delivered to the Greeks, shows they were in fact thus revered.† But that *learning* which was contained in hieroglyphics, and was, of itself, sufficient to perpetuate their use, gave birth to a tradition which would effectually secure it; and this was, that *the gods themselves invented hieroglyphic writing*.

On the whole, the argument drawn from their CONTINUED USE seems so sure a proof of the high antiquity of Egyptian learning in general, that one might safely rest the whole upon it: but to remove all cavil, I shall proceed to other, and, as I think, incontestable proofs of the antiquity of that *learning*, and particularly the *theologic*: the one taken from the true original of the art of ONEIROCRITIC, or *interpretation of dreams*; and the other from the true original of ANIMAL WORSHIP: both of these fantastic superstitions being the genuine and peculiar growth of EGYPT.

1. The art of ONEIROCRITIC, from whose *original* I deduce my first proof, made a very considerable part of ancient pagan religion. Artemidorus, who lived about the beginning of the second century, and wrote a treatise on *dreams*, collected from much earlier writers, divides *dreams* into two kinds, the *speculative* and the *allegorical*;‡ the first kind is that which presents a plain and direct picture of the matter about which the dream gives information; the second is an oblique intimation of it, by a tropical or symbolic image. This latter, which makes up the large farrago of dreams, is the only kind that needs an interpreter; on which account Macrobius defines a *dream* to be the notice of something *hid in allegory which wants to be explained*.§

\* Ils préfèrent même un beau caractère à la plus admirable peinture, et l'on en voit souvent qui achètent bien cher une page de vieux caractères, quand ils sont bien formés. Ils honorent leurs caractères jusques dans les livres les plus ordinaires, et si par hasard quelques feuilles étoient tombées, ils les ramassent avec respect: ce seroit, selon eux, une grossièreté et une impolitesse, d'en faire un usage profane, de les fouler aux pieds en marchant, de les jeter même avec indifférence; souvent il arrive, que les menuisiers et les maçons n'osent pas déchirer une feuille imprimée, qui se trouve collée sur le mur, ou sur le bois. Ils craignent de faire une faute.—Du Halde, Descr. de l'Empire de la Chine, t. ii. p. 223.

† See p. 25; and see note H H H at the end of this book.

‡ "Ἐν τῶν ὀνείρων, οἱ μὲν εἰσι διασημαστικοί, οἱ δὲ ἀλληγορικοί καὶ διασημαστικοὶ μὲν οἱ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν διαρρίπτειν τρεσικατένεις, ἀλληγορικοὶ δὲ οἱ δι' ἄλλων ἄλλα σημαίνοντες.—Artemid. Oneir. lib. i. cap. 2.

§ Somnium proprie vocatur, quod tegit figuris et velut ambagibus, non nisi interpretatione intelligendam, significationem rei quæ demonstratur.—In Somn. Scrip. lib. i. cap. 3.

So that the question will be, on what grounds or rules of interpretation the oneirocritics proceeded, when, if a man dreamed of a dragon, the interpreter assured him it signified *majesty*; if of a serpent, a *disease*; a viper, *money*; frogs, *impostors*; pigeons and stock-doves, *women*; partridges, *impious persons*; a swallow, *sorrow, death, and disaster*; cats, *adultery*; the ichneumon, *deceitful and mischievous men*,\* &c. for the whole art of ancient *oneirocritic* was concerned in these remote and mysterious relations. Now the early *interpreters of dreams* were not juggling impostors; but, like the early judicial *astrologers*, more superstitious than their neighbours; and so the first who fell into their own delusions. However, suppose them to have been as arrant cheats as any of their successors, yet at their first setting up they must have had materials proper for their trade; which could never be the wild workings of each man's private fancy. Their customers would look to find a known analogy, become venerable by long application to mysterious wisdom, for the groundwork of their deciphering; and the decipherers themselves would as naturally fly to some confessed authority, to support their pretended science. But what ground or authority could this be, if not the mysterious learning of *symbolic characters*? Here we seem to have got a solution of the difficulty. The *Egyptian priests*, the first interpreters of dreams, took their rules for this species of DIVINATION, from their *symbolic* riddling, in which they were so deeply read: a ground of interpretation which would give the strongest credit to the art; and equally satisfy the diviner and the consulter: for by this time it was generally believed that their gods had given them *hieroglyphic writing*. So that nothing was more natural than to imagine that these gods, who in their opinion gave *dreams* likewise, had employed the same mode of expression in both revelations. This, I suppose, was the true original† of *oneirocritic*, or the interpretation of those dreams called allegorical; that is, of dreams in general; for the wildness of an unbridled fancy will make almost all natural dreams to be of that kind. It is true, the art being now well established, every age adorned it with additional superstitions; so that at length the old foundation became quite lost in these new incrustations.

If this account of its original stood in need of farther evidence, I might urge the rules of interpretation here given from Artemidorus, and a great many more which might have been given; all of them conformable to the *symbolic hieroglyphics* in Horapollo.

Herodotus, in Clio, tells us, how Cyrus, dreaming that young Darius had wings on his shoulders, which, when spread out, shaded Asia and Europe, understood this dream by the assistance of his interpreters, to signify (as we must needs conclude) a conspiracy formed against him by that young man. Now Sanchoniatho tells us‡ that in the most ancient *hieroglyphic writing*, a supreme governor was designed by a man

\* Vid. Artemidor.

† See note I I I, at the end of this book.

‡ See above, p. 26 of this volume.

with four wings, and his lieutenants or princes under him by a man with two: and that their being *outstretched* signified action or design.\*

But there is one remarkable circumstance which puts the matter out of all doubt. The technical term used by the oneirocritics for the phantasms seen in dreams, was ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΑ,† *elements*. It would be hard to give a good account of the use of so odd a term on any other supposition than the derivation of oneirocritic from symbolic writing. On that supposition it is easy and evident; for symbolic marks‡ were called ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΑ. Now when they used symbols to decipher dreams, nothing was more natural than to give the same significative images, on the stone and in the fancy, the same appellation.

The reason why the Egyptian priests (who, we have seen, used the Greek tongue very early) called their hieroglyphic and symbolic marks *στοιχία*, was because, in this way of writing, they employed all kinds of natural entities, to denote their mental conceptions; the proper signification of *στοιχία* being the first elements and principles of things, out of which all beings arise, and, of which, they are compounded.§ Hence it came that *alphabet* letters, which were an improvement on *hieroglyphics* and received their first shapes from hieroglyphic images, were called *στοιχία*.

So much for the *original* of oneirocritic. To bring it to the point, we are next to consider its *antiquity*. Now, scripture leads us to the practice of this art as high up as the age of Joseph.

Pharaoh had two dreams;|| one of *seven kine*, the other of *seven ears of corn*. We see both these phantasms [*στοιχία*] were *symbols* of Egypt: the *ears* denoting its distinguished fertility; the *kine*, its great tutelary patroness, Isis. Pharaoh knew thus much without an interpreter; and hence arose his solicitude and anxiety to understand the rest, as a matter that concerned the public: accordingly, when Joseph¶ comes to decipher these dreams, he does not tell the king that the two *sevens* denoted *seven years in Egypt*, but simply *seven years*: the scene of the famine needed no deciphering. Unlike, in this, to the interpretation of Daniel, when Nebuchadnezzar saw in a dream *a fair and high tree*; which being the symbol of majesty in general, the prophet explains its particular meaning, "The tree that thou sawest—it is THOU, O king."\*\*

The argument therefore stands thus: the *oneirocritics* borrowed their art of deciphering from symbolic hieroglyphics.—But this could not be till hieroglyphics were become sacred, by being made the cloudy vehicle of their theology; because, till then, hieroglyphics had neither authority enough to support the credit of those interpretations, nor a perplexity sufficiently copious to support the mystery of this application.—But by the time hieroglyphics were become sacred, Egypt was

\* See note K K K, at the end of this book.

† See note M M M, at the end of this book.

‡ See note N N N, at the end of this book.

§ See note L L L, at the end of this book.

¶ See p. 25 of this vol. || Gen. xli.

\*\* Dan. iv. 19, 20, 21.



very learned.—Now they were sacred in the days of Joseph, as appears from the use of interpreting dreams according to those symbols.—Therefore *learned Egypt of very high antiquity*.

2. My second argument for this antiquity is deduced from the true original of ANIMAL WORSHIP; and stands thus: We have observed, that in those improved hieroglyphics, called *symbols* (in which it is confessed, the ancient Egyptian learning was contained) the less obvious properties of animals occasioned their becoming marks, by analogical adaption, for very different ideas, whether of substances or modes; which plainly intimates that physical knowledge had been long cultivated. Now these symbols I hold to be the true original of ANIMAL WORSHIP in Egypt. But animal worship was the *established worship* in the time of MOSES, as is evident from the book of *Exodus*: therefore the Egyptian learning was of this high antiquity.\* The only proposition in this argument, that needs any proof, is the first. The reasons therefore which induce me to think *symbolic writing* to be the sole origin of *animal worship* are these:

(1.) This kind of idolatry was peculiar to the *Egyptian* superstition; and almost unknown to all the castes of paganism, but such as were evidently copied from that original:† MOSES treats it as their distinguishing superstition:‡ the Greeks and Romans, though at a loss for its original, yet speak of it as the peculiar extravagance of *Egypt*: and the most intelligent of the moderns consider it in the very same light.§

(2.) The *Egyptians* not only worshipped *animals*, but PLANTS; and, in a word, every kind of being that had qualities remarkably singular or efficacious; because all these had found their place in symbolic writing: for, as hath been shown, when hieroglyphics came to be employed for mystery, no sooner was one symbol grown common and vulgar, than another was invented of a more recondite meaning: so that the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms, would be all explored to paint the histories of their gods.

(3.) Besides the adoration of almost every thing existing, the *Egyptians* worshipped a thousand chimeras of their own creation: some with human bodies, and the heads or feet of brutes; others with brutal bodies, and the heads or feet of men; while others again were a fantastic compound of the several parts of beasts, birds, and reptiles, terrestrial and

\* See note O O O, at the end of this book.

† Such as the several gentile nations of Palestine and India.

‡ Deut. iv. 14—21.

§ The learned Fourmont thus expresses himself:—*Mais pour parler simplement et sans fard, il faudra bon gré malgré en revenir à ceci, que les Egyptiens étoient, et, s'ils pensoient un peu, devoient se croire eux mêmes un peuple fort extravagant; on n'apothéose point sans folie les oignons et les asperges: que pensez encore des dieux oiseaux, poissons, serpens, crocodiles? mais non-seulement ils avoient deifié les animaux; ce qui est plus strange encore, infatués de la metempsychose, ils s'étoient enthousiasmés la dessus de mystagogies incompréhensibles. Leurs prêtres, par un zèle qu'on ne connoît pas trop, s'étoient rendus les predicateurs de ces mêmes folies; et ils en avoient dans leurs conquêtes, ou par des missions, infecté tout l'Inde, toute la Chine, tout le Japon.—Reflex. Crit. sur les Hist. des Anc. Peuples, t. i. p. 227.*

aquatic: for besides the simpler method, in hieroglyphic writing, of expressing their hero-gods by an entire plant or animal, there were two others which the more circumstantial history of those deities brought in use. Thus when the subject was only one single quality of a god or hero, the human shape was only partially deformed;\* as with the head of a dog, hawk, or ram, to denote fidelity, vigilance, or strength; with the feet and thighs of a goat, to represent rusticity, agility, or lust; and this gave being to their Anubis, Pan, and Jupiter Ammon: but where the subject required a fuller catalogue of the hero's virtues or useful qualities, there they employed an assemblage of the several parts of various animals: each of which, in hieroglyphic writing, was significative of a distinct property: in which assemblage, that animal, more peculiarly representative of the god, was most conspicuous. This will explain the verse of *Antiolides* in his hymn to the sun,

Ἡλίου δὲ νέμε' Ἀνὰ ἱερὰν ἰσοστροφίαν.

The sun was generally expressed by a *hawk*; but this *symbolic hawk*, under various considerations, had the various parts of other animals added to it.

(4.) That animal which was worshipped in one city was sacrificed in another. Thus, though at Memphis they adored the ox, at Mendes the goat, and at Thebes the ram; yet, in one place or other, each of these animals was used in sacrifice: but bulls and clean calves were offered up in all places. The reason of this can only be that at Memphis the ox was, in hieroglyphic learning, the symbol of some deity; at Mendes the goat; and at Thebes the ram; but the bull and calf no where: for what else can be said for the original of so fantastical a diversity in *representative* deities within a kingdom of one national religion?—But farther: the same animal was feasted in one place, with divine honours; in another it was pursued with the direst execrations. Thus, at Arsinoë, the crocodile was adored; because having no tongue it was made in hieroglyphic writing the symbol of the divinity;† elsewhere it was had in horror, as being made in the same writing the symbol of Typhon;‡ that is, it was used as a *sacred character* in the history both of their *natural* and *civil* theology.

(5.) Brute worship was, at *first*, altogether objective to their hero-gods; of whom animals were but the representatives. This is seen from the rank they hold on ancient monuments; from the unvaried worship of some few of them, as the *Apis*, which still continued to be adored as the

\* Εἶπασται παρ' αὐτοῖς τις μίχρη τραχήλου ἀνθρωποειδής, τὸ δὲ πρὶς αὐτῷ ἰστίον, ἢ λίκνιον, ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς ζώου κειτημένον· καὶ πάλιν αὖ κεφαλὴ ἀνθρωπίου, καὶ ἄλλου τινος ζώου μέρος πῇ μὲν ὀσσοειμένον, πῇ δὲ ἰσσοειμένον.—Porph. de Abst. lib. iv.

† Plutarch, in general, tells us, that the Egyptians thus considered the crocodile; but this author, for private ends, delivering a false original of animal worship, it was not to his purpose to tell us it was so considered in *symbolic writing*:—οὐ μὲν οὐδὲ ὁ προέδουλος αἰτίας πρὸς αὐτῆς ἀμειβοῦσαν ἰσχυρὰ τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ οὐ μίμημα θεοῦ λίγεται γιγνόνται, μένος μὲν ἀγλαῶντες αὐτῶν φανῆς γὰρ ὁ θεῖος λόγος ἀπροσδιός ἐστι.—De Is. et Osir.

‡ The subsequent doctrine of the *metempsychosis* soon made this the foundation of a fable, that the soul of Typhon had passed into a crocodile,—that Typhon had assumed that figure, &c.—See *Ælian's Hist. of Animals*, lib. x. cap. 21.

representative of Osiris:—and from the express testimony of Herodotus; who says, that, when the Egyptians addressed the sacred animal, their devotions were paid to that god to whom the beast belonged.\*

(6.) But to make the matter still plainer, it may be observed, that the most early brute worship in Egypt was not an adoration of the living animal, but only of its picture or image. This truth Herodotus seems to hint at in Euterpe, where he says, the Egyptians erected the first altars, images, and temples to the gods, and carved the **FIGURES OF ANIMALS** on stones.† Now, were the original of brute worship any other than what is here supposed, the living animal must have been first worshipped, and the image of it would have been only an attendant superstition. From the **SECOND COMMANDMENT**, and Moses's exhortation to obedience, it appears that the Egyptians at the time of the exodus, worshipped no living animal, but the picture or image only: "Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth. Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them."‡ Thus speaks the law of the first table; by which we not only see that brute worship was under an image, but that such image was symbolical of gods different from the animal pictured, and alluded to in the words, *Thou shalt have no other gods before me*. Another thing observable in the law is, that not only the making pictures and images for adoration was forbidden, but the simple making of them at all. And thus the Jews understood it. The consequence was, that *hieroglyphics* were forbidden: a strong proof of their being the source of the idolatry in question. Moses, in his exhortation to the people, paraphrases and explains this law: "Take ye, therefore, good heed unto yourselves (for ye saw *no manner of similitude on the day that the LORD spake to you in Horeb, out of the midst of the fire*) lest ye corrupt yourselves and make you a graven image, the similitude of any figure, the likeness of *male or female*, the likeness of any beast that is on the earth, the likeness of any winged fowl that flieth in the air, the likeness of any thing that creepeth on the ground, the likeness of any fish that is in the waters beneath the earth."§ There are two important conclusions to be drawn from the reason of this exhortation, *for you saw no manner of similitude, &c.* The first is, that the Egyptian brute worship was *symbolical*; the other, that Moses's prime intention was to warn the people against representing the God of Israel under the shape of men or animals, in the guise of the greater gods of Egypt. This observation will open our way to another circumstance, which shows that the worship of the *living animal* was not yet in use amongst the

\* Οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι Ἰασσαι ἐνθάδε τὰς δὲ σφί ἀποσιλίσουσι· ἐνθάμιναι τῇ Διὶ τοῦ δὲ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ.—Lib. ii. cap. 65.

† Εἰκαστός τι καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ τοὺς θεοῖσι ἀπονῦμαι σφίσις πρῶτους, καὶ ζῶα ἐν λίθοις ἑγγράψαν.—Cap. 4.

‡ Exod. xx. 3, 4, 5.

§ Deut. iv. 15, 16, 17, 18.

Egyptians; and that is, the idolatrous erection of the *golden calf*.<sup>\*</sup> The people now suspecting they had lost Moses, whom they were taught to consider as the vicegerent, or representative of their God, grew impatient for another; and, besotted with Egyptian superstitions, chose for his representative the same which the Egyptians used for the symbol of their great god, Osiris. Interpreters seem to run into two different extremes concerning this matter, some conceiving that the Israelites worshipped an Egyptian god under the *golden calf*; though the worshippers themselves expressly declare the contrary: "These," say they, "be thy gods, *O Israel*, which brought thee up out of the land of Egypt."<sup>†</sup> Others suppose the *calf* was not made in imitation of any Egyptian symbol whatsoever, because it was the living Apis that represented Osiris; but we see the worship of the living animal was not yet introduced. However, in time, and in no long time neither, for it was as early as the prophets, the Egyptians began to worship the *animal itself*; which worship, as might be well expected, prevailed at length over that of its image. *Colunt effigies multorum animalium, atque ipsa MAGIS animalia*, says Pomponius Mela<sup>‡</sup> of the Egyptians; and this naturally gave birth to new superstitions; for, as he goes on, *Apis populorum omnium nomen est. Bos niger, certis maculis insignis—raro nascitur, nec doitu pecoris (ut aiunt) sed divinitus et celesti igne conceptus*.

These considerations are sufficient to show that *hieroglyphics* were indeed the original of *brute worship*; and how easy it was for the Egyptians to fall into it from the use of this kind of writing, appears from hence. In these hieroglyphics was recorded the history of their greater, and tutelary deities, their kings and lawgivers; represented by animals and other creatures. The symbol of each god was well known and familiar to his worshippers, by means of the popular paintings and engravings on their temples and other sacred monuments:§ so that the symbol presenting the idea of the god, and that idea exciting sentiments of religion, it was natural for them, in their addresses to any particular deity, to turn towards his representative mark or symbol. This will be easily granted if we reflect, that when the Egyptian priests began to speculate, and grow mysterious, they feigned a *divine original* for hieroglyphic characters, in order to render them still more august and venerable. This would, of course, bring on a *relative* devotion to these symbolic figures; which, when it came to be paid to the living animal, would soon terminate in an *ultimate* worship.

But the occasional propensity to this superstition was, without question, forwarded and encouraged by the priesthood; for it greatly sup-

\* See note P P P, at the end of this book.

† Exod. xxxii. 4.

‡ De Sit. Orb. lib. i. cap. 2.

§ This account is supported by Herodotus, where saying that the *Egyptians first of all raised altars, statues, and temples to the gods*, he immediately adds, and *engraved animals on stone*: βωμούς τε καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ ἱεῖς θεοῖς ἀποτύμει σφίνας πρώτους, καὶ ΖΩΑ ΕΝ ΛΙΘΟΙΣΙ ΕΓΓΑΤΨΑΛ.—Lib. ii. cap. 4.

ported the worship of the hero-deities, by making their theology more intricate; and by keeping out of sight, what could not but weaken religious veneration in remote posterity, the naked truth, that they were only DEAD MEN DRIFTED. And these advantages they afterwards improved with notable address; by making those symbols as well relative to new conceived imaginary qualities and influences of their first *natural* gods, the host of heaven, as to what they properly respected, in hieroglyphic writing, their later heroes and tutelary deities; which trick, invented to keep the Egyptians in their superstition, spread so impenetrable an obscurity over paganism, as hindered the most sagacious philosophers and knowing antiquaries of Greece from ever getting a right view of the rise and progress of their own idolatry.

And, if I be not much mistaken, it was the design of these Egyptian priests to commemorate the advantages of this contrivance in the celebrated fable \* of TYPHON'S WAR WITH THE GODS; who, distressed and terrified by this earth-born giant, fled from his persecution into EGYPT; and there hid themselves each under the form of a several ANIMAL. This adventure is related by Ovid in a very agreeable and artful manner, where he makes one of the impious Pierides sing it, in their contest with the muses:

*Bella canit superis: Falsaque in honore gigantes  
Ponit, et extenuat magnorum facta decorum;  
Emissumque ima de sede Typhoëa terræ  
Cælitibus fecisse metum; cunctosque dedisse  
Terga fugæ: donec fessos ÆGYPTIA tellus  
Ceperit, et septem discretus in ostia Nilus.  
Hæc quoque terrigenam venisse Typhoëa narrat,  
Et æs ætæritæ superos celasse figuris:  
Dusque gregis, dixit, sit Jupiter: UNDE recurvis  
Nunc quoque formatus Libys est cum cornibus Ammon;  
Dellus in corvo, proles Semelëia capro,  
Fæle soror Phœbi, nivea Saturnia vacca,  
Pisce Venus latuit, Cyllenius Ibidis alis.†*

Typhon, amongst the Egyptians, was the exemplar of impiety: so that under that name we are to understand the *inquisitive*, which the priests always surnamed *the impious* (such who in after-times followed the celebrated Euhemerus of Greece); these, in a malicious search into the genealogies of their gods, had so near detected their original, and consequently endangered their worship, that the priests had nothing left but to perplex and embroil the inquiry, by encouraging the SYMBOLIC worship as explained above. Hence this fable (in which they celebrated the subtilty of their expedient) that Egypt afforded a place of refuge for the gods; who there lay hid under the *forms of beasts*. Where we must observe, that the shape each god was said to have assumed was that of his symbolic mark in hieroglyphic writing.‡ Indeed Antonius Liberalis§ differs from Ovid in the particular transformations; and Lucian, || from

\* Diod. Sicul. lib. i. p. 54.—Steph. ed. informs us, that this was an Egyptian fable: as does Lucian, in his tract *De Sacrificiis*.

† Metem. lib. v. fab. 5.

§ Cap. xxviii.

‡ See note Q Q Q, at the end of this book.

|| De Sacrif.

them both; but this rather confirms than weakens our interpretation; since each god, as we have seen, was denoted by divers hieroglyphics. We must not suppose, however, that the whole of their distress came from the quarter of their enemies. More favourable inquirers would be a little troublesome. And the same expedient would keep them at a distance likewise. The priests seem to have hinted at this case likewise, in the similar story they told Herodotus, "that Hercules was very desirous to see Jupiter, who was by no means consenting to this interview; at last overcome by the hero's importunity, he eluded his curiosity, by this expedient: he flayed the carcass of a ram; and investing himself with the skin separated with the head from the body, he presented himself under that appearance to the inquirer."\* Herodotus himself seems to hint at something like the explanation of the fable of Typhon given above, where speaking of Pan soon after, and on the same occasion, he says, "The Egyptians represent Pan as the Grecians paint him, with the face and legs of a goat. Not that they imagine this to be his real form, which is the same with that of the other gods. But I take no satisfaction in recording the reason they give for representing him in this manner."† From these two different ways of relating the circumstance of Jupiter's and Pan's disguises under a brutal form, it appears that the Egyptian priests had two accounts concerning it, the exoteric and the esoteric. Herodotus, in the story of Jupiter, makes no scruple to record the first; but the other, which concerns Pan's transformations, he did not care to touch upon.

If this explanation of the famous fable of Typhon needed any further support, we might find it in what the Egyptian theologers continued to deliver down concerning it. Diodorus Siculus, speaking of the difficulty in discovering the true original of Egyptian brute worship, says, that the priests had a profound secret concerning it:‡ a strong presumption that this here delivered was the secret; it being the only one which the priests were much concerned to keep to themselves; as we shall see when we come to speak of the *causes* assigned by the ancients for brute worship. What the priests thought fit to intrust to the people concerning this matter, the Sicilian tells us, was this; *That the gods of the early times being few in number, and so forced to yield to the multitude and injustice of earth-born men, assumed the forms of divers animals, and by that means escaped the cruelty and violence of their enemies; but that, at length, gaining the empire of the world, they consecrated the species of those animals whose forms they had assumed, in gratitude for that*

\* Θεβαῖοι μὲν οὖν, καὶ Ἰουὶ διὰ τούτους οἶον ἀπείχοντα, διὰ τὰς λίγους τοὺς νόμους ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι. Ἡρακλῆα θύλασθαι πάντας ἰδίσθαι ἐν Δία, καὶ ἐν οὐκ ἴδιον ἰδύναι ἐπ' αὐτοῦ εἶδος, καὶ ἰσχυρῶς ἐν Ἡρακλῆα, ἐν Δία μηχανήσασθαι, πρὶν ἰδύναιτα προχίσθαι ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ ἀποταμόντα τοῦ κριοῦ καὶ ἰδύναιτα ἐν αὐτοῖς, οὕτω αἱ ἰσχυρῶς ἐκιδύσθαι.—Lib. ii. cap. 3.

† — τοῦ Πανὸς εὐγαλμα, καθάπερ Ἑλλῆσιν, αἰγοπρόσωπον καὶ τραγοειδίαν· οὕτω τοιοῦτον νομίζοντες οὐκ αἶμι, ἀλλ' ὅμοιον τοῖσι ἄλλοις θεοῖσι, ὅτι οὐκ οὐκ τοιοῦτον γράφουσι αὐτὸν, οὐδ' αὖτις οὐκ ἰσχυρῶς λίγους.—Lib. i. cap. 46.

‡ Οἱ μὲν ἱερεῖς αὐτῶν ἀπὸρρήτοι ἐν δόγμα πρὸς τούτοις ἴχουσιν.—Lib. i. p. 54.



*relief which they had received from them in their distresses.\** The moral of the fable lies too open to need an interpreter: it can hardly, indeed, be any other than that we have here given. But Diodorus aids us in the discovery of that secret, which he himself appears not to have penetrated, where he says that Melampus, who brought the *mysteries of Proserpine* from Egypt into Greece, taught them the story of *TYPHON*, and the whole history of the disasters and sufferings of the gods.† Now we have shown‡ that one part of the office of the *hierophant* of the mysteries was to reveal the true original of polytheism: which instruction could not be conveyed more appositely, than in the history of *Typhon*, as here explained. From the whole then, we conclude, that *this* was indeed the *profound secret*, which the Egyptian priests had concerning it. So that the passage of Diodorus, last quoted, not only supports our interpretation of the *fable of Typhon*, but of the *secret of the mysteries* likewise.

Only one thing is worth our notice, that the priests should think fit to give the people this curious origin of brute worship: we have observed, that they promoted and encouraged this brutal idolatry in order to hide the weakness of their hero worship; but then some reason was to be given for that more extravagant superstition: so, by a fine contrivance, they made the *circumstances* of the fable, by which they would commemorate their address in introducing a new superstition to support the old, a *reason* for that introduced support. This was a fetch of policy worthy of an Egyptian priesthood.

But let us hear what the ancients in general have to say concerning the beginning of *brute worship*. Now the ancients having generally mistaken the origin of *hieroglyphics*, it is no wonder they should be mistaken in this likewise: and how much they were mistaken, their diversity and inconstancy of opinion plainly show us: and yet, amidst this diversity, the cause here assigned hath escaped them; which had otherwise, 'tis probable, put an end to all farther conjecture. But as they chanced to fall into a variety of wrong opinions, it will be incumbent on me to examine and confute them. What I can at present recollect as any way deserving notice, are the following:

They suppose brute worship to have arisen,

1. From the *benefits* men receive of animals.
2. From the doctrine of the *metempsychosis*.
3. From the use of *asterisms*.
4. From the notion of God's *pervading all things*.
5. From the use of animals as *symbols* of the divine nature.

\* *ἡσυχία γὰρ τοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς γινώσκοντας θεοὺς, ἐλπίδας ὄντας καὶ κατισχυμένους ὑπὸ τοῦ πλῆθους καὶ τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῶν γυναικῶν ἀνδράπων, ὁμιλεῖσθαι τισὶ τῶν ζώων, καὶ διὰ τοῦ τοιούτου τρέψαι διαφορὰν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ βίαν αὐτῶν· ὅστις δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὸν κόσμον πάντων κρατῆστατος καὶ τοῖς αἰτίαις τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς σωτηρίας χάριν ἀποδίδοντας, ἀφικεῖσθαι τὰς φύσεις αὐτῶν οὕτως ἀφαιμαλῆσαι.*—Lib. i. p. 54.

† *Τὸ σύνολον τὴν περὶ τὰ πάθη τῶν θεῶν ἱστορίαν.*—Lib. i.

‡ *Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 316, &c.*

6. From the invention of a certain Egyptian king for his private ends of *policy*.

These, I think, are all the opinions of moment. And of these, we may observe in general, that the fourth and fifth are least wide of the truth, as making brute worship *symbolical*: but the defect, common to them all, is that the reason assigned by each concludes for the universality of this worship throughout paganism; whereas it was in fact peculiar to Egypt; and seen and owned to be so by these very ancients themselves.

1. The first opinion is that we find in CICEERO,\* who supposes the original to be a *grateful sense of benefits received from animals*.

(1.) This labours under all the defects of an inadequate cause, as concluding both too much, and too little: too much; because, on this ground, brute worship would have been common to all nations; but it was peculiar to the Egyptian and its colonies: too little; because on this ground none but useful animals should have been worshipped; whereas several of the most useless and noxious† were held sacred. (2.) *Plant worship* must then, in the nature of things, have been prior to, or at least coëval with, that of *brutes*. But it was much later; and, on our theory, we see how this came to pass; the *vegetable* world would not be explored, to find out hieroglyphical analogies, till the *animal* had been exhausted.

2. Neither could *the doctrine of the metempsychosis*, mentioned by DIODORUS,‡ be the origin of brute worship: 1. Because that opinion was common to all nations; but brute worship peculiar to Egypt. The doctrine of the *metempsychosis* flourishes, at this day, with greater vigour in India, than, perhaps, it ever did in any place or age of the world: yet it occasions no worship, or religious veneration to those animals which are supposed the receptacles of departed souls. A very excessive charity towards them it does indeed afford. And this is the more remarkable, not only as this people are sunk into the most sordid superstitions, but because, having learnt animal worship of Egypt,§ if the doctrine of the *metempsychosis* had any natural tendency to inflame that superstition, they had by this time been totally devoted to it. 2. Because the hypothesis which makes *transmigration* the origin of brute worship, must suppose brutes to be venerated as the receptacle of *human* souls become deified: but the ancient Egyptians deified none but *heroic* and *demonic* souls: and souls of this order were not supposed subject to the common law of the *metempsychosis*.|| 3. The intrusion

\* See note R R R, at the end of this book.

† See note S S S, at the end of this book.

‡ Diodorus delivers this original, in his account of the superstitious worship of Apis: Τῆς δὲ τοῦ βόδις τούτου τιμῆς αἰτίαν ἔναι φέρουσι, λέγοντες ὅτι τελευτήσας Ὀσίριδος, εἰς τὸν αὐτοῦ ψυχὴ μετέστη, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα διατελεῖ μέχρι τοῦ νῦν αἰὶ κατὰ τὰς ἀναδείξεις αὐτοῦ μυσταμῖν πρὸς τοὺς μεταγινιστίους.—Lib. i. p. 54.

§ As appears from hence, that those few animals, which are the objects of their religious worship, are such as were formerly most revered in Egypt; and into such, no souls are doomed by the law of transmigration; the reason of which we shall see presently.

|| The difference between *heroic*, *demonic*, and *human* souls, as it was conceived by the most early pagans, will be explained hereafter.

of those souls into brutal bodies, according to the law of transmigration, was understood to be a punishment for crimes. Their prison-house therefore could never become the object of adoration; but rather of aversion and abhorrence; as all *subterraneous* fire was amongst the ancient Romans, and as that of *purgatory* is amongst the modern. 4. Lastly, the doctrine of the *metempsychosis* was much later than the first practice of brute worship; and evidently invented to remove objections against providence,\* when men began to speculate and philosophise. What seems to have given birth to this opinion of the origin of brute worship, was the fancy of the later Egyptians, that the soul of Osiris resided in the Apis. Diodorus himself supports the conjecture: for, reckoning up the several opinions concerning the origin of brute worship, when he comes to that of the *metempsychosis*, he delivers it in a popular relation of the soul of Osiris residing in the Apis.

3. The third opinion we find to be favoured by LUCIAN:† which is, that *the Egyptian invention of distinguishing the constellations, and marking each of them with the name of some animal, gave the first occasion to brute worship*. But, 1. the same objection lies against this solution as against the two preceding: for this way of distinguishing the asterisms was in use in all nations; but brute worship was confined to Egypt and its colonies. 2. This way of solving the difficulty creates a greater: for then nothing will be left in antiquity,‡ to account for so extraordinary a custom as the giving to one constellation the form of a ram, to another the form of a scorpion, &c., when, in the apparent disposition of those stars, there was not so much resemblance to any one part of any one animal as was sufficient to set the fancy on work to make out the rest. But if, for distinction's sake, those things were to have a name which had no shape,§ why then, as being of such regard from their supposed influences, were they not rather honoured with the titles of their heroes than of their brutes? Would the polite Egyptian priests, who first animalized the asterisms, do like Tom Otter in the comedy, bring their *bulls* and *bears* to court? would they exalt them into heaven, before they had made any considerable figure upon earth? The fact is, indeed, just otherwise. It was brute worship which gave birth to the asterisms. That the constellations were first named and

\* See vol. i. book III. sect. 3.

† Οἱ δὲ [Αἰγύπτιοι] καὶ ἄλλα ἱμάσαντο πολλῇ μίջω τοῦτων· ἐν γὰρ δὴ τοῦ παντός ἥρος, καὶ ἀστέρων τῶν ἄλλων, ἀπλανίαν τι καὶ ὑστάθιον, καὶ οὐδ' ἅμα κινούμενον, δωδίκῃ μοίρᾳ ἱτάμενον ἐν ταῖσι κινουμένοις, καὶ οἰκίᾳ ζῶα ἴοντα, ἱκαστοὶ αὐτῶν ἐς ἄλλην μορφήν μιμιμιάται· ἀπὸ τίνος δὲ καὶ ἡρὰ τὰ Αἰγύπτια πολυιδία ποιήσας· οὐ γὰρ πάντες Αἰγύπτιοι ἐν τῶν δωδίκῃ μορίων σπορίαν ἱκαστεύοντο, ἄλλοι δὲ, ἀλλοίῃσι μοίρῃσι ἰχθύοντο· καὶ πρὶν μὲν σίβουσαν, ἐκείνη ἐς πρὶν ἀσπίβλιπον· ἰχθύας δὲ οὐ σιτίονται, ἐκείνη ἰχθύας ἰσισημήναντο· οὐδὲ τράγον κτείουσιν, ἵνα αἰγόνιστον ἔδωκαν—καὶ μὴν καὶ ταῦρον ἐς τιμὴν τοῦ ἡγίου Ταύρου σιβάζονται.—De Astrologia, l. II. p. 363, edit. Reitzii, Amst. 4to. 1743.

‡ I say, in antiquity: for as to the solution of this point by the liberty of imagining, nothing is more easy. The French author of the History of the Heavens has, by the mere force of imagination, removed all these difficulties; not only without any support from antiquity, but even in defiance of it.

§ Ἐθία σημαίνειν ἔφαρ' ὃ ὀνόματα γίνονται  
Ἄστρα - - - Anal. in φαιωμ.

distinguished by the Egyptians, is agreed on all hands: that they were much later than the beginning of brute worship, is as evident; the confused multitude of stars not being thus sorted into bands, till the Egyptian priests had made some considerable progress in astronomy: but brute worship, we know from scripture, was prior to the time of Moses. When they began to collect the stars into constellations, a name was necessary to keep up the combination; and animals, now become the religious symbols of their gods, afforded the aptest means for that purpose: for, 1. it did honour to their heroes: 2. it supported their *astrology* (which always went along, and was often confounded with, their *astronomy*), it being understood to imply that their country gods had now taken up their residence in constellations of benignant influence.

4. Nor is there any better foundation for the fourth opinion; which is that of PORPHYRY;\* who supposes that *the doctrine of God's pervading all things was the original of brute worship*. But, 1. It proves too much: for according to this notion, every thing would have been the object of divine worship amongst the early Egyptians; but we know many were not. 2. According to this notion, nothing could have been the object of their execration; but we know many were. This notion was never an opinion of the people, but of a few of the learned only: 4. And those, not of the learned of Egypt, but of Greece. In a word, this pretended original of brute worship was only an invention of their late philosophers, to hide the deformities, and to support the credit of declining paganism.

5. Akin to this, and invented for the same end, is what we find in JAMBLICHUS;† namely, *That brutes were deified only as the symbols of the first Cause, considered in all his attributes and relations*. Groundless as this fancy is, yet as it is embraced by our best philologists; such as Cudworth, Vossius, and Kircher, on the faith of those fanatic and inveterate enemies to Christianity, Porphyry and Jamblichus, I shall endeavour to expose it as it deserves. This will be the best done by considering the rise and order of the *three great species of idolatry*. The first, in time, was, as we have shown, the worship of the *heavenly bodies*; and this continued unmixed till the institution of political society: then, another species arose, the deification of *dead kings and law-givers*. Such was the course of idolatry in all places as well as in Egypt: but there, the method of recording the history of their hero-gods, in improved *hieroglyphics*, gave birth to the third species of idola-

\* Ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης ἐρμώμιναι τῆς ἀσκήσιας, καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸ θῆον οἰκισίας, ἴγνωσαν, ὡς οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπων μόνον τὸ θῆον διῆλθαι, αὐτοὶ ψυχὰς ἐν μένῃ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπὶ γῆς κατοικῆσαι, ἀλλὰ σχιδὸν ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ πάντων διῆλθαι τῶν ζώων. Διὸ εἰς τὴν θιοποιεῖν παρέλαβον πᾶν ζῶον.—De Abst. lib. iv,

† Πρότερον δὲ σοι βούλομαι τῶν Αἰγυπτίων τὸν τρόπον τῆς θιολογίας διεμνηῖναι. Οὗτοι γὰρ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ παντός, καὶ τὴν δημιουργίαν τῶν θιῶν μιμούμενοι, καὶ αὐτοὶ τῶν μυστικῶν καὶ ἀποκρυφικῶν καὶ ἀφανῶν νοήσεων εἰκόνας τινας διὰ συμβόλων ἐμφαίνουσιν, ὥστε καὶ ὁ φύσις ταῖς ἐμφανίσιν ἰδῆσι τοὺς ἀφανῆς λόγους διὰ συμβόλων, τρόπον τινα, ἀπεικονίσαντο ἢ δὲ τῶν θιῶν δημιουργία, τὴν ἀλάθειαν τῶν ἰδῶν διὰ τῶν φανερῶν εἰκότων ἀπὸ γράψαντο. Εἰδότες οὖν χρηρῶντα πάντα τὰ κρείττενα ὁμοίωσι τῶν ὑποδιεστῶν, καὶ βουλόμενοι αὐτὰ ἀγαθὸν οὕτω πλεονεῖν διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν μιμήσεως, εἰκότας καὶ αὐτοὶ τὸν πρόσφορον αὐταῖς τρόπον τῆς εἰκονομίας ἐν ταῖς συμβόλοις μυσταγωγίας προσέφερον.—De Myst. Ægypt. sect. 7, cap. i.

try, *brute worship*; and this was peculiar to Egypt and its colonies. Now as the method used by all nations, of ingrafting *hero worship* on *star worship*, occasioned the philologists to mistake\* the former as symbolical of the latter; so the method, used by the Egyptians, mentioned a little before, of supporting brute worship, which was really symbolical of their hero gods, made the same writers think it to be originally symbolical of star gods, and even of the first Cause. Thus the very learned Vossius fell into two mistakes: 1. That hero worship was symbolical of star worship: 2. That brute worship was symbolical of it likewise. The consequence of which was, that the system of physical theology, which was, indeed, one of the last sciences of the Egyptian *school*, was supposed to be the first; and hero worship, which was indeed the first religion of the Egyptian *church*, was supposed to be the last. This is no more than saying, that, for reasons given before, the magistrate would very early institute the worship of their dead benefactors, and that the philosopher could have no occasion, till many ages afterwards, when men grew inquisitive or licentious, to hide the ignominy of it, by making those hero gods only shadowy beings, and no more than emblems of the several parts of nature.†

Now though the doctrine of this early *physical theology*, as explained by the Greeks, makes very much for the high antiquity of Egyptian learning, the point I am concerned to prove; yet as my only end is truth, in all these inquiries, I can, with the same pleasure, confute an error which supports my system, that I have in detecting those which made against it.

The common notion of these philologists, we see, brings hero worship, by consequence, very low; and as some of their followers have pursued that consequence, I shall beg leave to examine their reasonings. The learned author of the *Connections* pushes the matter very far:—"It does not appear from this table [the *Bembine*] that the Egyptians worshipped any idols of human shape, at the time when this table was composed; but rather, on the contrary, all the images herein represented, before which any persons are described in postures of adoration, being the figures of birds, beasts, or fishes; this table seems to have been delineated BEFORE the Egyptians worshipped the images of men and women; WHICH WAS THE LAST AND LOWEST STEP OF THEIR IDOLATRY."‡ Now the whole of this observation will, I am afraid, only amount to an *illogical consequence* drawn from a *false fact*; let the reader judge. *All the images*, he says, *herein represented, before which any persons are described, in postures of adoration, are the figures of birds, beasts, and fishes*. I was some time in doubt whether the learned writer and I had seen the same table: for in that given us by Kircher, the whole body of the picture is filled up with the greater Egyptian gods in HUMAN SHAPE; before several of which, are other human figures in postures of adoration; unless the learned writer will confine

\* See book iii. sect. 6.

† See note T T T, at the end of this book.

‡ Secr. and Prof. Hist. of the World connected, vol. ii. p. 320.

that posture to kneeling; which yet he brings no higher than the time of Solomon.\* Some of these worshippers are represented *sacrificing*;† others in the act of offering; and offering to gods enthroned.‡ One of which figures I have caused to be engraved,§ where a mummy from Kircher's *Œdipus*|| will show us what sort of idol it is which we see worshipped by offerings.¶ With regard to the kneeling postures of adoration, to birds, beasts, and fishes, these are in a narrow border of the table, which runs round the principal compartments. The learned writer indeed seems to make a matter of it, "that all the images that kneel are represented as paying their worship to some animal figure; there not being one instance or representation of this worship paid to an image of human form, either on the border or in the table."\*\* But surely there is no mystery in this. The table was apparently made for the devotees of Isis in Rome.†† Now, amongst the Romans, brute worship was so uncommon, that the artist thought proper to mark it out by the most distinguished posture of adoration; while the worship of the greater hero-gods, a worship like their own, was sufficiently designed by the sole acts of offering and sacrifice.

But supposing the fact to have been as the writer of these *Connections* represents it; how, I ask, would his consequence follow, *that the table was made BEFORE the Egyptians worshipped the images of men and women*? It depends altogether on this supposition, that brute worship was not symbolical of hero worship; but the contrary hath been shown. The learned author himself must own that Apis, at least, was the *symbol* of the hero-god Osiris. But can any one believe, he was not worshipped in his own figure before he was delineated under that of an ox? To say the truth, had this author's fact been right, it had been a much juster consequence, *that the table was made AFTER the Egyptians had generally left off worshipping the images of men and women*; for it is certain, the symbolic worship of brutes brought human images into disuse. Who can doubt but human images of hero-gods were used in Egypt long before the time of Strabo? yet he tells us, ‡‡ that in their temples (of which he gives a general description) they either had no images, or none of human form, but of some beast. He could not mean in those temples dedicated to animals; for where had been the wonder of that? nor will this disuse of human images appear strange to those who reflect on what hath been said of these *symbols*, which being supposed given by the gods themselves, their use in religious worship would be thought most pleasing to the givers.

This conclusion is further strengthened by these considerations: 1.

\* Sacr. and Prof. Hist. of the World connected, vol. ii. p. 320.

† As at [S. V.]

‡ As at [T. †.] [O. 2.] and [S. X.]

§ See Plate IX. fig. 1.

|| Fig. 2.

¶ Fig. 1.

\*\* Sacr. and Prof. Hist. of the World connected, vol. ii. p. 312.

†† See note U U U, at the end of this book.

‡‡ Τῆς δὲ κατασκευῆς τῶν ἱερῶν ἡ διάβρισις τοιαύτη. Κατὰ τὴν εἰσβολὴν τὴν εἰς τὰ εἴματα, &c.———μικτὰ δὲ τὰ προπύλαια, ὁ πῶς πρόσαι ἔχον μίγαν, καὶ ἀξόλογον· τὸν δὲ σκεπὸν σάμμιτρον, ἔχον δὲ οὐδὲν, ἢ οὐκ ἀνθρωπόμορφον, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων τινός.—Geogr. lib. xvii. pp. 1158, 1159. Amst. ed.



That the age of the *table* is so far from being of the antiquity conceived by the learned writer, that it is the very latest of all the old Egyptian monuments; as appears from the mixture of all kinds of hieroglyphic characters in it. 2. That on almost all the obelisks\* in Kircher's *Theatrum Hieroglyphicum*, which are undoubtedly very ancient, we see adoration given to idols in human form; and likewise in that very way the learned author so much insists upon, namely, *genuflexion*.

Thus, though from the *Bembinæ table* nothing can be concluded for the high date of heroic image-worship, yet nothing can be concluded for the low. However the learned writer will still suppose (what every one is so apt to do) that he is in the right; and therefore tries to maintain his ground by fact and reason.

His argument from *fact* stands thus:—"The Egyptians relate a very remarkable fable of the birth of these five gods. They say that Rhea lay privately with Saturn, and was with child by him; that the sun, upon finding out her baseness, laid a curse upon her, that she should not be delivered in any month or year: that Mercury being in love with the goddess lay with her also; and then played at dice with the moon, and won from her the seventy-second part of each day, and made up of these winnings five days, which he added to the year, making the year to consist of three hundred and sixty-five days, which before consisted of three hundred and sixty days only; and that in these days Rhea brought forth five children, Osiris, Orus, Typho, Isis, and Nephthe. We need not inquire into the mythology of this fable; what I remark from it is this, that the fable could not be invented before the Egyptians had found out that the year consisted of three hundred and sixty-five days, and consequently that by their own accounts the five deities said to be born on the five *επιπλέοντες*, or additional days, were not deified before they knew that the year had these five days added to it; and this addition to the year was made about A. M. 2665, a little after the death of Joshua."†

I agree with this learned author, that *the fable could not be invented before the Egyptians had found out that the year consisted of three hundred and sixty-five days*; I agree with him, that *the addition of the five days might be made about A. M. 2665*; but I deny the consequence, that *the five gods were not deified before this addition to the year*; nay, I deny that it will follow from the fable, that the makers and venders of it so thought. What hath misled the learned writer seems to be his supposing that the fable was made to commemorate the deification of the five gods, whereas it was made to commemorate the insertion of the five days; as appears from its being told in that figurative and allegoric manner in which the Egyptians usually conveyed the history of their science: and it was ever the way of antiquity, to make the gods a party, in order to give the greater reverence to the inventions of men. A design to

\* Namely, the Lateran of Rameses, the Flaminian of Psammithus, the Sallustian, and the Constantinopolitan.

† Connect. vol. ii. pp. 283, 284.

commemorate the *time of deification* was so absurd a thing in the politics of a pagan priest, that we can never believe he had any thing of that kind in view: it was his business to throw the Godhead back before all time; or at least to place it from time immemorial. But admitting the maker of this fable intended to celebrate in general the history of these five gods, can we think that he, who was hunting after the marvellous, would confine his invention within the inclosure of dates? a matter too of so dangerous a nature to be insisted on. We know (and we now, partly, see the reason of it) that the ancient mythologists affected to confound all chronology; a mischief which hath so shaken the crazy edifice of ancient times, that the best chronologists have rather buried themselves in its ruins, than been able to lead others through it: besides, it is evident that new lies were every year told of their old gods. Let him who doubts of this, consider what additions following poets and theologers have made to the fables which Homer and Hesiod had recorded of the gods; additions, seen, by their very circumstances, not to have been invented when those ancient bards sung of their intrigues. In these later fables we frequently find the gods of Greece and Egypt concerned in adventures, whose dates, if measured by determined synchronisms, would bring down their births to ages even lower than their long established worship. The not attending to this has, as will be seen hereafter, egregiously misled the incomparable Sir Isaac Newton in his *Ancient Chronology*. Thus the same author,\* Plutarch tells us, in the same place, of another Egyptian fable which makes *Typhon beget Hierosolymus and Judæus*.† But what then? must we believe, that Typhon was no earlier than the name of Judæus? must we not rather conclude, that this was a late story invented of him out of hatred and contempt of the Hebrews?

In a word, this practice of adding new mythology to their old divinity was so notorious, that the learned *Connector of sacred and profane history* could not himself forbear taking notice of it: “The Egyptians,” says he, “having first called their heroes by the names of their *siderial* and *elementary* deities, ADDED IN TIME TO THE HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND ACTIONS OF SUCH HEROES, A MYTHOLOGICAL *account of their philosophical opinions* concerning the gods whose names had been given to such heroes.”‡

“But,” says this writer, “had *Osiris, Orus, Typho, Isis, and Nephthé*, been esteemed deities before this additional length of the year was apprehended, *we should not have had this, but some other fabulous account of their birth transmitted to us.*”§ Here the premises and conclusion are severally propped up by two false suppositions; the premises, by this, that the fable was invented to *commemorate the origin of these*

\* Is. et Os.

† Tacitus seems to allude to this paltry fable: *Quidam, regnante Iside, exundantem per Ægyptum multitudinem, ducibus Hierosolyma et Juda, proximas in terras exoneratam.*—Hist. lib. v. cap. 2.

‡ Connect. vol. ii. pp. 300, 301.

§ lb. p. 284.

gods; and the conclusion, by this, that we have no *other fabulous account of their birth*.

From fact, the learned writer comes to reason; and speaking of the Egyptian hero-gods, who, he supposes, were antediluvian mortals, he says:—"But I do not imagine they were deified until about this time of correcting the year; for when this humour first began, it is not likely that they made gods of men but just dead, of whose infirmities and imperfections many persons might be living witnesses: but they took the names of their first ancestors, whom they had been taught to honour for ages, and whose fame had been growing by the increase of tradition, and all whose imperfections had been long buried, that it might be thought they never had any.—It is hard to be conceived that a set of men could ever be chosen by their contemporaries to have divine honours paid them, whilst numerous persons were alive, who knew their imperfections, or who themselves or their immediate ancestors might have as fair a pretence, and come in competition with them. Alexander the Great had but ill success in his attempt to make the world believe him the son of Jupiter Ammon; nor could Numa Pompilius, the second king of Rome, make Romulus's translation to heaven so firmly believed, as not to leave room for subsequent historians to report him killed by his subjects. Nor can I conceive that Julius Cæsar's canonization, though it was contrived more politically, would ever have stood long indisputable, if the light of Christianity had not appeared so soon after this time as it did, and impaired the credit of the heathen superstitions. The fame of deceased persons must have ages to grow up to heaven, and divine honours cannot be given with any show of DECENCY, but by a late posterity."\*

He says, *it is not likely they made gods of men but just dead, of whose infirmities and imperfections many persons might be living witnesses*. How *likely* shall be considered presently; but that they did in fact do so, is too plain, methinks, to be denied. The learned Eusebius, a competent judge (if ever there was any) of ancient fact, delivers it as a notorious truth, that in the early ages, those who excelled in wisdom, strength, or valour, who had eminently contributed to the common safety, or had greatly advanced the arts of life, were either deified during life, or immediately on their decease:† this he had reason to believe, for he had good authority, the venerable history of Sanchoniathon the Phenician: which gives a very particular account of the origin of hero-worship, and expressly says the deification was immediate: and surely, when men were become so foolish as to make gods of their

\* Connect. vol. ii. pp. 286, 287.

† —τρίται δὲ ἄλλοι, σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ γῆς ῥίψαντες· τοὺς ἐπὶ στίβῳ τῶν κατ' αὐτοὺς προφῆων κυρμίνους, ἢ καὶ ῥώμῃ σώματος, καὶ δυναστείας ἰσχύι τῶν πλείονων ἐπιερωτήσαντας, γόγγυσάς τινας, ἢ τυράντους, ἢ καὶ γοήτας, καὶ φαρμακίας ἀνδρας, ἢ τινος τῶν θυοτέρων ἀποστέσιος, τὰς κακοτίχους γοητίας συνσκευασμένους· ἢ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κακῆς εἰς τινος καὶ βιωφιλῶς ἐνεργείας προάραντας, ζῶντάς τι ἴτι καὶ μετὰ τελευτῇ θεοὺς ἐπιφῆμισαν.—Pier. Evang. lib. ii. cap. 5.

fellow creatures, the *likeliest*, as well as most excusable season was, while the heat of gratitude, for new-invented blessings, kept glowing in their hearts; or, at least, while the sense of those blessings was yet fresh and recent in their memories; in a word, while they were warmed with that enthusiastic *love* and *admiration* which our great poet so sublimely describes:

'Twas virtue only (or in arts or arms,  
Diffusing blessings, or averting harms)  
The same, which in a sire the sons obey'd,  
A prince, the father of a people made.  
On him their second providence they hung,  
Their law his eye, their oracle his tongue.  
He from the wond'ring furrow call'd the food;  
Taught to command the fire, control the flood,  
Draw forth the monsters of th' abyss profound,  
And fetch th' aerial eagle to the ground."\*

Was there any wonder in this, that he who taught mankind to subject all the elements to their use, should, by a rude admiring multitude, be adjudged a being of a superior order?

*But they took the names of their first ancestors, whose fame had been growing up by the increase of tradition.* Without doubt, the ancestors, men deified, and which, as being extremely early, may be called the *first*, had a very large and spreading reputation. But how was this procured but by an early apotheosis? which, by making them the continual subject of hymns and panegyrics, preserved them from the oblivion of those unlettered ages: and in fact, the fame of all, but those so deified, was very soon extinct and forgotten.

—*And all whose imperfections had been long buried, that it might be thought they never had any.* By this, one would be apt to think that the hero-gods of Greece and Egypt, whose deification the learned writer would bring thus low, had nothing unseemly told of them in their legends: which, were it true, the argument would have some weight. But what schoolboy has not read of the rogueries which the pagan worshippers have every where recorded of their gods? Are not these a convincing proof of their deification by that very age which saw both their virtues and their vices; but, with the fondness of times newly obliged, saw nothing but in an honourable light;† and so unhappily canonized both the good and the bad together, and, in that condition, delivered them all down to posterity? Not that I suppose (for I have just shown the contrary) that late poets and mythologists did not add to the tales of their forefathers. I can hardly believe Jupiter to have been guilty of all the adulteries told of him in Ovid: but this one may safely say, that unless he had been a famed adulterer, in early tradition, his later worshippers had never dared to invent so many odious stories of the *sire of gods and men*.

\* Essay on man, Ep. iii.

† —Quæ ista justitia est, nobis succensere, quòd talia dicimus de diis eorum; et sibi non succensere, qui hæc in theatris libentissimè spectant crimina deorum suorum? et quod esset incredibile, nisi contestatissime probaretur, hæc ipsa theatra crimina deorum suorum IN HONOREM INSTITUTA SUNT eorundem eorum.—August. de Civit. Dei, lib. iv. c. 10.

But, it is hard to be conceived that they should have divine honours immediately paid them, because their contemporaries might have as fair a pretence, and come in competition with them. I understood that none were deified but those whose benefits to their fellow citizens, or to mankind at large, were very eminent; and that *all* with these pretensions were deified; so that I scarce know what to make of this observation.

— But *Alexander and Cæsar's apotheoses were scorned and laughed at.*\* And so they deserved. For if they, or their flatterers for them, would needs affect deification in a learned and enlightened age and place, no other could be expected from so absurd an attempt. But then those, who knew better how to lay a religious project, found no impediment from their *nearness* to its execution. Thus Odin,† about this very Cæsar's time, aspired to immediate worship amongst a rude and barbarous people (the only scene for playing the farce with success), and had as good fortune in it, as either Osiris, Jupiter, or Belus.

— *Nor could Numa Pompilius make Romulus's translation to heaven so firmly believed, as not to leave room for subsequent historians to report him killed by his subjects.* Here the writer, conscious that antiquity opposed his hypothesis of the *late* deification of their early heroes, with many glaring examples to the contrary, has thought fit to produce one‡ which he fancied he could deal with. *Romulus's translation was never so firmly believed but that* SUBSEQUENT HISTORIANS, &c. As if at all times speculative men did not see the origin of their best established hero-gods: as if we could forget, what the learned writer himself takes care to tell us in this very place, that *Euhemerus Messenius wrote a book to prove the ancient gods of the heathen world to have been only their ancient kings and commanders.*

*The fame of deceased persons, says he, must have ages to grow up to heaven.—Must!* that is, in spite of a barbarous multitude, who would make gods of them out of hand; in spite of ancient story, which tells us plainly, they had their wicked wills.

— *And divine honours cannot be given with any show of decency but by a late posterity.* It must be confessed the ancients observed much decency when, in the number of their greater gods, they admitted ravishers, adulterers, pathics, vagabonds, thieves, and murderers.

But now the learned writer, in toiling to bring hero-worship thus low, draws a heavier labour on himself; to invent some probable cause of the apotheosis: that warmth of gratitude for godlike benefits received, which ancient history had so satisfactorily assigned for the cause, being now quite out of date. For when gratitude is suffered to cool for many

\* Plutarch uses this very argument against Euhemerus, to prove that their country gods never were mortal men.—Περὶ 12. καὶ OZ. p. 641.

† Odinus supremus est et antiquissimus Asarum, qui omnes res gubernat; atque etiam si ceteri dii potentes sint, omnes tamen ipsi inserviunt, ut patri liberi.—Cum Pompeius dum quidam Romanorum Orientem bellis infestaret, Odinus ex Asia huc in septentrionem fugit.—Edda Snorronis apud Thom. Bartholin. de Antiq. Danic. pp. 648 et 652.

‡ See note X X X, at the end of this book.

§ P. 288. See the Divine Legation, book iii. sect. 6.

ages, there will want some very strong machine to draw these mortals up to heaven. However, our author has supplied them with a most splendid vehicle. "Some ages after," says he, "they descended to worship heroes or dead men.—The most celebrated deities they had of this sort were Cronus, Rhea, Osiris, Orus, Typhon, Isis, and Nephthe; and these persons were said to be deified upon an opinion that, at their deaths, their souls migrated into some *STAR*, and became the animating spirit of some luminous and heavenly body: this the Egyptian priests expressly asserted.—Let us now see when the Egyptians first consecrated these hero-gods, or deified mortals. To this I answer, Not before they took notice of the appearances of the particular *stars* which they appropriated to them. Julius Cæsar was not canonized until the appearance of the *Julium sidus*, nor could the *Phenicians* have any notion of the divinity of Cronus until they made some observations of the *star* which they imagined he was removed into."\*

He says, *the Egyptian priests* EXPRESSLY ASSERTED *that these persons were said to be deified* upon an opinion *that at their death their souls migrated into some star*. And for this he quotes a passage out of Plutarch's tract of *Isis and Osiris*; which I shall give the reader in Plutarch's own words, that he may judge for himself. Speaking of the tombs of the gods, he says: *But the priests affirm not only of these, but of all the other gods, of that tribe which were not unbegotten nor immortal, that their dead bodies are deposited amongst them and preserved with great care, but that their souls illuminate the stars in heaven.*† All here *asserted* is that the Egyptians thought the souls of their hero-gods had migrated into some star; but not the least intimation that *they were deified upon this opinion of their migration*. These are two very different things. The opinion of their migration might, for any thing said by Plutarch, be an after superstition; nay we shall make it very probable that it was so: for the *connector* not resting on this authority, as indeed he had small reason, casts about for some plausible occasion, how men come to be deified upon so strange *an opinion*; and this he makes to be *their FIRST notice of the appearance of a particular star*. But how the new appearance of a star should make men suppose the soul of a dead ancestor was got into it, and so become a god, is as hard to conceive as how Tenterden steeple should be the cause of Goodwin-Sands. Indeed it was natural enough to imagine such an *ἐπιφάνεια*, when the cultivation of *judicial astrology* had aided a growing superstition to believe, that their tutelary god had chosen the convenient residence of a culminating star, in order to shed his best influence on his own race or people. This seems to be the truth of the case: and this, I believe, was all the Egyptian priests, in Plutarch, meant to say.

\* Connect. vol. ii. pp. 281, 282, 283.

† Οὐ μόνον δὲ τούτων οἱ ἱερεῖς λήγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν, ὅσοι μὴ ἀγέννητοι καὶ ἀφθάρτοι, τὰ μὲν σώματα παρ' αὐτοῖς κῆραι κατέοντα καὶ διακινεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ἐν οὐρανῷ λάμπειν ἄστρα.—Pag. 640. edit. Steph. 8vo.



But from a *sufficient cause*, this *new appearance* is become (before the conclusion of the paragraph) the *only cause* of deification: *Julius Cæsar was not canonized until the appearance of the Julium sidus: nor could the Phenicians have any notion of the divinity of Cronus until they made some observations of the star which they imagined he was removed into.* As to Cæsar's apotheosis, it was a vile imitation of those viler flatteries of Alexander's successors in Greece and Egypt; and the *Julium sidus* an incident of no other consequence than to save his sycophants from blushing. But abandoned courtiers and prostitute senates never wait for the declaration of heaven: and when the slaves of Rome sent a second tribe of monsters to replenish the constellations, we find that Augustus, Tiberius, Claudius, &c., who rose into gods as they sunk below humanity, had no more stars in their favour than Teague in the Committee. But of all cases, the Phenicians' seems the hardest: who with their infinite superstitions could yet have no notion of Cronus's divinity, till they had read his fortune in his star. I am so utterly at a loss to know what this can mean, that I will only say, if the reader cannot see how they might come by this notion another way, then, either he has read, or I have written, a great deal to very little purpose.

6. We come now to the last cause assigned by the ancients for brute worship, as we find it in EUSEBIUS;\* namely, That it was the invention of a certain king, for his private ends of policy, to establish in each city the exclusive worship of a different animal, in order to prevent confederacies and combinations against his government. That an Egyptian king did in fact contrive such a political institution one may safely allow, because, on this very supposition, it will appear that brute worship had another and prior original. For it is not the way of politicians to invent new religions, but to turn those to advantage which they find already in use. The cunning, therefore, of this Egyptian monarch consisted in founding a new institution of *intolerance*, upon an old established practice in each city of different *animal worship*. But supposing this king of so peculiar a strain of policy that he would needs invent a new religion; How happened it that he did not employ *hero worship* to this purpose (so natural a superstition that it became universal) rather than the whimsical and monstrous practice of *brute worship*, not symbolical, when direct hero worship would have served his purpose so much better; religious zeal for the exclusive honour of a dead citizen being likely to rise much higher than reverence to a compatriot animal? The only solution of the difficulty is this, brute worship being then the favourite superstition of the people, the politic monarch chose that for the foundation of his contrivance. So that we must needs conclude this pretended cause to be as defective as the rest.

These were the reasons the Greek writers gave for *brute worship* in general. But besides these, they invented a thousand fanciful causes

\* See Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 385.

of the worship of this or that animal in particular ; which it would be to no purpose to recount.

On the whole, so little satisfaction did these writers afford to the learned Fourmont, who yet is for making something or other out of every rag of antiquity, which he can pick up and new-line with an etymology, that he frankly owns the true original of brute worship is the most difficult thing imaginable to find out ; *Si on nous demandoit, says he, de quel droit, tel ou tel dieu avoit sous lui tel ou tel animal, pour certain, rien de plus difficile à deviner.\**

However, amidst this confusion, the Greeks, we see, were modest. They fairly gave us their opinions, but forged no histories to support them. The Arabian writers were of another caste : it was their way to free themselves from these perplexities by telling a story : thus Abennephi, being at a loss to account for the Egyptian worship of a fly, invents this formal tale, that the Egyptians being greatly infested with these insects, consulted the oracle, and were answered, that they must pay them divine honours. *See then, says this dexterous writer, the reason of our finding so many on the obelisks and pyramids.*

But of all the liberties taken with remote antiquity, sure nothing ever equalled that of a late French writer, whose book, entitled, *HISTOIRE DU CIEL*, accidentally fell into my hands as this sheet was going to the press, Kircher, bewildered as he was, had yet some ground for his rambles. He fairly followed antiquity : unluckily indeed, for him, it proved the *ignis fatuus* of antiquity ; so he was ridiculously misled. However, he had enough of that fantastic light to secure his credit as a fair writer. But here is a man who regards antiquity no more than if he thought it all imaginary, like his countryman, Hardouin. At least, he tells us in express words, that the study of the tedious and senseless writings of Herodotus, Plato, Diodorus, Plutarch, Porphyry, and such like, is all labour lost. The truth is, these volatile writers can neither rest in fact nor fable ; but are in letters what Tacitus's Romans were in civil government, who could neither bear a perfect freedom, nor a thorough slavery.† Only with this additional perversity, that when the inquiry is after truth they betray a strange propensity to fable ; and when fable is their professed subject, they have as untimely an appetite for truth ; thus, in that philosophical romance called *La vie de Sethos*, we find a much juster account of old Egyptian wisdom than in all the pretended *Histoire du Ciel*. This historian's system is, that all the civil and religious customs of antiquity sprung up from AGRICULTURE ; nay that the very gods and goddesses themselves were but a part of this all-bounteous harvest :‡

*Nec ulla interea est inarata gratia terræ.*

Now the two most certain facts in antiquity are these, “ that the idola-

\* *Refl. Crit. sur les Histoires des Anciens Peuples*, livre ii. sect. 4.

† This shows why LOCKE is no favourite of our historian. J'ai lû le *TRES-ENNUIEUX traité de LOCKE sur l'Entendement Humain*, &c.—Vol. i. pp. 387, 388.

‡ See pp. 99, 315, et passim, vol. i. ed. Par. 1739, 8vo.

trous worship of the **HEAVENLY BODIES** arose from the visible influence they have on sublunary things;" and "That the country gods of all the civilized nations were **DEAD MEN** deified, whose benefits to their fellow citizens, or to mankind at large, had procured them divine honours." Could the reader think either of these were likely to be denied by one who ever looked into an ancient book; much less by one who pretended to interpret antiquity? But neither gods nor men can stand before a *system*. This great adventurer assures us that the whole is a delusion; that antiquity knew nothing of the matter; that the *heavenly bodies* were not worshipped for their influences; that Osiris, Isis, Jupiter, Pluto, Neptune, Mercury, nay their very hero-gods, such as Hercules and Minos, were not *mortal men nor women*; nor indeed any thing but the letters of an ancient alphabet; the mere figures which composed the symbolic directions to the Egyptian husbandmen.\* And yet, after all this, he has the modesty to talk of **SYSTEMES BIZARRES**;† and to place the *Newtonian system* in that number. It would be impertinent to ask this writer, where was his regard to antiquity or to truth, when we see he has so little for the public, as to be wanting even in that mere respect due to every reader of common apprehension? and yet this *system*, begot by a delirious imagination on the dream of a lethargic pedant, is to be called *interpreting antiquity*.‡ However, as it is a work of entertainment, where **AGRICULTURE** has the top part in the piece, and antiquity is brought in only to decorate the scene, it should, methinks, be made as perfect as possible. Would it not therefore be a considerable improvement to it, if, instead of saying the Egyptian husbandmen found their gods in the symbolic directions for their labour, the ingenious author would suppose that they turned them up alive as they ploughed their furrows, just as the Etruscans found their god Tages:§ this would give his piece the *marvellous*, so necessary in works of this nature, corrected too by the probable, that is, some kind of support from antiquity, which it now totally wants. Besides, the moist glebe of Egypt, we know, when impregnated with a warm sun, was of old famed for hatching men|| and monsters.

To return. From what hath been last said, we conclude, that the true original of *brute worship* was the use of *symbolic writing*: and consequently, that symbols were extremely ancient; for brute worship was national in the days of MOSES. But symbols were invented for the

\* See note Y Y Y, at the end of this book.

† See p. 122 of his *Revision de l'Histoire du Ciel*.

‡ S'il y a même quelque chose de solide et de suivi dans l'histoire, que je vais donner de l'origine du ciel poétique, j'avoue que j'en suis redevable à l'explication ingénieuse, mais simple, par laquelle l'auteur des saturnelles [Macrob. Saturn. lib. i. cap. 17.] nous a éclairci l'origine du nom des ces deux signes.—Hist. du Ciel, vol. i. cap. i.

§ Tages quidam dicitur in agro Tarquiniensi, cum terra araretur et sulcus altius esset impressus, extitisse repente, et eum adfatus esse, qui arabas. Is autem Tages, ut in libris est Etruscorum, puerili specie dicitur visus, sed senili fuisse prudentia, &c.—Cic. de Div. lib. ii. cap. 23.

|| Δῆμος Ἐρμῆος μεγαλύτερος, ὃν ποτ' Ἀθήνη

Θεΐψι, Διὸς θυγάτηρ, ΤΕΚΕ δὲ ζῶντος ΑΡΟΤΡΑ.—Il. ii. ver. 54.

repository of Egyptian wisdom; therefore the Egyptians were very learned even from those early times: the point to be proved.

And now, had this long discourse on the *Egyptian hieroglyphics* done nothing but afford me this auxiliary proof, which my argument does not want, I should certainly have made it shorter. But it is of much use besides, for attaining a true idea of the EASTERN ELOCUTION (whose genius is greatly influenced by this kind of writing), and is therefore, I presume, no improper introduction to the present volume, whose subject is the religion and civil policy of the Hebrews. The excellent Mr Mede pointed to this use: and the learned Mr Daubuz endeavoured to prosecute his hint, at large; but falling into the visions of Kircher, he frustrated much of that service, which the application of hieroglyphic learning to scripture language would otherwise have afforded.

A farther advantage may be derived from this long discourse: it may open our way to the true Egyptian wisdom; which by reason of the general mistakes concerning the origin, use, and distinct species of hieroglyphic writing, hath been hitherto stopped up. The subject now lies ready for any diligent inquirer; and to such a one, whose greater advantages of situation, learning, and abilities, may make him more deserving of the public regard, I leave it to be pursued.

But whatever help this may afford us towards a better acquaintance with the ancient *Egyptian* wisdom, yet, what is a greater advantage, it will very much assist us in the study of the *Grecian*; and, after so many instances given of this use, one might almost venture to recommend these two grand vehicles of Egyptian learning and religion, the MYSTERIES treated of in the first volume, and the HIEROGLYPHICS in the present, as the cardinal points on which the interpretation of GREEK ANTIQUITY should from henceforth turn.

## SECT. V.

THE course of my argument now brings me to examine a new hypothesis against the high antiquity of Egypt, which hath the incomparable Sir ISAAC NEWTON for its patron; a man, for whose fame, science and virtue seemed to be at strife. The prodigious discoveries he had made in the *natural* world, and especially that superiority of genius which opened the way to those discoveries, hath induced some of his countrymen to think him as intimate with the *moral*; and even to believe with a late ingenious commentator on his Optics, that as every thing which Midas touched, turned to gold, so all that Newton handled turned to demonstration.

But the sublimest understanding has its bounds, and, what is more to be lamented, the strongest mind has its foible. And this miracle of science, who disclosed all nature to our view, when he came to correct old time, in the chronology of Egypt, suffered himself to be seduced, by

little lying Greek mythologists and story-tellers, from the *Goshen* of **MOSES**, into the thickest of the Egyptian darkness. So pestilent a mischief in the road to truth is a favourite hypothesis: an evil we have frequent occasion to lament, as it retards the progress of our inquiry at almost every step. For it is to be observed, that Sir Isaac's *Egyptian* chronology was fashioned only to support his *Grecian*; which he erected on one of those sublime conceptions peculiar to his amazing genius.

But it is not for the sake of any private system that I take upon me to consider the arguments of this illustrious man. The truth is, his discourse of *the empire of Egypt* contradicts every thing which **MOSES** and the **PROPHETS** have delivered concerning these ancient people. Though some therefore of his admirers may seem to think that no more harm can derive to religion by his contradicting the *history*, than by his overturning the *astronomy* of the Bible, yet I am of a different opinion; because, though the end of the sacred history was certainly not to instruct us in astronomy, yet it was, without question, written to inform us of the various fortunes of the people of God; with whom, the history of Egypt was closely connected. I suspect, therefore, that the espousing this hypothesis may be attended with very bad consequences in our disputes with infidelity. The present turn, indeed, of free-thinking is to extol the high antiquity of Egypt, as an advantage to their cause; and consequently to urge scripture, which bears full evidence to that antiquity, as a faithful relater of ancient facts; yet these advantages being chimerical, as soon as they are understood to be so, we shall see the contrary notion, of the low antiquity of Egypt, become the fashionable doctrine; and, what all good men will be sorry to find, the great name of **NEWTON** set against the **BIBLE**.

It is, therefore, as I say, for the sake of scripture, and from no foolish fondness for any private opinion, that I take upon me to examine the system of this incomparable person.

His whole argument for the low antiquity of Egypt may be summed up in this syllogism:

**OSIRIS** advanced Egypt from a state of barbarity to civil policy.—**OSIRIS** and **SESOSTRIS** were the same.—Therefore **EGYPT** was advanced from a state of barbarity to civil policy in the time of **SESOSTRIS**.

And to fix the time of **Sesostris** with precision, he endeavours to prove him to be the same with **SESAC**. But this latter identity not at all affecting the present question, I shall have no occasion to consider it.

Now the *minor* in this syllogism being the questionable term, he has employed his whole discourse in its support. All then I have to do, is to show that **OSIRIS** and **SESOSTRIS** were not one, but two persons, living in very distant ages.

And that none of the favourers of this system may have any pretence to say, that the great author's reasonings are not fairly drawn out and enforced, I shall transcribe them just as I find them collected, methodized, and presented under one view by his learned and ingenious apolo-

gist:—"He [Sir Isaac Newton] has found it more easy to lower the pretensions of the ancients than to conquer the prejudices of the moderns. Many of his opinions, that are in truth well founded, pass for dreams; and in particular his arguments for settling the time of Sesostris, which the Greeks never knew, have been answered with scurrility.—I shall lay together here the evidences that have convinced me of the truth of his conclusion, because he has not any where collected all of them.

"1. That Osiris and Bacchus were the same, was generally agreed by the Greeks and Egyptians, and is therefore out of question; and that the great actions related of Sesostris are true of Sesac, and the difference between them is only nominal, is affirmed by Josephus.

"2. Osiris and Sesostris were both Egyptian kings, who conquered Ethiopia; and yet there never was but one Egyptian king that was master of Ethiopia.

"3. Both were Egyptian kings, that with a prodigious army and fleet invaded and subdued all Asia northward as far as Tanais, and eastward as far as the Indian ocean.

"4. Both set up pillars in all their conquests, signifying what sort of resistance the inhabitants had made. Palestine, in particular, appears to have made little or none, to them.

"5. Both passed over the Hellespont into Europe, met with strong opposition in Thrace, and were there in great hazard of losing their army.

"6. Both had with them in their expeditions a great number of foster brothers, who had been all born on the same day, and bred up with them.

"7. Both built or exceedingly embellished Thebes in Upper Egypt.

"8. Both changed the face of all Egypt, and from an open country made it impracticable for cavalry, by cutting navigable canals from the Nile to all the cities.

"9. Both were in the utmost danger by the conspiracy of a brother.

"10. Both made triumphant entries in chariots, of which Osiris's is poetically represented to be drawn by tigers; Sesostris historically said to be drawn by captive kings.

"11. Both reigned about twenty-eight or thirty years.

"12. Both had but one successor of their own blood.

"13. Bacchus or Osiris was two generations before the Trojan war: Sesostris was two reigns before it. Again, Sesac's invasion of Judea in an. P. J. 3743, was about two hundred and sixty years before the invasion of Egypt in his successor Sethon's time by Sennacherib; and from Sesostris to Sethon inclusively there are ten reigns, according to Herodotus, which, if twenty-six years be allowed to a reign, make likewise two hundred and sixty years.

"In so distant ages and countries it is not possible that any king, with many names, can be more clearly demonstrated to be one and the same person, than all these circumstances and actions together do prove that Osiris and Bacchus, Sesostris and Sesac, are but so many appellations of the same man: which being established, it will evidently follow, that the



Argonautic expedition, the destruction of Troy, the revolution in Peloponnesus made by the Heraclidæ, &c., were in or very near the times in which Sir Isaac has ranged them.”\*

L. Before I proceed to an examination of these reasonings, it will be proper to premise something concerning the nature of the system, and the quality of the evidence.

1. We are to observe, then, that this system is so far from serving for a support or illustration of the ancient story of these two heroes, that it contradicts and subverts all that is clear and certain in antiquity; and adds new confusion to all that was obscure. The annals of Egypt, as may be seen by Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, Plutarch, and others, who all copied from those annals, were as express and unvariable for the real diversity, the distinct personality of OSIRIS and SESOSTRIS, as the history of England is for that of any two of its own country monarchs. For they were not vague names, of uncertain or adjoining times; one was the most illustrious of their DEMIGODS, and the other of their KINGS; both fixed in their proper eras; and those vastly distant from one another. So that, I make no question, it had appeared as great a paradox, to an old Egyptian, to hear it affirmed that Osiris and Sesostris were but one, as it would be now to an Englishman to be told that Bonduca and the empress Matilda were the same. All antiquity acquiesced in their diversity; nor did the most paradoxical writer, with which latter Greece was well stored, ever venture to contradict so well-established a truth. And what wonder? The history of Egypt was not, like that of ancient Greece or Suevia, only to be picked up out of the traditional tales of bards and mythologists; nor yet, like that of early Britain, the invention of sedentary monks: it consisted of the written and authentic records of a learned and active priesthood. In which, the only transgression, yet discovered, against truth, is that natural partiality common to all national historiographers, of extending back their annals to an unreasonable length of time. Let me add, that the distinct personality of these two men is so far from contradicting any other ancient history, that it entirely coincides with them. Nay, what is the surest mark of historic truth, there is, as perhaps we may take occasion to show, very strong collateral evidence to evince the real diversity of these two ancient chiefs.—So far, as to the nature of the system.

2. The quality of the evidence is another legitimate prejudice against this *new chronology*. It is chiefly the fabulous history of Greece, as delivered by their poets and mythologists. This hath afforded a plausible support to Sir Isaac’s hypothesis; by supplying him, in its genealogies of the gods and heroes, with a number of synchronisms to ascertain the identity in question. And yet, who has not heard of the desperate confusion in which the chronology of ancient Greece lies involved? Of all the prodigies of falsehood in its mythologic story, nothing being so

\* Mr Mann’s dedication to his tract *Of the true Years of the Birth and Death of CHRIST*.

monstrous as its dismembered and ill-joined parts of time. Notwithstanding this confusion, his proofs from their story, consisting only of scraps, picked up promiscuously from mythologists, poets, scholiasts, &c. are argued from with so little hesitation, that a stranger would be apt to think the fabulous ages were as well distinguished as those marked by the Olympiads. But the slender force of this evidence is still more weakened by this other circumstance, that almost all the passages brought from mythology to evince the *identity*, are contradicted (though the excellent person has not thought fit to take notice of it) by a vast number of other passages in the same mythology; nay even in the same authors; and entirely overthrown by writers of greater credit; the HISTORIANS of Greece and Egypt: which, however, are the other part of Sir Isaac's evidence; of weight indeed to be attentively heard. But this he will not do: but, from their having given to Osiris and Sesostris the like actions, concludes the actors to be one and the same, against all that those historians themselves can say to the contrary: yet what they *might* and what they *could not* mistake in, was methinks easy enough to be distinguished. For as fable unnaturally joins together later and former times; and ancient fable had increased that confusion, for reasons to be hereafter given: so history must needs abound with similar characters of men in public stations; and ancient history had greatly improved that likeness, through mistakes hereafter likewise to be accounted for. Indeed, were there no more remaining of antiquity concerning Bacchus, Osiris, and Sesostris, than what we find in Sir Isaac's book, we might perhaps be induced to believe them the same; but as things stand in history, this can never be supposed.

What I would infer therefore, from these observations, is this:—We have, in the distinct personality of Osiris and Sesostris, an historical circumstance, delivered in the most authentic and unvariable manner, and by annalists of the best authority. All succeeding ages agreed in their diversity; and it is supported by very strong collateral evidence. At length a modern writer, of great name, thinks fit to bring the whole in question. And how does he proceed? Not by accounting for the rise and progress of what he must needs esteem the most inveterate error that ever was; but by laying together a number of circumstances, from ancient story, to prove the actions of Osiris and Sesostris to be greatly alike; and a number of circumstances from ancient fable, to prove that the gods, whom he supposes to be the same with Osiris, were about the age of Sesostris. So that all the evidence brought by this illustrious writer, amounting, at most, but to difficulties against the best established fact of history; if we can, consistently with the distinct personality and different ages of these two heroes, fairly account for the similar actions recorded of them; and for the low age, as delivered by the mythologists, of those Grecian gods which are supposed to be the Egyptian Osiris; if, I say, this can be done, the reader is desired to observe, that all is done that can reasonably be required for the confu-

tation of Sir Isaac Newton's hypothesis, and for reinstating the ancient history of their distinct personality in its former credit.

But I shall do more; 1. I shall show from the religious constitutions of Greece and Egypt, that the incidental errors which the ancients fell into, concerning these two heroes, (of which errors our author has taken the advantage, to run them into one) were such as hardly any circumspection could avoid.

2. And still further, that the identity of Osiris and Sesostris, in its necessary consequences, contradicts SCRIPTURE, and the NATURE OF THINGS.

II. I proceed then to a particular examination of this famous proof of the identity, as it is collected and digested by the learned master of the Charter-house.

The first observation I shall make upon it is, that, by the same way of arguing, one might incorporate almost any two HEROES, one meets with, in early and remote history. For as our great English poet well observes,

HEROES ARE MUCH THE SAME, the point's agreed,  
From Macedonia's madman to the Swede;  
The whole strange purpose of their lives, to find,  
Or make an enemy of all mankind.

To show the reader how easily this feat may be performed, I will take any two of our own monarchs, that come first into my thoughts,—KING ARTHUR, for instance, and WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR. And now let him only imagine, when arts and empire have learned to travel further west, and have left Great Britain in the present condition of Egypt, some future chronologer of America, labouring to prove these heroes one and the same, only under two different names, by such kind of arguments as this:

1. ARTHUR and WILLIAM were both great warriors; 2. Both were of spurious or uncertain birth; 3. Both were in the management of public affairs in their early youth; 4. Both came from France to recover Britain from the Saxons; 5. Both proved victorious in their expedition; 6. Both got the crown of Britain by election, and not by descent; 7. Both had other dominions besides Britain, to which they succeeded by right hereditary; 8. Both went frequently on military expeditions into France; 9. Both warred there with various success; 10. Both had half-brothers, by the mother, who, being made very powerful, and proving guilty of manifold extortions and acts of injustice, were punished by them, in an exemplary manner; 11. Both had rebellious sons or nephews, whom they met in the field, fought with in person, and subdued; 12. Both reigned upwards of fifty years; 13. And both died in war.

When our chronologer had been thus successful with his argument from similar circumstances, (as in the case of Osiris and Sesostris), it is odds but he would go on; and to settle a chronology which made for some other hypothesis he had in view, he would next attempt to prove,

from *similitude of names*, as before from *similitude of actions*, that WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR and WILLIAM THE THIRD, another conqueror, were but one and the same, as in the case of Sesostris and Sesac.

Here the number of similar circumstances, in the lives of Arthur and William, are, evidently, more characteristic of ONE, than those in the history of Osiris and Sesostris. Yet we know that Arthur and William were really two different men of two very distant ages. This will show the critics the true value of this kind of evidence; and should reasonably dispose them to much caution in building upon it.

But it will be said, that the nature of the conformity between Osiris and Sesostris is, in some respects, very different from that between Arthur and William. I grant it is so; and, from those respects, shall now show, how the mistaken identity of Osiris and Sesostris may be certainly detected. For I go on, and say, though from this instance it be seen, that a greater agreement might well happen in the lives of two ancient heroes, than can be found in those of Osiris and Sesostris, while their distinct personality was acknowledged to be very certain and real; yet, in their case, it must be owned, that there are peculiar and specific circumstances of similitude, which could not arise from that general conformity between the actions of two men of the same quality and character; but must be allowed to have had their birth from some fancied identity. For several of the actions, given to both, agree only to the time of one: I mean as antiquity hath fixed their times. Thus, the vast conquests over Asia agree well with the time of Sesostris, but very ill with the time of Osiris; and, again, the invention of the most common arts of life agrees very well with the time of Osiris, but very ill with that of Sesostris. However, from this conformity in their story, Sir Isaac concludes Osiris and Sesostris to be the same. And so far we must needs confess, that it seems to have arisen from some kind of identity; a sameness of person, or a sameness of name. This great writer contends for the first; but as the first contradicts and subverts all antiquity, if the ascribed conformity of actions can be well accounted for from their *identity of name*, and that identity be proved very probable from ancient story, the reader will conclude that the fabulous conformity had its rise from thence; and, consequently, that all Sir Isaac's arguments for their *identity of person* make directly against him. For if the conformity arose from *identity of name*, they were two persons. I shall endeavour to show all this in as few words as I am able.

I. It was an old Egyptian custom, as we learn from Diodorus Siculus, to call their later heroes by the name of their earlier gods. This historian having spoken of the CELESTIAL gods, according to the Egyptians, adds, *They held, that besides these, there were other EARTHLY gods, born mortal; who through their wisdom, and common benefits to mankind, had acquired immortality; that some of these had been kings of Egypt; and that part got NEW NAMES, being called after those of*

the celestial gods; and part kept their own.\* "But this custom of calling the later heroes after the names of their earlier gods, was not peculiar to Egypt. Scripture informs us, that the Assyrians did the same. And the practice must needs have been general. For, as we have shown, the original use of it was to support nascent hero worship.† But there was another cause, more peculiar to early Egypt; and that was the doctrine of *transmigration*. For it being thought that the same soul passed successively into many human bodies; when they saw an eminent character strongly resembling some ancient hero, they were inclined to fancy it the old busy soul, which had taken up its residence in a new habitation: and therefore very equitably honoured the present hero with the *name* of the past. This reason, Tacitus tells us, the Egyptians gave for the great number of HERCULESES—"Quem [*Herculem*] *indigenæ* [*Ægypti*] *ortum apud se et antiquissimum perhibent, eosque qui postea pari virtute fuerint, in cognomentum ejus adscitos.*"‡ This was so notorious that Sir Isaac could not help owning, it was their way to give one common name to several men. Nay even the least corporeal resemblance was sometimes sufficient to set this superstition on work, and produce the effect in question; as we find from the same Diodorus's account of the Grecian Bacchus. He tells us, that when Cadmus the Egyptian was come into Greece, and his daughter Semele had a spurious son dying in his infancy, whose person resembled the images of Osiris, the grandfather, after having consulted the oracle (whose approbation was contained in the advice, *to observe the customs of his fathers,*) called him Bacchus, one of the names of Osiris: paid divine honours to the embalmed carcass; and proclaimed abroad, that OSIRIS had chosen to come once more amongst men under this infantine appearance.§ From this custom of giving the names of celebrated personages of high antiquity to later men, who resembled them in qualities either of mind or body, it was, that they not only, out of honour to Sesostrius, called him Osiris, but, out of contempt and hatred, gave MOSES the name of TYPHON, as appears from some later accounts of this Typhon, when they had now jumbled Moses and him into one; as they had done their Bacchuses, Herculese, and Minoses; and as they were very near doing, by Osiris and Sesostrius. The accounts, I mean, are those which

\* —"Ἄλλοις δ' ἐκ τούτων ἱεργίους γινέσθαι φασὶν, ὑπάρχοντας μὲν θεοῦς, διὰ δὲ σύνεσιν καὶ κατὰ ἀνθρώπων ἱεργίαν τιτυχεύοντας τῆς ἀθανασίας· ὧν ἱεῖρας καὶ βασιλεῖς γιγνέσθαι κατὰ τὴν Αἴγυπτον, μεμνησμένον δ' αὐτῶν, τινὰς μὲν ἱμανύμενους ὑπάρχουσιν τοῖς οὐρανίοις, τινὰς δ' ἰδίαν ἰσχυρίαν προσηγορίαν.—Lib. i. p. 8, Steph. ed.

† See Div. Leg. book iii. sect. 6.

‡ Annal. lib. ii. cap. 60.—Omnes, qui fecerant fortiter, HERCULES vocabantur, says Varro likewise, as quoted by Servius.

§ Κάδμος ἐκ Θιβῶν ὄντα τῶν Αἰγυπτίων, γινῆσαι σὺν ἄλλοις τέκναις καὶ Σιμίλῃν· ταύτην δὲ ἐκ τοῦ δήπου φθαρύσαι, ἔγκυν γινέσθαι, καὶ τιμὴν ἰστὰ μηνῶν διαλθόντων βεῖφος τὴν ὄψιν αὐτῇ πρὸς αἰ κατ' Αἴγυπτον τοῖς Ὀσίρην γιγνέσθαι νομίζουσι, ζωογονεῖσθαι δ' οὐκ εἰσθῆναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὥτι τῶν θεῶν μὴ βουλομένη, ὥτι τῆς φύσεως μὴ συγκαρούσης. Κάδμον δὲ αἰσθόμενον τὸ γιγνέσθαι, καὶ χρηστὸν ἔχοντα διατηρεῖν τὰ τῶν πατέρων νόμιμα χρυσώσασθαι τι τὸ βεῖφος καὶ τὰς καθαρὰς αὐτῷ ποιήσασθαι θυσίας, αἷς ἱερφανείας τινὸς κατ' ἀνθρώπους Ὀσίριδος γιγνημένης.—Lib. i. p. 24.

we find in Plutarch, of Typhon's flying seven days, and begetting, after his escape, two sons, JERUSALEM and JUDÆUS.\* And further that this Typhon was the son of Isaac, and of the race of Hercules.†

Causes like these could not fail to make this custom very durable, amongst a people not at all given to change. And in fact, we find it continued even to the time of Cleopatra, who affected to be called the NEW ISIS,‡ as her brother was called the NEW BACCHUS.§ At length it became so general as to have no measure but the fancy of every particular. For Lucian, defending the excessive compliments he had given to one Panthea, whose form he had compared to the images of the goddesses, justifies himself by examples; and amongst the rest, by that of Egypt; *I shall not insist, says he, upon the practice of the Egyptians, who, though they be the most religious of all people, yet employ the names of their gods even to satiety and disgust.*||

To apply this practice to the case of the heroes in question. Osiris was the great lawgiver of the Egyptians: and the founder of their monarchy. Sesostrius vastly extended and ennobled their empire; and was, at the same time, author of many beneficial institutions. Now if ever an occasion greater than ordinary presented itself, of putting in practice the custom of honouring later heroes with the name of the more early, it was here, where the resemblance was so remarkably strong. And if what Clemens Alexandrinus says be true, that Sesostrius sprung from Osiris,¶ there was still a farther occasion of giving the later hero the name of his first progenitor. However, that it was given him, is highly reasonable to suppose. And this supposition will clearly account for all that ingrafted likeness from which Sir Isaac hath inferred their *identity*.

For when now they had given to both, the same name; not distinguished, as were their Thothes or Hermeses,\*\* (another famous instance of this general custom) by the addition of *first* and *second*, posterity would frequently confound them with one another; and, in this confusion, inadvertently give the actions of Osiris to Sesostrius, and of Sesostrius to Osiris. But taking nothing from either, both their histories would soon become the same. And as, in this mutual transferring of one another's actions, several were given to both, entirely discordant to either's age, we are enabled to discover the true cause of this conformity: and thereby to prove, that that, which it is plainly seen might be, really was, the *cause*.

I. Thus Osiris (because Sesostrius was so) is made a great conqueror, at a time when Egypt was but just emerging from a state of barbarism,

\* —ἐπὶ οὗ τοῦ Τυφῶνι τὴν φυγὴν ἑπτὰ ἡμέρας γινέσθαι, καὶ συνίνα γενῆσαι παῖδας Ἱερουσαλὺν καὶ Ἰουδαῖον.—Is. et Osir.

† Ἰσαακοῦ τοῦ Ἡρακλείου ὁ Τυφῶν.

‡ Plut. in Ant.

§ Diod. Sic. lib. i.

|| Ἐὼ γὰρ τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους, οἵπερ καὶ δις δαιμονίσταται οἱ πάντες, ὅμοι τοῖς θεοῖς ἐοικέναι εἰς πόρον ἐπιχωρίους.—Pro. Imag. in fin.

¶ Τὸν οὖν Ὀσίριν, τὸν προπάτορα τὸν αὐτοῦ δαιδαλῆναι ἐκίλευσιν αὐτὸς [Σίσωστρις] πωλεσιλῶς.—Admon. ad. Gentes, p. 31. ed. Colon. 1688, fol.

\*\* The histories of the first and second Hermes are as much confounded with one another as those of Osiris and Sesostrius, and from the same cause; yet, I imagine, the distinction of *first* and *second* will hinder any one from supposing them to be the same.



into civil policy; and long before several of those nations, he was said to conquer, had a being. But this seems to be one of the latest corruptions in their history. Herodotus giving none of these conquests to Osiris, but to Sesostris only; whence I collect, it was the product of some age between him and Diodorus Siculus, who gives them to Osiris with all their circumstances, and supported by the evidence of pretended ancient monuments.\* It appears too, to have been a Grecian addition, and at a time when it was the fashion to make their fables, systematical.† For we are told,‡ (and the tale was apparently framed for no other end than to connect this god with the rest of the college) that when Osiris made this expedition, he took Silenus with him as his governor; that he appointed Isis, queen-regent in his absence; and Hermes her privy-counsellor; Hercules he made general of his army, and Neptune, admiral of his fleet. And, that nothing might be wanting to complete the cortège, he took with him a company of dancers and singers; amongst which were nine lively girls more particularly eminent; with the king's brother, as master of the maids, at their head; and these truly were to pass for Apollo and the nine muses. This quaint improvement on an Egyptian blunder, by some drivelling Greek mythologist,§ as rank as it is, is one of the chief circumstances on which our illustrious author hath thought fit to support his *chronology*. And that which is the mere representation of an old raree-show of the *Court of king Osiris*, brought by some stroller out of Egypt into Greece, is made an authentic record to ascertain the true age of all their heroes. I am fully supported in the conjecture, that the tale of Osiris's conquests was invented in some age between Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus, by the testimony of two of the soberest and most accurate of the Greek writers, Strabo and Arrian; who expressly tell us, that the stories of Bacchus's and Hercules's exploits in the Indies were invented by the Macedonians to aggrandize the glory of Alexander.|| The Egyptians had prepared the materials and made them fit for use, by confounding Osiris and Sesostris, under the common name of Bacchus.

\* The columns at Nysa in Arabia.

† Οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες, ἰσχυρὰ πάντας ὑπερβαλλόμενοι· τὰ μὲν πρῶτα πλεῖστα ἐξιδίωσαντο, καὶ τοῖς ἀρχαιοτέροις ποιήσας ἐξενεργήσαν, ταῖς τῶν μύθων ἡδοταῖς, δίλγυν ἱστιοῦντες παντοίως ἰστούμενοι.—Philo Bib. apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. i. c. 10.

‡ —Τὸν δ' οὖν Ὀσίριον φασὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Αἴγυπτον καταστήσαντα, καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄλων ἡγεμονίαν ἰσχυρὰ τῇ γυναικὶ παραδόντα, ταύτην μὲν παρακαταστήσαι σύμβουλον τὸν Ἑρμῆν, —καὶ στρατηγὸν μὲν ἀπολαύειν ἀπάσης τῆς ὑφ' αὐτὸν χώρας Ἡρακλῆα—ἱππομειλητὰς δὲ τάξαι τῶν μὲν πρὸς Φοινίκην περικλιμένον μισθὸν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ τόπων Βούσιριν.—Εἶναι γὰρ τὸν Ὀσίριον φιλογυλῶντα, καὶ χαίροντα μουσικῇ καὶ χοροῖς. Διὸ καὶ περιεργάζεσθαι πλῆθος μουσουργῶν, ἐν οἷς παρθενοὺς ἰσχυρὰ δυναμίας ἔδειν, καὶ κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα παιδιευμένας, τὰς παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὀνομαζομένας μούσας, τούτων δ' ἡγίως τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα λίγουσιν, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ μουσηγίτην αὐτὸν ὀνομάσθαι.—Lib. i. pp. 10, 11.

§ The very learned Casaubon, speaking of the fables, which concern Bacchus with the nymphs and muses, says, *Est enim Græcicæ vanitatis hoc quoque inventum, Bacchicæ in mojos semper attollentium*.—De Satyrica Poesi, p. 41.

|| Arrian, lib. v. c. 3. Strabo, lib. ii. p. 771. and lib. xv. pp. 1006, 7. Casaub. ed.—Καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ Ἡρακλῆος δὲ καὶ Διονύσου, Μεγασθῆνης μὲν μισθὸν ἐλίγυν πιστὰ ἡγῶνται, τῶν δ' ἄλλων οἱ ἐλάττω, οἱ ἴσιν καὶ Ἐρατοσθῆνης, ἄπιστα καὶ μυθώδη, καθάπερ καὶ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.—Strab. lib. xv.

2. On the other hand, Sesostris (because Osiris was so) is made the inventor of arts, and the civilizer of a rude and barbarous people, to whom he delivered the first rudiments of policy and religion, many ages after they had erected a flourishing and powerful empire. An inconsistency so glaring, that the ancient critics seeing these things recorded of Sesostris, reasonably understood Osiris to be meant. This doubtless made Aristotle say\* that Sesostris was many ages before Minos: yet Eusebius places Minos in the times of the *judges*. And in the twelfth dynasty of Africanus, Sesostris is made to reign, according to the calculation of Scaliger,† in the 1392d year of the Julian period: that very point of time on which the extravagant chronology of Egypt had thrown Osiris. But there is a passage in Ælian which proves still more expressly that the ancients sometimes understood Osiris by Sesostris. *The Egyptians*, says this historian, *affirm that Mercury taught Sesostris his laws*:‡ and that Mercury the contemporary of Osiris was here meant, is seen by another passage of this historian, where the same thing is said of all the Egyptians in general. *The Egyptians boast that MERCURY taught them their laws*.§

But though mistake gave birth to this corruption in the Egyptian history, yet, without doubt, it was a national vanity which supported it. For we are told by Diodorus,|| who made collections from their history, that the reason, assigned by the Egyptians for that famous military expedition, which they had transferred from Sesostris to Osiris, was the hero's beneficent purpose of carrying the new inventions of corn and wine to all the savage inhabitants of the earth; whom it was his purpose to reduce from a state of nature, to political society. The intelligent reader sees plainly, that the design of this story was to do honour to Egypt, as the common benefactress of mankind. Though I will not deny, that the extravagance of the conceit, at the same time, shows how much they were at a loss for a reasonable cause of so early an expedition. The difficulty of all this did not escape the Sicilian. He frankly owns, there is a vast discordancy and confusion in the accounts of Isis and Osiris.¶ What seems strange to me is, that this did not lead him to the cause here explained, when he had so well unravelled the like confusion in the parallel case of Hercules and Alcæus. Their story had been disordered, like this of Osiris and Sesostris, from Alcæus's taking the name of Hercules. But Diodorus, by the same kind of reasoning\*\* I have here employed to ascertain the diversity of Osiris

\* Πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτείνω τοῖς χρόνοις τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν ἢ Σισώστριος.—Pol. lib. vii. c. 10.

† Vide Marsham Can. Chron. Secul. X. tit. Nilus Rex.

‡ Φασὶν Αἰγύπτῳ Σίσωστριν παρ' Ἑρμοῦ τὰ νόμιμα ἐκμουσαῖναι.—Var. Hist. lib. xii. c. 4.

§ Αἰγύπτῳ φασὶ παρ' Ἑρμοῦ τὰ νόμιμα ἐκμουσαῖναι.—Lib. xiv. c. 34.

|| Τὸν δὲ Ὀσίριν λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ ὑπεργεινικὸν ὄντα καὶ φιλόδοξον, στρατεύειν μίγα συνετάσθαι, διανούμενον ἐπιλθεῖν ἅπασαν τὴν οἰκουμένην, καὶ διδάξαι τὸ γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰς τε τῆς ἀμπύλου φυτίας καὶ τὸν σπόρον τοῦ τε πυρίνου καὶ κριθίνου καρποῦ.—Lib. i. p. 10.

¶ Καθόλου δὲ πολλή τις ἐστὶ διαφωνία περὶ τούτων τῶν θιῶν.—Lib. i. p. 15.

\*\* Ὁμολογουμένως γὰρ ὄντος παρὰ πᾶσιν ὅτι τοῖς ὀλυμπίοις θεοῖς Ἡρακλῆς συνηγωνίσατο τὴν πρὸς τοὺς γίγαντας πόλιν, φασὶ τῇ γῇ μηδαμῶς ἀρμόττειν γιγνῆναι τοὺς γίγαντας κατὰ

and Sesostris, shows that Alcæus and Hercules were different men; namely, from actions, given to Alcæus, which could not belong to his age. But these being of different nations, the one a Greek, the other an Egyptian; this circumstance afforded him an opening which he wanted in the case of Osiris and Sesostris, who were both Egyptians.

And here let me observe, that this ancient practice of calling later heroes by the name of earlier, whether of their own or of foreign countries, brought still greater confusion into some other of their histories; making the ancients themselves imagine an *identity* where none was; as in Bacchus, Neptune, Hercules, Mars, Venus, Minos, &c. which popular mistakes Sir Isaac employs to support another imaginary identity that they never dreamt of.

From this state of antiquity I would infer these two things. First, that, notwithstanding the conformity in the histories of Osiris and Sesostris, there is great reason to suppose the reality of their distinct personalities, because the same kind of similitude, arising from the same mistake, is found in the histories of many other ancient heroes confessedly distinct. Secondly, that there must have been, in antiquity, some very convincing proofs of the real diversity of Osiris and Sesostris, to keep them, as it did, perpetually separate, notwithstanding the sameness in their histories; when the like kind of conformity had melted two or more Bacchuses, Herculeuses, Minoses, into one.

On the whole then, I have shown, that a *sameness of name* is sufficient to account for the original of the conformity in the history of Osiris and Sesostris; and, having done this, I have done all that is needful to ascertain their *diversity of person*: there being nothing to oppose to the full testimony of ancient history, which declares for their diversity, besides this conformity of actions.

But I have done more: I have shown, that a *sameness of name* was, in fact, the only cause of that conformity; and, consequently, that their persons were really different. That it could be only a *sameness of name*, I think, appears evidently from the giving to each hero, actions unsuitable to his age; as great conquests to Osiris, and civil inventions to Sesostris. For I persuade myself, (though Sir Isaac be obliged, for the sake of his hypothesis, partly to support, and partly to palliate, this convincing circumstance) no one can, in good earnest, believe that Egypt

τὸν ἡλιαίαν, ὃς οἱ Ἕλληες φασιν Ἡρακλῆα γενέσθαι. Γινῆ πρότερον τῶν Τρωϊκῶν· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ὡς αὐτοὶ λήγουσι, κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀπ' ἐκείνης μὲν γὰρ παρ' Αἰγυπτίους ἴση καταριθμῆσθαι πλείων τῶν μυρίων, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν Τρωϊκῶν ἰλάττω τῶν χιλίων καὶ διακοσίων. Ὅμοιος δὲ τό, τι βόεαλον καὶ τὴν λιουτῆν τῷ παλαιῷ πρίπυν Ἡρακλεῖ, διὰ τὸ ταῦτ' ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους μᾶλλον τῶν ὅπλων ἐνρημίνων, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοῖς μὲν ξύλοις ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς ἀντιπαταρμίνους, ταῖς δὲ δοραῖς τῶν Θηρίων σκιπαστηρίοις χρῆσθαι—συμφωνεῖν δὲ τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ληγομένοις καὶ τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων παραδιδόμενην φήμην, ὅτι καθαρὰν τὴν γῆν τῶν Θηρίων ἰποίησιν Ἡρακλῆς, ὅπερ μηδαμῶς ἀεμόττειν τῇ γιγνομένῃ σχιδὸν κατὰ τοὺς Τρωϊκούς χρόνους, ὅτι τὰ πλείωστα μέρη τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐξημέρωτο γιωργίαις καὶ πόλιν, καὶ πλάθῃ τῶν κατοικοῦντων τὴν χώραν πανταχοῦ. Μᾶλλον οὖν πρίπυν τῇ γιγνομένῃ κατὰ τοὺς ἀρχαίους χρόνους τὴν ἡμέραν τῆς χώρας, κατισχυομένην ἵτι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν Θηρίων καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὴν Αἰγυπτὸς εἰς τὴν ὑπερκυμίνην χώραν μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἔρημον εἶναι καὶ Θηροῦν.—Lib. i. pp. 14, 15.

was indeed emerging from a state of barbarism at the time in which he places Sesostris. 'Tis true, if men will yet suppose so, I have no better argument against it than the BIBLE: and how far the credit of that will go in this enlightened age is not very easy to guess. In a word, such unsuitable actions ascribed to each, nothing can account for, but a mistaken identity, arising from the *sameness of name*; for when this had advanced, or brought down, the real antiquity of either, the historian was to suit their actions to the imaginary time. Besides, we know they are not at all scrupulous about property, when they find an achievement in their way, capable of doing honour to a favourite hero. There is, as might be expected, a pregnant instance of this, in the history of this very Sesostris; of whom it was recorded, that he divided the lands of Egypt amongst the people, reserving an annual rent to the crown.\* Now we are very certain that this was done, long before his time, under the ministry of the patriarch Joseph. Here the theft lies open. While these heroes were only made to pilfer from one another, there was some difficulty to get them convicted; as where two cheats are taught to convey their stolen goods into one another's hands, to evade a pursuit: but here an honest man steps in to make good his claim, and proves it beyond all exception.

But it is our business only to show that the conformity, in the histories of Osiris and Sesostris, may be well accounted for, from a *sameness of name*. Otherwise, if the case required it, we should not want positive arguments, supported by the soundest part of antiquity, to prove their difference of person. To mention one or two only by the way; it has been observed before,† that, in substituting *hero*, to *planet worship*, the Egyptian rulers, in order to bring the people more easily into this later species of idolatry, called the *hero* by the name of a *celestial god*. So Diodorus says, *that Sol first reigned in Egypt; called so from the luminary of that name in the heavens*. This was the easier brought about, because the first civilizers, to gain the greater authority, pretended, as was very natural, to be the offspring of the Sun, that universal god of all the uncivilized people upon the earth. For the same end likewise, namely, to accustom the people, even while in the practice of planet worship, to the new adoration, they turned the compliment the other way; and called the luminary by the name of the hero; the same historian telling us, that *they called the sun, Osiris, and the moon, Isis*. Now the end of this mutual transferring of names being only to strengthen their *new* idolatry, by giving it a support from the *old*, it must needs be invented on the first introduction of hero worship. But hero worship was as early as the first institution of civil policy. Therefore the using the name of Osiris to this purpose, is a demonstration that he was as early as sober antiquity supposed. Again,

\* —Καταμίμει δὲ τὴν χώραν Αἰγυπτίῳσι ἅπασιν τοῦτον ἱλίου τοῖς βασιλῆα [Σίσωστριν] πλῆρον ἴσον ἑκάστην εἰσράγωνιν δίδοντα, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τὰς περιόδους ποιήσασθαι, ἐπιτάξας ἀποφέρειν ἀποσιλίην κατ' ἑκάστην.—Herod. lib. ii. cap. 109.

† See Div. Leg. book iii. sect. 6.

Herodotus tells us, and of his own knowledge, that no gods, besides Isis and Osiris, were worshipped by all the Egyptians in the same unvariable manner.\* This I think a plain proof of their being the common benefactors of all Egypt, in the invention of corn, wine, and civil policy, as the Egyptian annals deliver; their other hero gods, as particular and partial benefactors, being worshipped variously. But this fixes them in their high antiquity. Again, the calf and ox are owned to be the peculiar symbols of Osiris: but the GOLDEN CALF I have proved to be an Egyptian symbol; therefore Osiris was, at least, as old as Moses. And again, our great author owns†, that the king who invented agriculture in Egypt, seems to have been worshipped by his subjects in the ox or calf for this benefaction. Now the ox or calf was the symbol of Osiris. But agriculture, we certainly know, was invented before the time of Joseph, which will bring us to seek for Osiris 700 years higher than Sesac, who is our author's ancient Osiris or Sesostris of Egypt.

To proceed: such were the blunders in the history of Osiris and Sesostris,‡ of which Sir Isaac hath taken advantage, to prove them to be one and the same. And it is certain, as was said before, that, had not the sure records of antiquity kept them separate, this jumbling of their actions into one another's life had long ago incorporated them; and left no room for Sir Isaac's discovery; for the ancients were fond of running many into one, as appears particularly in the case of Bacchus, whose history we come now to consider.

II. For Sir Isaac farther strengthens the evidence of their identity, from Egyptian history, with the Grecian mythology: in which BACCHUS is delivered to us as the same with Osiris: and Bacchus being but two generations earlier than the Trojan war, the very age of Sesostris, this, in his opinion, reduces all three to one, p. 191.

This identity of Bacchus and Osiris, Diodorus Siculus has very accurately confuted.§ But to discover the general cause of this, and all other their mistaken identities, we must trace down the religion of GREECE from its original.

It is a certain truth, agreed upon by ancient as well as modern writers, that CIVILIZED GREECE received its religion from EGYPT. But the way in which this commerce was carried on is not so well understood. It is generally supposed to have been done by adopting, and worshipping the very Egyptian gods themselves. But this is a capital mistake. It was not till long after their first acquaintance with Egypt, and instruction in their religious rites, that they adopted Egyptian gods: which I shall now endeavour to show.

In the barbarous ages of Greece their only gods were those natural divinities, the heavenly luminaries.|| But, on their first commerce with Egypt for the arts of policy, they found there a new species of idolatry, the

\* Θεοὶ γὰρ δὲ οὐ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἅπαντες ὁμοίως Αἰγύπτῳ σίβονται, πλὴν Ἰσιός τε καὶ Ὀσίριδος· τὸν δὲ Διόνυσον ἔτι λέγουσι· τοῦτους δὲ ὁμοίως ἅπαντες σίβονται.—Lib. ii. cap. 42.

† See note Z Z Z, at the end of this book. ‡ See note A A A A, at the end of this book.

§ Lib. i. p. 14.

|| See Div. Leg. book iii.

worship of DEAD MEN; which civilized Egypt had invented; and which, as they improved in policy, had almost worked out their first natural deities; the same with those of all other uncivilized nations.\* This new species, the Greeks eagerly embraced: and beginning now to take the Egyptian nation for their model in religious as well as in civil matters, they brought home this mode of foreign worship, namely, DEAD MEN DEIFIED. Thus far is agreed on all hands. The material question is, whether their object were Egyptian hero gods; or whether, in imitation of that worship, they made hero gods of their own? The common opinion is that they took the Egyptian. I suppose, on the contrary, that they must needs make hero gods of their own; and could not, at that time, receive the other. My reason is this:

The greater celestial bodies were deities in common, as their influence sensibly extended over the whole habitable globe. But hero worship introduced the new idea of *local tutelary deities*: and this of necessity. For those heroes were the distinguished benefactors of their own nation, at the expense, frequently, of their neighbours: and, for such benefits, they were deified. Now several causes concurred to make men teach and think, that the care and providence of their heroes, now become gods, was still, as in life, confined to their own dear country: such as the superior reverence which rulers knew the people would pay to a god, whose peculiar they were supposed to be: for, when undistracted with other cares, he would be supposed at full liberty to attend to the minutest concerns of his own people: such again as the selfishness and pride of the worshippers, who would be for ingrossing a god to themselves; and raising honour to their country from this imaginary property. So that the opinion of *local tutelary deities* became, at length, one of the most general and most undisputed doctrines of paganism. It is delivered to us, for such, by Plato: yet, as the origin of hero gods from humanity was to be kept out of sight, he carefully disguises the foundation of it. *The Gods, says he, formerly divided the whole earth amongst themselves by lot: not from any contention or quarrel about their rights; for it is absurd to suppose they did not know what was fit for every one's peculiar care; or knowing this, that they should endeavour by violence to possess themselves of one another's property: but all of them receiving in an amicable manner, what fell to their share,† in this just method of distribution, each resided on his own peculiar: which, having rendered proper for our habitation, they lead and support us as shepherds do their flocks and herds in a pasture.—Every god therefore having his proper allotment, all his endeavours are employed to adorn and benefit his own.‡* This was so flattering a notion, that, in

\* See Div. Leg. book iii.

† Τὰ ρίχων λαγχάνοντες—Serr. translates it—deorum quisque prout hominum amore teneretur. I understand it—hæc amicorum sortiti—i. e. regions which belonged to gods who were in unity with one another.

‡ Θεοὶ γὰρ ἅπασαν γῆν ποτὶ κατὰ τοὺς τόπους διλάγχανον, οὐ κατ' ἑρῆν (οὐ γὰρ αὖ ἐξ ἑρῆν ἔχει λόγον, θείους ἀγνοεῖν τὰ πρίσωτα ἐκάστοις αὐτῶν, οὐδ' αὖ γινώσκοντας τὸ μᾶλλον ἑλλῆς



after-times, the pagans carried it even into their planet worship: and each climate was supposed to be under the proper protection of its own star or constellation. So that the writer of *The Wisdom of Solomon* seems to make this the distinguishing mark of paganism; where praising the God of Israel for his ancient mercies to that people, he says, *neither is there any god but thou, that carest for ALL.\**

Now, such a kind of *tutelary* god, the Egyptians would be so far from offering to others, that they would be careful to keep him to themselves. Hence the old practice of chaining down their gods (for hero gods were worshipped by statues in human form) when they imagined them disposed to ramble; or to take a liking to any of their neighbours. And as the Egyptians would be averse to lending, so the Greeks would be as little inclined to borrow; for they had now a race of heroes of their own; those godlike men, who had reduced them from a savage to a civilized condition, and had given them this very appetite; the appetite to improve their policy by the assistance of Egyptian wisdom. As little too would their own lawgivers, who brought that wisdom home to them, be disposed to offer them Egyptian gods; as knowing how much stronger their reverence and adherence would be to gods made out of their own parents and fellow citizens. But if this were the case, (and, in the course of the inquiry, it will be proved from *fact*, as here from the *reason* of the thing) it may be asked, What then was that RELIGION which all agree the Greeks borrowed of the Egyptians? I answer, the TRADE itself of hero worship; or the custom of deifying their dead benefactors. But again, if this were so, and that the Bacchus, Apollo, Mars, Jupiter, &c., first worshipped by the Greeks, were indeed Grecian deities, it will be then asked, how came their resemblance to the Egyptian to be so great, as that later times should be generally deceived in thinking them the SAME? This is a reasonable question, and will deserve a particular discussion. There were several causes of this resemblance.

1. Nothing could be more simple than the RITUAL of the first *planet worship*, as may be easily collected from the nature of that idolatry. But *hero worship* necessarily introduced a great number of complex ceremonies. For, the commemorating the peculiar benefits received from the hero god, in his state of humanity, would occasion many *specific* rites; and the shadowing or concealing his original and especially the blemishes in his moral character would necessitate the use of *allegorical*. And what this last sort of rites did not sufficiently cover, the notion propagated amongst his worshippers (on which was founded the rationale of their worship) was made to supply, viz. That the DEMONS or heroes had, like *men*, their inordinate virtues, passions and appetites.

ἐρεῖται, τοῦτο ἰσχυρὸν αὐτοῖς δι' ἰριδὸν ἐπιχυρῶν πᾶσθαι) δίκης δὲ πλήρεις τὰ φίλων λαγχάζουσι πατριᾶς καὶ χώρας· καὶ πατωκίαντες, οἷον νομίῃς κτήματα καὶ ποίμνια καὶ θέρματα ἰαντῶν ἡμᾶς ἱγρίζουσι.—ἄλλοι μὲν οὖν κατ' ἄλλους τόπους κληρουχίαντες διῶν ἰκύνει ἰσχυρίσιν.—Vol. III. p. 109. Ser. ed.

\* Cap. xli. 13. Οὐτε γὰρ θεὸς ἵστί πλὴν σου, ὃ μίλει περὶ πάντων, ἵνα διίξῃς ὅτι οὐκ ἀδίκως ἱερνᾷς.

Plutarch, in his tract *Of the Ceasing of the Oracles*, has a remarkable passage to this purpose: "There are in demons, as in men, a disparity in their virtues; and, like as in the latter, a mixture of passion and imperfection. Of which, in some, we find only the faint and obscure traces yet remain, as the dregs of evanid matter; in others the vestiges are much stronger, and indeed, indelible; and of this, we have certain marks and tokens dispersed up and down, and preserved in the sacrifices, in the mysteries, and in the ancient mythologic tales."\* In like manner, the general memory of the hero's descent from mortals, gave rise to the consultation of ORACLES and adoration of STATUES in HUMAN FORM. Now, when Greece borrowed of Egypt the superstition of hero worship, they would of course borrow such of the rites and practices as were peculiar to that superstition; and adapt them to their own hero gods, as best suited every one's character. For the truth of which we have the express testimony of Herodotus, who tells us, that *the Egyptians were the first authors of religious festivals, processions, and offerings; and that the Greeks learned them of that people.*† But this resemblance, even without a studious application of Egyptian rites, must have arisen, from the very practice itself of hero worship; as appears from what we have observed of the nature of those ceremonies which hero worship necessarily introduced. To confirm this, we need only consider the case of those hero worshippers of the north and west, the Gauls and Suevi; who did not, like the Greeks, borrow this mode of idolatry from Egypt; being indebted for it to nothing but the corruption of our common nature. Now the gods of those barbarians, and the rites with which their gods were adored, resembled the religion of Greece and Rome so exactly, that these polite nations thought the gods of the Gauls and Suevi were the same with their own; only worshipped under different names.‡ This was indeed a gross mistake; but natural to fall into: so great a resemblance have heroes of all times and places ever borne to one another; whether they were lawgivers, warriors, navigators, merchants, or artists. Nor was their common rise from humanity, and their occupations in social life, the only cause of this resemblance. There was another; viz. their several departments after they were become gods: some presiding over the elements, as earth, air, or water; others over the passions and pursuits of men, as love, war, trade, and the like. To this common resemblance it was that at length almost every nation pretended, (as we see by Diodorus) that the gods came originally from them. Now if the gods of these barbarians, though different in name, were for this resemblance, mistaken for the gods of another people, with whom they had no

\* Εἰσὶ γὰρ ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις καὶ δαίμοσιν ἀρετῆς διαφοραὶ, καὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ἀλόγου, τῆς μὲν ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἀμαυροῦν ἵτι λείψανον, ὅσπερ περὶ ττωμα· τοῖς δὲ πολὺ καὶ δυσκατάσβεστο ἵσιστιν, ὧν ἴχνη καὶ σύμβολα πολλαχού θύσται καὶ τιλταὶ καὶ μυθολογίαι σέζουσι καὶ διαφολάττουσιν ἰνδυσπαρμένα.

† — Παινηγυρίας δὲ ἄρα καὶ πομπὰς καὶ προσαγωγὰς πρῶτοι ἀνθρώπων Αἰγύπτου ἵσι οἱ ποιητάμενοι· καὶ παρὰ τούτων Ἕλλησις μιμαθήσαντι.—Lib. ii. cap. 58.

‡ See note B B B B, at the end of this book.

commerce; where was the wonder that the Grecian gods, who had the same name with those of a people with whom Greece held a perpetual commerce, should for the like resemblance, be believed to be originally Egyptian?

2. For, secondly, when the Greeks borrowed Egyptian rites to enrich the worship of their gods, they borrowed Egyptian NAMES of honour, to adorn their persons. Thus, for instance, the name of Bacchus, one of the appellations of Osiris, was given to the son of Semele. Herodotus tells us, that these names they did certainly borrow; and we see by his account, that this was all which, in his time, was pretended to be borrowed.\* This observing historian, in his account of the Pelasgi, further confirms this truth, by a very curious piece of history. "In former times," says he, "the Pelasgi in their religious worship used to sacrifice of every thing without distinction, to their gods, as I was informed by the priests at Dodona. They gave neither *name* nor *surname* to any of their gods: for they had heard of no such practice. But their titles were taken from what their worshippers conceived of their providence, directing and ordering all things fitly and harmoniously. But after a long course of time they heard of other gods, and of their NAMES, which came from EGYPT, and in the last place of the name of BACCHUS. Some time after they consulted the oracle of Dodona concerning these NAMES: for this oracle is supposed to be the oldest of any in Greece; and, at the time I am speaking of, the only one. Of this oracle therefore having asked advice, whether they should admit the NAMES, which came from the barbarians, into their religion; they received for answer, that they should admit them. From that time† therefore they sacrificed with specific multifarious rites, in which they honoured their gods with these new *appellations*. And, from the Pelasgi, the Greeks afterwards took up the custom. But the original of each god, and whether they are all from eternity, and what are their several kinds of natures, to say the truth, they neither knew at that time, nor since. For HOMER and HESIOD—were those who made a theogony for the Greeks; gave SURNAMES to the gods; adjusted their various and specific rites and attributes; and designed and delineated their several forms and figures.‡

\* Σχιδὸν δὲ καὶ πάντα τὰ ΟΥΝΟΜΑΤΑ τῶν Θεῶν ΕΞ ΑΙΓΥΠΤΟΥ ἰσθλῶσι ἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ὥστε μὴ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βαρβάρῳ ἦεν· συνθεσόμενοι, οὕτω ἐκρίναντο ἰσθλῶσι δὲ ὡς ἂν μάλιστα ἀπὸ Αἰγύπτου ἀπὶχθῶσι, ὅτι γὰρ δὴ μὴ Περσίδωντες, καὶ Διοσκουρίων (ὡς καὶ πρότερόν μιν ταῦτα εἰρηται καὶ Ἡρῆς, καὶ Ἰστίης, καὶ Θίμιος, καὶ Χαρίτων, καὶ Νηρηίδων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θεῶν, Αἰγυπτίῳσι αἰετοῖσι τὰ οὐνόματά ἰσθι ἰν τῇ χώρῃ· λίγω δὲ τὰ λίγουσι αὐτοὶ Αἰγύπτῳ.— Lib. ii. cap. 50.

† See note C C C C, at the end of this book.

‡ Ἐθεν δὲ πάντα πρότερον οἱ Πελασγοὶ Θεῶσι ἱκευχόμενοι· ὡς ἰγὼ ἐν Δωδώνῃ οἶδα ἀποέσας, ἱστορίῃν δ' οὐδ' οὐνομα ἱποικύντο οὐδὲν αὐτίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἀπηπόισάν κεν. Θεοὺς δὲ προσωνόμασάν σφας ἀπὸ τοῦ ταιούτου, ὅτι κόσμος θίντις τὰ πάντα πράγματα καὶ πάσας νομὰς ἱέχον· ἱπεί τι δὲ χρόνῳ πολλοῦ διλλόντες, ἱπύοντο ἐν τῇ Αἰγύπτῳ ἀπικόμενα τὰ οὐνόματα τῶν Θεῶν τῶν ἄλλων, Διόντιον δὲ ὕστερον πολλῶ ἱπύοντο. Καὶ μετὰ χρόνῳ ἱχρηστηριάζοντο περὶ τῶν οὐνομάτων ἐν Δωδώνῃ· τὸ γὰρ δὴ μαντήϊον τοῦτο νομόμιστο ἀρχαϊότατον τῶν ἐν Ἑλλήσι χρηστηρίων ἔκει· καὶ ἦν τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον μόνον· ἱπεί ὡς ἱχρηστηριάζοντο ἐν τῇ Δωδώνῃ οἱ Πελασγοὶ εἰ ἀκίλωνται τὰ οὐνόματα τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ἦγοντα, ἀνίλι τὸ μαντήϊον χρῆσθαι. Ἀπὸ μὲν ἐν τούτῳ τοῦ χρόνου ἴθουν, τοῖσι οὐνόμασι τῶν Θεῶν, χρεῖαμινι, παρὰ δὲ Πελασγῶν Ἑλλήσις

From this remarkable passage we may deduce the following facts; which, besides the evidence to the matter in question, are very corroborative of our general explanation of antiquity. 1. It appears from hence, that the Greeks borrowed the *names* of the Egyptian gods,\* to decorate their own; receiving them, as Herodotus here supposes, by the hands of the Pelasgians. 2. That they received *nothing but the names*. 3. That the humour of these ancient inhabitants of Greece was so far from disposing them to take Egyptian, or stranger gods, that they would not so much as venture on their *names* till they had consulted the oracle. 4. That the *religion of names* came in with hero worship or local tutelary deities (to which species of gods *names* were an honorary attribution); and unknown to the worshippers of the *natural divinities*, as the Pelasgians and all other uncivilized people. 5. That this *religion of names* was a thing of much consequence in the Egyptian superstition, and even characteristic of it; which the reader is desired to observe as of use to explain some passages in the next section, concerning the propensity of the Israelites to that superstition. 6. That one cause of that ignorance, which, Herodotus here tells us, the Greeks ever laboured under, concerning the original, nature, and species of their gods, and which, as now appears, we had not unjustly charged upon them, when we ventured to say the same in several parts of this work; one cause, I say, was, that those *names*, which the Pelasgians had applied to their new hero gods, the Greeks, their successors, took and transferred to theirs. 7. And lastly, (which supports the general argument we are now upon) the true sense of the concluding words, which has hitherto been grossly mistaken, lies open to us—*For* (says Herodotus) *Homer and Hesiod—were those who made a theogony for the Greeks; gave surnames to the gods; adjusted their various and specific attributes, and rites of worship; and designed and delineated their several forms and figures.* What hath been commonly understood by these words is, that in Herodotus's opinion, the Greeks knew little or nothing of what we call their classical gods, till Homer and Hesiod taught them how they were to be marshalled, and had assigned their several departments. A sense not only confuted by the poems of those two writers, who relate what they saw ESTABLISHED in their own times, but contradicted by what went just before, where the historian tells us that *Melampus* (whom Homer himself places three generations before the Trojan war) *first taught the Greeks the name, the rites, and the mysteries of Bacchus;*† the god last received (if we may believe the same historian) after the *religion of names* were come in fashion. And we have no reason to

ἐξιδίξαντο ὄσσοισιν. Ἐπειὶ δὲ ἰγίνετο Ἰκαστος τῶν Διῶν, ὥςτις δ' αὖ ἦσαν πάντες ἐκαὶ οἱ εἰς τὰ ἰδία, οὐκ ἠπιστάτο μέχρι οὗ πρῶτόν τι καὶ χθίς, ὥς ἐπιπῶν λόγῳ· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ καὶ Ὅμηρον—οὗτον δὲ εἴσι οἱ ποιήσαντες, Διογούην Ἑλλήσι καὶ Διοῖσι τὰς τοῖσι ἰωνομίας δόντες, καὶ τινὰς τι καὶ τέχνας διδόντες, καὶ ἰδία αὐτῶν σημῆνοισιν.—Lib. ii. cap. 62, 53.

\* See note D D D D, at the end of this book.

† — Ἦδη ὦν δοκίμῳ μοι Μελάμπευς ὁ Ἀμφίαντος τῆς Θουρίας ταύτης οὐκ ἦναι ἀδελφῆς, ἀλλ' ἱμπευρος, Ἑλλήσι γὰρ δὴ Μελάμπευς ἰστί ὁ ἐξηγησάμενος τοῦ Διονύσου, τότε οὐνομα, καὶ τὴν Θουρίαν, καὶ τὴν πομπὴν τῷ φελλεῦ.—Cap. 49

doubt his evidence, when we see the several parts of it so well coincide: for if Melampus first taught the Greeks the worship of Bacchus, this god must needs be the last received by them. But indeed, the whole context excludes the common interpretation, and directs us to one, very different. The Pelasgians, we are told, received the RELIGION OF NAMES from the barbarians [*i. e.* the Egyptians]; by which, the gods were divided into their several classes. This new doctrine, the Pelasgians conveyed down to the Greeks. *But*, says the historian, *the original of each god, and whether they are all from eternity, and what their several kinds and natures are, to say the truth, they neither knew at that time, nor since.* He then immediately subjoins the reason of their ignorance—FOR *Homer and Hesiod—were those who made a theogony for the Greeks; gave SURNAMES to the gods; adjusted their various and specific rites and attributes; and designed and delineated their several forms and figures;* and a convincing reason it is; for Homer's and Hesiod's being the popular and only authorized books of theology amongst the Greeks, which assign the *names*, the *attributes*, and the *form* to each god, and their accounts being, at the same time, overrun with fables and fictions, it was impossible even for the Greeks themselves to develope the confusion, and emancipate themselves from that ignorance here complained of, namely, of the *true natures of their gods*: which indeed, their teachers seem to have known as little of as themselves. For Homer when he speaks of Jupiter, sometimes represents him as a god *from eternity*, at other times as only the head of the college of their terrestrial deities. This then was what Herodotus meant to say; who is not speaking of the INVENTIONS of Homer and Hesiod, but of their AUTHORITY. Whether they were the first who propagated or delivered these things, was not the matter in question. Had it been so, we know how Herodotus would have decided; who, in this very place, expressly tells us, who were the FIRST; namely, the Pelasgians; who delivered them to the Greeks; where Homer and Hesiod found them. However, on the common interpretation, gross as it is, Sir Isaac Newton builds one of his strongest arguments in favour of his *new chronology*. To proceed:

3. The Greeks not only borrowed the NAMES, but likewise the SYMBOLS of the Egyptian gods; and fitted them to their own. A very natural superstition, as appears by the practice of the Hebrews in the wilderness; who, in the absence of Moses, running back into Egyptian idolatry, would needs worship the God of their fathers under an *Egyptian symbol*; and with *Egyptian rites* likewise, *and the people sat down to eat and drink, and rose up to play.* Now had God, on this occasion, persisted in the severity of his justice, where he tells Moses, that he would indeed give them the land of Canaan, and drive out the inhabitants before them, because he had promised Abraham so to do, yet that he would not honour them, as a select people, with his peculiar protection: had, I say, God thus cast them off, and the people departed with

their new leader, the **GOLDEN CALF**, into Canaan; and there made it the visible representative of the God of their fathers, and worshipped it with Egyptian rites; who can doubt but that the late posterity of this people, thus abandoned by God, and given up *to make and believe a lie*, would have supposed that their forefathers had worshipped Osiris, and not Jehovah, under this *golden calf*? The case needs no application.

This then was the whole of what Greece borrowed from Egypt in matters of religion, when it **FIRST** learnt the *mode* of hero worship from that superstitious people. But,

4. It must be owned, that soon after, they did indeed adopt **STRANGE** gods. At first the occasion was rare, and the worship particular and confined. Thus the Athenians labouring under a destructive famine, and relieved by Egypt with corn, did, in gratitude for that benefit, make Isis the patron goddess of their mysteries.

Their migrations were another cause of this adoption: for every region having a local tutelary deity, the new colony thought themselves obliged to worship the god of that place in which they came to settle. But, of this, more in another place.

However, in process of time, the Greeks naturalized all the greater gods of Egypt. For we are to observe that, as superstition grew in bulk, the principle of **INTERCOMMUNITY**, arising from the very essence of paganism, at length overspread all their national religions, so as to bring things round again. We observed, that those most early idol gods, the *celestial luminaries*, were common to all nations, and that *hero worship* brought in the idea of local tutelary deities: now, the principle of **INTERCOMMUNITY** at length broke down this inclosure, and turned all their gods again upon the common,

The grazed ox, and all her bleating gods.\*

But to be a little more particular concerning these various revolutions in the genius of paganism. The first idolatry was *planetary*: and so long, their gods were in common. But *hero worship*, by bringing in local tutelary deities, made their gods peculiar. As the times grew polished, and the absurdity of **MORTAL GODS** became better understood, the managers of this superstition were obliged to hide their origin from earth, and to pretend they had ever been celestial. This soon wore out their peculiarity, and brought in again the notion of their general providence: which, by means of an increasing superstition, ended in an universal **INTERCOMMUNITY**. To explain all these particulars, as they deserve, would require a volume. And not much less perhaps might be collected from what hath been occasionally said of them, in the course of this work. Only one attendant circumstance in these revolutions, it may not be improper to take notice of, as it greatly contributed to fix the later Greeks in their mistake concerning the origin of their hero gods. It was this: The learned Egyptians, as we have observed, at length con-

\* Milton.



trived to hide the deformity of their idolatry by pretending that the whole had a reference to the ONLY GOD. Thus their various *brute worship*, they said, was severally relative to the various attributes of the DIVINITY. The same kind of refinement they brought into their *hero worship*: and each of their greater gods they made significative, some way or other, of the FIRST CAUSE. But to perfect this part of their symbolical theology, it was necessary to make large additions to the legends of those gods. And thus the several parts of Isis's history became relative to the divine nature. But Isis being now possessed of all the attributes, which happened to be severally divided amongst the various Grecian goddesses, the Greeks began to think that these were all originally derived from her. This was the established doctrine in the time of Apuleius: who makes Isis address herself to him in these words: *En assum—rerum natura parens—cujus numen unicum multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo, totus veneratur orbis. Me primigenii Phryges Pessinunticam nominant Deum matrem; hinc Autochthones Attici Cecropiam Minervam; illinc fluctuantes Cyprii patriam Venerem; Cretes Sagittiferi Dictynnam Dianam; Siculi trilingues Stygiam Proserpinam; Eleusinii vetustam Deam Cererem; Junonem alii, alii Bellonam, alii Hecaten, Rhamnusiam alii—Ægyptii ceremoniis me prorsus propriis percolentes appellant vero nomine ISIDEM.\**

OSIRIS too, becoming equally symbolical, made his fortune in the same manner, as appears by this ancient epigram:

*Ogygia me Bacchum vocat,  
Osirin Ægyptus pulat,  
Myri Phanacen nominant,  
Dionyson Indi existimant,*

*Romana sacra Liberum,  
Arabica gens Adoneum,  
Lucaniacus Pantheum.†*

Thus have I explained the several causes which occasioned the later Greeks to think their own gods were originally Egyptian; for understanding that the *rites*, the *names*, and the very *symbols* of their gods were borrowed from thence, they concluded the same of the gods themselves. And with good appearance of reason, as they found too that the ages immediately preceding theirs, had certainly adopted Egyptian gods; which gods had all the attributes of the Grecian. Now when this opinion was once generally embraced, they would, of course, invent a legend for the gods, conformable to the Egyptian history of them. And thus we see the reason why they made their BACCHUS but two generations earlier than the Trojan war, of which age he was; and yet made him OSIRIS, the conqueror of India, which he was not.‡ But their more intelligent historians perceived the absurdity; and so, reasonably satisfied themselves in supposing a *double Bacchus*; but being, as Herodotus observes, *very ignorant of the true origin of their religion* it was a mere gratuitous solution: which made it easy for Sir Isaac to evade it; by only supposing, in his turn, that it was their wrong notion of the high antiquity of Egypt which made them split one *Bacchus* into two. And yet in

\* Metam. lib. xi. p. 378. † Auson. Ep. xxx. ‡ See note E E E E, at the end of this book.

another instance, he frankly enough allows of this ancient practice of *communication of names*.<sup>\*</sup> But he gives the fact reversed; for they were the earlier Greeks who worshipped two *Bacchuses*. And it was late, we find by *Diodorus*, ere they incorporated them into one.† Now had the cause of their *duality* been what the great writer supposes, the fact had been just contrary; and earlier times had worshipped *one* Bacchus, and the later, *two*. The truth of the case then is this: when the first worshipped hero gods, they had but one *Bacchus* and one *Hercules*, &c. and these were Grecian: when they afterwards borrowed the Egyptian gods, they had two of each. And this is not said at random for Herodotus‡ and Diodorus§ expressly tell us, that two *Bacchuses* and two *Herculeses* were worshipped by different rites, and as gods of different original, the one Grecian, the other Egyptian. And at length for the causes explained under the next head, the *two* of each were again reduced to *one*. For we shall now see, that design as well as mistake contributed to confound the Grecian Bacchus with the Egyptian.

III. For our illustrious author makes another use of the Grecian mythology, to support his system. He examines the genealogies of their gods and heroes; and finds them to coincide exactly with the time of SESOSTRIS:|| A farther evidence of the truth of his hypothesis.

There are but few cases in which one would seriously admit the testimony of a mythologist. Least of all, in settling of dates. The most learned of the moderns complain greatly of them for confounding all time in their pretended relations of fact. The excellent bishop STURLINGFLEET thus expresseth himself: *We see those* [Thucydides and Plutarch, whose confession he had quoted] *who were best able to judge of the Greek Antiquities, can find no sure footing to stand on in them; and what basis can we find for our faith, where they could find so little for their knowledge? And those who have been more daring and venturous than these persons mentioned, what a labyrinth have they run themselves into? How many confusions and contradictions have they involved themselves in? sometimes writing the passages of other*

\* The Phenicians, upon their first coming into Greece, gave the name of Jao-pater, Jupiter, to every king.—Chron. of Ancient Kings amended. p. 150.

† Διμήτορα δ' αὐτὸν προσαγορευθῆναι λέγουσι, διὰ τὸ πατρὸς μὲν ἑνὸς ὑπάρχειν τοὺς δύο Διόνυσους, μητέρων δὲ δυῖν· κταλ. ητοιμασθῆναι δὲ τὸν νεώτερον τὰς τοῦ προγενεστέρου πράξεις. Διότι τοῦ ΜΕΤΑΓΕΝΕΣΤΕΡΟΥΣ ἀνθρώπου, ΑΙΝΟΟΤΝΤΑΣ μὲν εἰς ἀληθείας, πλανηθέντας δὲ διὰ τὴν ἰμμενότητα, ἵνα γιγασθῶσι νομίσαι Διόνυσον.—Lib. iv. p. 148.

‡ —Καὶ δοκίμους δὲ μοι οὗτοι ἐσθότατα Ἑλλήνων ποίειν, οἳ διὰ Ἡράκλειον Ἰδρυάμειον ἱερῶνται· καὶ τῶ μὲν, ὡς ΑΘΑΝΑΤΩ Ὀλυμπίῳ δὲ Ἰωνυμίνῳ, θύουσι· τῷ δ' ἱεῖρα, ὡς Ἡραῖ, ἱερῶν ζουσι.—Herod. lib. ii. cap. 44.

§ Μυθολογοῦσι δὲ τίνες καὶ ἱερεῖον Διόνυσον γιγασθῆναι πολὺ τῷ χρόνῳ προτιθεῖντα τούτων. Φασὶ γὰρ ἐκ Διὸς καὶ Περσιφόνης Διόνυσον γινέσθαι, τὸν ὑπὲρ τινῶν Σαβάζιον ὀνομαζόμενον· οὗ τὴν τε γένεσιν, καὶ τὰς θυσίας, καὶ τιμὰς ΝΤΚΤΕΡΙΝΑΣ καὶ ΚΡΤΦΙΑΣ περιγράφουσι, διὰ τὴν αἰσχρότητα τὴν ἐκ τῆς συνουσίας ἱσακολουθεῖν.—Diod. lib. iv. p. 148. These *nightly* and *secret* rites show them to be Egyptian. As for what is said of the other Bacchus's being the son of Proserpine, this was only a fancy of the Greeks, on observing the *mysteries* of Bacchus and those of Ceres or Isis to have a great resemblance: but this was only occasioned by their being both Egyptian rites.

|| Page 191, et seq. of the Chron. of Ancient Kingdoms amended.

*countries for those of Greece, and at other times so confounding times, persons, and places, that one might think they had only a design upon the understandings of their readers, to make them play at blindman's buff in searching for the kings of Greece.\** And the candid and accurate bishop CUMBERLAND speaks so much to our purpose, that I shall add his words to the foregoing: *their mythic writers confound and lose all the times of their gods; which advantage divers Christians make use of against them: and this was a good argument ad hominem, as it is called, but is not sufficient to prove, that idolatry, and the heathen gods, are of SO LATE AN ORIGINAL, as some both heathen and Christians, have affirmed them to be.†* Now though, in answer to what Sir Isaac Newton brings from such writers, it were enough to say, with those who have considered their character before me, that they are so perplexed, contradictory, and infinitely fabulous, that nothing certain can be gathered from their accounts, for the regulation of ancient time; yet that they may never appear again amongst witnesses of credit, or be heard in matters of fact, I shall endeavour to show, from what sources those accounts arose, from which the low date of the Egyptian gods is inferred; whence it will appear that they are a heap of fictions, invented and contrived, as usual, only for the support of greater.

1. The *first* source was the address of the EGYPTIAN PRIESTS, to screen their *hero worship* from the inquisition of the curious. We have observed, from a famous fable, invented by these men,‡ to record the danger which this superstition incurred, and from their art in evading that danger, that the original of their *hero gods* was a subject maliciously pursued by the free inquirers of those times. For the discredit attending this superstition was, that these GODS had been MEN; and the proof of their humanity was taken from their late existence. Now what did these masters in their trade do, to evade this evidence? We have seen before what they did to obscure the inquiry. Why, by an equal effort of their skill, they invented a set of fables (one of which has been examined above) concerning these gods; which brought their birth even *lower down* than to the times of their established worship. What they gained by this was considerable: they threw a general confusion over the whole history of these gods: and in a short time made men as indisposed to give credit to the *old* stories of them (from whence the dangerous truth of their HUMANITY might be collected) as these *new* fables, which it was impossible they should believe, for the reason just now assigned. Hence, the first source of the *low dates* of these hero gods.

2. The *second*, was the extravagant vanity of the Greeks in pretending, at length, to be original even to the Egyptians themselves. For we are to observe, that there were three distinguished periods in the religion of civilized Greece; two of which we have described already. The

\* Orig. Sacr. p. 41. 8th edit.

† Sanchoniatho; pp. 132, 133.

‡ The fable I mean is that of Typhon's persecution of the gods and their flight into Egypt; which the Greeks borrowed and fitted up with their own names of the gods.

first was, when the Greeks borrowed Egyptian rites and ceremonies to adorn their own hero gods: the second, when they adopted the very Egyptian gods: and the third, when, on the contrary, they pretended that the Egyptians had adopted theirs. On their first acquaintance with Egypt, they were modest, and fairly allowed its superior antiquity. But as they advanced in arts and empire, they grew intoxicated with their good fortune; and would now contend with Egypt (become by this time as much fallen and depressed in both) for the honour of priority; and soon after (as was no wonder when they had ventured so far), with all the rest of mankind.\* And then it was, that having, before this time, thoroughly confounded the Grecian and Egyptian Bacchus with design (a confusion first occasioned by mistake) they invented many fables to countenance their absurd pretensions. Hence their idle tale of Apis, the son or grandson of Phoroneus, becoming OSIRIS; without any other reason in the world than that the son of Phoroneus chanced to have the same name with the *symbol* of Osiris. Hence, again, the fable of Io, the daughter of Inachus, becoming ISIS; for scarce so good a reason; only an approaching similitude of names. Yet these two wretched fables, Sir Isaac Newton (surprising as it is) hath drawn in for the main supports of his hypothesis.† But as much credit as his countenance hath given to them, he who can suppose Io to be stolen out of Greece, carried into Egypt, and there made a goddess, may as well believe an European ship to be now busied in bringing hither an Indian savage to be made a queen.

But another story of the same stamp, carries its confutation along with it, as Herodotus rightly observed.‡ For, to bring Hercules, as they had done Isis and Osiris out of Greece into Egypt, in a manner suitable to his character, they pretended that, when he had landed on that inhospitable shore, and was led by the natives, crowned with garlands, to be offered up at the altar of Jupiter, he broke loose from his leaders, and slaughtered all who were assembled for the sacrifice: and in this rough manner, I suppose, taught them to abolish those inhuman rites, and to worship their chastiser as a god: which would seem to have been the first bringing in of club law into religion. But, as Herodotus observes, the inventor of this fable hath laid his story so ill together, that he hath only betrayed his own ignorance of Egyptian manners. For, from the most early time, the inhabitants of the Nile were so far from offering up human victims, that they held it unlawful to sacrifice above three or four species of animals. But the Egyptians owed them a good turn for this slander of *human sacrifices*; and indeed paid them with usury. For Herodotus tells us, the priests informed him, that

\* Λατάνουσι δ' αὐτοὺς τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων κατορθώματα, ἀφ' ὧν μὴ ὅτι γε φιλοσοφία, ἀλλὰ καὶ γίνος ἀνθρώπων ἡρξί, βαρβάρους προσάπτουσι.—Diogenes Laertius, Proem. Segm. 3.

† Page 192 of his Chronology.

‡ Λίγουσι δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα ἀπιστικῶταί οἱ Ἕλλησι· ἰσχυρῶς δὲ αὐτίαν καὶ ὅτι ὁ μῦθος ἴσται, τὸν περὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλείους λίκουσι ὡς αὐτὸν ἀφικόμενον ἐς Αἴγυπτον, &c.—Lib. ii. cap. 45.

when Menelaus went to Egypt to inquire after Helen, and lay wind-bound in their ports, he cut up two children of the natives, to divine by their entrails.\*

This humour of priority was so rooted in the Greeks, that Diodorus seems to insinuate, they always disputed it with the Egyptians.† And so far indeed is true, that it was one of their most early vanities:‡ and though afterwards, on their most intimate acquaintance with Egypt, it was in some degree corrected, yet it burst out again, and lasted, as we see, even to the time of Diogenes Laertius. But this is the pleasant part of the story; the Egyptians were not content to complain, as well they might, that the Greeks had stolen away their gods and heroes; but they would needs make reprisals on them. Thus, as Diodorus tells us, when they charged the Greeks with taking away their Isis, to aggravate the theft they pretended that Athens itself was originally but an Egyptian colony.§ This was a home stroke: but the Greeks as handsomely returned it; by affirming that one of the Egyptian pyramids was built by Rhodope, a Grecian whore.|| This setting up one false claim to oppose another, was in the very spirit of ancient paganism.¶ So again, the Egyptians, maintaining that civilized Greece was indebted for the mode of hero worship to them, did, in order to support a just claim, which wanted none of these arts, pretend to antiquity most extravagantly *high*. The Greeks, not to be behind hand with them, and to support a false claim which did want these sort of arts, having pretended that the Egyptians borrowed all from them, brought down the age of these disputed gods as much too *low*. Unluckily, the great author, who saw the unreasonable antiquity of the one system, did not advert to the unreasonable novelty of the other.

But we are not to think the Greeks firm and steady in this natural consequence of their unjust pretensions. Nothing is so inconstant as falsehood. When, therefore, on the issue, it was seen that all the records of former times contradicted this novelty; and, consequently, that their darling claim itself was likely to be in danger, they shifted their support, and then contended, in imitation of the Egyptians, for as extravagant an antiquity.\*\*

IV. Hitherto Sir Isaac Newton was drawn in by antiquity; which had sunk with him, and foundered in the treacherous soil of mythology.

\* λαβὼν γὰρ δύο παῖδια ἀνδρῶν ἱπικωρίων, ἱστομάσφια ἱποίησι.—Herod. lib. ii. cap. 119.

† Περί δὲ τῆς τοῦ βίου ἡγουν γίνους ἀρχαιότητος οὐ μόνον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν Ἕλληνες, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἑαυτοὺς αὐτόχθονας λίγοντες.—P. 6.

‡ See sect. 3. pp. 1 et seq. of this volume.

§ Καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους δὲ φασιν ἀποίκους εἶναι Σαῖτῶν τῶν ἐξ Αἰγύπτου.—Diod. p. 17.

|| See note F F F F, at the end of this book.

¶ In the former part of this work, where we have shown that the converts from gentilism unhappily practised it, even after they had professed a religion which condemns all the oblique arts of falsehood and unjust retaliation.

\*\*—Πάντων δὲ πρῶτον μνησθῶμεν, ὅτι τὸ πικράλαιον ἦν ἱνάκις ἑπτὰ χίλια, ἀφ' οὗ γιγνομένης ἱμηνύθη πόλις τοῖς θ' ὑπὲρ Ἡρακλείας στήλας ἕξω κατοικοῦσι καὶ τοῖς ἱπτοῖς πᾶσιν· ὃν δι' οὗ τῶν ἱπποκρίτων τῶν μὲν οὖν ἦδη ἡ πόλις ἀρχοῦσα καὶ πάντα τὸν πόλιν διαπολιμήσασα ἰλίγιστο.—Plato, vol. iii. p. 108, E.

But the greatest part of his reasoning, from these genealogies, stands upon an error of his own. The age preceding the destruction of Troy is full of the loves and intrigues of the greater divinities: who supplied that expedition from their own loins with demigods once removed. Sir Isaac, who supposed, as indeed he well might from physical observation, that the gods left off getting children when they died, concludes, from the mythologic account of their offspring, that they must needs have lived but two or three generations before the war of Troy. But our great philosopher took this thing a deal too seriously. The truth is, he concerned himself no farther with the fabulous history of ancient times than just served the purpose of his system. Otherwise, he might have found, on the most cursory survey, that one of the essential attributes of a pagan god was the getting of bastards: and that, for one he fairly had in life, his worshippers fathered a hundred upon him after his decease. This amorous commerce between heaven and earth never ceased till near the latest times of paganism; as we learn from the primitive apologists; who, referring to their perpetual intrigues in mythologic story, rally the idolaters, of their time, with great vivacity, on the decrepit old age and sudden debility of their gods.

It being then notorious, that, in the later ages of paganism, earth swarmed as thick with the progeny of heaven, as in the early times of that religion, heaven swarmed with the progeny of earth, Sir Isaac's calculation, from the time of the sons and grandsons of the gods, what must needs be their own, is altogether fallacious. But as, in this inquiry, we have still attempted to account for the fables of antiquity, in order to detect their various impostures, and prevent their future mischief, we shall now consider the original of those in question.

1. The first cause of this doubly spurious offspring, was the contrivance of wives to hide their adultery; of virgins to excuse their incontinence; and of parents to cover the dishonour of their house.\* The god bore the blame, or rather the mortal reaped the glory; and passion, as is usual, was advanced into piety. Great men too employed it, (for then great men had some regard for their race and name) to conceal the ignominy of a low-born commerce. In a word, both sexes soon learned the sweets of a holy intrigue; where a pretended converse with a god or goddess preserved the reputation of the weaker, and procured power and authority to the stronger sex. Sometimes the pretended amour was mutually concerted between the real parties: as that of Anchises and a country wench; who, in regard to his honour, was to pass for a Venus. So Homer:†

\* See note G G G G, at the end of this book.

† Δαρδανίαν αὐτ' ἤρχειν, ἡὺς παῖς Ἀγχίσιος,  
Αἰνίας· τὸν ὑπ' Ἀγχίση τίσι δὲ Ἀφροδίτῃ,  
ἴδης ἐν κρημαῖσι, διὰ βροτῶν ἐννηλῖσα.

Il. β'. ver. 819.

Yet this is one of the instances Sir Isaac brings to prove the low age of the goddess Venus. See p. 191 of his *Chronology*.



Divine Æneas brings the Dardan race,  
 Anchises' son by Venus' stol'n embrace;  
 Born in the shades of Ida's secret grove,  
 A mortal mixing with the Queen of love. Pope.

And, in a much later age, the wife of Philip of Macedon and her court gallant. Sometimes again, one of the parties was deceived by the mask of divinity which the other had impiously assumed, as seems to have been the case of Astiochè.\*

Two valiant brothers rule th' undaunted throng,  
 Ialmen and Ascalapus the strong:  
 Sons of Astiochè, the heavenly fair,  
 Whose virgin charms subdu'd the god of war:  
 In Actor's court, as she retir'd to rest,  
 The strength of Mars the blushing maid comprest. Pope.

And of the priestess Rhea,

————— *Quem Rhea sacerdos*  
*FURTIVUM partu sub lūminis edidit auras,*  
 ———— *Mista deo mulier.†*

And of Alcmene the mother of Hercules. It was certainly the case of the virtuous Paulina, in the reign of Tiberius: who, being made to believe that the god Anubis was fallen in love with her, went to the appointed assignation with a mind equally balanced by conjugal chastity and superstition. The story is very curious, and told by Josephus ‡ in all its circumstances. In short, if we may believe Ovid, who was exquisitely skilled in the mythologic story, this was one of the most common covers of lust and concupiscence. The pretended nurse of Semele is made to caution her mistress against the addresses of Jupiter, in the following manner:

————— *Opto*  
*Jupiter ut sit, ait; metuo tamen omnia. MULTI*  
*NOMINE DIVORUM THALAMOS INIERE PUDICOS.§*

2. Another cause was the ambition of the pretenders themselves to heavenly birth, in order to support their authority amongst their barbarous subjects or followers. Thus we are told, that the two Amazon queens, Marthesia and Lampeto, gave out that they were the daughters of Mars, *ne successibus deesset auctoritas*, says the historian, *genitas se MARTE prædicabant.* || And thus Romulus and Remus pretended to the same relation: but this matter is explained more at large in the discourse on the ancient lawgivers.¶

3. A third cause was the flattery of sycophants and corrupt courtiers. To this practice Tlepolemus alludes in his address to Sarpedon:

\* Τῶν ἑρχ' Ἀσκάλαφος καὶ Ἰάλυινος υἱὲς Ἀρης,  
 Οὓς τίπειν Ἀστυόχην, δόμον Ἀκτορος Ἀζιδας,  
 Παρθένος Αἰδοίης ὑπερώϊον εἰσαναβᾶσα,  
 Ἀρηϊ κρατερῶν· ὃ δὲ οἱ περιλίξατο ΛΑΘΡΗ. Ιλ. β'. ver. 512.

† Æn. lib. vii. ver. 659.—See Dionys. Halicarn. Antiq. Rom. lib. i. p. 62.

‡ Antiq. Jud. lib. xviii. cap. 3.—See, for this general practice, Herod. lib. i. cap. 181.

§ Metam. lib. iii. fab. 3.

|| Justin. Hist. lib. ii. cap. 4.

¶ Div. Leg. book ii. sect. ii.

Know thy vain self, nor let their flatt'ry move,  
 Who style thee son of cloud-compelling Jove.  
 How far unlike those chiefs of race divine!  
 How vast the diff'rence of their deeds and thine!\*

Pope.

4. A fourth cause was a mere figure of speech common in the eastern phraseology; which, to express the qualities of the subject, called a prudent and powerful monarch† the son of Jupiter; a violent and inhuman ravager,‡ or an expert and able seaman, the son of Neptune;§ a sharper, a banker, or a large trader, the son of Mercury; a cultivator of the fine arts, the son of Apollo; a great warrior, the son of Mars; a beautiful woman, the daughter of Venus; and a good physician, the offspring of Æsculapius. Thus Homer,

In thirty sail the sparkling waves divide,  
 Which Podalirius and Machaon guide.  
 To these his skill their parent god imparts,  
 Divine professors of the healing arts.||

Pope.

And that the poet meant no more than that they were excellent in their profession, appears from his giving to all the Egyptians the same original, where, speaking of their superior eminence in the art of physic, he says,

These drugs, so friendly to the joys of life,  
 Bright Helen learn'd from Thone's imperial wife;  
 Who sway'd the sceptre, where prolific Nile  
 With various simples clothes the fatt'ned soil—  
 From *Pæon sprung*, their patron god imparts  
 To all the Pharian race his healing arts.¶

Fenton.

5. The last cause I shall mention were the dotages of judicial astrology. But whether giving to each of their gods a star over which to preside was the *cause* or *effect* of this folly, may be disputed; because,

\* Ψυδόμενοι δὲ σε φασὶ Διὸς γένει αἰγιόχοιο  
 Εἶναι, ἐπεὶ πολλὸν κτεῖναι ἱπιδεύσαι ἀνδρῶν  
 Οἳ Διὸς ἱεγίνοντο ἐπὶ προτέρων ἀνθρώπων.

Il. i. ver. 635.

† The words of Callimachus, in his hymn to Jupiter, are so apposite to our purpose, that the learned reader will not think them quoted impertinently:

Ἀντίπα χαλκῆας μὲν ὑδαίμεν Ἡφαιστοῖα,  
 Τευχεστάς δ' Ἀρῆος ἱπαστῆρας δὲ χιτώνης  
 Ἀρτίμιδος· Φοίβου δὲ, λύρης ἐν ἰδότης οἴμους.  
 Ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆς· ἐπεὶ Διὸς οὐδὲν ἀνάκτων  
 Θυόταρον.

Ver. 76, et seq.

‡ Præstantissimos virtute, prudentia, viribus, *Jovis filios*, poetæ appellaverunt, ut *Æacum*, et *Minoa*, et *Sarpedona*: ferocissimos et immanes et alienos ab omni humanitate tanquam e mari genitos, *Neptuni filios* dixerunt, *Cyclopa*, et *Cercyona*, et *Scyrona*, et *Læstrygonas*. —A. Gellius, lib. xv. cap. 21.

§ Thus in the Argonautic expedition Typhus the pilot, and his mate Ergynus, were called the sons of Neptune. And when these died in the voyage, they were succeeded by Ancæus and Euphemus; and both of these, we are told, were the sons of Neptune, likewise. I chose to give the reader this instance, because, from this figure of speech, thus qualifying men any way distinguished in the Argonautic times, Sir Isaac Newton infers the low age of the Grecian deities.

|| Τῶν αὖθ' ἡγίστην Ἀσκληπιοῦ δύο παῖδι,  
 Ἰητῆρ' ἀγαθὸν, Ποδαλείριος ἠδὲ Μαχάων·  
 Τοῖς δὲ τριήκοντα γλαφυραὶ νῆες ἴσσι χέοντο.

Il. β. ver. 731.

¶ Ἰητὴρ δὲ Ἰκαστός· ἱπαστάμινος περὶ πάντων  
 Ἀσθράπων· ἡ γὰρ Παιήονός ἐστι γινίθλης.

Od. γ. ver. 231.

I believe, it was sometimes one, and sometimes the other. Yet it gave frequent occasion to call an extraordinary person the son of that god or goddess under whose planet he was born.

Thus have I endeavoured to discover and lay open the true causes of all that confusion which goes under the name of the *History of the heroic ages*. Those false facts, therefore, and the mistaken conclusion drawn from them by Sir Isaac Newton to support the identity of Osiris and Sesostris, being detected, general tradition, which vouches for their real diversity, is reinstated in its credit: whose testimony likewise, as I have gone along, I have not neglected occasionally to support by divers corroborating circumstances.

I might indeed have taken a very different route through this *Land of Fables*, to the confutation of his hypothesis; by opposing adventure to adventure, and genealogy to genealogy; and have formed upon them, as others have done before me, a system of chronology directly opposite to our illustrious author's. But this, instead of relieving the reader, would only have put him in mind of the old man's complaint; *incertior sum multo quam dudum*. I have therefore attempted a way of greater certainty, in an explanation of the general principles and practices of ancient superstition; of which, their mythologic history was the fruits: and by this it appears that all these pretended facts, on which Sir Isaac Newton supports his hypothesis of the identity of OSIRIS and SESOSTRIS, are mere fables, invented to confound all times and eras, and therefore most unhappily chosen for one of the means of regulating and reforming the ancient chronology.

BUT although I could have given no reasonable account of these mistaken facts, from which Sir Isaac Newton infers the identity, I was still able to prove the falsehood of that supposed identity, by the consequences that follow from it: not only by those which our great author would not, but by those which he would, venture to admit. Both of which directly contradict SCRIPTURE and the NATURE OF THINGS. So that, as before I proved the error of his conclusion from the falsehood of his premises; I now begin at the other end, and shall prove the falsehood of his premises from the error of his conclusion.

I. I have, in the third and fourth sections of this book, shown at large, from sacred scripture, illustrated and confirmed by profane antiquity, that Egypt was a polite and powerful empire at the egression of the Israelites. This is alone sufficient to overthrow Sir Isaac Newton's whole system. But to make the truth still more evident, it may be proper to take a particular, though short, view of the necessary consequences which follow from the supposed identity of Osiris and Sesostris. These may be divided into two parts; such as our great author hath ventured to own; and such as, for their apparent falsehood, he was obliged to pass over in silence.

To begin with the latter. Those very histories on which Sir Isaac builds his identity, tell us that Osiris, and his wife and sister Isis, were

the professed patron and patroness of nascent arts, the very instruments of husbandry being invented in their time; that he first taught the culture of the vine;\* and abolished the bad habit, his savage subjects had of eating one another:† and that she taught them to sow corn;‡ and gave them their first system of laws.§—But if Osiris were Sesostris, all these fine discoveries were made but two generations before the Trojan war, and full five hundred years after the egression of the Israelites from Egypt: and then what are we to think of the Bible? But the gross absurdity of these things hindered our author from receiving them into the consequences of his new system: yet these standing on the same authority with the consequences he hath thought fit to receive, he was obliged to pass them over in silence. But though he be silent, we should not. On the contrary, we must insist that he hath transgressed the plainest rules of fair reasoning, which required him, either to receive the consequences he hath rejected, or to reject those which he hath received; or lastly, to show that they stand upon a different authority. But he will do nothing of this: he picks and chooses as he likes best, and, what is not for his purpose, he leaves without notice. Diodorus says, that Osiris abolished the custom of human sacrifices; that he built the city of Thebes; that he regulated the worship of the gods; and conquered many nations. These things Sir Isaac, who takes Osiris for Sesostris, readily admits. The same historian says, that this Osiris first cultivated the vine; restrained his subjects from eating one another; and found out the arts of life; that his wife Isis invented agriculture, and gave the first law to the Egyptians; but all this Sir Isaac tacitly rejects. Yet if one part of the Sicilian's account be of better authority than the rest, it is that, which says, *Isis invented agriculture*: for he expressly tells us, that so it was found written on a large column, in hieroglyphic characters, half consumed by time, then standing in the city of Nysa in Arabia:‖ and, without his telling, we are well assured, that her *mysteries* had very early brought the knowledge of the fact to all the neighbouring nations.

II. Amongst the consequences which the great author hath thought fit to admit; some are these, that *instruments of war*; *horses for military service*; *animal food*; *the exact distribution of property*; *alphabetic letters*; and *the well-peopling of Egypt*; were all the product of the Sesostrian age.

1. Vulcan, he says, who lived even to the times of the Trojan war,

\* Εὐρετάν δ' αὐτὸν γινίσθαι φασὶ τῆς ἀμπίλου περὶ τὴν Νύσαν, καὶ τὴν ἰργασίαν τοῦ ταύτης καρποῦ προσιπινύσαντα, πρῶτον οἶνον χρῆσασθαι καὶ διδάξαι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὴν τε φυτείαν τῆς ἀμπίλου, καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τοῦ οἴνου, καὶ τὴν συγκομιδὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τήρησιν.—Diod. Sic. lib. i. p. 10.

† Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ παῦσαι τῆς ἀλληλοφαγίας τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος.—Id. p. 9.

‡ Εὐρέουσης μὲν Ἰσιδος τὸν τι τοῦ πυροῦ καὶ τῆς κριθῆς καρπὸν, (φύμινον μὲν ὡς ἰσχυρὴ κατὰ τὴν χώραν μετὰ τῆς ἄλλης βοτάνης, ἀγνοοῦμιν δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων) τοῦ δὲ Ὀσίριδος ἱστορησάμενον τὴν τούτων κατεργασίαν τῶν καρπῶν.—Id. ib.

§ Θιῖναι δὲ φασὶ καὶ νόμους τὴν Ἰσιν, καθ' οὓς ἀλλήλοις δίδοναι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τῆς ἀδίσμου βίας καὶ ὕβριος παύσασθαι, διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς τιμωρίας φόβον.—Id. ib.

‖ Ἐγὼ ἴσις εἰμι ἡ βασίλισσα πάσης χώρας.—Ἐγὼ εἰμι γυνὴ καὶ ἀδελφὴ Ὀσίριδος βασιλῆως. Ἐγὼ εἰμι ἡ πρώτη καρπὸν ἀνθρώποις ἐρέουσα.—Diod. Sic. lib. i. p. 10.

invented armour, and was, on that account, deified by the Egyptians. His words are these, *He [Vulcan] reigned there [in Cyprus and Byblus] till a very great age, living to the times of the Trojan war, and becoming exceedingly rich—And for assisting the Egyptians with armour, it is probable, that he was deified by his friends the Egyptians, by the name of Baal-Canaan or Vulcan: for Vulcan was celebrated principally by the Egyptians, and was a king, according to Homer, and reigned in Lemnos; and Cinyras was an inventor of arts, and found out copper in Cyprus, and the smith's hammer, and anvil, and tongs, and laver; and employed workmen in making armour, and other things of brass and iron, and was the only king celebrated in history for working in metals, and was king of Lemnos, and the husband of Venus; all which are the characters of Vulcan: and the Egyptians about the time of the death of Cinyras, viz. in the reign of their king Amenophis, built a very sumptuous temple at Memphis to Vulcan.* pp. 223—225. Here we have a hero, living till the time of the Trojan war, not only the inventor of arms, but likewise of the very tools employed in making them. That this was our author's meaning, is plain from what he tells us of the Egyptians fighting with clubs in the time of Sesostris (p. 215); which certainly was for want of better weapons: and still plainer, from what he tells of Vulcan's being made a god; which, certainly, was for a NEW INVENTION. If I should now show, by a formal enumeration of particulars, how all here said, contradicts the BIBLE, the reader would think me disposed to trifle with him. Instead of this, I shall but just observe, how ill it agrees with HOMER: who seems, indeed, to make Vulcan the patron god of the armourers, but, at the same time, makes both him, and the invention, the product of a much earlier age. From the poem of the Trojan war it appears that military weapons had been then of tried use; and Vulcan, and his wife Venus, deities of long standing. Nor can it be objected that the poet hath here given us the picture of his own times. He was a stricter observer of decorum: as may be seen, amongst other instances, from a celebrated one taken notice of by the critics, that though, in his days, cavalry were common, yet he brings none to the siege of Troy, because those times had not yet learned their use. Nor was he less knowing than exact; for he was possessed of the songs and poems of his ancestors; in which he found all the particulars of that famous expedition.\* Now, if military weapons, at the time of the Trojan war, had been long in use amongst the Greeks, it is hardly possible they should have been just invented in Egypt.

2. Our author makes Sesostris's conquest of Libya the occasion of furnishing Egypt with horses. *After the conquest of Libya, says he, by which Egypt was furnished with horses, and furnished Solomon and his friends, he prepared a fleet, &c.* p. 215. The illustrious writer is here speaking of the original of those civil advantages, for which ancient Egypt was so much celebrated. He had before, and afterwards,

\* See note H H H H, at the end of this book.

told us his thoughts of their *astronomy, navigation, letters, names, and weapons of war*. We cannot therefore but understand what he here says, of the *Libyan horses*, to mean, that the conquest of that country was the first occasion of Egypt's abounding in horse. But this directly contradicts holy scripture, which assures us that they abounded in horse long before. Their pursuit of the Israelites is thus described,—*And Pharaoh made ready his chariot, and took his people with him. And he took six hundred chosen chariots, and all the chariots of Egypt, and captains over every one of them.—The Egyptians pursued after them (all the horses and chariots of Pharaoh and his horsemen and his army.)—And the Egyptians pursued after them to the midst of the sea, even all Pharaoh's horses, his chariots, and his horsemen.\** Sir Isaac (p, 167) seems to have been aware of this evidence against him, and endeavours to turn it on the side of his hypothesis. *In the days of Moses*, says he, *all the chariots of Egypt, with which Pharaoh pursued Israel, WERE BUT SIX HUNDRED. Exod. xiv. 7.* This is a strange mistake. The *six hundred*, mentioned in the place quoted, are expressly said to be the *chosen chariots*, that is, the king's guard; for over and above these, *all the chariots of Egypt*, an indefinite number, were in the pursuit. Besides, the number of horses is not to be estimated from the chariots, because there was an army of *horsemen* likewise in this expedition.

However, by Sir Isaac's own confession, it appears that Egypt abounded with horse much earlier than the time he here assigns. For the vast number of Philistim horse brought into the field, in the second year of the reign of Saul, in an army consisting of thirty thousand chariots and six thousand horsemen, came all, in our author's opinion, from Egypt. *The Canaanites*, says he, *had their horses from Egypt; and—from the great army of the Philistims against Saul, and the great number of their horses, I seem to gather that the shepherds had newly relinquished Egypt, and joined them.* p. 167.—Now if they had such plenty of horses in the time of Saul, how was it that they were first furnished from Libya in the time of Sesac?

But another circumstance in sacred history will show us, that Egypt, which supplied Canaan, abounded in horse still much earlier. In the law of Moses, we find this prohibition, personally directed to their future king: *he shall not multiply horses to himself, nor cause the people to return to EGYPT, TO THE END THAT HE SHOULD MULTIPLY HORSES: forasmuch as the Lord hath said unto you, ye shall henceforth return no more that way.†* Now the reason, here given being to prevent all commerce with Egypt, we must conclude, if it appear that Egypt, at this time, supplied other nations with horses, that the law extended to their judges as well as kings. But they did supply other nations. For we find the confederate Canaanites (who, by Sir Isaac's confession, had their horses from Egypt) warring against Joshua, *they and all their*

\* Exod. xiv. 6, 7—9—23.

† Deut. xvii. 16.



*hosts with them, much people, even as the sand that is upon the sea-shore in multitude, with horses and chariots very many.\** The law therefore did certainly respect the judges. And the reasoning is confirmed by fact. For Joshua, when he had defeated these confederate hosts, *houghed their horses and burnt their chariots with fire,†* according to the commandment of the Lord: observing it in the same rigorous manner in which it was obeyed by their kings, to whom the law was personally addressed: for thus Ahab destroyed the horses and chariots of Benhadad.‡ So that I now conclude the other way from this law, that a general traffic with Egypt for horses was very common in the times of Moses and Joshua. Consequently Egypt was not furnished with horses from Libya in the time of Sir Isaac Newton's Sesostris.

But it may give strength to this argument, as well as light to the sacred text, to inquire more particularly into the reasons of this PROHIBITION; which we shall find so weighty and various as to appear worthy of its author, and accommodated only to a law of divine original.

1. The first reason (which was expressly delivered with the law) is, properly, RELIGIOUS. He [the king], says the law, *shall not multiply horses to himself, nor cause the people to return to Egypt, to the end that he should multiply horses: forasmuch as the Lord hath said unto you, Ye shall henceforth return no more that way; i. e. he should not establish a body of cavalry, because this could not be effected without sending into Egypt, with which people the Lord had forbidden any communication, as, of all foreign commerce, that was the most dangerous to true religion.§*

When Solomon had violated this law, and multiplied horses to such excess that, we are told, he *had forty thousand stalls of horses for his chariots, and twelve thousand horsemen,||* it was soon attended with those fatal consequences which the law had foretold. For this wisest of kings having likewise, in violation of another law of Moses, married Pharaoh's daughter,¶ (the early fruits of this commerce) and then, by a repetition of the same crime, but a transgression of another law, had espoused more *strange women;\*\** they first of all, in defiance of a fourth law, persuaded him to build them idol temples for their use; and afterwards, against a fifth law, still more fundamental, brought him to erect other temples for his own.†† Now the original of all this mischief was the forbidden traffic with Egypt for horses: for thither we are told, the agents of Solomon were sent to mount his cavalry. *And Solomon gathered chariots and horsemen: and he had a thousand and four hundred chariots, and twelve thousand horsemen, which he placed in the chariot cities, and with the king at Jerusalem. And he had horses brought out of Egypt, and linen yarn: the king's merchants received the linen yarn at a price. And they fetcht up and brought forth out of Egypt a chariot for six hundred shekels of silver, and a horse for a*

\* Jos. xi. 4.

† Ib. xi. 9.

‡ 1 Kings xx. 21.

§ See the next section.

|| 1 Kings iv. 26.

¶ Ib. iii. 1.

\*\* Ib. xi. 1.

†† Ib. xi. 7, 8.

*hundred and fifty.\** Nay, this great king even turned factor for the neighbouring monarchs. *And so brought they out horses for all the kings of the Hittites, and for the kings of Syria by their means.†* This opprobrious commerce was kept up by his successors; and attended with the same pernicious consequences. Isaiah, with his usual majesty, denounces the mischiefs of this traffic; and foretells that one of the good effects of leaving it, would be the forsaking their idolatries. *Wo to them that go down to Egypt for help, and stay on HORSES, and trust in chariots, because they are many; and in HORSEMEN, because they are very strong: but they look not to the Holy One of Israel, neither seek the Lord. For thus hath the Lord spoken unto me, like as the lion, and the young lion roaring on his prey, when a multitude of shepherds is called forth against him, he will not be afraid of their voice, nor abase himself for the noise of them: so shall the Lord of Hosts come down to fight for mount Zion, and for the hill thereof. Turn ye unto him from whom the children of Israel have deeply revolted. For in that day every man shall cast away his idols of silver, and his idols of gold, which your own hands have made unto you for a sin.‡*

2. The second reason against *multiplying horses* I take to have been properly POLITICAL. The Israelites, separated by God for his peculiar people, under his government as king, must needs have been designed for the proprietors of one certain country. Accordingly the land of Canaan, the possession of the *seven nations*, was marked out for their proper inheritance. Within these limits they were to be confined; it being foreign to the nature of their institution to make conquests, or to extend their dominion. But the expulsion of the *seven nations* being, as we shall see presently, to be effected by the extraordinary assistance of their KING, JEHOVAH, their successes must, of course, be full and rapid. But nothing is so impatient of bounds as a multitude flushed with easy victories: the projects of such a people are always going on from conquest to conquest; as appears from the Mahometan Arabs, under the same circumstances, led out to conquest by a *false* prophet, as the Israelites by a *true*. Now to defeat this so natural a disposition, in a nation not designed for empire, a law is given against MULTIPLYING HORSES; than which nothing can be conceived more effectual. The country that confined them was rocky and mountainous, and therefore unfit for the breed and sustentation of horses. Telemachus is commended for giving this reason for refusing the horses of Menelaus:

*Haud male Telemachus, proles patientis Ulisei;  
Non est aptus equis Ithacæ locus, ut neque planis  
Porrectus spatiis, nec multæ prodigus herbæ.§*

Besides, when they had once gotten possession of these mountains, they had little need of horse to preserve their conquest; as all skilled in military matters very well understand. || The Israelites therefore, had they

\* 2 Chron. i. 16, 17.

† Ib. i. 17.

‡ Is. xxxi. 1, 4, 6, 7.

§ Hor.

|| See note I I I I, at the end of this book.

been either wise or pious, would soon have found that their true strength, as well political as religious, lay in infantry: as that of Egypt, for a contrary reason, was in their cavalry. Hence that people, who well understood their advantages, so industriously propagated the breed of horses, as the surest defence of their territories. There is a remarkable passage in the history of these times, to support what I here advance. When Benhadad, the gentile king of Syria, whose forces consisted of chariots and horsemen, had warred with ill success against the king of Israel, the ministers, in a council of war, delivered their advice to him in these terms:—*Their gods are gods of the HILLS, therefore they were stronger than we: but let us fight against them in the PLAIN, and surely we shall be stronger than they. And he hearkened unto their voice, and did so.\** From this passage I collect, 1. That the army of Israel, consisting all of infantry, had chosen the situation of the hills; and this with proper military skill. 2. That their constant success in such a disposition of their forces occasioned this advice of the ministers of Benhadad. These men, possessed with the general notion of local tutelary deities, finding the arms of Israel always successful on the hills, took it for the more eminent manifestation of the power of their gods. *Their gods, say they, are gods of the hills.* Their superstition dictated the first part of their advice; and their skill in war, the second,—*let us fight against them in the plain.* The operations of the war had been hitherto most absurd: they had attacked an army of infantry with one of cavalry, on hills and in defiles.

But this want of horse, which kind of military force neither the product of their country could well support, nor the defence of it need, would effectually prevent any attempt of extending their dominions either into the lesser Asia, Mesopotamia, or Egypt. All which neighbouring countries being stretched out into large and extended plains, could not be safely invaded without a numerous cavalry. In this view, therefore, the wisdom of the law can never be sufficiently admired.

3. But the third reason of the prohibition was evidently to afford a lasting MANIFESTATION OF THAT EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE by which the Israelites were conducted, in taking possession of the land of Canaan. I have shown that, when once settled, they might very well defend the possession without the help of cavalry: but to conquer it without cavalry, and from a warlike people abounding in horse, was more than a raw unpractised infantry could ever have performed alone. No more need be said to convince military men of the extreme difference of the two cases. To others it may be proper to observe,

1. That in the invasion of a country, the invaded may choose their ground; and as it is their interest to avoid coming to a decisive action, so, being amidst their own native stores and provisions, they have it in their power to decline it. On the contrary, the invader must attack his enemies wherever he finds them posted. For, by reason of the scan-

\* 1 Kings xx. 23, et seq.

tiness and uncertainty of supplies in an enemy's country, he has not, for the most part, time to draw them, by military stratagems, from their advantages. We find this verified in the history of Benhadad, mentioned above. He had invaded Israel; but this people disposing of their infantry with soldierlike address, he was forced to fight them on the *hills*, where only they were to be met with. After many unsuccessful engagements, his ministers proposed a new plan of operations; to attack the enemy in the *plains*. And truly the advice was good: but how to put it in execution was the question; for they being the assailants, the Israelites were masters of their ground. So that, after all, there was no other way of bringing them into the plains but by beating them from the hills. And there they must have stuck, till famine and desertion had ended the quarrel. In this exigence, their blasphemy against the God of Israel enabled them to put their counsels, against him, in execution. They fancied, according to the superstition of that time, and so gave out, that *he was God of the hills, but not of the valleys*. His omnipotence being thus disputed, he placed his people in the plains; and sent his prophet to predict the coming vengeance on his enemies. *And there came a man of God, and spake unto the king of Israel, and said, Thus saith the Lord, because the Syrians have said, the Lord is God of the hills, but he is not God of the valleys; therefore will I deliver all this great multitude into thine hand, and ye shall know that I am the Lord.\**

2. Secondly, we may observe, that the possessors of mountainous regions may so dispose their fortresses, with which they cover their country, as to make an invader's cavalry absolutely useless; and consequently to have no occasion for any of their own. But the invaders of such a place where cavalry is in use, and consequently the defences disposed in a contrary manner, so as best to favour the operations of horse, the invaders, I say, go to certain destruction without a body of horse to support their infantry. This then being the very situation of affairs when the Israelites invaded Canaan, and conquered it, for till then they had not begun to transgress the law against cavalry, I conclude that they must have been MIRACULOUSLY assisted. The Arabians, in a like expedition, thought it so extraordinary a thing to conquer without horse, that Mahomet made it a law, when this happened, for the spoils not to be divided according to the stated rule, but for all to go to the prophet himself, as a *deodand* or a gift from God alone.† Yet Mahomet never pretended to make his conquests without horse, but used them on every occasion of need.

To return, we see then how little reason Sir Isaac Newton had for saying that Sesostri's conquest of Libya was the occasion of Egypt's

\* 1 Kings xx. 28.

† *Et id, quod concessit in prædam Deus legato suo ex illis: non impulistis super illud ullos equos, neque camelos* [i. e. non acquisivistis illud ope equorum aut camelorum]; *sed Deus prævalere facit legatos suos, super quem vult: nam Deus est super omnem rem potens.*—Sur. 59. Alcor. ver. 6.

being furnished with horse, so as to supply the neighbouring countries. But the instance was particularly ill chosen: for Sesostris, whom he makes the author of this benefit to Egypt, did, by his filling the country with canals, defeat the chief use and service of cavalry; with which, till this time, Egypt had abounded; but which from henceforth we hear no more of.\*

3. Again, in consequence of the same system, our great author seems to think that animal food was not customary amongst the Egyptians till about this time. *The Egyptians*, says he, *originally lived on the fruits of the earth, and fared hardly, and abstained from animals, and THEREFORE abominated shepherds: Menes* [the third from Sesostris] *taught them to adorn their beds and tables with rich furniture and carpets, and brought in amongst them a sumptuous, delicious, and voluptuous way of life*, p. 241. Now, whoever brought in the *eating of flesh*, and a *voluptuous life*, did it, as we are assured from Scripture, before the time of Joseph. I have proved, in my account of their physicians as delivered in the bible, that they were then a luxurious people.† From the dream of Pharaoh's baker, compared with Joseph's interpretation,‡ it appears, they eat animal food; and, from the story of Joseph's entertainment of his brethren, it appears, that their enmity to shepherds was not occasioned by these Hebrews eating animal food, which, Sir Isaac says, the Egyptians abstained from. *And he said to the ruler of his house, Bring these men home, and SLAY, and make ready; for these men shall dine with me at noon. And the man did as Joseph bade: and the man brought the men into Joseph's house—and they set on for him by himself, and for them by themselves, and for the Egyptians, which did eat with him, by themselves, because the Egyptians might not eat bread with the Hebrews, for that is an abomination to the Egyptians.—And he took and sent messes unto them from before him.*§ Here, we see the common provision for their entertainment was animal food. And no one can doubt whether Joseph conformed to the Egyptian diet. He sat single out of state, with regard to the Egyptians; the Egyptians sat apart, with regard to the shepherds; and both were supplied from the governor's table, which was furnished from the steward's slaughter-house. The truth of this is farther seen from the murmuring of the Israelites in the wilderness, when they said, *Would to God we had died by the hand of the Lord in the land of Egypt, when we sat by the FLESH-POTS, and when we did eat bread to the full.*|| Now we can scarce

\* Νοτιώτας δὲ ὁ Σίσουστρις ἐς τὴν Αἴγυπτον, καὶ—τὰς διώρυχας τὰς νῦν ἰούσας ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, τὰς αὐτὰς ἀναγκαζόμενοι ἄρυσσαι ἰσπίδον τι οὐκ ἰκόντις Αἴγυπτον, τοπρὶν ἰούσαι ἰσπασίμην, καὶ ἀμαξιτομίην πᾶσαν, ἰδιᾷ τούτων· ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου Αἴγυπτος ἰούσα πιδίᾳς πᾶσα, ἀνσπρος, καὶ ἀναμάξιτος γίγνεται.—Herod. Hist. lib. iii. cap. 108.

† See p. 8, and following, of this volume.

‡ And the chief baker said unto Joseph, I also was in my dream, and behold I had three white baskets on my head, and in the uppermost basket there was of all manner of BAKE-MEATS for Pharaoh, and the birds did eat them out of the basket.—And Joseph answered and said—The three baskets are three days. Yet within three days shall Pharaoh lift up thy head from off thee, and shall hang thee on a tree; and the birds shall eat thy flesh from off thee.—Gen. xl. 16, et seq.

§ Gen. xliii. 16, 17—32—34.

|| Exod. xvi. 3.

suppose the Egyptians would permit their slaves, whom they kept in so hard oppression, to riot in *flesh-pots*, while, as Sir Isaac supposes, *they themselves fared hardly and abstained from animals*.

4. Again, he supposes, that the exact division of the land of Egypt into property was first made in the time of Sesostris. *Sesostris*, says he, *upon his returning home, divided Egypt by measure amongst the Egyptians; and this gave a beginning to surveying and geometry*, p. 218. And in another place, he brings down the original of geometry still lower; even as late as Mæris, the fifth from Sesostris. *Mæris*, says he, *—for preserving the division of Egypt into equal shares amongst the the soldiers—wrote a book of surveying, which gave a beginning to geometry*, p. 248. Let the reader now consider, whether it be possible to reconcile this with the following account of Joseph's administration. *And Joseph bought all the land of Egypt for Pharaoh; for the Egyptians sold EVERY MAN HIS FIELD, because the famine prevailed over them: so the land became Pharaoh's. And as for the people, he removed them to cities from one end of the borders of Egypt even to the other end thereof. Only the land of the priests bought he not; for the priests had a portion assigned them of Pharaoh, and did eat their portion which Pharaoh gave them; therefore they sold not their lands. Then Joseph said unto the people, Behold I have bought you this day, and your land for Pharaoh: lo here is the seed for you, and ye shall sow the land. And it shall come to pass, in the increase, that you shall give the fifth part unto Pharaoh, and four parts shall be your own, for seed of the field, and for your food and for them of your own households, and for food for your little ones. And Joseph made it a law over the land of Egypt unto this day, that Pharaoh should have the fifth part; except the land of the priests only, which became not Pharaoh's.\** Here we have the description of a country very exactly set out and settled in private property. It would afford room for a variety of reflections: I shall confine myself to the following. If private property had not been, at this time, established with the utmost order and exactness; what occasion had Joseph to recur to that troublesome expedient of transplanting the people, reciprocally, from one end of Egypt to the other? His purpose in it is evident: it was to secure Pharaoh in his new property, by defeating the ill effects of that fondness which people naturally have to an old paternal inheritance. But what fondness have men for one spot, rather than another, of lands lying in common, or but newly appropriated? Were the Egyptians at this time, as Sir Isaac Newton seems to suppose, in the state of the unsettled nomades, they would have gone from one end of Egypt to the other, without Joseph's sending; and without the least regret for any thing they had left behind.

But without weakening the great man's conjecture by scripture history, how does it appear from the simple fact of Sesostris's dividing the

\* Gen. xlvii. 20, et seq.



large champaign country of Egypt into square fields, by cross-cut canals, that this was a *dividing Egypt by measure, and giving a beginning to surveying and geometry?* If we examine the cause and the effects of that improvement, we shall find that neither one nor the other part of his conclusion can be deduced from it. The *cause* of making these canals was evidently to drain the swampy marshes of that vast extended level; and to render the whole labourable.\* But a work of this kind is never projected till a people begin to want room. And they never want room till private property hath been well established; and the necessities of life, by the advancement of civil arts, are become greatly increased. As to the *effects*; ground, once divided by such boundaries, was in no danger of a change of landmarks; and consequently had small occasion for future surveys. So that had not the Egyptians found out geometry before this new division, it is probable they had never found it out at all. The most likely cause, therefore, to be assigned for this invention, was the necessity of frequent surveys, while the annual overflowings of the Nile were always obliterating such landmarks as were not, like those cross-cut canals, wrought deep into the soil. But these put a total end to that inconvenience. Indeed, Herodotus seems to give it as his opinion, that geometry had its rise from this improvement of Sesostris.† But we are to remember what hath been said of the incredible antiquity which the ancient Greek writers, and particularly Aristotle,‡ assigned to this hero: the natural consequence of the Egyptian's having confounded the ages and actions, though never the persons, of Osiris and Sesostris.

6. The next inference this illustrious writer makes from his system is, that *letters were unknown in Egypt till the time of David. When the Edomites, says he, fled from David with their young king Aadad into Egypt, it is probable that they carried thither also the use of letters: for letters were then in use amongst the posterity of Abraham—and there is no instance of letters, for writing down sounds, being in use before the days of David in any other nation besides the posterity of Abraham. The Egyptians ascribed this invention to Thoth the secretary of Osiris; and therefore letters began to be in use in Egypt in the days of Thoth, that is, a little after the flight of the Edomites from David, or about the time that Cadmus brought them into Europe, p. 209.* It appears from the two stone tables of the law, and from the engravings on Aaron's breastplate, that letters were in common use amongst the Israelites at the time of their egression from Egypt. Now supposing alphabetic writing to be amongst the peculiar advantages of the chosen people, was it not more likely that the Egyptians should learn it of them during their long abode in that country, than from the fugitive *Edomites*, if they had indeed *carried thither*

\* See note K K K K, at the end of this book.

† Δαίμων δὲ μὴ ἰσχυρὸν γεωμετρὴν ἐκείνου, ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἰσχυρὸν—Herodot. lib. ii. cap. 109.

‡ See p. 100 of this volume.

(which however is a mere conjecture) *the use of letters?* But when we consider that alphabetic writing was introduced amongst the chosen people some time between the age of Jacob and that of Moses, it seems most probable that they learned it of the Egyptians. But, for a full confutation of this fancy, and of the arguments that support it, I am content to refer the reader to what I have occasionally observed, though to other purposes, in my discourse of the Egyptian hieroglyphics.\*

6. Lastly, he observes, that *Egypt was so thinly peopled before the birth of Moses, that Pharaoh said of the Israelites, "Behold the people of the children of Israel are more and mightier than we;" and that to prevent their multiplying, and growing too strong, he caused their male children to be drowned,* p. 186. Yet this country, so *thinly peopled at the birth of Moses*, was, we find from scripture, so vastly populous, by the time Moses was sent upon his mission, that it could keep in slavery six hundred thousand men besides children;† at a time, when they were most powerfully instigated to recover their liberty; which yet, after all, they were unable to effect but by the frequent desolation of the hand of God upon their insolent and cruel masters. And is this to be reconciled with Sir Isaac's notion of their preceding thinness? But he likewise supports himself on scripture. Egypt was so thinly peopled—that *Pharaoh said—Behold the people of the children of Israel are more and mightier than we.* Strange interpretation! The scripture relation of the matter is in these words; *And Pharaoh said unto his people, Behold the people of the children of Israel are more and mightier than we. Come on, let us deal wisely with them: lest they multiply, and it come to pass, that when there falleth out any war, they join also unto our enemies, and fight against us, and so get them up out of the land. Therefore they did set over them taskmasters, to afflict them with their burdens.—But the more they afflicted them, the more they grew and multiplied.*‡ By the whole turn of this relation it appears, that the *more and mightier* signify only *more prolific and healthy.* And that was in truth the case. The Egyptians of this time, as we have shown,§ were very luxurious: while the manners of the Israelites concurred with their condition to render them hardy and fruitful, by an abstemious and laborious course of life. On this account the king expresses his fear. But of what? certainly not that they should subdue their masters; but that they should *escape out of bondage*: which, even to the very moment of their egression, was the sole object of the Egyptian's fear.—*Lest, says he, they multiply; and it come to pass, that, when there falleth out any war, they join also unto our enemies, and fight against us, and so GET THEM UP OUT OF THE LAND.*— This was a reasonable apprehension: for Egypt was in every age subject to the incursions of that fierce and barbarous people the Arabians, on that very side which the Israelites inhabited: who, possessing their own district, unmixed with Egyptians, had the keys of the country in their

\* See p. 23, et seq. † Exod. xii. 37. ‡ Exod. i. 9, et seq. § See p. 8, et seq.

hands, to admit or exclude an invader at their pleasure. A circumstance which would make the smallest province formidable to the most powerful kingdom. To prevent then so probable a danger, their taskmasters are ordered to increase their oppressions; and they groan under them without power to resist, till set free by the all-powerful hand of God.

Thus, we see how Sir Isaac Newton's system stands with regard to SACRED ANTIQUITY. What is still worse, it is not only repugnant to the Bible, but even to ITSELF.

III. We have observed, that, by the casual confounding of the proper actions of Osiris and Sesostris with one another, each came to be, at the same time, the INVENTOR, and the PERFECTER, of the arts of life. This, which might have led our author, the most penetrating of all writers, to the discovery of the ancient error in their history, served only to confirm him in his own; as placing the invention of civil arts low enough for the support of his general chronology. However, it is very certain, that the making their *invention* and *perfection* the product of the same age is directly contrary to the very NATURE OF THINGS. Which if any one doubt, let him examine the general history of mankind; where he will see that the advances, from an emerging barbarity, through civil policy, to refined arts and polished manners, when not given them, ready fitted to their hands, by neighbouring nations forward to impart them, have been ever the slow and gradual progress of many and successive ages. Yet these, our illustrious author (in consequence of the supposed identity of his two heroes) makes to spring up, to flourish, and to come to their perfection, all within the compass of one single reign. Or rather, which is still more intolerable, he makes this extraordinary age of Sesostris to be distinguished from all others by an inseparable mixture of savage and polished manners. Which is so unnatural, so incredible, so impossible a circumstance, that, were there only this to oppose against his system, it would be a sufficient demonstration of its falsehood.

To show then, that Sir Isaac Newton, by fairly and honestly taking in these consequences of his system, hath indeed subjected it to this disgrace, I shall give two instances. The one taken from his account of the *state of war*, the other of the *state of architecture*, during this period.

1. Our author having made the Egyptian Hercules to be Sesostris, is forced to own that the war in Libya was carried on with clubs. *After these things, he [Hercules or Sesostris] invaded Libya, and fought the Africans with clubs, and thence is painted with a club in his hand.* Here, the great writer hath given us the very picture of the Iroquosian or Huron savages warring with a neighbouring tribe. And without doubt intended it for such a representation; as appears, first, from his immediately adding these words of Hyginus: *Afri et Ægyptii PRIMUM fustibus dimicaverunt, postea Belus Neptuni filius gladio belligeratus est, unde bellum dictum est,* p. 215. For we are to observe that the

title of the chapter, in which these words are found, is, *quis quid invenerit*.\* and secondly, from his supposing Vulcan (whom he makes to live at this time) the inventor of military weapons. Yet this, according to the great author, was after Sesostris's conquest of the Troglodytes and Ethiopians: it was after his father's building a fleet on the Red sea, with which he coasted Arabia Felix, went into the Persian gulf, and penetrated even into India: [pp. 214, 215,] and but a little before Sesostris's great expedition for the conquest of the habitable world. At which time we see him set out with the most splendid retinue of a court, and the most dreadful apparatus of war; we find him defeat great armies; subdue mighty kingdoms (amongst the rest Judæa, where all kind of military arms offensive and defensive had been in use for many ages); people large cities; and leave behind him many stately monuments of his power and magnificence.

2. Thus again, Sir Isaac tells us, that Tosorthrus or Æsculapius, an Egyptian of the time of Sesostris, discovered the art of building with square stones.† Yet his contemporary, Sesostris, he tells us, *divided Egypt into 36 nomes or counties, and dug a canal from the Nile, to the head city of every nome; and with the earth dug out of it, he caused the ground of the city to be raised higher, and built a temple in every city for the worship of the nome; &c.* p. 218. And soon after, Amenophis, the third from him, *built Memphis; and ordered the worship of the gods of Egypt; and built a palace at Abydus, and the Memnonia at This and Susa, and the magnificent temple of Vulcan in Memphis.*‡

Now, in this odd mixture of barbarity and politeness, strength and impotence, riches and poverty, there is such an inconsistency in the character of ages, as shows it to be the mere invention of professed fabulists, whose known talent it is to

Make former times shake hands with latter,  
And that which was before come after;

though composed of tales so ill concerted, and contradictory, as shows, they wrote upon no consistent plan, but each as his own temporary views and occasions required.

When I entered on a confutation of Sir Isaac Newton's *Egyptian Chronology* (for with that only I have here to do), I was willing for the greater satisfaction of the reader to set his arguments for the *identity of Osiris and Sesostris*, on which that chronology was founded, in the strongest and clearest light. On this account I took them as I found them collected, ranged in order, and set together in one view, with the greatest advantage of representation, by the very worthy and learned master of the Charter-house, in a professed apology for our great philosopher. But this liberty the learned writer hath been pleased to criti-

\* Fab. cclxxiv.

† — *The building with square stones*, says he, *being found out by Tosorthrus, the Æsculapius of Egypt.* — P. 247.

‡ See note L L L L, at the end of this book.

cise in the Latin edition\* of the tracts to which that apology was prefixed—"I am not ignorant," says he,† "that the author of *The Divine Legation* supposing it, some how or other, to concern Moses's divine mission, to prove that Osiris was not the same with Sesostris, hath lately turned all that is here said into ridicule, by a comparison made between the fabulous ARTHUR and WILLIAM the Norman; who, he says, may be made one by as good reasons (though they have scarce any thing alike or in common with one another) as those which we have brought to confound Osiris with Sesostris: and on this point he draws out a disputation through seventy pages and upwards; in which, however, he neither denies nor confutes, but only laughs at what we have here said of Sesostris. It is true indeed that some other of Newton's assertions he does oppose; such as those concerning the late invention of arts, arms, and instruments by some certain king; and in this part of the argument he gets the better. For that these things were found out by the Egyptians long before the age of Sesostris, holy writ commands us to believe: but whether found out by any of their kings, is not so certain. However, these were matters we never touched upon, as relating nothing to our purpose; nor do they yet induce us to recede from that conclusion of the famous Newton, that Sesac was Sesostris, Osiris, and Bacchus. But the cause being now brought before the public, let the learned determine of it." Thus far this candid and ingenuous writer.

He says, *the author of The Divine Legation supposes that it some how or other concerns Moses's divine mission to prove Osiris not the same with Sesostris*; which seems to imply that this learned person doth not see HOW it concerns it. And yet afterwards he owns, *that scripture* (meaning the writings of Moses) *will not allow us to believe with Sir Isaac, that the invention of arts, arms, and instruments, was so late as the time of Sesostris*. Now it follows, as I have shown, by certain consequence, that if Osiris and Sesostris were one and the same, then the invention of arts was as late as the time of Sesostris. But this contradicting scripture or the writings of Moses, as the learned person himself confesseth, the reader sees plainly, *HOW it concerns Moses's mission to prove Osiris not the same with Sesostris*.

The learned writer, speaking of the comparison I had made between

\* *De veris annis D. N. Jesu Christi natali et emortuali Dissertationes duæ Chronologicae.*

† "Non nescimus nuperrimè accidisse, ut vir ingenio et eruditione præstans, quum ratus sit ad divinam legationem Mosis demonstrandum aliquo modo pertinere, ut probetur Osiris non esse idem cum Sesostri, omnia huc allata in lusum jocumque verterit, instituta comparatione Arthuri illius fabulosi cum Wilhelmo Normanno, quos æquè bonis rationibus in unum hominem conflari posse ait (quamvis nihil fere habeant inter se commune aut simile) ac nos Osirin cum Sesostri confundimus. Et de hac re disputationem in 70 paginas et ultra producit. In qua tamen hæc nostra de Sesostri neque negat, neque refellit, sed irridet. Alia vero quædam Newtoni dicta de sero inventis ab aliquo rege artibus, armis, instrumentis oppugnat, et eâ quidem parte causæ vincit. Nam ut ista longe ante Sesostri ætatem apud Ægyptios reperta sint, scriptura sacra jubet credere; ab ullo unquam regum inventa esse haud ita certum. Sed ea prius non attigimus, ut quæ nihil ad propositum nostrum attinent, neque nunc nos movent, ut pedem retrahamus ab ista Cl. Newtoni conclusionem Sesacum, Sesostrem, Osirin et Bacchum fuisse. Lite jam contestata judicent eruditi."—In Dedic. pp. xli. xlii.

Arthur and William the Norman, says, *they have scarce any thing alike or in common with one another*. I had brought together thirteen circumstances (the very number which the learned writer thinks sufficient to establish the identity of Osiris and Sesostris) in which they perfectly agree. I am persuaded he does not suspect me of falsifying their history. He must mean, therefore, that *thirteen* in my comparison, prove nothing, which, in his, prove every thing.

He goes on,—*In a disputation of seventy pages and upwards, the author of The Divine Legation neither denies nor confutes, but only laughs at what we have said of Sesostris*. What is it the learned writer *hath said of Sesostris*? Is it not this? That between his history and that of Osiris there are many strokes of resemblance: from whence he infers, with Sir Isaac, that these two heroes were one and the same. Now if he means, I have neither *denied* nor *confuted* this resemblance, he says true. I had no such design. It is too well marked by antiquity to be denied. Neither, let me add, did I *laugh at* it. What I *laughed at* (if my bringing a similar case is to be so called) was his inference from this resemblance, that therefore Osiris and Sesostris were one and the same. But then too I did more than *laugh*: I both *denied* and *confuted* it. First I *denied* it, by showing that this resemblance might really be, though Osiris and Sesostris were two different men, as appeared by an equal resemblance in the actions of two different men, the British Arthur and William the Norman. But as the general history of ancient Egypt would not suffer us to believe all that the Greek writers have said of this resemblance, I then explained the causes which occasioned their mistaken accounts of the two persons, from whence so perfect a resemblance had arisen. Secondly, I *confuted* what the learned person had said of Sesostris, by showing, from the concurrent testimony of antiquity, and from several internal arguments deducible from that testimony, that Osiris and Sesostris were in fact two different persons, living in two very distant ages.

The learned writer proceeds,—*It is true indeed that some other of Newton's assertions he does oppose; such as those concerning the late invention of arts, arms, and instruments; and in this part of the argument he gets the better*. But if I have the better here, it is past dispute I overthrow the whole hypothesis of the *identity of Osiris and Sesostris*. For, as to the resemblance, which antiquity hath given them, that, considered singly when the pretended late invention of arts hath been proved a mistake, will indeed deserve only to be *laughed at*. But were it, as Sir Isaac Newton endeavoured to prove, that the invention of arts was no earlier than the time of Sesostris or Sesac, there is then indeed an end of the ancient Osiris of Egypt; and the hero, so much boasted of by that people, can be no other than the Sesostris of this author. For the very foundation of the existence of the ancient Osiris was his civilizing Egypt, and teaching them the arts of life: but if this were done by Sesostris, or in his reign, then is HE the true Osiris of Egypt. As, on



the contrary, were the invention of arts as early as SCRIPTURE-HISTORY represents it, then is Egypt to be believed, when she tells us that Osiris, their inventor of arts, was many ages earlier than Sesostris their conqueror: and consequently, all Sir Isaac Newton's *identity* separates and falls to pieces. In a word, take it which way you will. If Osiris were the same as Sesostris, then must the invention of arts (for all antiquity have concurred in giving that invention to Osiris) be as late as the age of Sesostris, the Sesac of Newton: but this, SCRIPTURE-HISTORY will not suffer us to believe. If, on the other hand, Osiris and Sesostris were not the same, then was the invention of arts (and for the same reason) much earlier than the age of Sesostris; as indeed all mankind thought before the construction of this new chronology. These were the considerations which induced that great man, who so well understood the nature and force of evidence, to employ all the sagacity of his wonderful talents in proving the invention of arts to be about the age of his Sesostris or Sesac. And is it possible he should have a follower who cannot see that he hath done this? or the necessity he had of doing it? It will be said, perhaps, "that Sir Isaac has, indeed, argued much for the low invention of arts: but had neither enforced it under the name of an argument, nor stated it in the form here represented." The objection would ill become a follower of Newton, who knows that his master's method, as well in these his critical as in his physical inquiries, was to form the principal members of his demonstration with an unornamented brevity, and leave the supplial of the small connecting parts to his reader's sagacity. Besides, in so obvious, so capital, so necessary an argument for this *identity*, it had been a ridiculous distrust of common sense, after he had spent so much pains in endeavouring to prove the *low invention of arts*, to have ended his reasoning in this formal way: "And now, reader, take notice that this is a conclusive, and perhaps the only conclusive argument for the *identity* of Osiris and Sesostris." Lastly, let me observe, that the very reason which induced Sir Isaac to be so large in the establishment of his point, *the low invention of arts*, induced me to be as large in the subversion of it. And now some satisfactory account, I hope, is given of the *seventy long pages*.

What follows is still more unaccountable—*However, these were matters* (says the learned writer, speaking of the invention of arts) *we never touched upon, as relating nothing to our purpose*. Here I cannot but lament the learned writer's ill fortune. There was but this very circumstance in the book he would defend, which is *essential to his purpose*, and this he hath given up as *nothing to his purpose*; and more unlucky still, on a review of the argument, he hath treated it as an error in his author, who took so much pains about it; but yet, as an error that doth not at all affect the point in question. For,

He concludes thus—*Nor do they yet induce me to recede from that conclusion of the famous Newton, that Sesac was Sesostris, Osiris, and Bacchus.*—Sesac, as I said before, I have no concern with. And as to

Bacchus, it is agreed that this was only one of the names of Osiris. The thing I undertook to prove was, that Osiris and Sesostris were not the same person: but in doing this, I did not mean to say that Osiris was not one of the names of Sesostris. This is a very different thing: and the rather to be taken notice of, because I suspect a quibble in the words of the learned writer, which would confound the difference. Nor is my suspicion unreasonable. For I have met with some of his most learned followers, who have ventured to say, that Sir Isaac meant no more than that Sesostris was AN Osiris. But if he meant no more, I would allow him to mean any thing: and never to have his meaning disputed. I, for my part, and so I suppose every body else, understood him to mean, "That the old Osiris, famous, amongst the Egyptians, for legislation and the invention of the arts of life, was the very same man with Sesostris, whom these Egyptians make to be a different man, of a later age, and famous for the conquest of the habitable world." This was the proposition I undertook to confute. Wherein I endeavoured to show, "that there was a real Osiris, such as the Egyptians represented him, much earlier than their real Sesostris." And now (to use this writer's words) *the cause being brought before the public, let the learned determine of it.* As to the other point, that Sesostris went by the name of the earlier hero, this I not only allow, but contend for, as it lays open to us one of the principal causes of that confusion in their stories, which hath produced a similitude of actions, whereon Sir Isaac Newton layeth the foundation of their IDENTITY.

But if Sir Isaac Newton and his learned advocate have paid too little deference to antiquity, there are, who, in a contrary extreme, would pay a great deal too much. The learned Dr Pococke, in his book of Travels, introduceth his discourse *On the mythology of the ancient Egyptians* in this extraordinary manner: "As the mythology, or fabulous religion of the ancient Egyptians, may be looked on, in a great measure, as the foundation of the heathen religion in most other parts; so it may not be improper to give some account of the origin of it, as it is delivered by the most ancient authors, which may give some light both to the description of Egypt, and also to the history of that country. We may suppose, that the ancients were the best judges of the nature of their religion; and consequently, that all interpretations of their mythology, by MEN OF FRUITFUL INVENTIONS, that have no sort of foundation in their writings, are forced, and such as might never be intended by them. On the contrary, it is necessary to retrench several things the ancients themselves seem to have invented, and grafted on true history; and, in order to account for many things, the genealogies and alliances they mention must in several respects be false or erroneous, and seem to have been invented to accommodate the honours of the same deities to different persons, they were obliged to deify, who lived at different times; and so they were obliged to give them new names, invent genealogies, and some different attributes," pp. 221, 222.

He says, *We may suppose that the ancients were the best judges of the nature of their religion, and of their mythology.* But the ancients, here spoken of, were not Egyptians, but Greeks; and the *mythology* here spoken of was not Greek, but Egyptian: therefore these *ancients* might well be mistaken about the *nature of a religion* which they borrowed from strangers; the principles of which, they tell us, were always kept secreted from them. But this is not all; they in fact were mistaken; and by no means *good judges of the nature of their religion*, if we may believe one of the most authentic of these ancients, HERODOTUS himself, where discoursing of the Greeks he expressly says,—“But the origin of each god, and whether they are all from eternity, and what is their several kinds or natures, to speak the truth, they neither knew at that time nor since.”\*

The learned traveller goes on—and CONSEQUENTLY *that all interpretations of their mythology by men of FRUITFUL INVENTIONS, that have no sort of foundation in their writings, are forced, and such as might never be intended by them.* This is indeed a TRUTH, but it is no CONSEQUENCE, and therefore not to the purpose. For, whether the *ancients* were, or were not, *the best judges*; whether the *moderns* have, or have not, *fruitful inventions*, yet if their *interpretations have no sort of foundation in ancient writings*, it is a great chance but they are *forced*; and as great, that the ancients never intended what the moderns ascribe to them. However, he gets nothing by this hypothetical proposition, unless it be the discredit of begging the question.

But the most extraordinary thing is his making it an additional reason for leaving the moderns and sticking to the ancients, that *the ancients seem to have invented and grafted on true history; and, in order*, he says, *to account for many things, the genealogies and alliances they mention must in several respects be false or erroneous, and seem to have been invented, &c.* Now, if the ancients were thus mistaken, the moderns sure may be excused in endeavouring to set them right: to common sense, therefore, this would seem to show the *use* of their interpretations. But this use is better understood from our author's own success; who, in this chapter concerning the *Egyptian mythology*, has attempted to give us some knowledge of antiquity, without them. And here we find the ancient account, to which he so closely adheres, is not only fabulous by his own confession, but contradictory by his own representation; a confused collection of errors and absurdities; that very condition of antiquity which forced the *moderns* to have recourse to *interpretations*; and occasioned that variety whereon our author grounds his charge against them. A charge, however, in which his *ancients* themselves will be involved; for they likewise had their *interpretations*; and were (if their variety would give it them) as *fruitful* at least, in their *inventions*. For instance, how discordant were they in their opinions concerning the origin of ANIMAL WORSHIP! Was our author ignorant that so odd a super-

\* See above.

stition wanted explanation? By no means. Yet for fear of incurring the censure of a *fruitful invention*, instead of taking the fair solution of a modern critic, or even any rational interpretation of the ancient mythologists, whom yet he professes to follow, he contents himself with that wretched fable “of Typhon’s dividing the body of Osiris into twenty-six parts, and distributing them to his accomplices; which being afterwards found by Isis, and delivered by her to distinct bodies of priests to be buried with great secrecy, she enjoined them to pay divine honours to him, and to consecrate some particular animal to his memory.” *From this account* (says our author very gravely) *we may see the reason why so many sacred animals were worshipped in Egypt*, p. 226. Again, the Greek account, in Diodorus, of Osiris’s expedition, has been shown to be a heap of impossible absurdities; yet our author believes it all; and would have believed as much more, rather than have run the hazard of any *modern invention*.

AND now, we presume, the MINOR of Sir Isaac Newton’s general argument, that *Osiris and Sesostris were the same*, is entirely overthrown. For, 1. It hath been proved, that the premises he employs in its support, do not infer it. 2. That the consequence of his conclusion from it, contradicts sacred scripture; and 3. That it disagrees with the very nature of things.

So that our first proposition, *That the Egyptian learning celebrated in scripture, and the Egyptian superstition there condemned, were the very learning and superstition represented by the Greek writers, as the honour and opprobrium of that people*, stands clear of all objection. What that *learning* and *superstition* were, we have shown very largely, though occasionally, in the course of this inquiry; whereby it appears, that their *learning* in general was consummate skill in CIVIL POLICY AND THE ARTS OF LEGISLATION; and their *superstition*, the WORSHIP OF DEAD MEN DEIFIED.

## SECT: VI.

[II.] I COME, at length, to my second proposition: which if, by this time, the reader should have forgotten, he may be easily excused. It is this, *That the Jewish people were extremely fond of Egyptian manners, and did frequently fall into Egyptian superstitions: and that many of the laws given to them by the ministry of Moses, were instituted, partly in compliance to their prejudices, and partly in opposition to those superstitions.\**

The first part of this proposition—the *people’s fondness for, and frequent lapse into, Egyptian superstitions*,—needs not many words to evince. The thing, as we shall see hereafter, being so natural in itself; and, as we shall now see, so fully recorded in holy scripture.

The time was now come for the deliverance of the chosen people from

\* See p. 686 of vol. i.

their Egyptian bondage: for now VICE and IDOLATRY were arrived at their height; the former, as St Paul tells, by means of the latter; for *as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient; being filled with all unrighteousness,\** &c. The two most populous regions at that time in the world were CANAAN and EGYPT: the first distinguished from all other by its *violence and unnatural crimes*; the latter by its *superstitions and idolatries*. It concerned God's moral government that a speedy check should be put to both; the inhabitants of these two places being now ripe for divine vengeance. And as the instruments he employed to punish their present enormities were designed for a barrier against future, the Israelites went out of Egypt with a *high hand*, which desolated their haughty tyrants; and were led into the possession of the land of Canaan, whose inhabitants they were utterly to exterminate. The dispensation of this providence appears admirable, both in the time and in the modes of the punishment. VICE and IDOLATRY had now, as I said, filled up their measure. EGYPT, the capital of false religion, being likewise the nursery of arts and sciences, was preserved from total destruction for the sake of civil life and polished manners, which were to derive their source from thence: but the CANAANITES were to be utterly exterminated, to vindicate the honour of humanity, and to put a stop to a spreading contagion which changed the reasonable nature into the brutal.

Now it was that GOD, remembering his covenant with Abraham, was pleased to appoint his people, then groaning under their bondage, a leader and deliverer. But so great was their degeneracy, and so sensible was MOSES of its effects, in their ignorance of, or alienation from the true GOD, that he would willingly have declined the office: and when absolutely commanded to undertake it, he desired however that GOD would let him know by what NAME he would be called, when the people should ask the *name* of the GOD of their fathers.—*And Moses said unto GOD, Behold when I come unto the children of Israel, and say unto them, The GOD of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say unto me, WHAT IS HIS NAME? what shall I say unto them?†* Here we see a people not only lost to all knowledge of the UNITY (for the asking for a *name* necessarily implied their opinion of a plurality), but likewise possessed with the very spirit of Egyptian idolatry. *The religion of NAMES*, as we have shown,‡ was a matter of great consequence in Egypt. It was one of their essential superstitions: it was one of their native inventions: and the first of them which they communicated to the Greeks. Thus when Hagar, the handmaid of Sarai, who was an Egyptian woman, saw the angel of God in the wilderness, the text tells us,§ *She called the name of the Lord that spake unto her, ELROI, the God of vision, or the visible God*: that is, according to the established custom of Egypt, she gave him a name of *honour*: not merely a name of *distinction*; for such all nations had (who worshipped local tutelary deities)

\* Rom. i. 28.

† Exod. iii. 13.

‡ Page 96, and seq.

§ Gen. xvi. 13.

before their communication with Egypt.\* But, after that (as appears from the place of Herodotus quoted above, concerning the Pelasgi), they decorated their gods with distinguished titles, indicative of their specific office and attributes. A NAME was so peculiar an adjunct to a local tutelary deity, that we see by a passage quoted by Lactantius from the spurious books of Trismegist (which however abounded with Egyptian notions and superstitions) that the one supreme God had no *name* or title of distinction.† Zachariah evidently alluding to these notions, when he prophesies of the worship of the supreme God, unmixed with idolatry, says, *In that day shall there be one Lord, and HIS NAME ONE*;‡ that is, only bearing the simple title of LORD: and, as in the words of Lactantius below, *ac ne quis NOMEN ejus requireret, ANONTMON esse dixit; eo quod nominis PROPRIETATE non egeat, ob ipsam scilicet UNITATEM*. Out of indulgence therefore to this weakness, GOD was pleased to give himself a NAME. *And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM: And he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you.*§ Where we may observe (according to the constant method of divine wisdom, when it condescends to the prejudices of men) how, in the very instance of indulgence to their superstition, he gives a corrective of it.—The *religion of names* arose from an idolatrous polytheism; and the NAME here given, implying *eternity* and *self-existence*, directly opposeth that superstition.

This compliance with the *religion of names* was a new indulgence to the prejudices of this people, as is evident from the following words: *And God spake unto Moses, and said unto him, I am the Lord: and I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the NAME OF GOD ALMIGHTY, but by my NAME JEHOVAH was I not known to them.*|| That is, as the GOD of Abraham, I before condescended to have a *name of distinction*: but now, in compliance to another prejudice, I condescend to have a *name of honour*. This seems to be the true interpretation of this very difficult text, about which the commentators are so much embarrassed. For the word *Jehovah*, whose name is here said to be unknown to the patriarchs, frequently occurring in the book of Genesis, had furnished unbelievers with a pretext that the same person could not be the author of the two books of Genesis and Exodus. But ignorance and scepticism, which set infidelity on work, generally bring it to shame. They mistook the true sense of the text. The assertion is not, that the WORD *Jehovah* was not used in the patriarchal language; but that the NAME *Jehovah*, as a title of honour, (whereby a

\* See note M M M M, at the end of this book.

† Hic scripsit libros—in quibus majestatem summi ac singularis Dei asserit, illudque nominibus appellat, quibus nos, DEUM et PATREM. Ac ne quis NOMEN ejus requireret ANONTMON esse dixit; eo quod nominis proprietate non egeat, ob ipsam scilicet unitatem. Ipsius hæc verba sunt, ὁ δὲ Θεὸς αὐτῷ· ὁ δὲ αὐτῷ ἐνέμαρτος οὐ πρὸς ἑαυτῷ· ἵνα γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς ἀνόντμον. Deo igitur nomen non est, quia solus est: nec opus est proprio vocabulo, nisi cum discrimen exigit multitudo, ut unamquamque personam sua nota et appellatione designes.—Div. Inst. lib. i. cap. 6.

‡ Chap. xiv. 9.

§ Exod. iii. 14.

|| Ib. vi. 3.



new *idea* was affixed to an old *word*,) was unknown to them. Thus, in a parallel instance, we say rightly, that the king's SUPREMACY was unknown to the English constitution till the time of Henry VIII., though the word was in use, and even applied to the chief magistrate, (indeed in a different and more simple sense,) long before.

The common solution of this difficulty is as ridiculous as it is false. You shall have it in the words of a very ingenious writer.—“ The word **JEHOVAH** signifies the being unchangeable in his resolutions, and consequently the being infinitely faithful in performing his promises. In this sense, the word is employed in the passage of Exodus now under examination. So that when God says, *by my name Jehovah was I not known to them*, this signifies—as one faithful to fulfill my promise, was I not known to them: *i. e.* I had not then fulfilled the promise which I had made to them, of bringing their posterity out of Egypt, and giving them the land of Canaan.”\* By which interpretation, the Almighty is made to tell the Israelites that he was not known to their fathers as the God who had redeemed their posterity from Egypt, before they had any posterity to redeem. A marvellous revelation, and, without doubt, much wanted. To return.

Moses, however, appears still unwilling to accept this commission; and presumes to tell God, plainly, *Behold they will not believe me, nor hearken to my voice: for they will say, The Lord hath not appeared unto thee.*† But could this be said or thought by a people, who, groaning in the bitterest servitude, had a message from God, of a long promised deliverance, at the very time that, according to the prediction, the promise was to be fulfilled, if they had kept him and his dispensations in memory? When this objection is removed, Moses hath yet another; and that is, his inability for the office of an ORATOR. This too is answered. And when he is now driven from all his subterfuges, he with much passion declines the whole employment, and cries out, *O my God, send I pray thee by the hand of him whom thou wilt send.*‡ This justly provokes God's displeasure: and thereon, he finally complies. From all this backwardness, (and the cause of it could be no other than what is here assigned; for Moses, as appears by the former part of his history,§ was forward and zealous enough to promote the welfare of his brethren,) we must needs conclude, that he thought the recovery of this people from EGYPTIAN SUPERSTITIONS to be altogether desperate. And, humanly speaking, he did not judge amiss; as may be seen from a

\* —Il signifie l'être immuable dans ses résolutions, et par conséquent l'être infiniment fidèle dans ses promesses, et c'est dans cette acception que ce nom est employé dans le passage de l'Exode, que nous examinons. Qu'ainsi quand Dieu dit, *Je ne leur ai point été connu en mon nom de Jehovah*, cela signifie, *Je ne me suis point fait connoître, comme fidèle à remplir mes promesses*, c'est-à-dire, *JE N'AI PAS ENCORE REMPLI LA PROMESSE, qui je leur avois faite, de retirer de l'Egypte leur posterité, et de lui donner la terre de Chanaan.* —M. Astruc, *Conjectures sur le livre de la Genèse*, p. 503. He says very truly, that, in this solution, he had no other part to perform, *que suivre la foule des commentateurs tant Chrétiens que Juifs*, p. 301.

† Exod. iv. 1.

‡ Chap. iv. 3.

§ Chap. ii. 12.

succinct account of their behaviour during the whole time God was working this amazing deliverance.

For now Moses and Aaron discharge their message; and having confirmed it by signs and wonders, the *people believed*: but it was such a belief, as men have of a new and unexpected matter, well attested.—*They bow the head too, and worship*;\* but it appears to be a thing they had not been lately accustomed to. And how little true sense they had of God's promises and visitation is seen from their murmuring and desponding† when things did not immediately succeed to their wishes; though Moses, as from God, had told them beforehand, that Pharaoh would prove cruel and *hard-hearted*; and would defer their liberty to the very last distress.‡ And at length, when that time came, and God had ordered them to purify themselves from all the *idolatries* of EGYPT, so prodigiously attached were they to these follies, that they disobeyed his command even at the very eve of their deliverance.§ A thing altogether incredible, but that we have God's own word for it by the prophet Ezekiel: *In the day, says he, that I lifted up mine hand unto them to bring them forth of the land of Egypt, into a land that I had spied for them, flowing with milk and honey, which is the glory of all lands: then said I unto them, Cast ye away every man the abominations of his eyes, and defile not yourselves with the idols of Egypt: I am the Lord your God. But they rebelled against me, and would not hearken unto me: they did not every man cast away the abominations of their eyes, neither did they forsake the idols of Egypt: then I said, I will pour out my fury upon them, to accomplish my anger against them in the midst of the land of Egypt. But I wrought for my name's sake, that it should not be polluted before the heathen, amongst whom they were, in whose sight I made myself known unto them, in bringing them forth out of the land of Egypt. Wherefore I caused them to go forth out of the land of Egypt, and brought them into the wilderness.*||

From all this it appears, that their *cry, by reason of their bondage, which came up unto God*, was not for such a deliverance as was promised to their forefathers, to be *brought up out of Egypt*; but for such a one as might enable them to live at ease, amongst their *flesh-pots*, in it.

But now they are delivered: and, by a series of miracles performed in their behalf, got quite clear of the power of Pharaoh. Yet on every little distress, *let us return to Egypt*, was still the cry. Thus immediately after their deliverance at the Red sea, on so common an accident, as meeting with *bitter waters* in their route, they were presently at their *what shall we drink?*¶ And no sooner had a miracle removed this distress, and they gotten into the barren wilderness, but they were, again, at their *what shall we eat?*\*\* Not that indeed they feared to die either of hunger or of thirst; for they found the hand of God was still ready

\* Exod. iv. 31.

† Chap. v. 21.

‡ Chap. iii. 19, 20, 21.

§ See note N N N N, at the end of this book.

|| Ezek. xx. 6, and seq.

¶ Exod. xv. 24.

\*\* Chap. xvi. 2.

to supply their wants; all but their capital want, to return again into EGYPT; and these pretences were only a less indecent cover to their designs: which yet, on occasion, they were not ashamed to throw off, as where they say to Moses, when frightened by the pursuit of the Egyptians at the Red sea, *Is not this the word that we did tell thee in Egypt, Let us alone that we may serve the Egyptians.\** And again, *Would to God, we had died by the hand of the Lord in the land of Egypt, when we sat by the flesh-pots and did eat bread to the full.†* That is, in plain terms, “Would we had died with our brethren the Egyptians.” For they here allude to the *destruction* of the *first-born*, when the destroying angel (which was more than they deserved) passed over the habitations of Israel.

But they have now both flesh and bread, when they cry out the second time for water; and even while, again, at their *why hast thou brought us up out of Egypt,‡* a rock less impenetrable than their hearts, is made to pour out a stream so large that *the water ran down like rivers:§* yet all the effect it seemed to have upon them was only to put them more in mind of the *way of Egypt, and the WATERS of Sihor. ||*

Nay even after their receiving the LAW, on their free and solemn acceptance of *Jehovah* for their GOD and KING, and their being consecrated anew, as it were, for his peculiar people, Moses only happening to stay a little longer in the mount than they expected, they fairly took the occasion of projecting a scheme, and, to say the truth, no bad one, of returning back into Egypt. They went to Aaron, and pretending they never hoped to see Moses again, desired another leader. But they would have one in the mode of Egypt; an image, or visible representative of GOD, *to go before them.¶* Aaron complies, and makes them a GOLDEN CALF, in conformity to the superstition of Egypt; whose great god Osiris was worshipped under that representation; \*\* and, for greater holiness too, out of the jewels of the Egyptians. In this so horrid an impiety to the GOD of their fathers, their secret drift, †† if we may believe St Stephen, was this; they wanted to get back into Egypt; and while the CALF, so much adored in that country, went before them, they could return with an atonement and reconciliation in their hands. And doubtless their worthy mediator, being made all of sacred, Egyptian metal, would have been consecrated in one of their temples, under the title of OSIRIS REDUCTOR. But Moses's sudden appearance broke all their measures: and the ringleaders of the design were punished as they deserved.

At length, after numberless follies and perversities, they are brought, through GOD's patience and long-suffering, to the end of all their travels,

\* Exod. xiv. 12.

† Chap. xvi. 3.

‡ Chap. xvii. 3.

§ Ps. lxxviii. 16.

|| Jer. ii. 18.

¶ Exod. xxxii. 1.

\*\* 'Ο ΜΟΥΣΚΟΣ ὄντος, ὁ ΑΠΙΣ καλῶμενος.—Herod. lib. iii. 28.

†† — To whom our fathers would not obey, but thrust *him* from them, and in their hearts turned back again into Egypt, saying unto Aaron, Make us gods to go before us, &c.—Acts vii. 39, 40.

to the promised place of rest, which is just opening to receive them when, on the report of the cowardly explorers of the land, they relapse again into their old delirium, *Wherefore hath the Lord brought us into this land, to fall by the sword, that our wives and our children should be a prey? were it not better for us to return into Egypt? And the said one to another, Let us make a captain, and let us return into Egypt.* This so provoked the Almighty, that he condemned that generation to be worn away in the wilderness. How they spent their time there, the prophet Amos will inform us, *Have ye offered unto me, says God, sacrifices and offerings in the wilderness forty years, O house of Israel?*

In a word, this unwillingness to leave Egypt, and this impatience to return thither, are convincing proofs of their fondness for its customs and superstitions. When I consider this, I seem more inclined than the generality even of sober critics to excuse the false accounts of the pagan writers concerning the exodus; who concur in representing the Jews as expelled or forcibly driven out of Egypt; for so indeed they were. The mistake was only about their driver. The pagans supposed him to be the king of Egypt; when indeed it was the God of Israel himself, by the ministry of Moses.

Let us view them next, in possession of the PROMISED LAND. A land *flowing with milk and honey, the glory of all lands.* One would expect now their longing after Egypt should have entirely ceased. And so without doubt it would, had it arisen only from the *flesh-pots*; but it had a deeper root; it was the spiritual luxury of Egypt, their *superstitions*, with which the Israelites were so debauched. And therefore no wonder they should still continue slaves to their appetite. Thus the prophet Ezekiel: *Neither LEFT she her whoredoms brought from Egypt.†* So that after all God's mercies conferred upon them in putting them in possession of the land of Canaan, Joshua is, at last, forced to leave them with this fruitless admonition: *Now therefore fear the Lord, and serve him in sincerity and in truth; and PUT AWAY the gods which your fathers served on the other side of the flood and in EGYPT.§* It is true, we are told that *the people served the Lord all the days of Joshua, and all the days of the elders that outlived Joshua, who had seen all the great works of the Lord, that he did for Israel.||* But, out of sight out of mind. It is then added—*And there arose another generation after them, which knew not the Lord, nor yet the works which he had done for Israel—And they forsook the Lord God of their fathers, which brought them out of the land of Egypt, and followed other gods, of the gods of the people that were round about them.¶* And in this state they continued throughout the whole administration of their JUDGES; except when, from time to time, they were awakened into repentance by the severity of God's judgments; which yet were no sooner passed, than they fell back again into their old lethargy, a forgetfulness of his mercies.

\* Num. xiv. 3, 4.

§ Josh. xxiv. 14.

† Amos v. 25.

|| Judges ii. 7.

‡ Ezek. xxiii. 8.

¶ Ib. ii. 10—12.

Nor did their fondness for Egypt at all abate when they came under the iron rod of their kings; the magistrate they had so rebelliously demanded; and who, as they pretended, was to set all things right. On the contrary, this folly grew still more inflamed; and instead of one CALF they would have two. Which Ezekiel hints at, where he says: *Yet she MULTIPLIED her whoredoms in calling to remembrance the days of her youth wherein she had played the harlot in Egypt.\** And so favourite a superstition were the CALVES of Dan and Bethel, that they still kept their ground against all those general reformation which divers of their better sort of kings had made, to purge the land of Israel from idolatries. It is true, their extreme fondness for Egyptian superstition was not the only cause of this inveterate adherence to their CALVES. There were two others.

They flattered themselves that this specific idolatry was not altogether so gross an affront to the GOD of their fathers, as many of the rest. Other of their idolatries consisted in worshipping strange gods in conjunction with the GOD of Israel; this of the CALVES, only in worshipping the GOD of Israel in an idolatrous manner: as appears from the history of their erection. *And Jeroboam† said in his heart, Now shall the kingdom return to the house of David: if this people go up to do sacrifice in the house of the Lord at Jerusalem, then shall the heart of this people turn again unto their lord, even unto Rehoboam king of Judah, and they shall kill me, and go again to Rehoboam king of Judah. Whereupon the king took counsel, and made two CALVES of gold, and said unto them, It is too much for you to go up to Jerusalem, behold thy gods, O Israel, which brought thee up out of the land of Egypt. And he set the one in Bethel, and the other put he in Dan.‡—It is too much for you, says he, to go up to Jerusalem.* Who were the men disposed to go up? None surely but the worshippers of the GOD of Israel. Consequently the CALVES, here offered to save them a journey, must needs be given as the representatives of that God. And if these were so, then certainly the CALF in Horeb: since, at their several consecrations, the very same proclamation was made of all three: *behold thy gods, O Israel, which brought thee up out of the land of Egypt.*

The other cause of the perpetual adherence of the kingdom of Israel to their GOLDEN CALVES was their being erected for a prevention of reunion with the kingdom of Judah. *If this people, says the politic contriver, go up to do sacrifice in the house of the Lord at Jerusalem, then shall the heart of this people turn again unto their lord, even unto Rehoboam king of Judah.* The succeeding kings, therefore, we may be sure, were as careful in preserving them, as he was in putting them up. So that, good or bad, the character common to them all was, that *he departed not from the sins of Jeroboam the son of Nebat, who*

\* Ezek. xxiii. 19.

† It is to be observed of this Jeroboam, that he had sojourned in Egypt, as a refugee, during the latter part of the reign of Solomon. 1 Kings xi. 40.

‡ 1 Kings xii. 26. et seq.

*made Israel to sin ; namely, in worshipping the calves in Dan and Bethel. And those of them who appeared most zealous for the law of God, and utterly exterminated the idolatry of Baal, yet connived at least, at this political worship of the CALVES.—Thus Jehu destroyed Baal out of Israel. Hombeit from the sins of Jeroboam the son of Nebat who made Israel to sin, Jehu departed not, to wit, the golden CALVES that were in Bethel, and that were in Dan.\**

But the Israelites had now contracted all the fashionable habits of Egypt. We are assured that it had been long peculiar to the Egyptian superstition for every city of that empire to have its own tutelary god, besides those which were worshipped in common : but now Jeremiah tells us the people of Judah bore a part with them in this extravagance : *Where are thy gods that thou hast made thee ? Let them arise, if they can save thee in the time of thy trouble : FOR ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THY CITIES, ARE THY GODS, O JUDAH.†*

And by the time that the sins of this wretched people were ripe for the punishment of their approaching captivity, they had polluted themselves with all kind of *Egyptian abominations* : as appears from the famous VISIONS of EZEKIEL, where their three capital idolatries are so graphically described. The prophet represents himself as brought in a vision, to Jerusalem : and, at *the door of the inner gate that looked towards the north, he saw the seat of the IMAGE OF JEALOUSY which provoketh to jealousy.‡* Here, by the noblest stretch of an inspired imagination, he calls this *seat* of their idolatries, the *seat of the image of jealousy*, whom he personifies, and the more to catch the attention of this corrupt people, converts into an *idol*, THE IMAGE OF JEALOUSY *which provoketh to jealousy* : as if he had said, God in his wrath hath given you one idol more to avenge himself of all the rest. After this sublime prelude, the prophet proceeds to the various scenery of the inspired vision.

1. The first of their capital idolatries is described in this manner : *And he brought me to the door of the court ; and when I looked, behold, a HOLE IN THE WALL. Then said he unto me, Son of man, dig now in the wall ; and when I had digged in the wall, behold, a DOOR. And he said unto me, Go in, and behold the wicked abominations that they do here. So I went in, and saw ; and behold, EVERY FORM OF CREEPING THINGS, AND ABOMINABLE BEASTS, and all the idols of the house of Israel, PORTRAYED UPON THE WALL ROUND ABOUT. And there stood before them seventy men of the ancients of the house of Israel, and in the midst of them stood Jaazaniah the son of Shaphan, with every man his censer in his hand ; and a thick cloud of incense went up. Then said he unto me, Son of man, hast thou seen what the ancients of the house of Israel do IN THE DARK, every man in the CHAMBERS OF HIS IMAGERY?§*

(1). The first inference I draw from these words is, that the supersti-

\* 2 Kings x. 28, et seq.

† Chap. ii. 28.

‡ Ezek. viii. 3.

§ Ezek. viii. 7, et seq.



tion here described was EGYPTIAN. This appears from its object's being the gods peculiar to Egypt, *every form of creeping things and abominable beasts*; which, in another place, the same prophet calls, with great propriety and elegance, the *abominations of the eyes* of the Israelites.\*

(2.) The second inference is, that they contain a very lively and circumstantial description of the so celebrated MYSTERIES OF ISIS AND OSIRIS. For, 1. The rites are represented as performed in a secret subterraneous place. *And when I looked, behold, a HOLE in the wall. Then said he unto me, Son of man, dig now in the wall; and when I had digged in the wall, behold, a DOOR. And he said unto me, Go in—Hast thou seen what the ancients of the house of Israel do in the DARK?* This secret place was, as the prophet tells us, in the temple. And such kind of places, for this use, the Egyptians had in their temples, as we learn from a similitude of Plutarch's. *Like the disposition, says he, and ordonance of their temples; which, in one place, enlarge and extend themselves into long wings, and fair and open aisles; in another, sink into dark and secret subterranean vestries, like the adyta of the Thebans:*† which Tacitus describes in these words—"atque alibi angustiae, et profunda altitudo, nullis inquirentium spatiis penetrabilis."‡ 2. These rites are celebrated by the SANHEDRIM, or the elders of Israel: *And there stood before them seventy men of the ancients of the house of Israel.* Now it hath been shown in the account of the MYSTERIES, that none but princes, rulers, and the wisest of the people, were admitted to their more secret celebrations. 3. The paintings and imagery, on the walls of this subterraneous apartment, answer exactly to the descriptions the ancients have given us of the mystic cells of the Egyptians. § *Behold every form of creeping things and abominable beasts, and all the idols of the house of Israel portrayed upon the wall round about.* So Ammianus Marcellinus—"Sunt et syringes subterranei quidam et flexuosi secessus, quos, ut fertur, periti, rituum vetustorum—penitus operosis digestos fodinis, per loca diversa struxerunt: *et excisis parietibus volucrum ferarumque genera multa sculpservnt, quas hieroglyphicas literas appellarunt.*" || There is a famous antique monument, once a consecrated utensil in the rites of Isis and Osiris, and now well known to the curious by the name of the ISLAC or BEMBINE TABLE; on which (as appears by the order of the several compartments) is portrayed all the imagery that adorned the walls of the *mystic cell*. Now if one were

\* Chap. xx. 7, 8. This shows *brute worship* in Egypt to have been vastly extensive at the *exodus*; the time the prophet is here speaking of.

† 'Ος—*ἡ τι τῶν καὶ διαβίσις, πῇ μὲν ἀνιμίνων εἰς πτερά καὶ δρόμους ὑπαθρίους καὶ καθαροῦς, πῇ δὲ κρυπτὰ καὶ σκότια κατὰ γῆς χόντων στολιστήρια Θηβαίοις ἱερὸτα καὶ σηκοῖς.*—Περὶ Ις. καὶ Ος. p. 632, Steph. ed.

‡ Ann. xi. cap. 62.

§ Thus described by a learned antiquary, *Adyta Aegyptiorum, in quibus sacerdotes sacra operari, ritusque et caeremonias suas exercere solebant, subterranea loca erant, singulari quodam artificio ita constructa, ut nihil non mysteriosi in iis occurreret. Muri ex omni parte pleni tum hieroglyphicis picturis, tum sculpturis.*—Kircher.

|| Lib. xxii. cap. 15.

to describe the engravings on that table, one could not find juster or more emphatic terms than those which the prophet here employs.

(3.) The third inference I would draw from this vision is, that the Egyptian superstition was that to which the Israelites were more particularly addicted. And thus much I gather from the following words, *Behold, every form of creeping things, and abominable beasts, and ALL THE IDOLS OF THE HOUSE OF ISRAEL, portrayed upon the wall round about.* I have shown this to be a description of an Egyptian mystic cell: which certainly was adorned only with Egyptian gods: and yet those gods are here called, by way of distinction, *all the idols of the house of Israel:* which seems plainly to infer this people's more particular addiction to them. But the words, *house of Israel*, being used in a vision describing the idolatries of the *house of Judah*, I take it for granted, that in this indefinite number of *all the idols of the house of Israel*, were eminently included those two prime idols of the *house of Israel*, the calves of Dan and Bethel. And the rather, for that I find the original calves held a distinguished station in the paintings of the mystic cell; as the reader may see by casting his eye upon the Bembine table. And this, by the way, will lead us to the reason of Jeroboam's erecting two calves. For they were, we see, worshipped in pairs by the Egyptians, as representing Isis and Osiris. And what is remarkable, the calves were *male* and *female*, as appears from 2 Kings, ch. x. ver. 29. compared with Hosea, ch. x. ver. 5. where in one place the masculine, and in the other the feminine term is employed. But though the Egyptian gods are thus, by way of eminence, called the *idols of the house of Israel*, yet other idols they had besides Egyptian; and of those good store, as we shall now see.

For this prophetic vision is employed in describing the three master superstitions of this unhappy people, the EGYPTIAN, the PHENICIAN, and the PERSIAN.

2. The Egyptian we have seen. The PHENICIAN follows in these words; *He said also unto me, Turn thee yet again, and thou shalt see greater abominations that they do. Then he brought me to the gate of the Lord's house, which was towards the NORTH, and behold, there sat WOMEN WEEPING FOR TAMMUZ.\**

3. The PERSIAN superstition is next described in this manner: *Then said he unto me, Hast thou seen this, O son of man? Turn thee yet again, and thou shalt see greater abominations than these. And he brought me into the inner court of the Lord's house, and behold, at the door of the temple of the Lord, between the porch and the altar, were about five and twenty men, with their backs towards the temple of the Lord, and THEIR FACES TOWARDS THE EAST; AND THEY WORSHIPPED THE SUN TOWARDS THE EAST.†*

(1.) It is to be observed, that when the prophet is bid to turn from the Egyptian to the Phenician rites, he is then said to look towards the north; which was the situation of Phenicia with regard to Jerusalem; consequently, he before stood *southward*, the situation of Egypt, with

\* Ezek. viii. 13. et seq.

† Ib. 15. et seq.

regard to the same place. And when, from thence, he is bid to turn into the inner court of the Lord's house, to see the Persian rites, this was east, the situation of Persia. With such exactness is the representation of the whole vision conducted.

(2.) Again, as the mysterious rites of Egypt are said, agreeably to their usage, to be held in secret, by their ELDERS AND RULERS only: so the Phenician rites, for the same reason, are shown as they were celebrated by the PEOPLE, in open day. And the Persian worship of the sun, which was performed by the Magi, is here said to be observed by the PRIESTS alone, *five and twenty men with their faces towards the east.*

These three capital superstitions, the prophet, again, distinctly objects to them, in a following chapter. *Thou hast also committed fornication with the EGYPTIANS thy neighbours, great of flesh;\* and hast increased thy whoredoms to provoke me to anger. Thou hast played the whore also with the ASSYRIANS, because thou wast unsatiable: yea thou hast played the harlot with them, and yet couldst not be satisfied. Thou hast moreover multiplied thy fornication in the land of CANAAN unto Chaldea, and yet thou wast not satisfied herewith.†*

And when that miserable remnant, who, on the taking of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar, had escaped the fate of their enslaved countrymen, were promised safety and security, if they would stay in Judea; they said, *No, but we will go into the land of EGYPT, where we shall see no war, nor hear the sound of the trumpet, nor have hunger of bread, and there will we dwell.‡*

Thus we see what a surprising fondness this infatuated people had for Egypt, and how entirely they were seized and possessed with its superstitions. Which the more I consider, the more I am confirmed in the truth of scripture history (so opposite to Sir Isaac Newton's Egyptian chronology), that Egypt was, at the egression of the Israelites, a great and powerful empire. For nothing so much attaches a people to any particular constitution, or mode of government, as the high opinion of its power, wealth, and felicity; these being ever supposed the joint product of its RELIGION AND CIVIL POLICY.

II. Having thus proved the first part of the proposition, *that the Jewish people were extremely fond of Egyptian manners, and did frequently fall into Egyptian superstitions*, I come now to the second; *that many of the laws given to them by the ministry of Moses were instituted partly in compliance to their prejudices, and partly in opposition to those and to the like superstitions.* But to set what I have to say in support of this second part of the proposition in a fair light, it may be proper just to state and explain the ENDS of the ritual law. Its first and principal, was to guard the chosen people from the contagion of IDOLATRY; a second, and very important end, was to prepare them for the reception of the MESSIAH. The first required that the ritual law should

\* See note O O O O, at the end of this book.

† Ezek. xvi. 26, et seq.

‡ Jerem. xlii. 14.

be OBJECTIVE to the pagan superstitions; and the second, that it should be TYPICAL of their great deliverer. Now the coincidences of these two ends, not being sufficiently adverted to, hath been the principal occasion of that obstinate aversion to the truth here advanced, *That much of the ritual was given, PARTLY in compliance to the people's prejudices, and PARTLY in opposition to Egyptian superstitions*: these men thinking the falsehood of the proposition sufficiently proved in showing the ritual to be *typical*; as if the one end excluded the other: whereas we see they were very consistent; and hereafter shall see, that their concurrency affords one of the noblest proofs of the divinity of its original.

And now, to go on with our subject: the intelligent reader cannot but perceive, that the giving a RITUAL in opposition to Egyptian superstition, was a necessary consequence of the people's propensity towards it. For a people so prejudiced, and who were to be dealt with as free and accountable agents, could not possibly be kept separate from other nations, and pure from foreign idolatries, any otherwise than by giving them laws IN OPPOSITION to those superstitions. But such being the corrupt state of man's will as ever to revolt against what directly opposeth its prejudices, wise governors, when under the necessity of giving such laws, have, in order to break and evade the force of human perversity, always intermixed them with others which eluded the perversity, by flattering the prejudice; where the indulgence could not be so abused as to occasion the evil which the *laws of opposition* were designed to prevent.\* And in this manner it was that our inspired law-giver acted with his people, if we will believe JESUS himself, where, speaking of a certain positive institution, he says, *Moses for the HARDNESS OF YOUR HEARTS wrote you this precept.*† Plainly intimating their manners to be such, that, had not Moses indulged them in some things, they would have revolted against all.‡ It follows, therefore, that Moses's giving laws to the Israelites, *in compliance* to these their prejudices, was a natural and necessary consequence of laws given *in opposition* to them. Thus far from the nature of the thing.

Matter of fact confirms this reasoning. We find in the law a surprising relation and resemblance between Jewish and Egyptian rites, in circumstances both *opposite* and *similar*. But the learned SPENCER hath fully exhausted this subject, in his excellent work, *De legibus Hebræorum ritualibus et earum rationibus*; and thereby done great service to divine revelation: for the RITUAL LAW, when thus explained, is seen to be an institution of the most beautiful and sublime contrivance. Which, without its CAUSES (no where to be found but in the road of this theory)

\* See this reasoning enforced, and explained more at large in the proof of the next proposition.

† Mark x. 5. and Mat. xix. 8.

‡ This is still farther seen from God's being pleased to be considered by them as a *local tutelary deity*: which, when we come to that point, we shall show was the prevailing superstition of those times.

must lie for ever open to the scorn and contempt of libertines and unbelievers. This noble work is no other than a paraphrase and comment on the third part of a famous treatise called *More Nevochim*, of the Rabbi MOSES MAIMONIDES: of whom only to say (as is his common encomium) that *he was the first of the rabbins who left off trifling*, is a poor and invidious commendation. Thither I refer the impartial reader; relying on his justice to believe that I mean to charge myself with no more of Spencer's opinions than what directly tend to the proof of this part of my proposition, by showing, that there is a great and surprising relation and resemblance between the Jewish and Egyptian rites, in circumstances both *opposite* and *similar*.

I ask nothing unreasonable of the reader, when I desire him to admit of this as proved; since the learned HERMAN WITSIUS, in a book professedly written to confute the hypothesis of Maimonides and Spencer, confesses the fact in the fullest and amplest manner.\*

What is it then (a stranger to controversy would be apt to inquire) which this learned man addresses himself, in a large quarto volume, to confute? It is the plain and natural consequence of this resemblance, namely, that *the Jewish ritual was given partly in compliance to the people's prejudices, and partly in opposition to Egyptian superstitions*; the proposition we undertake to prove. Witsius thinks, or is rather willing to think, that the Egyptian ritual was invented in imitation of the Jewish. For the reader sees, that both sides are agreed in this, *that either the Jews borrowed from the Egyptians, or the Egyptians from the Jews*; so strong is the resemblance which forces this confession from them.

Now the only plausible support of Witsius's party being a thing taken for granted, viz. that the rites and customs of the Egyptians, as delivered by the Greeks, were of much later original than these writers assign to them; and my discourse on the ANTIQUITIES OF EGYPT, in the preceding section, proving it to be entirely groundless; the latter part of the proposition, viz. *that many of the laws given to the Jews, by the ministry of Moses, were instituted partly in compliance to their prejudices, and partly in opposition to Egyptian superstitions*, is sufficiently proved.

But to let nothing that hath the appearance of an argument remain unanswered, I shall, in as few words as may be, examine this opinion, that *the Egyptians borrowed from the Israelites*; regarding both nations

\* *Ita autem commodissime me processurum existimo, si primo longa exemplorum inductione ex doctissimorum virorum mente, et eorum plerumque verbis, demonstravero, MAGNAM ATQUE MIRANDAM PLANE CONVENIENTIAM IN RELIGIONIS NEGOTIO VETERES INTER ÆGYPTIOS ATQUE HEBRÆOS ESSE. Quæ cum fortuita esse non possit, necesse est ut vel Ægyptii sua ab Hebræis, vel ex adverso Hebræi sua ab Ægyptiis abeant. And again; Porro, si levato antiquitatis obscurioris velo, gentium omnium ritus oculis vigilantibus intueamur, Ægyptios et Hebræos, PRÆ OMNIBUS ALIIS moribus SIMILLIMOS fuisse comperiemus. Neque hoc Kircherum fefellit, cujus hæc sunt verba: Hebræi tantam habent ad ritus, sacrificia, cæremonias, sacras disciplinas Ægyptiorum affinitatem, ut vel Ægyptios hebraizantes, vel Hebræos ægyptizantes fuisse, plane mihi persuadeam.—Sed quid verbis opus est? in rem presentem veniamus. [Ægyptiaca, p. 4.] And so he goes on to transcribe, from Spencer and Marsham, all the eminent particulars of that resemblance.*

in that very light in which holy scripture hath placed them. The periods then in which this must needs be supposed to have happened, are one or other of these: 1. The time of Abraham's residence in Egypt; 2. of Joseph's government; 3. of the slavery of his, and his brethren's descendants; or, 4. Any indefinite time after their egression from Egypt.

Now not to insist on the utter improbability of a potent nation's borrowing its religious rites from a private family, or from a people they held in slavery; I answer, that of these four periods, the three first are beside the question. For the *characteristic* resemblance insisted on, is that which we find between the Egyptian ritual, and what is properly called MOSAICAL. And let it not be said, that we are unable to distinguish the rites which were purely LEGAL from such as were PATRIARCHAL:\* for Moses, to add the greater force and efficacy to the whole of his institution, hath been careful to record each specific rite which was properly patriarchal.

Thus, though Moses enjoined CIRCUMCISION, he hath been careful to record the patriarchal institution of it with all its circumstances—*Moses gave unto you circumcision (not because it is of Moses, but of the fathers)* says JESUS.† So again, where he institutes the Jewish sabbath of rest, he records the patriarchal observance of it, in these words:—*In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, &c. and rested the seventh day: wherefore the Lord blessed the sabbath day, and hallowed it.*‡

The last period then only remains to be considered, namely, from the egression. Now at that time and from thenceforward, we say, the Egyptians would not borrow of the Israelites, for these two plain and convincing reasons. 1. They held the Israelites in the greatest contempt, and abhorrence, as SHEPHERDS, SLAVES, and ENEMIES, men who had brought a total devastation on their country: and had embraced a religion whose ritual daily treated the gods of Ægypt with the utmost ignominy and despite.§ But people never borrow their religious rites from those towards whom they stand in such inveterate distance. 2. It was part of the religion of the old Egyptians to borrow from none:‖ most certainly, not from the Jews. This is the account we have, of their natural disposition, from those ancients who have treated of their manners. While, on the other hand, we are assured from infallible authority that the Israelites, of the time of Moses, were in the very extreme of a contrary humour, and were for BORROWING all they could lay their hands on. This is so notorious, that I was surprised to find

\* See note P P P P, at the end of this book.

† 1 John vii. 22. See note Q Q Q Q, at the end of this book.

‡ Exod. xx. 11. And see note R R R R, at the end of this book.

§ See Spencer, De Leg. Heb. Rit. vol. i. p. 296.

‖ *Ægyptii detestari videntur quicquid ei gentis eū παρίδωκεν, parentes non commonstrant*, Witsii *Ægyptiaca*, p. 6.—Πατρίοις δὲ χρειόμενοι νόμοισι, ἄλλον οὐδὲνα ἐπιπείνουνται—Herodot. lib. ii. cap. 78. Ἑλληναῖσι δὲ νομαῖοισι φύγουσι χρᾶσθαι τὸ δὲ σὺμπαν ἐπιτῆ, μηδ' ἈΛΛΟΝ ΜΗΔΑΜΑ ΜΗΔΑΜΟΝ ἀνθρώπων νομαίοισι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλω Αἰγύπτῳ ὅττω νότῳ φυλάσσειν.—Cap. 91.



the learned Witsius attempt to prove, that the *Egyptians were greatly inclined to borrowing* :\* but much more surprised with his arguments; which are these: 1. Clemens Alexandrinus says, that it was the custom of the barbarians, and particularly the Egyptians, to honour their legislators and benefactors as gods. 2. Diodorus Siculus confirms this account, where he says, that the Egyptians were the most grateful of all mankind to their benefactors. And 3. The same historian tells us, that when Egypt was become a province to Persia, the Egyptians deified Darius, while yet alive: which honour they never had done to any other king. †—This is the whole of his evidence to prove the Egyptian genius so greatly inclined to foreign rites. Nor should I have exposed the nakedness of this learned and honest man, either in this place or in any other, but for the use which hath been made of his authority; of which more hereafter. But Witsius, and those in his way of thinking, when they talk of the Egyptians' borrowing Hebrew rites, seem to have entertained a wrong idea of that highly policed people. It was not in ancient Egypt, as in ancient Greece, where every private man, who had travelled for it, found himself at liberty to set up what *lying vanity* he pleased. For in that wary monarchy, religion was in the hand of the magistrate, and under the inspection of the public: so that no *private* novelties could be introduced, had the people been as much disposed, as they were indeed averse, to innovations; and that any *public* ones would be made, by rites borrowed from the Hebrews, is, as we have shown above, highly improbable.

Hitherto I have endeavoured to discredit this proposition, (*that the Egyptians borrowed of the Israelites*) from the nature of the thing. I shall now show the falsehood of it, from the infallible testimony of God himself: who, upbraiding the Israelites with their borrowing idolatrous rites of all their neighbours, expresses himself in this manner, by the prophet Ezekiel: *The contrary is in thee from other women, WHEREAS NONE FOLLOWETH THEE TO COMMIT WHOREDOMS: and in that thou givest a reward, and no reward is given to thee, therefore thou art con-*

\* His words are these: *Magna quidem laterum contentione reclamat doctissimus Spencerus, prorsusque incredibile esse contendit, considerato gentis utriusque genio, ut ab Hebræis Egyptii in suam tam multa religionem adsciverint. At quod ipsi incredibile videtur, id mihi, post alios eruditione atque judicio clarissimos, perquam probabile est: IPSE ÆGYPTIORUM ID SUADENTE GENIO. In eo quippe præstantissimi auctores consentiunt, solitos fuisse Ægyptios maximè eos existimatione prosequi, quos sapientia atque virtute excellentiores cernerent, et a quibus se ingentibus beneficiis affectos esse meminerant: adco quidem ut ejusmodi mortales, non defunctos solum, sed et superstites, pro diis haberent.—Lib. iii. cap. 12, p. 262.*

† Clemens Alexandrinus clarum esse dicit, barbaros eximie semper honorasse suos legumlatores et præceptores deos ipsos appellantes.—Inter barbaros autem maximè id præstiterunt Ægyptii. Quin etiam genus Ægyptium diligentissimè illos in deos retulit. Assentitur Diodorus; Ægyptios denique supra ceteros mortales quicquid bene de ipsis meretur grata mente prosequi affirmant.—Neque popularibus modo suis atque indigenis—sed peregrinis—Facit huc Darii Persarum regis exemplum, quod Diodori iterum verbis exponam. Tandem Darius legibus Ægyptiorum animum appulisse dicitur—Nam cum sacerdotibus Ægypti familiaritatem inivit, &c.—Propterea tantum honoris consecutus est, ut superstes adhuc divi appellationem quod nulli regum aliorum contigit, promeruerit.—Lib. iii. cap. 12, p. 263.

*trary.\** The intelligent reader perceives that the plain meaning of the metaphor is this, *Ye Jews are contrary to all other nations: you are fond of borrowing their rites, while none of them care to borrow yours.* But this remarkable fact, had it not been so expressly delivered, might easily have been collected from the whole course of sacred history. The reason will be accounted for hereafter. At present I shall only need to observe, that by the words, *whereas none followeth thee to commit whoredoms*, is not meant, that no particular gentile ever embraced the Jewish religion; but, that no gentile people took in any of its rites into their own national worship. That this is the true sense of the passage appears from hence, 1. The idolatry of the COMMUNITY of Israel is here spoken of: and this, as will be shown in the next book, did not consist in renouncing the religion of Moses, but in polluting it with idolatrous mixtures. 2. The embracing the Jewish religion, and renouncing idolatry, could not, in figurative propriety, be called *committing whoredom*, though polluting the Jewish rites, by taking them into their own superstitions, gives elegance to the figure thus applied.

The reader, perhaps, may wonder how men can stand out against such kind of evidence. It is not, I will assure him, from the abundance of argument on the other side; or from their not seeing the force on this; but from a pious, and therefore very excusable, apprehension of danger to the divinity of the law, if it should be once granted that any of the ceremonial part was given *in compliance to the people's prejudices*. Of which imaginary danger Lord Bolingbroke hath availed himself, to calumniate the law, for a COMPLIANCE too evident to be denied.

The apprehension therefore of this consequence being that which makes believers so unwilling to own, and deists, against the very genius of their infidelity, so ready to embrace an evident truth; I seem to come in opportunely to set both parties right: while I show, in support of my THIRD PROPOSITION, that the consequence is groundless; and that the fears and hopes, built upon this supposed *compliance*, are vain and fantastic: which, I venture to predict, will ever be the issue of such fears and hopes as arise only from the religionist's honest adherence to *common sense* and to the *word of God*.

[III.] Our THIRD PROPOSITION is, that *Moses's Egyptian learning, and the laws he instituted in compliance to the people's prejudices, and in opposition to Egyptian superstitions, are no reasonable objection to the divinity of his mission.*†

The first part of the proposition concerns Moses's *Egyptian wisdom*. Let us previously consider what that was. MOSES, says the holy martyr Stephen, was LEARNED IN ALL THE WISDOM OF THE EGYPTIANS, *and mighty in words and deeds.*‡ Now where the WISDOM of a nation is spoken of, that which is characteristic of the nation must needs be meant: where the *wisdom* of a particular man, that which is peculiar to his quality and profession. St Stephen, in this place, speaks of both.

\* Ezek. xvi. 34.

† See p. 686, of vol. i.

‡ Acts vii. 22.

In both, therefore, he must needs mean CIVIL or POLITICAL wisdom; because, for that (as we have shown) the Egyptian nation was principally distinguished: and in that consisted the eminence of character of one who had a royal adoption, was bred up at court, and became at length the leader and lawgiver of a numerous people. More than this,—St Stephen is here speaking of him under this public character, and therefore he must be necessarily understood to mean, that *Moses was consummate in the science of legislation*. The words indeed are, *ALL the learning of the Egyptians*. But every good logician knows, that where the thing spoken of refers to some particular use (as here, Moses's LEARNING, to his CONDUCTING the Israelites out of Egypt) the particle ALL does not mean *all of every kind*, but *all the parts of one kind*. In this restrained sense it is frequently used in the sacred writings. Thus in the gospel of St John, JESUS says, *When he the Spirit of truth is come he will guide you into ALL truth*.\* But further, the concluding part of the character,—*and mighty in WORDS and DEEDS*, will not easily suffer the foregoing part to admit of any other interpretation; ἡν δὲ δυνατὸς ἐν ΛΟΓΟΙΣ καὶ ἐν ΕΡΓΟΙΣ. This was the precise character of the ANCIENT CHIEF: who, leading a free and willing people, needed the arts of peace, such as PERSUASION and LAW-MAKING, the ΛΟΓΟΙ; and the arts of war, such as CONDUCT and COURAGE, the ΕΡΓΑ in the text. Hence it is, that Jesus, who was *the prophet like unto Moses*, the legislator of the new covenant as the other was of the old, and the conductor of our spiritual warfare, is characterised in the same words, δυνατὸς ἐν ΕΡΓΩ, καὶ ΛΟΓΩ, ἰσχυρίων τοῦ ΘΕΟΥ καὶ παντὸς τοῦ λαοῦ.†—*A prophet, mighty in DEED and WORD, before GOD and all the people*. This wisdom, therefore, in which Moses was said to be versed, we conclude, was the τὸ πραγματικὸν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, in contradistinction to the τὸ θεωρητικόν. Hence may be seen the impertinence of those long inquiries, which, on occasion of these words, men have run into, concerning the state of the speculative and mechanic arts of Egypt, at this period.

This being the WISDOM, for which Moses is here celebrated, the deist hastily concluded, *that therefore the establishment of the Jewish policy was the sole contrivance of Moses himself*; he did not reflect, that a fundamental truth (which he will not venture to dispute any more than the believer) stands very much in the way of his conclusion; namely, *That GOD, in the moral government of the world, never does that in an extraordinary way, which can be equally well effected in an ordinary*.

In the separation of the Israelites, a civil policy and a national religion were to be established, and incorporated with one another, by God himself. For that end, he appointed an under-agent, or instrument; who, in this work of legislation, was either to understand the government of a people, and so, be capable of comprehending the general plan delivered to him by GOD, for the erection of this extraordinary policy: or else he was not to understand the government of a people,

\* John xvi. 13.

† Luke xxiv. 19.

and so, God himself, in the execution of his plan, was, at every step, to interfere, and direct the ignorance and inability of his agent. Now, as this perpetual interposition might be spared by the choice of an able leader, we conclude, on the maxim laid down, that God would certainly employ such a one in the execution of his purpose.

There was yet another, and that no slight expediency, in such a leader. The Israelites were a stubborn people, now first forming into civil government; greatly licentious; and the more so, for their just coming out of a state of slavery. Had Moses therefore been so unequal to his designation, as to need God's direction at every turn to set him right, he would soon have lost the authority requisite for keeping an unruly multitude in awe; and have sunk into such contempt amongst them, as must have retarded their designed establishment.

But it will be said, "If there wanted so able a chief at the first setting up of a THEOCRACY, there would still be the same want, though not in an equal degree, during the whole continuance of that divine form of government." It is likely there would, because I find, God did make a proper provision for it; first in the erection of the SCHOOLS OF THE PROPHETS: and afterwards, in the establishment of the GREAT SANHEDRIM, which succeeded them. But sacred history mentioning these *schools of the prophets*, and the assembly of the *seventy elders*, only occasionally, the accounts we have of both are very short and imperfect. Which is the reason why interpreters, who have not well weighed the causes of that occasional mention, have suffered themselves to be greatly misled by the rabbins.

I. The most particular account we have of the *schools of the prophets* is in the first book of Samuel, and on this occasion: David, in his escape from the rage of Saul, fled to his protector, Samuel, who then presided over a *school of the prophets*, at Naioth in Ramah.\* When this was told to Saul, he sent messengers in pursuit of him.† And, on the ill success of their errand, went afterwards himself.‡ But as it was the intent of the historian, in this mention of the *schools of the prophets*, only to acquaint us with the effect they had on Saul and his messengers, when the Spirit of God came upon them, we have only a partial view of these collegiate bodies, that is, a view of them while at their DEVOTIONS only, and not at their STUDIES. For Saul and his messengers coming when the society was *prophesying*,§ or at divine worship, the Spirit of God fell upon them, and they *prophesied* also. And thus the *Chald. Paraph.* understands *prophesying*, as did the apostolic writers, who use the word in the same sense, of adoring God, and singing praises unto him. For we may well suppose these societies began and ended all their daily studies with this holy exercise.

But from hence, writers of contrary parties have fallen into the same strange and absurd opinion; while they imagined that, because these *schools* were indeed nurseries of the prophets, that therefore they were

\* 1 Sam. xix. 18.

† Ver. 21.

‡ Ver. 23.

§ Ver. 20.

places of instruction for I don't know what kind of ART OF PROPHECY. Spinoza borrowed this senseless fancy from the Rabbins, and hath delivered it down to his followers;\* from whence they conclude that PROPHECY was amongst the mechanic arts of the Hebrews. But an inquirer of either common sense or common honesty, would have seen it was a college for the study of the Jewish law only; and, as such, naturally and properly, a seminary of *prophets*. For those who were most knowing as well as zealous in the law, were surely the most fit to convey God's commands to his people.

This account of the nature of the *schools of the prophets* helps to show us how it became a proverb in Israel, *Is SAUL ALSO AMONGST THE PROPHETS?*† which, I apprehend, has been commonly mistaken. The proverb was used to express a thing unlooked for and unlikely. But surely the *Spirit of God* falling occasionally on their supreme magistrate, at a time when it was so plentifully bestowed on private men, could be no such unexpected matter to the people; who knew too, that even idolaters and gentiles had partaken of it, while concerned in matters which related to their economy. But more than this, they could not be ignorant that the *Spirit of God* had usually made its abode with Saul; as appears from the following words of the sacred historian, *But the Spirit of the Lord departed from Saul, and an evil spirit from the Lord troubled him.*‡ From all this I conclude that the people's surprise, which occasioned this proverb, was not because they heard the *Spirit of God* had fallen upon him: but a very different reason, which I shall now endeavour to explain.

SAUL, with many great qualities, both of a public man and a private, and in no respect an unable chief, was yet so poorly prejudiced in favour of the human policies of the neighbouring nations, as to become impiously cold and negligent in the support and advancement of the LAW OF GOD; though raised to regal power from a low and obscure condition, for this very purpose. He was, in a word, a mere politician, without the least zeal or love for the divine constitution of his country. This was his great, and no wonder it should prove his unpardonable crime. For his folly had reduced things to that extremity, that either he must fall, or the law. Now, this pagan turn of mind was no secret to the people. When, therefore, they were told that he had sent frequent messengers to the supreme school of the prophets, where zeal for the law was so eminently professed; and had afterwards gone himself thither, and entered with divine raptures and ecstasy into their devotions: they received this extraordinary news with all the wonder and amazement it deserved. And, in the height of their surprise, they cried out, *Is Saul also amongst the prophets?* i. e. Is Saul, who throughout his whole reign, hath so much slighted and contemned the law, and would conduct all his actions by the mere rules of human policy, is he

\* See note S S S S, at the end of this book.

† 1 Sam. xix. 24.

‡ Chap. xvi. 14.—And see note T T T T, at the end of this book.

at length become studious of and zealous for the *law of God*? And the *miracle*, of such a change in a politician, brought it into a proverb before the mistake was found out.

This matter will receive farther light from what we are told, in the same story, concerning DAVID; a man of so opposite a character, with regard to his sentiments of the law, that it appears to have been for this difference only that he was decreed by GOD to succeed the other, in his kingdom. Now David, the story tells us, sojourned for some time in this school.—*So David fled and escaped, and came to Samuel, at Ramah, and told him all that Saul had done to him, and HE AND SAMUEL WENT AND DWELT IN NAIOTH.\** And here it was, as we may reasonably conclude, that he so greatly cultivated and improved his natural disposition of love and zeal for the law, as to merit that most glorious of all titles, THE MAN AFTER GOD'S OWN HEART; for, till now, his way of life had been very distant from accomplishments of this nature; his childhood and youth were spent in the country; and his early manhood in camps and courts.† But it is of importance to the cause of truth to know, that this CHARACTER was not given him for his PRIVATE morals, but his PUBLIC; his zeal for the advancement of the glory of the THEOCRACY. This is seen from the first mention of him under this appellation, by Samuel, who tells Saul—*But now thy kingdom shall not continue.—The Lord hath sought him A MAN AFTER HIS OWN HEART, and the Lord hath commanded him to be captain over his people.‡* And again, God himself says, *I have chosen Jerusalem that my name might be there, and have chosen DAVID to be over my people Israel.§* Here David's vicegerency, we see, is represented to be as necessary to the support of the economy, as God's peculiar residence in Jerusalem. Conformably to these ideas it was, that Hosea, prophesying of the restoration of the Jews, makes the God of Israel and his vicegerent inseparable parts of the economy.—*Afterwards shall the children of Israel return, and seek the LORD their GOD and DAVID their KING;|| i. e. they shall have the same zeal for the dispensation which king David had; and on account of which they shall honour his memory.* Now if we would but seek for the reason of this pre-eminence, in David's *public*, not in his *private* character, we should see it afforded no occasion of scandal.¶ His zeal for the law was constantly the same: as is manifest by this distinguishing circumstance, that he never fell into idolatry. But the phrase itself, of *a man after God's own heart*, is best explained in the case of Samuel. ELI the prophet was rejected, and SAMUEL put in his place just in the same manner that DAVID superseded SAUL. On this occasion, when God's purpose was denounced to Eli, we find it expressed in the same manner—*And I will raise me up a faithful priest, THAT SHALL DO ACCORDING TO THAT*

\* 1 Sam. xix. 18.

† See note U U U U, at the end of this book.

‡ 1 Sam. xiii. 14.

§ 2 Chron. vi. 6.

|| Hos. iii. 5.

¶ See note X X X X, at the end of this book.



WHICH IS IN MINE HEART.\* What was then *in God's heart* (to speak in the language of humanity) the context tells us, *the establishment of his dispensation*. Thus, we see, the *man after God's own heart* is the man who seconds God's views in the support of the theocracy. No other virtue was here in question. Though in an indefinite way of speaking, where the subject is only the general relation of man to God, no one can, indeed, be called *a man after God's own heart*, but he who uses his best endeavours to imitate God's purity as far as miserable humanity will allow, in the uniform practice of every virtue.

By this time, therefore, I presume, the serious reader will be disposed to take for just what it is worth, that refined observation of the noble author of the *Characteristics*, where he says, "It is not possible, by the *muse's art*, to make that royal hero appear amiable in human eyes, who found such favour in the eye of Heaven. Such are mere human hearts, that they can hardly find the least sympathy with that ONLY ONE which had the character of being after the pattern of the Almighty."†—His lordship seems willing to make any thing *the test of truth*, but that only which has a claim to it, RIGHT REASON. Sometimes this *test* is RIDICULE; here, it is the ART OF POETRY—it is not possible, says he, *for the muse's art to make that royal hero appear amiable in human eyes*. Therefore, because DAVID was not a character to be managed by the poet, for the hero of a fiction, he was not a fit instrument in the hands of God, to support a theocracy: and having nothing amiable in the eyes of our noble critic, there could be nothing in him to make him acceptable to his Maker. But when classical criticism goes beyond its bounds, it is liable to be bewildered, as here. The noble author assures us that David was the only man *characterized*, to be AFTER GOD'S OWN HEART, whereas we see the very same character is given of Samuel; and both honoured with this glorious appellation for the same reason.

II. As for the GREAT SANHEDRIM, it seems to have been established after the failure of prophecy. And concerning the members of this body, the rabbins tell us, there was a tradition, that they were bound to be skilled in all sciences.‡ So far is certain, that they extended their jurisdiction to the judging of doctrines and opinions, as appears by their deputation to JESUS, to know by what authority he did his great works. And as the address of our blessed Saviour on this occasion deserves well to be illustrated, I shall set down the occurrence as it is recorded by St Matthew:—"When he was come into the temple, the chief priests and the elders of the people came unto him as he was teaching, and said; By what authority doest thou these things? And who gave thee this authority? And JESUS answered and said unto them, I also will ask you one thing, which if you tell me, I in like wise will tell you by what authority I do these things. The baptism of *John*, whence was it? from heaven, or of men? And they reasoned with themselves, saying,

\* 1 Sam. ii. 35.

† Advice to an Author, sect. 3, vol. i.

‡ See Smith's Select Discourses, p. 259.

If we shall say, From heaven, he will say unto us, Why did ye not then believe him? But if we shall say, Of men; we fear the people: for all hold *John* as a prophet. And they answered *JESUS* and said, We cannot tell. And he said unto them, Neither tell I you by what authority I do these things.\* We are not to suppose this to be a captious evasion of a question made by those whose authority he did not acknowledge. On the contrary, it was a direct reply to an acknowledged jurisdiction (as *JESUS* was obedient to all the institutions of his country), convincing them that the question needed not, even on the principles of that jurisdiction, any precise answer. They sent to him to know the authority on which he acted. He asks them whether they had yet determined of *John's*: they say, they had not. Then replies *JESUS*, "I need not tell you my authority; since the sanhedrim's not having yet determined of *John's*, shows such a determination unnecessary; or at least, since (both by *John's* account and mine) he is represented as the forerunner of my mission, it is fit to begin with his pretensions first." The address and reasoning of this reply are truly divine.

The foregoing observations concerning this method of divine wisdom, in the establishment of the Jewish theocracy, will be much supported, if we contrast it with that which providence was pleased to take in the propagation of Christianity.

The blessed *JESUS* came down to teach mankind a spiritual religion, the object of each individual as such; and offered to their acceptance on the sole force of its own evidence. The propagators of this religion had no need to be endowed with worldly authority or learning; for here was no body of men to be conducted: nor no civil policy or government to be erected or administered. Had *JESUS*, on the contrary, made choice of the great and learned for this employment, they had discredited their own success. It might have been then objected, that the gospel had made its way by the aid of human power or sophistry. To preserve, therefore, the splendour of its evidence unsullied, the meanest and most illiterate of a barbarous people were made choice of, for the instruments of *GOD's* last great revelation to mankind: armed with no other power but of miracles, and that only for the credence of their mission; and with no other wisdom but of truth, and that only to be proposed freely to the understandings of particulars. *St Paul*, who had fathomed the mysterious depths of divine wisdom under each economy, was so penetrated with the view of this last dispensation, that he breaks out into this rapturous and triumphant exclamation, *Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?*†

But further, divine wisdom so wonderfully contrived, that the inability and ignorance of the propagators of Christianity were as useful to the advancement of this religion, as the authority and wisdom of the leader of the Jews were for the establishment of theirs.

\* Mat. xxi. 23, et seq.

† 1 Cor. i. 20.

*I shall only give one instance out of many which will occur to an attentive reader of the evangelic history.*

When JESUS had chosen these mean and weak instruments of his power, he suffered them to continue in their national prejudices concerning his character; the nature of his kingdom; and the extent of his jurisdiction; as the sole human means of keeping them attached to his service, not only during the course of their attendance on his ministry, but for some time after his resurrection, and the descent of the Holy Ghost upon them; that power which was to *lead them into all truth*; but by just and equal steps. Let us see the use of this, in the following circumstance: from the order of the whole of God's dispensation to mankind, as laid down in scripture, we learn, that the offer of the gospel was to be first fairly made to the Jews; and then afterwards to the gentiles. Now when, soon after the ascension of our Lord, the church was forced, by the persecution of the synagogue, to leave Judea, and to disperse itself through all the regions round about; had the apostles, on this dispersion, been fully instructed in the design of God to call the gentiles into his church, resentment for their ill usage within Judea, and the small prospect of better success amongst those who were without, which they of Jerusalem had prejudiced against the gospel, would naturally have disposed them to turn immediately to the gentiles. By which means God's purpose, without a supernatural force upon their minds, had been defeated; as so great a part of the Jews would not have had the gospel *first preached unto them*. But now, pushed on by this com-  
modious prejudice, that the benefits belonged properly to the race of Abraham, they directly addressed themselves to their brethren of the *dispersion*: where meeting with the same ill success, their sense of the desperate condition of the house of Israel would now begin to abate that prejudice in their favour. And then came the time to enlighten them in this matter, without putting too great a force upon their minds; which is not God's way of acting with free agents. Accordingly, his purpose of calling the gentiles into the church was now clearly revealed to PETER at Joppa; and a proper subject, wherewith to begin this great work, was ready provided for him.

But though ignorance in the propagator of a divine truth amongst particulars, may serve to these important ends, yet to show still plainer how pernicious this inability would be wherever a society is concerned, as in the establishment of the Jewish religion, I shall produce an occasional example even in the Christian.

For when now so great numbers of the gentiles were converted to CHRIST, that it became necessary to form them into a church; that is, a religious society; which of course hath its policy as well as the civil; so hurtful was ignorance in its governing members, that divers of them, though graced with many gifts of the Holy Spirit, caused such disorders in their assemblies as required all the abilities of the LEARNED APOSTLE to reform and regulate. And then it was, and for this purpose,

that PAUL, the proper apostle of the gentiles,\* was, in an extraordinary manner, called in, to conduct, by his learning and abilities, and with the assistance of his companion LUKE, a learned man also, this part of God's purpose to its completion. The rest were properly apostles of the Jews; which people having a religious society already formed, the converts from thence had a kind of rule to go by, which served them for their present occasions; and therefore these needed no great talents of parts or learning; nor had they any. But a new society was to be formed amongst the gentile converts; and this required an able conductor; and such a one they had in Paul. But will any one say that his learning afforded an objection against the divinity of his mission? We conclude, therefore, that none can arise from the abilities, natural and acquired, of the great Jewish lawgiver. The point to be proved.

II. We come now to the second part of the proposition, *that the laws instituted in compliance to the people's prejudices, and in opposition to Egyptian superstitions, are no reasonable objection to the divinity of the Jewish religion.* That most of these laws were given in *opposition* to Egyptian superstitions, believers seem not unwilling to allow; as apprehending no consequence from such a concession that will give them trouble. The thing which startles them is the supposition that some of these laws were given in *compliance* to the Jewish prejudices; because infidels have enforced this circumstance to the discredit of Moses's pretensions. To satisfy believers, therefore, I shall show, "that the laws in *compliance* were a consequence of the laws in *opposition*." And to reconcile them to both sorts, I shall attempt to prove, from the double consideration of their NECESSITY and FITNESS, that the institution of such laws is no reasonable objection to the divinity of their original.

I. If God did indeed interfere in the concerns of this people, it will, I suppose, be easily granted, that his purpose was to separate them from the contagion of that universal idolatry, which had now overspread the whole earth; and to which, especially to the EGYPTIAN, they were most inveterately prone.

There were two ways, in the hand of God, for effecting this separation: either to overrule the will; and this required only the exercise of his power: or, by leaving the will at liberty, to counterwork the passions, and this required the exercise of his WISDOM.

Now, as all the declared purposes of this separation show, that God acted with the Israelites as MORAL AGENTS, we must needs conclude, notwithstanding the peculiar favour by which they were elected, and the extraordinary providence by which they were conducted, that yet, amidst all this display and blaze of almighty power, the WILL ever remained free and uncontrolled. This not only appears from the nature of the thing, but from the whole history of their reduction out of Egypt. To give only one instance: Moses tells us, that God led the Israelites into

\* The gospel of the uncircumcision was committed unto me, as the gospel of the circumcision was unto Peter, Gal. ii. 7.

the land of Canaan, not by the direct way of the Philistines, lest the sight of danger, in an expedition against a strong and warlike people, should make them choose to return to Egypt, and seek for refuge in their slavery: but he led them about, by the way of the wilderness, to inure them by degrees to fatigue and hardships; the best foundation of military prowess.\* And when God, to punish them for their cowardice, on the report of the faithless explorers of the land, had decreed that that generation should be worn away in the wilderness,† the wise policy of this sentence was as conspicuous as the justice of it.

If then the wills of this people were to be left free, and their minds influenced only by working on their passions, it is evident, that God, when he became their lawgiver, would act by the same policy in use amongst human lawgivers for restraining the vicious inclinations of the people. The same, I say, in kind, though differing infinitely in degree. For all people, whether conducted on divine or human measures, having the same nature, the same liberty of will, and the same terrestrial situation, must needs require the same mode of guidance. And, in fact, we find the Jewish to be indeed constituted like other civil governments, with regard to the integral parts of a political society.

According to all human conception, therefore, we see no way left to keep such a people, thus separated, free from the contagion of idolatry, but,

First, by severe penal laws against idolaters;

And, secondly, by framing a multifarious ritual, whose whole direction, looking contrary to the forbidden superstitions, would, by degrees, wear out the present fondness for them; and at length bring on an habitual aversion to them. This is the way of wise lawgivers; who, in order to keep the will from revolting, forbear to do every thing by direct force and fear of punishment; but employ, where they can, the gentler methods of restraint.

Thirdly; but as even in the practice of this gentler method, when the passions and prejudices run high, a direct and professed opposition will be apt to irritate and inflame them; therefore it will be further necessary, in order to break and elude their violence, to turn men's fondness for the forbidden practice into a harmless channel; and by indulging them in those customs, which they could not well abuse to superstition, enable the more severe and opposite institutions to perform their work. Such, for instance, might be the *lighting up of lamps* in religious worship: which practice, Clemens Alexandrinus assures us, came first from the Egyptians:‡ nor would Witsius himself venture to deny it.§ But, for the same reason, we conclude that the *brazen serpent* was no imitation of an Egyptian practice, as Sir J. Marsham would persuade us; because we see how easily it might, and did suffer abuse. Which conclusion,

\* Exod. xiii. 17.

† Num. xiii. and xiv.

‡ Διγόντιαι λύχνους καίον πρώτοι κατίδωξαν.—Strom. lib. i. p. 306, edit. Colon. 1658. fol.

§ Earum [lucernarum] prima ad religionem accensio, utrum Hebræis debeatur, an Ægyptiis, haud facile dixero.—Ægypt. p. 190.

not only our principle leads us to make, but matter of fact enables us to prove.\*

Such a conduct therefore as this, where the will is left free, appears to be NECESSARY.

II. Let us see next whether it were FIT, that is, whether it agreed with the wisdom, dignity, and purity of God.

1. His WISDOM indeed is the attribute peculiarly manifested in this method of government; and certainly with as great lustre as we should have seen his POWER, had it been his good pleasure to have overruled the will. To give an instance only in one particular, most liable to the ridicule of unbelievers; I mean, in that part of the Jewish institute which concerns *clean* and *unclean* meats; and descends to so low and minute a detail, that men, ignorant of the nature and end of this regulation, have, on its apparent *unfitness* to engage the concern of God, concluded against the divine original of the law. But would they reflect, that the purpose of separating one people from the contagion of universal idolatry, and this, in order to facilitate a still greater good, was a design not unworthy of the Governor of the universe, they would see this part of the Jewish institution in a different light: they would see the brightest marks of divine wisdom in an injunction which took away the very grounds of all commerce with foreign nations. For those who can neither eat nor drink together, are never likely to become intimate. This will open to us the admirable method of divine providence in PETER's *vision*. The time was now come that the apostle should be instructed in God's purpose of calling the gentiles into the church: at the hour of repast, therefore, he had a scenical representation of all kinds of meats, *clean* and *unclean*; of which he was bid to take and eat indifferently and without distinction.† The primary design of this vision, as appears by the context, was to inform him that the *partition-wall* was now broken down, and that the gentiles were to be received into the church of CHRIST. But besides its figurative meaning, it had a literal; and signified, that the distinction of MEATS, as well as of MEN, was now to be abolished. And how necessary such an information was, when he was about to go upon his mission to the gentiles, and was to conciliate their benevolence and good-will, I have observed above. But although this was the principal cause of the distinction of meats into clean and unclean, yet another was certainly for the preservation of health. This institution was of necessity to be observed in the first case, to secure the great object of a *separation*: and in the second case (which is no trivial mark of the wisdom of the institutor) it might be safely and commodiously observed by a people thus *separated*, who were consequently to be for ever confined within the limits of one country. And here the absurdity of this part of Mahometanism evidently betrays itself. Mahomet would needs imitate the law of Moses, as in other things, so in this *the distinction of meats, clean and unclean*; without considering that in a religion formed for conquest,

\* See above.

† Acts x. 10, et seq.



whose followers were to inhabit regions of the most different and contrary qualities, the food which in one climate was hurtful or nutritive, in another changed its properties to their contraries. But to show still more clearly the difference between institutions formed at hazard, and those by divine appointment, we may observe, that when Judaism arrived at its completion in Christianity, the followers of which were the inhabitants of all climes, the distinction between meats clean and unclean was abolished; which, at the same time, serving other great ends explained above, show the dispensation (in the course of which these several changes of the economy took place) to be really divine.

2. As to the DIGNITY and majesty of GOD, that, surely, does not suffer, in his not interfering with his power, to force the will, but permitting it to be drawn and inclined by those *cords of a man*, his natural motives. The dignity of any being consists in observing a conformity between his actions, and his quality, or station. Now it pleased the GOD of heaven to take upon himself the office of supreme magistrate of the Jewish republic. But it is, as we have shown, the part of a wise magistrate to restrain a people, devoted to any particular superstition, by a ritual directly *opposite* in the general to that superstition; and yet *similar* in such particular practices as could not be abused or perverted: because compliance with the popular prejudices in things indifferent, naturally eludes the force of their propensity to things evil. In this wise policy, therefore, the dignity of the GOD of heaven was not impaired.

3. Nor is his PURITY any more affected by this supposed conduct. The rites, in question, are owned to be, in themselves, indifferent; and good or evil only as they are directed to a true or false object.

If it be said "that their carnal nature, or wearisome multiplicity, or scrupulous observance, render them unworthy of the purity and spiritual nature of GOD:" to believers, I reply, that this objection holds equally against these rites in whatever view they themselves are wont to regard them:—to unbelievers; that they forget, or do not understand GOD's primary end, in the institution of the Jewish ritual; which was, to preserve the people from the contagion of those idolatrous practices with which they were surrounded. But nothing could be so effectual to this purpose, as such a ritual. And since the continual proneness of that people to idolatry hath been shown to arise from the inveterate prejudice of *intercommunity of worship*, nothing could be so effectual as the extreme minuteness of their ritual.

If it be said, "that the former abuse of these *indulged rites* to an abominable superstition had made them unfit to be employed in the service of the GOD of purity:" I reply, that there is nothing in the nature of things, to make them *unfit*. That a material substance, materially soiled, stained, and infected, is unfit to approach and be joined to one of great cleanness and purity, is not to be denied. But let us not mistake words for things; and draw a metaphysical conclusion from a metaphorical expression. The soil and stain, in the case before us, is

altogether figurative, that is, unreal. And in truth, the very objection is taken from the command of this very law, to abstain from things polluted by idolatry: but we now understand, that the reason of its so severely forbidding the use of some things that had been abused to superstition, was the very same with its indulging the use of others which had been equally abused; namely, to compass, by the best, though different yet concurring means, that one great end, *the EXTIRPATION OF IDOLATRY*. Notwithstanding this, the law concerning things polluted, like many other of the Jewish observances, hath occasionally been adopted by different sects in the Christian church. Thus our PURITANS, who seem to have had their name from the subject in debate, quarreled with the established use of the cross in baptism, the surplice, and the posture of communicating, because they had been abused to the support of popish superstition.\* I choose this instance, that the men whom I am arguing against, may see the issue of their objection; and that they, from whom the instance is taken, may be shown the unreasonableness of their separation; as far at least as it was occasioned on account of ceremonies.

If, lastly, it be said, “that these rites, which once had been, might be again, abused to superstition; and were therefore *unfit* to be employed in this new service;” I reply, that this is a mistake. For, 1. We go on the supposition, that the Jews were indulged in no practices capable of being so abused. 2. That though they might in themselves be subject to abuse, yet they carried their corrective with them: which was, first, their being intermixed with a vast number of other rites directly opposite to all idolatrous practice; and, secondly, their making part of a burdensome multifarious worship, which would keep the people so constantly employed, as to afford them neither time nor occasion, from the cause in question, of falling into foreign idolatries.

But how can I hope to be heard in defence of this conduct of the GOD of Israel, when even the believing part of those whom I oppose seem to pay so little attention to the reasoning of JESUS himself; who has admirably illustrated and vindicated the wisdom of this conduct, in the familiar parable of *new cloth in old garments*, and *new wine in old bottles*:† which though given in answer to a particular question, was intended to instruct us in this general truth, That it is the way of God to accommodate his institutions to the state, the condition, and contracted habits of his creatures.

But as this notion hath been condemned *ex cathedra*;‡ and the *Ægyptiaca* of HERMAN WITSIUS recommended to the clergy, *as a distinct and solid confutation of Spencer’s book, de legibus Hebræorum ritualibus*;

\* See note Y Y Y Y, at the end of this book.

† And he spake also a parable unto them, No man putteth a piece of a new garment upon an old: if otherwise, then both the new maketh a rent, and the piece that was taken out of the new, agreeth not with the old. And no man putteth new wine into old bottles, else the new wine will burst the bottles, and be spilled, and the bottles shall perish.—Luke v. 36.

‡ Waterland’s Charge to the Clergy of Middlesex.

I shall examine what that learned foreigner hath to say against it. All Witsius's reasoning on this point is to be found in the fourteenth chapter of his third book; which I shall endeavour to pick out, and set in the fairest light.

1. His first argument is, "that it is a dishonouring of God, who has the hearts of men in his power, and can turn them as he pleases, to conceive of him as standing in need of the tricks of crafty politicians; not but, he confesses, that God deals with men as reasonable creatures, and attains his end by fit and adequate means; and in the choice of these means, manifests a wisdom perfectly admirable." Yet, for all this, he says, "we cannot, without the highest contumely, presume to compare the sacred policy of Heaven with the arts and shifts of the beggarly politics of this world."\*—All I find here is only misrepresentation. Spencer never compared the wisdom of God, in the institution of the Jewish republic, to the *tricks* and *shifts* of politicians; but to their *legitimate arts* of government, conducted on the rules of strict morality. And if, as this writer owns, God *dealt with the Israelites as reasonable creatures, and attained his end by fit and adequate means*, he must needs use a wisdom the same in kind, though vastly different in degree, with what we call human policy. But indeed, he seems reconciled to the thing: it is the name only which he dislikes. If his followers say, otherwise, I desire they would explain, in some intelligible manner, their idea of that *wisdom*, in God's civil government of a people, which is not founded in the exercise of almighty power, and is yet different in kind from what we call policy.

2. His second argument is, "that, as God erected a new republic, it was his will that it should *appear* new to the Israelites. Its structure was not to be patched up out of the rubbish of the Canaanitish or Egyptian rites, but was formed according to the model brought down from heaven, and shown to Moses in the mount. Nor was it left to the people to do the least thing in religious matters, on their own head. All was determinately ordered, even to the most minute circumstance; which was so bound upon them, that they could not do, or omit, any the least thing contrary to the law, without becoming liable to immediate punishment."†—If, by this *NEWNESS* of the Jewish republic, be meant, that it

\* Verum enimvero quantamcunque hæc civilis prudentiæ speciem habeant, præter Dei verbum cuncta dicuntur, et humani commenta sunt ingenii, divini numinis majestate haud satis digna. Nimirum cauti catique in seculo mortales Deum ex sua metiuntur indole: arcanasque imperandi artes, et vaframenta politicorum, quæ vix terra probet, cœlo locant. Quasi vero in populo sibi formando firmandoque iis astutiarum ambagibus indigeat is, qui, mortalium corda in manu sua habens, ea, quorsum vult, flectit. Non nego equidem Deum cum hominibus, uti cum creaturis rationalibus, agentem, media adhibere iis persuadendis idonea, inque eorum mediorum dilectu sapientiam ostendere prorsus admirabilem. Attamen Dei sanctissima ista sapientia cum politicorum astibus ac vafratie comparari sine insigni illius contumelia non potest, p. 282.

† Uti revera novam moliebatur rempublicam, ita et novam, qualis erat, videri eam Israelitis voluit. Quippe cujus forma sive species, non ex rituum ruderibus Canaaniticorum aut Ægyptiacorum efficta, sed coëlitus delapsa, Mosi primum in sacro monstrata monte erat, ut ad illud instar cuncta in Israël componerentur. Neque permissum esse populo voluit, ut in religionis negotio vel tantillum suo ageret arbitratu. Omnia determi-

was different in many fundamental circumstances from all other civil policies, so as to vindicate itself to its divine author; I not only agree with him, but, which is more than he and his recommender could do, have proved it. But this sense makes nothing to the point in question. If by **NEWNESS** be meant, that it had nothing in common with any of the neighbouring institutions: to make this credible, he should have proved that God gave them new *hearts*, new *natures*, and a new *world*, along with their new *government*. There is the same ambiguity in what he says of the *appearance* of newness to the Israelites. For it may signify either that the institution appeared so new as to be seen to come from God: or that it appeared so new as not to resemble, in any of its parts, the institutions of men. The first is true, but not to the purpose: the latter is to the purpose, but not true.—From the fact, of the law's *coming down entire from heaven*, he concludes that the genius and prejudices of the Israelites were not at all consulted: from the same fact, I conclude, that they were consulted: which of us has concluded right is left to the judgment of the public. Let me only observe, that ignorant men may compose, and have composed laws in all things opposite to the bent and genius of a people; and they have been obeyed accordingly. But, when divine wisdom frames an institution, we may be sure that no such solecism as that of *putting new wine into old bottles* will ever be committed.—*But the people were not consulted even in the least thing that concerned religious matters.* How is this to be reconciled with their free choice of God for their King; and with his indulgence of their impious clamours afterwards for a vicegerent or another king? This surely *concerned religious matters*, and very capitally too, in a policy where both the societies were perfectly incorporated.—*But every thing was determined even to the most minute circumstances, and to be observed under the severest penalties.* What this makes for his point, I see not. But this I see, that, if indeed there were that indulgence in the law which I contend for, these two circumstances of *minute prescription*, and *severe penalties*, must needs attend it: and for this plain reason; men, when indulged in their prejudices, are very apt to transgress the bounds of that indulgence; it is therefore necessary that those bounds should be minutely marked out, and the transgression of them severely punished.

3. His third argument is—"That no religious rites, formerly used by the Israelites, on their own head, were, after the giving of the law **PERMITTED**, out of regard to habitude; but all things **PRESCRIBED** and **COMMANDED**: and this so precisely, that it was unlawful to deviate a finger's breadth either to the right hand or to the left."\*—This indeed is an observation which I cannot reconcile to the learned writer's usual can-

navit ipse, ad minutissimas usque circumstantias; quibus ita eos alligavit, ut non sine presentaneo vitæ discrimine quicquam vel omittere, vel aliter agere potuerint.—Pp. 282, 283.

\* Nec ulli in religione ritus fuerunt, ab Israëlitis olim sine numine usurpati, quibus propter assuetudinem ut in posterum quoque uterentur lege lata *permisit*: sed *præscripta jussæque* sunt omnia. Et quidem ita distinctè, ut nec transversum digitum dextrorum aut sinistrorum declinare fas fuerit.—Deut. v. p. 283.

dour and ingenuity. He is writing against Spencer's system: and here he brings an argument against it, which he saw in Spencer's book had been brought against Grotius (who was in that system), and which Spencer answers in defence of Grotius. Therefore, as this answer will serve in defence of Spencer himself against Witsius, I shall give it at the bottom of the page.\* For the rest, I apprehend all the force of this third argument to lie only in a quibble on the equivocal use of the word *PERMISSION*, which signifies either a *tacit connivance*, or *legal allowance*. Now Spencer used the word in this latter sense.† But *permission*, in this sense, is very consistent with *every thing's being expressly prescribed and commanded in the law*.

4. His fourth argument proceeds thus,—“But farther God neither *permitted* nor *commanded*, that the Israelites should worship him after the pagan mode of worship. For it had been the same thing to God not to be worshipped at all, as to be worshipped by rites used in the service of demons. And Moses teaches us that the laws of God were very different from what Spencer imagined; as appears from Deut. xii. 30, 31, 32, and from Lev. xviii. 2, 3, 4. Here the reason given of forbidding the vanities of Egypt, is, that Jehovah, who brought them out from amongst that people, will, from henceforth, allow no farther communication with Egypt. Small appearance of any indulgence. And hence indeed it is, that most of the ritual laws are directly levelled against the Egyptian, Zabian, and Canaanitish superstitions, as Maimonides confesseth.”‡—As to what this learned man says, that we may as

\* *Testium meorum agmen claudit Grotius—auctoris verba sunt hæc: “Sicut fines sacrificiorum diversi sunt,—ita et ritus, qui aut ab Hebræis ad alias gentes venere, aut, quod credibilis est, a Syris et Ægyptiis usurpati, correcti sunt ab Hebræis et ab aliis gentibus sine ea emendatione usurpati. Hic in Grotium paulo animosius insurgit auctor nuperus: nam hoc, ait ille, cum impietate et absurditate conjunctum est. Quid ita? Num enim, respondet ille, Deum sanctissima sua instituta, quæ ipse proluxe sancivit, et conscribi in religiosam observationem, per inspirationem numinis sui voluit, credemus ab idololatria Syrorum et Ægyptiorum mutuo sumpsisse? Neque ea pro libitu Ebræi assumpserunt, aut assumpta emendaverunt, sed omnia et singula divinitus in lege præscripta sunt, et juxta ejus normam exactissime observari debuerunt.”* At opinio Grotii multo solidior est quam ut mucrone tam obtuso confodi possit. Non enim asserit ille, vel sanus quispiam, Hebræos ritum ullum a gentibus, pro libitu suo, sumpsisse, vel sumptum pro ingenio suo correxisse. Id unum sub locutione figurata, contendit Grotius, Deum nempe ritus aliquos, usu veteri confirmatos (emendatos tamen, et ignem quasi purgatorium passos) a gentibus accepisse, et Hebræis usurpandos tradidisse; ne populus ille, rituum ethnicorum amore præceps, ad cultum et superstitionem gentilium rueret, ni more plurimum veteri cultum præstare concederetur.—De Leg. Heb. rit. vol. ii. pp. 748, 749.

† See note Z Z Z Z, at the end of this book.

‡ Porro nec *permisit*, nec *jussit* Deus, ut eo se modo Israëlitas colerent, quo modo Deos suos colebant gentiles; veritus scilicet ne per veteres istas vanitates dæmoni cultum deferrent, si minus Deo licuisset. Nam et inanis ille metus erat: quum Deo propemodum perinde sit, sive quis dæmoni cultum deferat, sive per vanitates aliquas veteres Deo cultum deferre præsumat. Et longe aliter Deum instituisse Moses docet, Deut. xiii. 30, 31, 32. adde Levit. xviii. 2, 3, 4. Audin', Spencere, qua ratione ab Ægyptiacis vanitatibus ad suorum observantiam præceptorum Israëlitas Deus avocet? Eo id facit nomine, quod ipse Jehova et Deus ipsorum sit, qui ex Ægypto eos eripiens nihil posthac cum Ægyptiorum vanitatibus commune habere voluit. Hoc profecto non est, id quod tu dicis, allicere eos per umbratiles veterum Ægypti rituum reliquias. Atque hinc factum est ut plurima Deus legibus suis ritualibus inseruerit, Ægyptiorum, Zabiorum, Canaanæorum institutis in *περὶ ἀλλήλων* opposita—Cujus rei varia a nobis exempla alibi allata sunt.—Pp. 283, 284.

well not worship God at all as worship him by rites which have been employed in paganism, we have already overturned the foundation of that fanatical assertion. It is true, the argument labours a little in the hands of SPENCER and MAIMONIDES: while they suppose the devil himself to be the principal architect of pagan superstition: for to believe that God would employ any rites introduced by this evil spirit is indeed of somewhat hard digestion. But that writer, who conceives them to be the inventions of superstitious and designing men only, hath none of this difficulty to encounter. As for the observation, that *most of the ritual laws were levelled against idolatrous superstition*, we are so far from seeing any inconsistency between this truth and that other, “that some of those *ritual laws* did indulge the people in such habituated practices, as could not be abused to superstition,” that, on the contrary, we see a necessary connexion between them. For if severe laws were given to a people against superstitions, to which they were violently bent, it would be very proper to indulge them in some of their favourite habits, so far forth as safely they could be indulged, in order to break the violence of the rest, and to give the body of opposed laws a fuller liberty of working their effect. And if they had laws likewise given them in indulgence, it would be necessary to accompany such laws with the most severe prohibitions of idolatrous practice, and of the least deviation from a tittle of the institute. In a word, laws in direct *opposition*, and laws in *conformity* or compliance, had equally, as we say, the same tendency, and jointly concurred to promote the same end; namely, the preservation of the Israelites from idolatry.\*

5. His fifth argument runs thus.—“Indulgence was so far from being the end of the law, that the ritual was given as a most heavy yoke, to subdue and conquer the ferocity of that stiff-necked people,” Gal. iv. 1, 2, 3. Col. ii. 21.†—By this one would imagine, his adversaries had contended for such a kind of indulgence as arose out of God’s fondness for a chosen people; when indeed, they suppose it to be only such an indulgence as tended the more effectually and expeditiously to subdue and conquer the ferocity of their savage tempers:

- - - - - Quos optimus  
Fallere et effugere est triumphus.

If, therefore, *that* were the END of the law which Witsius himself contends for, we may be assured that this indulgence was one of the MEANS. But the principal and more general *means* being laws in direct opposition, this justified the character the apostle gives of the Jewish ritual, in the two places urged against us.

6. His sixth argument is,—“That the intent of the law was to separate the Israelites, by a partition-wall, as it were, from all other people, which, by its diversity, might set them at a distance from idolaters, and

\* See note A A A A A, at the end of this book.

† Id sibi primum in rituum jussione propositum habuit Deus, ut laboriosis istis exercitiis ferociam populi indomitam, veluti *difficillimo jugo*, subigeret.—Gal. iv. 1, 2, 3.—Col. ii. 21, p. 286.



create an aversion to idolatry.”\*—As to the first effect of the diversity of the Jewish law, the keeping the people distinct; if the learned writer would thereby insinuate, which is indeed to his point, that this distinction could be kept up only while the Jews and other nations had no similar rites; it could never, even by the means he himself prescribes, be long kept up at all. For if the Jews were not indulged in the imitation of any pagan rites, the pagans might indulge themselves in the imitation of the Jewish: as indeed they are supposed to have done in the practice of **CIRCUMCISION**: and so this *partition-wall*, if only built of this untempered mortar of Witsius’s providing, would soon tumble of itself. But the very case here given shows no necessity for ALL the laws to be in opposition, in order to secure a separation; the Jews being as effectually separated from all their neighbours when most of them used the rite of *circumcision*, as when these Jews practised it without a rival. And the reason is this, **CIRCUMCISION** was not given to Abraham and to his race as a mark of distinction and separation from all other people, but, what its constant use made it only fit for, a standing memorial of the covenant between God and Abraham. *And ye shall circumcise, says God, the flesh of your foreskin, and it shall be a TOKEN OF THE COVENANT between me and you*, Gen. xvii. 11. But though it was not given as a mark of separation, yet it effectually answered that purpose: for it preserved the memory, or was the *token*, of a covenant, which necessarily kept them separate and distinct from the rest of mankind. As to the other effect of this diversity of the Jewish law, namely, the creating an aversion to the rites of all other nations; in this, the learned writer hath betrayed his ignorance of human nature. For we always find a more inveterate hatred and aversion, between people of differing religions where several things are alike, than where every thing is diametrically opposite: of which a plain cause might be found in the nature of man, whose heart is so much corrupted by his passions. So that the retaining some innocent Egyptian practices, all accompanied with their provisional opposites, would naturally make the Jews more averse to Egypt, than if they had differed in every individual circumstance.

7. His last argument concludes thus,—“The ceremonies of the Jewish ritual were types and shadows of heavenly things: it is therefore highly improbable that God should choose the impious and diabolic Sacra of Egypt, and the mummary of magic practices, for the shadows of such holy and spiritual matters.”† Thus he ends, as he began, with hard

\* Deinde hæc quoque Dei in rituum jussione intentio fuit, ut eorum observantia, veluti *periculis intergerino*, eos, à gentium communione longe semoveret, Eph. ii. 14. 15.—Quum autem legem præceptorum in ritibus *inimicitias* apostolus vocat, hoc inter cætera innuit, fuisse eam symbolum atque instrumentum divisionis atque odii inter Israël et gentes.—Pp. 287, 288.

† Denique et hic cæremoniarum scopus fuit, ut *rerum spiritualium figuræ* atque *umbræ* essent, et exstaret in iis artificiosa *pictura Christi*, ac gratiæ per ipsum impetrandæ—Non est autem probabile, Deum ex impiis *Ægyptiorum* ac diabolicis sacris, ex veteribus vanitatibus, ex magicæ artis imitamentis, picturas fecisse rerum spiritualium atque cœlestium.—P. 289.

words and soft arguments. No one ever pretended to say that such kind of practices were suffered or imitated in the Jewish ritual. All the indulgence supposed, is of some harmless rite or innocent ornament, such as the *lighting up of lamps, or wearing a linen garment*. And let me ask, whether these things, though done, as we suppose, in conformity to an Egyptian practice, were more unfit to be made a type or shadow of heavenly things, than the erection of *an altar without steps*; done, as they will allow, in direct opposition to pagan practice. But it will be shown under the next head, that the supposition that the Jewish ritual was framed, partly in compliance to the people's prejudices, and partly in opposition to idolatrous superstitions, and, at the same time, typical of a future dispensation, tends greatly to raise and enlarge our ideas of the divine wisdom.

But it is strange, that such a writer as WITSIUS (whatever we may think of the admirers of his argument) should not see, that the character given of the RITUAL LAW by God himself did not imply that it had a mixture at least of no better stuff than Egyptian and other pagan practices.

GOD, by the prophet EZEKIEL, upbraiding the Israelites with their perversity and disobedience, from the time of their going out of Egypt to their entrance into the land of Canaan, speaks to them in this manner.—

Ver. 1. "And it came to pass in the seventh year, in the fifth month, the tenth day of the month, that certain of the elders of Israel came to inquire of the Lord, and sat before me. 2. Then came the word of the Lord unto me, saying, 3. Son of man, speak unto the elders of Israel, and say unto them, Thus saith the Lord God; are ye come to inquire of me? As I live, saith the Lord God, I will not be inquired of by you. 4. Wilt thou judge them, son of man, wilt thou judge them? cause them to know the abominations of their fathers; 5. And say unto them, Thus saith the Lord God; in the day when I chose Israel, and lifted up mine hand unto the seed of the house of Jacob, and made myself known unto them in the land of Egypt, when I lifted up mine hand unto them, saying, I am the Lord your God, 6. In the day that I lifted up mine hand unto them, to bring them forth of the land of Egypt, into a land that I had espied for them, flowing with milk and honey, which is the glory of all lands: 7. Then said I unto them, Cast ye away every man the abominations of his eyes, and defile not yourselves with the idols of Egypt: I am the Lord your God. 8. But they rebelled against me, and would not hearken unto me: they did not every man cast away the abominations of their eyes, neither did they forsake the idols of Egypt: then I said, I will pour out my fury upon them, to accomplish my anger against them, in the midst of the land of Egypt. 9. But I wrought for my name's sake, that it should not be polluted before the heathen, among whom they were, in whose sight I made myself known unto them, in bringing them forth out of the land of Egypt. 10. Wherefore I caused them to go forth out of the land of Egypt, and brought them into the

wilderness. 11. And I gave them my statutes, and showed them my judgments, which if a man do, he shall even live in them. 12. Moreover also, I gave them my sabbaths to be a sign between me and them, that they might know that I am the Lord that sanctify them. 13. But the house of Israel rebelled against me in the wilderness; they walked not in my statutes, and they despised my judgments, which if a man do, he shall even live in them; and my sabbaths they greatly polluted: then I said, I would pour out my fury upon them in the wilderness to consume them. 14. But I wrought for my name's sake, that it should not be polluted before the heathen, in whose sight I brought them out. 15. Yet also I lifted up my hand unto them in the wilderness, that I would not bring them into the land which I had given them, flowing with milk and honey, which is the glory of all lands; 16. Because they despised my judgments, and walked not in my statutes, but polluted my sabbaths; for their heart went after their idols. 17. Nevertheless, mine eye spared them from destroying them, neither did I make an end of them in the wilderness. 18. But I said unto their children in the wilderness, Walk ye not in the statutes of your fathers, neither observe their judgments, nor defile yourselves with their idols. 19. I am the Lord your God; walk in my statutes, and keep my judgments, and do them; 20. And hallow my sabbaths; and they shall be a sign between me and you, that ye may know that I am the Lord your God. 21. Notwithstanding the children rebelled against me: they walked not in my statutes, neither kept my judgments to do them, which if a man do, he shall even live in them; they polluted my sabbaths: then I said, I would pour out my fury upon them, to accomplish my anger against them in the wilderness. 22. Nevertheless, I withdrew mine hand, and wrought for my name's sake, that it should not be polluted in the sight of the heathen, in whose sight I brought them forth. 23. I lifted up mine hand unto them also in the wilderness, that I would scatter them among the heathen, and disperse them through the countries; 24. Because they had not executed my judgments, but had despised my statutes, and had polluted my sabbaths, and their eyes were after their fathers' idols. 25. WHEREFORE I GAVE THEM ALSO STATUTES, THAT WERE NOT GOOD, AND JUDGMENTS WHEREBY THEY SHOULD NOT LIVE; 26. And I polluted them in their own gifts, in that they caused to pass through the fire all that openeth the womb, that I might make them desolate, to the end that they might know that I am the Lord.\*

Could the prophet have possibly given a plainer or more graphical description of the character and genius of the RITUAL LAW, than in those last words? Yet to suit it to theologic purposes, system-makers have endeavoured, in their usual manner, to *interpret it away*, as if it only signified God's suffering the Israelites to fall into idolatry. Now if it were not indulged to these men to make use of any arms they can catch hold of, one should be a little scandalized to find that they had borrowed

\* Chap. xx. ver. 1—26, inclusive.

this forced interpretation from the RABBINS; who holding their law to be perfect, and of eternal obligation, were indeed much concerned to remove this opprobrium from it. Kimchi is recorded for his dexterity in giving it this meaning: though done with much more caution than the Christian writers who took it from him. He supposed that the *statutes not good* were the tributes imposed on the Israelites while in subjection to their pagan neighbours. And this takes off something from the unnatural violence of the expression, of GIVING STATUTES, when understood only to signify the permission of abusing their free-will, when they fell into idolatry.

Now, because the right explanation and proper enforcement of this famous passage will, besides its use in the present argument, serve for many considerable purposes, in the sequel of this work, it may not be time mispent to expose this spurious pilfered interpretation. And, as the last enforcer of it, and the most satisfied with his exploit, the late author of the *Connections between Sacred and Profane History*, takes the honour of it to himself, I shall examine his reasoning at large.

Dr Spencer, and, I suppose, every capable judge before him, understood the *statutes and judgments* in the eleventh verse, to signify the MORAL law; and the *statutes and judgments* in the twenty-fifth verse, to signify the RITUAL. But Dr Shuckford, who always takes a singular pleasure in carping at that faithful servant of common sense, directs the defence of his borrowed novelty, against the great author of *the Reasons of the Ritual Law*, in the following manner—"The persons spoken of, who had the *statutes given* to them, which were *not good*, were not that generation of men to whom the *whole law* was given, but their children or posterity. To this posterity, God made no additions to his laws; the whole being completed in the time of their forefathers. Therefore all he GAVE to them of *statutes not good* was the PERMISSION of falling into the pagan idolatries round about."\* This, I believe, his followers will confess to be his argument, though represented in fewer words, yet with greater force: for a perplexed combination of needless repetitions, which fill two or three large pages, have much weakened and obscured his reasoning.

However, it concludes in these very terms: "And thus it must be undeniably plain, that the prophet could not, by the *statutes not good*, mean any part of the ritual law: for the whole law was given to the fathers of those whom the prophet now speaks of; but *these statutes* were not given to the fathers, but to the descendants. If we go on, and compare the narrative of the prophet with the history of the Israelites, we shall see further, that the *statutes and judgments not good* are so far from being any part of Moses's law, that they were not *given* earlier than the times of the judges;"† i. e. the Israelites then fell into the idolatries, here called (as this learned interpreter will have it) *statutes and judgments* GIVEN.

\* Con. v. p. 159—161.

† Ibid. p. 1'

And now, to canvass a little this decisive argument—**THUS**, says he, *it must be undeniably plain—Thus?* that is, grant him his premises, and the conclusion follows. Without doubt. But the whole context shows that his premises are false.

First then, let it be observed, that the occasion of the prophecy, in the xxth chapter of Ezekiel, was this,—The Jews, by certain of their elders, had, as was usual in their distresses, recourse to the God of Israel for direction and assistance [ver. 1.] On this we are informed [ver. 3,] that the word of the Lord came to Ezekiel, bidding him tell these elders, that God would not be inquired of by them: for that their continued rebellions, from their coming out of Egypt, to that time, had made them unworthy of his patronage and protection. Their idolatries are then recapitulated, and divided into three periods. The **FIRST**, from God's message to them while in Egypt, to their entrance into the promised land—*Thus saith the Lord God, In the day when I chose Israel, and lifted up mine hand unto the seed of Jacob, and made myself known unto them in the land of Egypt, &c.,* and so on, from the fifth to the twenty-sixth verse inclusively. The **SECOND** period contains all the time from their taking possession of the land of Canaan, to their present condition when this prophecy was delivered—*Therefore, son of man, speak unto the house of Israel, and say unto them, Thus saith the Lord God, Yet in this your fathers have blasphemed me, in that they have committed a trespass against me. For WHEN I HAD BROUGHT THEM INTO THE LAND, for the which I lifted up mine hand to give it to them, then they saw every high hill, &c.* and so on, from the twenty-seventh to the thirty-second verse inclusively. The **THIRD** period concerns the iniquities, and the consequent punishment of the present generation, which had now applied to him in their distresses—*As I live, saith the Lord God, surely with a mighty hand, and with a stretched-out arm, and with fury poured out, WILL I RULE OVER YOU, &c.* And this is the subject of what we find between the thirty-third and the forty-fourth verse, inclusively.

This short, but exact analysis of the prophecy, is more than sufficient to overturn Dr Shuckford's system, founded on a distinction between the *fathers* and the *children* in the eighteenth verse, (which is within the first period) as if the *fathers* related to what happened in the wilderness, and the *children*, to what happened under the judges; whereas common sense is sufficient to convince us, that the whole is confined to the two generations, between the exodus from Egypt and the entrance into Canaan.

But the confutation of a foolish system, dishonourable indeed to scripture, is the least of my concern. Such things will die of themselves. My point, in delivering the truths of God as they lie in his word, is to illustrate the amazing wisdom of that dispensation to which they belong. Let me observe therefore, as a matter of much greater moment, that this distinction, which the text hath made between the **FATHERS** and the

CHILDREN, in the first period, during their abode in the wilderness, affords us a very noble instance of that divine *mercy* which extends to *thousands*.

The prophet thus represents the fact. When God brought his chosen people out of Egypt, *he gave them his statutes, and showed them his judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them. Moreover also, he gave them his sabbaths, to be a sign between him and them.\** That is, he gave them the *moral* law of the decalogue, in which there was one *positive* institution,† and no more; but this one, absolutely necessary as *the token of a covenant*, to be a perpetual memorial of it, and, by that means, to preserve them a select people, unmixed with the nations: What followed so gracious and generous a dispensation to the house of Israel? Why, *they rebelled against him in the wilderness; they walked not in his statutes, and they despised his judgments, and his sabbaths they greatly polluted.‡* On which, he threatened to *pour out his fury upon them in the wilderness, and consume them.§* But, in regard to his own glory, lest the heathen, before whom he brought them out of Egypt; should blaspheme, he thought fit to spare them. || Yet so far punished that generation, as never to suffer them to come into the land of Canaan. ¶ Their *children* he spared, that the race might not be consumed as he had first threatened.\*\* And hoping better things of them than of their fathers, he said *to them in the wilderness, Walk ye not in the statutes of your fathers, neither observe their judgments, nor defile yourselves with their idols. Walk in my statutes, and keep my judgments, and do them; and hallow my sabbaths; and they shall be a sign between me and you.††* Here we see the children, or immediate progeny, were again offered, as their sole rule of government, what had been given to, and had been violated by their fathers; namely, the moral law of the decalogue, and the positive institution of the sabbath. Well, and how did they behave themselves on this occasion? Just as their fathers had done before them.—*Notwithstanding* [the repetition of this offered grace] *the children rebelled against me, they walked not in my statutes, they polluted my sabbaths.‡‡*—What followed? The same denunciation which had hung over the fathers, utter destruction *in the wilderness.§§* However, mercy again prevails over judgment; and the same reason for which he spared their fathers, inclines him to spare them; lest his *name should be polluted in the sight of the heathen.||* However, due punishment attended their transgressions, as it had done their fathers'. Their fathers left their bones in the wilderness: but this perverse race being pardoned, as a people, and still possessed of the privilege of a select and chosen nation, were neither to be scattered amongst the heathen, nor to be confined for ever in the wilderness: almighty wisdom therefore ordained that their punishment

\* Ezek. xx. 11, 12.

† The Sabbath.

‡ Ver. 13.

§ Ver. 16.

|| Ver. 14.

¶ Ver. 16.

\*\* Ver. 17.

†† Ver. 18, 19, 20.

‡‡ Ver. 21.

§§ Ib.

||| Ver. 22.



should be such, as should continue them, even against their wills, a separated race, in possession of the land of Canaan. What this punishment was, the following words declare:—*Because they had not executed my judgments, but had despised my statutes, and had polluted my sabbaths, and their eyes were after their fathers' idols. Wherefore I GAVE THEM ALSO STATUTES THAT WERE NOT GOOD, AND JUDGMENTS WHEREBY THEY SHOULD NOT LIVE.\** That is, because they had violated my FIRST system of laws, the DECALOGUE, I added to them [I GAVE THEM ALSO, words which imply the giving as a supplement] my SECOND system, the RITUAL LAW; very aptly characterized (when set in opposition to the MORAL LAW) by *statutes that were not good, and by judgments whereby they should not live.*

What is here observed, opens to us the admirable reasons of both punishments: and why there was a forbearance, or a second trial, before the *yoke of ordinances* was imposed. For we must never forget, that the God of Israel transacted with his people according to the mode of human governors. Let this be kept in mind, and we shall see the admirable progress of the dispensation. God brought the *fathers* out of Egypt, to put them in possession of the land of Canaan. He gave them the MORAL LAW to distinguish them for the worshippers of the true God: and he gave them the POSITIVE LAW of the sabbath to distinguish them for God's peculiar people. These *fathers* proving perverse and rebellious, their punishment was death in the wilderness, and exclusion from that good land which was reserved for their *children*. But then these *children*, in that very wilderness, the scene of their fathers' crime and calamity, fell into the same transgressions. What was now to be done? It was plain, so inveterate an evil could be only checked or subdued by the curb of some severe institution. A severe institution was prepared; and the RITUAL LAW was established. For the first offence, the punishment was *personal*: but when a repetition showed it to be in-bred, and, like the leprosy, sticking to the whole race, the punishment was properly changed to *national*.

How clear, how coherent, is every thing, as here explained! How consonant to reason! How full of divine wisdom! Yet, in defiance of scripture and common sense (which have a closer connexion than the enemies of religion suspect, or than the common advocates of it dare venture to maintain), comes a Doctor, and tells us, that these *children in the wilderness*, of the time of Moses, were *children of the land of Canaan* in the time of the judges; and that the *statutes given* which were *not good*, were pagan idolatries, *not given*, but *suffered*; indeed *not suffered*; because severely, and almost always immediately punished.

What misled our Doctor (whose *connexions*, by what we have seen, appear to be little better than a *chain* of errors) seems to have been this, the *ritual law* was given during the life of the *fathers*, and soon after their transgression mentioned in the 13th verse of this prophecy. So he

\* Ezek. xx. 24, 25.

could not conceive how the prophet should mean that this law was given to the *children*. But he did not consider, that the proper punishment of the *fathers* was extinction in the wilderness: the proper punishment of the *children*, who were reserved to possess the holy land, was the infliction of the RITUAL LAW.

The Doctor, however, notwithstanding all his complacency in this his adopted system, yet appears conscious of its want of strength; for he owns that an objection may be made to it from the following words of the prophecy—*But I said unto their children IN THE WILDERNESS, Walk ye not in the statutes of your fathers—walk in my statutes—and hallow my sabbaths.\** And again, of these *children—then I said I would pour out my fury upon them, to accomplish mine anger against them IN THE WILDERNESS.†* And again,—*I lifted up my hand unto them also IN THE WILDERNESS.‡* “Here,” says the learned Doctor, “the prophet may SEEM TO HINT, that God’s anger against the children was *while they were in the wilderness.*”—P. 169.

*May seem to hint!* The Doctor must be immoderately fond of precise expression, when he esteems this to be no more than a *hint* or doubtful intimation.

But MOSES having omitted to tell us, that these children did indeed play these pranks *in the wilderness*, he will not take a later prophet’s word for it. *As Moses*, says the Doctor, *wrote before Ezekiel prophesied; his prophecy could not alter facts.* It will be more than the Doctor deserves, if the freethinker neglects to reply, that both the prophet and the Doctor here *seem to hint*; the former, *that God’s anger against the children was while they were in the wilderness*; the latter, that Moses and Ezekiel contradict one another. But to let this pass.—*Prophecy*, he says, *could not alter facts*; by which he means that prophecy, any more than the author of prophecy, could not make that to be undone which was already done. Who ever thought it could? But might not Ezekiel’s prophecy explain facts, and relate them too, which a former prophet had omitted? However, Ezekiel is not the only one who informs us of this fact. AMOS upbraids these sojourners *in the wilderness* with a still more general apostacy. “Have ye offered unto me sacrifices and offerings IN THE WILDERNESS forty years, O house of Israel? But ye have borne the tabernacle of your Moloch and Chiun, your images, the star of your god, which ye made to yourselves.”§ Now if the Israelites committed idolatry all the time they sojourned in the wilderness, the crime necessarily included the CHILDREN with the *fathers*.

The Doctor’s second expedient to evade the determinate evidence of the text is as ridiculous as the first is extravagant. The text says,—*I will pour out my fury upon them, to accomplish mine anger against them IN THE WILDERNESS.*—“These words, *in the wilderness*,” says the acute expositor, “do not hint the place where the *anger* was to be *accomplished*, but rather refer to *anger*, and suggest the *anger* to be, as if we might

\* Ezek. xx. 18, 19, 20.

† Ver. 21.

‡ Ver. 23.

§ Amos v. 3, 26.

almost say in English, the WILDERNESS-ANGER."—P. 171.—If the Doctor's rhetoric is to be enriched with this new phrase, I think his logic should not be denied the benefit of a like acquisition, of which it will have frequent use, and that is, WILDERNESS-REASONING. And so much for this learned solution.

But the absurdity of supposing with these men, that the words, *I gave them also statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live*, might signify, their *taking* (without giving) *Baal and Ashtaroth for their gods*, (p. 163,) is best exposed by the prophet himself, as his words lie in the text. Consider then the case of these rebels. God's first intention (as in the other case of their father's rebellion) is represented to be the renouncing them for his people, and scattering them amongst the nations. *Then I said, I would pour out my fury upon them, to accomplish my anger against them in the wilderness.\** But his mercy prevails—*Nevertheless I withdrew mine hand, and wrought for my name's sake, that it should not be polluted in the sight of the heathen, in whose sight I brought them forth.†* In these two verses, we see, that the punishment intended, and the mercy shown, are delivered in general; without the circumstances of the punishment, or the conditions of the mercy. The three following verses, in the mode of the eastern composition, which delights in repetition, informs us more particularly of these *circumstances*, which were DISPERSION, &c. and of these *conditions*, which were the imposition of a *ritual law*—*I lifted up my hand unto them also in the wilderness, that I would SCATTER THEM amongst the heathen, and DISPERSE THEM through the countries; because they had not executed my judgments, but had despised my statutes, and had polluted my sabbaths, and their eyes were after their fathers' idols.‡* Here, the intended punishment is explained specifically, that is, with its circumstances.—The mercy follows; and the terms, on which it was bestowed, are likewise explained—*Wherefore I gave them also statutes that were NOT GOOD, and judgments whereby they should NOT LIVE.§* And now the beggarly shifts of the new interpretation appear in all their nakedness. Whatever is meant by *statutes not good*, the end of giving them, we see, was to preserve them a peculiar people to the Lord; for the punishment of dispersion was remitted to them. But if by *statutes not good* be meant the permitting them to fall into idolatries, God is absurdly represented as decreeing an *end* (the keeping his people separate); and at the same time providing *means* to defeat it: for every lapse into idolatry was a step to their dispersion and *utter consumption*, by absorbing them into the nations. We must needs conclude therefore, that, by STATUTES NOT GOOD is meant the RITUAL LAW, the only means of attaining that end of mercy—the preserving them a separate people.

Who now can choose but smile to hear our learned expositor quoting these words of the book of Judges,—*The CHILDREN of Israel did evil in*

\* Ezek. xx. 21.

† Ver. 22.

‡ Ver. 23, 24.

§ Ver. 25.

*the sight of the Lord, and followed other gods, of the gods of the people that were round about them, and provoked the Lord to anger, and served Baal and Ashtaroth;*\* and then gravely adding,—“So that here the scene opens which Ezekiel alludes to; and accordingly, what Ezekiel mentions as the punishment of these wickednesses began now to come upon them.”—P. 163.

However, it must be owned, that if words alone could shake the solidity of the interpretation I have here given, these which immediately follow the contested passage of *statutes not good*, would be enough to alarm us—*And I polluted them*, says the text, *in their own gifts, in that they caused to pass through the fire all that openeth the womb, that I might make them desolate, to the end that they might know that I am the Lord.*† The common interpretation of which is this: “I permitted them to fall into that wicked inhumanity, whereby they were polluted and contaminated, in making their children to pass through the fire to Moloch, in order to root them out and utterly to destroy them.”

Dr Spencer (who follows the general sense of the prophecy which I have here explained and supported) appeared but too sensible how much this text stood in his way. He endeavours therefore to show, that “it relates to God’s rejecting the first-born of the Israelites from the priesthood, and appointing the tribe of Levi to the sacred office in their stead;” and that, therefore, the verse should be rendered thus, *I pronounced them polluted in their gifts* [i. e. unfit to offer me any oblation], *in that I passed by all that openeth the womb* [i. e. the first-born] *in order to humble them, that they might know that I am the Lord.* And this rendering may be the right, for any thing Dr Shuckford has to oppose to the contrary (pp. 168, 169); the main of which is, what has been already confuted (or rather, what the very terms, in which the assertion is advanced, do themselves confute), namely, that the *children in the wilderness* were not the immediate issue of those who died *in the wilderness*, but a remote posterity. As for his Hebrew criticism, that the word *mass*, and not *nabar*, would probably have been used by the prophet, if *rejecting from the priesthood* had been the sense intended by him (p. 169), that is the slenderest of all reasoning, even though it had been applied to a rhetorician by profession, and in a language very copious, and perfectly well understood: how evanid is it therefore, when applied to a prophet under the impulse of inspiration, and speaking in the most scanty of all languages; the small knowledge of which is to be got from one single volume of no large bulk, and conveyed in a mode of writing subject to perpetual equivocations and ambiguities! From the mischiefs of which, God in his good providence preserved us by the Septuagint translation, made while the Hebrew was a living language, and afterwards authenticated by the recognition of the inspired writers of the New Testament.

However, the truth is, that this explanation of the learned Spencer

\* Judges ii. 11, 12, 13.

† Ver. 26.

must appear forced, even though we had no better to oppose to it: but when there is a better at hand, which not only takes off all the countenance which this 26th verse affords to Dr Shuckford's interpretation of *statutes not good*, but so exactly quadrates with the sense here given, that it completes and perfects the narrative, we shall be no longer frightened with its formidable look.

To understand then what it aims at, we must consider the context as it has been explained above. The 21st and 22d verses (it hath been shown) contain God's purposes of *judgment* and of *mercy* in general. The 23d, 24th, and 25th, explain in what the intended *judgment* would have consisted, and how the prevailing *mercy* was qualified. The Israelites were to be pardoned; but to be kept under, by the yoke of a ritual law, described only in general by the title of *statutes not good*. The 26th verse opens the matter still further, and explains the nature and genius of that yoke, together with its effects, both salutary and baleful. The *salutary*, as it was a barrier to idolatry, the most enormous species of which was that of *causing their children to pass through the fire to Moloch*: the *baleful*, as it brought on their *desolation* when they became deprived of the temple worship. But to be more particular—I *polluted them in their own gifts*. By *gifts* I understand that homage (universally expressed, in the ancient world, by rites of sacrifice) which a people owed to their God. And how were these *gifts polluted*? By a multifarious ritual, which, being opposed to the idolatries of the nations, was prescribed in reference to those idolatries; and, consequently, was incumbered with a thousand ceremonies, respecting the choice of the animal; the qualities and purifications of the sacrificers; and the direction and efficacy of each specific offering. This account of their *pollution*, by such a ritual, exactly answers to the character given of that ritual, [*statutes not good, &c.*] in the text in question. Then follows the reason of God's thus *polluting them in their own gifts*—*in that* [or, because that] *they caused to pass through the fire all that openeth the womb*—i. e. the *polluting* ritual was imposed as a PUNISHMENT FOR, as well as BARRIER TO their idolatries; characterized under this most enormous and horrid of them all, the causing of their children *to pass through the fire to Moloch*. Then follows the humiliating circumstance of this ritual yoke—that *I might make them desolate*, i. e. that they should, even from the nature of that ritual, be deprived, when they most wanted it, of their nearest intercourse with their God and king. A real state of *desolation*! To understand which, we are to consider, that at the time this prophecy was delivered, the Jews, by their accumulated iniquities, were accelerating, what doubtless the prophet had then in his eye, their punishment of the seventy years' captivity. Now, by the peculiar constitution of the ritual law, their religion became, as it were, local; it being unlawful to offer sacrifice but in the temple of Jerusalem only. So that when they were led captive into a foreign land, the most solemn and essential intercourse between God and them

(*the morning and evening sacrifice*) was entirely cut off: and thus, by means of the ritual law, they were emphatically said to be *made desolate*. The verse concludes in telling us, for what end this punishment was inflicted—that *they might know that I am the Lord*. How would this appear from the premises? Very evidently. For if, while they were in captivity, they were under an interdict, and their religion in a state of suspension, and yet that they were to continue God's select people (for the scope of the whole prophecy is to show, that, notwithstanding all their provocations, God still *worked for his name's sake*), then, in order to be restored to their religion, they were to be reinstated in their own land: which work, prophecy always describes as the utmost manifestation of God's power. Their redemption from the *Assyrian* captivity particularly, being frequently compared, by the prophets, to that of the *Egyptian*. From hence therefore all men *might know* and collect, that the God of Israel *was the Lord*.

This famous text then, we see, may be thus aptly paraphrased—*And I polluted them in their own gifts, in that they caused to pass through the fire all that openeth the womb, that I might make them desolate, to the end that they might know that I am the Lord*; i. e. “I loaded the religious worship due to me, as their God and King, with a number of operose ceremonies, to punish their past, and to oppose to their future, idolatries; the most abominable of which was the making their children to pass through the fire to Moloch: and further, that I might have the ceremonial law always at hand as an instrument for still more severe punishments, when the full measure of their iniquities should bring them into captivity in a strange land, I so contrived, by the very constitution of their religion, that it should then remain under an interdict, and all stated intercourse be cut off between me and them: from which evil, would necessarily arise this advantage, an occasion to manifest my power to the gentiles, in bringing my people again, after a due time of penance, into their own land.”

Here we see, the text, thus expounded, connects and completes the whole narrative, concerning the imposition of the ritual law, and its nature and consequences, from the 21st to the 26th verse inclusively: and opens the history of it by due degrees, which the most just and elegant compositions require. We are first informed of the threatened judgment, and of the prevailing mercy in general:—we are then told the specific nature of that judgment, and the circumstance attending the accorded mercy;—and lastly, the prophet explains the nature and genius of that attendant circumstance; together with its adverse as well as benignant effects.

I have now deprived the CONNECTER of all his arguments but one, for this strange interpretation of *statutes not good*; and that one is, “that the worshippers of *Baal* and *Ashtaro*th, in the book of Judges, and the slaves to *statutes not good* in the prophet Ezekiel, having the common name of CHILDREN, must needs be the same individuals:” but this I make a conscience of taking from him.



Yet such confidence has the learned person in his goodly exposition, that he concludes his reasoning against the obvious sense of the prophecy, in this extraordinary manner—Dr Spencer imagined, this text alone was sufficient to support his hypothesis; but I cannot but think, if what has been offered be fairly considered, NO HONEST WRITER can ever cite it again for that purpose.”—P. 167.

What is Dr Spencer's hypothesis? Just this and no other, that *Moses gave the ritual law to the Jews because of the hardness of their hearts*;\* the very hypothesis of Jesus Christ himself.

But the CONNECTER thinks, that, *if what he has offered be fairly considered*, NO HONEST WRITER can ever cite it again for that purpose. This smells strong of the bigot. One can hardly think one's self in the closet of a learned and sober divine; but rather in some wild conventicle of Methodists or Hutchinsonians; whose criticisms are all revelations: which, though you cannot embrace but at the expense of COMMON SENSE, you are not allowed to question without renouncing COMMON HONESTY.

I have *fairly considered* (as the *Connector* expects his reader should do) *what he has offered against Dr Spencer's hypothesis*: and if there be any truth in the conclusions of human reason, I think a writer may go on very advantageously, as well as with a good conscience, to defend *that hypothesis*. How such a writer shall be qualified by bigots, is another point. Many an HONEST MAN, I am persuaded, will still adhere to Dr *Shuckford's hypothesis*; and with the same good faith, with which he himself supported it; for though his charity will not allow that title to those who dissent from him, yet God forbid, that I should not give it to him.

But it is now time to proceed to the *third period* of THIS prophecy. For the principal design of this work is to vindicate and illustrate sacred scripture, though in my progress I be still obliged, from time to time, to stop a little, while I remove the most material obstructions which lie in my way.

This prophecy hitherto contains a declaration of the various punishments inflicted on the rebellious Israelites, from the time of Moses's mission to the preaching of Ezekiel. We have shown that their punishment in the first period, was *death in the wilderness*: their punishment in the second period, was *the fastening on their necks the yoke of the ritual law*.

Their punishment in the *third period* is now to be considered: and we shall see that it consisted in rendering the yoke of the ritual law still more galling, by withdrawing from them that EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE, which once rewarded the studious observers of it, with many temporal blessings. The punishment was dreadful; and such, indeed, the prophet describes it to have been. But we may be assured, their crimes deserved it, as having risen in proportion with it; and this like-

\* Matt. xix. 8.

wise, he tells us, was the case. Their idolatries were at first, and so, for some time, they continued to be, the mixing pagan worship with the worship of the God of Israel. But though they had so often smarted for this folly, they were yet so besotted with the gods of the nations, *the stocks and stones of the high places*, that their last progress in impiety was the project of casting off the God of Israel entirely, at least as their TUTELAR God, and of mixing themselves amongst the nations. They had experienced, that the *God of Israel* was a JEALOUS GOD, who would not share his glory with another; and they hoped to avoid his wrath by renouncing their covenant with him, and leaving him at liberty to choose another people. To such a degree of impiety and madness was this devoted nation arrived, when Ezekiel prophesied at the eve of their approaching captivity. All this will be made plain, by what follows.

We have seen their behaviour in the two former periods; in EGYPT, and in the WILDERNESS. The third begins with a description of their manners, when they had taken possession of the land of CANAAN.

Ver. 27, 28. "Son of man, speak unto the house of Israel, and say unto them, Thus saith the Lord God; yet in this your fathers have blasphemed me, in that they have committed a trespass against me. For when I had brought them into the land, for the which I lifted up my hand to give it to them, then they saw every high hill, and all the thick trees, and they offered there their sacrifices, and there they presented the provocation of their offering."

This was their continual practice, even to the delivery of this prophecy; at which time, their enormities were come to the height, we just mentioned; to contrive in their hearts to renounce the God of Israel, altogether. But being surrounded with calamities, and a powerful enemy at their door, they were willing to procure a present relief from him, whom they had so much offended; though at this very instant, they were projecting to offend still more. The singular impudence of this conduct was, apparently, the immediate occasion of this famous prophecy; as we shall now see.

Ver. 30, 31. "Wherefore say unto the house of Israel, Thus saith the Lord God; are ye polluted after the manner of your fathers? and commit ye whoredom after their abominations? For when ye offer your gifts, when ye make your sons to pass through the fire; ye pollute yourselves with all your idols EVEN TO THIS DAY: and shall I be inquired of by you, O house of Israel? As I live, saith the Lord God, I will not be inquired of by you."

That this recourse to the God of their fathers was only a momentary impulse, arising from their pressing necessities, is evident from what immediately follows; the mention of that specific crime which brought upon them the punishment annexed to the third period.—

Ver. 32—37. "AND THAT WHICH COMETH INTO YOUR MIND, SHALL NOT BE AT ALL, THAT YE SAY, WE WILL BE AS THE HEATHEN, AS THE FAMILIES OF THE COUNTRIES, TO SERVE WOOD AND STONE. As I live,

with the Lord God, Surely with a mighty hand, and with a stretched-out arm, AND WITH FURY POURED OUT, WILL I RULE OVER YOU. And I WILL BRING YOU OUT FROM THE PEOPLE, AND WILL GATHER YOU OUT OF THE COUNTRIES WHEREIN YE ARE SCATTERED, with a mighty hand, and with a stretched-out arm, AND WITH FURY POURED OUT. And I will bring you into the WILDERNESS OF THE PEOPLE, and there will I plead with you face to face. Like as I pleaded with your fathers in the *wilderness* of the land of Egypt, so will I plead with you face to face."

By all this it appears, that the Jews of this time were little anxious to avoid their approaching captivity, denounced and threatened by all their prophets. What they wanted was a light and easy servitude, which might enable them to mingle with, and at last to be lost amongst the nations; like the ten tribes which had gone before them. Against the vileness of these hopes is this part of the prophecy directed. God assures them, he will bring them out of the *Assyrian* captivity, as he had done out of the *Egyptian*; but not in mercy, as that deliverance was procured, but in judgment, and *with fury poured out*. And as he had brought their fathers into the *wilderness of the land* of Egypt, so would he bring them into the WILDERNESS OF THE PEOPLE, that is, the land of Canaan, which they would find, on their return to it, was become desert and uninhabited: and therefore elegantly called, the *wilderness of the people*. But what now was to be their reception, on their second possession of the promised land? A very different welcome from the first. God indeed leads them here again with a *mighty hand and a stretched-out arm*; and it was to take possession; but not, as at first, of a *land flowing with milk and honey*, but of a prison, a house of correction where they were to pass under the rod, and to remain in bonds.

Ver. 37. "AND I WILL CAUSE YOU," says God, "TO PASS UNDER THE ROD, AND I WILL BRING YOU INTO THE BOND OF THE COVENANT."

Words which strongly and elegantly express subjection to a ritual law, after the extraordinary providence, which so much alleviated the yoke of it, was withdrawn: and we find it withdrawn soon after their return from the captivity.—But, the prophecy, carrying on the comparison to the Egyptian deliverance, adds—

Ver. 38. "And I will purge out from amongst you the rebels, and them that transgress against me: I will bring them forth out of the country where they sojourn, and they shall not enter into the land of Israel."

These *rebels*, like their FATHERS *in the wilderness*, were indeed to be brought out of captivity, but were never to enjoy the promised land; and the rest, like the CHILDREN *in the wilderness*, were to have the yoke of the ritual law still made more galling. And thus the COMPARISON is completed.

These were the three different punishments inflicted in these three different periods. The first PERSONAL; the second and the third NATIONAL;

only the third made heavier than the second, in proportion to their accumulated offences.

But as, in the height of God's vengeance on the sins of this wretched people, the distant prospect always terminated in a mercy; so, with a mercy, and a promise of better times, the whole of this prophetic scene is closed; in order that the NATION to which it is addressed, should, however criminal they were, not be left in an utter state of desperation, but be afforded some shadow of repose, in the prospect of future peace and tranquillity. For now, turning again to these *temporary inquirers* after God, the prophecy, addresses them, in this manner:

Ver. 39. "As for you, O house of Israel, thus saith the Lord God; Go ye, serve ye every one his idols, and hereafter also, if ye will not hearken unto me: but pollute you my holy name no more with your gifts, and with your idols."

As much as to say, Go on no longer in this divided worship; halt no more between two opinions; if Baal be your god, serve him; if the God of Israel, then serve him only. The reason follows:

Ver. 40—43. "*For in mine holy mountain—there shall all the house of Israel—serve me. There will I accept them, and there will I require your offerings—with all your holy things—and there shall ye remember your ways, and all your doings wherein ye have been defiled. AND YE SHALL LOTHE YOURSELVES IN YOUR OWN SIGHT.*"—i. e. "For then, a new order of things shall commence. My people, after their return from the captivity, shall be as averse to idolatry, as till then they were prone and disposed to it: and the memory of their former follies shall *make them lothe themselves* in their own sight." And this, indeed, was the fact, as we learn by their whole history, from their restoration to their own land, quite down to the present hour.

The idea of MERCY is naturally attached to that of repentance and reformation; and with MERCY the prophecy concludes.

Ver. 44. "*And ye shall know that I am the Lord, when I have wrought with you for my name's sake, not according to your wicked ways, nor according to your corrupt doings, O ye house of Israel, saith the Lord God.*"

The reader hath now a full explanation of the whole prophecy: whereby he may understand how justly it hath acquired its eminent celebrity. Its general subject being no less than the fate and fortunes of the Jewish republic; of which the several parts are so important, so judiciously chosen, so elegantly disposed, and so nobly enounced, that we see the divinity of the original in every step we take.

But to return to the peculiar purpose of this comment,—which is given to show, that God himself has delivered the ritual law of the Jews, under the character of *statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live.*\*

The use I would make of it against WITSIUS, with whom I have been

\* See note B B B B B, at the end of this book.

concerned, is to show, that if such be the genius of the ritual law, it is no wonder it should have, in its composition, an alloy of no better materials, than Egyptian and other pagan ceremonies; cleansed indeed, and refined from their immoralities and superstitions: and conversely, that a composition of such an alloy was very aptly characterized by *statutes not good, and judgments whereby they should not live.*

Thus having before seen what little force there was in Witsius's arguments, and now understanding how little reason he had to be so tenacious of his opinion; the reader may think he scarce merited the distinction of being recommended to a learned body as the very bulwark of the faith, in this matter. But let what will become of his arguments, he deserves honour for a much better thing than orthodox disputation: I mean, for an honest turn of mind, averse to imputing odious designs to his adversaries, or dangerous consequences to their opinions.\*

On the whole then, we conclude, both against DEIST and BELIEVER, that the ritual law's being made in reference to Egyptian superstition is no reasonable objection to the divinity of its original.

But the deist may object, "That, though indeed, when the Israelites were once deeply infected with that superstition, such a ritual might be necessary to stop and cure a growing evil; yet as the remedy was so multiplex, burdensome, and slavish, and therefore not in itself eligible, how happened it, that God, who had this family under his immediate and peculiar care, should suffer them to contract an infection which required so inconvenient and impure a remedy?"

I have been so accustomed to find the strongest objections of infidelity end in the stronger recommendation of revealed religion, that I have never been backward, either to produce what they have said, when they write their best, or to imagine what they would say, if they knew how to write better. To this therefore I reply, that the promise God had made to Abraham, to give his posterity the land of Canaan, could not be performed till that family was grown strong enough to take and keep possession of it. In the mean time, therefore, they were necessitated to reside amongst idolaters. And we have seen, although they resided unmixed, how violent a propensity they ever had to join themselves to the gentile nations, and to practise their manners. God, therefore, in his infinite wisdom brought them into Egypt, and kept them there during this period; the only place where they could remain, for so long a time, safe and unconfounded with the natives; the ancient Egyptians being, by numerous institutions, forbidden all fellowship with strangers; and bearing, besides, a particular aversion to the profession † of this family. Thus we see, that the natural disposition of the Israelites, which, in Egypt, occasioned their superstitions; and, in consequence, the necessity of a burdensome ritual, would, in any other country, have absorbed them in gentilism, and confounded them with idolaters. From this ob-

\* See note C C C C C, at the end of this book.

† The profession of shepherds.

jection, therefore, nothing comes but a new occasion to adore the footsteps of eternal wisdom in his dispensations to his chosen people.

[IV.] THE LAST PROPOSITION is, *That the very circumstances of Moses's Egyptian learning, and the laws instituted in compliance to the people's prejudices, and in opposition to Egyptian superstitions, are a strong confirmation of the divinity of his mission.\**

EGYPT was the great school of legislation for the rest of mankind. And so revered were her oracular dictates, that foreign lawgivers, who went thither for instruction, never ventured to deviate from those fundamental principles of government which she prescribed. In RELIGION, particularly, which always made a part of civil policy, they so closely adhered to Egyptian maxims, that posterity, as we have seen, were deceived into an opinion that the Greek lawgivers had received their very gods from thence.

What therefore must we think had been the case of a native of Egypt: bred up from his infancy in Egyptian wisdom, and, at length, become a member of their legislative body? would such a man, when going to frame a civil policy and religion (though we suppose nothing of that natural affection, which the best and wisest men have ever borne for their own country institutions), be at all inclined to deviate from its fundamental principles of government?

Yet here we have in Moses, according to our adversaries' account of him, a mere human lawgiver, come fresh out of the schools of Egypt, to reduce a turbulent people into society, acting on fundamental principles of religion and policy directly opposite to all the maxims of Egyptian wisdom.

One of the chief of which, in the RELIGIOUS POLICY of Egypt, was, that the government of the world had, by the supreme Ruler of the universe, been committed into the hands of subordinate, local, tutelary deities; amongst whom the several regions of the earth were shared out and divided: that these were the true and proper objects of all public and popular religion; and that the knowledge of the ONE TRUE GOD, the Creator of all things, was highly dangerous to be communicated to the people; but was to be secreted, and shut up in their MYSTERIES; and in them, to be revealed only occasionally, and to a few; and those few, the wise, the learned, and ruling part of mankind.† Now, in plain defiance and contempt of this most venerable principle, our Egyptian lawgiver rejects these doctrines of inferior deities, as impostures, and *lying vanities*; and boldly and openly preaches up to the people, the belief of the ONE TRUE GOD, the Creator, as the sole object of the religion of all mankind.‡

Another fundamental maxim, in the RELIGIOUS POLICY of Egypt, was to propagate, by every kind of method, the doctrine of A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS; as the necessary support of all religion and government. Here again, our lawgiver (no deist can tell why §)

\* See p. 686 of vol. i. † See an account of these MYSTERIES in the first volume.

‡ See note D D D D D, at the end of this book.

§ See *View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy*, vol. xii. letter iv.



forakes all his own principles; intentionally rejects a support, which was as really beneficial to mankind, in all his interests, as the other notion, of inferior deities, was but thought to be; entirely omits to mention it in his institutes of law and religion; and is studiously silent in all those particulars which lead to the propagation of it.\* But of this, more at large, in a future part of this volume.

Again, it was of the CIVIL POLICY of Egypt to prefer an hereditary despotic monarchy to all other forms of government: Moses, on the contrary, erects a THEOCRACY on the free choice of the people; to be administered aristocratically.

Add to all this, that his deviation from the policy of Egypt was encountering the strongest prejudices of his people; who were violently carried away to all the customs and superstitions of that policy.

And now let an ingenuous deist weigh these instances, with many more that will easily occur to him, and then fairly tell us his sentiments. Let him try, if he can think it was at all likely, that Moses, a mere human lawgiver, a native of Egypt, and learned in all its political wisdom, should, in the formation of a civil policy, for such a people as he undertook to govern, act directly contrary to all the fundamental principles in which he had been instructed?

I. To this perhaps it may be said,—“That Moses well understood the folly and falsehood of inferior gods:—that he did not believe the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments;—that he was too honest to employ fraud;—that his love to his people made him indisposed to an hereditary despotic monarchy;—and that the theologic principles of Egypt led him to the invention of a THEOCRACY.” To all this, I answer,

1. As to *his seeing the falsehood of inferior gods*.—So did many other of the old lawgivers, instructed in Egyptian policy; yet being taught to think polytheism useful to society, they did not, for all that, the less cultivate their abominable idolatry.

2. As to *his not believing a future state, and his honesty in not teaching what he did not believe*.—Such objectors forget that they have already made him a fraudulent impostor, in his pretension to a divine employment. Now if the end of civil government made him fraudulent in that instance, it would hardly suffer him to be scrupulous in this; even allowing the extravagance of this fancy, that he *did not believe* a future state; because, as hath been proved at large,† the propagation of this doctrine is, and was always believed to be, the firmest support of civil government: but of this more at large, hereafter.

3. With regard to *his concern for the happiness of his people*;—I will readily allow this to be very consistent with heroic or legislative fraud. But this happiness the ancient lawgivers thought best procured by the Egyptian mode of government: and indeed they had EXPERIENCE, the best guide in public matters. For the excellent education which the

\* See note E E E E E, at the end of this book.

† See the first volume.

Egyptians gave their kings, in training them up to the love of the public, and high veneration for the laws, prevented the usual abuse of power; and gave to that people the longest and most uninterrupted course of prosperity that any nation ever enjoyed.\* It is no wonder, therefore, that this should make MONARCHY, as it did, the first favourite form of government, in all places civilized by the aid of Egypt.

4. But, *the theologic principles of Egypt led Moses to the invention of a THEOCRACY.*—Without doubt those principles, as we shall see hereafter, occasioned its reception amongst the Hebrews. But there is one circumstance in the case that shows its invention must have been of God, and not of Moses. For the ground of its easy reception was the notion of local tutelary deities. But this notion, Moses, in preaching up the doctrine of the one true God, entirely took away. This, indeed, on a supposition of a DIVINE LEGATION, has all the marks of admirable wisdom; but supposing it to be Moses's own contrivance, we see nothing but inconsistency and absurdity. He forms a design, and then defeats it; he gives with one hand, and he takes with the other.

II. But it may be farther objected,—“That, as it was the intention of Moses to separate these people from all others, he therefore gave them those cross and opposite institutions, as a barrier to all communication.” To this I answer,

1. That were it indeed God, and not Moses, who projected this SEPARATION, the reason would be good. Because the immediate end of God's *separation* was twofold, to keep them unmixed; and to secure them from idolatry: and such end could not be effected but by opposing those fundamental principles of Egypt, with the doctrine of ONE God, and the institution of a THEOCRACY. But then this, which would be a good reason, will become a very bad objection. Our deist is to be held to the question. He regards Moses as a mere human lawgiver. But the sole end which such a one could propose by a *separation*, was to preserve his people pure and unmixed. Now this could be effected only by laws which kept them at home, and discouraged and prevented all foreign commerce: and these, by the same means, bringing on general poverty, there would be small danger of their being much frequented, while they laboured under that contagious malady. This we know was the case of Sparta. It was their lawgiver's chief aim to keep them distinct and unmixed. But did he do this by institutions which crossed the fundamental principles of the religion and policy of Greece? By no means. They were all of them the same. The method he employed was only to frame such laws as discouraged commerce and foreign intercourse. And these proved effectual. I the rather instance in the Spartan, than in any other government, because the end, which Moses and Lycurgus pursued in common, (though for different purposes) of keeping their people *separate*, occasioned such a likeness in several parts of the two institutions, as was, in my opinion, the real origin of that tradition mentioned

\* See note F F F F F, at the end of this book.

in the first book of Maccabees, That there was a family relation between the two people.

2. But, secondly, as it is very true, that the mere intention of keeping a people separate and unmixed (which is all a human lawgiver could have in view) would occasion laws in opposition to the customs of those people, with whom, from their vicinity to, or fondness for them, they were in most danger of being confounded; so, when I insisted on those Anti-Egyptian institutions, which I gave as a certain proof of Moses's *divine legation*, I did not reckon, in my account, any of that vast number of ritual and municipal laws, which Manetho confesses, were *given principally in opposition to Egyptian customs*.\* This a mere separation would require; but this is a very different thing from the opposition to FUNDAMENTALS, here insisted on; which a mere separation did not in the least require.

III. But it may be still further urged, "That resentment for ill usage might dispose Moses to obliterate the memory of the place they came from, by a policy contrary to the *fundamental* institutions of Egypt." Here again our objecting deist will forget himself. 1. He hath urged a CONFORMITY in the LAW to Egyptian rites; and this, in order to discredit Moses's *divine legation*: and we have allowed him his fact. Whatever it was therefore that engaged Moses to his general OPPOSITION, it could not be resentment: for that had certainly prevented all kind of conformity or similitude.

2. But, secondly, such effects of civil resentment, the natural manners of men will never suffer us to suppose. We have in ancient history many accounts of the settlement of new colonies, forced injuriously from home by their fellow-citizens. But we never find that this embittered them against their country-institutions. On the contrary, their close adherence to their native customs, notwithstanding all personal wrongs, has in every age enabled learned men to find out their original, by strong characteristic marks of relation to the mother city. And the reason is evident: INNATE LOVE OF ONE'S COUNTRY, whose attractive power, contrary to that of natural bodies, is strongest at a distance; and INVETERATE MANNERS, which stick closest in distress, (the usual state of all new colonies) are qualities infinitely too strong to give way to resentment against particular men for personal injuries.

It is not indeed unlikely but that some certain specific law or custom, which did, or was imagined to contribute to their disgrace and expulsion, might, out of resentment, be reprobated by the new colony. And this is the utmost that the history of mankind will suffer us to suppose.

On the whole, therefore, I conclude that MOSES'S EGYPTIAN LEARNING IS A STRONG CONFIRMATION OF THE DIVINITY OF HIS MISSION.

The second part of the proposition is no less evident, *That the laws*

\* 'Ο δὲ πρῶτος μὲν αὐτοῖς νόμον ἴδισε, μήτε προσκυνῆναι θεοὺς, μήτε τῶν μάλιστα ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ θεμισισμῶν ἱερῶν ζῶν ἀπείχισται μηδινός, πάντα τι θύειν καὶ ἀναλοῦν· ἐναντίας δὲ καθεὶ πλὴν τῶν συνομωσμένων, τοιαῦτα δὲ νομοθετήσας καὶ πλῆστα ἄλλα, μάλιστα τοῖς Αἰγυπτίους ἰδιωμοῖς ἐναντιούμενα.—Apud Joseph. cont. Ap. lib. i. pp. 460, 461. Haverc. ed.

*instituted in compliance to the people's prejudices, and in opposition to Egyptian superstitions, support the same truth with equal strength.* Had Moses's mission been only pretended, his conduct, as a wise lawgiver, had doubtless been very different. His business had been then only to support a false pretence to inspiration. Let us see how he managed. He pretended to receive the whole frame of a national institution from God; and to have had the pattern of all its parts brought him down from heaven, to the mount. But when this came to be promulged, it was seen that, the CEREMONIAL LAW being politically instituted, partly in compliance to the people's prejudices, and partly in opposition to Egyptian superstitions, several of its rites had a reference to the pagan superstitions in vogue. This, as we see, from the objection of the ignorant in these times, might have been an objection in those. And as an impostor could not have foreseen the objection, his fears of a discovery would have made him decline so hazardous a system, and cautiously avoid every thing that looked like an imitation. It is true, that, on inquiry, this unfolds a scene of admirable and superior wisdom: but it is such as an impostor could never have projected; or at least would never have ventured to leave to the mercy of popular judgment. We conclude, therefore, that this conduct is a clear proof that Moses actually received the institution from God. Nor does this in any wise contradict what we have so much insisted on above, That a mere human lawgiver, or even an inspired one, acting with free agents, is necessitated to comply with the passions of the people; a compliance which would necessarily induce such a relation to Egypt as we find in the ritual law; for we must remember too what hath been likewise shown, that the *ends* of a divine and human lawgiver, both using the common means of a SEPARATION, are vastly different; the latter only aiming to keep the people unmixed; the former, to keep them pure from idolatry. Now, in both cases, where the people are dealt with as free agents, some compliance to their prejudices will be necessary. But as, in the institutions of a human lawgiver pretending only to inspiration, such compliance in the RITUAL would be subject to the danger here spoken of; and as compliance in the FUNDAMENTALS, such as the object of worship, a future state, and mode of civil government, would not be so subject; and, at the same time, would win most forcibly on a prejudiced people, to the promoting the legislator's *end*; we must needs conclude that these would be the things he would comply with and espouse. On the other hand, as a divine lawgiver could not comply in these things; and as a RITUAL, like the Mosaic, was the only means left of gaining his end; we must conclude that a divine lawgiver would make his compliance on that side.

1. Let me only add one corollary to our BELIEVING ADVERSARIES, as a farther support of this part of the *proposition*; "That, allowing the ritual law to be generally instituted in reference to Egyptian and other neighbouring superstitions, the divine wisdom of the contrivance will be seen in redoubled lustre. One reason, as we have seen above, of the

opposition to the notion of *such a reference* is, that the RITUAL LAW WAS TYPICAL, not only of things relating to that dispensation, but to the evangelical. This then they take for granted; and, as will be shown hereafter, with good reason. Now an institution of a body of rites, particularly and minutely levelled against, and referring to, the idolatrous practices of those ages; and, at the same time, as minutely typical, not only of all the remarkable transactions under that dispensation, but likewise of all the great and constituent parts of a future one, to arise in a distant age, and of a genius directly opposite, must needs give an attentive considerer the most amazing idea of divine wisdom.\* And this I beg leave to offer to the consideration of the unprejudiced reader, as another strong INTERNAL ARGUMENT THAT THE RITUAL LAW WAS NOT OF MERE HUMAN CONTRIVANCE.

2. Let me add another corollary to the UNBELIEVING JEWS. We have seen at large how expedient it was for the Jews of the first ages, that the ritual or ceremonial law should be directed against the several idolatries of those ages. It was as expedient for the Jews of the later ages that this law should be TYPICAL likewise. For had it not been *typical*, God would have given a law whose reason would have ceased many ages before the *theocracy* was abolished: and so have afforded a plausible occasion to the Jews for changing or abrogating them, on their own head.

3. Let me add a third corollary to the UNBELIEVING GENTILES. The law's being *typical* obviates their foolish argument against revelation, that the abolition of the *Mosaic* religion and the establishment of the *Christian* in its stead, impeaches the wisdom of God, as implying change and inconstancy in his acting; for by his making the law *typical*, the two religions are seen to be the two parts of one and the same design.

The great Maimonides, who first† explained the CAUSES of the Jewish ritual in any reasonable manner, and who, to observe it by the way, saw nothing in the LAW but *temporal sanctions*, was so struck with the splendour of divinity, which this light reflected back upon the law, that in the entry on his subject he breaks out into this triumphant boast, *EA TIBI EXPLICABO UT PLANE NON AMPLIUS DUBITARE QUEAS ET DIFFERENTIAM HABEAS QUA DISCERNERE POSSIS INTER ORDINATIONES LEGUM CONDITARUM AB HOMINIBUS ET INTER ORDINATIONES LEGIS DIVINÆ.*

Thus the reader sees what may be gained by fairly and boldly sub-

\* Hear what the learned Spencer says on this occasion: "Atque hac in re Deus sapientiæ suæ specimen egregium edidit, et illi non absimile quod in mundo frequenter observamus: in eo enim, notante *I'crulamio*, dum *natura aliud agit, providentia aliud elicit*; nam frondibus quas natura, consuetudinem suam retinens, parit, utitur providentia ad cœli injurias a fructu tenello propulsandas. Pari modo, cum Hebræorum natio, consuetudinem suam exuere nescia, ritus antiquos impense desideraret. Deus eorum desiderio se morigerum præbebat; sed eorum ruditate et impotentia puerili ad fines egregios et sapientia sua dignos utebatur. Sic enim ritus antiquos populo indultos, circumstantiis quibusdam demptis aut additis, immutavit, ut rerum cœlestium schema repræsentarent, oculis purgationibus facile percipiendum; adeo ut Deus puerilibus Israelitarum studiis obsequens, divina promoveret." —*De Leg. Heb. Rit.* p. 218.

† In his *More Nevoch*. Par. III.—And see note G G G G G, at the end of this book.

mitting to the force of evidence. Such a manifestation of the divinity of the law, arising out of the deist's own principles, as is sufficient to cover him with confusion!

And what is it, we lose? Nothing sure very great or excellent. The imaginary honour of being original in certain rites (considered in themselves) indifferent; and becoming good or bad by *comparison*, or by the *authority* which enjoins them, and by the object to which they are directed.

The deist indeed pretends that, in the things borrowed from Egypt, the first principles of law and morality, and the very tritest customs of civil life, are to be included. The extravagance of this fancy hath been exposed elsewhere.\* But as it is a species of folly all parties are apt to give into, it may not be amiss to consider this matter of **TRADUCTIVE** CUSTOMS a little more particularly.

There is nothing obstructs our discoveries in antiquity (as far as concerns the noblest end of this study, the knowledge of mankind) so much as that false, though undisputed principle, that the general customs of men, whether civil or religious, (in which a common likeness connects, as in a chain, the manners of its inhabitants, throughout the whole globe) are traductive from one another. When, in truth, the origin of this general similitude is from the sameness of one common nature, improved by reason, or debased by superstition. But when a custom, whose meaning lies not upon the surface, but requires a profounder search, is the subject of inquiry, it is much easier to tell us that the users borrowed it from such or such a people, than rightly to inform us, what common principle of **REASON** or **SUPERSTITION** gave birth to it in both.

How many able writers have employed their time and learning to prove that Christian Rome borrowed their superstitions from the pagan city! They have indeed shown an exact and surprising likeness in a great variety of instances. But the conclusion from thence, that, therefore, the catholic borrowed from the heathen, as plausible as it may seem, is, I think, a very great mistake; which the followers of this hypothesis might have understood without the assistance of the principle here laid down: since the rise of the superstitious customs in question were many ages later than the conversion of that imperial city to the Christian faith: consequently, at the time of their introduction, there were no **PAGAN** prejudices which required such a compliance from the ruling clergy. For this, but principally for the general reason here advanced, I am rather induced to believe, that the very same *spirit of superstition*, operating in equal circumstances, made both papists and pagans truly originals.

But does this take off from the just reproach which the reformed have cast upon the church of Rome, for the practice of such rites, and encouragement of such superstitions? Surely not; but rather strongly

\* See book ii.



fixes it. In the former case, the rulers of that church had been guilty of a base compliance with the infirmities of their new converts: in the latter, the poison of superstition is seen to have infected the very vitals of its hierarchy.\*

But then, truth will fare almost as ill when a right, as when a wrong principle, is pushed to an extravagance. Thus, as it would be ridiculous to deny, that the Roman laws of the Twelve Tables were derived from the Greeks, because we have a circumstantial history of their translation: so it would be equally foolish not to own, that a great part of the Jewish ritual was composed in reference to the superstitions of Egypt; because their long abode in the country had made the Israelites extravagantly fond of *Egyptian* customs; but to think (as some deists seem to have done) that they borrowed from thence their common principles of morality, and the legal provisions for the support of such principles,† is, whether we consider the Israelites under a divine or human direction, a thing equally absurd; and such an absurdity as betrays the grossest ignorance of human nature, and the history of mankind.

And thus much concerning the ANTIQUITY of Egypt, and its EFFECTS on the divine legation of Moses.

\* See note H H H H H, at the end of this book.

† See Marsham.

## NOTES ON BOOK IV.

---

P. 680, A. DR PRIDEAUX, in his learned *Connexions*, has indeed told us a very entertaining story of ZOROASTRES: whom, of an early lawgiver of the Bactrians, Dr Hyde had made a late false prophet of the Persians, and the preacher-up of one God in the public religion; which doctrine, however, this learned man supposes to be stolen from the Jews. But the whole is a pure fable; contradicts all learned antiquity; and is supported only by the ignorant and romantic relations of late Persian writers under the califs; who make Zoroastres contemporary with Darius Hystaspes, and servant to one of the Jewish prophets; yet, in another fit of lying, they place him as early as Moses: they even say he was Abraham; nay, they stick not to make him one of the builders of Babel. It may be thought strange how such crude imaginations, however cooked up, could be deemed serviceable to revelation, when they may be so easily turned against it; for all falsehood is naturally on the side of unbelief. I have long indeed looked when some *minute philosopher* would settle upon this corrupted place, and give it the infidel taint. And just as I thought, it happened. One of them having grounded upon this absurd whimsy the impious slander of *the Jews having received from the followers of Zoroastres, during the captivity, juster notions of God and his providence than they had before.*—See *The Moral Philosopher*, vol. i. and vol. ii. p. 144. Another of these *philosophers* makes as good a use of his Indian Brahmans, and their *Vedam* and *Exourvedam*; for this *Vedam* is their bible, as the *Zend* or *Zendavesta* is the bible of the fire worshippers in Persia, and both of them apparent forgeries since the time of Mahomet to oppose to the Alcoran. Yet M. Voltaire says, of his *Κυμήλιον*, the *Exourvedam*, that it is apparently older than the conquests of Alexander, because the rivers, towns, and countries, are called by their old names, before they were new christened by the Greeks.—Cet ancien commentaire du Vedam me paraît écrit avant les conquêtes d'Alexandre, car on n'y trouve aucun des noms que les vainqueurs Grecs imposèrent aux fleuves, aux villes, aux contrées.—Additions à l'Hist. Generale, pp. 23, 24. Which is just as wise, as it would be to observe, that the Saracen and Turkish annals were written before the conquests of Alexander, because we find in them none of the names which the Greeks imposed on the rivers, the cities, and the countries, which they conquered in the Lesser Asia, but their ancient names, by which they were known from the earliest times. It never came into the poet's head that the Indians and Arabians might be exactly of the same humour, to restore the native names to the places from which the Greeks had driven them.

P. 680, B. Μόνη δὲ τῶν Ἑβραίων γένε τὴν ΕΠΟΠΤΕΙΑΝ ἀνατιθεῖσθαι τῆς ΘΕΟΡΙΑΣ τῶν τῶν ὅλων ποιητοῦ καὶ ΔΠΜΙΟΥΡΓΟΥ Θεοῦ, καὶ τῆς εἰς αὐτὸν ἀληθοῦς ὑπερβίας.—*Præp. Evang.* lib. i. cap. ix. p. 20. As the imaginary interest of religion engaged Dr Prideaux to espouse the *Persian tale* of Zoroastres; so the same motive induced those excellent persons, Stillingfleet, Cudworth, and Newton, to take the affirmative in the general question, whether the one true God had ever been publicly worshipped out of Judea, between the introduction of general idolatry, and the birth of Christ. As this determination of the *general* question is no less injurious to revelation than the *particular* of Zoroastres, we may be assured no less advantage would be taken of it. Lord Bolingbroke saw to what use it might be applied, and has therefore enforced it to the discredit of Judaism: indeed, with his usual address, by entangling it in a contradiction. But those other venerable names will make it necessary hereafter to examine both the one and the other question at large.

P. 685, C. See Shuckford's *Sacred and Profane History of the World connected*, vol. ii. edit. 2, p. 317—327. Our countryman Gale, in the like manner, is for deriving all arts and sciences, without exception, from the Jews.—“*Arithmetic*,” he says, “it is evident, had its foundation from God himself; for the first computation of time is made by God. Gen. i. 5, &c. And as for *navigation*, though some ascribe it to the Phenicians; yet it is manifest the first idea thereof was taken from Noah's ark. It is as plain that *geography* first line from the Mosaic description of the several plantations of Noah's posterity. —Court of the Gentiles, part i. p. 18. Who would not think but the learned man, and learned he really was in good truth, was disposed to banter us, had he not given

as a proof of his being in earnest as the writing three bulky volumes to support these wonderful discoveries.

P. 686, D. See Canon Chron. Secul. v. tit. *Circumcisio*. I decline entering into this controversy for two reasons: 1. Because, which way soever the question be decided, the truth of the Mosaic account will be nothing affected by it; for the scripture no where says, that Abraham was the first man circumcised; nor is the prior use of this rite amongst men, any argument against God's enjoining him to observe it. The pious bishop Cumberland little thought he was diserving religion, when he followed an interpretation of the fragment of Sanchoniatho, which led him to conclude [Remarks on Sanchon's Phœn. Hist. p. 150,] that whole nations had practised circumcision before Abraham: but I quote this great man, not for the weight of his opinion in a matter so unconcerning, but as an example of that candour of mind and integrity of heart, without which the pursuit of truth is a vainer employment than the pursuit of butterflies. A less able and a less ingenious man, with not a tenth part of this noble writer's invention, would have had a thousand tricks and fetches to reconcile the first institution of this rite in Abraham to the high antiquity he had given to Croesus. Another example of a contrary conduct, in a writer of equal account, will show us how much this ingenuity is to be esteemed in men of learning. The excellent Dr Hammond, misled by the party prejudices of his time, had persuaded himself to believe, that the prophecies of the Apocalypse related only to the first ages of the Christian church; and that the book was written, not, as Irenæus supposed, about the end of Domitian's reign, but, as Epiphanius affirmed, in Claudius Cæsar's. To this, there were two objections; First, that then the prophecy, which, on Hammond's system, related to the destruction of Jerusalem, would be of an event past: while the prophecy speaks of it as a thing future. To this he replies, that it was *customary with the prophets to speak of things past as of things to come*. So far was well. But then the second objection is, that if this were the time of writing the revelations, Antipas, who is said, cap. ii. ver. 13, to have been martyred, was yet alive. No matter for that, it was *customary with the prophets*, as he tells us on the other hand, *to speak of things to come as of things past*. And all this within the compass of two pages. 2. The other reason for my not entering into this matter is, because it is not my intention to examine (except occasionally) any particular question of this kind. This hath been done already. What I propose is to prove in general, that many of the positive institutions of the Hebrews were enjoined in opposition to the idolatrous customs of the Egyptians; and that some bearing a conformity to those customs, and not liable to be charged to superstition, were indulged to them, in wise compliance with the prejudices which long use and habit are accustomed to induce.

Vol. II. P. 2, E. The recovery of exhausted fertility by compost, seems not to have been a very early invention. For though Homer describes Laertes in his rural occupations as busied in this part of agriculture; yet Hesiod, in a professed and detailed poem on the subject, never once mentions the method of dunging land.—Not that I regard this circumstance as any sure proof to determine the question of Hesiod's priority in point of time. It may be well accounted for, by supposing, that they described particular places in the state they were then found, some more and some less advanced in the arts of civil life.

P. 4, F. Here let me observe, that this representation of the high and flourishing state of Egypt, in these early times, greatly recommends the truth of the Samaritan chronology, and shows how much it is to be preferred to the Hebrew. See the learned and judicious M. LEONARD in his *Observations sur l'antiquité des Hieroglyphes Scientifiques*, p. 330, vol. ii.

P. 5, G. The various disasters to which determined disputants are obnoxious from their own proper temper, would make no unentertaining part of literary history. A learned writer undertaking to confute the Egyptian pretensions to their high antiquity, thinks it proper first to show, that they did indeed pretend to it. And this, it must be owned, he does effectually enough. His words are these: "Et profecto, ab ANTIQUISSIMIS TEMPORIBUS hæc vanitate infecti erant: dicebat enim, ipso Isaïæ tempore, purpuratorum quisque Pharaoni se esse *filium regum antiquissimorum*."—*Spicilegia Antiq. Egypt. &c. autore Gul. Jameson*. Now, could any thing be more unlucky? The author only meant to introduce his system by this flourish; and in introducing it, he confutes it. For can there be a better evidence of the high antiquity of any people, than that they claimed it from the *most ancient times*? from times long preceding that general vanity of a high antiquity, which had infected the nations, and prompted them to support their claims against one another, by forged evidence and unphilosophic reasoning? Not to say, that this high antiquity is acknowledged by the prophet also: the force of whose exultation depends on the truth of it. For what reason was there to insist so much on the power and wisdom of God in *destroying the counsel of Egypt*, if Pharaoh and his counsellors, only pretended to be, but were not, *wise: nor yet, the sons of ancient kings*?

P. 7, H. Chærenon, who, as we are told by Josephus, wrote the history of Egypt, calls Moses and Joseph scribes; and Joseph a sacred scribe, *ἱερέως ὁ ἀβρὰν γραμματίας*

Μωϋσῆς, ὃς καὶ ἸΩΣΗΦΟΝ καὶ τοῦτον ἸΕΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΕΑ, cont. Ap. lib. i. It is true, the historian has confounded times, in making Joseph contemporary with Moses: but this was a common mistake amongst the pagans. Justin the epitomizer of Trogus Pompeius calls Moses the son of Joseph—*Filius ejus* [Joseph] *Moses fuit, quem præter paternas scientias hæreditatem, &c.* lib. xxxvi. cap. 2. Those learned men therefore are mistaken, who, for this reason, would have it that Chæremôn, by Joseph, meant Joshua. Besides, the superior title here given to Joseph shows plainly we are to understand the patriarch, and not the companion of Moses: for though it appears from scripture that Joseph and Moses were related to, and educated by the Egyptian priesthood, yet we have not the least reason to think that Joshua had ever any concern with them; being held with the rest of his brethren in a state of servitude, remote from the benefit of that education, which a singular accident had bestowed upon Moses.

P. 7, I. Hence we may collect, how ill-grounded that opinion is of Eupolemus and other authors, ancient and modern, who imagine, that Abraham first taught the Egyptians astrology. And indeed the contending for this original of the sciences seems to contradict another argument much in use amongst divines, and deservedly so; which answers the objection of infidels against the authority of the Bible, from several inaccuracies in science to be met with in sacred history, by observing it was not God's purpose, in revealing himself to mankind, to instruct them in the sciences.

P. 7, K. Εἰδοξον μὲν οὖν Κοινοῦς φησι Μιμῶνται διακρίσει· Σίλωνα δὲ, Σέγγινοι Σαί-  
του· ΠΥΘΑΓΟΡΑΝ δὲ, Οἰνέφριος ΗΛΙΟΤΡΟΑΙΤΟΥ.—Plut. de Is. et Osir. p. 632, Steph. ed. Here we see, each sage went for that science he was disposed to cultivate, to its proper mart: for not only Pythagoras studied astronomy at Heliopolis, where it was professed with the greatest celebrity; but Eudoxus learnt his geometry at Memphis, whose priests were the most profound mathematicians; and Solon was instructed in civil wisdom at Sais, whose patron deity being Minerva (as we are told by Herodotus and Strabo), shows that politics were there in most request: and this doubtless was the reason why Pythagoras, who, during his long abode in Egypt, went through all their schools, chose Minerva for the patroness of his legislation.—See Div. Leg. vol. i. book ii. sect. 2, 3.

P. 9, L. I cannot forbear on this occasion to commend the ingenuous temper of another learned writer, far gone in the same system: who, having said all he could think of to discredit the antiquity and wisdom of Egypt, concludes in this manner:—"Tandem quæres, in qua doctrina Ægyptiorum propter quam tantopere celebrati erant in scripturis, viz. 1 Reg. ch. iv. com. 30, et vii. Actorum, com. 22. Respondeo, non nego magnos philosophos, geometras, et medicos, et aliarum artium peritos fuisse in Egypto, tempore Mosis, et postea quoque. Sed sensim et gradatim illa doctrina exolevit, ut omnino nihil aut parum ejus permanserit."—G. Jameson, Spicilegia Antiq. Egypt. pp. 400, 401. You will ask now, what is become of his system? No matter. He is true to a better thing, the sacred text: for the sake of which he took up the system; and for the sake of which, upon better information, he lays it down again: and, like an honest man, sticks to his Bible at all hazards.

P. 15, M. Diodorus Siculus, lib. i. says, that Melampus was in the number of those civilizers of Greece, who went, to fit themselves for that employment, into Egypt: and, as Orpheus proceeded thence a legislator and philosopher; so Melampus, whose bent lay another way, commenced physician and diviner; those two arts being, as we have said, professed together in Egypt. Apollodorus says, he was the first who cured diseases by medicinal potions, τὴν διὰ φαρμακῶν καὶ καθαρμῶν θεραπείαν πρῶτος ἐξηπάς—meaning the first among the Greeks. As this Greek went to Egypt to be instructed in his craft, so we meet with an Egyptian who went to practise the very same trade in Greece:

Ἄσις γὰρ ἰλθὼν ἐκ πίσεως Ναυπακτίας,  
ΙΑΤΡΟΜΑΝΤΙΣ ΠΑΙΣ ΑΠΟΛΛΑΝΝΟΥ, χθόνια  
Τήνδ' ἐκκαθαίρει πικρὰν βροτοφθόρον.

Æsch. Ixer. p. 316, Stanl. ed.

As to what is said of his being the son of Apollo, we must understand it in the sense of Homer, where he speaks of the Egyptian physicians in general:

ΙΗΤΡΟΣ δὲ ἱκαντοὶ ἐπιστάμηνος περὶ πάντων  
Ἀιγύπτου· ἥ γὰρ ΠΑΙΘΟΝΟΣ Εἰσι ΓΕΝΕΘΑΗΣ.

P. 22, N. Nothing can be more unjust or absurd than the accusation of Joseph's making the free monarchy of Egypt despotic: for allowing it did indeed at this time suffer such a revolution, who is to be esteemed the author of it but Pharaoh himself? Joseph indeed was prime minister; but it does not appear that his master was of that tribe of lazy monarchs, who intrust their sceptre to the hands of their servants. Moses describes him as active, vigilant, jealous of his authority, anxious for his country, and little indulgent to his officers of state. But the terms in which he invests Joseph in his office, show that office to be

purely ministerial; *Thou shalt be over my house, and according to thy word shall all my people be ruled, ONLY IN THE THRONE WILL I BE GREATER THAN THOU.*—[Gen. xli. 40.] i. e. thou shalt administer justice, but I will reserve to myself the prerogative of giving law. It is highly reasonable therefore, when we find, in so concise a history as the Mosaic, Joseph bidding the people give their money, their cattle, and their lands for bread, to suppose that he only delivered to them the words of Pharaoh, who would supply their wants on no other conditions.

P. 23, O. This is the general sentiment of antiquity: and as generally embraced by modern writers. Kircher makes it the foundation of his *Theatrum Hieroglyphicum*, and so consequently hath written a large volume full of the most visionary interpretations. The great principle, he goes upon, as he himself tells us, is this:—*Hieroglyphica Ægyptiorum doctrina nihil aliud est, quàm arcana de Deo, divinisque ideis, angelis, dæmonibus, cæterisque mundanarum potestatum classibus ordinibusque scientia, SAXIS potissimum insculpta.*—*Edipus Ægyptiacus*, tom. iii. p. 4. Dr Wilkins follows the received opinion in the general division of his subject, in his *Essay towards a real Character*: for speaking of notes for secrecy, such, says he, were the *Egyptian hieroglyphics*.—Yet he adds, with his usual penetration—it seems to me questionable whether the Egyptians did not at first use their hieroglyphics as a mere shift for the want of letters, as was done by the Mexicans, p. 12. And this was all his subject led him to say of the *Egyptian hieroglyphics*. Servius had gone farther, and asserted the priority of hieroglyphics without a doubt. *Annus enim secundum Ægyptios indicabatur, ante inventas literas, picto dracone caudam suam mordente.*—*Apud Virg. Æn. lib. v. ver. 85.*

P. 25, P. The ship and pilot, bearing this signification, would, of course, be much used in the descriptions of their mysteries, in which, as we have shown, the knowledge of the Governor of the universe was part of the *ἀντίφρα*: and so we find it more than once delineated in the *Bemine Table*. Kircher, according to custom, makes it full of sublime knowledge; but the plain truth is no more than this above. Tacitus, speaking of the religion of the Suevians, says they worshipped Isis; he could not conceive how this came about, only the figure of a galley, under which image she was represented, showed that the worship was imported from abroad. “*Pars Suevorum et ISIDI sacrificat: unde causa et erige peregrino sacro, parum comperi, nisi quod signum ipsum, in modum LIBURNÆ figuratum, docet advectam religionem.*”—*De Morib. Germ. cap. ix.* The latter part of which period Mr Gordon has thus translated, *unless the figure of her image formed like a galley showed, &c.* But *nisi quod* does not signify *unless*, as implying any doubt, but *saving only*. So the same author, *De Mor. Ger. cap. xxv.* “*Occidere solent non disciplina et severitate, sed impetu et ira, ut inimicum, nisi quod impune.*” Tacitus could tell no more of the original than this, that the worship of Isis was imported, because her image was made in the figure of a galley. In this he was positive: but for all this, not the less mistaken. It was indeed imported; but the galley was no mark of that original. Strabo tells us, in his fourth book, that, in an island near Britain, they performed the same mysterious rites to Ceres and Proserpine as were used in Samothrace. Ceres and Isis were the same. The Phenician seamen, without doubt, brought them thither, as likewise to the Suevians inhabiting the coasts of the German ocean. The Governor of the universe was taught in these mysteries. Isis was represented by the later Egyptians to be the Governor of the universe, as we have seen before, in a discourse on the metamorphosis of Apuleius. But the Governor of the universe was delineated, in their hieroglyphics, by a ship and pilot. Hence, amongst the Suevians, Isis was worshipped under the form of a galley, and not because her religion was of foreign growth: and so amongst the Romans, which Tacitus did not advert to. For in the *calendarium rusticum* amongst the inscriptions of Gruter, in the month of March, an Egyptian holiday is marked under the title of ISIDIS NAVIGIUM. The ceremonies on this holiday are described in Apuleius, *Met. lib. ii.* It was a festival of very high antiquity amongst the Egyptians: and seems to be alluded to in these words of the prophet Isaiah: *Who to the land shadowing with wings—that sendeth ambassadors by the sea even in VESSELS OF BULRUSHES upon the waters, saying, Go ye swift messengers, &c.* chap. xviii. ver. 1, 2.

P. 26, Q. The original is, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν διατύπωσιν τοὺς ἱεροὺς τῶν στοιχείων χαρακτῆρας. There is a small fault in this reading; it should be τοὺς ΤΕ ἱεροὺς, with the conjunction; the corruption helped to mislead Cumberland, who translates,—*and formed the sacred characters of the other elements* [p. 38 of his *Sanchoniatho's Phenician history*]; which looks as if the learned prelate understood by στοιχίων, the elements of nature; Cælum or Ouranos having, as he supposed, been mentioned before, as delineated or engraved by Taautus: but ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΝ signifies the elements of hieroglyphic writing, and λοιπῶν refers not to that, but to Θεῶν just above; which further appears from what follows—τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς Θεοὺς; otherwise, only Dagon is left, for these words, τοὺς λοιποὺς Θεοὺς to be applied to. Sanchoniatho had said that Taautus represented the gods in a new invented hieroglyphic character; and then goes on to tell us that he invented other hieroglyphic characters, whether by figures or marks; for I apprehend that ἱεροὺς τῶν στοιχείων χαρακτῆρας principally designs that part of

hieroglyphic writing which was by marks, not figures: for without doubt, at first,\* the Egyptians used the same method as the Mexicans, who, we are told, expressed in their hieroglyphic writing, those things which had form, by figures; others by arbitrary marks. —See p. 118, note †. But we shall see, that when the Egyptians employed this writing for the vehicle of their secrets, they then invented the forms of things to express abstract ideas. However, that this is the meaning of *συναχίαν* is further evident from this place of Eusebius, where he speaks of a quotation of Philo's, from a work of Sanchoniatho, concerning the Phenician elements, *Φωνίαν συναχίαν*; which work, as appears by his account of the quotation, treated of the nature of several animals. But we have shown how much the study of natural history contributed to the composition of hieroglyphic characters.

P. 27, R. At the time this account was first given to the public, the learned Dr Richard Pococke coming fresh from Egypt, thought it incumbent on him to contradict that Egyptian learning which was only conceived at home. But as, by a common practice of prudent men, he had not mentioned me by name, it was thought I had no right to reply. Let the reader judge of one, by the other. This learned and indeed candid writer, in his book of travels, has a chapter, *On the ancient hieroglyphics of Egypt*; in which he expresseth himself as follows:—"If hieroglyphical figures stood for words or sounds that signified certain things, the power of hieroglyphics seems to be the same as of a number of letters composing such a sound, that by agreement was made to signify such a thing. For hieroglyphics, as words, seem to have stood for sounds, and sounds signify things; as for instance, it might have been agreed that the figure of a crocodile might stand for the sound that meant what we call malice: the children of the priests were early taught that the figure of a crocodile stood for such a sound, and, if they did not know the meaning of the sound, it would certainly stand with them for a sound; though, as the sound, it signified also a quality or thing; and they might afterwards be taught the meaning of this sound; as words are only sounds, which sounds we agree shall signify such and such things; so that, to children, words only stand for sounds, which relate to such things as they know nothing of; and, in this sense, we say children learn many things like parrots, what they do not understand, and their memories are exercised only about sounds, till they are instructed in the meaning of the words. This I thought it might be proper to observe, AS SOME SAY HIEROGLYPHICS STOOD FOR THINGS AND NOT FOR WORDS,—if sounds articulated in a certain manner are words. And though it may be said, that in this case, when different nations of different languages agree on common characters, that stand for certain things they agree on, that then such figures stand for things: this will be allowed; but then they stand for sounds too, that is, the sounds in each language that signify such things: and, as observed before, to children, who know nothing of the several things they stand for, to them they are only marks that express such and such sounds: so that these figures stand not for things alone, but as words, for sounds and things."†

The design of this passage, the reader sees, is to oppose the principle I went upon, in explaining the nature of Egyptian hieroglyphics, *that they stood for things, and not for words*. But that is all one sees; for the learned writer's expression conforming to his ideas, will not suffer us to do more than guess at the proof which he advances: it looks, however, like this,—That hieroglyphics cannot be said to stand for things only; because things being denoted by words or sounds; and hieroglyphics exciting the idea of sounds (which are the notes of things) as well as the idea of the things themselves, hieroglyphics stand both for sounds and things.—This seems to be the argument put into common English. But, for fear of mistaking him, let us confine ourselves to his own words.

*If hieroglyphical figures, says he, stood for words or sounds that signified certain things, the power of hieroglyphics seems to be the same as of a number of letters composing such a sound that by agreement was made to signify such a thing.* Without doubt, if hieroglyphics stood for sounds, they were of the nature of words, which stand for sounds. But this is only an hypothetical proposition: let us see therefore how he addresses himself to prove it—*For hieroglyphics, AS WORDS, seem to have stood for sounds, and sounds signify things; as for instance, it MIGHT have been agreed that the figure of a crocodile MIGHT stand for the same sound that meant what we call malice.* The propriety of the expression is suited to the force of the reasoning. 1. Instead of saying, *but hieroglyphics*, the learned writer says, *for hieroglyphics*; which not expressing an illation, but implying a reason, obscures the argument he would illustrate. 2. He says, *Hieroglyphics, as words, seem to have stood for sounds.* Just before he said, *hieroglyphics stood for words OR sounds.* Here they are *AS words*, or *like words*, and *seem to stand FOR sound*. What are we to take them for? are words sound? or, do they stand for sound? He has given us our choice. But we go on. 3. For, he

\* This Eustathius intimates in these words, speaking of the most ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics,—*ζωδιὰ τὰ ἱερογλυφούντις, καὶ λεπτὰς δὲ χαρακτῆρας εἰς σημασίαν ἐν λέγειν ἱερούμεν.*—In *Iliad*, vi. ver. 168.

† Pp. 228, 229, of a book intitled, "A Description of the East," &c.



corroborates this seeming truth by an instance, in which the possibility of its standing for a sound is made a proof of its so doing. *It MIGHT*, says he, *have been agreed that the figure of a crocodile MIGHT stand, &c.*

But he is less diffident in what follows. *The children of the priests were early taught that the figure of a crocodile stood for such a sound, and if they did not know the meaning of the sound, it would certainly stand with them for a sound.* This indeed is an anecdote: but where did he learn that the children, before they could decipher the sounds of their own language, were taught hieroglyphics? Till now, hieroglyphics, when got into exclusive hands, were understood to be reserved for those instructed in high and mysterious science. But let us suppose that they were taught to children amongst their first elements: yet even then, as we shall see from the nature of the thing, they could never stand as marks for words or sounds. When a child is taught the power of letters, he learns that the letters, which compose one word, *malice*, for instance, express the *sound*; which, naturally arising from a combination of the several powers of each letter, shows him that the letters stand for such a sound or word. But when he is taught that the figure or picture of a crocodile signifies *malice*, he naturally and necessarily conceives (though he knows not the meaning of the word) that it stands for some *thing*, signified by that word, and not for a *sound*; because there is no natural connexion between *figure* and a *sound*, as there is between *figure* and a *thing*. And the only reason why the word *malice* intervenes, in this connexion, is because of the necessity of the use of words to distinguish things, and rank them into sorts. But the veriest child could never be so simple as to conceive that, when he was told the figure of a beast with four short legs and a long tail signified *malice*, that it signified the *sound* of *malice*: any more than if he were told it signified a *crocodile*, that it signified the *sound* of the word *crocodile*. The truth is, the ignorant often mistake words for things, but never, things for words: that is, they frequently mistake the name of a thing for its nature: and rest contented in the knowledge which that gives them: like him who, on the sight of a pictured elephant, inquiring what the creature was, on his being answered, that it was the great *Cow*, asked no further, but went away well satisfied in his acquaintance with that illustrious stranger. Yet I apprehend he did not understand his informer to mean that it signified only the sound of that word. Perhaps the learned writer will object, that the cases are different; that the *elephant* was a mere picture, and the *crocodile* a sign or mark. But I have shown at large, that the ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics were at first mere pictures; and that all the alteration they received, in becoming marks, was only the having their general use of conveying knowledge rendered more extensive and expeditious, more mysterious and profound; while they still continued to be the marks of *things*.

To proceed; our author considers next what he apprehends may be thought an objection to his opinion. *And though*, says he, *it may be said that, in this case, where different nations of different languages agree on common characters, that stand for certain things they agree on, that then such figures stand for things.* To which he answers, *This will be allowed; but then they stand for sounds too, that is, the sounds in each language that signify such things.* He who can grant so much, and without injury to his system, need be under no fear of ever giving his adversary advantages. He may, if he pleases, say next, when disputing about the colour of an object,—*that it is black, will be allowed; but then it is white too.* For a mark for *things* can no more be a mark for *sounds*, than *black* can be *white*. The reason is the same in both cases; one quality or property excludes the other: thus, if hieroglyphic marks stand for *things*, and are used as common characters by various nations differing in speech and language, they cannot stand for *sounds*; because these men express the same *thing* by different sounds; unless, to remove this difficulty, he will go farther, and say, not, as he did before, that one *hieroglyphic word* (to use his own language) stood for one sound, but that it stands for a hundred. Again, if hieroglyphic marks stand for *sounds*, they cannot stand for *things*: not those things which are not signified by such sounds; this he himself will allow: nor yet, I affirm, for those which are thus signified; because it is the sound which stands for the thing signified by the sound, and not the hieroglyphic mark. But all this mistake proceeded from another, namely, *that words stand both for sounds and things*, which we now come to. For he concludes thus, *So that these figures (viz. hieroglyphics) stand not for things alone, but, as words, for sounds and things.* An unhappy illustration! which has all the defects, both in point of meaning and expression, that a proposition can well have. For, if by *words*, he meant *articulated sounds*, then the expression labours in the sense, as affirming, that sounds stand for sounds. And that he meant so is possible, because in the beginning of the passage quoted, he uses words for articulate sounds.—*Hieroglyphics*, says he, *stood for words or sounds.* But if, by words, he meant letters, (and that he might mean so is possible likewise, for he presently afterwards uses words in that sense too—*Hieroglyphics, as words*, says he, *seem to stand for sounds*) then the proposition is only false: the plain truth being this, letters stand for sounds only; which sounds they naturally produce; as sounds arbitrarily denote things.

But to be a little more particular; as in this distinction lies the judgment which is to be

made, if ever it be rightly made, of the controversy between us. All this confusion of counter-reasoning proceeds, as we observed before, first, from not reflecting that letters, which stand for words, *have not*, and hieroglyphics, which stand for things, once *had not*, an arbitrary, but a natural designation. For, as the powers of letters naturally produce words or sounds, so the figures of hieroglyphics naturally signify things: either more simply, by representation, or more artificially by analogy: secondly, from his not considering, that as we cannot think nor converse about things either accurately or intelligibly without words, so their intervention becomes necessary in explaining the marks of things. But therefore, to make hieroglyphics the marks of sounds, because sounds accompany things, would be as absurd as to make letters the marks of things, because things accompany sounds. And who, before our author, would say that *letters signified things as well as sounds*? unless he had a mind to confound all meaning. If he chose to instruct, or even to be understood, he would say, that letters naturally produced sounds or words; and that words arbitrarily denoted things: and had our author spoken the same intelligible language, and told us that hieroglyphics naturally expressed things, and that things were arbitrarily denoted by words, he would indeed have spared both of us the present trouble; but then he had said nothing new. As it is, I cannot but suspect that this learned writer, though he had been in Egypt, yet found his *hieroglyphics* at home, and mistook these for the Egyptian. No other agreeing with his description of picture characters standing for *sounds*, but that foolish kind of *rebus-writing* called by the polite vulgar, *hieroglyphics*, the childish amusement of the illiterate; in which indeed, the figures stand only for sounds: sounds, divested of *sense* as well as *things*. Nor is Dr Pococke the only *polite* writer who has fallen into this ridiculous mistake. See a paper called THE WORLD, No. XXIV.

P. 32, S. It may not be improper, in this place, just to take notice of one of the strangest fancies, that ever got possession of the pericranium of an antiquary. It is this, that the Chinese borrowed their *real characters* or *hieroglyphic marks* from the Egyptians. The author of it expresses his conceit in this manner—"Linguam autem primitivam et barbaram vel puram, vel saltem parum immutatam, et politam Ægyptiorum consuetudine, retinere poterant [Sinenses,] et solum hoc sibi ab ipsis DERIVARE, ET ADOPTARE SCRIBENDI GENUS, ratione habita non ad linguam Ægyptiacam, sed unice ad ideas his characteribus expressas, quæ et sermonis sui nativi, immo etiam et linguæ suæ syllabis separatim sumptis eodem tempore applicaverunt."—De Inscr. Ægyptica Epist. p. 53. Auctore Turbervil. Needham.

From what hath been observed of the nature and origin of a REAL CHARACTER in general, supported by what the Chinese tell us of the very high antiquity of theirs, it is impossible to fix upon any period of time when the Egyptians (whether invited, or simply enabled by their improvements in navigation and commerce to penetrate into China) could find this highly policed people without a *real character*.

The question then will be, What possible inducements the Chinese could have to exchange their *real characters* for the Egyptian? Benefit by this change they could receive none, because one *real character* is just as good as another: and men at their ease, are rarely disposed to change native for foreign, but with the prospect of some advantage. To this it may be said, "that one *alphabetic character* likewise is just as good as another: and yet nothing has been more common than for one nation to change its own alphabet for the alphabet of another." An instance, without doubt, very apposite. To change the shapes of four and twenty letters is but a morning's work; and I suppose a small share of civility and complaisance might go thus far, between neighbours. But to throw away a million of old marks, and to have a million of *new* to learn, is an amusement of quite another nature. I apprehend, that such a proposal (had the Egyptians made it, with an offer of all their learning along with it) would have much alarmed the indolent unenterprising temper of the Chinese. But the critic seems to think, that an old character, like an old coat, would be willingly exchanged for a new one. Alas! Time and antiquity, which make such havoc with the *muddy vestures of decay*, give a new gloss, as well as a stronger texture, to the *spiritual clothing* of ideas. And if their old characters were like an old coat, it must be such a one as Settle wore in Elysium; which, as the poet sings, had, together with its owner, received a new lustre in this its state of beatification:

"All as the vest, appear'd the wearer's frame,  
Old in new state, another yet the same."

The truth is, the Chinese, who have preserved specimens of all the various revolutions in their *real characters*, have the highest veneration for the most ancient. Now is it possible to conceive that a people, thus circumstanced and disposed, should part with their native characters, the gift of their demigods and heroes, to receive others, of the same sort, from strangers: recommendable for no advantage which their own did not possess, and partaking of all the inconveniences to which their own were subject. Had the Egyptians indeed offered them an ALPHABET (which, were they disposed to be so communicative, we know, they had it in their power to do, at what time soever it can be reasonably supposed they first visited the coasts of China), the offer had been humane, and, without doubt, the benefit had

been gratefully accepted. But that the Egyptians did nothing of all this, appears from the Chinese being without an ALPHABET to this very day. And yet I am persuaded, it was the confounding of these two things, one of which was practicable and useful, the other useless and impracticable, I mean the communication of an alphabet, which was common in the ancient world; and the communication of a real character, which was never heard of till now,—I say, it was the confounding of these two things that gave birth to this strange conceit. And then the similitude of shape between the Egyptian and the Chinese *marks*, was thought to complete the discovery. The letter-writer did not seem to reflect, that the shapes of *real characters*, after great improvements made in them by a long course of time, such as the Egyptian and the Chinese, must needs have a great resemblance, whether the characters were formed by ANALOGY or INSTITUTION. In the first case *nature* made the resemblance, as being the common archetype to both nations. In the latter, *necessity*, for only straight and crooked lines being employed to form these marks, there must needs arise from a combination of such lines infinitely varied, a striking resemblance between the *real characters* of two people, though most distant in genius and situation. But the folly, which such conjectures are apt to fall into, is, that, if the *forms* of the marks be alike, the *powers* must be alike also.

What is here said will enable us likewise to appreciate another ingenious contrivance of one *M. de Guignes*, of the *Academy Royal of Inscriptions*, &c. to get to the same discovery. Upon a supposition of the truth of what I had laid down, that the first Egyptian alphabet was taken from their hieroglyphic characters,\* this academician fell to work, to ANALYZE, as he terms it, the Chinese characters; when to his great surprise, he found, that their contents were only a certain number of LETTERS belonging to the oriental alphabets, packed up, as it were, for carriage: which, when taken out, developed, and put in order, formed an Egyptian or Phenician word, that expressed the idea for which the Chinese *real character* stood, as its representatives. How precarious, and of how little solidity this fanciful analysis is, may be understood by all who have seen these *Chinese marks* and *oriental alphabets*; both of which consist of the same straight and curve lines variously combined; so that it cannot be otherwise but that in every Chinese mark should be found, that is, easily imagined, a composition of any alphabetic letters which the profound decipherer stands in need of. But the pleasantry of the conceit lies here, that though the Chinese have alphabetic characters (which this ingenious author has, with great astonishment, now first discovered) yet they themselves know nothing of the matter, as he at the same time has assured us.†

I might likewise insist upon this scheme's labouring under the same absurdity with *M. Needham's*. For though when *M. de Guignes* speaks of that part of the Chinese real character whose marks are *symbolic*, or formed upon analogy, pp. 71, 72, he is willing to have it believed (what his titlepage enounces), that China was inhabited by an Egyptian colony, which carried along with them the hieroglyphics they now use: yet where he examines that other part, consisting of arbitrary marks, or marks by institution, p. 64 and seq. he supposes them, as we see above, communicated to the Chinese by the Egyptians. *On pourroit donc presumer*, says he, *que les Egyptiens avoient communiqué aux Chinois les caractères que je venois de decouvrir*.

To conclude, the learned world abounds with discoveries of this kind. They have all one common original; the old inveterate error, that a similitude of customs and manners, amongst the various tribes of mankind most remote from one another, must needs arise from some communication. Whereas human nature, without any other help, will, in the same circumstances, always exhibit the same appearances.

P. 33, T. L'alphabet Ethiopien est de tous ceux que l'on connoit qui tient encore des hieroglyphes.—Fourmont, *Reflexions Crit. sur les Hist. des Anc. Peuples*, tom. sec. p. 501. Kircher illustrates this matter in his account of the Coptic alphabet. But as on his system every thing that relates to Egypt is a mystery, the shapes and names of the letters of their alphabet we may expect to find full of profound wisdom: yet, methinks, nothing could be more natural, than for a people long used to hieroglyphic characters, to employ the most

---

\* *M. Warburton* avoit pensé que le premier alphabet avoit emprunté ses elemens des hieroglyphes mêmes; et *M. l'Abbé Barthelemy* avoit mis cette excellente théorie dans un plus grand jour, en plaçant sur une colonne diverses lettres *Ægyptiennes*, en correspondance avec les hieroglyphes qui les avoient produits. On pouvoit donc presumer que *les Égyptiens avoient communiqué aux Chinois* les caractères que je venois de decouvrir, mais qu'ils les regardoient eux-mêmes alors comme des signes Hieroglyphiques, et non comme des lettres proprement dites.—De l'Origine des Chinois, pp. 63, 64.

† Les caractères Chinoises dans l'état où nous les avons à present, constituent trois sortes de caractères; l'épistolique ou ALPHABETIQUE, le hieroglyphique et le symbolique; c'est un nouveau rapport des plus singuliers avec l'Égypte, qui n'a point été connu jusque à present, que LES CHINOIS EUX-MÊMES IGNORENT, et qui me jette dans le plus grand étonnement, un examen attentif—me l'a fait connoître, &c.—*Mem. de Lit.* tom. 29, p. 15.

celebrated of them, when they invented an alphabet, in forming the letters of it: and if the Chinese, who yet want an alphabet, were now to make one, it is not to be doubted but they would use the most venerable of their characteristic marks for the letters of it. However, let us hear Kircher for the fact's sake. — *Ita Ægyptiis natura comparatum fuit, ut quemadmodum nihil in omnibus eorum institutis sine mysterio peragebatur, ita et in lingua communis, uti ex alphabeto eorundem, mysteriosa literarum institutione ita concinnato, ut nulla fore in eodem litera reconditorum sacramentorum non undique plena reperiretur, patet. De primævis Ægyptiorum literis varis diversorum sunt opiniones. Omnes tamen in hoc consentiunt, plerasque ex sacrorum animalium forma, incessu, aliarumque corporis partium ritibus et symmetria desumptas.* Ita Demetrius Phalereus, qui septem vocales assignans, septem diis consecratas, ait, cæteras ex animalium formâ desumptas. Eusebius adstruit idem.—*Theatr. Hierogl. p. 42 tom. iii. of his (Edip. Ægypt.* As for this fancy, mentioned by Demetrius Phalereus, it had a very different original from what Kircher supposes; being only an enigmatic intimation of the different natures of vowels and consonants. The latter being brute sounds without the aid of the former, by which they are as it were animated.

P. 33, U. The very learned and illustrious author of a work intitled, *Recueil d'Antiquités Égyptiennes, Etrusques, Grecques et Romaines*, vol. i. M. the Count Caylus, after having confuted the idle conjectures of certain learned men concerning the contents of a sepulchral linen, marked over with Egyptian alphabetic characters, proceeds thus — *Il me semble qu'on tireroit de plus grands avantages de ce monument, si au lieu de s'obstiner à percer ces ténèbres, on tâchoit, de remonter par son moyen à l'origine de l'écriture, et d'en suivre le développement et le progrès: si l'on cherchoit enfin à connoître la forme des anciennes lettres, et le pays où l'on a commence à les employer. Ces questions et tant d'autres semblables ne pourront jamais être éclaircies par les témoignages des auteurs Grecs et Latins. Souvent peu instruits des antiquités de leur pays, ils n'ont fait que recueillir des traditions incertaines, et multiplier des doutes, auxquels on préféreroit volontiers l'ignorance la plus profonde. c'est aux monumens qu'on doit recourir. Quand ils parleront clairement, il faudra bien que les anciens auteurs s'accordent avec eux. Avant le commencement de ce siècle on ne connoissoit point l'écriture courante des Égyptiens, et plusieurs critiques la confondoient tantôt avec celle des anciens Hébreux, et tantôt avec les hiéroglyphes, mais depuis cette époque il nous est venu plusieurs fragmens, qui ont fixé nos idées: et il faut espérer que de nouvelles recherches nous en procureront un plus grand nombre. Conservons avec soin des restes si précieux, et tachons de les mettre en œuvre, en suivant l'exemple de celui des modernes, qui a repandu les plus grandes lumières sur la question de l'antiquité des lettres. M. Warburton a détruit l'erreur où l'on étoit que les prêtres Égyptiens avoient inventé les hiéroglyphes pour cacher leur science: il a distingué trois époques principales dans l'art de se communiquer les idées par écrit: sous la première, l'écriture n'étoit qu'une simple représentation des objets, une véritable peinture, sous la seconde, elle ne consistoit qu'en hiéroglyphes, c'est-à-dire, en une peinture abrégée, qui, par exemple, au lieu de représenter un objet entier, n'en représentoit qu'une partie, un rapport, &c. Enfin sous la troisième époque, les hiéroglyphes altérés dans leurs traits devinrent les élémens d'une écriture courante. M. Warburton auroit pu mettre cette excellente théorie à portée de tout le monde, en plaçant dans une première colonne une suite d'hiéroglyphes, et dans une seconde les lettres qui en sont dérivées, mais sans doute que les bornes qu'il s'étoit prescrites ne lui ont pas permis d'entrer dans ce détail. Quoi qu'il soit, tous ceux qui recherchent l'origine des arts et des connoissances humaines, peuvent vérifier le système du sçavant Anglois, et se convaincre que les lettres Égyptiennes ne sont que des hiéroglyphes déguisez. Nous avons assez de secours pour entreprendre cet examen. Les recueils des antiquaires offrent plusieurs monumens Égyptiens chargés d'hiéroglyphes: et la seule bande de toile que l'on publie ici [Pl. No. XXI. XXII. XXIII. XXIV. XXV.] suffiroit pour donner une idée de l'écriture courante—de s'assurer que l'alphabet de la langue Égyptienne émanoit des hiéroglyphes, il suffira d'avoir un assez grande quantité des lettres isolées, et de comparer avec les figures représentées sur les monumens Égyptiens. Or je puis assurer que l'on appercevra entre elles la liaison la plus intime, et les rapports les plus sensibiles, et pour s'en convaincre, on n'a qu'à jeter les yeux sur le No. I. de la XXVI. planche. J'y ai fait graver sur une première colonne une suite d'hiéroglyphes tirés la plupart des obélisques, et dans une colonne correspondante, les lettres Égyptiennes qui viennent de ces hiéroglyphes. On trouvera, par exemple, que le premier hiéroglyphe représentant une barque, a produit un élément d'écriture, dont la valeur a pu varier, suivant les points ou les traits dont il étoit affecté: que le troisième hiéroglyphe, qu'on croit être l'image d'une porte, en perdant son arrondissement a formé la lettre qui lui est parallèle, que la figure d'homme ou d'animal accroupie au No. IV. est devenue une lettre qui ne conserve que les linéamens du symbole original, enfin que le serpent figuré si souvent sur les monumens Égyptiens, No. XIX. s'est changé en un caractère qui retrace encore aux yeux les sinuosités de ce reptile. On trouvera aussi que les autres hiéroglyphes, tels que le II. le V. le VI. le XI. le XIII. &c. ont passé dans l'écriture courante, sans éprouver le moindre changement. Au reste, ce n'est ici que le léger commencement*



d'une operation qui pourroit être poussée plus loin, et dans laquelle on appercevroit peut-être des rapports différens de ceux que j'ai établis entre certaines lettres Egyptiennes prouve visiblement leur origine; et plus il est approfondi, plus il sert à confirmer le sentiment de M. Warburton, p. 69. Thus far this learned person. I have borrowed the scheme he refers to, and the reader will find it marked, Plate VII.

P. 33, X. M. Voltaire, in a discourse intituled, Nouveau plan de l'Histoire de l'Esprit humain, speaking of the Chinese printing, which is an impression from a solid block, and not by movable types, says they have not adopted the latter method, *out of attachment to their old usages*—On sait que cette imprimerie est une gravure sur des planches de bois. L'art de graver les caractères mobiles et de fonte, beaucoup supérieure à la leur, n'a point encore été adopté par eux, TANT ILS SONT ATTACHÉS A LEURS ANCIENS USAGES. Now I desire to know of M. Voltaire, how it was possible for them to adopt the method of a font of types or movable characters, unless they had an *alphabet*. That they had no such, M. Voltaire very well knew, as he gives us to understand, in the same place. L'art de faire connoître ses idées par l'écriture, qui devoit n'être qu'une methode très simple, est chez eux ce qu'ils ont de plus difficile; chaque mot a des caractères differens: un savant à la Chine est celui qui connoît le plus de ces caractères, et quelques uns sont arrivés à la vieillesse avant que de savoir bien écrire. Would not Caslon or Baskerville be finely employed to make a font of letters for this people, who have so many millions of real characters? But this historian of men and manners goes on in the same rambling incoherent manner, and so he can but discredit the Jewish history, he cares little for the rest.—Qui leur donne une superiorité reconnue sur tous ceux qui rapportent l'origine des autres nations, c'est qu'on n'y voit aucun *prophete*, aucune *prediction*, aucune même de ces fourberies politiques que nous attribuons aux fondateurs des autres états, excepté peut-être ce qu'on a imputé à Fohi, d'avoir fait accroire qu'il avoit vu ses loix écrites sur le dos d'un serpent ailé. Cette imputation même fait voir qu'on connoissoit l'écriture avant Fohi. Enfin, ce n'est pas à nous, au bout de notre Occident, à contester les archives d'une nation que étoit toute policée quand nous n'étions que des sauvages—First, China has the advantage of the western world, because the founders of its religious policy employed neither miracles nor prophecies, nor the founders of its civil policy state tricks and cheats, like other leaders. And yet he is forced, before the words are well out of his mouth, to own that Fohi pretended to have seen his laws written upon the back of a winged serpent: and one can hardly think that Fohi now gotten into so good a train would stop there. Secondly, By this, however, the historian gains (and he bids us observe it) a very early date for *writing* amongst the Chinese, whereas in truth they have no *writing* in the sense the historian gives to the word, even at this day: and as for hieroglyphic characters, all nations had them from the most early times, and as soon as men began to associate. Thirdly, We barbarians of yesterday must not pretend, he says, to contradict the records of this ancient nation. And why not, I pray, when superior science has enabled this upstart people of the west to detect the falsehood of the records of Egypt, a nation which pretended to as high antiquity as the Chinese? This they have done, and, I suppose, to the good liking of our historian, if ever he has heard of the names of Scaliger and Petavius, of Usher and Marsham.

P. 33, Y. — 'Αλλὰ γὰρ οὐ μόνον Αἰγυπτίῳ οἱ λογιστάται, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βαρβάρων, ὅσοι φιλοσοφίας ἀρίχθησαν, τὸ συμβολικὸν εἶδος ἐζήλωσαν φασὶ γούνη καὶ Ἰδαίουραν τῶν ΣΚΥΘΩΝ βασιλεία, &c.—Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. v. p. 567. Thus this learned father; who being in the general prejudice that hieroglyphics were a late art, invented by philosophic men, to secrete their knowledge, expresses himself accordingly, ὅσοι φιλοσοφίας ἀρίχθησαν: and yet, methinks, the story he tells of the Scythian king might have directed him to another original.—Eustathius says the same thing: Οἱ δὲ γὰρ παλαιοὶ, ὅποῖόν τι καὶ οἱ Αἰγύπτῳ ἰσχύοντες, ζῶντι τινὰ ἱερογλυφούντας καὶ λοιποὺς δὲ χαρακτηῖρας εἰς σημασίαν ὧν λίγιστον ἰβούλοντα, οὕτω καὶ αὐτοὶ καθὰ καὶ τῶν τινος ὑστέρων Σκυθῶν, ἰσήμενοι ἃ ἤθελον εἰδωλὰ τινα καὶ πολυὲν γράμματα ξίσματα ἰγγράφοντες.—In Iliad. vi. ver. 168.

P. 34, Z. In judging only from the nature of things, and without the surer light of revelation, one should be apt to embrace the opinion of Diodorus Siculus [lib. ii.] and Vitruvius [lib. ii. cap. 1.] that the first men lived, for some time, in woods and caves, after the manner of beasts, uttering only confused and indistinct noises; till associating for mutual assistance, they came, by degrees, to use articulate sounds, mutually agreed upon, for the arbitrary signs or marks of those ideas in the mind of the speaker, which he wanted to communicate to the hearer. Hence the diversity of languages; for it is confessed on all hands, that speech is not innate. This is so natural an account of the original of language, and so unquestioned by antiquity, that Gregory Nyssen [*adver. Eunomium*, lib. xii.] a father of the church, and Richard Simon [*Hist. Crit. du Vieux Test.* lib. i. cap. 14 et 15. lib. iii. cap. 21,] a priest of the oratory, have both endeavoured to support this hypothesis: and yet, methinks, they should have known better; scripture plainly informing us, that *language* had a different original. This was just the case of SACRIFICES. It is

very easy to conceive, that one sort arose naturally from the sense of gratitude to our divine Benefactor, and the other from a sense of our demerit towards him (as will be shown hereafter); yet it is certain they were of divine appointment. In this indeed the two cases differ; *language*, I believe, had, for its sole original, divine instruction; whereas *sacrifices* amongst many people were certainly of human invention, and undervived from tradition. But to return to the subject of language. It is strange, as I say, that these learned men should not have been better informed. We see, by scripture, that God instructed the first man, in *religion*. And can we believe, he would not at the same time teach him *language*, so necessary to support the intercourse between man and his Maker? For quietism is a thing of modern growth; this, with mysticism of all kinds, is the issue of that wantonness which makes favoured man grow tired of his two great blessings, REASON and LANGUAGE.—If it be said, Man might gain language by the use of reason, I reply, so might he gain religion likewise: and that much easier and sooner. Again, when God created man, he made woman for his companion and associate; but the only means of enjoying this benefit is the use of speech. Can we think that God would leave them to themselves, to get out of the forlorn condition of brutality as they could? But there is more than a probable support for this opinion. If I am not much mistaken, we have the express testimony of MOSES, that God did indeed teach men language: it is where he tells us, that *God brought every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air, unto Adam, to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof. And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast of the field.* Gen. ii. 19, 20. Here, by a common figure of speech, instead of directly relating the fact, that God taught men language, the historian represents it, by showing God in the act of doing it, in a particular mode of information; and that, the most apposite we can conceive, namely, elementary instruction, in the giving names to substances; such as those with which Adam was to be most conversant, and which therefore had need of being distinguished each by its proper name: how familiar an image do these words convey of a learner of his rudiments—*And God brought every beast, &c. to Adam, to see what he would call them.* In a word, the prophet's manner of relating this important fact, has, in my opinion, an uncommon elegance. But men of warm imaginations overlooked this obvious and natural meaning to ramble after forced and mysterious senses, such as this, that Adam gave to every creature *a name expressive of its nature*. From which fantastic interpretation, all the wild visions of Hutchinson, and his cabalistic followers, seem to have arisen. Nor are the freethinkers much behind them in absurdities. "Some," says Tindal, "would be almost apt to imagine that the author of the book of GENESIS thought that words had ideas naturally fixed to them, and not by consent; otherwise, say they, how can we account for his supposing that God brought all animals before Adam, as soon as he was created, to give them names; and that *whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof?*" [Christianity as old as the Creation, 8vo ed. p. 228.] But though Moses *thought* no such thing, I can tell him of one who did: a very ancient writer, and frequently quoted by the men of this tribe to confront with Moses, I mean HERODOTUS; who not only thought this, but thought still more absurdly, that *ideas had words naturally affixed to them*. See the famous tale of Psammetichus and his two boys, lib. ii. How would these men have rejoiced to catch Moses at the same advantage! —To conclude. From what hath been said, it appears, that God taught man language: yet we cannot reasonably suppose it to be any other than what served his present use: after this, he was able of himself to improve and enlarge it, as his future occasions should require: consequently the first language must needs be very poor and narrow.

P. 35, A A. "How many commands did God give his prophets, which, if taken according to the letter, seem unworthy of God, as making them act like madmen or idiots? As for instance, the prophet *Isaiah walked for three years together naked for a sign*; Jeremiah is commanded *to carry his girdle as far as Euphrates,—to make bands and yokes, &c.*—Ezekiel is commanded *to draw Jerusalem on a tile,*" &c. &c. [Tindal's Christianity as old as the Creation, p. 229.] *The prophet Jeremiah, says a learned writer, is ordered to buy a girdle, &c.—He is also sent about with yokes—Ezekiel besieges a pan-tile.—He shaves his head and beard.—No reasonable man can believe these actions were really performed.* See Dissertation on the History and Character of Balaam.

P. 35, B B. Quemadmodum autem vidit in visionibus [propheta] quod jussus fuerit [Ezech. cap. viii.] fodere in pariete, ut intrare et videre posset, quid intus faciant, quod foderit, per foramen ingressus fuerit, et viderit id quod vidit; ita quoque id quod dictum est ad eum. *Et tu sume tibi laterem, &c.* [Ezech. cap. iv.] quod item alibi ei dictum legitur, *Novaculum hanc tonsoriam cape tibi,* [Ezech. cap. v.] ita, inquam, ista omnia in visione prophetiæ facta sunt, ac vidit, vel visum fuit ipsi, se ista opera facere, quæ ipsi præcipiebantur. Absit enim ut Deus prophetas suos stultis vel ebriis similes reddat, eoque stultorum aut furiosorum actiones facere jubeat.—More Nev. p. ii. cap. 46. But here the author's reasoning is defective,—because what Ezekiel saw in the chambers of imagery





told after a simple historical manner, like all the relations in the Old Testament. A great improvement, believe me, this, to his discovery,—that the ancients thought not only that beasts, but that trees spoke in the first ages of the world. The ancients! an' please you, it is true, they delighted in fabulous traditions. But what then? they had always the sense to give a sufficient cause to every effect. They never represented things out of nature, but when placed there by some god, who had nature in his power. Even Homer, the father of fables, when he makes the horses of Achilles speak, or feel human passions, thinks it not enough to represent them as stimulated by a god, without informing us, that they themselves were of a celestial and immortal race.

P. 38, E E. This account shows how ridiculously the critics were employed in seeking out the inventor of the apologue; they might as well have sought for the inventor of the metaphor, and carried their *researches* still further, and with Sancho Pancha inquired after the inventor of eating and drinking.

P. 40, F F.—Καὶ ἡ Αἰγύπτῳ μὲν τῆς ἱερῆς συνῆς, καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ἐξίμαθε, καὶ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων φωνῇ. Γραμμάτων δὲ τριττὰς διαφορὰς ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΟΓΡΑΦΙΚΩΝ τε, καὶ ἹΕΡΟΓΛΥΦΙΚΩΝ, καὶ ΣΥΜΒΟΛΙΚΩΝ τῶν μὲν κειταλογουμένων κατὰ μίμνησιν, τῶν δὲ ἀλληγορουμένων κατὰ τινος αἰνυγμοῦ.—De Vita Pythagoræ, cap. xi. et xii. pag. 15. Ed. Kusteri.—Holstenius translates τῶν μὲν κειταλογουμένων κατὰ μίμνησιν, τῶν δὲ ἀλληγορουμένων κατὰ τινος αἰνυγμοῦ, in this manner.—“Quorum illud propriam et communem loquendi consuetudinem imitatur, reliqua per allegorias sub quibusdam ænigmatum involueris sensum exprimunt.” By which it seems, he understood τῶν μὲν κειταλογουμένων κατὰ μίμνησιν to be an explanation of the nature of *epistolary writing*; and τῶν δὲ ἀλληγορουμένων κατὰ τινος αἰνυγμοῦ, of the nature both of *hieroglyphic* and *symbolic*; whereas the first words are an explanation of *hieroglyphic writing*, and the second only of *symbolic*. For Porphyry having named three kinds of writing, the first common to all people, the two other peculiar, at that time, to the Egyptians, when he comes to speak of their natures, he judiciously omits explaining the *epistolary*, which all the world knew, and confines his discourse to the *hieroglyphic* and *symbolic*. But was it, as Holstenius thought, that he explained the nature of the *epistolary* in the words τῶν μὲν κειταλογουμένων, &c. then has he entirely omitted the proper *hieroglyphic* (for the τῶν δὲ ἀλληγορουμένων, &c. relates only to the *symbolic*); which had been an unpardonable fault. But that this is Holstenius's mistake is further seen by the next passage from Clemens Alexandrinus. for what Porphyry calls *hieroglyphical* and *symbolical*, Clemens calls *hieroglyphical*; using *hieroglyphical* as a generic term which Porphyry used as a specific. Clemens, I say, giving an account of the nature of *hieroglyphic writing*, tells us it was of two sorts, the one, ΚΥΡΙΟΛΟΓΕΙΤΑΙ ΚΑΤΑ ΜΙΜΗΣΙΝ, *directly and simply imitates the thing intended to be represented*; by this he meant the proper *hieroglyphic* (which Porphyry, in his enumeration of the kinds, distinguishes from the *symbolic*; and what is more, Porphyry seems to have borrowed his expression of τῶν μὲν κειταλογουμένων κατὰ μίμνησιν, from Clemens's κυριολογεῖται κατὰ μίμνησιν, by which this latter evidently means to express the nature of the proper *hieroglyphic*. Besides, Clemens, who gives the nature of *epistolary writing*, with the same judgment that Porphyry omitted giving it, describes it in a very different manner, and with great propriety, thus, ἢ ἡ μὲν ἔστι διὰ τῶν πρώτων ΣΤΟΒΕΙ ΧΕΙΡΩΝ ΚΥΡΙΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ. Yet a learned writer, supported by the authority of Holstenius, which served his purpose in an argument for the low antiquity of Egypt, would persuade us that Porphyry did not mean by the expression κειταλογουμένων κατὰ μίμνησιν, that the characters he spoke of imitated the forms or figures of the things intended by them, for that was not the μίμνησιν, which the ancient writers ascribed to LETTERS. [Sac. and Prof. Hist. of the World connect. vol. ii. p. 296.] This argument is a *petitio principii*; which supposes Porphyry to be here describing *epistolary writing*. On this supposition the writer says, that the imitation of the forms or figures of things is not the μίμνησιν the ancient writers ascribed to letters. Certainly it is not. But Porphyry is not speaking of the letters, but of *hieroglyphic figures* therefore μίμνησιν does here, and may any where, mean (because it is the literal sense of the word) imitation of the figure of things. However, let us consider his criticism on this word, though it makes so little to his purpose.—Socrates in Plato says, it seems, ἡ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν καὶ γραμμάτων ἐν ἑστέῃ τῶν πραγμάτων ΑΠΟΜΙΜΟΤΜΕΝΟΝ, and the ancients, the learned writer tells us, were exceeding philosophical in their accounts of both words and letters when a word or sound was thought fully to express, according to their notions, the thing which it was designed to be the name of, then they called it the *imitation* or picture of that thing. The ancients were, without doubt, wonderfully profound, if we will believe Kireher and his school—but if a plain man may be heard, all the mystery of μίμνησιν and εἰκων was simply this alphabetic letters, as we have observed, sprung from *hieroglyphic* characters; and even received their form from thence. Now the ancients, as was very natural, when they spoke of the power of letters, and of words composed of letters, frequently transferred the terms μίμνησιν and εἰκων, to these, which properly belonged to *hieroglyphic* characters, a plain proof of this is the very word ἀπειμιμασμαι, quoted by the learned writer from Plato; which literally signifies, to imitate from an exemplar, but figuratively, to express

at large: so *πλάσμα* originally signified any thing formed and fashioned by art; traductively, a similitude in speech, nay, the musical modulation of the voice. There is a remarkable passage in Plutarch's discourse of the *Pythian propheteess no longer rendering her prophecies in verse*; where the word *πλάσμα* is generally thought to be used in the first of these traductive senses, but I think it must be understood in the second; speaking of the ancient manner of delivering the oracles, he says,—*οὐκ ἀκρόατοι, οὐδὲ λιτὴν, ἀλλ' ἐν μέτρῳ καὶ ὄγκῳ καὶ ΠΛΑΣΜΑΤΙ καὶ μεταφοραῖς διαμένον, καὶ μετ' ἀόλου*. M. Le Clerc, [De Prophetia, pag. 18. tom. iv. Comm. in V. T.] translates the latter part thus, *pedibus vincta, tumida, quæsitis et tralati-tis verbis constantia, et cum tibia pronunciata*. But *πλάσματι* signifies here, not *quæsitis verbis*, but that modulation of the voice which we may call *placida conformatio*, and is opposed to *ὄγκος*, a contrary modulation of the voice, which may be called *gravis conformatio*. These two were used in the theatre (to which the matter is compared) in a kind of *recitatio* on the flute: so that what Plutarch would say, is this, that the ancient oracles were not only delivered in verse, and in a pompous figurative style, but were sung likewise to the flute. To *ὄγκος* and *πλάσματι* he opposed *ἀκρόατοι*, in the sense of *untunable*; and to *μεταφοραῖς διαμένον* he opposed *λιτὴν*, *plain*, *simple*. Plutarch uses *πλάσμα* again in the sense of *conformatio*, where speaking of the elocution of Pericles, he calls it ΠΛΑΣΜΑ φωνῆς ἰσχυρῆς, a composed modulation of voice. But Quintilian employs it in the very sense in question, to express a soft and delicate modulation of voice. Sit autem imprimis lectio virilis et cum suavitate quadam gravis, et non quidem prosæ similis, quia carmen est, et se posse canere testantur. Non tamen in canticum dissoluta, nec PLASMATE (ut nunc a plerisque fit) effeminata, lib. i. cap. 14. Hence again, in another traduction, *plasma* was used to signify a certain medicine, that speakers in public took to render their voice soft and harmonious:

Sede leges celsa, liquido cum plasmate guttur  
Mobile conlueris—Pers. Sat. i. ver. 17.

Turnebus, not attending to this progressive change in the sense of words, and taking his signification of *plasma* from the passage of Quintilian, supposed that *plasma*, in this place of the poet, signifies not a medicament, but a soft and delicate modulation of the voice.—Est enim molli et tenera fictaque vocola poema eliquaverit udo gutture. Est enim *plasma*, ut alio loco docui, cum vox est tenera et mollis. On the other hand, Lubin, who had taken his signification of *plasma* from this place, will needs have the same word in the passage quoted above from Quintilian to signify not a soft and delicate modulation of the voice, but a medicament. Turnebi hujus loci explicatio, lib. xxviii. cap. 26. Adversar. mihi non placet, et hoc Quintiliani loco refutatur. Comment. in Pers.

P. 40, G G. Κατ' αἰκνύοντα μεταγόντες καὶ μετατιθέντες. That is, as I understand it, represented one thing by another, which other hath qualities bearing relation or analogy to the thing represented.

P. 40, H H. Ἀναγράφουσι διὰ τῶν ἀναγλύφων. The Latin translator keeps close to his original, *anaglyphicis describunt*; and Stanley, [Lives of Phil. p. 350. ed. 3d.] *they write by anaglyphics*: as if this was a new species of writing, now first mentioned by Clemens, and to be added to the other three: whereas, I suppose, it was Clemens's intention only to tell us that tropical symbols were chiefly to be met with on their stone monuments, engraven in relief: which was true.

P. 40, I I. Ἀντίκα οἱ παρ' Αἰγυπτίους παιδιύμενοι πρῶτον μὲν πάντων τῶν Αἰγυπτίων γραμμάτων μίθῳ ἐκμαθάνουσι, τὴν ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΟΓΡΑΦΙΚΗΝ καλουμένην· διυτίρας δὲ, τὴν ἹΕΡΑΤΙΚΗΝ, ἣ χαῖνται οἱ ἱερογλυμματίῳ· ὑστέρητι δὲ καὶ τελευταίαν, τὴν ἹΕΡΟΓΑΤΡΕΥΤΙΚΗΝ, ἣ ἡ μὲν ἐστὶ διὰ τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων κυριολογικὴ· ἡ δὲ συμβολικὴ· τῆς δὲ συμβολικῆς ἡ μὲν κυριολογεῖται κατὰ μέγεθος· ἡ δ' ἄσπερ τροπικῶς γράφεται· ἡ δὲ ἀντικρὺς ἀλληγορεῖται κατὰ σπουδὴν αἰνιγμάτων. Ἡλίου γὰρ γράψαι βουλόμενοι, κύκλον ποιῶσι· Σελήνην δὲ, σχῆμα μηνιοῖδές, κατὰ τὸ κυριολογούμενον ὕδους· τροπικῶς δὲ, κατ' οἰκνύοντα μεταγόντες καὶ μετατιθέντες, τὰ δ' ἑκαλλέττωσι· τὰ δὲ, πολλαχῶς μετασχηματίζονται, χαρέττουσιν· τοῦ γοῦν τῶν βασιλείων ἱππικῶν Συλλογισμῶν μύθους παραδίδόντες, ἀναγράφουσι διὰ τῶν ἀναγλύφων· τοῦ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς αἰνιγμούς, τρίτου ὕδους, διῶγμα ἴστω τόδε. τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρον, διὰ τὴν περίαν τῆς λατρίας, ὅφρην σάμασι ἐπίσταζον· τὸν δὲ ἥλιον, τῷ τοῦ παιδάρου, ἱπυδὴν πυλότητις ἐν τῆς βοείης ὁδοῦ σχῆμα πλασάμενος, ἀντιπρίσσωπος πυλίνδην. Strom. lib. v. pp. 555, 556.—Ed. Moroll. —ὡς ἡ μὲν ἐστὶ διὰ τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων κυριολογικὴ· ἡ δὲ συμβολικὴ, the Latin translator takes thus, *Cujus una quidem est per prima elementa κυριολογικὴ, id est, proprie loquens; altera vero symbolica, id est, per signa significans*. This is so faithfully translated, that it preserves the very ambiguity of the original, and leaves us still to guess at the author's division. Marsham takes it just wrong; and so does his nephew Stanley: the first of these learned men quotes and translates the passage thus: *Triplex erat apud Aegyptios characterum ratio, ἱστολογεγραφικὴ, ad scribendas epistolas apta, sive vulgaris; ἱερατικὴ, qua utuntur ἱερογλυμματίῳ, qui de rebus sacris scribunt, et ἱερογλυφικὴ, sacra sculptura; ἡ δὲ ἡ δὲ αὐτῆς species, κυριολογικὴ, proprie loquens per prima elementa, et συμβολικὴ, per signa*



[Can. Chron. p. 38. Franeq. ed.] The second thus,—*the last and most perfect*, hieroglyphical WHEREOF *one is* curiologic, *the other* symbolic. [Lives of Phil. p. 829. 3d ed.] By this interpretation, the learned father is, 1. made to enumerate three kinds of writing, but to explain only the last, namely, *hieroglyphics*; 2. which is worse, he is made to say one kind of hieroglyphics was by letters of an alphabet; for that is the meaning of *ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων*: 3. which is still worse, he is made to divide hieroglyphics into two sorts, *curiologic* and *symbolic*; and *symbolic* into three sorts, *curiologic*, *tropical* and *allegorical*; which makes the prior division into curiologic and symbolic, inaccurate and absurd; and spreads a general confusion over the whole passage. Their mistake seems to have arisen from supposing *μετέδωκεν ἱερογλυφικὰς*, (the *immediate antecedent*,) was understood at *ἡ*; ἡ *πρὶν* *ἔστι*; whereas it was the more *remote antecedent*, *μετέδωκεν Αἰγυπτίαν γραμμάτων*; and what made them suppose this, was, I presume, the author's expressing the common plain way of writing by letters of an alphabet, and the common plain way of imitating by figures, two very different things, by the same words, *καταλογιστὴν* and *καταλογιστῶν*; not considering that *ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων*, joined to the adjective, signified writing by letters; and *κατὰ μέτρον*, joined to the verb, signified *writing by figures*. In a word then, the plain and easy meaning of Clemens is this,—“The Egyptian method of writing was epistolic, sacerdotal, and hieroglyphical; of this method, the epistolic and sacerdotal were by letters of an alphabet; the hieroglyphical, by symbols: symbols were of three kinds, curiologic, tropical, and allegorical.”

P. 40, K K. This was indeed a very logical conclusion from the opinion *that hieroglyphics were invented to hide mysteries*; but the high improbability of the fact should have led them, one would think, to the falsehood of the premises. That the Egyptians had *letters* before they had *hieroglyphics*, seems to me as extravagant as that they danced before they could walk; and, I believe, will seem so to all who consider the first part of this dissertation. However, a modern writer has taken up that opinion: and tells us in plain terms, that *the hieroglyphical way of writing was not the ancient way of writing in Egypt*; [Connect. of the Sacr. and Prof. Hist. vol. i. p. 230, and again to the same purpose, vol. ii. 293, 294.] partly, I presume, as it favoured the hypothesis of the low antiquity of Egypt; and partly, perhaps, in compliment to that consequential notion, that not only all arts and sciences came from the Hebrews, but all the vehicles of knowledge likewise; whence, particularly, the author of the *Court of the Gentiles* derives hieroglyphics. *The greatest pieces of the Jewish wisdom*, says Mr Gale, *were couched under the cover of symbols and types; whence the Egyptians and other nations borrowed their hieroglyphic and symbolic wisdom*. [Part i. p. 77.] But on what ground does the author of the *Connection* build, in support of his opinion? On this, that *letters* are very ancient; in which, without doubt, he is right; but surely not so ancient as he would have them. However, the argument he uses is certainly a very perverse one: *There is one consideration more*, says he, *which makes it very probable that the use of LETTERS came from Noah, and out of the first world, and that is the account which the Chinese give of their LETTERS. They assert their first emperor, whom they name Fohi, to be the inventor of them; before Fohi they have no records, and their Fohi and Noah were the same person*. [vol. i. p. 236.] Now it unluckily happens that the Chinese are without LETTERS, even to this day. Nor are we, for all this, to think our author ignorant of the nature of the Chinese characters; for he tells us soon after, that *the Chinese have no notion of alphabetical letters, but make use of characters to express their meaning. Their characters are not designed to express words, for they are used by several neighbouring nations who differ in language*. [p. 244.] Thus the learned writer, before he was aware, in endeavouring to prove *letters* of higher antiquity than *hieroglyphics*, hath proved just the contrary; even that hieroglyphic characters, not letters, were the writing so early as his Noah; for the Chinese characters are properly hieroglyphics, that is, marks for *things*, not *words*; and *hieroglyphics* they are called by all the missionaries from whom we have the most authentic accounts of China. But had their characters been indeed *letters*, as our author, in this place, by mistake supposed them, yet still his argument would have had no weight; and I will beg leave to tell him why: the Chinese characters in use at present are very modern in comparison of the monarchy. The missionaries tell us, as may be seen by the quotations given above, that the Chinese character hath undergone several changes; that their first way of writing was, like the Mexican, by picture; that they then abbreviated it in the manner of the most ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics; and at length brought it, by many gradual improvements, to its present contracted form: yet a *real character* or *hieroglyphic* the Chinese writing still is; and so is likely to continue.

P. 42, L L. A late curious voyager, who had examined the larger PYRAMIDS with great exactness, and found no hieroglyphics inscribed upon them, either without or within, concludes, rather too hastily, that they were built before the use of hieroglyphic writing in Egypt; and from thence insinuates another conclusion, in favour of the absurd hypothesis here confuted, that hieroglyphics were not the first species of writing known in Egypt; and, consequently, did not come from picture-writing, but from alphabetic marks; a foolish error, which betrays great ignorance in the natural progress of human knowledge. “*Si se sup-*

pass," says Captain Norden, "que les pyramides, même les dernières, ont été élevées avant que l'on eût l'usage des hiéroglyphes, je ne l'avance sans fondement. Qui pourroit se persuader, que les Egyptiens eussent laissé ces superbes monumens, sans la moindre inscription hiéroglyphique, eux, qui, comme on l'observe de toutes parts, prodiguoient les hiéroglyphes sur tous les édifices de quelque considération ? Or on n'en apperçoit aucun, ni au dedans, ni au dehors, des pyramides, pas même sur les ruines des temples de la seconde et de la troisième pyramide: n'est ce pas une preuve que l'origine des pyramides précède celle des hiéroglyphes, que l'on regarde néanmoins comme les premiers caractères dont on ait usé en Egypte."—*Voyage d'Egypte*, 3me partie, p. 75.

The curious voyager not only satisfies himself in accounting for the want of hieroglyphic characters on the pyramids, by their being built before the invention of such characters, but seems to value himself upon a discovery resulting from it, that *hieroglyphics were not the first sort of writing in Egypt*. But there is a greater difficulty in this matter than he was aware of.

It hath been proved at large, that *marks for things*, by a kind of picture-writing, were the first rude effort of every people upon earth, to convey and perpetuate their intelligence and conceptions to one another, as soon as they began to associate into tribes and nations. The monuments in question are a proof that the erectors of them had advanced in the arts of civil life. No one, then, who understands what society is, can doubt but that the Egyptians had then a method of conveying their thoughts at a distance, by visible marks: and no one, acquainted with the slow progress of human inventions, can imagine that alphabetic writing was the first effort towards this conveyance. Hence arises the difficulty.

But this observation of the curious voyager, which furnishes the difficulty, supplies the solution. Suppose only the pyramids to be erected in the interval between the inventions of *curiologic* and *tropical* hieroglyphics, that is, between their natural and more artificial state, and the difficulty vanishes: for in their natural state they would be only used out of security; and not for ornament, luxury, or decoration. So that it is no wonder we do not find them on the PYRAMIDS in pompous and flattering inscriptions like those on the OBELISKS.

His observation, Norden indeed gives, as a proof of the high antiquity of the pyramids; and very justly. But his drawings furnish us with another argument in support of this truth, which he himself seems not to have considered: it is this, that the general idea of Egyptian architecture was entirely taken from the PYRAMIDS: which nothing sure but the high veneration for them, increased by their remote antiquity, could possibly have occasioned; since the figure of these sepulchral monuments, so well adapted to triumph over time, is the most inconvenient that can possibly be imagined for habitable structures, whether public or private; and exceedingly grotesque, in all others. And yet we see, from the ancient ruins of Egypt, of which this diligent and exact traveller has given us so fine drawings, that all their buildings, without exception, were raised on the idea and genius of the pyramids. We are surprised to find not only their ports, their door-steads [see plates CIX.—CXVIII.] but even the very walls of their temples, [Pl. CXLVII.—VIII.—CLI.—CLIV.] nay of their towns, narrowing upwards and inclining inwards, in the manner of a modern fortification. [Pl. XCIX.—CXV.—CXXXVIII.]—But to return to the solution given above: it may be said, perhaps, "Allow the pyramids to have been erected in the interval between the invention of *curiologic* and *tropical* hieroglyphics. What hindered the Egyptians from scribbling over these bulky monuments with their first rude essays, as other barbarous nations have done upon their rocks? of which we find specimens enough in Scandinavia, north-east Tartary, and elsewhere." Indeed I know of nothing but custom that hindered them; that sovereign mistress of the world, who only is of force to control and conquer nature: and that custom did effectually hinder them, is very plain, from our finding no specimens of any of their first rude hieroglyphic paintings; though, from them, their improved hieroglyphics received their birth. Nor did they want, any more than other barbarians, their isolated rocks for this purpose: they had them very commodiously bordering on the Nile, and in view of all passengers. And on these, it is remarkable, they have inscribed their improved hieroglyphics, though we see no remains of any the earlier and ruder efforts of picture-writing.

But the modesty and reserve of this curious traveller, and his deference to learned antiquity, deserve commendation. He is not of the number of those who expect more faith from their reader than they commonly find, or venture to entertain him with discoveries which he did not expect. For the learned reader acquiesces in antiquity; the sensible reader prefers the evidence of a contemporary writer to the conjectures of a modern traveller: yet such is the general humour of our voyagers, that they think they do nothing, if they do not rectify the errors of antiquity. I have an ingenious measurer of the pyramids in my eye, and one of the latest too [Dr Shaw], who, in the passion for saying something new, assures us, that the opinion of their being SEPULCHRES is an old inveterate mistake: that they are indeed no other than TEMPLES, for religious worship. To soften so rugged a paradox, he says, *there was no universal consent amongst the ancients concerning the use or purpose for which these pyramids were designed*. And was there any universal consent

amongst them that snow was white? But would this save the modesty or understanding of him who should affirm, after a certain ancient philosopher, that it was black? And yet such a one would have the advantage of our traveller; who would be hard put to it to produce any ancient, whether philosopher or otherwise, who said the pyramids were *temples*. But if the positive and agreeing testimony of all the old writers extant may be called *universal consent*, it certainly is not wanting. Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, Pliny, Tacitus, &c., all assure us that the pyramids were *sepulchres*. Nay, Diodorus, to put the matter out of doubt, informs us, that the sacred commentaries of their priests said so. But our traveller supposed this universal consent to be shaken at least by Pliny, who tells us, *they were built for ostentation, and to keep an idle people in employment*. As if this intimated that, in Pliny's opinion, they were not sepulchres! Suppose I should say the great arch at Blenheim was *built for ostentation*; and if not to set an idle people to work, yet at least to make them stare: does this contradict the universal consent of its being a bridge, though as much too large for the water that runs under it, as the pyramids were for the bodies contained in them? In a word, Pliny is not speaking of the use to which the buildings were applied, but of the *motives* for their erection.

P. 45, M M. Against this, a late furious writer objects—"But is it credible that the polite and learned priests of Egypt would use a method to hide and secrete their knowledge, which the more rude and barbarous nations employed to publish and divulge theirs? Or can you conceive that a curious and studied refinement of so knowing and enlightened a people as the Egyptians should be one and the very same thing with a rude and simple invention of those nations which were most barbarous and uncivilized?"—Jackson's *Chronol.* vol. iii. p. 357.

I answer by another question—Is it credible that the polite and learned orators and historians of Greece and Rome should, out of choice, use a method [FIGURATIVE EXPRESSION] to perfect their eloquence, which the first rude and barbarous nation employed out of necessity, and which rude and barbarous nations still employ, for want of intellectual ideas, and more abstract terms? Or can you conceive, that a curious and studied refinement of dress, in so knowing and enlightened a people as the present French, should be one and the same thing with the rude and simple invention of leathern garments to cover nakedness amongst the Laplanders, a people most barbarous and uncivilized? But if it displeases our chronologist, that so enlightened and refined a people as the Egyptians should pride themselves in the rude and simple invention of barbarians: what will he say to find, that the most savage people upon earth go a step beyond the most polished in the delicacy and luxury of speech? Yet this is the case of the Greenlanders, or the missionary Eggede deceives us. *The women*, says he, *have a dialect different from the men, making use of the softest letters at the ends of words, instead of the hard ones*.—Hist. of Greenland, p. 160.

P. 45, N N. This hieroglyphic likewise signified the *earth*; for the first rude mortals imagined, that that which sustained them was the Deity which gave them being. So Hesiod, who took his notions of the *earth* from the Egyptians, describes her after their paintings; ΓΑΙ' ΕΡΤΥΣΤΕΡΝΟΣ, which the figure of the Diana multimammia well explains. But Shakspeare, who, as Pope finely observes, had *immediately from nature what the two Greek poets, Homer and Hesiod, received through Egyptian strainers*, paints this famous hieroglyphic with much more life and spirit:

——— "Common mother thou!  
Whose womb unmeasurable and INFINITE BREAST  
Teems and feeds all."

That Hesiod had there the Egyptian goddess in his mind, is plain from the character he gives of her in the words subjoined,

πάντων ἴδης ἀσφαλὲς αἰὲν  
'Αθαιάνην,

for the *earth* was the first habitation of those gods which Greece borrowed of the Egyptians; from whence, as the poet insinuates, they were transferred into heaven:

Γαῖα δὲ τοι πρῶτον μὲν ἰγύνετο Ἰσσι ἑαυτῇ  
Οὐρανὸν ἀσπερίσθ', ἵνα μιν περὶ πάντα καλύπτει,  
'Ορε' ὣη μακάρεσσι θιῶϊς ἴδης ἀσφαλὲς αἶν.

P. 47, O O. A very curious specimen of this hasty delineation of the outlines of the figures (which gave birth to the running hand character we are here speaking of) the reader will find in Kircher, p. 350, of his *Œdip. Ægypt.* tom. iii. where he has given the characters on the Florentine obelisk, which, though dignified by that name, is only a late mimic in miniature of the superb monuments so entitled. See plate VIII.

P. 47, P P. The account which a missionary jesuit gives us of the several sorts of writing amongst the Chinese will illustrate this matter:—*Parmi ces caractères il y en a de plusieurs sortes. Les premiers ne sont presque plus d'usage, et on ne les conserve que*



pour faire honneur à l'antiquité. Les seconds beaucoup moins anciens n'ont place que dans les inscriptions publiques: quand on en a besoin, on consulte les livres, et à la faveur des dictionnaires il est facile de les déchiffrer. Les troisiemes, beaucoup plus reguliers et plus beaux, servent dans l'impression et même dans l'écriture ordinaire. Néanmoins comme les traits en sont bien formés, il faut un temps considerable pour les écrire; c'est pour cela qu'on a trouvé une quatrième espece d'écriture, dont les traits plus liés et moins distingués les uns des autres, donnent la facilité d'écrire plus vite—ces trois derniers caractères ont entre eux beaucoup de ressemblance, et respondent assez à nos lettres capitales, aux lettres d'impression, et à l'écriture ordinaire.—Nouveaux Memoires sur l'état present de la Chine, par le P. L. Le Comte, tom. i. Amst. 1698, pp. 258, 259. And here let me just take notice of a ridiculous mistake into which the equivocation of the word *notes* (a term signifying as well *short-hand* characters, as *hieroglyphical*) drew a certain learned grammarian: who in a letter to his friend [*Gloss. Ant. Rom.* p. 414, ed. 1731,] undertaking to give the original of *short-hand* characters, rejects the account of the ancients (which makes them a Roman invention) to fetch them from the barbarians; and will have them to be indeed the same as the *Ignorabiles literæ* of the Egyptians (mentioned by Apuleius) and the present Chinese characters; that is, real *hieroglyphics*. But had he considered, that the *notes of short-hand* were marks for words, and the *notes of hieroglyphics* marks for things, he would have seen that they had no manner of relation to one another, but were of different original, and employed to different ends: he thinks, however, he has found a support for his notion in St Jerome; who, he says, tells us somewhere or other, that they came from the barbarians: *Restant adhuc NOTÆ, quæ, cum ex barbarorum puto ortu notæ sint, rationem amisere*. But without searching for the place, and recurring to the context, we may safely pronounce, that St Jerome meant here by NOTÆ, not the *notes of short-hand*, but *hieroglyphic notes*; by his saying of them *rationem amisere*; which was not true of *short-hand notes*, but very true of *hieroglyphical*.

P. 48, Q Q. To this, perhaps, it may be objected that *literary writing* had the name of *epistolary*, rather from its being afterwards employed in such kind of compositions; because Clemens Alexandrinus says, that *Atossa the Persian empress was the first that wrote epistles*; and Tatian, where he gives a list of some inventors, expresses himself, from Hellanicus the historian, in this manner, 'Επιστολὰς ΣΥΝΤΑΣΣΕΙΝ ἔξωθεν ἡ Περσὶν ποτὶ ἡγεμονίην γὰρ, καὶ ἄλλοις ποτὶ Ἕλληνας, Ἀτὼσα δὲ ὄνομα αὐτῇ ἦν. But to this it may be replied, that the supposition of literary writing's having the name of *epistolary* from any later application of alphabetic letters to this sort of composition, is very precarious: for it may be asked, why rather a name from *epistles* than from any nobler sort of composition, in which we must needs conclude letters had been employed, before the use of epistles, if epistles were so lately invented? But the truth is, if by *συντάσσειν*, which word Clemens likewise uses, we are to understand the *composing*, and not the *artificial closing and sealing up* of the tablets in which the ancients wrote their epistles (the more natural sense of the word, and an invention more to the genius of a court lady), we must needs say the whole story of Atossa's invention is a very idle one, and worth only the attention of such triflers as the writers *Of the invention of things*; from whence Tatian and Clemens had it: they might as well have inquired after the inventors of *speech*: writing epistles being as early as the occasions of communicating the thoughts at a distance; that is, as early as human commerce. We find in the *Il.* ζ. ver. 169, Bellerophon carrying an epistle from Prætus to Iobates. "No," says a great critic [see p. 539, of the *Dissertation upon Phalaris*,] this was no epistle, as Pliny rightly remarks, but *codicilli*; and Homer himself calls it *πίναξ ὀρυκτός*." I do not comprehend the force of the learned person's argument; the point between him and his noble adversary was concerning the *thing*, not the *name*; but Pliny's observation, and his own, is concerning the *name*, not the *thing*. Let what Bellerophon carried be *πίναξ ὀρυκτός*, small leaves of wood covered with wax, and written upon by a pen of metal, yet was it essentially an *epistle*, if Cicero's definition of an *epistle* be a true one: *hoc est*, says he, *epistola proprium, ut is ad quem scribitur, de iis rebus quas ignorat, certior fiat*. Why Pliny said, this *πίναξ ὀρυκτός* was not an *epistle*, but a *codicil*, was because small leaves of wood covered with wax, when written on, were called by his countrymen *codicilli*; and a missive paper, *epistola*: that this was his meaning appears from the account he gives of the pretended *paper epistle of Sarpedon* mentioned as a great rarity by Licinius Mucianus.—See the Dissert. mentioned above.

P. 49, R R. By *sonos vocis* Cicero means *words*: it was impossible he could ever conceive that brute and inarticulate sounds were almost infinite.—See what is said on this matter below.

Long before this addition was made to the discourse on hieroglyphic writing, one of the ablest philosophers of this age, M. l'Abbé de Condillac, in his *Essai sur l'Origine des Connoissances humaines*, had the candour to say, that I had perfectly well discovered the progress by which men arrived to the invention of letters. Cette section [De L'écriture], says he, étoit presque achevée, quand l'Essai sur les Hieroglyphes traduit de l'Anglois de

M. Warburton me tomba entre les mains: ouvrage où l'esprit philosophique et régissent également, &c. mes propres réflexions m'avoient aussi conduit à rendre l'écriture n'avoit d'abord été qu'une simple peinture: mais je n'avois point encore découvert par quels progrès on étoit arrivé à l'invention des lettres, et il me parut facile d'y réussir. La chose a été parfaitement exécutée par M. Warburton, partie.—My own countrymen have been less candid: and to them the above is owing.

P. 51, S S. Τὸ περί τῶν ἐν Βαβυλῶνι ἱερῶν γραμμάτων. Περὶ τῶν ἐν Μαισῶι ἱερῶν.—In Vit. Democr. Segm. xlix. lib. 9. But Reinesius and Menage, supposing there was any sacred mysterious writing out of Egypt and its confines the *Babylon* here mentioned to be Babylon in Egypt; but they should have reflected, unlikely it was, if Democritus had chosen to write of the *sacred letters of the Egyptians*, that he should denominate his discourse from a place not at all celebrated for their use, when there were so many other that these characters had rendered famous.

P. 54, T T. I have the pleasure to find, that so sensible a writer as the celebrated M. Astruc, in his *Conjectures sur la Genèse*, has espoused this opinion, that *alphabetic writing* was in use amongst the Egyptians before the time of Moses: he has likewise adopted the arguments here employed in support of it, as well as this whole theory of *hieroglyphic writing*.

P. 54, U U. Exod. xxviii. 21. *And the stones shall be with the names of the children of Israel, twelve, according to their names; LIKE THE ENGRAVINGS OF A SIGNET, every one with his name shall they be, according to the twelve tribes.* And again, ver. 36. *And thou shalt make a plate of pure gold, and grave upon it, like the engravings of a signet, HOLINESS TO THE LORD.* Had letters been invented by Moses, and unknown till then to the Israelites, would he not naturally have said, when he directed the workmen to engrave names and sentences on stones and gold,—*and in these engravings you shall employ the alphabetic characters which I have now invented and taught you the use of?* On the contrary, he gives them a very different direction; he refers them to a model in familiar use,—*like the engravings of a signet.* For the ancient people of the east engraved names and sentences on their seals, just as the Mahometan princes do at present.—Mr Fleury with great ingenuity confesses the high perfection of the arts at this time amongst the Israelites. “Ils sçavoient tailler et graver les pierres précieuses. Ils étoient Menuisiers, Tapisseurs, Brodeurs et Parfumeurs. Entre ces arts, il y en a deux que j’estime principalement: la taille des pierreries, et la fonte des figures, telles qu’étoient les Chérubins de l’Arche et le Veau d’or. Ceux qui ont tant soit peu connoissance des arts, savent combien il faut d’artifices et de machines pour ces ouvrages. Si des-lors on les avoit trouvées, on avoit déjà bien raffiné, même dans les arts qui ne servent qu’à l’ornement; et si l’on avoit quelque secret pour faire les mêmes choses plus facilement, c’étoit encore une plus grande perfection, ce qui soit dit en passant, pour montrer que cette antiquité si éloignée n’étoit pas grossière et ignorante, comme plusieurs s’imaginent.”—*Mœurs des Israelites*, sect. 9.

P. 54, X X. A certain anonymous writer, quoted by Crinitus from an ancient MS. in his *De honesta Disciplina*, is of this opinion. But I quote him chiefly for his pacific disposition to accommodate and compromise matters, by giving every nation its share in the glory of the invention; not, I mean, of the alphabetic powers, but of the various alphabetic characters:

Moses primus Hebraicas exaravit literas;  
Mente Phœnices sagaci condiderunt Atticas;  
Quas Latini scriptitamus, edidit Nicostrata;  
Abraham Syras, et idem repperit Chaldaicas;  
Isis arte non minore, protulit Ægyptiacas;  
Gulfilæ promisit Getarum, quas videmus, literas.”

P. 60, Y Y. Les Iroquois, comme les Lacedemoniens, veulent un discours vif et concis; leur style est cependant figuré, et tout *metaphorique*. *Mœurs des Sauvages Américains comparées aux Mœurs des premiers Temps*, par Lafitau, tom. i. p. 480, 481. And of the various languages of all the people on that great continent in general, he expresseth himself thus, La plupart de ces peuples occidentaux, quoiqu’avec des langues très différentes, ont cependant à peu près la même genie, la même façon de penser, et les mêmes tours pour s’exprimer; tom. ii. p. 481. Condamine gives pretty much the same account of the savages of South America. Speaking of their languages, he says, plusieurs sont énergiques et susceptibles d’éloquence, &c. p. 54, which can mean no other than that their terms are highly figurative. But this is the universal genius of the language of barbarians. Egede, in his *History of Greenland*, says, *the language is very rich of words and sense; and of such ENERGY, that one is often at a loss, and puzzled to render it in Danish.*—P. 165. This energy is apparently what the French missionary calls tout *metaphorique*.

in, speaking of metaphors, says, *Qua quidem cum ita est ab ipsa nobis concessa et inducti quoque ac non sentientes ea frequenter utantur*, lib. viii. cap. 6, which is the way, that Quintilian did not apprehend their true cause or original.—By all he seen how much M. Bullet mistakes the matter, where, in his *Memoires sur le Celtique*, he says, “*Dans les pays chauds une imagination ardente decouvre la plus petite ressemblance qu’une chose peut avoir avec une autre. Elle voit par exemple, le rapport qui se trouve entre un homme cruel et une bête feroce; et a connoître qu’elle apperçoit cette ressemblance elle donne à cet homme le nom de Veille l’origine du langage figuré et metaphorique. Dans les pays froids, où l’on n’a pas une vivacité pareille, on se sert de termes propres pour exprimer le chose, on appelle tout par son nom.*”—Vol. i. p. 6. But we find the fact to be just the reverse.

P. 60, Z Z. *Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς ἰμυλίας βραχυλόγου, καὶ αἰνγματίνου, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ αἰνιγμένον συνεδραμῶς· πάλλὰ δὲ λίγοντις ἐν ὑπερβολαῖς.*—P. 213. This being the nature and genius common to all the barbarous nations upon earth, I am almost tempted to believe *Geoffry of Monmouth*, when he says, that he translated his worthy history of Britain from the Welsh; of which, his original, he gives this character,—*Phallerata verba et ampullosa dictiones*. If this was not so, one can hardly tell why he should mention a circumstance that neither recommended his copy nor his original. But the character of the ballads of the old Welsh bards fully supports Diodorus’s account of the style of the ancient Gauls.

P. 60, A A A. But the important use to which the very learned the Abbé de Condillac has employed all that has been here said on this matter, may be seen in his excellent Essay on the origin of human Knowledge, part ii. which treats of Language.

P. 60, B B B. Quintilian makes an objector to the *figurative style* argue thus,—*Antiquissimum quæque maxime secundum naturam dixisse contendunt; mox poetis similiores extitisse, etiamsi parcius, simili tamen ratione, falsa et impropria virtutes ducentes*. On which he observes—*qua in disputatione non nihil veri est*. It is true, there is something of truth in it, and indeed, not much; for though the polishers of human speech did, as the objector says, turn the improprieties of speech into ornament, it is utterly false that the most ancient speakers used only simple and proper terms.

P. 63, C C C. So I thought: and so it has been generally thought. But M. de Beausobre, in his *Histoire de Manichée*, lib. iv. cap. 4, has made it probable, that the heretics had no hand in these *Abdiasas*, but that they are altogether pagan.

P. 64, D D D. This charm, which the Arabs called *talisman* or *tsalimam*, the latter Greeks, when they had borrowed the superstition, called ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΑ; which shows of what house they supposed it to have come; *στοιχεῖα* being, as we have observed, the technical Greek name for hieroglyphic characters.

P. 64, E E E. The same error has made the half-paganized Marsilius Ficinus fall into the idle conceit, that the *golden calf* was only a *talisman*:—Hebræi quoque, says he, in *Ægypto nutriti*, struere vitulum aureum didicerant, ut eorundem astrologi putant, ad aucupandum Veneris lunæque favorem, contra Scorpionis atque Martis influxum Judæis infestum.—*De Vita Cœlit. Com. lib. iiii. cap. 13.*

P. 64, F F F. This discourse on the EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPHICS hath had the same fortune abroad, that the discourse on the BOOK OF JOB hath had at home: like this, it hath been the occasion of much waste paper, and violation of common sense. For the Discourse on the Hieroglyphics having been well translated and well received in France, both the subject and the author became known enough to invite all gentlemen scholars, better able to entertain the public, to oblige us with their ingenious conjectures; and many a French pen, even to that of a captain of grenadiers, hath been drawn, to show that the nature of hieroglyphics is yet as unknown as ever. A nameless dissertator, *sur l’Ecriture Hieroglyphique*, (who chooses to write, as he himself very truly says, in his titlepage,—*sub luce maligna*) assures us, that hieroglyphics were not a species of writing to convey intelligenco to the reader, but a mere ornament upon stone, to entertain the eye of the spectator: so there is an end of the SUBJECT. The learned captain, who wheels in a larger circle, and takes in all the wisdom of Egypt, laments with much humanity, the superficiality and ignorance of all who have gone before him, and their utter incapacity of getting to the source of things: so there is an end of the AUTHOR. Indeed, the journalist who recommends this important work to the public seems to have his doubts as to this point—N’est ce pas s’avancer un peu trop, says he, et peut-on dire que MARSHAM pour la Chronologie et l’Histoire, M. WARBURTON pour les Hieroglyphes, et d’autres sçavans ayent négligé de consulter les sources?

To say the truth, these wonderful investigators of the learning of ancient Egypt, by the mere dint of modern ingenuity, had provocation enough to fall upon this unlucky discourse, which no sooner appeared amongst them in the fine translation of a very learned French lawyer, than the celebrated writers of the *Journal des Sçavans*, of March 1744, and of *Trevoux*, of July in the same year, announced it to the public in these terms. “*Il regne,*” says the first, “une si belle analogie dans le système de Mr Warburton, et toutes ses parties

tennent les unes aux autres par un lien si naturel, qu'on est porté à croire que l'origine, et les progrès de l'écriture et du langage ont été tels qu'il les a décrits. Le public doit avoir bien de l'obligation au traducteur de lui avoir fait connoître un ouvrage si curieux."—"M. Warburton," says the other, "n'a pû sans une erudition profonde, une lecture soigneusement digérée et des reflexions infinies traiter avec tant de précision, de justesse et de netteté, un sujet de lui même si difficile à mettre en œuvre. Les plus savans hommes se sont laissé séduire sur l'origine des hieroglyphes; et la plupart ont regardé un effet du peu d'expérience des Egyptiens comme un raffinement de la plus mystérieuse sagesse. C'est cette erreur que M. Warburton s'applique particulièrement à détruire dans la première partie. Il le fait de la manière la plus naturelle. Ce n'est point un système fondé sur DES IMAGINATIONS VAGUES. Ses raisonnemens, ses preuves, sont appuyées sur des FAITS, sur la NATURE des choses, et sur LES PRINCIPES LES PLUS LUMINEUX DU SENS COMMUN."

P. 65, G G G. Amongst the rest, the author of *Sacred and Profane History connected*: who says: "We have no reason to think that these hieroglyphics [namely, what we call the *curiologic*] were so ancient as the first letters:" this is his first answer to the opinion that hieroglyphics were more ancient. His second is in these words: "They would have been a very imperfect character; many, nay most occurrences, would be represented by them but by halves," vol. ii. p. 295. Now this to me appears a very good argument why *hieroglyphics* were indeed the *first* rude effort towards recording the human conceptions; and still, a better, why they could not be the *second*, when men had already found out the more complete method of alphabetic letters.

P. 66, H H H. What hath been said above of the reason why *Egypt* alone continued their *hieroglyphic* characters after the invention of *letters*, and why all other nations thenceforward left them off, will give an easy solution to what a curious traveller seems to think matter of some wonder, namely, that "the symbolic learning was the only part of Egyptian wisdom not translated into Greece." [Dr Shaw's *Travels*, p. 391]—But if this learned man meant not *hieroglyphic characters*, but only the *mode* of Egyptian wisdom employed therein, he raises a wonder out of his own mistake; that mode was *translated into Greece* with the rest; for the precepts of Pythagoras were a fantastic kind of *translation* of hieroglyphic pictures into verbal propositions; and on that account, doubtless, called *συνεολα*:—*Μάλιστα*, says Plutarch, ὃ οὗτος [ὁ Πυθαγόρας] ὡς ἴσκει, θαυμαστίαι καὶ θαυμάσιαι τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἀπειμνήσαντο τὸ συμβολικὸν αὐτῶν καὶ μυστηριώδες, ἀναμίξας αἰνίγμασι τὰ δόγματα τῶν γὰρ καλουμένων γραμμάτων ἱερογλυφικῶν οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει τὰ πολλὰ τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν παραγγιγμάτων, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ Μὴ ἰσθίην ἐπὶ δίφρου μὴδ' ἐπὶ χοίνικος καθῆσθαι, μὴδ' φαίμενα ἐστύνειν, μὴδ' πῦρ μαχαίρῃ σπαλύνειν ἐν οἰκίᾳ.—*De Is. et Os.* p. 632, ed. Steph. 8vo. Ἀντίκα τῆς βαρβάρου, says Clemens Alex., φιλοσοφίας, πάντοσφ' ὁρᾷ ἱστοικευμένης ἄρτυται τὰ Πυθαγόρεια ΣΥΜΒΟΛΑ. παρὰ τοῦ γοῦν ὁ Σάμιος χελιδόνα ἐν οἰκίᾳ μὴ ἔχειν, τοῦτίσθαι, λάλῃ καὶ ψιθυρεῖν καὶ πρὸς γλαύκας ἀνδρῶν, &c.—*Strom. lib. v.* p. 558, edit. Colon. 1688, fol.

P. 67, I I I. The reader may now see how inconsiderately the learned W. Baxter pronounced upon the matter when he said, "The *ἱερὰ γράμματα* of the Egyptians were *notæ sacrae* borrowed from the oneirocritics, and therefore divine." [App. to his *Gloss. Antiq. Rom.* p. 414.] Nor does the more judicious Mr Daubuz conclude less erroneously, when he supposes that both *oneirocritics* and *hieroglyphics* stood upon one common foundation. But he was misled by Kircher, and certain late Greek writers, who pretended that the ancient Egyptians had I can't tell what notion of a close union between visible bodies in heaven, the invisible deities, and this inferior world, by such a concatenation from the highest to the lowest, that the affections of the higher link reached the lower throughout the whole chain: for that the intellectual world is so exact a copy and idea of the visible, that nothing is done in the visible, but what is decreed before and exemplified in the intellectual. [Prelim. Discourse to his *Comm. on the REVELATION*.] This was the senseless jargon of Jamblichus, Porphyry, Proclus, and the rest of that fanatic tribe of Pythagorean-Platonists; and this they obtruded on the world for old Egyptian wisdom; the vanity of which pretence has been confuted in the first Part. It is hard to say whether these enthusiasts believed themselves, there is such an equal mixture of folly and knavery in all their writings: however, it is certain, Kircher believed them.

P. 68, K K K. But hieroglyphic writing, as we have observed, not only furnished rules of interpretation for their oneirocritics, but figures of speech for their orators. So Isaiah expresseth the king of Assyria's invasion of Judea by the *stretching out of his wings to fill the breadth of the land*:\* And afterwards, prophesying against Egypt and Ethiopia, he says, *No to the land shadowing with wings*.† Most of the interpreters, indeed, explain wings to signify the sails of their vessels on the Nile; but the expression evidently means, in general, the overshadowing with a mighty power: of which wings in hieroglyphic language were the emblem.

P. 68, L L L. Thus Suidas on the word ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΑ· αἱ ἰσάντι καὶ ἀπεπλάσμι τῶν οὐρανῶν αἱ δὲ ἐλίου ἢ πολλοῦ χρόνου τὴν ἔκτασιν ἔχουσαι. Artemidorus tells us this was the

\* Chap. viii. ver. 8.

† Chap. xviii. ver. 1.

technical word for the phantasms in dreams: 'Ονειρός ἐστι, κρίσις ἢ πλάσις ψυχῆς πολλῶν ὁρίων σημασιὰ τῶν ἰσχυρίων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν· τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντες, ὅσα μὲν ἀποβήσεται μεταξὺ χρέων διλλόντες, ἢ πολλῶν, ἢ ὀλίγων, ταῦτα πάντα δι' ἰσχυρίων ἰδίῳ φυσικῶν τῶν καὶ ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΝ παλαυρίων, προαγορεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τὸν μεταξὺ χρέων νομιζουσα ἡμᾶς δύνασθαι λογισμῷ διδασκαλίῳ τὰ ἰσχυρίων μαθεῖν.—Oneir. lib. i. cap. 2. And in his fourth book he begins a chapter which he entitles πρὸς ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΝ in this manner: Περὶ δὲ τῶν ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΝ πρὸς τὸν ἰσχυρίων ἐκδοῦναι δεκόντας, οὗτοι δὲ λόγος ἀρμόσι, ὅπως ἔχῃ; ἀπικρίνεσθαι καὶ αὐτοῖς, καὶ μὴ ἔκαστῃς ἐπὶ τῶν πλάσιων λυγόντων ὕμῃ.—Cap. 3.

P. 64, M M M. But the learned Daubuz, in consequence of his trusting to the fanatic notion of the late Greek philosophers, supposes that hieroglyphic marks were called *στειχιῶν*, because the first composers of them used the heavenly bodies to represent the notions of their minds, there being, according to them, a mystic sympathetic union and analogy between heavenly and earthly things; consequently that *στειχιῶν*, in this use, signifies the host of heaven: That it may do so, according to the genius of the Greek tongue, he endeavours to prove by its coming from *στειχῶν*, which is a military term, and signifies to march in order. [p. 10. of the Prel. Disc.] But this learned man should on this occasion have remembered his own quotation from the excellent Quintilian, p. 54, *that analogy is not founded upon reason, but example. Non ratione nititur analogia, sed exemplo; nec lex est loquendi, sed observatio; ut ipsam analogiam nulla res alia fecerit, quam consuetudo.*—Inst. lib. i. cap. 10.

P. 68, N N N. Here perhaps I shall be told, with the candour I have commonly experienced, that I have applied the history of Pharaoh's dream in illustrating the old pagan method of oneirocritic for no other purpose than to discredit Joseph's prophetic interpretation of it: therefore, though this matter be explained afterwards at large, I must here inform the reader, of what every one will be content to know, except such as these, who never think but to suspect, and never suspect but to accuse, that when God pleases to deal with men by his ministers, he generally condescends to treat them according to their infirmities; a method which hath all the marks of the highest wisdom as well as goodness. Phantasms in dreams were superstitiously thought to be *symbolical*: God, therefore, when it was his good pleasure to send dreams to Pharaoh, made the foundation of them two well-known symbols; and this, doubtless, in order to engage the dreamer's more serious attention: but then to confound the Egyptian *oneirocritics*, these dreams were so circumstanced with matters foreign to the principles of their art, that there was need of a truly divine interpreter to decipher them.

P. 69, O O O. But if you will believe a late writer, *animal worship* was so far from coming from *hieroglyphics*, that hieroglyphics came out of animal worship. This is an unexpected change of the scene; but, for our comfort, it is only the forced consequence of a false hypothesis, which will be well considered in its place; "The *hieroglyphical* inscriptions of the Egyptians," says he, "are pretty full of the figures of birds, fishes, beasts, and men, with a few letters sometimes between them; and this alone is sufficient to hint to us, that they could not come into use before the animals, represented in inscriptions of this sort, were become by allegory and mythology capable of expressing various things by their having been variously used in the ceremonies of their religion."—Connect. of the Sacred and Profane History, vol. ii. p. 294. But if this were the case, how came these animals to be *so capable* of expressing by *allegory* and *mythology*? or in other words, how came they to be the objects of worship? We are yet to seek; and it must be more than a *hint* that can supply us with a reason.

P. 72, P P P. As unanswerable a proof as this appears to be, that the *living animal* was not yet worshipped in Egypt, for if it were, what occasion for this trouble and expense? yet a learned German, so oddly are men's heads sometimes framed, brings this circumstance to prove that the *living animal* was at this time worshipped in Egypt.—Eadem historia Mosæica cultus vivorum animalium in Ægypto, vestigia alia non inficienda, tum sæpe alias, tum vero omnium clarissime in VITULO AUREO nobis offert.—Jablonski, Pantheon Ægyptorum Prolegom.—P. 85.

P. 73, Q Q Q. Sis, in the eastern languages, signified a *swallow*; under whose form, as this fable says, Isis concealed herself: and BUBASTE, which signifies a *cat*, was the Egyptian name of Diana, who lay hid under that shape. Hence the learned Bochart supposes, in his usual way, that the original of this fable was only an equivocal of some Greek storyteller, whose countrymen delighted in the marvellous. But 1. The fable was not of Greek invention, if we may believe Diodorus and Lucian; the latter of whom, speaking of the Egyptian account of it, says, ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμίλῳ ἐν τοῖς ἀδύτοις ἀπόκρυφα γράφοντα, πρὶν ἢ πρὸ ἱερῶν μυσίων, *de sacrificiis*. 2. This only places the difficulty a step backward, without removing it: for one might ask, how came the Egyptian name of Diana to signify a *cat*; or the word Sis or Isis to signify a *swallow*? Can any other good reason be given, but that these goddesses were expressed by such *symbols* in hieroglyphic writing? Agreeably to this, Horapollo tells us [lib. i. cap. 7.] that the *hieroglyphic* for the *soul* was a *hawk*.



which in the Egyptian tongue was called *baïeth*, a word compounded of *baï* and *eth*, the first of which signified, in that language, the *soul*; the other the *heart*; for according to the Egyptians the heart was the inclosure of the soul. But if this were the case, what we have given above seems the more natural original of the story.

P. 76, R R R. *Ipsi, qui irridentur, Ægyptii, nullam beluam, nisi, ob aliquam utilitatem, quam ex ea caperent, consecraverunt.—Ita concludam tamen beluas a barbaris propter beneficium consecratas.—*Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. 36. This, in the person of *Cotta* the academic. How ill it agrees with what the same *Cotta* says afterwards, I have shown above: *omne fere genus bestiarum Ægyptii consecraverunt*, lib. iii. cap. 15. Now this being a fact, and the other but a speculation, we see the reason has no weight. The wonder is that Tully should not see it. But the notion was plausible, and antiquity seemed enamoured of it. When Plutarch [Is. et Os.] had said, the Jews worshipped swine; not content with this simple calumny, he invents a reason for it; and takes up this which lay so commodious for these occasions; namely, gratitude to that animal for having taught men to plough the ground.

P. 76, S S S. A passage in Eusebius strongly confirms our opinion of the origin of brute worship; and, consequently, accounts for the adoration paid to noxious animals: 'Ο δὲ αὐτὸς πάλιν περὶ τῶν Φινίκων στοιχείων ἐκ τῶν Σαγχωνιαθῶν μεταβαλὼν, διὰ ὅσαί φασι περὶ τῶν ἱερουργῶν καὶ ἰαβόλων θηρίων, ἃ δὲ χρῆσι μὴ ἀγαθὴν ἀνθρώποις εὐδαιμόνιαν συντελεῖ, φθορὰν δὲ καὶ λύμην εἰς αὐτὸν δυνάμει καὶ χαλεπὸν ἰὸν ἰγχεῖν ψυαὶ ἀπὸ πρὸς γράφει δὲ καὶ ταύτην πρὸς λίξιν ἀδελφὸς πῶς λέγων. Τὴν μὲν αὖν τοῦ δράκοντος φύσιν καὶ τῶν ὄφιν αὐτὸς ἐκείνους ὁ Τάαντος, καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν αὐτοὶ Φινίκαις τε καὶ Αἰγύπτωσι. [Præp. Evang. lib. i. cap. 10.] Consider again what he [Philo] says in his translation of Sanchoniatho's discourse of the Phœnician elements, concerning certain reptiles and other venomous animals, which not only bring no benefit to man, but convey certain mischief and destruction on whomsoever they shed their deadly venom. These are his very words. Taautus therefore consecrated the species of dragons and serpents, and the Phœnicians and Egyptians followed him in the superstition. The quotation from Philo then goes on to show, from the nature of the serpent kind, why it was made a symbol of the Divinity. The discourse of Sanchoniatho here mentioned, as translated by Philo, was part of a larger work, which he wrote concerning the Phœnician and Egyptian wisdom and learning, and treated of hieroglyphic characters, as appears from the title of Φινίκων ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΝ, which latter word I have shown to be the technical term for hieroglyphic; but how a digression concerning the consecration of noxious animals should come into this discourse, unless the author understood hieroglyphics to be the origin of brute worship, is difficult to conceive.

P. 79, T T T. And it is remarkable that this, which was done to hide the ignominy of vulgar paganism, the advocates of the church of Rome have lately revived, to hide the ignominy of vulgar popery, in their saint worship: nothing having been of late more fashionable amongst the French philologists than the contending against that most established doctrine of early antiquity, that the greater gods of paganism were all dead men deified. Il seît aisé de prouver, says one of them, que, de tous les Dieux du paganisme, Hercule, Castor et Pollux sont les seuls qui aient été véritablement des hommes.—Hist. de l'Académie Royale des Inscript., &c. t. xxiii. p. 17.

P. 80, U U U. Winckelman, in his Histoire de l'Art chez les Anciens, vol. I. p. 97, says I am mistaken, in supposing it to be made at Rome. And that this is an opinion I have adopted without any foundation—il ne paroît avoir adopté cette opinion, destinée de fondement que parce qu'elle cadre avec son système. That I told my opinion, because it quadrated with my system, is certain. But that it is not without foundation he might have understood by the very hint I gave of the devotees of Isis in Rome. These were very numerous, and had the liberty of celebrating their own country rites. And when they had this, it would be hard upon them not to permit a Roman artificer to make them one of the proper implements of their worship, and decent furniture for their temple. The Jews at the same time had the like indulgence in Rome, and without doubt made the like use of it in directing Roman workmen to make them utensils like these, once employed in their temple worship. Now should one of these chance to fall into the hands of an antiquarian of the size of Winckelman, he would say they could never have been made at Rome, but at Jerusalem, for that they were entirely different from the style of the Roman school. And this wise remark Winckelman makes with regard to the *Bembine table*—les hieroglyphes qui s'y trouvent, et qu'on ne voit sur aucun ouvrage imité par les Romains, en prouvant l'antiquité et refutent d'avance, tous les sentimens qui pourroient y être contraires. But after all, how does he know but that the Romans might be at one time as fond of Egyptian hieroglyphics, as we in England (whom he says have neither art nor taste) have lately been of Chinese filigrane? Would he therefore, because there is certainly as wide a difference between the Chinese and the English style as there was between the Egyptian and the Roman, deprive us of a fashion which we have been at so much pains to make our own? They seem to have been fond enough of hieroglyphics when they were at so much cost and



labour of transporting to Rome the gigantic obelisks covered all over with them. And though the grandees procured these for their bulk, and not for their literature, the common people might mistake, and grow fond of these overbearing strangers, for the sake of their imputed learning, which they might take upon trust, and be ready to transcribe into smaller volumes, such as the *Bembine table*. In a word, the good man, with all the advantage of eyesight—*je n'ai parlé*, says he, *que de ce que j'ai vu*—has not been able to distinguish between works which a Roman artificer was employed to make for a *barbarian* customer, and those he made according to his own fancy, or on Grecian rules, to please the more elegant taste of his own countrymen.

P. 85, X X X. To this I shall be bold to add one or two more: for though antiquity be fall and clear in this matter, yet lest it should be said, that as the Greeks talk of things done long before their time, it might very well be that, for the credit of the god, tradition would pretend a very early deification, how short soever, in reality, of the age of the hero; lest this, I say, should be objected, I shall give an instance or two of the fact from contemporary evidence. God speaking by the prophet to the king of Tyre, says: *Thine heart is lifted up, and thou hast said, I am a god, I sit in the seat of God in the midst of the seas; yet thou art a man and not God.—Wilt thou yet say before him that slayeth thee, I am a god? but thou shalt be a man and no god, in the hand of him that slayeth thee.*—Ezek. xxviii. 2—9. This I understand to denote a real worship paid to the living king of Tyre, by his idolatrous subjects: it is not unlikely but he afterwards became one of the *Greek Neptunes*. The rabbins seem to have understood the text in this sense, when, as Jerome observes, they made him to have lived a thousand years. For the Egyptians taught (whose ceremonial of the *epithosis* was followed by the rest of the nations) that their first god-kings reigned a thousand or twelve hundred years apiece. *Μεθολογούντι*, says Diodorus, *ὅτι καὶ τῶν θίων τοὺς ἀρχαιότατους βασιλεύσαι πλείον τῶν χιλίων καὶ διασείων ἐτῶν.*—P. 15. We have already taken notice of Odin and his early consecration. But Tacitus assures us, it was a general custom amongst the northern barbarians to deify without loss of time: and this not in jest, like their contemporary Romans. For speaking of the German nations he say: *Ea virgo [Velleda] nationis Bructera late imperitabat: VETERE apud Germanos MORE, quo plerasque feminarum fetiditas et augecente superstitione, arbitrentur DEAS.*—Lib. iv. Hist. And again of the same heroine: *Vidimus DIVO Vespasiano Velledam, diu apud plerosque NUMINIS LOCO habitam. Sed et olim Auriniam, et complures alias venerati sunt, NON ADULATIONE SED TANQUAM FACERENT DEAS.* Here the historian hints at the mock deifications in Rome, and insinuates, that these in Germany were of another nature, and believed in good earnest.

P. 89, Y Y Y. This paradox, as we say, is advanced in defiance of antiquity. The *magister*, in their secret communications, taught that ALL THE NATIONAL GODS WERE DEAD MEN DEIFIED. Of this we are assured by the express testimony of the most learned ancients, both gentile and Christian; Cicero, Julius Firmicus, Plutarch, Eusebius, Clemens Alexandrinus, Cyprian, and St Austin. See the first part of the *Divine Legation*. And will this author pretend to say, that the institutors of the *mysteries* did not know the true original of their national gods? But we have much more than their bare testimony; almost every rite in the ancient worship of these gods declared them to be DEAD MORTALS: such as the solemn mournings and lamentations with which they began their celebrations; the custom of never coming to worship empty-handed, but with a present, as was the eastern use when they approached their princes; the building sumptuous houses for their gods, and setting meat before them for their refreshment; with a number of other domestic usages, too tedious to dwell upon. Thus the clearest facts and most creditable testimony concur to support this notorious truth; a truth, which they who most eagerly defended paganism, and they who most maliciously undermined it; as well the ministers of the *mysteries*, as Euhemerus and his followers, equally allowed. On what then is this author's paradox supported? On the common foundation of most modern philologic systems, ETYMOLOGIES; which, like fungous excrescencies, spring up from old Hebrew roots, mythologically cultivated. To be let into this new method of improving barren sense, we are to understand, that in the ancient oriental tongues the few *primitive* words must needs bear many different significations; and the numerous *derivatives* be infinitely equivocal. Hence any thing may be made of Greek proper names, by turning them to oriental sounds, so as to suit every system past, present, and to come. To render this familiar to the reader by example: M. Pluche's system is, that the gentile gods came from *agriculture*: all he wants then, is to pick out (consonant to the Greek proper names) Hebrew words which signify a *plough*, *tillage*, or *cars of corn*; and so his business is done. Another comes, let it be Fourmont, and he brings news, that the Greek gods were *Moses* or *Abraham*; and the same ductile sounds produce, from the same primitive words, a *chief*, a *leader*, or a *true believer*; and then, to use his words; *Nier qu'il s'agisse ici du seul Abraham, c'est être aveugle d'esprit et d'un aveuglement irremédiable.* A third and fourth appear upon the scene, suppose them, Le Clerc and Bannier; who, prompted by the learned Bochart, say that the Greek gods were only *Phœnician voyagers*; and then, from the same ready sources, flow *navigation*, *ships*, and *negociators*. And when

any one is at a loss in this game of crambo, which can never happen but by being duller than ordinary, the kindred dialects of the Chaldee and Arabic lie always ready to make up their deficiencies. To give an instance of all this in the case of poor distressed Osiris, whom hostile critics have driven from his family and friends, and reduced to a mere vagabond upon earth. M. Pluche derives his name from *ochosi-erets, domaine de la terre*; Mr Fourmont from *Hoscheiri, habitant de Seir*, the dwelling of Esau, who is his Osiris; and Vossius from *Shicher* or *Sior*, one of the scripture names for the Nile. I have heard of an old humorist, and a great dealer in etymologies, who boasted, *That he not only knew whence words came, but whither they were going*. And indeed, on any system-maker's telling me his scheme, I will undertake to show *whither all his old words are going*: for in strict propriety of speech they cannot be said to be *coming from* but *going to* some old Hebrew root.—There are certain follies (of which this seems to be in the number) whose ridicule strikes so strongly, that it is felt even by those who are most subject to commit them. Who that has read M. Huet's *Demonstratio Evangelica*, would have expected to see him satirize, with so much spirit, the very nonsense with which his own learned book abounds? *Le veritable usage de la connoissance des langues étant perdu, l'abus y a succédé. On s'en est servi pour ETYMOLOGISER—on veut trouver dans l'Hebreu et ses dialectes la source de tous les mots et de toutes les langues, toutes les barbares et étranges qu'elles puissent être—Se presente-t-il un nom de quelque roi d'Ecosse ou de Norvège, on se met aux champs avec ses conjectures; on en va chercher l'origine dans la Palestine. A-t-on de la peine à l'y rencontrer? On passe en Babylone. Ne s'y trouve-il point, l'Arabe n'est pas loin: et en un besoin même on pousseroit jusqu'en Ethiopie, plutôt que de se trouver court d'ETYMOLOGIES: et l'on battant de païs qu'il est impossible enfin qu'on ne trouve un mot qui ait quelque convenance de lettres et de son avec celui, dont on cherche l'origine.—Par cet art on trouve dans l'Hebreu ou ses dialectes, l'origine des noms du Roi Artur, et tous les Chevaliers de la table ronde; de Charlemagne, et des douze pairs de France; et même en un besoin de tous les Yncas du Perou. Par cet art, un Allemand que j'ai connu, prouvoit que Priam avoit été le même qu'Abraham; et Æneas le même que Jonas.—Lettre au Bochart.* On such subjects as these, however, this trifling can do no great harm. But when, by a strange fatality of the times, it is transferred from matters of profane antiquity, to such important questions as the redemption of mankind, and faith in the Messiah, we are ready to execrate a cabalistic madness which exposes our holy religion to the scorn and derision of every unbeliever, whose bad principles have not yet deprived him of all remains of common sense.

P. 103, Z Z Z. As Sir Isaac's own words seem so much to shake his system, I shall quote them at length: "The lower part of Egypt being yearly overflowed by the Nile, was scarce inhabited before the invention of corn, which made it useful: and the king, who by this invention first peopled it and reigned over it, perhaps the king of the city Mesir, where Memphis was afterwards built, seems to have been worshipped by his subjects after death, in the ox or calf, for this benefaction."—Pp. 107, 108.

P. 103, A A A A. I apprehend such mistakes were pretty general in the traditional accounts of nations, concerning their early times. Garcillasso's history of the YNCAS affords us just such another instance. "Ils pretendent," says the French translator "qu'un de leur rois fût un grand législateur. Ils disent de plus, qu'il fût un excellent capitaine, qui conquît un grand nombre de provinces et de royaumes. Mais pour le tirer de ce labyrinthe, ils attribuent au premier Ynca tous ces choses, tant pour ce qui est de leurs loix, que du fondement de leur empire."—Vol. i. p. 150.

P. 106, B B B B. Julius Cæsar had so little doubt of this matter, that speaking of the Gauls, he says, *deum maxime Mercurium colunt—Post hunc, Apollinem et Martem et Jovem et Minervam. De his eandem ferè, quam reliquæ gentes, habent opinionem.*—*De Bell. Gall. lib. vi. sect. 15.* The reason he gives is, that the several gods of Gaul had attributes correspondent to those of Greeco and Rome. Hence he, and most other writers, concluded them to be the same. So Tacitus observes of the Germans, that they worshipped Mercury, Hercules, and Mars, *deorum maxime Mercurium colunt—Herculem ac Martem concessis animalibus placant.* [*De Mor. Ger. cap. ix.*] and speaking of the Æstii, a nation of the Suevians, he says, they worshipped the *mother of the gods—Ergo jam deo Suevici maris littore Æstiorum gentes adluuntur: quibus ritus habitusque Suevorum, linguae Britannicæ propior.* Matrem deum venerantur. [*cap. 45.*] But this *mother of the gods* was, as we learn from the ancient northern chronicles, an idol peculiar to those people, called Solotta Babba, or the *golden woman*. Yet as she most resembled the *mother of the gods*, she is called so by Tacitus without any hesitation: who yet, in another place, speaking of the worship paid to Castor and Pollux, amongst this people, gives us to understand by his expression that no more was meant than that the Germans had a couple of gods, whose attributes and relation to one another bore a resemblance to the Greek and Roman *Dioscuri*. "Præsidet sacerdos muliebri ornatu, sed deos, *interpretatione Romana*, Castorum Pollucemque memorant." [*cap. 43.*] But what greatly confirms our opinion is, that, when

these people were converted from paganism to the Christian faith, their convertists, who had the best opportunities and fittest occasion to inquire thoroughly into the state of their superstition, found neither Greek nor Roman gods amongst them; but idols of their own growth only. And though, indeed, the vulgar herd of antiquarians, misled by the classic writers, are wont to speak after them, in this matter, yet the most learned investigators of the history of this people expressly affirm the contrary. Of whom I need only mention the celebrated Saxo Grammaticus, who says, "Eos qui a nostris colebantur non esse quos Romanorum vetustissimi Jovem Mercuriumque dixere, vel quibus Græci Latiumque plenum superstitionis obsequium exsolverunt, ex ipsa liquidò seriarum appellatione colligitur."—*Hist. Dan.* lib. vi. But Tacitus has recorded a circumstance which fully evinces the mistake of this supposed identity. For when he had told us that the Germans worshipped Mercury, Hercules, Mars, &c., he immediately adds, that they did not worship their gods in temples, nor under a human figure. *Ceterum nec cohibere parietibus deos, neque in ullam humani oris speciem assimilare ex magnitudine celestium arbitrantur.* [cap. ix.] I quote the words for the *fact*. The *reason* seems to be a conjecture of his own. Now if the Germans had borrowed their Mercury, Hercules, and Mars, from Greece and Rome, they probably would have worshipped them in temples; most certainly, under a human form. And, what is strangest of all, Tacitus himself afterwards, in the case of the Naharvali, seems to be sensible of this; for having told us that they worshipped two young brother gods, which the Romans conjectured to be Castor and Pollux, he makes the following observation, as seeming to dissent from them. *Nulla simulacra, nullum peregrinæ superstitionis vestigium,* cap. xlii.

A celebrated French author, M. Freret, has borrowed and adopted this system. He holds with me, that the gods of these barbarians were not the same with the Greek and Roman gods; and that the mistake arose from the resemblance between their attributes, which he shows, in the manner I have done (and I suppose from the observations I had made) must needs be alike. "Chaque dieu dans toute religion polytheïste avoit son district, ses occupations, son caractère, etc. Le partage avoit été réglé sur les passions et sur les besoins des hommes: et comme leurs passions et leurs besoins sont les mêmes par tout, les départemens des dieux barbares avoient nécessairement du rapport avec ceux des divinités de la Grèce. Il falloit par tout une intelligence qui gouvernât le ciel, et qui lancât le tonnerre. Il en falloit d'autres pour gouverner les élémens, pour présider à la guerre, au commerce, à la paix, etc. La conformité des emplois entraînoit une ressemblance d'attributs: et c'étoit sur ce fondement, que les Grecs et les Romains donnoient les noms de leurs dieux aux divinités des barbares."—Voyez M. de la Bléterie, ses remarques sur la Germanie de Tacit. p. 135.

In conclusion; the learned reader will remark, that this is a species of that general *conformity* which I had observed is commonly ascribed to *imitation*, when in truth its source is in our common nature, and the similar circumstances in which the partakers of it are generally found. Here again I have the pleasure of finding this M. Freret agree with me in this general principle, as before in the particular system of polytheism here advanced. "Il seroit utile, says M. Freret, de rassembler les conformités qui se trouvent entre des nations qu'on sait n'avoir jamais eu de commerce ensemble. Ces exemples pourroient rendre les critiques un peu moins hardis à supposer qu'une nation a emprunté certains opinions et certains coutumes d'une autre nation, dont elle étoit séparée par une très grande-distance, et avec qui l'on ne voit point qu'elle ait jamais eu la moindre communication."—See M. de la Bléterie, p. 168, and compare it with what I had said many years before at the end of the last section of this fourth book. When I reflect upon the honours of this kind, which several writers of this *humane* nation have done me in silence, it puts me in mind of what Muret says of Macrobius on the like occasion,—*ut appareat eum facitasse eandem artem, quam plerique hoc sæculo faciunt, qui ita humani a se nihil alienum putant, ut alienis sequi utantur ac suis.*

P. 107, C C C C. It is remarkable, that though Herodotus tells us, these Pelasgians, before their knowledge or admission of the *Ægyptian names*, sacrificed to their gods, [*ἔθνη δὲ πάρα πρότερον εἶδε Πηλαγοὶ*], yet when they had admitted these *names*, he gives the matter of sacrificing as one change which this admission had introduced; *from that time*, says he, *they sacrificed* [*ἀπὸ μὲν δὴ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου ἔθνη*]. A passage in Julius Cæsar will explain this difficulty: after he had given an account of the gods of the Gauls, who, living under a civil policy, worshipped hero-gods; he goes on to those of the uncivilized Germans, which, he tells us, were only the celestial luminaries and elements. *Deorum numero eos solos ducunt, quos cernunt, et quorum opibus apertè juvantur; solem et Vulcanum et lunam. Reliquos ne fama quidem acceperunt.*—*De Bell. Gall.* vi. sect. 19. The very gods, as we observed, of all the uncivilized idolaters upon earth. Now of these barbarians he adds, *Neque druides habent, qui rebus divinis præsent; neque sacrificiis student.* They were not nice and exact in the matter of *sacrificing*: and no wonder, for he tells us, they had no priests. Now Herodotus, speaking of his barbarians, informs us of the same thing, though in other words, and on a different occasion. *They sacrificed*, says

he, every thing without distinction; this was the *negus sacrificis* student of Cæsar. But when they came to use the names of the Egyptian gods, then *Idem*, they sacrificed, i. e. made a study of it, had a large ritual concerning it, and no longer sacrificed without distinction. For these names being expressive of each god's peculiar nature, qualities, and dispositions, soon introduced a distinction of sacrifices, according to the imaginary agreement or disagreement between the *subject* and the *object*.

P. 108, D D D D. This communication of names (from whence the men we are arguing against inferred, that the Grecian gods were originally Egyptian) made another party, such as Bochart, Huet, and Fourmont, conclude they were originally Jewish. Thus the last of these writers in one place says; *Par tout ce discours il est clair, que les Romains, les Grecs, les Phrygiens, les Gètes, les autres Scythes, et en general tous les peuples guerriers ont adoré MARS sans le connoître, et que c'étoit un dieu originairement Phenicien, comme les autres grands dieux.* [Refl. Critic. vol. i. p. 103.] And in another place, *Mais en voilà assez sur ce dieu ou héros, qui comme l'on voit, avoit été fort illustre SANS ÊTRE CONNU.* [P. 156.] For, according to these critics, a pagan hero was never known till his pedigree had been traced up into the holy family.

P. 111, E E E E. But, besides the Greek and Egyptian, there was certainly an Indian Bacchus: whose existence and history the learned Mr Shuckford has well disembarrassed. I shall quote his words, and this with more pleasure than I have yet done on most occasions. "There have been several persons called by the name of Bacchus; at least one in India, one in Egypt, and one in Greece; but we must not confound them one with the other, especially when we have remarkable hints by which we may sufficiently distinguish them. For, 1. The Indian Bacchus was the first and most ancient of all that bore that name. 2. He was the first that pressed the grape and made wine. 3. He lived in those parts before there were any cities in India. 4. They say he was twice born, and that he was nourished in the thigh of Jupiter. These are the particulars which the heathen writers give us of the Indian Bacchus; and from all these hints it must unquestionably appear that he was NOAH, and no other. Noah being the first man in the postdiluvian world, lived early enough to be the most ancient Bacchus; and Noah, according to Moses, was the first that made wine. Noah lived in those parts as soon as he came out of the ark, earlier than there were any cities built in India; and as to the last circumstance of Bacchus being twice born, and brought forth out of the thigh of Jupiter, Diodorus gives us an unexpected light into the true meaning of this tradition; he says, *that Bacchus was said to be twice born, because in Deucalion's flood he was thought to have perished with the rest of the world, but GOD brought him again as by a second nativity into the sight of men, and they say, mythologically, that he came out of the thigh of Jupiter.*"—Connection, vol. ii. pp. 49, 50.

P. 115, F F F F. Τὴν δὲ μετέστινον φασὶ Ἑλλήνων Ῥαδάμανθυς γυναικὸς ἔχειν.—Herod. lib. ii. cap. 134. Their handle for this was a story the Egyptian priests told of their king Cheops, the great builder of pyramids. That, having exhausted his revenues, he raised a new fund for his expenses by the prostitution of his DAUGHTER: by which the priests, in their figurative way of recording matters, only meant, as I suppose, that he prostituted JUSTICE. This interpretation is much confirmed by the character they give of his son Mycerinus, *δίκαιος δὲ ἐφ' ὅσον βασιλὴν διαποιεῖται ἀρίστην.*—[See Herod. lib. ii. cap. 126, 129.] However, the Greeks took it literally.

P. 116, G G G G. Plutarch, in Theseus, tells us, that when the daughter of Pitheus bore Theseus of Ægeus, her father gave out that the infant was begot by Neptune.

P. 121, H H H H. That Homer collected his materials from the old songs and poems of his predecessors, I conclude from this circumstance; In those things wherein he might be instructed by the records of poesy, we find him calling upon the MUSES to inform him: but when he relates what happened amongst the gods, which he could only learn by poetical inspiration, he goes boldly into his story, without invoking the muses at all. Thus when he speaks of the squabbles between Jupiter and his wife Juno, he tells them with as little preparation as if they had been his next door neighbours. But when he comes to give a catalogue of the Grecian forces which went to the siege of Troy, the likeliest of all subjects to be found in the old poems of his ancestors, he invokes the muses in the most solemn and pompous manner: which therefore I understand as only a more figurative intimation (to give the greater authority to what followed), that he took his account from authentic records, and not from uncertain tradition. And these old poems being, in his time, held sacred, as supposed to be written by a kind of divine impulse, an invocation to them, under the name of the goddesses, who were said to have inspired them, was an extremely natural and easy figure:

Ἔστιν ὦν μοι, Μοῦσαι, δάμνα δάμνα' ἱχθυοί.  
 Ἰαυὲς γὰρ διαί ἔστι, παρσενί σι, ἴσσι σι πάντα,  
 Ἡμῶς δὲ πλῆος εἶον ἀπολόμεν, οὐδὲ τι θῆμεν.  
 Οἴηται ἡγεμόνως.

Il. β'. ver. 484.

Say, virgins, seated round the throne divine,  
 All-knowing goddesses! immortal nine!  
 Since earth's wide regions, heaven's unmeasured height,  
 And hell's abyss hide nothing from your sight,  
 We wretched mortals, lost in doubt below,  
 But guess by rumour, and but boast we know,  
 Oh, say what heroes.

Pope.

Which, put into a plain dress, is no more than this, *That as the old records of the poets had preserved a very circumstantial account of the forces warring before Troy, he chose rather to fetch his accounts from thence than from uncertain and confused tradition.*

This observation will help to explain another particular in Homer, and as remarkable; namely, his so frequently telling us, as he is describing persons or things, that they bore one name amongst the gods, and another amongst mortals. Which, we may now collect, means no more than that, in those old poems, they were called differently from what they were in the time of Homer. Thus speaking of Titan he says,

Ὅς Ἐκαστόχρονος καλῖστος ἐς μακρὸν Ὀλύμπου,  
 ὃν Βριάειον καλῖσσι Διὶ, ἄνδρες δὲ τι πάντας  
 Αἰγαίον.

Il. α. ver. 402.

Then call'd by thee, the monster Titan came,  
 Whom gods, Briareus, men Ægeon name.

Pope.

So again,

Ἔστι δὲ τις προσήκουσι πύλαισι αἰπὺν καλόνη,  
 ἔνθα πύλαι ἀσπίδα, περιδρομαί ἰδοὶ καὶ ἰδοὶ.  
 Τὴν ἦντι ἄνδρες βασιλῆας καλῶσκευσον,  
 Ἀδύατα δὲ τι σῆμα πολυσπέρηναι Μυρίνης.

Il. β. ver. 811.

Amidst the plain in sight of Ilion stands  
 A rising mount, the work of human hands,  
 This for Myrinné's tomb th' immortals know,  
 Tho' call'd Bateia in the world below.

Pope.

And again,

Ἄντα δ' ἔξ' Ἡφαίστου μέγας ποταμὸς βαθυδίνης,  
 ὃν Πάριον καλῖσσι Διὶ, ἄνδρες δὲ Σκάμανδρον.

Il. ε. ver. 73.

With fiery Vulcan last in battle stands  
 The sacred flood that rolls on golden sands;  
 Xanthus his name with those of heav'nly birth,  
 But call'd Scamander by the sons of earth.

Pope.

Now supposing these names were not taken by Homer from the old poems, no reasonable account can be given for his so particular an information of this circumstance. But allow them to be taken thence, and the reason is evident. It was to remind the reader, from time to time, that he still kept their own venerable records in his eye; which would give weight and authority to what he delivered. The old names are called by Homer, the *names used by the immortals*, on these three accounts: 1. As they were the names employed in the old sacred poems. 2. As they were in use in the first heroic ages. And 3. As they were of barbarous and Egyptian original; from whence came the mythologic history of the gods. Two lines of the pretended Chaldaic oracles, collected by Patricius, explain this whole matter well, as they show the great reverence of the ancients for the religion of names:

Ὅνόματα βάρβαρα μύησσι ἀλλάξῃς,  
 Εἰσὶ γὰρ ὀνόματα παρ' ἱεράτοις Διόδοτα.

..

*Never change barbarous names; for every nation hath names which it received from God.*

P. 124, I I I I. The late bishop Sherlock supposed, that "the divine original of the law might be inferred from this prohibition of the use of cavalry: for that nothing but a divine command could have prevailed with Moses to forbid the princes of his country the uses of horses and chariots for their defence."—[4th Dissert. p. 320, ed. 4.] But I choose not to insist on this, as the use of cavalry could not be necessary for their defence after they were in possession of the country.

P. 129, K K K K. It is true Diodorus supposes, the principal reason was to cover and secure the flat country from hostile incursions: τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολέμων ἐφόδους ὀχυρὰν καὶ ἀντίμβολον ποιήσει τὴν χώραν, p. 36. But sure he hath chosen a very unlikely time for such a provision. The return of Sesostris from the conquest of the habitable world would hardly have been attended with apprehensions of any evil of this kind.

P. 132, L L L L. The reader may not be displeased to see Homer's ideas of this matter:



who supposes the science of architecture to be arrived at great perfection in the time of the Trojan war. For speaking of the habitation of Paris (whom, as his great translator rightly observes, Homer makes to be a *bel-esprit* and a *fine genius*) he describes it in this manner:

Ἐταρος δὲ πρὸς δόμας Ἀλεξάνδρου Βασιλέως  
ΚΑΛΑ, τὰ δ' αὐτὸς ἰσχυρὴν ἀνδράσιν, αἱ τὰς ἈΡΙΣΤΟΙ  
Ἦσαν ἐν Τροίῃ ἱερὸν τεκτονέων ἀνδρῶν,  
Οἱ αὖ ἰσοίησαν ΘΑΛΑΜΟΝ, καὶ ΔΩΜΑ, καὶ ΑΥΑΗΝ. ——— Δ. ζ. 310.

Here, we see a magnificent palace, built by professed architects, with suits of apartments; as different from the description of Hector's dwelling, as the character of the masters from one another; of which last he only says, it was a commodious habitation.

Ἀλλὰ δ' ἰσχυρὴν ἔκαστος δόμας ΕΥ ΝΑΙΕΤΑΟΝΤΑΣ  
Ἐταρος. ——— Ibid. 497.

P. 140, M M M M. In the history of the acts of Hezekiah, king of Judah, it is said, that, "He removed the high places, and brake the images, and cut down the groves, and brake in pieces the brazen serpent that Moses had made; for unto those days the children of Israel did burn incense to it: and he called it *NĒHUSHTAN*." [2 Kings xviii. 4.] The historian's care to record the *name* which the king gave to the brazen serpent, when he passed sentence upon it, will appear odd to those who do not reflect upon what hath been said about the superstition of *NAMES*. But that will show us the propriety of the observation. This idol, like the rest, had doubtless its *name of honour*, alluding to its sanative attributes. Good Hezekiah, therefore, in contempt of its title of deification, called it *NĒHUSHTAN*, which signifies A THING OF BRASS. And it was not out of season either to nickname it then, or to convey the mockery to posterity: for the *NAME* of a demolished god, like the shade of a deceased hero, still walked about, and was ready to prompt men to mischief.

P. 142, N N N N. A learned writer [Mr Fourmont, *Reflections Critiques sur les Histoires des anciens Peuples*] hath followed a system which very well accounts for this unquerable propensity to Egyptian superstitions. He supposeth that the Egyptian, and consequently the Jewish idolatry, consisted in the worship of the dead patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, &c. The mischief is, that this should have the common luck of so many other learned systems, to have all antiquity obstinately bent against it. Not more so, however, than its author is against antiquity, as the reader may see by the instance I am about to give him. Mr Fourmont, in consequence of his system, having taken it into his head, that Cronus, in Sanchoniatho, was ABRAHAM; notwithstanding that fragment tells us, that Cronus rebelled against his father, and cut off his privities; buried his brother alive, and murdered his own son and daughter; that he was an idolater; and a propagator of idolatry, by consecrating several of his own family; that he gave away the kingdom of Athens to the goddess Athena; and the kingdom of Egypt to the god Taaut; notwithstanding all this, so foreign and inconsistent with the history of Abraham, yet, because the same fragment says, that Cronus, in the time of a plague, sacrificed his only son to appease the shade of his murdered father; and circumcised himself and his whole army; on the strength of this, and two or three cold, fanciful etymologies, this great critic cries out, *Nier qu'il s'agisse ici du seul Abraham, c'est être AVEUGLE D'ESPRIT, ET D'UN AVEUGLEMENT IRREMEDIABLE*.—Liv. ii. sect. 3, cap. 3.

P. 149, O O O O. Fornication, adultery, whoredom, are the constant figures under which the Holy Spirit represent the idolatries of the Israelites: consequently, by this character of the *Egyptians being great of flesh*, and in another place, *their flesh was as the flesh of asses, and their issue like the issue of horses*, Ezek. xxiii. 20, we are given to understand that Egypt was the grand origin and incentive of idolatry, and the propagator of it amongst the rest of mankind: which greatly confirms our general position concerning the antiquity of this empire.

P. 152, P P P P. Yet this evasive reasoning a systematic writer, who has therefore often fallen in our way, would seem to insinuate in an argument designed to make short work with Spencer's learned volumes. His words are these—"It is remarkable that some learned writers, and Dr Spencer in particular, have imagined, that the resemblance between the ancient heathen religions, and the *ancient religion which was instituted by God*, was in many respects so great, that they thought that *God was pleased to institute the one in imitation of the other*. This conclusion is indeed a very wrong one, and it is the grand mistake which runs through all the works of the very learned author last mentioned." "The ancient heathen religions do indeed in many particulars agree with the institutions and appointments of that religion, *which was appointed to Abraham and to his family, and which was afterwards revived by Moses*; not that those were derived from those of the heathen nations, but much more evidently the heathen religions were copied from them; for there is, I think, ONE OBSERVATION, which, as far as I have had opportunity to apply it, will fully answer every particular that Dr Spencer has offered, and that is this. He is able



to produce no one ceremony or usage, practised both in the religion of Abraham or Moses, and in that of the heathen nations, but that it may be proved, that it was used by Abraham or Moses, or by some other of the true worshippers of God earlier than by any of the heathen nations." Sacred and Prof. Hist. Connected, vol. i. 2d ed. pp. 316, 317.—This writer, we see, seems here to suppose a palpable falsehood; which is, that there is an impalpable difference between the *Mosaic* and *Patriarchal* religions. But this was not the principal reason of my quoting so long a passage. It was to consider his ONE OBSERVATION, which is to do such wonders. Now I cannot find that it amounts to any more than this; That the Bible, in which is contained the account of the Jewish religion, is a much older book than any other that pretends to give account of the national religions of paganism. But how this discredits Dr Spencer's opinion I cannot understand. I can easily see indeed the advantage this learned writer would have had over it, had there been any ancient books which delivered the *origin of gentile religions* in the same circumstantial manner that the Bible delivers this of the *Jewish*; and that, on a proper application of this ONE OBSERVATION, it appeared that Dr Spencer, with all his labour, *was able to produce no one ceremony or usage practised both in true and false religion, but that it might be proved it was used first in the true*. But as things stand at present, what is it this learned writer would be at? The Bible is by far the oldest book in the world. It records the history of a religion given by God to a people who had been long held in a state of slavery by a great and powerful empire. The ancient historians, in their accounts of the religious rites and manners of that monarchy, deliver many which have a surprising relation to the Jewish ritual; and these rites, these manners, were, they tell us, as old as the monarchy. Thus stands the evidence on the present state of things. So that it appears, if, by *it may be proved*, the learned writer means to confine his proof to contemporary evidence, he only tells us what the reader knew before, *viz.*, That the Bible is the oldest book in the world. But if, by *it may be proved*, he means proved by such arguments as the nature of the thing will admit, then he tells us what the reader knows now to be false. Sir Isaac Newton hath given much us the same kind of paralogism in his account of the original letters. *There is no instance, says he, of letters for writing down sounds being in use before the days of David in any other nation besides the posterity of Abraham.* [Chron. p. 209.] So that what hath been said above in answer to the other will serve equally against this. I would only remark, that the learned writer seems to have borrowed his ONE OBSERVATION from a chapter of Witsen's *Aegyptiaca*, thus intitled; *Nullius Historici sufficienti Testimonio probari posse, eas in Religione laudabilia sunt apud Aegyptios, quam apud Hebræos antiquiora fuisse*, lib. iij. cap. 1. to which, what I have here said is, I think, a full answer.—The learned writer will forgive me, if, before I leave this passage, I take notice of an expression which seems to reflect on that good man, and sincere believer, Dr Spencer; but I suppose not designedly, because it seems a mere inaccuracy. The words are these; *they thought* [i. e. Dr Spencer and others] *that God was pleased to institute the one in imitation of the others*. Now this neither Dr Spencer nor any believer ever thought. They might indeed suppose that he *instituted one in reference to the other*, i. e. that part of its rites were in direct opposition to the customs of the idolaters; and part, out of regard to the people's prejudices, in conformity to such of their customs as could not be abused to superstition. But this is a very different thing from *instituting one religion in imitation of another*. As no believer could suppose God did this; so neither, I will add, could any unbeliever. For this opinion, *that the Jewish religion was instituted in imitation of the heathen*, is what induces the unbeliever to conclude, that God was not its author.

P. 152, Q Q Q Q. The parenthesis seems odd enough. It may not therefore be unreasonable to explain the admirable reasoning of our divine Master on this occasion. Jesus, being charged by the Jews as a transgressor of the law of Moses, for having cured a man on the sabbath-day, thus expostulates with his accusers. "Moses therefore gave unto you circumcision, not because it is of Moses, but of the fathers, [*οὐχ ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ Μωϋσῆος, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν πατέρων*] and ye on the sabbath-day circumcise a man. If a man on the sabbath-day receive circumcision, that the law of Moses should not be broken, are ye angry at me, because I have made a man every whit whole on the sabbath-day?" That is, "Moses enjoined you to observe the rite of circumcision, and to perform it on the eighth day: but if this day happen to be on the sabbath, you interrupt its holy rest by performing the rite upon this day, because you will not break the law of Moses, which marked out a certain day for this work of charity. Are you therefore angry at me for performing a work of equal charity on the sabbath-day? But you will ask, why was it so ordered by the law, that either the precept for circumcision, or that for the sabbatical rest, must needs be frequently transgressed? I answer, that though Moses, as I said, gave you circumcision, yet the rite was not originally of Moses, but of the fathers. Now the fathers enjoined it to be performed on the eighth day; Moses enjoined the seventh day should be a day of rest; consequently the day of rest and the day of circumcision must needs frequently fall together. Moses found circumcision instituted by a previous covenant which

his law could not disannul.\* But had he originally instituted both, it is probable he would have contrived that the two laws should not have interfered."—This I take to be the sense of that very important parenthesis, *not because it is of Moses, but of the fathers.*

P. 152, R R R R. No one ever yet mistook *circumcision* for a natural duty; while it has been esteemed a kind of impiety to deny the *sabbath* to be in that number. There are two circumstances attending this latter institution, which have misled the sabbatarians in judging of its nature.

1. The first is, *that* which this positive institution and a natural duty hold in common, namely, the setting apart a certain portion of our time for the service of religion.—Natural reason tells us, that that Being, who gave us all, requires a constant expression of our gratitude for the blessings he has bestowed, which cannot be paid without some expense of time: and this time must first be set apart before it can be used. But things of very different natures, may hold some things in common.

2. The second circumstance is this, that Moses, the better to impress upon the minds of his people the observance of the sabbath, acquaints them with the early institution of it; that it was enjoined by God himself, on his finishing the work of creation. But these sabbatarians do not consider, that it is not the time when a command was given, nor even the author who gave it, that discovers the class to which it belongs, but its *nature* as discoverable by human reason. And the sabbath is as much a positive institution when given by God to Adam and his posterity, as when given by Moses, the messenger of God, to the Israelites and to their posterity. To judge otherwise, is reducing all God's commands to one and the same species.

Having thus far cleared the way, I proceed to show that the Jewish sabbath is a mere positive institution,

1. From the account the prophet Ezekiel gives of it—*Moreover also I gave them my SABBATH to be a SIGN between me and them.*† A sign of what? A sign of a covenant. And so was *circumcision* called by God himself—*And ye shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, and it shall be a TOKEN [or sign] OF THE COVENANT between me and you.*‡ Now nothing but a rite by institution of a POSITIVE LAW could serve for a sign or token of a covenant between God and a particular selected people; for besides its use for a remembrance of the covenant, it was to serve them as a *partition-wall* to separate them from other nations: and this a rite by positive institution might well do, though used before by some other people, or even borrowed from them. But a natural duty has no capacity of being thus employed: because a practice observed by *all* nations would obliterate every trace of a sign or token of a covenant made with *one*. Indeed, where the covenant is with the whole race of mankind, and so, the *sign of the covenant* is to serve only for a remembrance, there, the sign may be either a *moral duty* or a *natural phenomenon*. This latter was the case in GOD's promise or covenant, not to destroy the earth any more by water. Here the Almighty, with equal marks of wisdom, made a natural and beautiful phenomenon, seen over the whole habitable earth, the *token* of that covenant. *And God said, This is the TOKEN OF THE COVENANT. I do SET my bow in the cloud, and it shall be for a token of a covenant between me and the earth.* Gen. ix. 12, 13. Yet it is wonderful to consider how this matter has been mistaken. Perhaps the word *set* did not a little contribute to it: the expression being understood absolutely; when it should have been taken in the relative sense, of *set for a token*. And in this sense, and only in this sense, the *bow* was then *FIRST set in a cloud*. However, Dr Burnet of the Charterhouse, who had a visionary theory to support, which made it necessary for him to maintain that the phenomenon of the rainbow did not exist before the flood, endeavours to countenance that fancy from the passage above, by such a kind of reasoning as this, "That, had there been a rainbow before the flood, it could not have been properly used as a *token* of GOD's covenant, that he would no more drown the earth, because, being a common appearance, it would give no extraordinary assurance of security." And to this reasoning Tindal, the author of *Christianity as old as the Creation*, alludes. *Perhaps*, says he, *the not knowing the natural cause of the rainbow, occasioned that account we have in Genesis of its institution*, pp. 223, 229. Its institution! The expression is excellent. GOD's appointing the rainbow to be a *token* or memorial, for perpetual generations, of his covenant with mankind, is called, *the institution of the rainbow*. But ill expression is the homage to nonsense, for the privilege of freethinking. However, his words show, he took it for granted that Moses represents GOD as then *FIRST setting his bow in the clouds*. And it is the reasoning which we are at present concerned with. Now this, we say, is founded in gross ignorance of the nature of simple compacts and promises: in which, the *only security* for performance is the known good faith of the promiser. But, in the case before us, the most novel or most supernatural appearance could add nothing to their assurance, which arose from the evidence of GOD's veracity. As, on the contrary, had the children of Noah been ignorant of this attribute of

\* See Gal. iii. 17.

† Chap. xx. ver. 12.

‡ Gen. xvii. 11.

the Deity, such an extraordinary phenomenon could have given no assurance at all. For what then served the rainbow? For the wise purpose so well expressed by the sacred writer, for **THE TOKEN OF THE COVENANT**. That is, for a memorial or remembrance of it throughout all generations. A method of universal practice in the contracts of all civilized nations. Indeed, had this remnant of the human race been made acquainted with God's covenant or promise by a third person, and in a common way, there had then been occasion to accompany it with some extraordinary or supernatural appearance. But for what? Not to give credit to God's veracity; but to the veracity of the messenger who brought his will. Now God revealed this promise *immediately* to the children of Noah. But here lies the mistake: our deists have put themselves in the place of those patriarchs, when a much lower belonged to them; and, the promise being revealed to them only by a third hand, and in a common way, they refuse to believe it, because not accompanied with a miracle. In the mean time they forget the condition of the patriarchs when this covenant was made with them; filled with terror and astonishment at the past, and with the most disquieting apprehensions of a future deluge, they needed some superior assurance to allay their fears. Had not that been the case, a particular covenant had not been made with them; and had their posterity all along continued in the same condition, we may certainly conclude, from the uniformity of God's dealings with mankind, that he would, from time to time, have renewed this covenant, in the way it was first given; or have secured the truth of the tradition by a supernatural appearance. But those fears soon wore out: and posterity, in a little time, became no more concerned in this particular promise, than in all the other instances of divine goodness to mankind. But *Moses*, as this great philosopher concludes, *had no knowledge of the natural cause of the rainbow*. It may be so: because I know of no use that knowledge would have been to his mission. But he was acquainted with the *moral cause*, and the *effects* too, of COVENANTS, which was more to the purpose of his office and character; and which this freethinking DOCTOR OF LAWS should not have been so ignorant of.

2. But secondly, if the Jewish prophets cannot convince our sabbatarians, that the Mosaic day of rest was a *positive institution*; yet methinks the express words of Jesus might, who told the sabbatarians of that time, the Pharisees, *That the sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath*.—Mark ii. 27. Now were the observation of the sabbath a natural duty, it is certain, *man was made for the sabbath*, the end of his creation being for the observance of the MORAL LAW,—the worship of the Deity, temperance and justice: nor can we by natural light conceive any other end. On the contrary, all positive institutions *were made for man*, for the better direction of his conduct in certain situations of life; the observance of which is therefore to be regulated on the end for which they were instituted: for, contrary to the nature of moral duties, the observance of them may, in some circumstances, become hurtful to man, for whose benefit they were instituted; and whenever this is the case, God and nature grant a dispensation.

3. Thirdly, the primitive Christians, on the authority of this plain declaration of their blessed Master, treated the sabbath as a positive law, by changing the day dedicated to the service of religion from the seventh to the first day, and thus abolished *one* positive law, **THE SABBATH** instituted in memory of the *creation*, and, by the authority of the church, erected another, properly called **THE LORD'S DAY**, in memory of the redemption.

P. 157. S S S S. The author of the *grounds and reasons of the Christian religion* says —“They [the pagans] learnt the art [divination] in schools or under discipline, as the Jews did *prophesying* in the *schools and colleges of the prophets*. [For which *Wheatley's Schools of the Prophets* is quoted] where the learned Dodwell says, the candidates for prophecy were taught the rules of divination practised by the pagans, who were skilled therein, and in possession of the art long before them.”—P. 28.

P. 157. T T T T. Dr Mead, in his *Medica Sacra*, cap. iii. p. 25, observes that *what is said of the Spirit of the Lord is not to be understood literally*. He did not reflect that the vicegerent of the theocracy is here spoken of. Otherwise, surely, he could not but acknowledge that if there was any such thing as the SPIRIT OF THE LORD existing in that administration, it must needs reside in the supreme magistrate.

P. 158. U U U U. There is a difficulty in the history of *David*, in which SPINOZA much exults, as it supports him in his impious undertaking on sacred scripture. It is this, in the xvth chapter of the first book of Samuel, we find David sent for to court, to soothe Saul's melancholy with his harp. On his arrival, he gave so much satisfaction, that the distempered monarch sent to his father to desire he might *stand before him*, ver. 22, that is, remain in his service. David hath leave; and becomes Saul's *armour-bearer*, [ver. 21.] Yet in the very next chapter, viz., the xviith, which relates an incursion of the Philistines, and the defiance of Goliath, when David goes to Saul for leave to accept the challenge, neither the king, nor the captain of his host, know any thing of their champion or of his lineage. This is the difficulty, and a great one it is. But it would soon become none, in the usual way critics have of removing difficulties, which is by supposing, that, whatever occasions them is an *interpolation*; and some blind manuscript is always at hand

to support the blinder criticism. But had more time been employed in the study of the *nature of scripture history*, and somewhat less in *collations* of manuscripts, those would have found a nearer way to the wood, who now cannot see wood for trees. In a word, the true solution seems to be this: David's adventure with Goliath was prior in time to his soothsaying Saul with his music. Which latter story is given by way of anticipation in chap. xvi., but very properly and naturally. For there the historian having related at large how God had rejected Saul, and anointed David, goes on, as it was a matter of highest moment in a RELIGIOUS HISTORY, to inform us of the effects both of one and the other; though we are not to suppose them the instantaneous effects. The effect of Saul's rejection was, he tells us, the departure of God's Spirit from him, and his being troubled with an evil spirit [ver. 14.]: this leads him, naturally, to speak of the effect of David's election, namely, his being endowed with many divine graces; for Saul's malady was only to be alleviated by David's skill on the harp. When the historian had, in this very judicious manner, anticipated the story, he returns from the 14th to the 23d verse of the xvth chapter to the order of time, in the beginning of the xviith chapter. So that the true chronology of this part of David's life stands thus: He is anointed by Samuel—he carries provisions to his brethren, incamped against the Philistines, in the valley of Elah—he fights and overcomes Goliath—is received into the king's court—contracts a friendship with Jonathan—incurs Saul's jealousy—retires home to his father—is, after some time, sent for back to court, to soothe Saul's melancholy with his harp—proves successful, and is made his armour-bearer—and, again, excites Saul's jealousy, who endeavours to smite him with his javelin. This whole history is to be found between the first verse of the xvth, and the tenth of the xviith chapter. Within this, is the anticipation above mentioned, beginning at the fourteenth verse of the xvth chapter, and ending at the twenty-third verse. Which anticipated history, in order of time, comes in between the 9th and 10th verses of the xviith chapter, where indeed the breach is apparent. For in the 9th verse it is said; "And Saul eyed David from that day forward." He had just begun, as the text tells us, to entertain a jealousy of David from the women's saying in their songs, "Saul hath slain his thousands, and David his ten thousands."—"From that day forward, Saul eyed David," i. e. watched over his conduct. Yet, in the very next verse, it says; "And it came to pass on the MORROW, that the evil spirit from God came upon Saul—And David played with his hand—And Saul cast the javelin." This could never be on the *morrow* of that day on which he first began to entertain a jealousy; for the text says, *from that day forward* he began to watch over his conduct, to find whether his jealousy was well grounded. Here then is the breach, between which, in order of time, comes in the relation of the evil spirit's falling upon Saul; his sending for David from his father's house, &c. For when Saul began at first, on account of the songs of the women, to grow jealous of David, and to watch his behaviour, David, uneasy in his situation, asked leave to retire; which we may suppose was easily granted. He is sent for again to court: Saul again grows jealous: but the cause, we are now told, was different: *And Saul was afraid of David, BECAUSE the Lord was WITH HIM, and was DEPARTED FROM SAUL*, ver. 12. This plainly shows, that the departing of God's Spirit from Saul was after the conquest of Goliath: consequently, that all between ver. 14 and 23 of the xvth chapter is an anticipation, and, in order of time, comes in between ver. 9 and 10 of the xviith chapter, where there is a great breach discoverable by the disjointed parts of distant time. Thus the main difficulty is mastered. But there is another nearly as stubborn, which this solution likewise removes. When David is recommended by the courtiers for the cure of Saul's disorder, he is represented as a *mighty valiant man, a man of war and prudent in matters, and that the Lord was with him*, chap. xvi. 18, i. e. a soldier well versed in affairs, and successful in his undertakings. Accordingly he is sent for; and preferred to a place which required valour, strength, and experience; he is made Saul's *armour-bearer*. Yet when afterwards, according to the common chronology, he comes to fight Goliath, he proves a raw inexperienced stripling, unused to arms, and unable to bear them; and, as such, despised by the giant. I will not mispend the reader's time, in reckoning up the strange and forced senses the critics have put upon these two passages, to make them consistent; but only observe, that this reformation of the chronology renders all clear and easy. David had vanquished the Philistine; was become a favourite of the people; and, on that account, the object of Saul's jealousy; to avoid the ill effects of which, he prudently retired. During this recess, Saul was seized with his disorder. His servants supposed it might be alleviated by music; Saul consents to the remedy, and orders an artist to be sought for. They were acquainted with David's skill on the harp, and likewise with Saul's indisposition towards him. It was a delicate point, which required address; and therefore they recommend him in this artful manner—*The son of Jesse is cunning in playing, and a mighty valiant man, and a man of war, and prudent in matters, and a comely person*;—That is, "as you must have one constantly in attendance, both at court, and in your military expeditions, to be always at hand on occasion, the son of Jesse will become both stations well: he will strengthen your camp, and adorn



your court; for he is a tried soldier, and of a graceful presence. You have nothing to fear from his ambition, for you saw with what prudence he went into voluntary banishment, when his popularity had incurred your displeasure."—Accordingly Saul is prevailed on: David is sent for, and succeeds with his music. This dissipates all former umbrage; and, as one that was to be ever in attendance, he is made his *armour-bearer*. This sunshine continued, till David's great successes again awakened Saul's jealousy; and then the lifted javelin was, as usual, to strike off all court-payments. Thus we see how these difficulties are cleared up, and what light is thrown upon the whole history by the supposition of an anticipation in the latter part of the xvth chapter, an anticipation the most natural, proper, and necessary for the purpose of the historian. The only reason I can conceive of its lying so long unobserved is, that, in the xviith chapter, ver. 15, it is said, *But David went, and returned from Saul, to feed his father's sheep at Bethlehem*. Now this being when the Israelites were encamped in Elah against the Philistines, and after the relation of his going to court to soothe Saul's troubled spirit with his music, seems to fix the date of his standing before Saul in quality of musician in the order of time in which it is related. But the words, *David went and returned from Saul*, seem not to be rightly understood: they do not mean, David left Saul's court where he had resided, but that he left Saul's camp to which he had been summoned. The case was this. A sudden invasion of the Philistines had penetrated to Shochoh, which belonged to Judah. Now on such occasions there always went out a general summons for all able to bear arms, to meet at an appointed rendezvous; where a choice being made of those most fit for service, the rest were sent back again to their several homes. To such a rendezvous, all the tribes at this time assembled. Amongst the men of Bethlehem, came Jesse and his eight sons; the three eldest were enrolled into the troops, and the rest sent home again. But of these, David is only particularly named; as the history related particularly to him. "Now David was the son of that Ephrathite of Bethlehem-Judah, whose name was Jesse, and he had eight sons: and the man went amongst men for an old man in the days of Saul. And the three eldest sons of Jesse went and followed Saul to the battle—And David was the youngest, and the three eldest followed Saul. But David went and returned from Saul, to feed his father's sheep at Bethlehem," i. e. he was dismissed by the captains of the host, as too young for service. And in these sentiments, we find, they continued, when he returned with a message from his father to the camp.—I have only to add, that this way of anticipation is very frequent with this sacred historian.—In the xviiiith chapter, ver. 11. it is said, "And Saul cast the javelin; for he said, I will smite David even to the wall with it: and David avoided out of his presence twice." But one of these times relates to a second casting of the javelin a considerable time after the first, here spoken of, which is recorded in chap. xix. 10. So again the historian telling us in the xth chapter, how Saul, when he was first anointed by Samuel, prophesied amongst the prophets, says; "And it came to pass, when all that knew him beforetime saw, that behold, he prophesied among the prophets; then the people said one to another, What is this that is come unto the son of Kish? Is Saul also among the prophets?—Therefore it became a proverb, Is Saul also among the prophets?" ver. 11, 12. But it is evident, that the original of the proverb, was his second prophesying amongst the prophets at *Naioth*, recorded chap. xix. both for the reasons given above, and for these: 1. Saul was not at this time known to the people; and, 2. The original of the proverb is said to arise from this second prophesying, ver. 24. Therefore the account of the proverb in the xth chapter is given by way of anticipation.

P. 158, X X X X. A malignant and very dull buffoon, who appears to have had little idea of this matter, and less inclination to be better instructed, lately published a large and virulent invective against the personal character of DAVID; his pretended provocation was as extraordinary; it was a pulpit parallel; of which he ironically complains, as injurious to a modern character of great name, who is complimented with a likeness to the king of Israel. He was answered as he deserved.—But if divines think they can manage infidel cavils by the aid of sums and systems, instead of studying to acquaint themselves with the nature and genius of the Jewish dispensation, as it lies in the Bible, unbelievers will have little to apprehend, how bad soever be the cause which a low vanity has put them upon supporting.

P. 166, Y Y Y Y. There were no sort of men more averse to the system here defended of Jewish customs borrowed from Egypt, than those puritans. Yet when they could serve a turn by adopting it, they made no scruple of so doing. Thus, in order to disgrace the *surplice*, they venture to say, in the *Declaration of the Ministers of London*, published 1566, that the *surplice*, or white linen garment, came from the EGYPTIANS into the Jewish church.

P. 169, Z Z Z Z. For, with regard to every thing's being exactly prescribed; from which direction it was not lawful to make the least deviation, Spencer acknowledges this as fully as Witsius himself. "Nihil enim cultum divinum spectans verbis obscuris aut incertis sensus a Mose traditum, nil cæco vel præcipiti zelo, nihil prurienti Judæorum ingenio, vel naturæ humanæ rerum novarum in sacris avidæ, relictum fuit. Nempe lex de minimis plerique curavit. Ipsi arcæ annuli," etc.—De Leg. Rit. Heb. lib. i. cap. 10. sect. 5.

And it is remarkable, that he employs this very circumstance, with great weight as well as ingenuity, to enforce the opposite conclusion; namely, that God admitted some rites in use amongst the gentile nations in compliance to the people's prejudices:—*Ipsæ ritus Mosaicos instituendi modus huic sententiæ non parum præsidii præbet.* Deus enim non tantum eorum materiam, sed et locum, tempus, ipsum etiam corporis situm quandoque quo præstari debebant, aliasque minoris notæ circumstantias, accurate præscripsit. Et postquam Deus minimas quasque circumstantias rituum singulorum tradidisset, præcepto cautum est. Deut. iv. 2, ne quid è ceremoniis nempe vetitis iis adderetur; aut quicquam è ceremoniis nempe præceptis adimeretur. Nemo vero qui judicio valet, opinari potest deum horum rituum minutias accurate adeo præscripsisse, ex ullo quo ipse eorum amore vel desiderio tangebatur. A ratione multo minus abest, gentium et Hebræorum ritus haud paucos (si materiam eorum vel substantiam spectemus) proximam inter se similitudinem et affinitatem habuisse, IDEOQUE lege curatum fuisse, ne eodem modo peragerentur, sed ut circumstantiis quibusdam peculiaribus et a deo præscriptis ab invicem discernerentur. Nam Israëlitiæ ritus suos omnes è Dei præscripto peragentes, se in Jehovah [non dei alicujus ethnici] honorem sacra sua præstare testarentur; et ratio temporum exegit, ut cultus deo præstitus quandam *idiotiam* retineret, nec ad ritus gentium nimis accidere, vel ab iis plusquam par erat abire videretur. Mosis ætate res in loco tam lubrico et aucipiti sitæ sunt, quod summa tantum sapientia limites eos definire noverat, quos ultra citrave non potuit consistere Dei veri cultus.—Lib. iii. cap. 2. sect. 1.

P. 170, A A A A A. I cannot therefore agree with Mr Whiston in the high value he sets upon a passage of Manetho,—*This, says he, is a very valuable testimony of Manetho's, that the laws of Osarsiph or Moses were not in compliance with, but in opposition to, the customs of the Egyptians.*—Translat. of Josephus, p. 993. However, though this fairy treasure vanish, it is some comfort that we do not want it.

P. 186, B B B B B. That very able interpreter of scripture, father Houbigant, understands these words of the prophet as spoken of the *Jewish law*. “Itaque in præceptis *non bonis* intelligendæ veniunt ejusmodi legis quæ ad poenam propositæ erant, non ad mercedem; quales erant leges de suppliciis, de aquis ab uxore suspectæ pudicitie bibendis, de leprosis ab hominum cœtu arcendis, et aliæ quædam, quæ ab irato legislatore proficiaci videbantur.”—In loc. This learned person was too well versed in the style of scripture, in the subject of the prophecy, and in the history of the Jews, to imagine, when God speaks in the character of legislator, of *giving statutes and judgments*, that he meant the general permission of divine Providence to suffer a people to fall into a number of senseless and idolatrous practices. Indeed, a little to soften the character given of *statutes not good*, he supposes they were thus qualified on account of their being *penal laws*: and so makes what I understand to be a representation of the moral genius of the ritual law in general, only the physical quality of some particular rites. But the very words of the prophecy evince that a body of laws was meant; and the character of the speaker shows, that the subject is of *moral*, not of *physical* good and evil.

P. 187, C C C C C. Speaking of MARSHAM and SPENCER, he says: In omnium nunc fere eruditorum manibus versatur nobilissimi viri Johannis Marshami CANON CHRONICUS. Opus quantivis pretii; quod uti auctori suo multa lectione, accurata meditatione, plurimisque lucubrationibus stetit, ita lectori per salebrosos obscurissimæ antiquitatis recessus viam non paulo faciliorem expeditioremque effecit. Sed ut in humanis rebus nihil omni ex parte beatum esse solet, ita nec pulcherrimo huic corpori suos deesse nævos videas—Eandem sententiam magno nuper animo atque apparatu tuitus est Johannes Spencerus in Dissertatione de *Urim et Thummim*. Ubi ita vir doctissimus instituit, &c.—Multa a viris doctissimis congesta sunt, quibus huic sumæ assertioni fidem faciant. Ea autem quam plurimum reconditæ contineant eruditionis, non videntur clarissimi auctores sua laude, uti nec studiosi lectores jucunditate atque utilitate, quæ exinde percipi potest, fraudandi esse.—Super omnibus denique *læxipies* meam subjungam, eo argumentorum robore quod suscepti negotii ratio patitur firmandam. Nequaquam ea mente ut doctissimorum virorum laboribus detrahā; sed ut me et lectores meos in investiganda veritate exerceam, sit forte detur curva corrigere et egregio inspersos abstergere corpore nævos.—P. 1—4. This candour was the more extraordinary, as Sir J. Marsham had given but too many marks of disaffection to revealed religion. And though that great and good man Dr Spencer was entirely free from all reasonable suspicion of this kind; yet, it must be owned, that too intent on a favourite argument, he was apt to express himself somewhat crudely. He had a bright and vigorous imagination, which, now and then, got the better of his judgment; and the integrity of his heart made him careless in giving it the reins; sometimes in a dangerous road. Thus, for instance, in his fine discourse *concerning prodigies*, speaking of a certain quality in the soul, which, as he says, makes it *greatly impressive to the persuasion of parallels, equalities, similitudes, in the frame and government of the world*, he goes on in this strange manner: “This general temper of the soul easily inclines it to believe great and mighty changes in states, ushered with the solemnity of some mighty and analogous changes in nature, and that



all terrible evils are prefaced or attended with some prodigious and amazing alterations in the creation.—Hence, perhaps, it is that we generally find great troubles and judgments on earth described, especially by persons *ecstatical, prophets and poets* (whose speeches usually rather follow the easy sense of the soul than the rigid truth of things) by all the examples of horror and confusion in the frame of the creation. The prophet David describes God's going out to judgment thus," &c. pp. 71, 72, 2d ed. Dr Spencer seems to have been misled in this philosophic solution, by a greater master, who, however, talks still more grossly of what he seems to have understood as little. "In matters of faith and religion," says Lord Verulam, "we raise our imagination above our reason: which is the cause why religion sought every access to the mind by similitudes, types, parables, visions, dreams."—Adv. of Learning, b. 2d. The serious Christian reader cannot but be offended at this injurious representation of the holy prophets. Such remarks as these are altogether unworthy these two excellent men. It is false in fact that prophetic figures were enthusiastic or fantastic visions raised by, and then represented to, the imagination. I have shown that the images, which the prophets employed, composed the common phraseology of their times; and were employed by them because this figurative language was well understood, and still better relished by the people. See p. 36 of this vol.—But is it therefore fitting that such writers should be treated by every dirty scribbler, as libertines, deists, and secret propagators of infidelity, for inadvertencies, which a man like the candid Witsius would only call *nævi in pulcherrimo corpore*?

P. 188, D D D D D. Let me here observe how this very circumstance in Moses's conduct, acquits him of all suspicion of that kind of FRAUD so much in use amongst the best human lawgivers of antiquity. The Mosaic dispensation had been treated by our free-thinkers with great liberties. It was therefore offered by the late learned and ingenious Dr Middleton, as a means to rescue it from their contempt, and to solve the difficulties which attend it, without hurting the authority whereon it stands, to suppose SOME DEGREE OF FICTION in certain cases, in the Mosaic writings. And this he endeavoured to make credible, from the practice of the ancient lawgivers. Now I think this supposition neither true nor probable. 1. If we consider what it was that induced the ancient lawgivers to employ *fiction*, we shall find it arose, in part, from their false pretences to a divine mission; and, in part, from the imaginary necessity of propagating polytheism. As to the first, Moses's pretensions to a divine mission are here allowed. And it is notorious that he preached up the one true GOD, the Creator, in opposition to all kinds of polytheism. No occasion therefore remained for the use of *fiction*. And we can hardly think he would employ it without occasion. What we have then to show is, that the only cause why the ancient sages employed *fiction* (besides the support of a false mission) was to hide the absurdities of polytheism. This indeed hath been already done for other purposes, in several places of this work: so that I shall here confine myself to one single proof. Macrobius assures us, that the ancient sages did not admit the fabulous in all their disputations; but in those only which related to the SOUL, to the HEAVENLY BODIES, and to the HERO GODS. *Sciendum est tamen non in omnem disputationem philosophos admittere fabulosa vel ficta, sed his uti solent cum vel de animâ vel de AERIS ÆTHERISVE POTESTATIBUS, vel de CÆTERIS DIIS loquuntur.* [In Somn. Scip. lib. i. cap. 2.] On the contrary, when they discoursed of the FIRST CAUSE, then every thing was delivered exactly agreeable to the truth. *Ceterum cum ad SUMMUM ET PRINCIPIUM OMNIUM DEUM—tractatus se audet attollere—NIHIL FABULOSUM penitus attingunt.* [*id. ib.*] The reason of their using *fiction* or fable, in treating of their false gods, was to hide the absurdities attendant on their worship; a worship thought to be necessary. Hence, as hath been shown elsewhere, [vol. i. of the Divine Legation, b. iii. sect. 6.] they were led from the *absurdity* and the *necessity* together, to conclude *that utility, and not truth, was the end of religion*; and from another mistake there mentioned, *that utility and truth do not coincide*. From these two principles necessarily arose a third, *that it was expedient and lawful to deceive for the public good*. And on this last was founded the practice of *fiction* above mentioned. Now the whole religion of Moses being established on that very doctrine, in the handling of which the ancient sages neither needed nor used *fiction*; and at the same time directly opposing that very superstition, for the sake of which, the *fiction* was employed; we conclude, with certainty, that Moses employed NO DEGREE OF FICTION in the composition or in the propagation of the Jewish religion. But 2. That which he had no occasion to use, we think it impossible he should use, if his pretensions were (as is here allowed) real. We have, indeed, in order to display the wisdom of GOD's dispensation, endeavoured to show that he employed, in the contrivance of it, all those arts (though in an infinitely more perfect degree) which human lawgivers are wont to use, in the legitimate exercise of civil government: for that, without forcing the will, no other method was sufficient to accomplish the end designed. But this, we presume, is as different from *fiction* as truth is from falsehood. Thus far, we think, God, in his dispensations to men, would choose to do, rather than to force the will. But could we suppose a people, favoured with a divine revelation, so absurdly circumstanced as to be incapable of being worked upon by common means, without the use

of some degree of fiction, we should then conclude God would rather choose miraculously to overrule the will: because we conceive *divine revelation* with *human fiction* to be a mixture of things utterly incompatible; that there can be no alliance between God and Belial; nor any union between the Spirit of truth, and the father of lies.

P. 189, E E E E E. "Suppose," says Dr Stebbing, "a deist should allege that the Israelites learned this doctrine in Egypt where Moses himself also might have learned it, *How would you prove the contrary?*"—Examination, pp. 33, 34.

Should a *deist* allege this, as making any thing *against* my argument, or *for* his own cause, I should say he knew as little either of one or the other as Dr Stebbing himself does: for my argument being addressed to the deist, supposes that Moses and the Israelites might have learned the doctrine in Egypt; and on that supposition, deifies them to find a reason, exclusive of the *extraordinary providence*, why Moses did not make so useful and necessary a doctrine (in favour of which his people were much prejudiced) the sanction of his laws. Their acquaintance with the doctrine in Egypt, I supposed: this acquaintance my argument required me to suppose: and yet this answerer of my book knew so little of its contents, as to ask, *HOW I WOULD PROVE THE CONTRARY?* If the learned Doctor had any pertinent drift in this question, you can discover it only by supposing him to go upon this ridiculous assumption, that what the Jews once learned they could never either *unlearn* or forget, and therefore if they had learned the doctrine of a future state in Egypt, they could not be so ignorant of it, as I say they were. But to clear up his conceptions in this matter he may have recourse, if he pleases, to the latter division of the fifth section of the fifth book, of the Divine Legation.

P. 190, F F F F F. This was the character it bore even so late as the time of Jeremiah, who tells us, that the rebellious Israelites, frightened at the power of the king of Babylon, refused to stay any longer in Judea, saying, *No, but we will go into the land of Egypt, where we shall see no war, nor hear the sound of the trumpet, nor have hunger of bread, and there will we dwell.*—Chap. xlii. 14.

P. 193, G G G G G. This famous book (as is the fortune of all which bring new proofs for revelation in a new way) hath undergone many heavy censures both from Jews and Christians. Those blame him for attempting to assign reasons for the ceremonial ordinances; these for explaining scripture on the principles of Aristotle. But both, as usual, expose their own ignorance and pretension. In this work, the excellent author studied the real honour of God, together with the good of those to whom his discourse was addressed. And because its end and design appears to be little understood, and depends on a curious piece of history, neglected by his editors and translators, I shall give the reader a short account of it. In the first flourishing times of the Saracene empire, (as we learn from William of Paris in his book *De Legibus*) a great number of Jews, devoting themselves to the study of the Aristotelian philosophy, (then cultivated by the Arabs with a kind of scientific fanaticism) and thereby contracting not only an inquisitive but a disputations habit, set themselves to examine into the REASONS OF THE JEWISH LAWS; which being unable to discover, they too hastily concluded them to be useless, absurd, and of human invention; and so apostatized, in great numbers, from the religion of their fathers.—*"Postquam autem Chaldæis sive Babyloñis et genti Arabum commixti sunt, et miscuerunt se studiis eorum et philosophiæ; et secuti sunt opiniones philosophorum; nescientes legis suæ credulitates et Abrahæ fidem contra disputationes eorum et rationes defendere: hinc est quod facti sunt in lege erronei, et in fide ipsius Abrahæ hæretici; maxime postquam regnum SARACENORUM diffusum est super habitationem eorum. Exinde enim eternitatem mundi et alios Aristotelis errores secuti sunt multi eorum. Hincque pauci veri Judæi (hoc est, qui non in parte aliquâ credulitatis suæ Saraceni sunt, aut Aristotelicis consentientes erroribus) in terrâ Saracenorum inveniuntur, de his qui inter philosophos commorantur. Dedit enim occasionem non levem apostasiæ hujusmodi ea quæ videtur multorum mandatorum absurditas vel inutilitas: dum enim apparet in eis absurditas et inutilitas, nulla autem præceptionis aut inhibitionis earum ratio, nulla observantiarum utilitas, non est mirum si ab eis receditur: sed tanquam onera supervacanea projiciuntur."*—fol. 18. In these times, and under this empire, our author wrote. So that nothing could be more useful than to show his apostatizing brethren that the SCRIPTURES might be defended, nay, even explained on the principles of ARISTOTLE, and that the precepts of the CEREMONIAL LAW were founded in the highest reasonableness and convenience—Maimonides, where, in his preface, he gives his reasons for writing this discourse, plainly hints at that apostasy—*"Vertiginosos vero quod attinet, quorum cerebrum est pollutum et vane futilibusque ac falsis opinionibus repletum, quique sibi imaginantur se magnos esse PHILOSOPHOS, ac theologos, illos scio fugituros a multis, contra multa etiam objectiones moturos. —Deus vero benedictus novit, quantopere timuerim conscribere ea, quæ explicare et consignare volui in hoc libro. Nam quia talia sunt de quibus nullus ex gente nostra in hac captivitate quicquam scripsit hactenus, quâ ratione primus ego prodire in hanc palæstrâ audeo: verum suffultus sum duobus principiis; primo, quod de istiusmodi negotio dictum*

at, tempus est faciendi Domino: IRRITAM FECERUNT LEGEM TUAM, &c., secundo, eo quod sapientia nostri dicunt, omnia opera tua fiant ad gloriam Dei."

P. 195, H H H H H. The learned author of the elegant and useful *Letter from Rome* has here taken to himself what was meant in general of the numerous writers on the same subject; and so has done it the honour of a confutation, in a postscript to the last edition of that *Letter*. But the same friendly considerations which induced him to end the postscript with declaring his unwillingness to enter further into controversy with me, disposed me not to enter into it at all. This, and neither any neglect of him, nor any force I apprehended in his arguments, kept me silent. However, I owe so much both to myself and the public, as to take notice of a misrepresentation of my argument; and a change of the question in dispute between us: without which notice the controversy (as I agree to leave it where it is) can scarce be fairly estimated.—"A paragraph in Mr Warburton's *Divine Legation of Moses* obliges me," say Dr Middleton, "to detain the reader a little longer, in order to obviate the prejudices which the authority of so celebrated a writer may probably inject, to the disadvantage of my argument.—I am at a loss to conceive what could move my learned friend to pass so severe a censure upon an argument which has hitherto been espoused by all protestants; admitted by many papists; and evaded rather than contradicted by any. But whatever was his motive, which, I persuade myself, was no unfriendly one, he will certainly pardon me, if, pursuing the full conviction of my mind, I attempt to defend an established principle, confirmed by strong and numerous facts, against an opinion wholly new and strange to me; and which, if it can be supposed to have any force, overthrows the whole credit and use of my present work.—He allows that the writers, who have undertaken to deduce the rites of popery from paganism, have shown an exact and surprising likeness between them in a great variety of instances. This, says he, one would think, is allowing every thing that the cause demands; it is every thing, I dare say, that those writers desire."\* That it is every thing those writers desire, I can easily believe, since I see, my learned friend himself hath considered these two assertions, 1. *The religion of the present Romans derived from that of their heathen ancestors*; and, 2. *An exact conformity, or uniformity rather of worship between popery and paganism*: he hath considered them, I say, as convertible propositions: he, undertaking, as his titlepage informs us, to prove *the religion of the present Romans derived from that of their heathen ancestors*; and having gone through his arguments, he concludes them in these words, "But it is high time for me to conclude, being persuaded, if I do not flatter myself too much, that I have sufficiently made good WHAT I FIRST UNDERTOOK TO PROVE, an exact conformity, or uniformity rather, of worship between popery and paganism."† But what he undertook to prove, we see, was, *The religion of the present Romans derived from their heathen ancestors*: that I have therefore, as my learned friend observes, allowed every thing those writers desire, is very likely. But then whether I have allowed every thing that the cause demands, is another question: which I think can never be determined in the affirmative, till it be shown that no other probable cause can be assigned of this exact conformity between Papists and Pagans, but a borrowing or derivation from one to the other. And I guess, that now this is never likely to be done, since I myself have actually assigned another probable cause, namely, the same spirit of superstition operating in the like circumstances.

But this justly celebrated writer goes on—"This question according to his [the author of *The Divine Legation*] notion is not to be decided by facts, but by a principle of a different kind, a superior knowledge of human nature."‡ Here I am forced to complain of a want of candour, a want not natural to my learned friend. For, whence is it, I would ask, that he collects, that, according to my notion, this question is not to be decided by facts, but a superior knowledge of human nature? From any thing I have said? Or from any thing I have omitted to say? Surely, not from any thing I have said (though he seems to insinuate so much by putting the words *a superior knowledge of human nature* in italic characters as they are called) because I leave him in possession of his facts, and give them all the validity he desires; which he himself observes; and, from thence, as we see, endeavours to draw some advantage to his hypothesis:—Nor from any thing I have omitted to say; for, in this short paragraph where I deliver my opinion, and, by reason of its evidence, offer but one single argument in its support, that argument arises from a FACT, viz. that the *superstitious customs in question were many ages later than the conversion of the imperial city to the Christian faith*: whence I conclude, that the ruling churchmen could have no motive in borrowing from pagan customs, either as those customs were then fashionable in themselves, or respectable for the number or quality of their followers. And what makes this the more extraordinary is, that my learned friend himself immediately afterwards quotes these words; and then tells the reader, that *my argument consists of an HISTORICAL FACT, and of a consequence deduced from it*. It appears therefore, that, according to my notion, the question is to be decided by facts, and not by a superior knowledge of human nature. Yet I must confess I then thought, and do so still, that a superior knowledge of human na-

\* Postscript, p. 228.

† Letter, p. 224.

‡ Postscript, p. 228.

ture would do no harm, as it might enable men to judge better of *facts* than we find they are generally accustomed to do. But will this excuse a candid representer for saying, that *the question, according to my notion, was not to be decided by facts, but a superior knowledge of human nature?* However, to do my learned friend all justice, I must needs say, that, as if these were only words of course, that is, words of controversy, he goes on, through the body of his postscript, to invalidate my argument from *fact*; and we hear no more of a *superior knowledge of human nature* than in this place where it was brought in to be laughed at.

As to the argument, it must even shift for itself. It has done more mischief already than I was aware of: and forced my learned friend to extend his charge from the *modern* to the *ancient church of Rome*. For my argument, from the low birth of the superstitions in question, coming against his hypothesis, after he had once and again declared the purpose of his letter to be the exposing of the heathenish idolatry and superstition of the *PRESENT church of Rome*; he was obliged, in support of that hypothesis, to show that even the early ages of the church were not free from the infection. Which hath now quite shifted the subject with the scene, and will make the argument of his piece from henceforth to run thus, *The religion of the present Romans derived from their early Christian ancestors; and theirs, from the neighbouring pagans*. To speak freely, my reasoning (which was an argument *ad hominem*, and, as such, I thought, would have been revered) reduced the learned writer to this dilemma; either to allow the fact, and give up his hypothesis; or to deny the fact, and change his question. And he has chosen the latter as the lesser evil. As to the fact; that the churches of the first ages might do that on their own heads, which Moses did upon authority, i. e. indulge their pagan converts with such of their customs as could not be easily abused to superstition, may be safely acknowledged. My learned friend has produced a few instances of such indulgence, which the censure of some of the more scrupulous of those times hath brought to our knowledge. But the great sarraginous body of popish rites and ceremonies, the subject of my learned friend's *Letter from Rome*, had surely a different original. They were brought into the church when paganism was in part abhorred and in part forgotten; and when the same spirit of sordid superstition which had overspread the gentile world, had now deeply infected the Christian.

END OF THE FOURTH BOOK.

THE  
DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES  
DEMONSTRATED.

---

BOOK V.—SECT. I.

HAVING now examined the CHARACTER of the Jewish people, and the TALENTS of their lawgiver, I come next to consider the NATURE of that policy, which by his ministry was introduced amongst them. For in these two inquiries I hope to lay a strong and lasting foundation for the support of the third general proposition, *That the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is not to be found in, nor did make part of the Mosaic dispensation.*

We find amongst this people a policy differing from all the institutions of mankind: in which the two societies, civil and religious, were perfectly incorporated, with GOD ALMIGHTY, AS A TEMPORAL GOVERNOR, at the head of both.

The peculiar administration attending so singular a frame of government hath always kept it from the knowledge of superficial observers. Christian writers, by considering Judaism as a religious policy only, or a church; and deists, as a civil policy only, or a state; have run into infinite mistakes concerning the reason, the nature, and the end of its laws and institutions. And, on so partial a view of it, no wonder that neither have done justice to this amazing economy. Let us suppose, the famous picture of the female centaur by Zeuxis, where two different natures were so admirably incorporated, that the passage from one to the other, as Lucian tells us, \* became insensible; let us, I say, suppose this picture to have been placed before two competent judges, yet in such different points of view, that the one could see only the *brutal*, the other the *human* part; would not the first have thought it a beautiful horse, and the second, as beautiful a woman; and would not each have given the creature supposed to be represented such functions as he judged proper to the species in which he ranked it? But would not both of them have been mistaken; and would not a sight of the whole have taught them to rectify their wrong judgments as well knowing

\* Τῇ δὲ Δήλιαν δὲ ἴσπου γι τῆς καλλίστης, εἶαι μάλιστα αἱ Θιτταλαί εἰσιν, ἀδμήτις, ἴτι καὶ ἄλκται· τὸ δ' ἄνω ἡμίτομοι, γυναικὲς, πάγκαλον,—καὶ ἡ μίξις δὲ, καὶ ἡ ἀρμογὴ τῶν σωμάτων, καὶ συνάπτεται καὶ συνδιῆται τῇ γυναικίᾳ τὸ ἵππικόν, ἥριμα, καὶ οὐκ ἀθρόως μεταβαίνουσα, καὶ ἐκ προσαγωγῆς τριτομίνη, λαμβάνει τὴν ὥψιν ἐκ θαιτίου, εἰς τὸ ἴτιον ὑπατομίνη.—Zeuxis, cap. 6. l. i. p. 843, edit. Reitzii, Amst. 4to, 1743.

that the functions of such a compounded animal, whenever it existed, must be very different from those of either of the other, singly and alone. From such partial judges of the LAW therefore little assistance is to be expected towards the discovery of its true nature.

Much less are we to expect from the Jewish doctors: who, though they still keep sheltered, as it were, in the ruins of this august and awful fabric; yet patch it up with the same barbarity of taste, and impotence of science, that the present Greeks are wont to hide themselves amongst the mouldering monuments of Attic power and politeness. Who, as our travellers inform us, take a beggarly pride in keeping up their claim to these wonders of their ancestors' magnificence, by white-washing the Parian marble with chalk, and incrusting the porphyry and granite with tiles and potsherds.

But least of all shall we receive light from the fantastic visions of our English *Cocceians*; \* who have sublimed the crude nonsense of the cabalists, so long busied in the dull amusement of picking mysteries out of letters, into a more spiritual kind of folly; a quintessence well defecated from all the impurities of sense and meaning.

Therefore, to understand the nature of the Jewish economy, we must begin with this truth, to which every page of the five books of Moses is ready to bear witness, *That the separation of the Israelites was in order to preserve the doctrine of the UNITY, amidst an idolatrous and polytheistic world.* The necessity of this provision shall be shown at large hereafter.† At present we only desire the deist would be so civil as to suppose there might possibly be a sufficient cause.

But now, because it is equally true, that this *separation* was fulfilling the promise made to ABRAHAM their father; these men have taken occasion to represent it as made for the sake of a FAVOURITE PEOPLE.‡ And then again, supposing such a partial distinction to be inconsistent with the divine attributes, have ventured to arraign the LAW itself of imposture.

But this representation of the fact is both unjust and absurd. They cannot deny but it might be God's purpose, at least, that it became his goodness, to preserve the doctrine of the UNITY amidst an idolatrous world. But this (we know by the event) could never be effected but by a *separation* of one part from the rest. Nor could such a separation be made any otherwise than by bringing that part under God's peculiar protection: the consequence of which were GREAT TEMPORAL BLESSINGS. Now as some one people must needs be selected for this purpose, it seems most agreeable to our ideas of divine wisdom, which commonly effects many ends by the same means, to make the *blessings* attendant on such a *selection*, the reward of some high exalted virtue in the progenitors of the chosen people. But therefore to object that they were chosen as FAVOURITES, is both unjust and absurd. The *separation* was made for the sake of mankind in general; though one people became

\* The followers of Hutchinson.

† In the ninth book.

‡ See the first volume of *The Divine Legation*.



the honoured instrument, in reward of their forefathers' virtues. And this is the language of those very scriptures which, as they pretend, furnish the objection. Where God, by the prophet Ezekiel, promises to restore the Israelites, after a short dispersion through the countries, to their own land, he declares this to be the end of their separation: "Therefore say unto the house of Israel, Thus saith the LORD GOD, I DO NOT THIS FOR YOUR SAKES, O HOUSE OF ISRAEL, BUT FOR MINE HOLY NAME'S SAKE, which ye have profaned among the heathen whither ye went. And I will sanctify my great name which was profaned amongst the heathen, which ye have profaned in the midst of them; and the heathen shall know that I am the LORD, saith the LORD GOD, when I shall be sanctified in you before their eyes."\* What GOD himself says of the PEOPLE, St Paul says of their LAW: "Wherefore then serveth the law? IT WAS ADDED BECAUSE OF TRANSGRESSIONS; till the seed should come, to whom the promise was made."† *It was added*, says the apostle. To what? To the patriarchal religion of the UNITY.‡ To what end? *Because of transgressions*, i. e. the transgressions of polytheism and idolatry; into which the rest of mankind were already absorbed, and the Jews at that time hastening apace; and from which there was no other means of restraining them, than by this ADDITION; an addition that kept them separate from all others, and preserved the doctrine of the UNITY till the *coming of the promised seed*.

But another thing offends the deists: they cannot understand, let the end of this choice be what it would, why GOD should prefer so perverse and sottish a people, to all others. One reason hath been given already; that it was for the sake of their forefathers, and to fulfill the promise made to the patriarchs. But others are not wanting; and those very agreeable to the ideas we have of infinite wisdom; such, for instance, as this, that the EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE, by which they were blessed and protected, might become the more visible and illustrious. For had they been endowed with the shining qualities of the more polished nations, the effects of that providence might have been ascribed to their own power or wisdom. Their impotence and inability, when left to themselves, is finely represented in the prophet Ezekiel, by the similitude of the vine-tree: *Son of man, what is the vine-tree more than any tree, or than a branch which is amongst the trees of the forest? Shall wood be taken thereof to do any work? or will men take a pin of it to hang any vessel thereon?—Therefore thus saith the Lord God, As the vine-tree amongst the trees of the forest,*§ &c. For as the vine, which, with cultivation and support, is the most valuable of all trees, becomes the most worthless, when left neglected in its own natural state: so the Jews, who made so superior a figure under the particular protection of GOD, when, for their sins, that protection was withdrawn, became the weakest and most contemptible of all tributary nations.

\* Ezek. xxxvi. 22, 23. † Gal. iii. 19. ‡ See note A, at the end of this book.  
§ Chap. xv. ver. 3.

The poet VOLTAIRE indeed has had a different revelation. "The pride of every individual amongst the Jews," says he, "is interested in believing, that it was not their DETESTABLE POLICY, their ignorance in the arts, and their unpoliteness, which destroyed them; but that it is God's anger which yet pursues them for their idolatries."\* This DETESTABLE POLICY (for so, with the free insolence of impiety, characteristic of these times, he calls the MOSAIC INSTITUTION) was a principle of independency: this *ignorance in the arts* prevented the entrance of luxury; and this *unpoliteness* hindered the practice of it. And yet parsimony, frugality, and a spirit of liberty, which naturally preserve other states, all tended, in the ideas of this wonderful politician, to destroy the Jewish. Egypt was long lost for want of a spirit of independency; Greece sunk by its knowledge in the arts; and Rome was ruined by its politeness: yet Judea suffered for the want of all these causes of destruction. Is not this more than a thousand topical arguments, to prove, that they were ruined by nothing but by their idolatries, which brought down God's vengeance upon them? But any contrivance will serve a poet, any argument will satisfy a freethinker, to keep a God and his providence at a distance. And that the PEOPLE were as DETESTABLE as their POLICY, the same poet, the virtuous Voltaire, assures us,—"We do not find," says he, "throughout the whole annals of the HEBREW PEOPLE one generous action. They are utter strangers both to hospitality, to beneficence, and to clemency. Their sovereign good is the practice of usury, with all but their own nation. And this disposition, the principle of all baseness, is so inrooted in their hearts, that *usury* is the constant object of the figures they employ in that species of eloquence which is peculiar to them. *Their glory is to lay waste, with fire and sword, such paltry villages as they were just able to storm: They cut the throats of the old men and children, and reserve from slaughter only the marriageable virgins. They assassinate their masters when they are slaves. They are incapable of pardoning when they conquer. THEY ARE THE FOES OF ALL MANKIND.*"†

Such is the strong colouring of our MORAL PAINTER. He has dipped his pencil in sulphur to delineate with horns and tails, these chosen instruments of God's vengeance on a devoted nation, overrun with UNNATURAL LUST and brutish idolatry; for to their destruction, the murders, the rapine, and the violations here charged upon the *Hebrew people*,

\* L'orgueil de chaque Juif est intéressé à croire que ce n'est point sa DETESTABLE POLITIQUE, son ignorance des arts, sa grossiereté, qui l'a perdu; mais que c'est la colère de Dieu que le punit.—Rem. ix. sur les pensées de Pascal.

† On ne voit dans toutes les Annales du peuple Hebreu aucune action généreuse. Ils ne connaissent ni l'hospitalité, ni la libéralité, ni la clémence. Leur souverain bonheur est d'exercer l'usure avec les étrangers; et cet esprit de usure, principe de toute lacheté, est tellement enraciné dans leurs cœurs, que c'est l'objet continuel des figures, qu'ils emploient dans l'espece d'eloquence, qui leur est propre. Leur gloire est de mettre à feu à sang les petits villages, dont ils peuvent s'emparer. Ils égorgent les vieillards & les enfans; ils ne réservent que les filles nubiles; ils assassinent leurs maîtres quand ils sont esclaves; ils ne savent jamais pardonner quand ils sont vainqueurs; ILS SONT LES ENNEMIS DU GENRE HUMAIN.—Addit. à l'Hist. Generale, p. 30.

allude. For the rest, it is so much below all criticism, that one is almost ashamed to touch upon it. Otherwise, we might observe, that in his rage he hath confounded the character of the ancient HEBREWS with that of the modern JEWS, two people as much unlike as the ancient Franks to modern Frenchmen.—We might be merry with the nonsense, of *usury's being the object of their figures of eloquence*; which yet is not more ridiculous in the thought than absurd in the expression; his meaning, I suppose, being, that their figures of eloquence are formed from, and allude to, the circumstances attending their practice of *usury*.

But the affair grows more serious, as we proceed with our *general historian*; and we shall find that this unhappy people, however they may stand with their *God*, certainly, at present, for some reason or other, lie under the *poet's curse*. And from his uncommon knowledge of their *usury* and their *eloquence*, I should suspect, he had lately been transacting some money-matters with them, and had been not only out-witted but out-talked too into the bargain.

As to their HATRED OF ALL MANKIND, (the chopping block of infidelity) we have it over again, and more at large, in another place. "You are," says he to his reader, "struck with that hatred and contempt, which all people have always entertained for the Jewish nation. It is the unavoidable consequence of THEIR LEGISLATION; which reduced things to the necessity, that either the Jews must enslave the whole world, or that they, in their turn, must be crushed and destroyed. It WAS COMMANDED THEM to hold all other people in abhorrence, and to think themselves polluted if they had eat in the same dish which belonged to a man of another religion. BY THE VERY LAW ITSELF, they at length found themselves the natural enemies of THE WHOLE RACE OF MANKIND."\*

I believe it will not be easy to find, even in the dirtiest sink of free-thinking, so much falsehood, absurdity, and malice, heaped together in so few words. He says, *There was an inevitable necessity, arising from the very genius of the law itself, either that this people should enslave the whole world, or that they, in their turn, should be crushed and destroyed.*

It might be thought unreasonable to expect that a poet should read his Bible: but one might be allowed to suppose that he had heard at least of its general contents. If he ever had, could he, unmasked, and in the face of the sun, have said, "That the MOSAIC LAW directed or encouraged the Jewish people to attempt extensive conquests?" That very LAW, which not only assigned a peculiar and narrow district for the abode of its followers; but, by a number of institutions, actually confined

\* —Vous êtes frappés de cette haine et de ce mépris que toutes les nations ont toujours eu pour la nation Juive. C'est la suite inévitable de LEUR LEGISLATION; il falloit, ou que ce peuple subjuguât tout, ou qu'il fût écrasé. Il lui fut ordonné d'avoir les nations en horreur, et de se croire souillées s'ils avaient mangé dans un plat, qui eût appartenu à un homme d'un autre loi—they se trouverent PAR LEUR LOI MEME enfin ennemis naturels du GENRE HUMAIN.—Add. à l'Hist. Generale, p. 174.

them within those limits: such as the stated division of the land to *each* tribe; the prohibition of the use of horses; the distinction of *meats* into clean and unclean: the yearly visit of each individual to Jerusalem, with many others. The poet, who appears throughout his whole history to be a much better mussulman than a Christian, was surely, when he said this, in some pious meditation on the *ALCORAN*; which indeed, by *the inevitable consequence of its legislation*, must either set the *Saracens* upon enslaving all mankind, or all mankind on extirpating so pernicious a crew of miscreants.

But *the Jews*, he tells us, were *COMMANDED to hold all other people in abhorrence*. If he had said, *to hold their IDOLATRIES in abhorrence*, he had said *true*; but that was saying nothing. To tell the world that *the Jews were commanded to hold the PERSONS of idolaters in abhorrence*, was done like a poet.

But when he goes on to say, that *The Jews found, BY THE VERY CONSTITUTION OF THE LAW ITSELF, that they were the NATURAL ENEMIES of all mankind*, this was not like a poet, being indeed a transgression of the *PROBABLE*; for by the *constitution of the law itself*, every Jew that could read, found all mankind to be his *BRETHREN*. For Moses, to prevent any such estrangement, which some other parts of his institution, if abused, might occasion, was careful to acquaint the chosen family with the origin of the human race, and of their descent from one man and woman; and, in order to impress this salutary truth more strongly on their minds, he draws out an exact genealogy from Adam, not only of the direct line which was to inhabit the land of Judea, but of all the collateral branches by which the whole earth was peopled.

So that were our poet to turn *lawgiver*, (which he might as well do, as *GENERAL HISTORIAN*) and sit down to contrive a method by which brotherly love and affection might be best established amongst the sons of men, one might defy him, with all his poetical or historical invention; to hit upon any more efficacious than that which Moses has here employed. St Paul, when he would enlarge the affections of the Athenians (to whom all other nations, as well as the Jews, were become *BARBARIANS*) to that extent which Christian benevolence requires, employed no other topic than this, that *GOD HAD MADE OF ONE BLOOD ALL NATIONS OF MEN*: and from thence inferred, that they all stand in the relation of *BRETHREN* to one another.

But it may be asked, What are we then to think of that *ODIUM HUMANI GENERIS*, with which the ancient pagans charged the Jews? I have shown, in the first volume of this work, that there was not the least shadow from *fact* to support this calumny; and that it was merely an imaginary consequence, which they drew from the others' declared hate and abhorrence of the idols of paganism, and firm adherence to the sole worship of the *one true God*. But besides this original, the *principles and doctrine*, there was another, the *rites and ceremonies* of the Mosaic religion; either of them sufficient alone to perpetuate this wretched

calumny amongst ignorant and prejudiced men. That the *doctrine* was worthy of its original, the enemies of revelation confess; That the establishment of the *ceremonies*, as they were necessary to support the *doctrine*, were of no less importance, I shall now show our poet.

To separate one people from all others, in order to preserve the doctrine of the *unity*, was a just purpose.

No separation could be made but by a ceremonial law.

No ceremonial law could be established for this purpose, but what must make the gentiles be esteemed unclean by the separated people.

The consequence of an estimated *uncleanness*, must be the avoiding it with horror: which, when observed by their enemies, would be maliciously represented to arise from this imaginary *odium humani generis*. What idea then must we needs entertain, I will not say of the religion, but of the common honesty of a modern writer, who, without the least knowledge of the Jewish nation or their policy, can repeat an old exploded calumny with the assurance of one who had discovered a newly acknowledged truth? But the pagans were decent when compared to this rude libertine. They never had the insolence to say, that this pretended *hate of all mankind* was COMMANDED BY THE LAW ITSELF. They had more sense as well as modesty. They revered the great Jewish lawgiver, who, they saw, by his account of the origin of the human race, had laid the strongest foundation amongst his people, of brotherly love to all men. A foundation, which not one of the most celebrated lawgivers of antiquity had either the wit to enforce, or the sagacity to discover.

Well, but if the Jews were indeed that DETESTABLE *people* which the poet Voltaire represents them to be, they were properly fitted however with a *law*, which, he assures us, was full as DETESTABLE. What pity is it that he did not know just so much of his Bible, however, as might serve to give some small countenance at least to his impieties! We might then have had the *prophet* to support the *poet*, where, speaking in the name of God, he says—*I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live\**. But to leave this to his maturer projects; and go on with him, in his pious design of *eradicating* this devoted people; for he assures us, we see, that unless they be rooted out, their DETESTABLE POLICY will set them upon enslaving all mankind.

He hath shown the PEOPLE to be *detestable*, and their LAW to be *detestable*; and well has he provided for the reception of both, a most *detestable* COUNTRY. You may, if you please, suppose all this done in vindication of the good providence of the God of Israel; for a *people* so bad, certainly deserved neither a better *government* nor *habitation*. No, he had a nobler end than this; it was to give the lie to the legate of the God of Israel, who promised to them, in his Master's name, *A land flowing with milk and honey, the glory of all lands*. Having gotten

\* Farkiel.—See book IV. sect. 6

Moses at this advantage, by the assistance of Servetus and his followers (for he always speaks from good authority) he draws this delightful picture of the HOLY LAND—"All of it which is situated towards the south, consists of DESERTS OF SALT SANDS on the side of the Mediterranean and Egypt; and of HORRID MOUNTAINS all the way to Esiongaber, towards the Red Sea. These sands, and these rocks, at present possessed by a few straggling Arabian robbers, were the ancient patrimony of the Jews."\*

Now admitting this account to be true: 1. In the first place, we may inform our poet, that, from the face of a country lying desert, there is no safe judgment to be made of the degree of its fertility when well cultivated; especially of such a one as is here described, consisting of rugged mountains and sandy plains, which, without culture, indeed, produce nothing, but which, by human industry in a happy climate, may be made to vie with soils naturally the most prolific. 2. It appears, from the vast numbers which this country actually sustained in the most flourishing times of the theocracy, that it well answered the character their lawgiver had bestowed upon it, *of a land flowing with milk and honey*. 3. The Israelites, when they took possession of it, certainly found it to come up to the character which Moses had given them, of a place where they should find *great and goodly cities which they had not builded, houses full of good things which they had not filled, wells digged which they had not digged, and vineyards and olive-trees which they had not planted.*† If, I say, they had not found it so, we should soon have heard of it, from the most turbulent and dissatisfied people upon earth. And it was no wonder they found it in this condition, since they had wrested it from the hands of a very numerous and luxurious people, who had carried arts and arms to some height, when they, in any sense, could be said to have *cities fenced up to heaven*. But the poet has a solution of this difficulty; for to the Israelites, just got out of their forty years' captivity in the wilderness, this miserable country must needs appear a paradise, in comparison of the deserts of Paran and Kadesh Barnea.‡ Now, it is very certain, that no *desert* thereabout, could be more horrid or forbidding than that of Judea, as the poet has here drawn the landscape. But does he think they had quite forgot the fertile plains of Egypt all this time? And if they *compared* the promised inheritance to the wilderness on the one hand, would they not be as apt to *compare* it to Egypt on the other? And what Judea gained by the first, it would lose by the second. But he will say, *that generation which came out of Egypt, fell in the wilderness*. What if they did?

\* Tout ce qui est situé vers le midi consiste en deserts de sables salés du côté de la Méditerranée et de l'Égypte, et en montagnes affreuses jusqu' à Esiongaber vers la Mer Rouge. Ces sables et ces rochers, habités aujourd'hui par quelques Arabes voleurs, sont l'ancienne patrie des Juifs. Add. à l'Hist. Generale, p. 83.

† Deut. vi.—viii.

‡ —Ce pays fut pour eux une terre délicieuse en comparaison des Déserts de Paran et de Kadesh-Barné. Ib.



they left their fondness for its flesh-pots behind them, as we are sufficiently informed from the excessive attachment of their posterity for Egyptian luxury of every kind. 4. But let us admit his account of the sterility of the promised land, and then see how the pretensions of the Mosiac mission will stand. We will consider this sterility in either view, as *corrigible*, or as *incorrigible*.

If *corrigible*, we cannot conceive a properer region for answering the ends of providence, as Moses has delivered them unto us, with regard to this people. The first great blessing bestowed on mankind, was to be particularly exemplified in the posterity of Abraham, which was to be *like the sand on the sea-shore for multitude*: and yet they were to be confined within the narrow limits of a single district: so that some proportionate provision was to be made for its numerous inhabitants. Affluence by commerce they could not have; for the purpose of their separation required that idolaters should no more be permitted to come and pollute them, than that they should go amongst idolaters to be polluted by them: And accordingly, a sufficient care was taken, in the framing of their laws, to hinder this communication at either end. Thus the advantages from commerce being quite cut off, they had only agriculture to have recourse to, for subsistence of their multitudes. And the natural sterility of the land would force them upon every invention to improve it. And artificial culture produces an abundance, which unassisted nature can never give to the most fruitful soil and most benignant climate. Add to this, that a people thus sequestered, would, without such constant attention to the art, and application to the labour, which the meliorating of a backward soil requires, soon degenerate into barbarous and savage manners; the first product of which has been always seen to be a total oblivion of a God.

But if we are to suppose what the poet would seem to insinuate, in discredit of the dispensation, that the soil of Judea was absolutely *incorrigible*; a more convincing proof cannot be given of that EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE which Moses promised to them. So that if the *corrigibility* of a bad soil perfectly agreed with the END of the dispensation, which was a separation, the *incorrigibility* of it was as well fitted to the MEAN, which was an *extraordinary providence*. For the fact, that Judea did support those vast multitudes, being unquestionable, and the natural incapacity of the country so to do being allowed, nothing remains but that we must recur to that *extraordinary providence*, which not only was promised, but was the natural consequence of a *theocratic* form of government. But I am inclined to keep between the two contrary suppositions, and take up the premises of the one, and the conclusion of the other: to hold that the sterility of Judea was very corrigible; but that all possible culture would be inadequate to the vast numbers which it sustained, and that therefore its natural produce was still further multiplied by an *extraordinary blessing* upon the land.

To support this system, we may observe, that this extraordinary

assistance was bestowed more eminently, because more wanted, while the Israelites remained in the *wilderness*. MOSES, whose word will yet go as far as our *general historian's*, says, that when God took Jacob up, to give him his LAW, he *found him indeed in a desert land, and in the waste howling wilderness*; but it was no longer such, when now God had the leading of him. "*He led him about,*" [i. e. while he was preparing him for the conquest of the promised land] "*He instructed him,*" [i. e. by the LAW, which he there gave him] "*He kept him as the apple of his eye,*" [i. e. he preserved him there by his extraordinary providence;] the effects of which he describes in the next words,—"*He made him ride on the high places of the earth,*" [i. e. he made the wilderness to equal, in its produce, the best cultivated places] "*that he might eat the increase of the fields; and he made him to suck honey out of the rock, and oil out of the flinty rock: butter of kine, and milk of sheep, with fat of lambs, and rams of the breed of Bashan*" [i. e. as large as that breed] "*and goats, with the fat of kidneys of wheat,*" [i. e. the flour of wheat] "*and thou didst drink the pure blood of the grape.*"

That this was no fairy scene, appears from the effects—"Jeshurun waxed fat, and kicked; thou art waxen fat, thou art grown thick, thou art covered with fatness; then he forsook God which made him, and lightly esteemed the rock of his salvation,"\* &c. This severe reproof of Moses certainly did not put the Israelites in a humour, to take the wonders in the foregoing account on his word, had the facts he appeals to been the least equivocal.

On the whole, we can form no conception how God could have chosen a people, and assigned them a land to inhabit, more proper for the display of his almighty power, than the people of Israel and the land of Judea. As to the people, the PROPHEET in his *parable* of the vine-tree, informs us, that they were, naturally, the weakest and most contemptible of all nations: and as to the land, the POET, in his *great fable*, which he calls a General History, assures us, that Judea was the vilest and most barren of all countries. Yet somehow or other this *chosen people* became the instructors of mankind, in the noblest office of humanity, the science of true theology: and the *promised land*, while made subservient to the worship of one God, was changed, from its native sterility, to a region *flowing with milk and honey*; and, by reason of the incredible numbers which it sustained, deservedly entitled the GLORY OF ALL LANDS.

This is the state of things which SCRIPTURE lays before us. And I have never yet seen those *strong reasons*, from the schools of infidelity, that should induce a man, bred up in any school at all, to prefer their logic to the plain facts of the sacred historians.

I have used their testimony to expose one, who, indeed, renounces their authority: but in this I am not conscious of having transgressed any rule of fair reasoning. The *freethinker* laments that there is no contemporary historian remaining, to confront with the Jewish lawgiver. and

\* Deut. xxxii. 10, et seq.

detect his impostures. However, he takes heart, and boldly engages his credit to confute him from his own history. This is a fair attempt. But he prevaricates on the very first onset. The sacred history, besides the many civil facts which it contains, has many of a *miraculous* nature. Of these, our freethinker will allow the first only to be brought in evidence. And then bravely attacks his adversary, who has now one hand tied behind him: for the civil and the miraculous facts, in the Jewish dispensation, have the same, nay, a nearer relation to each other, than the two hands of the same body; for these may be used singly and independently, though to disadvantage; whereas the civil and the miraculous facts can neither be understood nor accounted for, but on the individual inspection of both. This is confessed by one who, as clear-sighted as he was, certainly did not see the\* consequence of what he so liberally acknowledged. "The miracles in the Bible," says his philosophic Lordship, "are not like those in Livy, detached pieces, that do not disturb the civil history, which goes on very well without them. But the miracles of the Jewish historian are intimately connected with all the civil affairs, and make a necessary and inseparable part. The whole history is founded in them; it consists of little else; and if it were not a history of them, it would be a history of nothing."†

From all this, I assume that where an unbeliever, a philosopher if you will, (for the poet Voltaire makes them convertible terms) pretends to show the falsehood of Moses's mission from Moses's own history of it; he who undertakes to confute his reasoning, argues fairly when he confutes it upon facts recorded in that history, whether they be of the miraculous or of the civil kind: since the two sorts are so inseparably connected, that they must always be taken together, to make the history understood, or the facts which it contains intelligible.

## SECT. II.

ALLOWING it then, to have been GOD's purpose to perpetuate the knowledge of himself amidst an idolatrous world, by the means of a separated people; let us see how this design was brought about, when the family, he had chosen, was now become numerous enough to support itself under a *separation*; and idolatry, which was grown to its most gigantic stature,‡ was now to be repressed.

The Israelites were, at this time, groaning under the yoke of Egypt; whither the all-wise providence of God had conducted them, while they were yet few in number, and in danger of mixing and confounding themselves with the rest of the nations. In this distress, one of their own brethren is sent to them with a message from God, by the name and character of the GOD OF THEIR FATHERS, whose virtues God had pro-

\* See the View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy, vol. xii.

† Bolingbroke's Posthumous Works, vol. iii. p. 279.

‡ See note B, at the end of this book.

mised to reward with distinguished blessings on their posterity. The message, accompanied with *signs and wonders*, denounced their speedy deliverance from Egyptian bondage, and their certain possession of the land of Canaan, the scene of all the promised blessings. The people hearken, and are delivered. They depart from Egypt; and in the third month from their departure, come to Mount Sinai. Here God first tells them by their leader, MOSES, that, *if they would obey his voice indeed, and keep his covenant, then they should be a PECULIAR TREASURE to him above all people, for that the WHOLE EARTH was his.\** Where we see an example of what hath been observed above, that whenever an institution was given to this people, in compliance with the notions they had imbibed in Egypt, a corrective was always joined with it, to prevent the abuse. Thus, God having here told them, that if they would *obey his voice* they should be *his peculiar treasure above all people* (speaking in the character of a *tutelary God*); to prevent this compliance from falling into abuse, as the division of the several regions of the earth to several celestial rulers was inseparably connected with the idea of a *tutelary deity*, he adds, as a reason for making this people his peculiar, a circumstance destructive of that pagan notion of tutelary gods—*for that the WHOLE EARTH was his*. Well. The people consent;† and God delivers the covenant to them, in the words of the two tables.‡

But this promise, of their being received for God's *peculiar treasure*, could be visibly performed no otherwise than by their separation from the rest of mankind. As on the other hand, their separation could not have been effected without this visible protection. And this, MOSES observes in his intercession for the people: *for wherein shall it be known here, that I and thy people have found grace in thy sight? Is it not in that THOU GOEST WITH US? So shall we be SEPARATED, I and thy people, from all the people that are upon the face of the earth.§* The better, therefore, to secure this separation, God proposes to them, to become their KING. And, for reasons that will be explained anon, condescends to receive the magistracy, on their free choice.—*And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests,|| and an holy nation.—And all the people answered together and said, All that the Lord hath spoken we will do.¶* God then delivers them a digest of their civil and religious laws, and settles the whole constitution both of church and state. Thus the Almighty becoming their KING, in as real a sense as he was their God, the republic of the Israelites was properly a THEOCRACY; in which the two societies, civil and religious, were of course entirely incorporated. A thing neither attended to nor understood. The name indeed is of familiar use: but how little men mean by it, is seen from hence, that those who, out of form, are accustomed to call it a *theocracy*, yet, in their reasonings about it, consider it as a mere aristocracy under the judges; and as

\* Exod. xix. 5.

† Exod. xix. 8.

‡ Exod. xx.

§ Exod. xxxiii. 16.

|| For where *God is King*, every *subject* is, in some sense or other, a *priest*; because in that case, civil obedience must have in it the nature of religious ministration.

¶ Exod. xix. 6—8.

a mere monarchy under the kings: whereas, in truth, it was neither one nor the other, but a real and proper THEOCRACY, under both.

Thus was this famous SEPARATION made. But it will be asked, Why is so extraordinary a way? A way, in which the sagacious deist can discover nothing but the marks of the legislator's fraud, and the people's superstition.—As to what a mere human lawgiver could gain by such a project, will be seen hereafter. At present, it will be sufficient, for the removal of these suspicions, to show, that

[I.] A THEOCRACY WAS NECESSARY, as the *separation* could not be effected any other way.

It appears, from what hath been shown above, that the Israelites had ever a violent propensity to mix with the neighbouring nations, and to devote themselves to the practices of idolatry: this would naturally, and did, in fact, absorb large portions of them. And the sole human means which preserved the remainder, was the severity of their civil laws against idolatry.\* Such laws, therefore, were necessary to support a *separation*. But penal laws, enforced by the ordinary magistrate, for matters of opinion, are manifestly unjust. Some way therefore was to be contrived to render these laws equitable. For we are not to suppose God would ordain any thing that should violate the rule of natural justice. Now these penal laws are equitable only in a theocracy: therefore was a THEOCRACY NECESSARY.

That the punishment of opinions, by civil laws, under a THEOCRACY, is agreeable to the rules of natural justice, I shall now endeavour to prove.

Unbelievers and intolerant Christians have both tried to make their advantage of this part of the Mosaic institution. The one using it as an argument against the divinity of the Jewish religion, on presumption that such laws are contrary to natural equity; and the other bringing it to defend their intolerant principles by the example of Heaven itself. But they are both equally deceived by their ignorance of the nature of a *theocracy*: which, rightly understood, clears the Jewish law from an embarrassing objection, and leaves the rights of mankind inviolate.

Mr Bayle, in an excellent treatise for toleration, when he comes to examine the arguments of the intolerants, takes notice of that which they bring from the example in question. "The fourth objection," says he, "may arise from hence, that the law of Moses gives no toleration to idolaters, and false prophets, whom it punishes with death; and from what the prophet Elijah did to the priests of Baal, whom he ordered to be destroyed without mercy. From whence it follows, that all the

\* "If there be found amongst you within any of thy gates which the LORD thy God giveth thee, man or woman that hath wrought wickedness in the sight of the LORD thy God in transgressing his covenant; and hath gone and served other gods, and worshipped them, either the sun, or the moon, or any of the host of heaven, which I have not commanded; and it be told thee, and thou hast heard of it, and inquired diligently, and behold it be true, and the thing certain, that such abomination is wrought in Israel: then shalt thou bring forth that man or that woman (which have committed that wicked thing) unto thy gates, even that man, or that woman, and shalt stone them with stones till they die."—Deut. xvii. 2—5.

reasons I have employed, in the first part of this *commentary*, prove nothing, because they prove too much; namely, that the literal sense of the law of Moses, as far as relates to the punishment of opinions, would be impious and abominable. Therefore, since God could, without violating the eternal order of things, command the Jews to put false prophets to death, it follows, evidently, that he could, under the gospel also, command orthodox believers to inflict the same punishment upon heretics.

“I am not, if I rightly know myself, of that temper of mind, so thoroughly corrupted by the contagion of controversy, as to treat this objection with an air of haughtiness and contempt; as is the way when men find themselves incapable of answering to the purpose. I ingenuously own the objection to be strong; and that it seems to be a mark of God’s sovereign pleasure, that we should not arrive at certainty in any thing, seeing he hath given exceptions in his holy word to almost all the common notices of reason. Nay, I know some who have no greater difficulties to hinder their believing that God was the author of the laws of Moses, and of all those revelations that occasioned so much slaughter and devastation, than this very matter of intolerance, so contrary to our clearest ideas of natural equity.”\*

Whether Mr Bayle himself was one of these backward believers, as by some of his expressions he gives us reason to suspect, is not material. That he dwelt with pleasure on this circumstance, as favouring his beloved scepticism, is too evident. But sure he went a little too far when he said, *God’s word contains exceptions to almost all the common notices of reason.*† I hope to show, before I have done with infidelity, that it contains exceptions to none. Our excellent countryman Mr LOCKE, who wrote about this time on the same subject, and with that force and precision which is the character of all his writings, was more reasonable and modest in his account of this matter. *As to the case*, says he, *of the Israelites in the Jewish commonwealth, who being initiated into the Mosaical rites, and made citizens of the commonwealth, did afterwards apostatize from the worship of the God of Israel; these were proceeded against as traitors and rebels, guilty of no less than high treason. For the commonwealth of the Jews, different, in that, from all others, was an absolute THEOCRACY; nor was there, nor could there be, any difference between the commonwealth and the church. The laws established there concerning the worship of the one invisible Deity were the civil laws of that people, and a part of their political government, in which God himself was the legislator.*‡ This he said; but it being all he said,

I shall endeavour to support his solution by such other reasoning as occurs to me. It will be necessary then to observe, that God, in his

\* Voyons presentement cette iv. objection. On la peut tirer de ce que la loi du Moïse, &c.—Commentaire Philosophique, part ii. ch. iv.

† — par les exceptions qu’il a mise dans sa parole à presque toutes les notions communes de la raison.

‡ Letter concerning Toleration, p. 37, ed. 1689.



infinite wisdom, was pleased to stand in two *arbitrary* relations towards the Jewish people, besides that *natural* one, in which he stood towards them and the rest of mankind in common. The first was that of a *tutelary Deity, gentilitial and local*; the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who was to bring their posterity into the land of Canaan, and to protect them there, as his peculiar people. The second was that of *supreme magistrate and lawgiver*. And in both these relations he was pleased to refer it to the people's free choice, whether or no they would receive him for their God and KING. For a tutelary deity was supposed by the ancients to be as much matter of election as a civil magistrate. The people, therefore, thus solemnly accepting him, these necessary consequences followed from the HOREB CONTRACT.

I. First, that as the national God and civil magistrate of the Jews centered in one and the same object, their civil policy and religion must be intimately united and incorporated;\* consequently, their religion had, and very reasonably, A PUBLIC PART, whose subject was the society as such: though this part, in the national pagan religions, which had it likewise, was extremely absurd, as hath been shown more at large in the first volume.†

II. Secondly, as the two societies were thoroughly incorporated, they could not be distinguished; but must stand or fall together. Consequently the direction of all their civil laws must be for the equal preservation of both. Therefore, as the renouncing him for King was the throwing him off as God; and as the renouncing him for God was the throwing him off as King; idolatry, which was the rejecting him as God, was properly the *crimen læsæ majestatis*; and so justly punishable by the civil laws. But there was this manifest difference in these two cases, as to the effects. The renouncing God as civil magistrate might be remedied without a total dissolution of the constitution; not so, the renouncing him as tutelary God: because, though he might, and did appoint a deputy,‡ in his office of KING, amongst the Jewish tribes; yet he would have no substitute, as GOD, amongst the pagan deities. Therefore, in necessity as well as of right, idolatry was punishable by the civil laws of a THEOCRACY; it being the greatest crime that could be committed against the state, as tending, by unavoidable consequence, to dissolve the constitution. For the one God being the supreme magistrate, it subsisted in the worship of that God alone. Idolatry, therefore, as the renunciation of one God alone, was in a strict philosophic, as well as legal sense, the crime of lese majesty. Let us observe farther, that as, by such INCORPORATION, religious matters came under civil consideration, so likewise civil matters came under the religious. This is what Josephus would say, where, in his second book against Apion,

\* Such a kind of union and incorporation was most absurdly affected by MAHOMET, in imitation of the Jewish economy; whence, as might be expected, it appears that neither he nor his assistants understood any thing of its true nature.

† See Divine Legation, book ii. sect. i.

‡ The kings of Israel and Judah being, as we shall show, indeed no other.

speaking of the Jewish theocracy, he tells us that Moses did not make *religion a part of virtue, but virtue a part of religion*.\* The meaning is, that, as in all human societies, obedience to the law is moral virtue; under a THEOCRACY, it is religion.

III. The punishment of idolatry, by law, had this farther circumstance of equity, that it was punishing the rebellion of those who had chosen the government under which they lived, when freely proposed to them. Hence, in the law against idolatry, the crime is, with great propriety, called the TRANSGRESSION OF THE COVENANT.†

Thus we see, the law in question stands clear of the cavils of infidels, and the abuse of intolerants.‡

But to this, the defender of *the common rights of subjects* may be apt to object, that "these penal laws were unjust, because no contract to give up the rights of conscience can be binding."

To which I reply, with a plain and decisive fact, that none of all the idolatrous worship the Jews ever fell into, from the time of giving the law to the total dissolution of the republic, was MATTER OF CONSCIENCE; but always of convenience; such as procuring some temporal good, which they wantonly affected, or averting some temporal evil, which they servilely feared. The truth of which appears from hence, that, in the midst of all their idolatries, the GOD of their fathers, as we shall see, was ever owned to be the Creator and first Cause of all things; and the religion taught by Moses, to be a revelation from heaven.

But it may be asked, What if their commission of idolatry had, at any time, proved matter of conscience; i. e. such an action as they thought they were obliged in duty to perform?

I reply, the question would have weight, had the law in dispute been of human institution. But as it was given by GOD, who knows the future equally with the past and present, and saw the case would not happen, it is altogether impertinent. The question, indeed, points out to us, the danger and absurdity in any human legislature to make penal laws for restraining the exercise of religion, on any pretence whatsoever.

Thus it is seen, that a *separation*, so necessary to preserve the unity, could not have been supported without PENAL LAWS against idolatry; and, at the same time, seen that such penal laws can never be equitably instituted but under a theocracy. The consequence is, that A THEOCRACY WAS NECESSARY.

But this form of government was highly convenient likewise. The Israelites, on their leaving Egypt, were sunk into the lowest practices of idolatry. To recover them, therefore, by the discipline of a *separation*, it was necessary that the idea of GOD and his attributes should be impressed upon them in the most *sensible* manner. But this could not be

\* *Λίτιον δ' ὅτι καὶ τῇ τρέφῃ τῆς νομοθεσίας πρὸς τὸ χρήσιμον πάντων αὐτῶν καὶ πολλὸν διδάσκειν· οὐ γὰρ μέρος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐποιεῖσι τὴν ἐνείκελαν, ἀλλὰ ταύτας τὰ μέρη εἰς ἄλλα συνῶν καὶ κατὰ μέρος λίγω διὰ τὴν δικαιοσύνην, τὴν κατεργείαν, τὴν σωφροσύνην, τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐν ἀρετῇ συμφωνίαν.*—P. 483, Hav. ed.

† Deut. xvii. 2.

‡ See note C, at the end of this book.

done, commodiously, under his character of God of the universe: under his character of King of Israel, it well might. Hence it is, we find him in the Old Testament so frequently represented with affections analogous to human passions. The civil relation, in which he stood to these people, made such a representation natural; the grossness of their conceptions made the representation necessary; and the guarded manner in which it was always qualified, prevented it from being mischievous. Hence, another instance of the wisdom of this economy; and of the folly of Spinoza, and others, who would conclude from it, that Moses and the prophets had themselves gross conceptions of the Deity. Nor should the indiscretion of those divines pass uncensured, who have taught that God, in the Old Testament, looks on man with a less gracious and benign aspect, than in the New. An error, which at one time gave birth to the most absurd and monstrous of the ancient heresies; and hath at all times furnished a handle to infidelity.\* But God, whenever he represents himself under the idea of Lord of the universe, makes one uniform revelation of his nature, throughout all his dispensations, *as gracious and full of compassion; as good to ALL, and whose tender mercies are OVER ALL HIS WORKS*: yet condescending to become the tutelary God, and civil magistrate of the Jews, it cannot but be, that he should be considered as having his peculiar inspection attached to this people, and as punishing their transgressions with severity.

These appear to me the true reasons of the *theocratic* form of government. With such admirable wisdom was the Jewish economy adapted, to effect the ends it had in view! Yet, notwithstanding the splendour of divinity which shines through every part of this theocratic form, Mr Foster, a dissenting preacher, tells us roundly, that it is all an idle dream; and that he will undertake to defend the law, which punishes idolatry with death, “not on *dark and imaginary*, but on *clear and solid* principles; I therefore add,” says he, “supposing the THEOCRATIC form of government amongst the Jews to be a point incontestible, it *seems scarce* capable of affording a *full and satisfactory* answer to the objection raised against the Hebrew law for devoting idolaters to death. For when the people of Israel, fond of novelty, and of imitating the customs of other nations, were stubbornly and inflexibly resolved, notwithstanding all the remonstrances of the prophet Samuel to the contrary, to have a visible and mortal king; God upon this occasion declared, that they had *rejected him that he should not reign over them*: and as his former political reign is founded on a supposed compact between the Almighty sovereign and his people, that *original compact* being now solemnly renounced on the part of the people, there must of course be a dissolution or end of the theocracy.”†

\* *It must be owned*, says Tindal, *that the same spirit (I dare not call it a spirit of cruelty) does not alike prevail throughout the Old Testament: the nearer we come to the times of the gospel, the milder it appeared.*—Christianity as old as the Creation, p. 241. See too Lord Bolingbroke's Posthumous Works throughout.

† Sermons, vol. iii. pp. 373, 374.

He begins with calling the theocracy *a dark principle*. And yet, the account he gives of it shows, that he did not find it *dark*; and, what was worse, could not, with all his endeavours, make it so. He calls it *imaginary*; and yet the very history he quotes to prove its short duration, shows, even by his own proof, it was *not imaginary*, but real.

Indeed, if that civil government, which is founded on ORIGINAL COMPACT, were dissolvable at pleasure, that is, as soon as one of the contracting parties was grown weary of it (which this decider on government and laws expressly says it is), then government, on its most legitimate foundation, would be the most *dark and imaginary* of all things. When the parliament rose up in arms against Charles I. they wanted just such a preacher as this (and yet they had many precious ones), to assure them, that *their renouncing* the king's authority had fairly dissolved the monarchy, and brought it to a lawful end. For the leaders of that body, it is plain, knew nothing of this secret, and were therefore at a great deal of pains to prove, and at last could hardly get themselves believed, that Charles himself had broken the *original compact*. But unless this *compact* stands upon a different footing from all other compacts in the world, we may safely pronounce, that a bargain or agreement, which has been made between two parties, can never be dissolved but by the consent of both of them; or by a fundamental misdemeanour in one; if the other party chooses to exact the forfeiture. Now, in the case of the Jews under Samuel, there was a *renunciation*, it is true, on the part of the people, or, in plainer English, a REBELLION. But God did not give way to it; he would not (as on the principles of civil justice he might) exact the forfeiture; which was, the withdrawing his protection. All this will be proved at large in its place. The *theocracy*, therefore, still continued under their kings; which were indeed no other than the *anointed*, or the viceroys of God.—Such is our preacher's success in attempting to show Mr Locke's principle to be *dark and imaginary*. Let us see next whether he has better fortune in proving his own to be *clear and solid*.

Now his way of justifying the law, which punished idolatry with death, without the aid of the *theocratic principle*, is this.—“As the end for which the civil constitution of the Jews was formed, *viz.* to prevent their being overrun with idolatry, (which, as it prevailed amongst the neighbouring nations, corrupted their internal sense of the difference of good and evil, and banished humanity and decency, and many of the most considerable and important of the social virtues, by introducing shameful impurities and human sacrifices, quite detestable to nature) as the end, I say, for which the civil constitution of the Jews was formed, appears, when thus explained, and abstracted from all considerations merely religious, to be wise and gracious in itself; and as the judicial laws in that scheme of government were admirably adapted to subserve and advance this wise and gracious end; it necessarily follows, that idolatry, which would have frustrated the whole design of the constitu-

nion, and have entirely dissolved and destroyed it, must, upon the same reasons that are allowed to be just in all other policies, have deserved capital punishment." \*

Here we see our preacher approves himself just as skilful in the *end* of civil government, as he did before, in its *nature and essence*. He appears not to know (what he might have seen proved in the first two books of this work) that civil society must have one particular, distinct, and appropriated end; and that this end can be no other than security to the temporal liberty and property of man; because (as is there shown) all other ends may be attained without civil society. This then is the only proper end of government. Yet our preacher falls into that exploded conceit, which makes any attainable end, so it be a good one, the legitimate business of civil society, as such: which confounds this society with all others, there being no way to keep the civil distinct, but by assigning it an end peculiar to itself. But his subject happening to be the *Jewish government*, it secured his reasoning from the glare of the absurdity. And his false and fallacious account of the *end* of its institution, with which he introduces his reasoning, gave a certain plausibility to the nonsense which followed. It is in these words, *The end for which the civil constitution was formed, was to prevent their being overrun with idolatry*. Now, by *civil constitution*, a fair reasoner should mean (where the question is concerning the efficacy of a *mere* civil government, in contradistinction to the religious) the civil constitution of the Jews, as it was so distinguished. But, in this sense, the *end* of the *civil constitution* of the Jews was the same with all other, namely, security to men's temporal liberty and property. It is true, if by their *civil constitution*, he meant both civil and religious, which here indeed was incorporated, and went under the common name of *LAW*; then indeed its *end was to prevent idolatry*; but then this is giving up the point, because that incorporation was the consequence of the *theocratic* form of government, or, to speak more properly, it was the *THEOCRACY* itself. Thus he comes round again to the place on which he had turned his back; and, before he knows where he is, establishes the very doctrine he would confute. In a word, our preacher was got out of his depth; and here I shall leave him to sink or swim; only observing, that this great advocate of religious liberty has done his best (though certainly without design) to support a principle the most plausible of any that persecutors for opinions can catch hold on, to justify their iniquitous practice; namely, *that civil government was ordained for the procuring all the good of all kinds, which it is even accidentally capable of advancing*. And to make sure work, he employs that adulterate gloss, which they so artfully put upon their wicked practice; *viz.* that it is *for the support of morality*: for who is so purblind that he cannot spy *immoralities* lurking in all heretical opinions? And thus it is that our preacher defends civil government, in punishing opinions: *The idolatry of the neighbouring nations, says he, corrupted their*

\* Pp. 375, 376.

*internal sense of the difference of good and evil, and banished humanity and decency, and many of the most considerable and important of the social virtues.* A reason constantly in the mouths, whatever hath been in the hearts of persecutors, from St Austin to St Dominic.\*

[II.] We come, in the next place, to show, that this THEOCRACY, as it was NECESSARY, so it would have an easy reception; being founded on the flattering notion, at that time universally entertained, of TUTELAR DEITIES, *gentilitial and local*. Thus, to carry on his great purpose, the Almighty very early represented himself to this chosen race, as a *gentilitial* Deity, the GOD of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob:† afterwards, when he preferred Judea to all other countries for his personal residence (on this account called HIS LAND‡), he came under their idea of, a *local* Deity: which notion was an established principle in the gentile world, as we have shown above, from Plato. It was originally EGYPTIAN; and founded in an opinion that the earth was at first divided by its Creator, amongst a number of inferior and subordinate divinities. The Septuagint translators appear to have understood the following passage in the song of Moses, as alluding to this opinion;—*When the Most High divided to the nations their inheritance, when he separated the sons of Adam, he set the bounds of the people* ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL. *For the Lord's portion is his people: Jacob is the lot of his inheritance* § for, instead of, *according to the number of the children of Israel* (which if they found in the text, they understood no more than later critics) they wrote *κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀγγέλων Θεοῦ*, ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE ANGELS OF GOD. Which at least is intelligible, as referring to that old notion, original to the country where this translation was made. And Justin Martyr tells us,|| that in the beginning, GOD had committed the government of the world to angels, who, abusing their trust, were degraded from their regency. But whether he learned it from this translation, or took it from a worse place, I shall not pretend to determine.

The land, thus selected by God for his personal residence, he bestows upon his chosen people. *Behold, says he, the land of Canaan which I give unto the children of Israel for a possession.*¶ This too was according to the common notions of those times. Thus Jephtha, who appears to have been half paganized by a bad education, speaks to the king of the Ammonites, *Wilt not thou possess that which Chemosh thy God giveth thee to possess? So, whomsoever the Lord our God shall drive out from before us, them will we possess.*\*\*

It was no wonder, therefore, when God was thus pleased, for the wise ends of his providence, to be considered, by a prejudiced people, in this character, that all the pagan nations round about should regard the GOD OF ISRAEL no otherwise than as a local tutelary deity; too apt, by their

\* See note D, at the end of this book.

† See Jer. x. 16. and ii. 19.

‡ Lev. xxv. 23. Deut. xi. 12. Ps. x. 16. Is. xiv. 25. Jer. ii. 7. xvi. 19. Ezek. xxxv. 10. xxxvi. 5. 20. xxxviii. 16. Wisd. of Sol. xii. 7.

§ Deut. xxxii. 8, 9.

|| Apologet. i.

¶ Deut. xxxii. 49.

\*\* Judg. xi. 24.



common prejudices, to see him only under that idea. Thus he is called the God of the land,\*—the God of the hills,† &c. And it is expressly said, that *they spoke against the God of Jerusalem, as against the gods of the people of the earth, which were the work of the hands of man.*‡ By which is meant, that they treated him as a local tutelary deity, of a confined and bounded power: for it was not the old pagan way to speak against one another's gods, in discredit of their divinity: and this circumscribed dominion was esteemed, by them, no discredit to it: but, by the Jews, the worshippers of the true God, it was justly held to be the greatest. Therefore, to call the God of Israel *the God of the hills, and not of the plain, was speaking against him.*

For, here again we must observe, than when God, agreeably to the whole method of this dispensation, takes advantage of, or indulges his people in, any habituated notion or custom, he always interweaves some characteristic note of difference, to mark the institution for his own. Thus in this indulgence of their prejudices concerning a tutelary god.

1. He first institutes, upon it, a *theocracy*; a practice just the reverse of paganism: for there kings became gods; whereas here, God condescended to become king.§

2. Secondly, he forbids all kind of community or intercourse between the God of Israel and the gods of the nations, either by joining their worship to his, or so much as owning their divinity. Thus were the Israelites distinguished from all other people in the most effectual manner; for, as we have often had occasion to observe, there was a general intercommunity amongst the gods of paganism: they acknowledged one another's pretensions; they borrowed one another's titles; and, at length, entered into a kind of partnership of worship. All the pagan nations, we see, owned the God of Israel for a tutelary Deity.|| But his followers were not permitted to be so complaisant. There was to be no fellowship between God and Belial; though a good understanding always subsisted between Belial and Dagon.

But, amidst a vast number of characteristic circumstances proving the origin of the MOSAIC RELIGION to have been different from that of every other nation, there is none more illustrious than this, *that the Mosaic religion was built upon a former*, namely, the PATRIARCHAL: whereas the various religions of the pagan world were all unrelated to, and independent of, any other.¶

And yet the famous author of *The Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion*, hath been hardy enough to employ one whole chapter to prove, that *this method of introducing Christianity into the world, by building and grounding it on the Old Testament, is agreeable to the common method of introducing new revelations, whether real or PRETENDED, or any changes in religion; and also the nature of*

\* 2 Kings xvii. 26. et xviii. 33, et seq.

§ See note E, at the end of this book.

¶ See vol. i. book i.

† 1 Kings xx. 23. ‡ 2 Chron. xxxii. 19.

|| 2 Kings xviii. 25. Jer. iv. 2, 3.

*things.\** “For if,” says he, “we consider the various revolutions and changes in religion, whereof we have any tolerable history, in their beginning, we shall find them, for the most part, to be grafted on some old stock, or founded on some preceding revelations, which they were either to supply, or fulfill, or retrieve from corrupt glosses, innovations, and traditions, with which by time they were encumbered: and this, which MAY SEEM MATTER OF SURPRISE TO THOSE, WHO DO NOT REFLECT on the changeable nature of all things, hath happened; though the old revelations, far from intending any change, ingraftment, or new dispensation, *did for the most part declare they were to last for ever*, and did forbid all alterations and innovations, they being the last dispensation intended.”—P. 21.

Here are two things asserted: 1. That the building new religions and new revelations upon old, was agreeable to the common method of the ancient world. 2. That it was agreeable to the nature of things. These are discoveries one would little have expected.

I. Let us first examine his FACTS.—But to judge truly of their force, we must remember, that the observation is made to discredit what believers call true revelation, by showing that all false religions have taken the same method of propagation.

1. His first point is, *That this method was agreeable to the common practice of the ancient world.*—Would not one expect now an instance of some confessedly false religion, between the time of ABRAHAM and CHRIST, which pretended to be built on some preceding revelation? Without doubt: If it were only for this, that there is no other way of proving the proposition. Besides, to say the truth, such an instance would be well worth attending to, for its extreme curiosity. But he could not give the reader what was not to be had: and therefore he endeavours to make up this deficiency of *fact*, by showing, 1. That the JEWISH religion, like the CHRISTIAN, pretended to be built on a preceding. “Thus the mission of Moses to the Israelites, says he, supposed a former revelation of God (who from the beginning seems to have been constantly giving a succession of dispensations and revelations) to their ancestors; and many of the religious precepts of Moses were borrowed, or had an agreement with the religious rites of the heathens, with whom the Israelites had correspondence, and particularly with the religious rites of the Egyptians, (who upon that account seem confounded with the Israelites by some pagans, as both their religious rites were equally, and at the same time, prohibited by others) to whose religious rites the Israelites seem to have been *conformists* during their abode in Egypt.” p. 22. Go thy way, for a good reasoner!—To prove that false revelations had the same pretensions of dependency on a preceding, as the true have had, he shows that all the true had these pretensions. But this is but half the achievement. The best part is still behind. It is a rarity; a blunder ingrafted on a sophism. He was not content to say that Moses

\* Grounds and Reasons, &c. p. 20.

founded his religion on the patriarchal: He must needs go on,—*And many of the religious precepts of Moses were borrowed, or had an agreement with the religious rites of the heathens, with whom the Israelites had correspondence, and particularly with the religious rites of the Egyptians.* Now, how it comes to pass that Moses's borrowing from the religious rites of the Egyptians, whose religion he formerly condemned of falsehood, should be metamorphosed into an example of one religion's being founded upon, or receiving its authority from, another, I confess, I cannot comprehend. If he were not at the head of the FREETHINKERS, I should suspect some small confusion in his ideas: and that this great reasoner was unable to distinguish between *a religion's supporting itself on one preceding, which it acknowledged to be true:* and *a religion's complying, for the sake of inveterate prejudices, with some innocent practices of another religion, which it was erected to overthrow, as false.*

2. He shows next, that those false religions which came AFTER the Jewish and the Christian, and are confessed to mimic their peculiarities, pretended to be built on preceding revelations.—“The mission of Zoroaster to the Persians supposed the religion of the magians; which had been, for many ages past, the ancient national religion of the Medes as well as Persians. The mission of Mahomet supposed Christianity; as that did Judaism.”—P. 23. This is still better. The design of his general observation, *That it was the common method for new revelations to be built and grounded on preceding revelations,* was to show that the revelations, which we call true, imitated the false. And he proves it,—by showing that the false imitated the true. That Mahomet's did so, is agreed on all hands. And those bewildered men who would have us credit the story of a *late* Zoroaster, do, and must suppose that he borrowed from Judaism. But the truth is, the whole is an idle tale, invented by Persian writers under the early califs. However, though the Zoroaster of Hyde and Prideaux be a mere phantom, yet the religion called by his name, was a real thing, and started up in the first ages of Mahometanism, with a bible to support its credit, in imitation of, and to oppose to, the Alcoran. But this neat device unluckily detects the whole imposture: for in the age of Mahomet, and in the time of the first commentators on the Alcoran, the Persians were esteemed by them as idolaters, and without a bible; (and they had good opportunity, by their constant commerce thither, to be well informed :) which is agreeable to every thing that the earlier and the later Greek writers unanimously deliver of the Persian religion. But that, on the appearance of Mahometanism, the Persians should do what the Greeks did on the first appearance of Christianity, refine their old idolatrous worship, till they brought it to what Hyde and Prideaux observe it is at this day, amongst the remainder of the magian sect in Persia and India, is nothing strange. The wonder is, that these learned men should have swallowed so gross a cheat, on the testimony of later Mahometan writers; who had so many motives to support it, and so slender abilities to detect it; whose propensity to

fabling is so great as even to discredit any truth that rests on their authority; and whose talents in the art of lying are so little proportioned to their inclination to exercise it, that they never fail of defeating their own impositions. This argument, therefore, was in all respects worthy the author of *The Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion*.

3. Lastly, he tells us, that “the Siamese and Brachmans both pretend that they have had *a succession of incarnate deities* amongst them, who at due distances of time have brought new revelations from heaven; each succeeding one depending on the former; and that religion is to be conveyed on, in that way, for ever.”—P. 23.—He promised to prove a succession of religions in the ancient world, the later founded and depending on the preceding: and he proves—*a succession of incarnate deities*, talked of amongst the MODERN pagans of India and Siam; and, from this succession concludes for a succession of DEPENDENT RELIGIONS, of which they have no kind of notion. Nor are these extravagancies, which their priests do indeed talk of, any other than late inventions of their priests, to oppose to Mahometan and Christian missionaries. But a *succession of incarnate deities* was so arch a ridicule on the mysteries of our holy faith, that it was to be brought in at any rate. But now the joke is over, let me tell him, he need not have gone so far for it. Were not Cœlus, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, &c. *a succession of incarnate deities*? yet were any of the religions, which had those gods for their author or object, FOUNDED OR DEPENDENT ON (though they succeeded to) one another? Here again, our sagacious freethinker was at a halt; and, with all his logic, could not distinguish between *one religion's being built upon another*, and *one religion's simply succeeding another*.

II. He comes next to the NATURE OF THINGS. The reader has seen how short he falls of his reckoning from *fact*: but let him fairly make up his accounts, and we shall not differ with him about his way of payment; but willingly receive his deficiencies of fact, in reason.—“If we consider,” says he, “the *nature of things*, we shall find that it must be difficult, if not impossible, to introduce amongst men (who in all civilized countries are bred up in the belief of some revealed religion) a revealed religion wholly new, or such as has no reference to a preceding one: for that would be to combat all men in too many respects, and not to proceed on a sufficient number of principles necessary to be assented to by those, on whom the first impressions of a new religion are proposed to be made.”—Pp. 23, 24.

Here his head was full of the theologic ideas of modern times; where one religion is maintained and propagated on the destruction of all the rest. And that indeed would be *combating all men in too many respects*, without good evidence in the religion thus proposed. But had he had the least knowledge of antiquity, he would have known that the gentile religions of those times were founded on different principles, and propagated on different practices. Not one of those numerous religions ever pretended to accuse another of falsehood; and therefore was never itself in danger of being so accused.

They very amicably owned one another's pretensions; and all that a new religion claimed, was to be let into partnership with the rest, whose common practice was to trade in shares.\* Yet, according to this great philosopher, *it was difficult, if not impossible—it was combating all men in too many respects—It was not proceeding on a sufficient number of principles necessary to be assented to, &c.* But he can make men, as well as religions, change their natures when he wants them for some glorious mischief. It is his more usual way, and so it is of all his fellows, to make the people (the gross body of mankind) run headlong into religion, without the least inquiry after evidence. But here we are told it is *very difficult, if not impossible*, to induce them to think well of a religion which hath not the most plausible evidence for its support: that the not giving them this, is *not proceeding on a sufficient number of principles, but combating all men in too many respects, &c.*

And this is all we can get out of him, FROM THE NATURE OF THINGS. But as he has raised a curiosity which he knew not how to gratify, I shall endeavour to supply his ignorance; and from this *nature of things*, show the reader, 1. How the religions of MOSES and JESUS must NECESSARILY suppose a *dependency* on some preceding. 2. How the ancient religions of paganism must NECESSARILY NOT suppose any such *dependency*; and 3. How it came to pass, that more modern impostors, risen since the coming of Christianity, imitated the true, rather than the false religions of ancient times, in this pretence to *dependency*.

I. The PATRIARCHAL, the JEWISH, and the CHRISTIAN religions, all professed to come from the only one GOD, the Creator of all things. Now as the whole race of mankind must be the common object of its Creator's care, all his revelations, even those given only to a part, must needs be thought ultimately directed to the interest of the whole: consequently, every later revelation must suppose the TRUTH of the preceding. Again, when several successive revelations are given by him, some less, some more extensive, we must conclude them to be the parts of ONE ENTIRE DISPENSATION; which, for reasons best known to infinite wisdom, are gradually enlarged and opened: consequently every later must not only suppose the TRUTH of every preceding revelation, but likewise their mutual RELATION and DEPENDENCY. Hence we see, there may be weighty reasons, why *God, from the beginning, should have been constantly giving a succession of dispensations and revelations*; as this author (p. 22,) with a lewd sneer, seems to take a pleasure in observing. If therefore, what we call the true revelation came from GOD, these religions must needs be, and profess to be, dependent on one another.

II. Let us see next how the case stood in the ancient pagan world. Their pretended revelations were not from the ONE GOD; but all from local tutelary deities; each of which was supposed to be employed in the care of his own country or people, and unconcerned in every other's department. Consequently, between earlier and later revelations of this

\* See vol. i. book ii. p. 174, et seq.

kind, there could be no more dependency, than there was opposition: but each stood on its own foundation, single, unrelated, and original.

III. But when, by the propagation of the gospel, the knowledge of the **ONLY ONE GOD** was spread abroad over the whole earth, and the absurdities of polytheism fully understood by the people, an impostor, who would now obtrude a new religion on the world, must of necessity pretend to have received it from that *only one God*. But the probability of his giving a revelation now, being seen greatly to depend on his having giving one before, our impostor would be forced to own the truth of those preceding religions, which professed to come from that God. And as the credit of the new religion was best advanced by its being thought a finishing part of an incomplete dispensation, he would, at the same time, bottom it on the preceding. Besides, as an impostor must needs want that necessary mark of a divine mission, the power of miracles, he could cover the want no otherwise than by a pretended relation to a religion which had well established itself by miracles. And thus, in fact, **MAHOMET** framed the idea of his impostor. He pretended his new religion was the completion of Christianity, as Christianity was the completion of Judaism; for that the world not being to be won by the mild and gentle invitations of Jesus, was now to be *compelled to enter in* by Mahomet. And so again, to complete the imitation, this last and greatest prophet, as his followers believe him to be, is pretended to be foretold in the New Testament, as the Messiah was in the Old.

Thus this notable observation, from whence the author of *the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian religion* endeavoured to deduce so discrediting a likeness between all *false* religion, and what we believers hold to be the *true*, comes, we see, just to nothing.

But he has yet another flagrant mark of *likeness*, in reserve: and thus he goes on, from discovery to discovery.—*In building thus upon PROPHECY*, says he, *as a principle, Jesus and his apostles had the concurrence of all sects of religion amongst the pagans*. Is it possible? Yes. *For the pagans universally built their religion on DIVINATION*.—Pp. 27, 28. As much as to say, the people of Amsterdam, in building their town-house upon piles, had (in the mode of laying a foundation) the concurrence of all the cities in England; who build theirs upon stone, or clay, or gravel. In the Jewish writings there are prophecies of a future and more perfect dispensation; which, Jesus claiming to belong to **HIS**, his religion was properly built upon **PROPHECIES**. The heathens made gods of their dead benefactors, and then consulted them at their shrines, as oracles; they inspected the entrails of beasts; they observed the flight of birds; they interpreted dreams and uncommon phenomena; and all these things they called **DIVINATION**. But what likeness is there between these things and prophecies, the prophecies on which Jesus founded his religion? Just as much as there is between **TRUTH** and what these men call **FREETHINKING**. But he has found a device to bring them related. It is a master-piece; and the reader shall not be robbed of it. *They* [the



pagans], says he, *learnt that art* [divination] *in schools, or under discipline, as the Jews did prophesying in the schools and colleges of the prophets; where the learned Dodwell says, the candidates for prophecy were taught the rules of divination practised by the pagans, who were skilled therein, and in possession of the art long before them.\** This idle whimsy of the *learned Dodwell* concerning the schools of the prophets has been exposed, as it deserves, already.† But for the sake of so extraordinary an argument (an *impiety*, grafted on its proper stock, an *absurdity*), it deserves to be admitted, though it be but for a moment. The reasoning then stands thus: divination was an art learned in the schools; so was one kind of prophecy, or the Jewish art of divination: those who learnt this Jewish art of divination were taught the rules of pagan divination: THEREFORE, pagan divination and ANOTHER kind of prophecy, such as foretold the coming of the Messiah, were things of the same kind. Incomparable reasoner! and deservedly placed at the head of modern freethinking! But his learning is equal to his sense, and his premises just as true as his conclusion: *The pagans universally built their religion on divination.* I believe there are few schoolboys, who would not laugh at his blunder, and tell him it was just otherwise, *that the pagans universally built divination on their religion.* All that was ever *built on divination* was now and then a shrine and a temple.—To return:

[III.] But these prejudices, concerning local tutelary deities, which made the introduction of a theocracy so easy, occasioned as easy a defection from the laws of it.

1. For these tutelary deities owning one another's pretensions, there was always a friendly intercourse of mutual honours, though not always of mutual worship. For at first, each god was supposed to be so taken up with his own people, as to have little leisure or inclination to attend to the concerns of others.—Now this prejudice was the *first* source of the Jewish idolatry.

2. But the pretensions of these gods being thus reciprocally acknowledged; and some, by the fortunate circumstances of their followers, being risen into superior fame, the rites used in their worship were eagerly affected. And this was the *second* source of the Israelites' idolatry; exemplified in the erection of the GOLDEN CALF, and their fondness for all Egyptian superstitions in general.

3. But of these tutelary deities there being two sorts, GENTILITIAL and LOCAL; the one ambulatory, and the other stationed; the latter were fixed to their posts, as a kind of *heir-loom*, which they who conquered and possessed the country were obliged to maintain in their accustomed honours. And whatever *gentilitial* gods a people might bring with them, yet the *local* god was to have a necessary share in the religious worship of the new comers. Nay, it was thought impiety, even in foreigners, while they sojourned only in a strange country, not to sacrifice to the

\* See vol. ii. book iv. sect. 6.

† Ibid.

gods of the place. Thus Sophocles makes Antigone say to her father, that a stranger should both venerate and abhor those things which are venerated and abhorred in the city where he resides.\* Celsus gives the reason of so much complaisance—"Because," says he, "the several parts of the world were, from the beginning, distributed to several powers, each of which has his peculiar allotment and residence."† And those who were loth to leave their paternal gods when they sought new settlements, at least held themselves obliged to worship them with the rites, and according to the usages of the country they came to inhabit. Against this more qualified principle of paganism, Moses thought fit to caution his people, in the following words: *When the Lord thy God shall cut off the nations from before thee, whither thou goest to possess them, and thou succeedest them, and dwellest in their land: take heed to thyself that thou be not snared by following them, after that they be destroyed from before thee; and that thou INQUIRE NOT AFTER THEIR GODS, saying HOW did these nations serve their gods? even so will I do likewise.*‡ But the adoption of these new GODS, as well as of their rites, was so general, that David makes his being unjustly driven into an idolatrous land, the same thing as being forced to serve idolatrous gods. For thus he expostulates with his persecutor, "Now therefore, I pray thee, let my lord the king hear the words of his servant: if the Lord have stirred thee up against me, let him accept an offering: but if they be the children of men, cursed be they before the Lord; for they have driven me out this day from abiding in the inheritance of the Lord saying; GO, SERVE OTHER GODS.§ To the same principle Jeremiah likewise alludes, in the following words, *therefore will I cast you out of this land into a land that ye know not, neither ye nor your fathers: and THERE SHALL YE SERVE OTHER GODS day and night; where I will not show you favour.*|| By which is not meant that they should be forced, any otherwise than by the superstitious dread of divine vengeance for a slighted worship: for at this time civil restraint in matters of religion was very rare.

But the imaginary vengeance which the tutelary GOD was supposed to take on those, who, inhabiting his land, yet slighted his worship, was at length really taken on the idolatrous Cutheans, when they came to cultivate the land of Israel. For the Almighty having, in condescension to the prejudices of the Israelites, assumed the title of a TUTELARY LOCAL GOD, and chosen Judea for his peculiar regency: it appeared but fit that that he should discharge, in good earnest, the imaginary function

\* Τόλμα ξείνος

Ἐπὶ ξείνης, ὡς τλᾶμον, ὅ,τι

Καὶ πόλις τίτροφι ἄφιλον

Ἀποστυγῶν καὶ τὸ φίλον σίβισθαι. Act. i. (Edip. Colon.

† — ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι, ὡς εἰπὼς, τὰ μέρη τῆς γῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλλα ἄλλοις ἰσοπταῖς νομιμαῖνα καὶ κατὰ τινὰς ἐπικρατίας διυλημμένα, ταύτη καὶ διοικεῖται. Καὶ δὴ τὰ παρ' ἰσάστοις ὁρῶς αὐτὰ πράττοντο ταύτη δρώμενα, ὅση ἐκείνοις φίλον, παραλύειν δὲ οὐχ ὅσιον εἶναι τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τόπους νομιμαῖνα.—Orig. cont. Cels. lib. v. p. 247. See the passage, from Plato, pp. 230, 231.

‡ Deut. xii. 29, 30. § 1 Sam. xxvi. 19. || Chap. xvi. ver. 13.

of those tutelary gods, in order to distinguish himself from *the lying vanities* of that infatuated age. Therefore when so great a portion of his chosen people had been led captive, and a mixed rabble of eastern idolaters were put into their place, he sent plagues amongst them for their profanation of the holy land. Which calamity their own principles easily enabled them to account for. The story is told in these words: "And the king of Assyria brought men from Babylon, and from Cuthah, and from Ava, and from Hamath, and from Sepharvaim, and placed them in the cities of Samaria, instead of the children of Israel: and they possessed Samaria, and dwelt in the cities thereof. And so it was at the beginning of their dwelling there, that they feared not the Lord: therefore the Lord sent lions amongst them, which slew some of them. Wherefore they spake to the king of Assyria, saying, the nations which thou hast removed, and placed in the cities of Samaria, KNOW NOT THE MANNER OF THE GOD OF THE LAND: therefore he hath sent lions amongst them, and behold, they slay them, because they know not the manner of the God of the land. Then the king of Assyria commanded, saying; Carry thither one of the priests—and let him teach them *the manner of the God of the land*. Then one of the priests came and dwelt in Bethel, and taught them how they should fear the Lord. Howbeit, every nation made gods of their own—every nation in their cities wherein they dwelt.—So these nations feared the Lord, and served their graven images, both their children, and their children's children: as did their fathers, so do they unto this day."\*

But, lest this account of the miraculous interposition should be misunderstood as an encouragement of the notion of local gods, or of *intercommunity* of worship, rather than a vindication of the sanctity of that country, which was consecrated to the God of Israel, the sacred historian goes on to acquaint us with the perverse influence this judgment had on the new inhabitants, so contrary to the divine intention. They feared the Lord, and served their own gods, after the manner of the nations whom they carried away from thence. Unto this day they do after the former manners: they fear not the Lord, neither do they after their statutes, or after their ordinances, or after the law and commandment which the Lord commanded the children of Jacob, whom he named Israel."† *They feared the Lord, and served their own gods*; that is, they feared the vengeance impending on the exclusion of the worship of the God of Israel. But *they feared not the Lord, neither did after their statutes*. That is, they transgressed the commandment which they found so frequently repeated in the Pentateuch, of joining no other worship to that of the God of Israel.

And this was the true reason why the kings of Persia and Syria (when Judea afterwards became a province to them) so frequently appointed sacrifices to be offered to the *God of the land*, at Jerusalem, in behalf of themselves and families. Nor was the practice disused when the

\* 2 Kings xvii. 24. et seq.

† Ver. 33, 34.

Jews fell under the Roman yoke; both Julius Cæsar and Augustus making the same provision for the *felicity* of the empire.

Hence therefore the *third* source of the Jewish idolatries. It was this superstitious reverence to local deities within their own departments, which made them so devoted while in Egypt, to the gods of that country; and when in possession of their own land, to the tutelary gods of Canaan.

But this *intercommunity* of worship, begun by the migration of people and colonies from one country to another, grew more general, as those migrations became more frequent. Till at length the frequency, aided by many other concurrent causes (occasionally taken notice of in several places of this work), made the *intercommunity* universal. And this was the *last* source of Jewish idolatries. This drew them into the service of every god they heard of; or from whom they fancied any special good might be obtained; especially the gods of all great and powerful nations. These prejudices of opinion, joined to those of practice which they had learned in Egypt, were the true causes of their so frequent lapse into idolatry.

From all this it appears, their defection from the God of Israel, wicked and abominable as it was, did not however consist in the rejecting him as a false god, or in renouncing the law of Moses as a false religion; but only, in joining foreign worship and idolatrous ceremonies to the ritual of the true God. Their bias to the idolatries of Egypt was an inveterate custom; their inclination for the idolatries of Canaan was a prevailing principle that the tutelary god of the place should be worshipped by its inhabitants; and their motive for all other idolatries, a vain expectation of good from the guardian gods of famous and happy nations.

These were all inflamed by that common stimulation of a debauched people, the luxurious and immoral rites of paganism; for it is to be observed that these defections generally happened amidst the abuses of prosperity. There is a remarkable passage in the book of Joshua, which sets this matter in a very clear light. The Israelites having lapsed into idolatry, Joshua drew together their heads and rulers at Shechem, in order to a reformation. And the topic, he insists upon for this purpose, is not, that the God of Israel was the only true God, the Maker of all things; but that he was the family God of the race of Abraham, for which he had done so great things. And this he prosecutes from the 2d to the 13th verse of the xxivth chapter. His conclusion from all is, "Now therefore fear the Lord, and *serve him in sincerity and in truth*: and put away the gods which your fathers served on the other side of the flood, and in Egypt."\* However, continues he, at least make your choice, and either serve the Lord, or serve the gods of other people. "And the people answered, God forbid we should forsake the Lord, to serve other gods: † for we acknowledge him to be that God who has

\* Ver. 14.

† Ver. 16, 17.

done so great things for us." To this Joshua replies, "*Ye cannot serve the Lord : for he is an holy God ; he is a jealous God ; he will not forgive your transgressions, nor your sins.*"\* From all this it appears, that the point debated between Joshua and his people, was not, whether the Israelites should return to God, whom they had rejected and forsaken ; but whether they should serve him ONLY, or, as Joshua expresses it, *serve him in sincerity and in truth.* For on their exclaiming against the impiety of rejecting God,—"*God forbid we should forsake the Lord ; we will still serve him ;*" meaning along with the other gods,—their leader replies, *Ye cannot serve the Lord, for he is an HOLY God : he is a JEALOUS God ; i. e.* As a *holy God*, he will not be served with the lewd and polluted rites of the nations ; and as a *jealous God*, he will not suffer you to serve idols of wood and stone with his rites. The consequence is, you must serve him alone, and only with that worship which he himself hath appointed.

That this was the whole of their idolatry, is farther seen from the accounts which the holy prophets give us of it, in their reproofs and expostulations.

ISAIAH says, *To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? saith the Lord: I am full of the burnt-offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts, &c.*† To whom are these words addressed? To those who, besides their numerous immoralities, there reckoned up at large, delighted in idolatrous worship in *groves* and *high places*. For the denunciation is thus continued: *They shall be ashamed of the OAKS which ye have desired, and ye shall be confounded for the GARDENS that ye have chosen.*‡ He describes them again in this manner: *A people that provoketh me to anger continually TO MY FACE ; that sacrificeth in gardens, and burneth incense upon altars of brick.*§ Yet, at the same time, these men gloried so much in being the peculiar people of the Lord, that they said, *Stand by thyself, come not near to me ; for I am holier than thou.*||

JEREMIAH draws them in the very same colours: *Though they say, The Lord liveth, surely they swear falsely,*¶ i. e. vainly, idolatrously. Why? The reason is given soon after; they swore likewise by their idols: *How shall I pardon thee for this? thy children have forsaken me, and SWORN BY THEM THAT ARE NO GODS,\*\** Again, *Will ye steal, murder, and commit adultery, and SWEAR FALSELY, and BURN INCENSE UNTO BAAL, and walk after other gods that ye know not* [i. e. strange gods]; *and come and STAND BEFORE ME IN THIS HOUSE, which is called by my name, and say, We are delivered to do all these abominations?††* And in another place we find them thus expostulating with the prophet, —*Wherefore hath the Lord pronounced all this evil against us? or what is our iniquity? or what is our sin that we have committed against the Lord our God?‡‡* and the prophet answering them in this

\* Ver. 19. † Chap. i. ver. 11. ‡ Ver. 29. § Chap. lxxv. ver. 3. || Ver. 5.

¶ Chap. v. ver. 2. \*\* Ver. 7. †† Chap. vii. ver. 9, 10. ‡‡ Chap. xvi. ver. 10.

manner,—*because your fathers have forsaken me, saith the Lord, and walked after other gods, and have served them, and have worshipped them, and have forsaken me, and have not kept my law: and ye have done worse than your fathers.\** But is it possible they could be so exceedingly stupid or impudent as to talk at this rate, had they ever renounced the RELIGION, or the GOD of their forefathers?

EZEKIEL, likewise, shows plainly that their idolatries consisted in polluting the religion of Moses with foreign worship: “Son of man, these men have set up their idols in their heart, and put the stumbling-block of their iniquity before their face: SHALL I BE INQUIRED OF *at all by them?* Therefore speak unto them, and say unto them, Thus saith the Lord God, every man of the house of Israel, that putteth up his idols in his heart, and putteth the stumbling-block of his iniquity before his face, and *cometh to the prophet*; I the Lord will answer him that cometh according to the multitude of his idols,”† &c. And again: *As for you, O house of Israel, Thus saith the Lord God; Go ye, serve ye every one his idols, and hereafter also, if ye will not hearken unto me: but POLLUTE YE MY HOLY NAME NO MORE with your gifts, and with your idols,‡ i. e. with gifts offered up to me with idolatrous rites.* In another place he giveth a terrible instance of this horrid mixture: “They have committed adultery, and blood is in their hands, and with their idols have they committed adultery, and have also caused their sons, whom they bare unto me, to pass for them through the fire to devour them. Moreover, this they have done unto me: THEY HAVE DEFILED MY SANCTUARY IN THE SAME DAY, and have profaned my sabbaths. For when they had slain their children to their idols, then THEY CAME THE SAME DAY INTO MY SANCTUARY to profane it; and lo, thus have they done in the midst of mine house.”§ These, and innumerable other passages in the prophets to the same purpose, evidently show, that this defection from the God of Israel consisted not in a rejection of him, or of his law.

This appears still more evident, from the following considerations:

1. That, in the course of their idolatries, they abused the memorials of their own dispensation to superstitious worship. Such as the *brazen serpent* of Moses; to which, in the time of their kings, they paid divine honours.|| And I am much mistaken if the monument of *Twelve stones*, taken out of Jordan, and pitched in Gilgal for a memorial of their miraculous passage,¶ was not equally abused. What induces me to think so, is the following passage of ISAIAH: “Draw near hither, ye sons of the sorceress, the seed of the adulterer, and the whore. Against whom do you sport yourselves?—inflaming yourselves with idols under every green tree, slaying the children in the valleys, under the cliffs of the rocks? AMONG THE SMOOTH STONES OF THE STREAM IS THY PORTION: they, they are thy lot; EVEN TO THEM HAST THOU Poured A DRINK-OFFERING, thou hast offered a meat-offering. Should I receive comfort in these?”\*\*

\* Jer. 11. 12. † Chap. xiv. ver. 3, 4. ‡ Chap. xx. ver. 39. § Chap. xxiii. ver. 37—39.  
|| 2 Kings xviii. 4. ¶ Josh. iv. 3. 20, 21, 22. \*\* Isaiah lvii. 3. et seq.



2. The Israelites were most prone to idolatry in PROSPEROUS TIMES; and generally returned to the God of their fathers in ADVERSITY, as appears from their whole history. Against this impotence of mind they were more than once cautioned, before they entered into the land of blessings, that they might afterwards be left without excuse. "And it shall be," says Moses, "when the Lord thy God shall have brought thee into the land which he swore unto thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, to give thee great and goodly cities which thou buildedst not, and houses full of all good things which thou filledst not, and wells digged which thou diggedst not, vineyards and olive-trees which thou plantedst not; when thou shalt have eaten and be full; then beware lest thou forget the Lord which brought thee forth out of the land of Egypt, from the house of bondage. Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and serve him, and shalt swear by his name. Ye shall not go after other gods, of the gods of the people which are round about you."\* However, Moses himself lived to see an example of this perversity, while they remained in the wilderness: *But Jeshurun, says he, waxed fat and kicked: Thou art waxed fat, thou art grown thick, thou art covered with fatness; then he forsook God which made him, and lightly esteemed the rock of his salvation.*† And the prophet HOSEA assures us, that the day of prosperity was the constant season of idolatry: *Israel is an empty vine, he bringeth forth fruit unto himself:* ACCORDING TO THE MULTITUDE OF HIS FRUIT HE HATH INCREASED THE ALTARS; ACCORDING TO THE GOODNESS OF HIS LAND THEY HAVE MADE GOODLY IMAGES.‡ And again: *According to their pasture, so were they filled; THEY WERE FILLED, AND THEIR HEART WAS EXALTED; therefore have they forgotten me.*§ This, therefore, is a clear proof that their defection from the God of Israel was not any doubt of his goodness or his power, but a wanton abuse of his blessings. Had they questioned the truth of the law, their behaviour had been otherwise: they would have adhered to it in times of prosperity; and would have left it in adversity and trouble. This the deists would do well to consider.

3. The terms, in which God's warnings against this defection are expressed, plainly show that their lapse into idolatry was no rejection of him: he will have no FELLOWSHIP OF COMMUNION with false gods. The names employed to design their idolatries are ADULTERY and WHOREDOM. And God's resentment of their defection is perpetually expressed by the same metaphor: which shows that his right over them was still acknowledged, just as an adulterous wife owns the husband's right, amidst all her pollutions with strangers. Where we may observe, that though their idolatry is so constantly styled ADULTERY, yet that of the pagans never is; though it is very often called WHOREDOM. The reason of this distinction is plainly intimated in the following words of Ezekiel: "How weak is thine heart, saith the Lord God, seeing thou doest all these things,

\* Deut. vi. 10, et seq. and chap. viii. ver. 11, et seq.

† Chap. x. ver. 1.

‡ Chap. xxxii. ver. 15.

§ Chap. xiii. ver. 6.

the work of an imperious whorish woman? In that thou buildest thine eminent place in the head of every way, and makest thine high place in every street; and hast NOT BEEN AS AN HARLOT (in that thou scornest hire) but AS A WIFE that committeth ADULTERY, which taketh strangers instead of her husband."\* The Jews had entered into a covenant with God, which had made them his peculiar: and when they had violated their plighted faith, they stood in that relation to him which an ADULTERESS does to her injured husband. The gentiles, on the contrary, had entered into no *exclusive* engagements with their gods, but the practice of *intercommunity* had prostituted them, as a common HARLOT, to all comers.

Thus much, however, must be confessed, that though the very worst of their idolatry consisted only in mixing foreign worship with their own; yet, in their mad attention to those abominable things, God's worship was often so extremely neglected, that he says, by the prophet, *They have forsaken me, the fountain of living waters*, just as the saint-worshippers in the church of Rome forsake God, when in their private devotions the vulgar think only of their tutelary saints.

The several principal parts, therefore, of the Israelitish idolatry were these,

1. Worshipping the true GOD under an image, such as the *golden calves*, 1 Kings xii. 28.—2. Worshipping him in places forbidden, as in *groves*, 2 Kings xviii. 22. Is. xxxvi. 7.—3. And by idolatrous rites, such as *cutting themselves with knives*, Jer. xli. 5.—4. By profaning the house of GOD with *idolatrous images*, Jer. xxxii. 34.—5. By worshipping the *true GOD and idols together*.—6. And lastly, by worshipping *idols alone*, Jer. ii. 13. Yet by what follows, ver. 35, it appears, that even this was not a total apostasy from GOD.

If the reader would know what use I intend to make of this account of the Jewish idolatry, to the main question of my work, I must crave his patience till we advance farther in the work. If he would know what other use may be made of it, he may consider what hath been said above; and be farther pleased to observe, that it obviates the objection of a sort of men equally unskilled in sacred and profane antiquity (of whom more, by and by), who, from this circumstance of the perpetual defection of the Jews into idolatry, would conclude that the dispensation of GOD to them could never have been so illustrious as their history hath represented it. The strength of which objection rests on these two suppositions, that their idolatry consisted in renouncing the law of Moses: and renouncing it as dissatisfied of its truth. Both which suppositions we have shown to be false: the neglect of the law, during their most idolatrous practice, being no other than their preferring impure novel rites (which most strongly engage the attention of a superstitious people) to old ones, whose sanctity has no carnal allurements. As to its original from GOD, they never entertained the least doubt concerning it; or that the GOD of Israel was

\* Ezek. xvi. ver. 30, 31, 32.

the Creator of the universe: they had been better instructed. *Thus saith the Lord, the HOLY ONE OF ISRAEL and HIS MAKER.\** As much as to say, the tutelary God of Israel is the Creator of the universe: indeed, in the period just preceding their captivity, when the *extraordinary* providence was gradually withdrawing from them (a matter to be considered hereafter more at large), they began to be suspicious of God's farther regard to them, *as his chosen people*. But that nothing of this ever contributed to their idolatry, is plain from what we have shown above, of its being a wanton defection in the midst of peace, prosperity, and abundance (the confessed effects of the *extraordinary* providence of the God of Israel), and of their constantly returning to him in times of difficulty and distress.

It is true, that this state of the case, which removes the infidel objection, at the same time discovers a most enormous perversity in that people; who, although convinced of the truth of a religion forbidding all *intercommunity*, was for ever running astray after foreign worship. However, would we but transport ourselves into these times, and remember what hath been said of that great principle of INTERCOMMUNITY OF WORSHIP; and how early and deeply the Jews had imbibed all the essential superstitions of paganism; we should not only abate of our wonder, but see good cause to make large allowances to this unhappy people.

But there is another circumstance in this affair, too remarkable to be passed by in silence. As fond as the Jews were of borrowing their neighbours' gods, we do not find, by any hints in ancient history, either profane or sacred, that their neighbours were disposed to borrow theirs. Nay, we are assured, by holy writ, that they did not. God, by the prophet Ezekiel, addressing himself to the Jews, speaks on this wise:—*And the contrary is in thee from other women in thy WHOREDOMS, WHEREAS NONE FOLLOWETH THEE TO COMMIT WHOREDOMS: and in that thou givest a reward, and no reward is given to thee; therefore thou art contrary.†* I have shown, elsewhere, that, by this, is meant, that no gentile nation borrowed the Jewish rites of worship, to join them to their own. For as to proselytes, or particular men converted to the service of the true God, we find a prodigious number in the days of David and Solomon.‡ So again, in the prophet Jeremiah; *HATH A NATION CHANGED THEIR GODS, WHICH ARE YET NO GODS? But my people have changed their glory for that which doth not profit;§ i. e.* Hath any of the nations brought in the God of Israel into the number of their *false* gods, as the Israelites have brought in theirs to stand in fellowship with the *true*? For that the nations frequently changed their tutelary gods, or one idol for another, is too notorious to need any proof.

This then is remarkable. The two principal reasons of the contrariety, I suppose, were these:

1. It was a thing well known to all the neighbouring nations, that the God of Israel had an abhorrence of all *community* or alliance with the

\* Isaiah xlv. 11. † Chap. xvi. ver. 34. ‡ 2 Chron. ii. 17. § Chap. ii. ver. 11.

gods of the gentiles. This unsociable temper would deter those people (who all held him as a tutelary Deity of great power) from ever bringing him into the fellowship of their country gods. For, after such declarations, they could not suppose his company would prove very propitious. And in truth, they had a single instance of his ill neighbourhood, much to their cost; which brings me to the second reason.

2. The devastation he brought upon the Philistines, while the **ARK** rested in their quarters. For they having taken it from the Israelites in battle, carried it, as another *Palladium*,\* to Ashdod, and placed it in the temple of their god Dagon; who passed two so bad nights with his new guest, that on the second morning he was found pared away to his *fishy stump*: † and this disaster was followed with a desolating pestilence. The people of Ashdod, who hitherto had intended to keep the ark as one of their idol protectors, now declare *it should not abide with them, for that the hand of the GOD OF ISRAEL was sore upon them, and upon Dagon their god.* ‡ They sent it therefore to Gath, another of their cities; and these having carried it about in a religious procession, it made the same havoc amongst them. § It was then removed a third time, with an intent to send it to Ekron; but the men of that city, terrified with the two preceding calamities, refused to receive it, saying *they had brought the ark of the God of Israel, to slay them and their people.* || At length the Philistines by sad experience were brought to understand, that it was the best course to send it back to its owners: which they did with great honour; with gifts and trespass-offerings, to appease the offended Divinity. ¶ And from this time we hear no more of any attempts amongst the gentile nations to join the Jewish worship to their own. They considered the God of Israel as a tutelary Deity, absolutely **UNSOCIABLE**; who would have nothing to do with any but his own people, or with such particulars as would worship him alone; and therefore, in this respect, different from all other tutelary gods; each of which was willing to live in community with all the rest. This, the historian Josephus understood to be their sentiment, when he makes the Midianitish women address the young men of Israel in the following manner: *Nor ought you to be blamed for honouring those gods which belong to the country where you sojourn.\*\* Besides, our gods are COMMON TO ALL THE NATIONS, yours to NONE OF THEM.* ††

And thus the matter rested, till occasion requiring that God should vindicate his property in that country which he had chosen for his peculiar residence, as a tutelary Deity, he then drove the pagan inhabitants of Samaria into his worship, just as he had driven the Philistines from it: and, in both cases, hath afforded to his servants the most illustrious

\* See note F, at the end of this book.

† 1 Sam. v. 4, 5.

‡ Ver. 7.

§ Ver. 9.

|| Ver. 10.

¶ Chap. vi. ver. 3.

\*\* See what hath been said above concerning this imaginary obligation.

†† Μιμψαίτο δ' οὐδὲς, ἡ γὰρ οὐκ ἦν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τοὺς ἰδίους αὐτῆς θεοὺς προτρέψασθαι καὶ ταῦτα, τῶν μὲν ἡμετέρων κοινῶν ὄντων πρὸς πάντας, τοῦ δ' ὑμετέρου πρὸς μηδὲν τούτου τυχεύοντος.  
—Antiq. Jud. lib. iv. cap. 6, sect. 8.

proofs of divine wisdom, in his manner of conducting this wonderful economy to its completion.

But from this circumstance of the inability of the law to prevent the Israelites from falling thus frequently into idolatry, a noble writer\* has thought fit to ground a charge of imposture against the lawgiver. It would therefore look like prevarication to let so fair an opportunity pass by without vindicating the truth from his misrepresentations; especially when the nature and causes of that idolatry, as here explained, tend so directly to expose all his pompous sophistry.

“One of the most conceivable perfections of a law is,” says his Lordship, “that it be made with such a foresight of all possible accidents, and with such provisions for the due execution of it in all cases, that the law may be effectual to govern and direct these accidents, instead of lying at the mercy of them. Such a law would produce its effect, by a certain moral necessity resulting from itself, and not by the help of any particular conjuncture. We are able to form some general notions of laws thus perfect; but to make them, is above humanity.—To apply these reflections to the law of Moses: we cannot read the Bible without being convinced, that no law ever operated so weak and uncertain an effect as the law of Moses did. Far from prevailing against accidents and conjunctures, the least was sufficient to interrupt the course and to defeat the designs of it; to make that people not only neglect the law, but cease to acknowledge the legislator. To prevent this, was the first of these designs; and if the second was, as it was, no doubt, and as it is the design or pretence of all laws, to secure the happiness of the people, **THIS DESIGN WAS DEFEATED AS FULLY AS THE OTHER**; for the whole history of this people is one continued series of infractions of the law, and of national calamities. So that this law, considered as the particular law of this nation, has proved more ineffectual than any other law perhaps that can be quoted. If this be ascribed to the hardness of heart and obstinacy of the people, in order to save the honour of the law, this honour will be little saved, and its divinity ill maintained. This excuse may be admitted in the case of any human law; but we speak here of a law supposed to be dictated by divine wisdom, which ought, and which would have been able, if it had been such, to keep in a state of submission to it, and of national prosperity, even a people rebellious and obstinate enough to break through any other. If it be said, the law became ineffectual by the fault of those who governed the people, their judges and their kings, let it be remembered that their judges and their kings were of God’s appointment, for the most part at least: that he himself is said to have been their King during several ages; that his presence remained amongst them, even after they had deposed him; and that the high priest consulted him, on any emergency, by the urim and thummim. Occasional miracles were wrought to enforce the law; but this was a standing miracle, that might serve both to explain and

\* Lord Belingbroke.

enforce it, by the wisdom and authority of the legislator, as often as immediate recourse to him was necessary. Can it be denied that the most imperfect system of human laws would have been rendered effectual by such means as these?"\*

I. The sum of his Lordship's reasoning amounts to this,—that the Jewish law being ordained for a certain end, it betrays its imposture by never being able to attain that end. For, first, if *infinite wisdom* framed the law, it must be most perfect; and it is essential to the perfection of a mean, for a law is nothing but a mean, that it attain its end. Secondly, if *infinite power* administered it, that power must have rendered even the most imperfect system effectual to its purpose.

Thus, we see, his argument, when reduced to order, divides itself into these two branches; considerations drawn, first, from the *wisdom*, and, then, from the *power* of the Deity, to discredit his workmanship.

1. We will take him at his best, with the improvement of order; and first examine his conclusions from the circumstance of *infinite wisdom's framing the law*.

Let us admit then for a moment, that his representation of the *end* of the law is exact; and that his assertion of its never gaining its end, is true: I answer, that this objection to the divine original of the JEWISH LAW holds equally against the divine original of that law of nature, called the MORAL LAW. Now his Lordship pretends to believe that the *moral law* came from GOD: nay, that he was so entirely the author and creator of it, that if he had so pleased, he might have made it essentially different from what it is. But yet the experience of all ages hath shown, that this law *prevailed* still less *against accidents and conjunctures* than the Mosaic. For if the Jews were always transgressing their law till the captivity, yet after that disaster they as scrupulously adhered to it; and in that attachment have continued ever since: whereas, from the day the MORAL LAW was first given to mankind, to this present hour, *the least accident was sufficient to interrupt the course, and to defeat the designs of it*. How happened it, therefore, that this acknowledged law of GOD did not *govern and direct accidents, instead of lying at the mercy of them*? Was it less *perfect* in its kind than the Mosaic? Who will pretend to say that, who believes the moral law came directly from GOD, and was delivered intimately to man, for the service of the whole species; while the Jewish came less directly from him, as being conveyed through the ministry of Moses, for the sole use of the Jewish people?

To these questions his Lordship would be ready to answer, "That it is necessary for the subjects of a moral law to be endowed with free will: that free will may be abused; and that such abuses may render the most *perfect* system of laws ineffectual." But this answer turns upon his Lordship, when applied to the defence of the Mosaic law; and turns with redoubled force.

\* Lord Bolingbroke's Works, vol. iii. pp. 292—294, 4to ed.



We see then how much he was mistaken in concluding, that, because *perfection in its kind* is one of the essential qualities of a divine law, therefore such a law must of *necessity* produce its effect. His best reason for this fancy is, that *he is able to form some general notions of laws thus perfect*. Which is no more than telling us (notwithstanding his parade of insinuated ability), that he is able to conceive how the will may be controlled, and how man may be transformed into a machine. It is true, he owns, that this fact, viz. *to make laws thus perfect, is above humanity*. It is so; and let me add, as much *below the Divinity*; whose glory it is to draw his reasonable creatures with the *corde*s of a man. A law then, which produces its effects by a *certain necessity*, must do it by a necessity which is *physical*, and not *moral*; it being the quality of *physical*, not of *moral necessity*, that its effects cannot possibly be *defeated*.

Thus, we see, all there is of truth in his Lordship's assertion, of its being *essential to the perfection of a mean that it attain its end*, amounts only to this, a capacity in such a *mean* to attain its end, naturally and of itself. And this, we say, was the condition of the Mosaic law; whatever might be the actual success.

The qualities of a law capable of producing its effect, are to be sought for *à priori*, as the schools speak, and not *à posteriori*: and if here we find intrinsic marks of excellence in the particular laws; of consummate wisdom in the general frame and constitution of them; and can likewise discover those *accidents*, which, at some periods of the dispensation, hindered the *effect*; we have done all that human reason can require, to vindicate this divine law, from his Lordship's imputations of imposture.

To treat this matter as it deserves, would require a volume, though not so large as his Lordship's. But a few words will suffice to give the reader a general idea of the truth. And a general idea will be sufficient to show the futility of the objection.

The admirable provision made by the Jewish law for preventing idolatry, may be seen in the following instances:

1. That each specific rite had a natural tendency to oppose, or to elude, the strong propensity to idolatrous worship, by turning certain pagan observances, with which the people were besotted, upon a proper object.—Hence that CONFORMITY between Jewish and pagan ceremonies, which so vainly alarms, and so vainly flatters, both the friends and enemies of revelation.

2. That by their multiplicity, and the frequent returns of their celebration, they kept the people constantly busied and employed; so as to afford small time or leisure for the running into the forbidden superstitions of paganism.

3. That the immediate benefits which followed the punctual observance of the law, had a natural tendency to keep them attached to it.

4. But lastly, and above all, that the admirable coincidency between the *institute of law*, and the *administration of government* (whereby the

magistrate was enabled to punish idolatry with death, without violating the rights of mankind), went as far towards the actual prevention of idolatrous worship, as, according to human conceptions, CIVIL LAW, whether of human or divine original, could possibly go. And resting the matter here, I suppose, one might safely defy his Lordship, with all his legislative talents, and his vain boast of them, *to form any general notions of a law more perfect.*

But this reasoning on the natural efficacy of the Mosaic law, by its innate virtue, to prevent and to restrain idolatry, which it did not at all times, in fact, prevent and restrain, will be further supported by this consideration: that the circumstance which, from time to time, occasioned a defection from the law, was neither an indisposition to its establishment; nor any incoherence in its general frame and constitution; nor aversion to any particular part, nor yet a debility or weakness in its sanctions. The sole cause of the defection was an inveterate prejudice, exterior and foreign to the law. The Israelites, in their house of bondage, had been brought up in the principles of LOCAL AND TUTELARY DEITIES and INTERCOMMUNITY OF WORSHIP; principles often referred to, on various occasions, in the course of this work, for the illustration of the most important truths. In these principles, they saw the whole race of mankind agree: and, from the practice of them, in the worship of tutelar deities, they thought they saw a world of good ready to arise. But not only the hope of good, but the fear of evil drew them still more strongly into this road of folly. Their Egyptian education had early impressed that bugbear notion of a set of *local* deities, who expected their dues of all who came to inhabit the country which they had honoured with their protection;\* and severely resented the neglect of payment on all new comers. This will easily account for the frequent defections of the Israelites in the divided service of the gods of Canaan.—But it is difficult for men fixed down to the impressions of modern manners, to let themselves into distant times; or to feel the force of motives whose operations they have never experienced: therefore, to convince such men that the early Jewish defections were not owing to any want of force or virtue in the law, but to the exterior violence of an universal prejudice, it may be proper to observe, that, from the Babylonian captivity to this very time, the Jews have been as averse to idolatry under every form and fashion of it, as before they were propense unto it. If it be asked, what it was that occasioned so mighty a change? I answer, it was, in part, the severity of that punishment which they had felt; and in part, the abatement of that foolish prejudice which they had favoured, of INTERCOMMUNITY OF WORSHIP; this, though still as general as ever in the pagan world, had yet lost greatly of its force amongst the Jews, since they became acquainted with the principles of gentile philosophy: the sounder parts of which being found conformable to the *reasonable*

\* See what has been said on this matter just above, in the case of the *Cuthrans*, inhabiting Samaria.

doctrines of their religion, were applied by them to the use of explaining the law. A use which this philosophy was never put to in the place of its birth, on account of the *absurdities* of pagan worship; for this kept the principles of philosophy and the practices of religion at too great a distance to have any influence on one another. Such was the advantage the followers of the Jewish law reaped from the Greek philosophy; an advantage peculiar to them; and which made some amends for the many superstitions of another kind, which the mixing philosophy with religion introduced into the practice of the law: superstitions which depraved, and at length totally destroyed the noble simplicity of its nature and genius.—But I anticipate a subject for which I shall find a much fitter place.

At length then we see, that the law of Moses was, indeed, such a one as his Lordship would require in a LAW OF DIVINE ORIGINAL, namely, that it *produced its effect*, if not by a *physical* necessity which bears down all obstruction before it, yet by a *moral*, which constantly kept operating when no foreign impediment stood in the way! So false is his Lordship's assertions, that *the whole history of this people is one continued series of infractions of the law*. If, by the *whole*, he means (as his argument requires he should mean) the whole both of their sacred and merely civil history; and, by *one continued series of infractions of the law*, their lapses into idolatry; it is the grossest misrepresentation: the far greater part of their duration as a distinct people was free from idolatry; and an authentic account of this freedom is recorded in their annals. But if by *their whole history*, he means (as his cause might necessitate him to mean) only the sacred books; and, by *their infraction of the law*, only transgressions in lesser matters, it is illusory and impertinent.

2. We have seen the force of his Lordship's conclusion from the circumstance—of *infinite wisdom's framing the law*: we come next to the other circumstance, from which he deduceth the same conclusion, namely, *infinite power's administering the law*.

“Let it be remembered,” says his Lordship, “that God himself is said to have been their King during several ages; that his presence remained amongst them, even after they had deposed him; and that the high priest consulted him, on any emergency, by the urim and thummim. OCCASIONAL MIRACLES were wrought to enforce the law; but this was a standing miracle, that might serve both to explain and enforce it, by the wisdom and authority of the legislator, as often as immediate recourse to him was necessary. *Can it be denied that the most imperfect system of human laws would have been rendered effectual by such means as these?*”

This bad reasoning seems to be urged with much good faith, contrary to his Lordship's usual custom; and arises from his ignorance of a *theocratic* administration, as the nature of the administration may be collected from the common principles of the law of nature and nations.

Let us consider the affair dispassionately. God, in giving laws to his chosen people, was pleased, *more humano*, to assume the title of King, and to administer their civil affairs by a *theocratic* mode of government. Every step in this establishment evinces, that it was his purpose to interfere no otherwise than in conformity to that political assumption. He proceeded on the most equitable grounds of civil government: he became their *King* by free choice. It must needs therefore be his purpose to confine himself to such *powers of legislation*, as human governors are able to exert; though he extended the *powers of administration* far beyond the limits of humanity. His Lordship's ignorance of so reasonable a distinction occasioned all this pompous fallacy. He found in the Mosaic dispensation OCCASIONAL MIRACLES pretended: and he imagined that, consistently with this pretence, *miracles* ought to operate throughout, rather than that the *end* of the law should be defeated. But, I presume, God could not, conformably to his purpose of erecting a THEOCRACY, and administering it MORE HUMANO, exert miraculous powers in *legislating*, though he very well might, and actually did exert them, in *governing*: because, in legislation, a *miracle*, that is, a supernatural force added to the laws, to make them constantly obeyed, could not be employed without putting a force upon the will; by which God's laws would indeed *produce their effect*, but it would be by the destruction of the subject of them. The case was different in administering the laws made: here God was to act *miraculously*; often out of wise choice, to manifest the nature of the government, and the reality of his *regal* character; sometimes out of necessity, for the carrying on of that government on the sanctions by which it was to be dispensed: and all this he might do without the least force upon the will.

This is sufficient to expose the futility of his Lordship's conclusion from the circumstance of *infinite power's administering the law*; it being essential to the law, that *infinite power administering it*, should restrain itself within such bounds as left the will perfectly free. But *infinite power*, restrained within such bounds, might sometimes meet with unsurmountable obstructions in the course of its direction, under a theocracy administered *more humano*.

II. We have seen how weak his Lordship's reasoning is in itself: let us now see how much weaker he makes it by ill management; till at length it comes out a good argument against his own objection.

"The law of Moses," says his Lordship, "was so far from prevailing over accidents and conjunctures, that the least was sufficient to interrupt the course and defeat the design of it, to make that people not only neglect the law, BUT CEASE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE LEGISLATOR. To prevent this, was the *first of these designs*; and if the *second* was (as it was, no doubt) and as it is the design or pretence of all laws, to secure the happiness of the people, THIS DESIGN WAS DEFEATED AS FULLY AS THE OTHER: for the whole history of this people is one continued series of INFRACTIONS OF THE LAW, AND OF NATIONAL CALAMITIES.

To pass by that vulgar mistake (which has been sufficiently exposed above) that the Jews *ever ceased to acknowledge their Legislator*; let me observe it to his Lordship's credit, that he appears to have understood so much at least of the Mosaic institution, as to see that the *first end* of it was peculiar to itself; and that that which is common to all civil communities was but the *second end* of this.

But is it not strange, when he saw so far into the nature of the Jewish constitution, that he should not see that this *second end* was entirely dependent on what he himself makes the principal; namely, to preserve the Israelites from idolatry; but should argue against the divinity of the law, as if these ends were independent one of another; and that one might be obtained without the other? For, to aggravate the imbecility of the law, he informs us in the passage last quoted, "that it was not only unable to gain its first end, but its second likewise: *that the one design was defeated as fully as the other*; that the people were not only idolaters in spiritual matters, but poor, miserable, and calamitous in their civil interests." Strange! that he could not see, or would not acknowledge, that the LAW denounces their happiness and misery as citizens, in exact proportion to their adherence to, or their defection from that law; when he saw and confessed (what their HISTORY records), that this was their invariable fortune. *The whole history of this people, says his Lordship, is one continued series of infractions of the law, and of national calamities.* Now if the whole frame of the Mosaic law was so composed, as to do that by *positive* institute which the moral law does by *natural*, viz. reward the obedient, and punish the disobedient, (and it certainly was so composed, if a *continued series of infractions* was followed by a *continued series of calamities*,) we must needs conclude that we have here the strongest proof of that divine wisdom in the constitution, which this great modern lawgiver pretends to seek, but assures us he is not able to find; and yet, at the same time, brings this convincing circumstance of the *truth* of the LAW;—*this design*, says he, *was defeated as fully as the other.* Here his rhetoric, as usual, got the better of his reasoning: not content to say,—*the whole history of this people is one continued series of infractions of the law*,—he will needs add by way of exaggeration—AND OF NATIONAL CALAMITIES. Which has so perverse an influence on the argument, as to undo all he had been labouring to bring about, by discovering a connexion between *infractions* and *calamities*, which has all the marks of a divine contrivance.

Had it been the declared design of their lawgiver to *separate* the two ends, and to form such an economy as that the people under it might be flourishing in peace and affluence, while they were idolaters in religion; or, on the other hand, true worshippers, and at the same time calamitous citizens; then to find them neither religious nor prosperous, under a law which pretended to procure truth without temporal felicity, or to establish peace and prosperity in the midst of error; this indeed (without taking in the perversity of such a system) would have fully discred-

ited the pretended original. But when, in this law, truth and happiness, error and misery, are declared to have an inseparable connexion: the freethinking politician, who shows from history that this connexion was constant and invariable, is entrapped by the retortion of nature and reason, to prove against himself the divinity of that institute he labours to discredit.

Still further: when, on reading the history of this extraordinary people, we find (as Josephus well expresses it) that, *in proportion to the neglect of the law, easy things became unsurmountable, and all their undertakings, how just soever, ended in incurable calamities,\** we cannot but acknowledge the divine direction in every stage of such a dispensation. For, to comprehend the whole of the historian's meaning, we must remember, that there were some laws given purposely to manifest the divinity of their original: such as that *against multiplying horses*; which, when it was transgressed, *easy things became unsurmountable*; and that which most facilitates a victory, a strong body of cavalry intermixed with foot, proved amongst the Israelites a certain means of their defeat. So again, when they transgressed the law which commanded *all the males to go annually to the temple*, the historian tells us, *their most just undertakings ended in incurable calamities*; and sure nothing could be more *just* than to defend their borders from invaders; yet they were sure to be most infested with them when they thought themselves best secured: that is, while their males were at home, when they should have been worshipping in the temple.

III. But it is now time to come a little closer to his Lordship. He has been all along arguing on a FALSE FACT, which his ignorance of the nature of the Jewish separation hindered him from seeing.

He understood, indeed, that this extraordinary economy had, for its *primary end*, something very different from all other civil policies; and that that which was the first (indeed the only end) in others, was but the secondary end in this. Yet this primary end he saw so obscurely, as not to be able to make it out. He supposed it was *to keep the Israelites from idolatry*; whereas it was TO PRESERVE THE MEMORY OF THE ONE GOD IN AN IDOLATROUS WORLD, till the coming of Christ: to *keep the Israelites from idolatry*, was but the *mean* to this *end*. Thus has our political architect "mistaken the scaffold for the pile," as his harmonious friend expresses it. And the mistake is the more gross, as the notion of the ultimate end's being to *keep the Israelites from idolatry*, is founded in that vain fancy of Jewish pride, that their fathers were selected as the favourites of God, out of his fondness for the race of Abraham.

Under this rectified idea therefore, let us consider the truth of his Lordship's assertion, *That no law ever operated so weak and uncertain*

\* — Καθ' ὅσον δ' αὖ ἀπιστῶσι τῇς τούτων ἀκριβοῦς ἱστορίας, ἅπαντα μὲν γίνονται τὰ περίμα, τρέπεται δ' εἰς συμφορὰς ἀνηκίστους, ὅτι ποτ' αὖ ὡς ἀγαθὸν δεῖν σπουδάζουσιν.—  
Antiq. vol. i. p. 4.



*an effect as the law of Moses did: far from prevailing against accidents and conjunctures, the least was sufficient to interrupt the course, and to defeat the designs of it.*

Now if we keep the true end of the law in view, we shall see, on the contrary, that it prevailed constantly and uniformly, without the least interruption, against the most violent *accidents*, and in the most unfavourable *conjunctures*; those I mean, which happened when their propensity to the practice of idolatry, and their prejudice for the *principle of intercommunity*, were at the height: for amidst all the disorders consequent thereto, they still preserved the knowledge of the true God, and performed the rites ordained by the law. And the very calamities which followed the infraction of the law, of which the neighbouring nations occasionally partook, were sufficient to alarm these latter, when most at ease, amidst the imaginary protection of their tutelary gods, and to awaken them to the awful sense of a BEING different from, as well as superior to, their *national protectors*. Which shows, that the law still *operated its effect*, strongly and constantly; and still *prevailed against accidents and conjunctures*, which it *governed and directed*, instead of *lying at the mercy of them*. But as it is very probable that the frequent transgressions, which those *accidents and conjunctures* occasioned, would in time have defeated the end of the law, the transgressors were punished by a seventy-years' captivity; the extraordinary circumstances of which made such an impression on their haughty masters as brought them to confess that the *God of Israel* was the *true God*; and was so severely felt by them, that they had an utter aversion and abhorrence of idolatry, or the worship of false gods, ever after. So that from thence to the coming of Christ, a course of many ages, they adhered, though tributary and persecuted, and (what has still greater force than persecution, if not thoroughly administered) despised and ridiculed by the two greatest empires of the world, the Greek and Roman; and though surrounded with the pomp and splendour of pagan idolatries, recommended by the fashion of courts, and the plausible glosses of philosophers, they adhered, I say strictly, and even superstitiously, to the letter of that law, which allowed of no other gods besides the God of Israel. Now if this was not *gaining its end*, we must seek for other modes of speech, and other conceptions of things, when we reason upon government and laws.

Yet this was not all. For the LAW not only gained its end, in delivering down the religion of the TRUE GOD into the hands of the REDEEMER OF MANKIND; who soon spread it throughout the whole Roman empire; but even after it had done its destined work, the vigour of the Mosaic revelation still working at the root, enabled a bold impostor to extend the principle of the UNITY still wider, till it had embraced the remotest regions of the habitable world: so that, at this day, almost all the natives of the vast regions of higher Asia, whether gentiles, Christians, or Mahometans, are the professed worshippers of the ONE ONLY

**GOD.** How much the extension of the principle of the *unity* has been owing to this cause, under the permission and direction of that providence, which is ever producing *good out of evil*, is known to all who are acquainted with the present state of the eastern world.

The reason why I ascribe so much of this good to the lasting efficacy of the Mosaic law, is this: Mahomet was born and brought up an idolater, and inhabited an idolatrous country; so that had he seen no more of true religion than in the superstitious practice of the Greek church, at that time overrun with saint and image worship, it is odds but that, when he set up for a prophet, he might have made idolatry the basis of his new religion: but getting acquainted with the Jews and their scriptures, he came to understand the folly of gentilism and the corruptions of Christianity; and by this means was enabled to preach up the doctrine of the **ONE GOD**, in its purity and integrity. It is again remarkable, that to guard and secure this doctrine, which he made the fundamental principle of Ishmaelitism, he brought into his imposture many of those provisions which Moses had put in practice to prevent the contagion of idolatry.

But the great man with whom we have to do, is so secure of his fact, namely, that *the law was perpetually defeated, and never gained its end*, that he supposes his adversaries, the **DIVINES**, are ready to confess it; and will only endeavour to elude his inference by throwing the ill success of its operations on the *hardness of the people's hearts and the impiety of their governors*.\* And this affords him fresh occasion of triumph.

I will not be positive that this species of divines is entirely of his own invention, and that this their apology for Moses is altogether as imaginary as their famous **CONFEDERACY**† against God; because I know by experience that there are of these divines, who in support of their passions and prejudices, are always ready (as I have amply experienced) to admit what scripture opposes, and to oppose what it admits, in almost every page. But the best apologies of such men are never worth a defence, and indeed are rarely capable of any.

To conclude: such as these here exposed, are all the reasonings of his Lordship's bulky volumes: and no wonder, when a writer, however able in other matters, will needs dictate in a science of which he did not possess so much as the first principles.

### S E C T. III.

HAVING thus shown the nature of this **THEOCRACY**, and the attendant circumstances of its erection: our next inquiry will be concerning its **DURATION**.

Most writers suppose it to have ended with the **JUDGES**; but scarce

\* Pages 293, 4.

† Page 357 of this volume.

my bring it lower than the CAPTIVITY. On the contrary, I hold that, in strict truth and propriety, it ended not until the coming of CHRIST.

I. That it ended not with the judges, appears evident, for these reasons:

1. Though indeed the people's purpose, in their clamours for a king, was to live under a gentile monarchy, like their idolatrous neighbours (for so it is represented by God himself, in his reproof of their impiety);\* yet, in compassion to their blindness, he, in this instance, as in many others, indulged their prejudices, without exposing them to the fatal consequence of their project: which, if complied with, in the sense they formed it, had been the withdrawing of his *extraordinary protection* from them, at a time when they could not support themselves without it. He therefore gave them a *king*; but such a one as was only his VICEROY or deputy; and who, on that account, was not left to the people's election, as he left his own regality; but was chosen by himself: the only difference between God's appointment of the Judges and of Saul being this, that they were chosen by internal impulse; he, by lots, or external designation.

2. This king had an unlimited *executive* power; as God's viceroy must needs have.

3. He had no *legislative* power: which a viceroy could not possibly have.

4. He was placed and displaced by God at pleasure: of which, as viceroy, we see the perfect fitness; but as sovereign by the people's choice, one cannot easily account for; because God did not choose to supersede the natural rights of his people, as appears by his leaving it, at first, to their own option whether they would have God himself for their King.

5. The very same punishment was ordained for cursing the king as for blaspheming God, namely, stoning to death; and the reason is intimated in these words of Abishai to David, *Shall not Shimei be put to death for this, because he cursed the LORD'S ANOINTED?*† This was the common title of the kings of Israel and Judah, and plainly denoted their office of viceroyalty: improperly, and superstitiously transferred, in these later ages, to Christian kings and princes.

6. From this further circumstance, a *viceroyalty* is necessarily inferred: the throne and kingdom of Judea is all along expressly declared to be God's throne and God's kingdom. Thus, in the first book of Chronicles, it is said that *Solomon sat on the THRONE OF THE LORD, instead of David his father.*‡ And the queen of Sheba, who visited Solomon, to be instructed in his wisdom, and doubtless had been informed by him of the true nature of his kingdom, compliments him in these words: *Blessed be the Lord thy God, which delighted in thee, to set thee on HIS THRONE, TO BE KING FOR THE LORD THY GOD.*§ In like manner Abijah speaks to the house of Israel, on their defection from Rehoboam: *And now ye think to withstand the KINGDOM OF THE LORD in the*

\* 1 Sam. vii. 7. † 2 Sam. xix. 21. ‡ Chap. xxix. ver. 23. § 2 Chron. ix. 8.

*hands of the sons of David.\** And to the same purpose, Nehemiah: *Neither have our kings, our princes, our priests, nor our fathers, kept thy law, nor hearkened unto thy commandments, and thy testimonies, wherewith thou didst testify against them. For they have not served thee in THEIR KINGDOM.†* The sense, I think, requires that the Septuagint reading should be here preferred, which says *EN BASILAEIA ΣΟΥ, IN THY KINGDOM.* And this the Syriac and Arabic versions follow. As Judea is always called *his kingdom*, so he is always called the *King of the Jews*. Thus the Psalmist: *Thine altars, O Lord of Hosts, my KING, and my God.‡* And again: *Let Israel rejoice in him that made him: let the children of Zion be joyful in their KING.§* And thus the prophet Jeremiah: *The KING, whose name is the Lord of Hosts.||*

7. The penal laws against idolatry were still in force during their kings, and put in execution by their best rulers, and even by men inspired. Which, alone, is a demonstration of the subsistence of the THEOCRACY; because such laws are absolutely unjust under every other form of government.

As to the title of *king* given to these rulers, this will have small weight with those who reflect that Moses likewise, who was surely no more than God's deputy, is called king: *Moses commanded us a law; even the inheritance of the congregation of Jacob. And he was KING in Jeshurun, when the heads of the people, and the tribes of Israel, were gathered together.¶*

Let us now see what the celebrated M. Le Clerc says in defence of the contrary opinion, which supposeth the THEOCRACY to have ended with the judges. Father Simon of the Oratory had said, that *the republic of the Hebrews never acknowledged any other CHIEF than God alone, who continued to govern in that quality even during the time in which it was subject to kings.\*\** This was enough to make his learned adversary take the other side of the question; who being piqued at Simon's contemptuous slight of his offered assistance in the project for a new polyglot, revenged himself upon him in those licentious†† letters, entitled, *Sentimens de quelques theologiens de Hollande*, where his only business is to pick a quarrel. He therefore maintains against Simon, *that the theocracy ceased on establishing the throne in the race of David.‡‡* What he hath of argument to support this opinion is but little; and may be summed up in the following observation, *That God*

\* 2 Chron. xiii. 8.

† Chap. ix. ver. 34, 35.

‡ Psalm lxxxiv. 8.

§ Psalm cxlix. 2.

|| Chap. li. ver. 57.

¶ Deut. xxxiii. 4 and 5.

\*\* La republique des Hebreux differe en cela de tous les autres états du monde, qu'elle n'a jamais reconnu pour chef que Dieu seul, qui a continué de la gouverner en cette qualité dans les tems mêmes, qu'elle a été soumise à des rois.—Histoire Crit. de Vieux Test. p. 15, ed. Rotterd. 1685.

†† See note G, at the end of this book.

‡‡ Il paroît au contraire par l'écriture, que Dieu n'a gouverné la republique des Hebreux, en qualité de chef politique, que pendant qu'ils n'avoient point des rois, et peut-être au commencement que les rois furent établis, avant que la famille de David fut affermie sur le trône d'Israël.—Sentimens, etc. p. 78.

*did not PERSONALLY interfere with his directions, nor discharge the functions of a magistrate after the establishment of the kings as he had done before.\** But this, instead of proving the abolition of the *theocracy*, only shows that it was administered by a *viceroy*. For in what consists the office of a viceroy, but to discharge the functions of his principal? He had been a cipher, had God still governed *immediately*, as before. M. Le Clerc could see that God acted *by the ministry of the judges.†* If then the theocratic function could be discharged by deputation, why might it not be done by kings as well as judges? The difference, if any, is only from less to more, and from occasional to constant. No, says our critic, the cession was in consequence of his own declaration to Samuel: *For they have not rejected thee, but they have REJECTED ME, that I should not reign over them.‡* This only declares the sense God had of their mutinous request; but does not at all imply that he gave way to it. For who, from the like words (which express so natural a resentment of an open defection) would infer in the case of any other monarch, that he thereupon stepped down from his throne, and suffered an usurper to seize his place? This, we see, was poor reasoning. But, luckily for his reputation, he had an adversary who reasoned worse.—However, Simon saw thus much into Le Clerc's cavil, as to reply, *That all he had said was quite beside the purpose, for that the thing to be proved was, that, after the establishment of the kings, God was no longer the civil Chief.§* On which Le Clerc thus insults him: *As much as to say, that in order to prove God was no longer Chief of the Hebrews after the election of a king, it is beside the purpose to show, he never afterwards discharged the functions of a Chief of the republic. It is thus this great genius happily unravels matters, and discovers, in an instant, what is, and what is not to the purpose.||* Whether Simon indeed knew *why* Le Clerc's objection was nothing to the purpose, is to be left to God and his own conscience, for he gives us no reasons for the censure he passes on it: but that it was indeed

\* — Pendant tout ce temps-là, Dieu fit les fonctions de roi, il jugeoit des affaires—il repondoit par l'oracle—il regloit la marche de l'armée—il envoyoit même quelquefois un ange—On n'étoit obligé d'obéir aveuglement, qu'aux seuls ordres de Dieu. Mais lors qu'il y eut des rois en Israël, et que le royaume fut attaché à la famille de David, les rois furent maîtres absolus, et Dieu cessa de faire leurs fonctions.—Pp. 78, 79.

† — Au lieu qu'auparavant Dieu lui-même la faisoit, par le ministère des juges, qu'il suscitoit de temps en temps au milieu d'Israël.—Def. des Sent. p. 121.

‡ — C'est pour cela que Dieu dit à Samuel, lors qu'Israël voulut avoir un roi pour le juger à la manière de toutes les nations : *ce n'est pas toi qu'ils ont rejeté, mais moi, afin que je ne regne point sur eux.*—1 Sam. viii. 7.

§ Je passe sous silence le long discours de M. le Clerc touchant le pouvoir de Dieu sur les Israélites avant l'établissement des rois, d'où il prétend prouver que Dieu pendant tout ce temps-là fit la fonction de roi. Tout cela est hors de propos, puis qu'il s'agit de prouver, qu'après ces temps là Dieu n'a plus été leur chef : et c'est ce qu'on ne prouvera jamais.—Réponse aux Sentimens de quelques Theol. de Hol., p. 55.

|| — C'est à dire, que pour prouver que Dieu n'a pas été chef des Hebreux, après l'élection des rois, il est hors de propos de prouver qu'il n'a plus fait les fonctions de chef de la republique. C'est ainsi que ce grand genie débrouille heureusement les matieres, et découvre d'abord ce qui est hors de propos, de ce qui ne l'est pas.—Defens. des Sentimens, p. 120.

nothing to the purpose, is most evident, if this proposition be true, “That a king does not cease to be king, when he puts in a viceroy, who executes the regal office by deputation.”

Le Clerc returns to the charge in his *Defence of the Sentiments*:—“The Israelites did not reject God as Protector, but as civil Chief, as I observed before. They would have a king who should determine sovereignly, and command their armies. Which, before this, God himself did by the ministry of the Judges, whom he raised up, from time to time, from the midst of Israel. In this sense we must understand absolutely the words of God, in Samuel, *that I should not reign over them.*”<sup>\*</sup> It is indeed strange, that, after writing two books, he should still insist on so foolish a paralogism.† That God’s *giving up* his office of civil Chief, was a necessary consequence of the people’s *demanding* it. For, that they did demand it, I acknowledge. Let us consider then this whole matter a little more attentively.

Samuel (and I desire the deists would take notice of it) had now, by a wise and painful direction of affairs, restored the purity of religion, and rescued his nation from the power of the Philistines, and their other hostile neighbours; against whom they were utterly unable to make head when he entered upon the public administration. At this very time, the people, debauched, as usual, by power and prosperity, took the pretence of the corrupt conduct of the prophet’s two sons,‡ to go in a tumultuary manner, and demand a king. But the secret spring of their rebellion was the ambition of their leaders: who could live no longer without the splendour of a regal court and household; GIVE ME, (say they, as the prophet Hosea interprets their insolent *demand*) A KING AND PRINCES;§ where every one of them might shine a distinguished officer of state. They could get nothing when their affairs led them to their judges’ poor residence, in the *schools of the prophets*, but the GIFT of the *Holy Spirit*;|| which a courtier, I presume, would not prize even at the rate Simon Magus held it, of a paltry piece of money.—This it was, and this only, that made their demand criminal. For the choosing regal rather than aristocratic viceroys was a thing plainly indulged to them by the law of Moses, in the following admonition: *When thou art come into the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, and shalt possess it, and shalt dwell therein, and shalt say, I will set a KING over me, like as the nations that are about me; Thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee, whom the LORD THY GOD SHALL CHOOSE: one from amongst thy brethren shalt thou set king over thee: Thou mayest not set a stranger over thee, which is not thy brother.*¶ The plain meaning of which caution

\* Les Israélites ne rejeterent pas Dieu comme protecteur, mais comme chef politique, ainsi que je l’ai marqué. Ils voulurent un roi qui les jugeât souverainement, et qui commandât leurs armées, au lieu qu’auparavant Dieu lui-même le faisoit, par le ministère des juges, qu’il suscitoit de temps en temps au milieu d’Israël.—En ce sens il faut entendre absolument les paroles de Dieu dans Samuel, *afin que jene regne point sur eux*, p. 121.

† However, foolish as it is, the reader hath seen, how a late sermonizer has borrowed it, and how little force he has added to it.

‡ 1 Sam. viii. 5, and xii. 12.

|| Chap. x. 10, and chap. xix.

§ Chap. xiii. ver. 10.

¶ Deut. xvii. 14, 15.



is, that they should take care, when they demanded a king, that they thought of none other than such a king who was to be GOD'S DEPUTY. As therefore court ambition only was in the wicked view of the ringleaders of these malcontents, and no foolish fears for the state, or hopes of bettering the public administration; it is evident to all acquainted with the genius of this time and people, that compliance with their demand must have ended in the utter destruction of the Mosaic RELIGION as well as LAW. But it was GOD'S purpose to keep them SEPARATE, in order to preserve the memory of himself amidst an idolatrous world. And this not being to be done but by the preservation of their religion and law, we must needs conclude that he would not give way to their rebellious demand.

And what we are brought to conclude from the *reason of the thing*, the *history* of this transaction clearly enough confirms. For it having now informed us how GOD consented to give this people a king; to show us, that he had not cast off the government, but only transferred the immediate administration to a deputy, and consequently that *their* king was *his* viceroy; it tells us next, how he was pleased to bring them to repentance in an extraordinary way; the gracious method he commonly employed when he intended to pardon. Samuel assembled the people;\* and to convince them of their crime in demanding a king, called down the present vengeance of their offended GOD in a storm of *thunder and rain at the time of wheat harvest.*† This sudden desolation brings them to a sense of their guilt, and they implore mercy and forgiveness: "And all the people said unto Samuel, Pray for thy servants unto the Lord thy God, that we die not: for we have added unto all our sins this evil, to ask us a king. And Samuel said unto the people, Fear not; (ye have done all this wickedness: yet turn not aside from following the Lord, but serve the Lord with all your heart; and turn ye not aside; for then should you go after vain things which cannot profit nor deliver; for they are vain :) for the Lord will *not forsake his people* for his great name's sake; because it hath pleased the Lord to *make you his people.*"‡ Here, we see, they repent, are pardoned, and received again into grace, as appears by the concluding promise, that the *theocratic* form should be continued. They are ready to give up their king, and yet a regal character is instituted. The plain conclusion from all this is, that their king was given, and, now at least, received as GOD'S DEPUTY.

But father Simon is at length provoked into a reason, and that, to say the truth, no weak one. God, he observes, kept the election of their king in his own hands.§ But *this*, Le Clerc says, *proves nothing*. How so? *Because, according to this reasoning, we should be obliged to say that God oftener discharged the functions of civil Chief in the idolatrous realm of the ten tribes than in that of Judah: for that was elective,*

\* 1 Sam. xii. † Chap. xii. 17, 18. ‡ 1 Sam. xii. 19, et seq.

§ Et une preuve même qu'il ne cessoit pas d'être leur chef par cette election, c'est qu'il s'en rend le maître.—Réponse aux Sentimens, p. 55.

this, *hereditary*.\* And what if we do? Where will be the harm of it? The two kingdoms made up but one commonwealth; of which God, as head, governed by two viceroys. And if he oftener acted immediately in the kingdom of Israel, there was a plain reason for it; its inhabitants were more given to idolatrous worship; and needed more the frequency of an extraordinary restraint. And, in effect, we find he did interfere greatly in other instances, as well as in the election of their kings.

In truth, father Simon seemed to see as little into the force of the observation (*that God reserved the choice of their king to himself*) when he urged it, as M. Le Clerc did, when he despised it: yet it is strongly conclusive for the continuation of the theocracy. For had the visible king which the Israelites demanded been granted to them, that is, a king in his own right, sovereign, and at the head of a new constitution, or indeed, any other than a viceroy to the KING of the theocracy, the choice of him would have been reserved to the people. It was a natural right; and more than that, a right which God did not think fit to take from them, when he first accepted the regal office for himself. But if the people have, by natural law, a right to choose their own king, that king hath, by civil law, a prerogative to choose his own deputy. When we see him therefore exercise this prerogative, we may be assured that the king chosen was no other than his deputy, as SOVEREIGN of the theocracy. But to return to the two combatants.—Here the dispute ended; and for farther satisfaction, Le Clerc refers us to a book of Spencer's, written professedly upon this very subject.† It is his tract *De Theocratia Judaica*. What is to be found there, besides the arguments which Le Clerc has borrowed from it, and which have been considered already, I shall now with some reluctance inform the reader.

This treatise is by no means in the number of those on which Spencer raised his reputation. He goes on a wrong hypothesis; he uses weak arguments; and he is confused and inconsistent in his assertions.

1. He thinks the theocracy was established by degrees,‡ and abrogated by degrees.§ A conceit highly absurd, as God was the lawgiver, and supreme magistrate of the Jews.—He thinks the first step to its introduction was their protection at the Red Sea:|| and the first step to its

\* Pour ce que dit M. Simon, que Dieu se rend maître de l'élection des rois, il ne s'ensuit nullement qu'il continuât d'être pour cela chef politique de la république d'Israël; puisque si cela étoit, il faudroit dire que Dieu faisoit beaucoup plus souvent les fonctions de chef de l'état dans le royaume idolâtre des dix tribes, que dans celui de Juda. Car ce dernière royaume étoit héréditaire, et étoit possédé par la maison de David, sans qu'il fut besoin d'aucune élection, au lieu qu'il le fit plusieurs élections dans celui des dix tribes.—*Defense des Sentimens*, pp. 121, 122.

† Il n'est pas nécessaire que je m'arrête d'avantage à cela, après ce qu'en a dit le savant Spencer dans un traité qu'il a fait expressement sur cette matière.—*Lib. i. de Legg. Heb. Rit. Def. des. Sent.* p. 122.

‡ — Neminem in sacris literis vel mediocriter versatum latere potest theocratiam in ipso rerum Israeliticarum exordio aliquatenus obtinuisse, ad ἀρχὴν autem non nisi gradatim et post legem in Sinai datam pervenisse.—*Vol. I. p. 239.*

§ Cum autem regiminis hujus, non simul et semel, sed per gradus quosdam, jacturam fecerint, placet hic veritatis fugientis vestigia gradatim premere.—*Id. ib.*

|| Gradum primum ad potestatem regiam obtinendam fecisse videtur Deus, cum gentem

abolition, their demand of a king :\* That it was still more impaired when Saul and David got possession of the throne:† That it approached much nearer to its end when it became hereditary, under Solomon :‡ and yet, for all this, he confesses that some obscure footsteps of it remained even to the time of CHRIST.§

2. In his reasoning for the abolition of the THEOCRACY, instead of employing the general principles of civil policy, which were the only means of coming to the truth, he insists much on the disuse of urim and thummim, &c. which Le Clerc borrowed from him; and which hath been already considered. He brings the despotic power of the kings,|| as another argument; which, I think, proves just the contrary. For if so be, that these kings were the viceroys of God, whose power was despotic, their power must be despotic too, i. e. independent on all but the SOVEREIGN. Not so, if they were monarchs in their own right.

3. Though, as we observed, Spencer, in the second section of his fourth chapter, supposes a gradual decay of the theocracy; and that even some obscure footsteps of it remained to the time of CHRIST; yet, in the following section, he, all the way, argues upon the supposition of an absolute and entire abrogation¶ by the establishment of the kings.\*\*—To proceed.

II. That this theocracy, the administration of which lay, as it were, in abeyance during the captivity, was again exercised after the return from it, is evident from the express declaration of the Almighty, by the prophet Haggai: *Yet now be strong, O Zerubbabel, saith the Lord; and be strong, O Joshua, son of Josedech the high priest; and be strong, all ye people of the land, saith the Lord, and work: for I am with you, saith the Lord of Hosts: ACCORDING TO THE WORD THAT I COVENANTED WITH YOU, WHEN YOU CAME OUT OF EGYPT, SO MY SPIRIT REMAINETH AMONGST YOU: fear ye not.††* What was that *covenant*? That Israel should be his people, and he their God and *King*. Therefore it cannot barely mean, that he would be their God, and they should be his people; for this was but *part* of the *covenant*. Nor can it mean that they should be conducted by an extraordinary providence, as at their coming out of Egypt, and during the first periods of the theocracy; for this was but *the effects* of the *cove-*

Israeliticam insigni illo potentiae et bonitatis suae documento (Ægyptiorum in Mari Rubro submersione) sibi devinxisset.—Id. ib.

\* Primo itaque ad certum affirmo, quod Israelitæ, regem sibi dari postulantes, gradum primum ad imperii hujus desideratissimi ruinam fecisse videantur.—Id. ib.

† Dei regimen multo magis imminutum est, cum Deus *Saulem et Davidem* ad rerum arbitrium evocasset.—P. 240.

‡ Solomone rerum potito, theocratia multo vicinior ἀφανεσμή non immerito censeatur.

§ Judæi theocratiae veteris indicia et vestigia quædam obscuriora, ad extrema usque politiae suae tempora retinuerunt—ipso Domini nostri seculo, Hierosolyma civitas magni regis auduit.—Id.

|| — Adeo ut hinc constet, eos se pro regibus gessisse, et potestatem arbitriam exercuisse.—Id.

¶ — Regiminis hujus mutati vel abrogati causa principalis—De regiminis hujus abrogati effectu vel eventu breviter disserendum est &c.—Pp. 241—243.

\*\* See note II, at the end of this book.

†† Chap. ii. ver. 4, 5.

*nant*: and besides, we know that that dispensation of providence soon ceased after the re-establishment. The meaning therefore must be, that he would still continue to be their KING as well as God. Yet at the same time, when this theocracy was restored, it was both fit, on account of its own dignity, and necessary for the people's assurance, that it should be attended with some unusual display of divine favour. Accordingly, prophets were raised up; and an extraordinary providence for some short time administered, as appears from many places in those prophets.\*

III. That the theocracy continued even to the coming of CHRIST, may be seen from hence—

1. Whenever it was abrogated, it must needs be done in the same solemn manner in which it was established; so that the one might be as well known as the other: because it was of the highest importance to a people so strictly bound to obedience, not to be mistaken concerning the power under which they lived. Natural equity requires this formality as a necessary concomitant in the imposing and abrogating of all civil laws and institutions whatsoever. Now the theocracy having never been thus abolished till the coming of Christ, we conclude that it continued to subsist till that time.

2. Nor, indeed, could it have been abolished without dissolving the whole frame of the republic; since all the laws of it, whether as to their equity, force, or fitness, as well as the whole ritual of worship, respected, and referred to God as civil governor. But neither by the declaration of any prophet, nor by the act of any good king, did the institution suffer the least change in any of its parts, from the time of its establishment by Moses to its dissolution by JESUS CHRIST, either by addition, correction, or abrogation. Consequently, the *theocracy* was existing throughout that whole period: nothing being more absurd than to suppose that national laws, all made in reference to the form of government, should remain invariable, while the government itself was changed. For, what the author of the epistle to the Hebrews says of the PRIEST (in a constitution where the two societies were incorporated) must be equally true of the KING.—THE PRIESTHOOD BEING CHANGED, THERE IS MADE ALSO, OF NECESSITY, A CHANGE OF THE LAW.† And now it was that JESUS, the MESSIAH, who is here spoken of as making this change, in quality of PRIEST, made it likewise in quality of KING. For, as we learn from the history of his ministry, he came as heir of God, to succeed immediately without any interregnum, in his Father's kingdom: GOD having DELIVERED UP to his Son the kingdom, of which the Father was, till then, in possession. And this change in the government, from the *temporal theocracy* of GOD the Father, to the *spiritual kingdom* of GOD the Son, was made in the same solemn and authentic manner in which that theocracy was introduced. GOD raised up from amongst his chosen people, a *prophet like unto Moses*, who exercised the *legislative* power, like Moses; and assumed the *regal* power, like God. He gave

\* Hag. i. 6—11;—ii. 16—19; Zech. viii. 12; Mal. iii. 10, 11. † Chap. vii. ver. 12.

A NEW LAW to be administered in a NEW KINGDOM, and confirmed the divinity of the dispensation by the most stupendous miracles. Thus, we find, the theocracy did indeed subsist till the coming of Christ.

And this ABOLITION of it by the Son of God, I take to be the true completion of that famous PROPHECY of Jacob, of which so much hath been written and disputed. THE SCEPTRE SHALL NOT DEPART FROM JUDAH, NOR A LAWGIVER FROM BETWEEN HIS FEET, UNTIL SHILOH COME, \* *i. e.* the THEOCRACY shall continue over the Jews† until Christ come to take possession of his Father's kingdom: for there was never any *lawgiver*,‡ in *Judah*, but God by the ministry of Moses, until the coming of his SON.

JESUS the MESSIAH, the best interpreter of the oracles of God, of which he himself is the capital subject, and for whose sake the *chain of prophecies* was so early drawn out, and extended to such a length, seems to have paraphrased and explained the words of Jacob concerning the *departure of the sceptre from Judah*, by his declaration recorded in St Matthew, THE PROPHETS AND THE LAW PROPHESED TILL JOHN,§ *i. e.* "The Mosaic law, and the theocratic government by which it was dispensed, continued in being till the approach of this harbinger of Christ, John the Baptist; but was then superseded by the promulgation of a *new law* and the establishment of a *new kingdom*."

But as this interpretation is so different from the common, and understands the prophecy as foretelling that the Jewish nation should not be bereft of sovereign power, by falling under a foreign yoke, till the advent of the MESSIAH, the reader will excuse me, if I detain him a little longer on so important a subject.

The common notion of the *sceptre of Judah*, is explained three different ways, each of which has its particular followers.

1. Some suppose the *sceptre of Judah* to signify the SOVEREIGNTY OF THE JEWISH NATION at large.

2. Others again suppose it to signify the SOVEREIGNTY OF THE TRIBE OF JUDAH.

3. And a third sort contend that it signifies not a sovereign or regal, but a TRIBAL SCEPTRE only.

In the sense of a *sovereignty in the Jewish people at large*, which is the most general interpretation, and, in my opinion, the most natural of the three (as the whole people were long denominated from that tribe), the pretended prophecy was not only never fulfilled, but has been directly falsified: because long before the *coming of Shiloh*, or of Christ,

\* Gen. xlix. 10.

† Who took their name from the tribe of *Judah*; the rest being incorporated in that tribe, or extinguished in captivity.

‡ *Māhōkek*, *legislator*, aut *legis interpres*. But the first is its original and proper signification. And thus Isaiah [chap. xxxiii. ver. 22], "The Lord is our *judge*, the Lord is our LAWGIVER [*māhōkekenou*], the Lord is our *king*, he will save us." Where the word *māhōkek* is used in its proper signification of *lawgiver*; the other sense of dispenser or interpreter of the law being contained in the titles of *judge* and *king*.

§ Mat. xi. 13.

the sceptre or sovereignty in the Jewish people was *departed*. During the Babylonian and Persian captivity, and while afterwards they continued in a tributary dependence on the Greeks, they could, in no reasonable sense, be said to have retained their *sceptre*, their sovereignty, or independent rule. But it may be replied, "that the prophecy by *departure*, meant a final departure; and in these instances it was but temporary: for CYRUS restored the *sceptre* to them; and when it was again lost in the Grecian empire, the MACCABEI recovered it for them." Though this be allowed, yet we must still confess, that the Romans, who under Pompey reduced Judea to a dependent province, effectually overthrew the prophecy. POMPEY took Jerusalem; and left to Hyrcanus, the last of the Asmonean family, only the office of high priest. From this time, to the birth of Christ, it was ever in dependence on the Romans, who disposed of all things at their pleasure. The senate gave the government of Judea to Antipater; and then to Herod his son, under the title of king. And Archelaus, on the death of his father, did not dare to take possession of this subject kingdom, till he had obtained leave of Augustus; who afterwards, on complaint of the Jews against him, banished him into the west, where he died. Now the precarious rule of a dependent monarch could no more be called a *sceptre* (which, in the figurative mode of all languages, signifies *sovereignty*) than the condition of the Jews could be said to be sovereign, when this Archelaus was deposed, and Coponius a Roman knight made procurator of Judea, at that time which the supporters of this interpretation fix for the *departure of the sceptre*.

I reckon for nothing another objection which has been made to the common interpretation, "That after the return from the captivity, the Jews were, from time to time, under a form of government resembling rather the aristocratic than the monarchic;" because the *sceptre*, or sovereignty, belongs equally to all those forms. This then makes no more against the common interpretation, than the other, I am now going to mention, makes for it, namely, that the senate of Rome gave the government of Judea to Herod under the title of KING; since the dependent rule of this roitelet was as certainly the *departure of a sceptre*, as a sovereignty under an aristocratic government was the *continuance* of it.

The learned father Tournemine was so embarrassed with these difficulties, that in a dissertation on *the sceptre of Judah*, he endeavours to show, that the proof of the predicted birth of Christ from this prophecy arises not from the *departure of the sceptre*, but from its re-establishment under the Messiah.\* Which thesis (as the intelligent reader may observe) fairly put him in the road; and, had it been pursued, would have led him to the sense I am here endeavouring to establish.

The second branch of the common interpretation is, That by the *sceptre* is signified a *civil sovereignty in the tribe of Judah*. This, in my opinion, has still less of stability than the other. It supposes that

\* Journal de Trevoux, Mars 1705, et Feb. 1721.



the *sceptre*, or the supreme rule of the Jewish people, remained in natives of that tribe, from the time of David to the coming of Christ. But Petavius hath shown, that from the giving of the prophecy to the time of David (a space of above six hundred years), there was but one or two rulers descended from the time of Judah: and that from the death of Sedecias to the birth of Christ (a space of near the same number of years) all the rulers of the Jewish people were of other tribes; the Asmonean princes particularly being all of the tribe of Levi.\* The Abbé de Houteville, who, at a very easy rate, hath obtained the reputation of an able defender of revelation,† hath indeed invented a curious expedient to evade this difficulty. His system is, that the rulers of the tribe of Levi (and so I suppose of the rest) exercised this sovereignty by leave, or deputation from the tribe of Judah. To such wretched shifts are learned men reduced, when they have reversed the order of things, and made truth to wait upon their systems; instead of making their systems subservient to truth.

These two senses (by one or other of which the common interpretation hath been long supported) being found on a stricter scrutiny, to be untenable, men cast about for a third; and a happy one it was thought to be, which contrived, that *sceptre* should signify a *domestic*, not a *civil* rule; a **TRIBAL**, not a **SOVEREIGN** *sceptre*; and of which, they say, **JUDAH**, at the giving of the prophecy, was already possessed. This expedient, the learned Dr Sherlock, bishop of London, has honoured with his support and protection.‡

It would be want of respect to so eminent a person, to pass over this refinement with the same slight notice that has been given to the other two. I shall therefore do myself the honour to consider his Lordship's reasoning more at large.

His Lordship's first argument in support of a *tribal sceptre* is—That the *sceptre's* not **DEPARTING** *from Judah* shows plainly that Judah had a *sceptre* when the prophecy was given.—“Is there any sense,” says his Lordship, “in saying that a thing shall not *depart*, which never was yet in *possession*? The prophecy is not a *grant* of the *sceptre*, but a *confirmation* of it. Now a confirmation of nothing is nothing: and, to make it something, the *possession* of the thing *confirmed* must be supposed. I know not by what rules of language or grammar, these words can be construed into a *grant* of the *sceptre*. And though so many writers and

\* — At complures antiquorum recentiorumque qui in illa Jacobi sententia *Judam* peculiari de tribu intellexerunt, id sibi patriarcham voluisse credunt, ex stirpe ac progenie *Juda* filii ipsius perpetuo Judæis præfuturum aliquem eorumque fore principem, donec Christus adveniat. Sed in hujus reddenda dicti ratione multum æstuant, siquidem vetustatis omni teste memoriâ refelluntur, quæ non solum ante Davidem unum alterumve duntaxat ex illa tribu rexisse populum ostendit, annis circiter 675 ab edita prophetia; sed etiam post Sedecias necem, occasumque urbis et templi ad Christum usque de alia quam *Judæ* stirpe duces extitisse annis 584; etenim Machabæos constat ex Levitica et sacerdotali progenie descendere.—Ration. Temporum, Par. II. lib. iii. cap. 16.

† See his book, entitled, *Religion prouvée par les Faits*.

‡ Use and Intent of Prophecy, Dissert. III. 5th ed. 1749.

interpreters have followed this sense, yet I do not remember to have seen one passage or parallel expression from the scripture, or any other author, produced to justify the interpretation."—Pp. 326, 327.

*Is there any sense, his Lordship asks, in saying a thing shall not DEPART which never was yet in possession?* Yes certainly, a very good one, in a PROPHECY, where the subject is not of a present but of a future possession; and where the Holy Spirit is wont to *call the things that are not, as though they were*. The subject is a *sceptre*, which could in no sense, not even in the sense of a *tribal sceptre*, be in possession of Judah before he became a *tribe*. His Lordship, indeed, supposes he became a tribe immediately after the death of Jacob.—*This power in the hands of the tribes took place immediately upon the death of Jacob*.—P. 323. But if it did? Was not that accession as properly *future*, as if it had been a thousand years after? Judah then, at the time of this prophecy, not being in possession of his sceptre, *a confirmation of nothing is nothing, &c.*, so that all the absurdities here imagined stick to his Lordship's era of the *sceptre*, as well as to the common one. But let us suppose that Jacob's prophecy and death were individual; and then see how he proves his assertion, that Judah and the rest became tribes immediately on the death of Jacob. His proof is a little extraordinary—*When Moses and Aaron led them into the wilderness, says his Lordship, we hear of the ELDERS of the people, and the BULERS of the congregation*.—P. 323. His assertion is, that the *tribal sceptre* sprung up from the ashes of Jacob; and his proof, that it arose and flourished in the wilderness. This is indeed the truth; it was a native of that place; as may be fairly *presumed* from the occasion which the Israelites had of a tribal rule (namely, to fit them for the warfare they were now about to undertake), and as may be fairly *proved* from the first chapter of the book of Numbers—"And the Lord spake unto Moses in the wilderness of Sinai: Take ye the sum of all the congregation of the children of Israel, after their families, by the house of their fathers—all that are able to go forth to war in Israel; thou and Aaron shall number them with their armies. And with you, there SHALL BE A MAN of every tribe; every one HEAD OF THE HOUSE of his fathers—and they assembled all the congregation; and they declared their pedigrees after their families, by the house of their fathers—these were those which were numbered: and the PRINCES OF ISRAEL BEING TWELVE MEN, EACH ONE WAS FOR THE HOUSE OF HIS FATHERS. And the children of Israel shall pitch their tents, every man by his own camp, and every man by his own standard, throughout their hosts—and the children of Israel did according to all the Lord commanded them."\* Then follow the order of the tribes in their tents.† Now, surely, this detailed account of these *tribal sceptres* hath all the marks of a new institution.

The Bishop's hypothesis therefore is without foundation: the *sceptre* was something in *reversion*. Indeed the particular words, as well as the

\* Num. i. 4, 5, 18, 44, 52, 54.

† Num. chap. ii.

general nature of prophecy, declare the subject to be of things future.—  
 “And Jacob called to his sons, and said; *Gather yourselves together that I may tell you what shall befall you IN THE LAST DAYS.*” \* The Bishop owns, that *most of the interpreters*, from these words, *take it for granted, and it is the common notion, that the sceptre was not to be settled in Judah’s family till some ages after the death of Jacob.*—P. 326. I think they had not reason so to do. How does his Lordship prove they had? In this manner: “The observation, when rightly applied, is right. And if the *continuance* of the sceptre of Judah be, as I suppose, the thing foretold, it extends to the very last days of the Jewish state; and in this respect the interpretation is justified:” (p. 327) *i. e.* if you will agree that *futurity* refers to the *continuance*, and not to the *establishment* of the sceptre, his Lordship will show you, how well he can evade this objection. But though we were inclined to be thus complaisant, the book of Numbers would not suffer us: which informs us (we see) that even the *tribal sceptre* was established long after the death of Jacob. But to go no farther than the prophecy. If each tribe had a sceptre then existing, how happened it that Judah’s is only named, *by way of CONFIRMATION*, as his Lordship will have it. For, *by way of GRANT*, we find Dan too had a sceptre—*Dan SHALL judge his people as one of the tribes [or SCEPTRES] of Israel.* But then Dan’s is a *reversionary* sceptre; and such a one destroys all his Lordship has been erecting.

To proceed—*The prophecy*, says the Bishop, *is not a GRANT of a sceptre, but a CONFIRMATION.* The prophecy itself plainly intimates the contrary. Jacob having told his sons that he would inform them *of what should befall them in the last days*, when he comes to Judah, he says, *Thy father’s children shall bow down before thee.*† This, if it was any thing, was the promise of a future sceptre; and consequently it was the *grant*.

The Bishop goes on—*Now a confirmation of nothing is nothing.* Without doubt. But he supposes (what I have shown to be a mistake), that there was no *grant*. If there were a *grant*, then the confirmation of it was the confirmation of *something*. He seems to be apprehensive of so obvious an answer, for he immediately adds—*I know not by what rules of language or grammar these words can be construed into a GRANT of the sceptre.* By the plainest *rule* in the world; that of *common sense*, the first and capital *rule* in every art as well as *grammar*. For if Jacob made a declaration concerning some future prerogative, as the words—*Thy father’s children shall bow down before thee*—prove he did; and that this was the first time that Judah heard of it, as the words—*I will tell you what shall befall you in the last days*—prove it was; what can this prophecy be but *the GRANT of a sceptre*?

“Though so many writers and interpreters,” says the Bishop, “have followed this sense, yet I do not remember to have seen one passage or parallel expression from the scripture or any other writer produced to justify the interpretation.” As for *any other writers* than those of scrip-

\* Gen. xlix. 1.

† Gen. xlix. 8.

ture, I know of none who have prophesied: and the language of prophecy hath peculiarities unknown to other compositions. But a *scripture*—I am able to produce; and the same who has recorded this prophecy of Jacob.—On Abraham's departure out of Haran, he being then seventy-five years of age, *the Lord*, as Moses tells us, *appeared unto him and said, Unto thy SEED will I give this land.\** Was this now a *grant* or a *confirmation* only of SEED? “A confirmation only,” says his Lordship: “all the *grant* contained in these words is the grant of the *land* and this shows (will he say) that the *seed* was now existing: for a *seed* is incapable of receiving any grant or donation: besides, a *confirmation of nothing is nothing*, and so on.”—Notwithstanding all this it so happens that Abraham had then *no seed*.

Here now is a *parallel expression*, which holds *à fortiori*. For it would be a little anomalous to talk of a *thing's departing which was never in possession*, it seems to be much more absurd to talk of *giving to sons who were never yet in being*. Besides, the promise of rule actually accompanies the promise of its duration: but the express promise of duration does not accompany the promise of a provision for it: I suppose the reason of this difference of expression in the two places is, because to *possess* is a much commoner case than to get a sceptre.

His Lordship having thus shown, that Judah's sceptre was a *tribal* sceptre *in possession*, he will prove next, that it was not a *civil*, but a *tribal* sceptre; which did not stretch its sovereignty over a whole nation, but was confined to the economic rule of the single tribe of Judah.—“Another thing supposed,” says he, “by most interpreters is, that the *sceptre*, here mentioned, is an emblem of dominion over all the tribes of Jacob. But how can that be? Had not Jacob settled a *sceptre* on every tribe? as is evident, ver. 16, *Dan shall judge his people as one of the sceptres of Israel*. Suppose a father has divided his estate amongst twelve sons, and should say of one of them, *The estate shall not depart from John, for many ages*; could you possibly suppose that to mean more than the *share* of the estate given to John? Could you understand him to mean that all the estate, the twelve shares, should come to John and continue in his family? The case is the same here. Twelve princes are created; of one of them Jacob says, *the sceptre shall not depart from him until Shiloh come*. Is it not plain then, that the sceptres are distinguished here; and that it is foretold of one, that it shall long outlast the rest? consequently the sceptre here is an emblem of authority IN AND OVER ONE TRIBE ONLY.”—Pp. 328, 329.

His Lordship's reasoning, on which he grounds his parallel, stands thus—Judah's sceptre was the same with Dan's: now Dan's was a *tribal* sceptre; therefore Judah's. But the very words of the prophecy show that the sceptres were *specifically* different. Of Dan it is said, *he shall judge his people AS ONE OF THE TRIBES OR SCEPTRES OF ISRAEL*. Here is a *tribal* sceptre marked out in express and proper terms.

\* Chap. xii. ver. 7.

of Judah's sceptre it is said, **THY FATHER'S CHILDREN SHALL BOW DOWN BEFORE THEE**. Who were these *children* but the eleven tribes? So that here a *civil* and a *sovereign* sceptre is as properly and expressly marked out for Judah, as before, a *tribal* one for Dan. This shall judge his own tribe; but the other shall, with his own tribe, judge the rest also. And yet if you will rely on his Lordship's authority, he has a *case in point*; and he assures us "that Judah's grant is the same as that of a father's to his son John, who when he had divided his estate amongst his twelve sons, should say of John's part, that it should not depart for many ages."

He tells us next, "that the sense of the word **LAWGIVER** will follow the fate of the word *sceptre*."—P. 329. In this, I perfectly agree with him. And therefore, as his sense of the word *sceptre* is found to be erroneous, his sense of the word *lawgiver* must fall with it.

All that follows has nothing to do with the question of a *tribal sceptre*, till we come to page 344. From thence to page 350, he endeavours to take advantage of the hypothesis, to show that this *tribal sceptre* never departed from Judah till the coming of Christ: and here he had an easy task. But unluckily confounding *economic* with *civil* rule, he embarrasses himself as much, to make out the completion of the prophecy, as the supporters of the other two branches of the common interpretation are wont to do.—As where he talks of the Jews in Babylon *ordering all matters relating to their own CIVIL and ECCLESIASTICAL affairs*.—P. 345.—*Their coming back to their own country as a people and a nation GOVERNED BY THEIR OWN LAWS—though never so FREE A PEOPLE as they had been formerly. They lived under subjection to the Persian monarch, and under the empire of the Greeks and Romans*.—P. 347.—*The Evangelists show that they lived under their OWN LAWS, and EXECUTED JUDGMENT amongst themselves*.—P. 349.—*Had the exercise of JUDICIAL AUTHORITY amongst themselves*.—P. 350. Thus, like the successors of Peter, who enlarged his *rock* into a *citadel*, his Lordship at last lengthens his *tribal* sceptre into a *sovereign*. But if here he extends it over a people and nation, he contracts it as much by and by; and we see it shrink up into a mere philosophical or stoical regality. His Lordship undertakes to prove that the Jews were a **FREE PEOPLE**, from their consciousness of their free condition.—*When our Saviour, says the Bishop, tells the Jews, "the truth shall make you free;" they reply, "We are Abraham's children, and were never in bondage to any man"*.—P. 349. This his Lordship urges as a proof of their *civil freedom*. But if the Jews, who expected a carnal Messiah to lead real armies against their enemies, could suppose that Jesus made them an offer of sending *truth* in person, to execute this commission for them, their stupidity must have exceeded every thing we have been told of it, by their enemies. To be plain with his Lordship; the subject here debated, between Jesus and his adversaries, is most foreign from his Lordship's purpose. Our blessed Saviour is here addressing himself to

the PHARISEES, a rank of men not ignorant of the Greek philosophy (though greatly mistaking its use when they brought so much of it in the law), and therefore, with a stoical dignity, he tells them—*the law shall set you free*. They answer him in the same tone, *We are Abraham's children, and were never in bondage to any man*. That “Our principles are of divine extraction, and we never suffered ourselves to be enslaved to human decisions.” Surely, says his Lordship, *they had not forgot their captivity in Babylon*. Forgot! Why, Jesus had said nothing to put them in mind of it. The question is not about their freedom from Babylon, but from error.—*Much less*, says he, *could they be ignorant of the power of the Romans over them at that time and yet we see they account themselves free*. And why should they mind when the question between Jesus and them was only who should rule them so, HE OR ABRAHAM. Strange! that his Lordship's own account of their *civil condition* under the *power of the Romans* should not have brought him to see, that the subject in hand was only of their *manly condition*. Stranger still! that his solution of this difficulty should have led him to discover that it was but imaginary—*they were free* says his Lordship, *for they lived by their own laws, and executed judgment amongst themselves*.—Had he added—*but, at the precarious nature of an arbitrary tyrant*—it would doubtless have given great force to the observation: for, about this time, Coponius, a Roman knight, was named procurator of Judea. Nay, even the precarious privilege of punishing capitally was now taken from them: they had a pagan governor: and justice was administered, not by their own forms of law, but by the Roman. An admirable character of *civil freedom*!

His Lordship seems to be no happier in answering others' objections than in urging his own proofs. “You will say,” continues he, “why did not Jacob foretell also the continuance of the sceptre of Benjamin? For the tribe of Benjamin ran the same fortune with that of Judah: they went together into captivity: they returned home together; and were both in being when *Shiloh* came.”—P. 355.

Upon my word, a shrewd objection. Let us see how his Lordship quits his hands of it. His first answer is,—*That from the division of the kingdom after the death of Solomon, the tribe of Benjamin and the remnant of Israel, that is, part of all the other tribes, ADHERED TO JUDAH AS THEIR HEAD*.—Pp. 355, 356.

Here his Lordship seems fairly to have given up the cause; his answer proving, in so many words, that *Judah's sceptre* was not *tribal* but *civil*. Let us examine it step by step. *Benjamin and the remnants of all the other tribes adhered to Judah as their head*. Now such an adherence can be no other than an acknowledgment of a *civil sceptre* in Judah. Yet his Lordship gives this as a reason why the continuance of Judah's sceptre is foretold, and not Benjamin's. Therefore the sceptre, whose continuance is foretold, was a *civil*, not a *tribal*, sceptre even on his own principles. If this needed a support, the words of the



prophecy afford it amply: his Lordship says, that *Benjamin and the remnants of all the other tribes adhered to Judah as their HEAD; and this adherence, Jacob foretells—Thy father's children shall FALL DOWN before thee.*

Supposing therefore that this sceptre of Judah were of the *civil* kind, his Lordship, it must be owned, has given a very satisfactory reason why Benjamin's *tribal* sceptre was not mentioned. But if both were *tribal* sceptres, the *continuance* of Benjamin's had as good a claim to the prophet's notice (for any thing the bishop has shown to the contrary) as Judah's. Since as *tribes*, they both continued to exist, and to exist distinct.

His second answer to the objection seems as little satisfactory as the first—*Though the continuance of the SCEPTRE of Benjamin is not foretold, yet the continuance of the tribe or PEOPLE of Benjamin is distinctly foretold.*—P. 356. Would you desire a more conclusive argument against his own notion of a *tribal* sceptre? If this prophetic sceptre of Judah was a *civil* one, there is a very good reason why the *continuance of the people*, and not of the *sceptre* of Benjamin, should be foretold; because what Judah and Benjamin had in common was their continuing to exist as distinct tribes; the *sceptre* being peculiar to the first: but if a *tribal* sceptre be the subject of the prophecy concerning Judah, then no possible reason can be assigned why the *continuance* of Benjamin's sceptre should not be honoured with the divine notice as well as Judah's; since his Lordship assures us—*they both ran the same fortune; they went together into captivity; they returned together to Judea; and were both in being when Shiloh came.* And while a *tribe* continues distinct, a *tribal* sceptre continues with it; just as the head of a family exists so long as there is a family to govern.

All this considered, his Lordship in my humble opinion had done well not to load himself with more than he had occasion to carry: especially as he had so little to answer for, in the success of this hypothesis; for he tells us at the end of his DISSERTATION, *that he has nothing more to add, but to acquaint the reader that the interpretation of Jacob's prophecy now advanced, was not a mere invention of his own; that it was, as to the main point, the same with that which is the fourth in Huetius, and by him rejected, but for such reasons as had been fully obviated in this dissertation.*—That it was the same which JUNIUS and TREMELLIUS, and our own learned countryman, AINSWORTH, had espoused; and which not many years ago was revised and improved by Mr JONCOURT.—P. 358.

Now, from what hath been said, it appears that of all the three branches, into which the common interpretation spreads, though they be equally weak, the last betrays its weakness most. But, what is of principal consideration, it is, of all the three, least suitable to the DIGNITY OF PROPHECY; the whole body of which has a perpetual reference to one or other of the great parts of the dispensation of grace. Now the first

branch refers with suitable dignity to a whole people at large: the second to the same people under the government of one certain line: while the third concerns only the fortunes of a single tribe, and under a family idea.

The common interpretation therefore being shown so very exceptionable in all its branches, what remains for us to conclude, but that the true and real meaning of the *sceptre of Judah* is that THEOCRATIC GOVERNMENT which God, by the vicegerency of judges, kings, and rulers, exercised over the Jewish nation? We have shown from various considerations of weight, that this THEOCRACY, which was instituted by the ministry of Moses, continued over that people till the coming of Shiloh or Christ; THAT PROPHET *like unto Moses*, whom God had promised to *raise up*. And to support what hath been urged from reason, to illustrate this important truth, we have here a prophetic declaration enouncing the same thing,—*the sceptre shall not depart from Judah till Shiloh come*: Shiloh is Christ. Now Christ is not the successor of those VICEGERENTS of the Jewish state, but of God himself, the KING of the Jews. The sceptre therefore which descends to him, through the hands of those vicegerents, is not merely a CIVIL, but a THEOCRATIC *sceptre*. This, at the same time, explains the evangelic doctrine of CHRIST'S KINGDOM, arising out of the *theocracy* or *kingdom of God*. Hence the distinction in that famous declaration of Christ, so much abused to factious and party purposes, that HIS KINGDOM WAS NOT OF THIS WORLD: the theocracy which was administered over the Jews only, and in a carnal manner, was a *kingdom of this world*: but when transferred to Shiloh, and extended over all mankind, and administered in a spiritual manner, it became a *kingdom not of this world*. And the making the *sceptre of Judah* neither *tribal*, nor MERELY *civil*, but properly *theocratic*, clears the prophecy from those insuperable difficulties which render all the other interpretations hurtful or dishonourable to the prophetic system in general.

These are the superior advantages of the sense I have here endeavoured to establish. Nor are these all the advantages. The prophecy is seen to embrace a much nobler object than was imagined. It was supposed to relate only to the fortunes of the *Jewish economy*, and we find it extends itself to the *whole dispensation of grace*. It was considered but as a simple PROPHECY, while it had the dignity of a REVELATION. It was mistaken for the *species*, when it is indeed of the *genus*.

But to all this an *answerer* may reply: 1. "That, as we admit the THEOCRACY to be a *kingdom of this world*, the same objection will lie against the CONTINUANCE or duration of a *theocratic* sceptre as of a mere *civil* one." But here we must distinguish. The theocracy was indeed carnal in its *administration*, but in its *original* it was divine. Therefore, as where the subject is of the *continuance* of a mere *civil* sceptre, we cannot but understand the *continuance of its administration*, because the administration is inseparable from the existence; so where the subject is of the continuance of a *theocratic* sceptre, we must understand that continuance to consist in its remaining unrevoked, since what is of divine

original exists, independently of its being actually administered ; it exists till it be formally abrogated. This difference is evident from the nature of things. Forms of government ordained by men, cease when men no longer administer them ; because, in the non-administration of them, they are naturally supposed to revoke what they had ordained : but men's ceasing to administer (whether by choice or force) a form of government given by God, does not (on any rules of logic or ideas of nature) imply God's revocation of that form of government.

Again, we must remember what has been said of the effect and consequence of a THEOCRACY. It not only *united*, but *incorporated* the two societies, civil and religious into one. And this incorporated body of the Jewish state went by the name of THE LAW. Now under that part of the law which more intimately regarded religion, the Jews always lived FREE till the publication of the gospel ; though the other part of it, regarding the sovereign administration of civil policy and justice, they had lost from the time of Pompey. For a power precariously enjoyed, and ready to be abolished at the nod of a conqueror, can never be called *sovereign* (which implies the being free and independent) without the worst abuse of words, which is the quibbling upon them. So that a *sovereignty* in this theocracy was still administered to the last, though in part. However, this partial exercise was consentaneous to the system on which this theocracy was dispensed ; its administration being ordained to have a gradual decline. The Jews, for their transgressions, being first of all deprived of that natural effect of theocratic rule, the *extraordinary providence* : and then, for their incorrigible manners, further punished by an infringement of their civil sovereignty : but still the theocracy, as to that more essential, the religious part, remained unhurt till the coming of Christ : and let it be observed, that it was this part in particular which was to be assigned over to him from the Father. Thus, as I said before, this is not so properly a *prediction* of human events, as a *revelation* concerning the course of God's dispensation.

2. Secondly, it hath been objected, that "according to the sense here put upon the *sceptre*, it should have been said—*the sceptre shall not depart from* JEHOVAH instead of JUDAH. But such objectors do not advert, that the theocracy was administered by vicegerents of JUDAH. And this likewise will account for the expression of a *lawgiver between his feet*.

3. Lastly, it may be said, "That by this interpretation of the *sceptre of Judah* we deprive the prophecy of one principal part of the information it was supposed to give, namely, the TIME of Christ's advent, which the common interpretation is supposed to fix exactly." To this I answer, that religion loses nothing by this change, since there are so many other prophecies which point out the *time* with infinitely more precision. On the other hand, religion gains much by it, in evading a number of objections, which had stigmatized the supposed prediction with apparent marks of falsehood.

Thus we see the noble prophecy, concerning the transfer of the kingdom of God to CHRIST, contains a matter of much greater dignity in itself, and of much greater moment for the support of CHRISTIANITY, than could arise from the perplexed question about the reign of the Asmonean princes, or the continuance of the power of life and death amongst a tributary people. For in predicting the *abolition of the law*, it supplies us with a new and excellent argument for the conversion of the Jewish people, fatally persuaded of its *eternal obligation*.

The reasons of my being so particular concerning the duration of the THEOCRACY are various, and will be seen as occasion offers. Only the reader may here take notice, that it was necessary for the present purpose, to show its continuance throughout the whole duration of the republic, in order to vindicate the justice of those laws all along in force, for the punishment of idolatrous worship.

#### SECT. IV.

THUS far as to the nature and duration of the Mosaic republic. Let us now see what PECULIAR CONSEQUENCES necessarily attended the administration of a THEOCRATIC form of government.

One necessary consequence was an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE. For the affairs of a people under a theocracy, being administered by God as King; and his peculiar and immediate administration of human affairs being what we call *an extraordinary providence*; it follows that an extraordinary providence must needs be exercised over such a people. My meaning is, that if the Jews were indeed under a theocracy, they were indeed under an extraordinary providence: and if a theocracy was only pretended, yet an extraordinary providence must necessarily be pretended likewise. In a word, they must be either both true or both false, but still inseparable, in reality or idea. Nor does this at all contradict (as was suggested by Doctor SYKES even after he had seen his suggestion confuted) what I observe concerning the gradual decay and total extinction of the extraordinary providence, while the theocracy yet existed. For when I say *an extraordinary providence was one necessary consequence of a theocracy*, I can only mean that it was so in its original constitution, and in the order and nature of things: not that in this, which was matter of compact, the contravening acts of one party might not make a separation. For, as this extraordinary providence was (besides its being a mode of administration arising out of a theocracy) a reward for obedience, it became liable to forfeiture by disobedience, though subjection to the government still continued. I beg leave to illustrate this position both by a foreign and a domestic instance. The *æerarii* in the Roman state were such who, for their crimes, were deprived of the right of citizens: yet these delinquents were obliged to pay the public taxes. At home, a voice in the supreme council of the kingdom

is the necessary consequence of an English barony; yet they may be separated by a judicial sentence; and actually have been so separated; as we may see in the two famous cases of Lord Verulam and the Earl of Middlesex, in the reign of James the first; who were both deprived of their seats in the house of Lords, and yet held their baronies, with all the other rights pertaining to them. Thus a punishment of this kind was inflicted on the rebellious Israelites: they were deprived of the *extraordinary providence*: and were yet held subject to the *theocracy*, as appears from the sentence pronounced upon them, by the mouth of the prophet Ezekiel:—"Ye polluted yourselves with your idols even unto this day: and shall I be inquired of by you, O house of Israel? As I live, with the Lord God, *I will not be inquired of by you. And that which cometh into your mind shall not be at all, that ye say; We will be as the heathen, as the families of the countries, to serve wood and stone. As I live, saith the Lord, with a mighty hand, and with a stretched-out arm, and with fury poured out, will I rule over you. And I will bring you out from the people, and will gather you out of the countries wherein ye are scattered, with a mighty hand, and with a stretched-out arm, and with fury poured out. And I will bring you into the wilderness of the people, and there will I plead with you face to face. Like as I pleaded with your fathers in the wilderness of the land of Egypt, so will I plead with you, saith the Lord. And I will cause you to pass under the rod, and I will bring you into the BOND OF THE COVENANT.*"—Chap. xx. ver. 31—37. It is here we see denounced, that the extraordinary providence should be withdrawn; or in scripture phrase, *that God would not be inquired of by them*; that they should remain in this condition, which their *fathers* had occasionally felt *in the wilderness*, when the extraordinary providence, for their signal disobedience, was, from time to time, suspended: and yet, that, though they strove to disperse themselves amongst the people round about, and projected *in their minds to be as the heathen, and the families of the countries, to serve wood and stone*, they should still be under the government of a THEOCRACY; which, when administered without an extraordinary providence, the blessing, naturally attendant on it, was, and was justly called THE ROD AND BOND OF THE COVENANT.

But now if you will believe a professor of divinity and a no less eminent dealer in laws, the case grows worse and worse, and, from a contradiction in my system, it becomes a contradiction in God's. For thus Dr RUTHERFORTH descants upon the matter; "As the law was gradually deprived of its sanction, the *obligation* of it grew continually weaker, till at last, after the people were returned from the captivity, it must have ceased to oblige them at all. For whatever may be the case of God's MORAL LAW, yet most certainly, as he withdraws the sanctions of his POSITIVE ones, he takes off something from their obligation; and when he has wholly withdrawn the promise of reward and the threatening of punishment, THOSE LAWS OBLIGE NO LONGER."—P. 329. To this deter-

mination of the learned professor, concerning OBLIGATION, I have nothing to oppose but the *determination* of GOD himself: who, by the mouth of one of his prophets, declares, that the *laws shall still oblige, though the sanction be withdrawn*. “Ye pollute yourselves with your idols,” &c.,—as the reader may find it transcribed just above. Here God declares he would withdraw that extraordinary providence which naturally attended a THEOCRACY.—*I will not be inquired of by you*. “Yet do not,” says he, “deceive yourselves in an expectation that, because for your crimes I withdraw this sanction of my law, the law will oblige no longer—and that which cometh into your mind shall not be at all, that ye say we will be as the heathen: for, in order to the bringing about my own great purposes, I will still continue you a select and sequestered people—I will bring you out from the people, and will gather you out from the countries wherein you are scattered. And will still rule over you by my law; now in my wrath, as before in my mercy. With fury poured out I will rule over you, and bring you into the bond of the covenant.”

I suppose the thing that led our Doctor into this rash judgment, that *when the sanctions of a positive law are withdrawn, the obligation to the law ceases*, was his totally misunderstanding the principles of the best writers on the law of nature; not by their fault, I dare assure the reader.—*The law of nature* is written in the heart; but by whom, is the question. And a question of much importance; for if not written by a competent obliger it is no law, to bind us. The inquirers therefore into this matter had no other way of coming to the author of the law, but by considering the effects which the observance or inobservance of it would have on mankind. And they found that the observance tended to the benefit of all, the inobservance to their destruction. They concluded therefore that it must needs have been given by God, as a law to mankind; and these effects of its observance or inobservance they called the *sanction*. Hence it appears that the knowledge of our *obligation to the law of nature* arises from the knowledge of the *sanction*. And, this sanction away, we had not been obliged, because we could never have discovered any real ground of obligation.

But the *positive law of the Jews* was written in stone by the finger of God, in a visible manner; in which the senses of the people were appealed to, for the truth of the transaction. Here the knowledge of their obligation did not arise from their knowledge of the sanction, but from quite another thing, namely, the immediate knowledge they had by their senses, that God, their sovereign Lord and Master, gave them the law. To enforce which, a *sanction* indeed was added; but a sanction that added nothing to the obligation, nor consequently that took from it, when it was withdrawn.

This is a plain and clear state of the case. Yet so miserably has our professor mistaken it, that for want of seeing on what principle it was which the writers on the law of nature proceeded, when they supposed



*obligation to depend on the sanction*, he hath, of a particular case, made a general maxim: and in applying that maxim, he hath turned every thing topsy-turvy, and given us just the reverse of the medal. He supposes the taking the sanction from the moral law might not destroy the obligation, which it certainly would,—*whatsoever*, says he, *might be the cause of God's moral laws*, and that taking away the sanction from his positive law would destroy the obligation, which it certainly would not.

What might further mislead our professor, for the more such men read, the less they understand, is the attribute the Roman lawyers give to such civil laws as are made without a penal sanction. These they are wont to call, *leges imperfectæ*: and our great civilian might believe that this assigned *imperfection*, had a reference to the *obligation* they imposed, whereas it refers to the *efficacy* they were able to work. He should have known at least this first principle of law, that it is the AUTHORITY of the lawgiver, not the SANCTION he annexes to his law, which makes it, I will not say, OPERATE *properly*, for this is nothing to the purpose, but makes it OBLIGE *really*, which is only to the purpose. In a word, I know of nobody but HOBBS, besides this Doctor, who pretended to teach that the *obligation* to laws depended upon their *sanction*: and this he did, because he derived all *right* and *wrong* from the civil magistrate: which, for ought I know, our learned professor may do likewise, as only mistaking *right* and *wrong*, by a blunder like to the foregoing, for *good* and *evil*. Yet hath this grave man written most enormously both on LAWS and MORALS: and is indeed a great writer, just as the mighty giant, Leon Gawer, was a great builder; of whom the monk of Chester so sweetly sings:

“The founder of this city, as saith Polychronicon,  
Was Leon Gawer, a mighty strong giant,  
Which builded *caves* and *dungeons* many a one:  
No goodly building, ne proper, ne pleasant.”

But our business at present is not with the actual administration of an extraordinary providence, but with the scripture representation of such an administration. And this the sacred history of the Jews attests in one uniform unvaried manner; as well by recording many instances of it in particular, as by constantly referring to it in general.

I. The first is in the history of MIRACLES. For an equal providence being, by the nature of man's situation and affairs, necessarily administered partly by ordinary and partly by extraordinary means, these latter produce what we call *miracles*, the subject of the sacred writers their more peculiar regard. But I apprehend it would be thought presuming too much on the reader's patience, to expect his attention, while I set myself formally to prove that many *miracles* are related in the sacred history of the Israelites.

The simpler sort of deists fairly confess that the Bible records the working of many miracles, as appears even from the free names they give to those accounts. But there are refiners in infidelity, such as SPINOZA

and his mimic TOLAND; who acknowledge many of the facts recorded, but deny them to have been miraculous. These are to our purpose, and an appeal to the common sense of mankind is a sufficient answer to them all. And surely I should have done no more, had they not attempted to draw in to their party much honest men than themselves. For such, therefore, even charity requires us to attempt some kind of defence.

The infamous *Spinoza* would persuade us that JOSEPHUS himself was as backward in the belief of miracles as any modern pagan whatsoever. The handle, for his calumny, is \* that writer's relation of the *passage of the Red Sea*; which he compares to Alexander's through the *Pamphylian*, and which concludes with saying that *every man may believe of it as he pleases*. No unusual way with this historian, of introducing or ending a miraculous adventure. This hath indeed so libertine an air, that it hath betrayed some believers into the same false judgment concerning Josephus; as if he afforded only a political or philosophical belief to these things; and gave a latitude to *those of his own religion*, to think as they should see cause.

But here lies the difficulty; the historian is every now and then putting on a very different aspect, and talking like a most determined believer. Many are the places where he expresses the fullest and firmest assent to the *divinity* of the *Mosaic* religion, and to the *truth* of the sacred volumes. To mention only one or two, from a book so known, and in a point so notorious. The following words of his Introduction (where he cannot possibly be considered as a translator, or relater only of what he found in the *sacred books*, from which he composed his history) these, I say, show in how different a light he regarded *Moses* from all other lawgivers: "And now I earnestly entreat all who take these volumes in hand, to apply themselves with their whole faculties to the contemplation of the divine nature, and then turn to our LAWGIVER, and see whether he has not made a representation of that nature entirely worthy of it; always assigning such actions to GOD, as become his excellence, and preserving the high subject clear from any impure mixture of FABLE. Though if we consider the distance and antiquity of the time he wrote in, we cannot but understand he was at full liberty to invent and falsify at pleasure. For he lived full two thousand years ago.—A distance of time

\* —Scriptura de natura in genere quibusdam in locis affirmat eam fixam atque immutabilem ordinem servare.—Philosophus præterea in suo *eccl.* clarissime docet nihil novi in natura contingere.—Hæc igitur in scriptura expresse docentur, at nullibi, quod in natura aliquid contingat, quod ipsius legibus repugnet, aut quod ex iis nequeat sequi, adeoque neque etiam scripturæ affingendum.—Ex quibus evidentissime sequitur miracula res naturales fuisse.—Attamen—de his unicolque, prout sibi melius esse sentiet, ad Dei cultum et religionem integro animo suscipiendum, liberum est existimare. Quod etiam JOSEPHUS SENTIT; sic enim in conclusione, *lib: 2. Antiq.* scribit, *Nullus vero discredat verbo miraculi, et antiquis hominibus, et malitia privatis via salutis liquet per mare facta, sive voluntate Dei, sive sponte revelata: dum et eis, qui cum Alexandro rege Macedoniæ fuerunt olim, et antiquitus à resistantibus Pamphylicum mare divisum sit, et cum aliud iter non esset, transitum præbuit iis, volente Deo, per eum Persarum destruere principatum; et hoc conflentur omnes, qui actus Alexandri scripserunt; DE HIS ITAQUE, SICUT PLACUERIT CUILIBET, EXISTIMET.* Hæc sunt verba Josephi, ejusque DE FIDE MIRACULORUM JUDICIUM.—Tract. Theologico-Pol. cap. vi. de Miraculis, pp. 81, 82.

to which even the poets dared not to carry up the birth of their gods, the actions of their heroes, or the establishment of their laws.”\* Here, we see, the historian expressly declares that MOSES in his writings employed *no degree of fiction*, so common in the practice of other ancient lawgivers.

And how *truly* divine he supposed the LAW, appears from his observing, in the same place, that, while the *Jews* religiously observed its precepts, all things went well and prosperously; but that, whenever they transgressed, then nothing but disasters followed. And lest any one should pretend, he meant no more than that national happiness was the natural consequence of adhering to the laws of their country; or that those laws being founded on just and right, God (whose general providence it is agreed he acknowledged) would reward the virtuous observers, whatever were the original of such laws; lest, I say, this should be pretended, he adds, that these disasters followed whenever they transgressed the law, though in pursuit of things just and good. His words are these: “Upon the whole, what the reader of this history may chiefly learn from it is this: That those who obsequiously study the will of God, and reverence his well established laws, pass their lives in incredible prosperity; happiness, the reward from God, ever attending their obedience. But in proportion to their neglect of these laws, easy things become unsurmountable, and all their undertakings, *how justly soever directed*, end in incurable calamities.”† In which words, I take it for granted, he had the case of *Saul* particularly in his view. Again, so full was his persuasion of the divinity of the law, that he extols the *Jews* for suffering *Ptolemy*, the son of *Lagus*, to take their city by storm on the seventh day, rather than violate the *sabbatic* rest. “Agatharchides,” says he, “thinks this scruple worthy of contempt and laughter. But those who weigh it without prejudice, will see something truly great, and deserving of the highest commendations, in thus always preferring their piety towards God, and adherence to his law, before their own safety, or even the freedom of their country.”‡

These passages, we see, have all the marks of a very zealous believer. And what makes the greatest difficulty of all, is, that the very places in which the historian uses such offensive latitude of expression, are those

\* Ἡ δὲ ταύτην τοὺς ἐντιυχομένους τοῖς βιβλίοις παρακαλῶ τὴν γνώμην Θεῷ προσανίχιν, καὶ θεωρῶν τὴν ἡμίτερον νομοθέτην, εἰ τὴν τε φύσιν αὐτοῦ ἀξίως κατινόησιν, καὶ τῇ δυνάμει περιποιήσας αὐτὰς πράξεις ἀντίθηκει, πάσης καθαρὴν τὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ φυλάξας λόγον τῆς παρ’ ἄλλοις ἀσχετῆς μυθολογίας· καίτοιγε, ὅσον ἐπὶ μήκει χρόνου καὶ παλαιότητι, πολλὴν ἔχων ἄδικαν ψευδῶν πλασμάτων· γίγονιν γὰρ πρὸς ἑτῶν δισχιλίων,—ἰφ’ ὅσον πλῆθος αἰῶνος οὐδ’ αὐτῶν οἱ σκεπταὶ τὰς γενέσεις τῶν Θεῶν, μήτιγε τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράξεις, ἢ τοὺς νόμους ἀντιγχεῖν ἐτόλμασαν.—Vol. i. pp. 3, 4.

† Τὸ σύνολον δὲ μάλιστα τις εἴη ἐκ ταύτης μάλοι τῆς ἱστορίας, ἐβλήσας αὐτὴν διελθεῖν, ὅτι μὴ τὰς Θεοῦ γνώμης κατακυλοῦσιν, καὶ τὰ καλῶς νομοθετηθέντα μὴ τολμῶσι παραβαίνειν, πάντα κατορθοῦνται περὶ πίστιν, καὶ γίγας εὐδαιμονίας πρόκειται παρὰ Θεοῦ· καθ’ ὅσον δ’ εἴη ἀποστῶσι τῆς ταύτης ἀκριβοῦς ἐπιμιλίας, ἅπορα μὴ γίνεται τὰ πόριμα, τρέπεται δ’ εἰς συμφορὰς ἀνηκίστος, ὅ,τι ποτ’ εἴη, ὡς ἀγαθὸν δρᾶν σπουδάζουσιν.—Vol. i. pp. 3, 4.

‡ Τοῦτο μὴν Ἀγαθαρχίδης καταγίλωτος ἄξιον δοκεῖ· τοῖς δὲ μὴ μετὰ δυσμειρίας ἐξετάζουσι φαίνεται μίγα καὶ πολλῶν ἄξιον ἐγκωμίων, εἰ καὶ σωτηρίας καὶ πατρίδος ἀνθρωποῖ τινος νόμων φυλακῆς καὶ τὴν πρὸς Θεὸν ἐνσίβυσιν αὐτὴν προτιμῶσιν.—Vol. ii. pp. 458.

where he employs his utmost endeavours to show the real divinity of his religion; of which these *miracles* are produced as evidence; an evidence he studiously seeks, and seems to dwell upon with pleasure.

This varying aspect, therefore, so indifferently assumed, creates all the embarrassment. But would men only do in this case what they ought to do in all, when they pass their judgment on an ancient writing, that is, consider the *end* and *time*, and *genius* of the writer, together with the character of those to whom the work is addressed; they would find *Josephus* to be indeed a steady follower of the law, and a firm believer of its *miraculous* establishment; and, at the same time, discover the easy solution of all those untoward appearances which have brought his religion into question.

The case, with our historian, stood thus: His country was now in great distress; its constitution overturned, and his brethren in apparent danger of utter extirpation; calamities arising as much from the ill-will which the heathens had entertained of their religion\* for its *unsociable* nature, as for their own turbulent and rebellious carriage. This ill-will had been much increased by their superior aversion to *Christianity*, considered by them as a sect of *Judaism*; which had carried its unsociability as far, and its pretensions much farther: so far as to insist on the necessity of all men's submitting to its dominion, and renouncing their own country religions as the impostures of politicians, or the inventions of evil demons. This put the heathen world into a flame, and produced those mad and wicked persecutions that attended the first propagation of the *Christian* faith.† Such was the unfriendly state of things, when *Josephus* undertook an apology for his nation, in the HISTORY OF ITS ANTIQUITIES. Now as their conqueror's aversion to them, arose from the supposition that their religion required the belief and obedience of all mankind (for they had, as we observed, confounded *Judaism* with *Christianity*), to wipe off this invidious imputation, we must conclude, would be ever in the author's thoughts. So that when the course of his history leads him to speak of the effects of God's extraordinary providence in his conduct of this people, he sometimes adds to his relation of a miraculous adventure, *but in this every man may believe as he pleases*. A declaration merely to this effect: "The *Jewish* religion was given by God for the use of his chosen people, therefore the gentiles might believe as they pleased. The *Jews* did not pretend they should leave their own country religion to embrace theirs:‡ that in this they were different from the *Christian* sect, which required all mankind to follow the faith of a crucified Saviour under pain of total destruction.§ But that yet they were not so *unhospitable*, but that they received with open arms all who were willing to worship one God, the Creator of the universe."|| Thus we see how it came to pass

\* See note I, at the end of this book.

† See note K, at the end of this book.

‡ See book i.

§ See note L, at the end of this book.

|| —καὶ τοῦτο μόνον εἶναι κοινόν, εἰ βούλωνται, πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ πᾶσι ἀνθρώποις, ἀφισταμένους εἰς τὸ ἰερόν σέβειν τὸν Θεόν.—Vol. i. p. 556.

(which was the main difficulty), that the places where he gives such a latitude of belief, are those very places where he most labours to prove the divinity of his religion.

But this solution clears up all difficulties, and shows the historian's great consistency, as well as artful address, throughout the whole work. *Josephus* professes the most awful regard to the sacred volumes; and yet, at the same time, takes such liberties of going from their authority, that it provoked the honest resentment of a late excellent writer \* to the following asperities: "Nec levis sit suspicio illum Hebraice non scivisse, cum multis indiciis linguæ ejus imperitiam prodatur. Quivis certe, cui vel mica salis est, sentiat illum historias sacras pro arbitrio interpolasse, demendo, addendo, immutando, ut antiquitates suas ad lectorum Græcorum et Romanorum palatum accommodaret." But this license, though surely to be condemned, was however something more legitimate and sober than is generally supposed; his deviation from scripture being in those places *only*, where an exact adherence to it would have increased that general aversion to his nation, whose effects were at that time so much to be dreaded, either as exposing the *perverse nature* of the people, or the *unsociable genius* of their religion. To give an instance or two of each:

1. The *murmuring* of the *Israelites*, for *bread* and *flesh* in the wilderness, is represented in scripture, and justly, † as an act of horrid ingratitude towards God. Yet *Josephus* makes *Moses* own they had reason for their complaints.‡ And in the execrable behaviour of the men of *Gibeah* to the *Levite* and his wife, though scripture expressly says they attempted a more unnatural crime than adultery, yet the historian passes this over in silence, and makes all the personal outrage attempted, as well as committed, to be offered to the woman.§ The reader will now easily account for what Mr *Whiston* could not, his author's omission of the story of the *golden Calf*.|| For this was so amazing a perversity, at that juncture, that it must have made the very *pagans* themselves ashamed of their *Jewish* brethren in idolatry.

2. Again, we are told in Scripture, that when the *Cutheans*, or *Samaritans*, heard that the *Jews*, who were returned from the captivity, were rebuilding the temple, they came and desired to be partners in the work, and joint worshippers of the God for whom it was erected; to which the *Jews* gave this round reply: *you have nothing to do with us, to build an house unto our God, but we ourselves together will build unto the Lord, God of Israel, as king Cyrus the king of Persia hath commanded us.*¶ And *Nehemiah*, on the same occasion, gave them a still rougher answer: *The God of heaven he will prosper us, therefore we his servants will arise and build: but you have no portion, nor right, nor memorial in*

\* Bishop Hare.

† Exod. xvi.

‡ Παῦς δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν ἀνάγκην τοῦτο νομίσας.—Antiq. Jud. lib. iii. cap. 1. sect. 5.

§ Ant. Jud. lib. v. cap. 2. sect. 8.

|| See note M, at the end of this book.

¶ Ezra iv. 3.

Jerusalem.\* This was a tender place: it was touching upon the very sore, in an express declaration of the *unsociableness* complained of. The story therefore, we may be sure, was to be softened before the gentiles were to be intrusted with it. Accordingly, *Josephus* makes them speak in these obliging terms: *That they could not possibly admit them as partners in the work; for that the command to build the temple was directed to them first by Cyrus, and now by Darius: That indeed they were at liberty to worship along with them: and that this was the only community, in religious matters, that they could enter into with them, and which they would do with as many of the rest of mankind, as were willing to come up to the temple to adore the God of heaven.*† The reason the *scripture Jews* give for the refusal of the offer to be joint partners with them in their work and worship, is, that it was a temple built in the *land of Israel*, and to the honour of the *God of Israel*. The reason *Josephus's Jews* give for their refusal, is, obedience to the king of Persia: else, as for community of worship, they were very ready to receive them.

And now was not that a wise project ‡ which proposed reforming the *sacred text* by the writings of *Josephus*?

But this explanation will enable us to conclude with certainty against that *spurious* passage concerning CHRIST. I think I have already offered one demonstrative argument against it.§ And I suppose, the many marks of forgery are so glaring, that most men would be willing to give it up, were *Josephus's* silence on so extraordinary an occasion but easy to be accounted for. Now we have so far laid open his conduct, as to see, that the preaching up of CHRIST was an affair he would studiously decline. His great point, as we observed, was to reconcile the gentiles to his countrymen. But the *pagan* aversion was greatly increased by the new sect of *Christians*, sprung, as was well known, from the country of *Judea*. It was therefore utterly destructive of his purpose to show, as he must have done, in giving them an account of CHRIST, the close connexion between the two religions. Of all dangerous subjects, therefore, *Josephus* would be careful to avoid this.|| So that (certain as I am of the writer's purpose, and not ignorant of the liberty he took with the sacred records, when it served his ends, of adding and omitting at pleasure) I should have been as much surprised to have found the *history* of JESUS in his works, as others are to be told that it is not there. This too will equally well account for his omission of Herod's slaughter of the

\* Neh. ii. 20.

† —Ἰφασαν, “τῆς μὲν οἰκοδομίας αὐτοῦς ἀδύνατον εἶναι κοινωνῆν, αὐτῶν προσταχθέντων κατασκευάσαι τὸν ναόν, πρότερον μὲν ὑπὸ Κύρου, νῦν δὲ ὑπὸ Δαρείου· προσκυνῆν δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀφίαι· καὶ τοῦτο μόνον εἶναι κοινόν, εἰ βούλονται, πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ἀφικνουμένους εἰς τὸ εὐερεῖν τὸν Θεόν.”—Vol. i. p. 556.

‡ Mr Whitton's.

§ See vol. i.

|| “La plus forte preuve qu'on ait, pour soutenir que le passage en question, où il est parlé de JESUS CHRIST, est de *Joseph*, c'est qu'il n'est pas croyable, qu'il n'ait rien dit de JESUS CHRIST. Photius fournit une réponse à ce raisonnement, en parlant de *Juste de Tiberide*, qui a écrit l'Histoire des Juifs en Grec, et qui vivoit du tems de *Joseph*, avec qui il a eu de grands démêlés. *Juste de Tiberide*, dit Photius, n'a point parlé de JESUS CHRIST: parce qu'il étoit Juif de nation et de religion.”—P. Simon, Bibl. Crit. vol. ii. p. 41.



children at Bethlehem, which Scaliger so much wondered at; \* which Collins so much triumphed in; † and for the sake of which, our Whitby seemed ready to give up the truth of the story. ‡

Thus did this excellent writer, out of extreme love to his country (the most pardonable however of all human frailties) make too free with truth and scripture; though most zealously attached to the religion of his forefathers: as those men generally are who love their country best. And a *Jew* he strictly was, of a very different stamp too, from that poor paltry mimic of the *Greek* sophists, *Philo*. § Of whom his master *Plato* would have said, what *Josephus* tells us *Aristotle* did say, of one of his *Jewish* acquaintance, A GREEK HE WAS, AND NOT IN SPEECH ONLY, BUT IN SOUL LIKEWISE. ||

I judged it of importance to set this matter in a true light: because many, I supposed, would think it a fair prejudice against the divinity of the *Mosaic* religion, had a person so eminent amongst his countrymen while the republic was yet existing, and of so learned an age; so conversant in the *Jewish* records, and so skilled in the best *Grecian* literature; had such a one afforded only a political or philosophic faith to the sacred volumes. But then it will follow on the other hand, that the sincere *belief* of one, so circumstanced, will be as fair a prejudice in its favour.

Not that I am over fond of this kind of evidence, in matters where every one is obliged to judge for himself; and consequently, where every one, on a due application to the subject, is capable of judging. Much less would I lay great weight on the opinions of men out of their own profession, however eminent in any other. What is it to truth, for instance, what a courtier judges of a church; a politician of conscience; or a geometer, grown grey in *demonstration*, of *moral evidence*?—To go on:

MIRACLES, therefore, as they are recorded to be continued through so large a period of this republic, I give for one proof that the scriptures have represented the Israelites as living under an extraordinary providence. I say, as they are recorded to be so *continued*: for when miracles are only given at the first propagation of a religion (as of the Christian), they are to be no otherwise esteemed of, than as the credentials of a new revelation: these being like the cloud which conducted the Israelites in their journeyings in the wilderness; the other like the same cloud which abode upon the mercy-seat: these like the manna rained down from heaven only for a present subsistence; the other like the same manna preserved uncorrupted in the ark, to be a testimony to future ages.

\* Animad. in Chron. Eusebii.

† Scheme of literal Prophecy considered.

‡ Comment on the New Testament.

§ *Philo*, in his life of *Moses*, brings in the *Egyptian* priests reasoning on the *Platonic* principles, concerning the soul that informed *Moses's* body; which is altogether as well judged, as if a modern writer of the life of *Ptolemy* the astronomer should bring him in explaining *Sir Isaac Newton's Principia*.

|| Ἑλληνας ἦν, οὐ τῇ διαλίκεται μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ.

II. This extraordinary providence is represented as administered; 1. Over the state in general. 2. Over private men in particular. A such a representation we should expect to find from the nature of a republic; because, as an extraordinary providence over the STATE necessarily follows God's being their TUTELARY DEITY; so an extraordinary providence to PARTICULARS follows as necessarily from his being their SUPREME MAGISTRATE.\*

As to this providence over the state, it would be absurd to quote particular texts, when the whole BIBLE is one continued history of it. On it may not be amiss to observe, that from a passage in Ezekiel, where God says; *Because that Moab and Seir do say, BEHOLD THE HOUSE OF JUDAH IS LIKE UNTO ALL THE HEATHEN,*† it appears the Jews had boasted, and the gentiles, till then, had acknowledged, that they were under an extraordinary providence. As this therefore is so plain, I shall not hazard the obscuring it by many words: but go on to show, that scripture represents this providence as administered likewise to particulars.

In the dedication of the first temple, SOLOMON addresses his prayer to God, that the covenant between him and the people might remain for ever firm and inviolate, and the old economy be still continued. And after having enumerated divers parts of it, he proceeds in this manner: "When the heaven is shut up, and there is no rain, because they have sinned against thee; yet if they pray towards this place, and confess thy name, and turn from their sin when thou dost afflict them; then hear thou from heaven, and forgive the sin of thy SERVANTS and of thy PEOPLE ISRAEL, when thou hast taught them the good way wherein they should walk; and send rain upon the land which thou hast given unto thy people for an inheritance. If there be dearth in the land, if there be pestilence, if there be blasting or mildew, locusts or caterpillars; if their enemies besiege them in the cities of their land; whatsoever sore, or whatsoever sickness there be: then what prayer, or what supplication shall be made of ANY MAN, or of all thy PEOPLE ISRAEL, *when EVERY ONE shall know his own sore, and his own grief,* and shall spread forth his hands in this house: then hear thou from heaven, and forgive, and RENDER UNTO EVERY MAN according unto all his ways, whose heart thou knowest."‡ Solomon in this petition, which, with respect to the given covenant, we might properly call a PETITION OF RIGHTS, speaks the language of one who extended the temporal sanctions of the law to PARTICULARS and INDIVIDUALS. For he desires God, according to the terms of the covenant, to render unto *every man according to all his ways*. But when is it that he prays for the exertion of this extraordinary providence to particulars? At the very time when it is administering to the state in general.—*If there be dearth in the land, if there be pestilence, if there be blasting or mildew, locusts or caterpillars; if their*

\* See note N, at the end of this book.

† Chap. xxv. ver. 8.

‡ 2 Chron. vi. 26.—See also note O, at the end of this book.

*enemies besiege them, &c.* The necessary consequence is, that as sure as Solomon believed an extraordinary providence exercised to the state in general, so surely did he believe it exercised to individuals in particular. The psalmist bears his testimony to the same economy: *I have been young, says he, and now am old: yet have I not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging their bread.\** God himself declares it, by the prophet Isaiah: *Say ye to the righteous that it shall be well with him: for they shall eat the fruit of their doings. Wo unto the wicked, it shall be ill with him: for the reward of his hands shall be given him.†* And again: *He that walketh righteously and speaketh uprightly, &c., he shall dwell on high: his place of defence shall be the munitions of rocks, bread shall be given him, his waters shall be sure.‡* And we learn, from a parabolical command in Ezekiel, how exactly these promises were fulfilled: “And the Lord said unto him, go through the midst of the city, through the midst of Jerusalem, and set a mark upon the foreheads of the men that sigh and that cry for all the abominations that be done in the midst thereof. And to others he said in mine hearing, go ye after him through the city, and smite: let not your eye spare, neither have ye pity. Slay utterly old and young, both maids and little children, and women; *but come not near any man upon whom is the mark; and begin at my sanctuary,*” § &c. The same prophet in another place, alluding to Abraham’s intercession for Sodom, declares from God, that when his judgments come out against the land of Judea, the righteous, found in it, should save only themselves; which plainly shows, a providence extending to particulars—“Son of man, when the land sinneth against me by trespassing grievously, then will I stretch out mine hand upon it, and will break the staff of the bread thereof, and will send famine upon it, and will cut off man and beast from it. Though these three men, Noah, Daniel, and Job, were in it, they should deliver but their own souls by their righteousness, saith the Lord God.”—Chap. xiv. 13, 14. But God, by the prophet Amos, describes this administration of providence in the fullest manner: “Also I have withholden the rain from you, when there were yet three months to the harvest; *and I caused it to rain upon one city, and caused it not to rain upon another city: one piece was rained upon, and the piece whereupon it rained not, withered.* So two or three cities wandered into one city to drink water; but they were not satisfied: yet have ye not returned into me, saith the Lord. I have smitten you with blasting and mildew,” || &c. And again: *Lo, I will command, and I will sift the house of Israel amongst all nations, like as corn is sifted in a sieve, yet shall not the least grain fall upon the earth.¶*

These declarations of God’s providence are so exactly correspondent to Solomon’s petition; that they seem as it were the FIAT to it.\*\*

\* Ps. xxxvii. 25.—See also note P, at the end of this book.

† Chap. iii. ver. 10, 11.

‡ Chap. xxxiii. ver. 15, 16.

§ Chap. ix. ver. 4—6.—See also note Q, at the end of this book.

|| Chap. iv. ver. 7—11.

¶ Chap. ix. ver. 9.

\*\* See note R, at the end of this book.

Thus we see the law, as well by its express declarations as by its essential nature and genius, extended its sanctions of temporal rewards and punishments as well to particulars as to the general. And as in civil government, universal practice shows the necessity of a more exact dispensation of punishment than of reward, so we may observe from the passages last quoted, that the Mosaic law had the same attention; which occasioned the wise man to say: *Behold the righteous shall be recompensed in the earth: MUCH MORE the wicked and the sinner.\**

The inspired writers of the NEW TESTAMENT give evidence to this dispensation of providence under the OLD. The author of the epistle to the Hebrews argues from it as a thing well known and generally allowed: *For if the word spoken by angels was stedfast, and EVERY TRANSGRESSION AND DISOBEDIENCE RECEIVED A JUST RECOMPENCE OF REWARD, how shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation?†*

St Paul, in his epistle to the Romans, speaking of the advantages which Christianity had over Judaism, says: *Therefore, being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ. By whom also we have access by faith into this grace, wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God. And not only so, but we GLORY IN TRIBULATION ALSO, knowing that tribulation worketh patience,‡ &c.* Here St Paul, opposing the advantages which the gentile converts had by FAITH, to those which the Jews, in contempt to the gentiles, gloried to have by the LAW, adds, in order to show those advantages in their highest superiority, that the Christian gentiles could glory even in that which was the very opprobrium of the Jews, namely, *tribulation*. For the sanction of the Jewish law being temporal rewards and punishments, administered by an equal providence; *tribulation* was a punishment for crimes, and, consequently, a high opprobrium.§ But the followers of Christ, who were taught, *that we must through much TRIBULATION enter into the kingdom of God*, || had the same reason to *glory* in the roughness of the road, as the ancient agonistæ had in the toils which procured them the victory. This is urged with great address. But the critics, not taking the apostle's meaning, have supposed, in their usual way, that he here broke in upon his argument, with an idea foreign to the point in hand.

This will help us to explain an odd remark of the excellent Maimonides: "That their wise men talked of a thing which was NOT TO BE FOUND in the LAW, namely, that which some of them call the CHASTISEMENTS OF LOVE, by which they meant that TRIBULATIONS might befall a man without any precedent sin,¶ and only in order to multiply his reward. And that this was the very opinion of the sect called *Muatzal*,

\* Prov. xi. 31.

† Chap. ii. ver. 2, 3.

‡ Rom. v. 1. et seq.

§ See note S, at the end of this book.

|| Acts xiv. 22.

¶ This explanation was necessary; for, another kind of *chastisements of love* there was in the law, namely, *paternal chastisements*. Thus Moses: *Thou shalt also consider in thine heart, that as a man chasteneth his son, so the Lord thy God chasteneth thee.*—Deut. viii. 5.

of which, or in favour of which opinion, there is not one single word to be found in the law.”\* This seems to have perplexed our rabbi; and with cause. He lived when his countrymen were under a common providence, and had the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, which, he took for granted, was always in the Jewish economy. These things disabled him from seeing that—NO CHASTISEMENT OF LOVE was a necessary consequence of temporal rewards and punishments administered by an equal providence: and likewise when this sanction ceased, and a future state was known, then CHASTISEMENTS OF LOVE became a necessary consequence.

But if by the LAW, Maimonides did (as the Jews frequently do) include the writings of the prophets, then he was very much mistaken in saying there is not one word in it concerning the *chastisements of love*. For Zechariah, prophesying of a NEW dispensation, describes this sort of *chastisements* in very express terms: “And I will bring the third part through the fire, and *will refine them as silver is refined, and will try them as gold is tried*: and they shall call on my name, and I will hear them.” So admirably do all the parts of God’s grand economy support one another.

We have seen what testimonies their coeval writers afford of an extraordinary providence. But we must not suppose the Jews always held the same language. The difference is great between the early and later Jews, even during the existence of the republic. Take an instance from the psalmist, and the writer of Ecclesiasticus. The former says, *I have been young, and now am old, yet have I not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging their bread.*† The latter—*Look at the GENERATIONS OF OLD, and see: did ever any trust in the Lord and was confounded? Or did any abide in his fear, and was forsaken? Or whom did he ever despise that called upon him?*‡ The psalmist, living under an extraordinary providence, appeals to his own times: the author of Ecclesiasticus living when it was long ceased, appeals to former times. But as we have been told, that this talk of a particular providence is only an eastern hyperbole, in which every thing is ascribed to God, I think it not improper to take notice here of one singular circumstance in favour of the reporters.

We may observe, then, that the spirit of *gentilism* was always uniform; and, throughout its whole duration, had ever the same unvaried pretensions to divine intercourse, supported by the same sort of oracles and divinations. But amongst the *Jews*, matters were on another footing. After their perfect settlement, on their return from captivity (when we know, from the course and progress of God’s economy, that

\* Unum tamen occurrit in verbis sapientum nostrorum, quod NON INVENITUR IN LEGE; id nempe, quod quidam eorum dicunt CASTIGATIONES AMORIS. Juxta hanc enim sententiam possunt TRIBULATIONES alicui evenire sine precedente peccato, sed ut multiplicetur ejus remuneratio. Atque hæc ipsissima est sententia sectæ Muatzali, de qua, aut pro qua, ne verbum quidem in lege reperitur.—More Nevoch. Buxtorffii, p. 381.

† Ps. xxxvii. 85.

‡ Chap. ii. ver. 10, &c.

the extraordinary providence was to cease), we hear no more of their pretences to it, though they now adhered more strictly than ever to the religion of their forefathers. They made no claim, as we see by the excellent writer of the first book of *Maccabees*, either to *prophets, oracles, or extraordinary dispensations*. When they write unto the *Lacedemonians*, for the renewal of their alliance, they tell them, at the same time, that they need it not, FOR THAT THEY HAVE THE HOLY BOOKS OF SCRIPTURE IN THEIR HANDS TO COMFORT THEM.\* Language very different from their forefathers', when God was wont to send immediate help from the sanctuary. How ingenuously does the same historian relate the misfortune of *Bethsura*, caused by the observance of the sabbatic year?† A misfortune of which we have no instance before the captivity; and therefore a plain evidence that the extraordinary providence was indeed withdrawn. Besides, if we consider the nature of the *religion*, the genius of the *people*, and the circumstances of the *time*, we shall find, they all concurred to favour the continuance of a pretension to an extraordinary providence, had it been *only a pretension*.

1. The *Mosaic religion*, like the *pagan*, had a *public part*, and therefore the *Jews* might, with the greatest ease, have still carried on the superstition of *oracles*, had their oracles been indeed a superstition; especially as they were now become so closely attached to their religion. For when did ever *Greece* or *Italy* confess that their *oracles* were become *dumb*, till the consulters had generally forsaken them, and the whole frame of their religion was falling to pieces? Besides, the practice of this superstition had been as easy as it was commodious; for the oracular voice was wont to come from the *mercy-seat* behind the *veil*.

2. The *genius of the people* too would have contributed to the continuance of this claim. For, some how or other, it was become their character *to require a sign*;‡ and though, now, really superstitious, yet the humour spent itself rather in telling lies of former times, § than in inventing any of their own. This, on a supposition of the human invention of their law, is altogether unaccountable. But take the matter as we find it in their sacred books, and nothing is more easy. For if they had indeed been long accustomed to a *miraculous* dispensation, they would, ever after, be strongly disposed *to require a sign*; but it would be only such a *sign* as bore the evident marks of a divinity; which not being to be had in human inventions, they would be kept safe from delusions, and made sensible of the difference of times: and such was, in fact, their case.

Add to all this, that the *time of the Maccabees* was the season of enthusiasm, when that airy spirit was at its height; after the national genius, long sunk by oppression, begins to rise and recover itself to a vindication of public liberty. And of this we have a signal instance in the person of *Judas Maccabæus* himself; who, in imitation of *Gideon*,

\* 1 Mac. xii. 9.

† 1 Mac. vi. 49.

‡ 1 Cor. i. 22.

§ See note T, at the end of this book



would set upon an army of twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, with only eight hundred straggling desperadoes; which rash and fanatic attempt was followed with the fortune that might, at this time, have been expected.\*—In such a season too, artful leaders are most disposed to support themselves by inspirations; have most need of them; and are thought, by the people, most worthy to receive them.

There is the same difference between the writers of the New Testament and of the Old, as between the writers of the several ages of the Old. The apostles (who worked *miracles* as well as Moses and the prophets) represent the followers of CHRIST as under the same *common* providence with the rest of mankind: unlike, in this, to the first propagators of the LAW, who always declared the Israelites to be under an *extraordinary* providence.

From all this I conclude, that as amidst the concurrence of so many favourable circumstances, no such claim was made; but that, contrary to the universal practice of all false religions, the *Jews* saw and owned a great change in the divine economy, that therefore their former pretensions to the peculiar protection of Heaven were TRUE.

But it hath been objected, that the early sacred writers themselves frequently speak of the *inequality* of providence to *particulars*:† and in such a manner as men living under a common providence are accustomed to speak. It is very true that these writers do now and then give intimations of this inequality. And therefore, though we shall hereafter prove an extraordinary *providence* to have been actually administered, in which, not only this objection will be seen to drop of itself, but the particular passages, on which it is founded, will be distinctly considered, yet, for the reader's satisfaction, it may not be amiss to show here, that these representations of *inequality* are very consistent with that before given of the extraordinary providence. We say, therefore,

I. That when the sacred writers speak of the *inequalities* of providence, and the unfit distribution of things, they often mean that state of it amongst their *pagan* neighbours, and not in *Judea*: as particularly in the book of *Psalms* and *Ecclesiastes*.‡

II. We sometimes find men complaining of *inequalities* in events, which were indeed the effects of a most *equal* providence. Such as the punishment of *posterity* for the crimes of their *forefathers*; and of *subjects* for their *kings*. Of the first, the prophet *Ezekiel* gives us an instance in the people's case: "What mean ye, that ye use this proverb concerning the land of *Israel*, saying, The fathers have eaten sour

\* 1 Mac. ix. 6.

† — Asaph de Dei providentia dubitavit, et fere a vera via deflexisset—Salomon etiam, cujus tempore res Judæorum in summo vigore erant, suspicatur omnia casu contingere—Denique omnibus fere prophetis hoc ipsum valde obscurum fuit, nempe quomodo ordo naturæ et hominum eventus cum conceptu quem de providentia Dei formaverant, posset convenire.—Spinozæ Theologico-Pol.—Pp. 73, 74.

‡ See Appendix.

grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge?"\*—Of the second, *David* gives it in his own; not duly attending to the justice of this proceeding where he says; *But these sheep, what have they done?*† And that he was sometimes too hasty in judging of these matters appears from his own confession: "Behold, these are the ungodly, who prosper in the world; they increase in riches. When I thought to know this, it was too painful for me: until I went into the sanctuary of God; then understood I their end. Surely thou didst set them in slippery places: thou castedst them down into destruction. So foolish was I, and ignorant: I was as a beast before thee."‡ That is, I understood not the course of thy justice, till I had considered the *way* in which an equal providence must necessarily be administered under a *theocracy*, and the *consequences* of such an administration. For,

III. Even admitting the reality of an *equal* providence to particulars in the *Hebrew* state, the administration of it must needs be attended with such circumstances as sometimes to occasion those observations of *inequality*. For, 1. It appears from the reason of the thing, that this administration did not begin to be exerted in particular cases till the civil laws of the republic had failed of their efficacy. Thus where any crime, as for instance disobedience to parents, was *public*, it became the object of the civil tribunal, and is accordingly ordered to be punished by the judge.§ But when *private* and secret, then it became the object of divine vengeance.|| Now the consequence of this was, that when the laws were remissly or corruptly administered, *good* and *ill* would sometimes happen unequally to men. For we are not to suppose that providence, in this case, generally interfered till the corrupt administration itself, when ripe for vengeance, had been first punished. 2. In this extraordinary administration, one part of the wicked was sometimes suffered as a scourge to the other. 3. The extraordinary providence to the state might sometimes clash with that to particulars, as in the plague for numbering the people. 4. Sometimes the extraordinary providence was suspended for a season, to bring on a national repentance: but at the same time this suspension was publicly denounced.¶ And a very severe punishment it was, as leaving a state which had not the sanction of a future state of rewards and punishments in a very disconsolate condition. And this was what occasioned the complaints of the impatient *Jews*, after they had been so long accustomed to an extraordinary administration.\*\*

IV. But the general and full solution of the difficulty is this, The common cause of these complaints arose from the GRADUAL WITHDRAWING the extraordinary providence. Under the *judges* it was perfectly equal. And during that period of the *theocracy*, it is remarkable that we hear of no complaints. When the people had rebelliously demanded

\* Ezek. xviii. 2.

† Ps. lxxiii. 12—22.

‡ Deut. xxvii. 16; and Prov. xxx. 17.

\*\* Is. v. 19; Jer. xvii. 15; Amos v. 18; Zeph. i. 12; Mal. ii. 17.

† 2 Sam. xxiv. 17.

§ Exod. xxi. 15, and 17.

¶ Is. iii. 5; lix. 2; lxiv. 7.

a king, and their folly was so far complied with, that God suffered the *theocracy* to be administered by a *viceroy*, there was then, as was fitting, a great abatement in the vigour of this *extraordinary* providence; partly in natural consequence, God being now farther removed from the immediate administration; and partly in punishment of their rebellion. And soon after this it is that we first find them beginning to make their observations and complaints of *inequality*. From hence to the time of the *captivity*, the *extraordinary* providence kept gradually decaying, till on their full re-establishment, it entirely ceased.\* For what great reasons, besides punishment for their crimes; and what consequences it had on the religious sentiments of the people, will be occasionally explained as we go along.

But now, let it be observed, that though I have here accounted for the *appearances* of an unequal providence, yet this is *ex abundanti*; the very nature of my general argument evincing, that there must needs have been an equal providence actually administered: for a people in society, without both a future state and an equal providence, could have no belief in the moral government of God: and under such circumstances, it hath been shown, that they could not long subsist, but must fall back again into all the confusion of a savage state. We must conclude therefore, that what *appearances* soever there may be of inequality in the administration of providence, in the early times of the Jewish *theocracy*, they are *but appearances*: that is, nothing which can really affect such a mode of administration.† The adversaries therefore of the *Divine Legation*, such of them, I mean, who profess themselves believers, should consider that, while they oppose the reality of an *extraordinary* providence over the Jewish people, they are weakening the evidence for the miracles recorded in the Old Testament. But this is the least of their care. One of them, with an assurance that hath something in it of a prodigy, affirms, “that the providence administered under the *law* was exactly the same kind with that administered under the *gospel*.”‡ How this could be the case, without impeaching the veracity of God himself, as not making good his repeated engagements, this man would do well to consider before he becomes the scorn and contempt of unbelievers. But as such sort of men bear worse the disgrace of folly than impiety, I shall consider this portent on its ridiculous side only.

Temporal rewards and punishments administered by the hand of God, followed, as a consequence, from the Jewish government’s being *theocratical*; and an *extraordinary* providence followed, as a consequence, from the dispensation of temporal rewards and punishments. Yet here we have a regius professor of divinity affirming, that both *temporal sanctions* and an *extraordinary providence* are administered under the *gospel* in the very same manner they formerly were under the *law*. In

\* See note U, at the end of this book.

† See note X, at the end of this book.

‡ Dr Rutherford.

which it is difficult to determine what most to admire; his modesty or his wit. For if it does honour to his wit to maintain conclusions destitute of their premises, it as strongly recommends his modesty to contradict the whole tenor of the New Testament. But there is neither end nor measure to party bigotry. Faustus, the Manichean, contended that the Jews and Christians got the doctrine of the one only God from the gentiles. Is this a wilder fancy than what many modern divines have asserted, that the gentiles got the doctrine of future rewards and punishment from the law of Moses? Or are either of these more extravagant than the folly I am going to expose, namely, that *the temporal sanctions of the LAW are transferred into the GOSPEL*? Now, if you should ask whether the gospel claimed to be a *theocracy*; I suppose, at first, they would say *no*; till they found the advantage you get over them by this answer. And then, I make no doubt, they would as readily say *yes*. For what should hinder them? Does the gospel disclaim, in stronger terms, its being a TEMPORAL KINGDOM, when Christ says, *his kingdom was not of this world*, than it disclaims TEMPORAL SANCTIONS, when it says, “Yea, and all that will live godly in Jesus Christ shall suffer persecution,”\* or than it disclaims an *extraordinary providence* where it declares that the Jews had *the promise of the life that now is*, and the Christians *of that which is to come*?†

But not to stretch our conjectures to the lengths these men are disposed to go; let us consider how far they have already gone. They say *the temporal sanctions of the law are transferred into the gospel*: and they prove it by these two notable texts:

The first is of St PAUL, “Children, obey your parents in all things: for this is right. *Honour thy father and thy mother* (which is the first commandment with promise) that it may be well with thee, and thou mayest live long on the earth.”‡ All that I here find *transferred*, from the law to the gospel, are the *words* of the fifth commandment. For the apostle having said, “Children obey your parents in the Lord: for this is right,” he supports his exhortation by a quotation from the decalogue; just as any modern preacher, on this, would do, without ever dreaming of *temporal sanctions* in the gospel; the observation the apostle makes upon it being in these words—*which is the first commandment with promise*; as much as to say, “You may see from this circumstance, how very acceptable the performance of this duty is to God:” the only inference which common sense authorizes us to draw from it being what in another place, he thus expresses,—“Godliness [or the observance of God’s commands] is profitable unto all things, having the promise of the life that now is [under the LAW] and of that which is to come [under the GOSPEL].”

The other colour for this clandestine *transfer* of *temporal sanctions*, is from St PETER: “Who is he that will harm you, if you be followers of that which is good?”§ So says the apostle; and so too said his

\* 2 Tim. iii. 12.    † 1 Tim. iv. 8.    ‡ Eph. vi. 2, 3.    § 1 Pet. iii. 13.

Master; to whose words Peter alludes, "Fear not them which kill the body: but rather fear him which is able to destroy body and soul in hell."\* But as if the apostle had it in his thoughts to guard against this absurd vision of *temporal sanctions*, he immediately subjoins—"But, and if ye suffer for righteousness' sake, happy are ye."

Our Doctor having so well made out this point, we need not wonder at his confidence, when he assures us, *that there is full as good evidence of an extraordinary providence under the Christian dispensation as under the Jewish.* This though the language of Toland, Tindal, Collins, and the whole tribe of freethinkers, yet comes so unexpected from a regius professor of divinity, that we should be very careful not to mistake his meaning.

If, by *full as good*, he would insinuate that an *extraordinary providence* was administered under both dispensations, I shall be in pain for his intellects: if he would insinuate, that an *extraordinary providence* was administered in neither, I shall be in pain for his professorship. But he is in pain for nothing; as the reader may perceive by his manner of supporting this impertinent paradox. His proofs follow with equal ease and force.—"I say unto you, that if two of you shall agree on earth, as touching any thing that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of my Father which is in heaven."†—"And every one that hath forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my name's sake, shall receive an hundredfold, and shall inherit everlasting life."‡—"Take therefore no thought saying, What shall we eat? or what shall we drink? or wherewithal shall we be clothed? for your heavenly Father knoweth that you have need of all these things. But seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you."§—And again, "If ye ask any thing in my name, I will give it."||—"No more, my most wise friend? Thou hast my wonder; that's enough. My understanding shall come after;" said, once on a time, a plain good man to a profound philosopher like this.

Now not to repeat again the illogical bravado of taking and supporting a *conclusion* divorced from its *premises*; such as is the contending for temporal sanctions and an extraordinary providence where there was no theocracy, from whence they could be derived; we have here a professor of divinity who has his elements of scripture-interpretation yet to learn. The first rule of which is, 1. "That *all*, does not signify *all simply*, but *all of one kind*; and, of what kind, the context must direct us to determine." When, therefore, the members of Christ's *spiritual kingdom* are promised they shall obtain *all* they ask, this *all* must needs be confined to *things spiritual*. Now when here we find those, who are bid to leave their temporal possessions and propagate the gospel, have the promise of a hundredfold, are we to seek for the performance, in Pales-

\* Mat. x. 28.

§ Mat. vi. 31, et seq.

† Mat. xviii. 19.

|| John xiv. 14.

‡ Mat. xix. 29.

tine, or in a *better country*?\* Again, where, under the *law*, we read of *temporal promises*, we read likewise that they were fulfilled. Where, under the GOSPEL, we read that “those who, for the sake of Christ, forsake houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father or mother, or wife or children, or lands, shall receive an hundredfold;” what are we there to look for? For the good things of this world, which this sharp-sighted Doctor is so eager and intent to find? Now, admit there might be no great inconvenience in receiving a hundred *houses* for one; would not a hundred *wives* a little embarrass his professorship? And as to the *house and land*—Where did he learn that this was literally fulfilled, even to those who had the best title to them if they were literally promised, I mean the APOSTLES, yet these we always meet on foot; strangers upon earth; and without either house or home. He, who then passed for a learned apostle, once at Rome, indeed, got a warm *house* over his head; yet let us not forget that it was but a *hired* one. Here, in this capital of the world, he received all who came to him. But though a good divine, as times then went, he never rose to a regius professorship.

The second elementary rule of interpretation is, “That all the promises of *extraordinary* blessings, made to the first propagators of the gospel, are not to be understood as extending to their successors of all ages, or to the church in general.” To apply this likewise to the thing in question. If it should be admitted that great *temporal blessings* were promised to the first disciples of Christ, it will not follow that their successors had a claim to them, any more than they had to their *spiritual gifts and graces*, such as the power of working miracles, prophesying, speaking with tongues, &c. Because as divine wisdom saw these latter to be necessary for the discharge of their peculiar function; so divine goodness might be graciously pleased to bestow the other on them, as the reward of their abundant faith, and superior courage in the day of trial, when the powers of this world were bent on their destruction. But this (blessed be God) is neither the learned professor’s case, nor mine. The worst that has befallen me, in the defence of religion, is only the railings of the vile and impotent: and the worst that is likely to befall him, is only the ridicule of all the rest. Happy had it been for himself, and much happier for his hearers, had our professor’s modesty disposed him rather to seek instruction from those who have gone before, than to impart it to those who are to come after. HOOKER has so admirably exposed this very specific folly which our Doctor has run into, of arguing against his senses, in making the dispensation of providence under the *Mosaic* and *Christian* economies to be the same, that I cannot do him better service than to transcribe the words of that divine ornament of the English priesthood:—“Shall we then hereupon ARGUE EVEN AGAINST OUR OWN EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE? Shall we seek to persuade men that, of necessity, it is with us as it was with them, that because God is ours, in all respects as much as theirs, therefore, either

\* Heb. xi. 16.



no such way of direction hath been at any time, or if it have been, it doth *still continue* in the church? Or if the same do not continue, that yet it must be, at the least, supplied by some such means as pleaseth us to account of equal force? A more dutiful and religious way for us, were to admire the wisdom of God which shineth in the beautiful variety of things, but most in the manifold and yet harmonious dissimilitude of those ways, whereby his church upon earth is guided from age to age throughout all the generations of men."\*

But this was one of the charitable expedients employed to set me right, and to prevent the disgrace of scribbling much to no purpose. However, as in a work of this nature, which partakes so much of the history of the human mind, I may be allowed occasionally, and as it falls in my way, to give as well, examples of its more uncommon degrees of depravity and folly, as of its improvements and excellencies, I shall go on. My constant friend Dr Stebbing proceeds another way to work, but all for the same good end. He desires me and my reader to consider, "what it was that Moses undertook; and what was the true end of his mission. It was to carry the children of Israel out of Egypt, and put them in possession of the land of Canaan, in execution of the covenant made with Abraham. The work in the very NATURE of it *required* the administration of an *extraordinary* providence; of which it OUGHT THEREFORE TO BE PRESUMED that Moses had both the *assurance* and *experience*: otherwise he would have engaged in a very MAD undertaking, and the people would have been AS MAD in following him. THIS SHORT HINT POINTS OUT THE TRUE INTERNAL EVIDENCE of *Moses's divine legation*, and this evidence *has no sort of dependence* upon the belief or disbelief of the doctrine of a future state. For supposing (what is the truth) that the Israelites did believe it; what could this belief effect? It might carry them to heaven, and would do so if they made a proper use of it, but it could not put them in possession of the land of Canaan. Mr Warburton therefore has plainly mistaken his point."

This intimation of my mistake is kind: and I should have taken his *hint*, as *short* as it is, but for the following reasons:

1. This *hint* would serve the mufti full as well, to prove the *divine legation of Mahomet*: for thus we may suppose he would argue:—"Mahomet's work was not like Moses's, the subdual of a small tract of country, possessed by seven tribes or nations, with a force of some hundred thousand followers; but the conquest of almost all Asia, with a handful of banditti. Now *this work*, says the learned Mahometan, *in the very nature of it, required the administration of an extraordinary providence, of which IT OUGHT THEREFORE TO BE PRESUMED, that Mahomet had both the assurance and experience; otherwise he would have engaged in a very mad undertaking, and the people would have been as mad in following him.*"

Thus hath the learned Doctor taught the mufti how to reason. The

\* Eccl. Pol. book iii. sect. 10.

worst of it is, that I, for whom the kindness was principally intended, cannot profit by it, the argument lying exposed to so terrible a retortion. To this the Doctor replies, that the cases are widely different: and that I myself allow them to be different, for that I hold, the legation of Moses to be a true one; and the legation of Mahomet, an imposture.—*Risum teneatis, amici!*

But there is another reason why I can make nothing of this gracious *hint*. It is because I proposed to PROVE (and not, as he says I ought to have done, TO PRESUME upon) the divinity of Moses's mission, by an *internal argument*. Indeed he tells me, that if I be for *proving*, he has *pointed out* such a one to me. He says so, it is true: but in so saying, he only shows his ignorance of what is meant by an INTERNAL ARGUMENT. An internal argument is such a one as takes for its medium some notorious fact, or circumstance, in the frame and constitution of a religion, *not in contest*; and from thence, by necessary consequence, deduces the truth of a fact supported by testimony which is *in contest*. Thus, from the notorious fact of the omission of a future state in Moses's institution of law and religion, I deduce his *divine legation*.

But the learned artist himself seems conscious that the ware he would put into my hands is indeed no better than a counterfeit piece of trumpery; and so far from being an *internal argument*, that it is no argument at all; for he tells us, IT OUGHT THEREFORE TO BE PRESUMED, *that Moses had both the assurance and experience* that God governed the Israelites by an extraordinary providence.

But what follows is such unaccountable jargon!—*For supposing the Israelites did believe a future state, what would this belief effect? It might carry them to heaven, but it could not put them in possession of the land of Canaan.* This looks as if the learned Doctor had supposed that, from the truth of this assertion, *That no civil society under a common providence could subsist without a future state*, I had inferred, that, *with a future state*, society would be able to work wonders.—What efficacy a future state hath, whether little or much, affects not my argument any otherwise than by the oblique tendency it hath to support the reasoning: and I urged it thus;—“Had not the Jews been under an *extraordinary providence*, at that period when Moses led them out to take possession of the land of Canaan, they were most unfit to bear the want of the doctrine of a *future state*,” which observation I supported by the case of Odin's followers, and Mahomet's; who, in the same circumstances of making conquests, and seeking new habitations, had this doctrine sedulously inculcated on them, by their respective leaders. And the histories of both these nations inform us, that nothing so much contributed to the rapidity of their successes as the enthusiasm which that doctrine inspired.

And yet, to be sure, the Doctor never said a livelier thing, who is celebrated for saying many, than when he asked,—*What could this belief effect? It might carry them to heaven; but it could not put them in pos-*

*union of the land of Canaan.* Now unluckily, like most of these witty things, when too nearly inspected, we find it to be just the reverse of the truth. The *belief* could never *carry them to heaven*, and yet was abundantly sufficient, under such a leader as Moses, to *put them in possession of the land of Canaan*. The Arabians' *belief* of a future state could never, in the opinion at least of our orthodox Doctor, carry them to heaven; yet he must allow, it enabled them to take and keep possession of a great part of Europe and Asia. But the Doctor's head was running on the efficacy of the *Christian faith*, when he talked of *belief carrying men to heaven*.—Yet who knows, but when he gave the early Jews the knowledge of a *future state*, he gave them the *Christian faith* into the bargain?

## SECT. V.

THUS we see that an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE WAS THE NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE OF A THEOCRACY; and that this providence is represented in Scripture to have been really administered. TEMPORAL REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, therefore, (the effects of this providence,) and *not future*, MUST NEEDS BE THE SANCTION of their law and religion.

Having thus prepared the ground, and laid the foundation, I go on to show,

[I.] That future rewards and punishments, which COULD NOT BE THE SANCTION of the Mosaic dispensation, WERE NOT TAUGHT in it at all: and that, in consequence of this omission, the PEOPLE had not the doctrine of a future state for many ages. And here my arguments will be chiefly directed against the believing part of my opponents; no deist,\* that I know of, ever pretending that the doctrine of a future state was to be found in the law.

Moses delivered to the Israelites a complete digest of law and religion: but, to fit it to the nature of a theocratic government, he gave it perfectly incorporated. And, for the observance of the entire institution, he added the sanction of rewards and punishments: both of which we have shown to be necessary for the support of a republic: and yet, that civil society, as such, can administer only one.†

Now in the Jewish republic, both the rewards and punishments promised by heaven were TEMPORAL only. Such as health, long life, peace, plenty, and dominion, &c., diseases, immature death, war, famine, want, subjection, and captivity, &c. And in no one place of the Mosaic institutes is there the least mention, or any intelligible hint, of the rewards and punishments of another life.

When SOLOMON had restored the integrity of religion; and, to the regulated purity of worship, had added the utmost magnificence; in his DEDICATION of the new built temple, he addresses a long prayer to the God of Israel, consisting of one solemn petition for the continuance of

\* See note Y, at the end of this book.

† i. e. Punishments.—See vol. I. p. 123.

the OLD COVENANT made by the ministry of Moses. He gives an exact account of all its parts, and explains at large the SANCTION of the Jewish law and religion. And here, as in the writings of Moses, we find nothing but TEMPORAL rewards and punishments; without the least hint or intimation of a future state.

The holy PROPHETS speak of no other. Thus Isaiah; "Then shall he give the rain of thy seed that thou shalt sow the ground withal, and bread of the increase of the earth, and it shall be fat and plenteous; and in that day shall thy cattle feed in large pastures.—And there shall be upon every high mountain, and upon every high hill, rivers and streams of water."\* And Jeremiah: "I will surely consume them, saith the Lord; there shall be no grapes on the vine, nor figs on the fig-tree, and the leaf shall fade, and the things that I have given them shall pass away from them.—I will send serpents and cockatrices amongst you, which will not be charmed, and they shall bite you, saith the Lord."† Nay so little known, in these times, was any other kind of rewards and punishments to the Jewish people, that, when the prophets foretell that NEW dispensation, by which *life and immortality were brought to light*, they express even those future rewards and punishments under the image of the present. Thus Zechariah, prophesying of the times of CHRIST, describes the punishment attendant on a refusal of the terms of grace, under the ideas of the Jewish economy: "And it shall be that whoso will not come up of all the families of the earth unto Jerusalem, to worship the King the Lord of Hosts, even upon them SHALL BE NO RAIN."‡ I would have those men well consider this, who persist in thinking "that the early Jews had the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, though Moses taught it not expressly to them;" and then tell me why Zechariah, when prophesying of the gospel times, should choose to express these *future* rewards and punishments under the image of the *present*?

Indeed, were it not for the amazing prejudices which have obtained on this subject, a writer's pains to show that a future state of rewards and punishments made no part of the Mosaic dispensation, would appear as absurd to every intelligent reader, as his would be who should employ many formal arguments to prove that Sir Isaac Newton's *Theory of Light and Colours* is not to be found in Aristotle's books *de Cælo et de Coloribus*. I will therefore for once presume so much on the privilege of common sense, as to suppose, the impartial reader may be now willing to confess, that the doctrine of life and immortality was not yet known to a people while they were *sitting in darkness, and in the region and shadow of death*;§ and go on to other matters that have more need to be explained.

[II.] I shall show then, in the next place, that this OMISSION was not accidental; or of a thing which Moses did not well understand: but that,

\* Chap. xxx. ver. 23, 25.

† Chap. viii. ver. 13, 17.

‡ Chap. xiv. ver. 17.

§ Matt. iv. 16.

on the contrary, it was a designed omission ; and of a thing well known by him to be of high importance to society.

I. That the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments was studiously omitted, may appear from several circumstances in the book of Genesis. For the history of Moses may be divided into two periods ; from the creation to his mission ; and from his mission to the delivering up his command to Joshua : the first was written by him in quality of HISTORIAN ; the second, of LEGISLATOR ; in both of which he preserves an equal silence concerning the doctrine of a future state.

1. In the history of the *fall of man*, it is to be observed, that he mentions only the instrument of the agent, the SERPENT ; not the agent himself, the DEVIL : and the reason is plain ; there was a close connexion between that agency,—the spiritual effects of the fall,—the work of redemption,—and the doctrine of a future state. If you say, the connexion was not so close but that the agent might have been mentioned without any more of his history than the temptation to the *fall* ; I reply, it is true it might ; but not without danger of giving countenance to the impious doctrine of *two principles*, which at this time prevailed throughout the pagan world. What but these important considerations could be the cause of the omission ?\* when it is so evident that the knowledge of this grand enemy of our welfare would have been the likeliest cure of pagan superstitions, as teaching men to esteem of idolatry no otherwise than as a mere diabolical illusion. And in fact we find, that when the Israelites were taught, by the later prophets, to consider it in this light, we hear no more of their idolatries. Hence we see, that the folly of those, who, with *Collins*, would have a mere serpent only to be understood, is just equal to theirs, who, with the *cabalists*, would have that serpent a mere allegory.

2. In the history of Enoch's *translation*† to heaven,‡ there is so studied an obscurity, that several of the rabbins, as Aben Ezra and Jarchi, fond as they are of finding a future state in the Pentateuch, interpret this translation as only signifying an immature death. *And Enoch walked with God, and he was not, for God took him.* How different from the other history of the translation of Elijah ! “ And it came to pass when the Lord would take up Elijah into heaven by a whirlwind, that Elijah went with Elisha from Gilgal, &c.—And it came to pass as they still went on and talked, that behold there appeared a chariot of fire, and horses of fire, and parted them both asunder, and Elijah went up with a whirlwind into heaven.”§ But the reason of this difference is evident : when the latter history was written, it was thought expedient to make a preparation for the dawning of a *future state* of reward and punishment, which in the time of Moses had been highly improper. The reflections of an eminent critic on this occasion, will show how little he penetrated into the true design of this economy. “ *Mirum est Mosem rem tantam, si modo immortalem Henochum factum CREDIDIT, tam obiter,*

\* See note Z, at the end of this book.

† Gen. v. 24.

‡ Heb. xi. 5.

§ 2 Kings ii. 1, 11.

tamque obscure, quasi EAM LATERE VELLE, perstrinxisse. Fortè cum hæc ex antiquissimis monumentis exscriberet, nihil præter ea quæ nobis tradidit invenit, quibus aliquid adjicere religio fuit.\* For Moses both knew and *believed* the immortality of Enoch, and purposely obscured the fact, from whence it might have been collected. But what is most singular in this reflection is, that the learned commentator, to aggravate the obscurity, says it is *as obscure, as if he purposely designed to hide it*, supposing such a design to be the highest improbability; which was indeed the fact, and is the true solution of the difficulty.

3. In his history of the patriarchs, he entirely omits, or throws into shade, the accounts of those revelations, with which, as we learn from the writers of the New Testament, some of them were actually favoured, concerning the redemption of mankind. Of these favours we shall give ere long a great and noble instance, in the case of ABRAHAM, who, as we are assured by JESUS himself, *rejoiced to see CHRIST'S day, and saw it, and was glad*.

From whence therefore could all this studied caution arise, but to keep out of sight that doctrine, which, for ends truly worthy of the divine wisdom, he had omitted in his institutes of law and religion? This shows the weakness of that evasion, which would reconcile the OMISSION, to the people's KNOWLEDGE of the doctrine, by supposing they had been so well instructed by the patriarchs, that Moses had no occasion to say any thing farther on that subject.

Let me observe by the way, that these considerations are more than a thousand topical arguments, to prove that Moses was the real author of the book of Genesis. But the proof deduced therefrom will be drawn out and explained at large hereafter.

II. That the importance of this doctrine to society was well understood by Moses, may appear from a particular provision in his institutes (besides that general one of an extraordinary providence,) evidently made to oppose to the inconvenient consequences of the OMISSION.

We have shown at large, in the first three books, that under a common or unequal providence, civil government could not be supported without a religion teaching a future state of reward and punishment. And it is the great purpose of this work to prove, that the Mosaic religion wanting that doctrine, the Jews must REALLY have enjoyed that equal providence, under which holy scripture represents them to have lived: and then, no transgressor escaping punishment, nor any observer of the law missing his reward,† human affairs might be kept in good order, without the doctrine of a future state.

Yet still the violence of irregular passions would make some men of stronger complexions superior to all the fear of *personal temporal evil*. To lay hold therefore on these, and to gain a due ascendant over the most determined, the punishments, in this institution, are extended to the POSTERITY of wicked men; which the instinctive fondness of parents

\* Vid. Clericum in Gen. v. 24.

† See note A A, at the end of this book.



to their offspring would make terrible even to those who had hardened themselves into an insensibility of personal punishment: "I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me."\*

Now that this punishment was only to supply the want of a *future state*, is evident from hence:† towards the conclusion of this extraordinary economy, when God, by the later prophets, reveals his purpose of giving them a *new dispensation*,‡ in which a future state of reward and punishment was to be *brought to light*, it is then declared in the most express manner, that he will abrogate the law of punishing children for the crimes of their parents. JEREMIAH, speaking of this *new dispensation*, says: "In *those days* they shall say no more, The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge: but every one shall die for his own iniquity, every man that eateth the sour grape, his teeth shall be set on edge. Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a NEW COVENANT with the house of Israel,—NOT according to the covenant that I made with their fathers in the day that I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt,"§ &c. And EZEKIEL, speaking of the same times, says: "I will give them one heart, and will put a NEW spirit within you, &c.—But as for them, whose heart walketh after the heart of their abominable things—I will recompense their way UPON THEIR OWN HEADS, saith the Lord God."|| And again: "What mean ye, that ye use this proverb concerning the land of Israel, saying, the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge?¶ As I live, saith the Lord God; Ye shall *not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel*. Behold all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine: *the soul that sinneth, it shall die.*"\*\*

And yet (to show more plainly that the *abrogation* of the law was solely owing to this *new dispensation*) the same prophets, when their subject is the *present* Jewish economy, speak of this very law as still in force. Thus JEREMIAH: "Thou showest loving-kindness unto thousands, and *recompensest the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children* after them."†† And HOSEA: "*Seeing thou hast forgotten the law of thy God, I will also forget thy children.*"‡‡

From all this I conclude, that, whoever was the real author of what goes under the name of the *law of Moses*, was at least well acquainted with the *importance* of the doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment; and provided well for the *want* of it.

But the blindness of infidelity is here most deplorable. The deists are not content with condemning this law of injustice, but will accuse the dispensation itself of inconsistency; pretending that the prophets have directly contradicted Moses in their manner of denouncing punishment.

\* See note B B, at the end of this book.

† Note C C, at the end of this book.

‡ Note D D, at the end of this book. § Chap. xxxi. 29—33. || Chap. xi. ver. 19—21.

¶ See note E E, at the end of this book.

\*\* Chap. xviii. ver. 2—4.

†† Chap. xxxii. ver. 18.

‡‡ Chap. iv. ver. 6.

It is indeed the standing triumph of infidelity. *But let us return, says SPINOZA, to the prophets, whose discordant opinions we have undertaken to lay open—The xviiiith chap. of EZEKIEL does not seem to agree with the 7th ver. of the xxxivth chap. of EXODUS, nor with the 18th ver. of the xxxiid chap. of JEREMIAH, &c.\*—*“There are several mistakes,” says TINDAL, “crept into the Old Testament, where there is scarce a chapter which gives any historical account of matters, but there are some things in it which could not be there originally.—It must be owned, that the same spirit (I dare not call it a spirit of cruelty) does not alike prevail throughout the Old Testament; the nearer we come to the times of the gospel, the milder it appears; for though God declares in the decalogue, that he is *a jealous God visiting the iniquity of the parents upon the children to the third and fourth generation*, and accordingly Achan, with all his family, was destroyed for his single crime; yet the Lord afterwards says; *The soul that sinneth it shall die; the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father,*”† &c.‡

I. Let us see then what these men have to say on the first point, the *injustice of the law*. They set out on a false supposition, that this method of punishment was part of an universal religion given by God as the Creator and Governor of mankind: whereas it is only part of a civil institute, given by him to *one people*, as their *tutelary God and civil Governor*. Now we know it to be the practice of all states to punish the crime of lese majesty in this manner. And to render it just, no more is required than that it was in the compact (as it certainly was here) on men’s free entrance into society.

When a *guilty* posterity suffered for the crimes of their parents, they were deprived of their natural unconditional rights; when an *innocent*, they only forfeited their conditional and civil: but as this method of punishment was administered with more lenity in the Jewish republic, so it was with infinitely more rectitude, than in any other. For although God allowed capital punishment to be inflicted for the crime of *lese majesty* on the *person of the offender*, by the delegated administration of the law; yet concerning his *family* or *posterity* he reserved the inquisition of the crime to himself, and expressly forbade the magistrate to meddle with it, in the common course of justice. “The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin.”§ And we find the magistrate careful not to trench on this part of God’s jurisdiction. We are told, that as soon as Amaziah the son of Joash king of Judah became firmly established in the throne, “He slew his servants which had slain the king his father. But the CHILDREN of the murderers he slew not: according unto that which is written in the book of the law

\* — Sed ad prophetas revertamur, quorum discrepantes opiniones etiam notare suscepimus. Cap. saltem xviii. Ezech. non videtur convenire cum versu 7, cap. xxxiv. Exod. nec cum ver. 18, cap. xxxii. Jer. &c.—Tract. Theological-Pol., pp. 27, 28.

† Christianity as Old as the Creation, pp. 240, 241.

‡ See note F F, at the end of this book.

§ Deut. xxiv. 16.

of Moses [Deut. xxiv. 16,] wherein the Lord commanded saying, The fathers shall not be put to death for the children,\* &c. Yet such hath been the perversity or stupidity of freethinking, that this very text itself hath been charged with contradicting the xxth chapter of Exodus. Now God's appropriating to himself the execution of the law in question would abundantly justify the equity of it, even supposing it had been given by him as part of an *universal religion*. For why was the magistrate forbidden to imitate God's method of punishing, but because no power less than omniscient could, in all cases, keep clear of injustice in such an inquisition?

But God not only reserved this method of punishment to himself, but has graciously condescended to inform us, by his prophets, *after what manner* he was pleased to administer it. YOUR INIQUITIES, says he, AND THE INIQUITIES OF YOUR FATHERS TOGETHER, *which have burnt incense upon the mountains, and blasphemed me upon the hills: therefore will I measure their former work into their bosom.*† And again: "But ye say, Why? doth not the son bear the iniquity of the father? When the son hath done that which is lawful and right, and hath kept all my statutes, and hath done them, he shall surely live.—But when the righteous turneth away from his righteousness and committeth iniquity—shall he live?"‡

So much for that case in which the posterity were *iniquitous*, and suffered punishment, in the strict and proper sense of the word. But doubtless, an innocent posterity were sometimes punished, according to the denunciation of this law, for the crimes of their wicked fathers;§ as is done by modern states, in attaint of blood and confiscation: and this, with the highest equity in both cases.

In our Gothic constitutions, the throne being the fountain of honour and source of property, *lands and titles*, descend *from it*, and were held as *FIEFS* of it, under perpetual obligation of military and civil services. Hence the LAWS OF FORFEITURE for high treason,|| the most violent breach of the condition on which those *fiefs* were granted. Nor was there any injustice in the forfeiture of what was acquired by no natural right, but by civil compact, how much soever the confiscation might affect an innocent posterity.

The same principles operated under a theocracy. God supported the Israelites in Judea, by an extraordinary administration of his providence. The consequence of which were great temporal blessings to which they had no natural claim; given them on condition of obedience. Nothing therefore could be more equitable than, on the violation of that condition, to withdraw those extraordinary blessings from the children of a father thus offending. How then can the deist charge this law with

\* 2 Kings xiv. 5, 6. † Isaiah lxxv. 7. ‡ Ezek. xviii. 19 and 24.—See note G G, at the end of this book.

§ This appears from the rise of that proverb in Israel, *The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge.*

|| See note H H, at the end of this book.

injustice? since a posterity, when *innocent*, was affected only in their civil conditional rights; and, when deprived of those which were natural and unconditional, were always guilty.

From all this it appears, that the excellent GROTIUS himself had a very crude and imperfect notion of the whole matter, when he resolved the justice of it entirely into God's sovereign right over his creatures. "Deus quidem in lege Hebræis datâ paternam impietatem in posteros se vindicaturum minatur: sed ipse jus domini plenissimum habet, et in res nostras, ita in vitam nostram, ut munus suum, quod sine ullâ causâ et quovis tempore auferre cuivis, quando vult, potest."\*

II. As to the second point, the charge of *contradiction in the dispensation*, we now see, that, on the contrary, these different declarations of God's manner of punishing in two so distant periods, are the **MOST DIVINE INSTANCE** of constancy and uniformity in the manifestations of eternal justice: so far are they from any indication of a *milder or severer spirit*, as Tindal with equal insolence and folly hath objected to revelation. For while a *future state* was kept hid from the Jews, there was absolute need of such a law to restrain the more daring spirits, by working on their instincts; or, as Cicero expresses it—*ut caritas liberorum amiciores parentes reipublicæ redderet*. But when a doctrine was *brought to light* which held them up, and continued them after death, the objects of divine justice,† it had then no farther use; and was therefore reasonably to be abolished with the rest of the judicial laws, peculiar to the Mosaic dispensation. But these men have taken it into their heads, and what comes slowly in, will go slowly out, that it was repealed for its *injustice*; though another reason be as plainly intimated by the prophets, as the circumstances of those times would permit; and so plainly by JEREMIAH, that none but such heads could either not see or not acknowledge it. In his thirty-first chapter, foretelling the advent of the NEW dispensation, he expressly says, this law shall be revoked: *IN THOSE DAYS they shall say no more, the fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge. But every one shall die for his own iniquity.*‡ Yet, in the very next chapter, speaking of the OLD dispensation, under which they then lived, he as expressly declares the law to be still in force. *When I had delivered the evidence of the purchase unto Baruch, I prayed unto the Lord, saying,—Thou showest loving-kindness unto thousands, and recompensest the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them.*§ Is this like a man who had forgot himself, or who suspected the law of cruelty or injustice?

But the ignorance of freethinking was here unaffected; and indeed the more excusable, as the matter had of old perplexed both Jews and Christians. The synagogue was so scandalized at EZEKIEL's declarations against this mode of punishment, that they deliberated a long time whether he should not be thrown out of the canon, for contradicting MOSES

\* De Jure Bel. et Pac. vol. ii. p. 593,—ed. Barbeyrac, Amst. 1720.

† See note I I, at the end of this book.      ‡ Ver. 29, 30.      § Ver. 16 and 18.

in so open a manner.\* And sentence had at last passed upon him, but that one *Chananias* promised to reconcile the two prophets. How he kept his word, is not known, for there is nothing of his extant upon the subject; only we are told that he proved himself a man of honour, and, with great labour and study, at length did the business.†

ORIGEN was so perplexed with the different assertions of these two prophets, that he could find no better way of reconciling them than by having recourse to his *allegorical* fanaticism, and supposing the words of the first to be a parable or mystic speech; which however, he would not pretend to decipher. The learned father, having quoted some pagan oracles intimating that children were punished for the crimes of their forefathers, goes on in this manner: "How much more equitable is what our scriptures say on this point: *The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin*, DEUT. xxiv. 16, &c.—But if any one should object that this verse of the oracle,

*On the children's children and their posterity;*

is very like what scripture says, that God visits the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate him, EXOD. xx. 5, he may learn from *Ezekiel* that those words are a PARABLE; for the prophets reprove such as say, *The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge*; and then it follows: *As I live, saith the Lord, every one shall die for his own sins only*. But this is not the place to explain what is meant by the PARABLE of visiting iniquity unto the third and fourth generation."\* There could hardly be more mistakes in so few words. The two texts in Deuteronomy and Exodus, which Origen represents as treating of the same subject, treat of subjects very different: the first, as we have shown above, concerns the magistrate's execution of the law; the other, that which God reserves to himself. Again, because the text of Exodus apparently occasioned the proverb mentioned by *Ezekiel* and *Jeremiah*, therefore by a strange blunder or prevarication, the father brings the proverb in

\* Les Juifs disent qu' Ezechiel étoit serviteur de Jérémie, et que le sanhedrin delibera long-tems, si l'on rejeteroit son livre du canon des écritures. Le sujet de leur chagrin contre ce prophete vient de son extreme obscurité, et de ce qu'il enseigne diverses choses contraires à Moïse—Ezechiel, disent-ils, a déclaré, *Que le fils ne porteroit plus l'iniquité de son pere*, contre ce que Moïse dit expressement, *Que le Seigneur venge l'iniquité des peres sur les enfans, jusqu'à la troisieme et quatrieme generation*.—Calmet, Dissert. vol. ii. p. 361.

† See note K K, at the end of this book.

‡ Exod. xx; Exek. xviii.

§ "Ὁρα δὲ ὅσα τοῦτου βίλτιον τὸ, οὐκ ἀποθνήσκουσιν, &c. ἵνα δὲ τις ὅμοιον εἶναι λίγη τῇ

Ἐς παίδων παῖδας οἳ καὶ ὀπίσθιν γίνονται,

τὸ, Ἀποδίδους ἀμαρτίας πατέρων ἐπὶ τέκνα, ἐπὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην γενεὰν τοῖς μισοῦσι [μι.] μαρτίαν, ὅτι ἐν τῇ Ἰσραηλ παραβολὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι λέλειπται, αἰτιωμένοι τοὺς λίγοντας, οἳ πατέρες ἔφαγον ὄμφακα, καὶ οἱ ὀόντες τῶν τέκνων ἡμωδίζαν· ἢ ἐπιφίρεται, Ζῶ ἰγὼ, λίγω Κύριος, ἀλλ' ἢ ἕκαστος τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀμαρτίᾳ ἀποθνήσκει. Οὐ κατὰ τὸν παρόντα δὲ καιρὸν ἵστι, διηγῆσθαι τί σημαίνει ἡ περὶ τοῦ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην γενεὰν ἀποδίδεσθαι τὰς ἀμαρτίας παραβολή.—Coul. Cels. p. 403.

proof that the law which gave birth to it, was but a proverb or *parable* itself.\*

[III.] We have now shown that MOSES did not teach a future state of reward and punishment; and that he omitted it with design; that he understood its great importance to society; and that he provided for the want of it. And if we may believe a great statesman and philosopher, "Moses had need of every SANCTION that his knowledge or his imagination could suggest, to govern the unruly people to whom he gave a law, in the name of God."†

But as the proof of this point is only for the sake of its consequence, that *therefore the people had not the knowledge of that doctrine*, our next step will be to establish this consequence: which (if we take in those circumstances attending the *omission*, just explained above) will, at the same time, show my argument in support of this *omission* to be more than *negative*.

Now though one might fairly conclude, that the people's not having this doctrine, was a necessary consequence of Moses's not teaching it, in a law which forbids the least addition‡ to the written institute; yet I shall show, from a circumstance, the clearest and most incontestable, that the Israelites, from the time of Moses to the time of their captivity, had not the doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment.

The BIBLE contains a very circumstantial history of this people throughout the aforesaid period. It contains not only the history of public occurrences, but the lives of private persons of both sexes, and of all ages, conditions, characters, and complexions; in the adventures of virgins, matrons, kings, soldiers, scholars, merchants, and husbandmen. All these, in their turns, make their appearance before us. They are given too in every circumstance of life; captive, victorious; in sickness, and in health; in full security, and amidst impending dangers; plunged in civil business, or retired and sequestered in the service of religion. Together with their story, we have their compositions likewise. Here they sing their triumphs; there, their palinodia. Here, they offer up to the Deity their hymns of praise; and there, petitions for their wants: here, they urge their moral precepts to their contemporaries; and there, they treasure up their prophecies and predictions for posterity; and to both denounce the promises and threatenings of Heaven. Yet in none of these different circumstances of life, in none of these various casts of composition, do we ever find them acting on the motives, or influenced by the prospect of future rewards and punishments; or indeed expressing the least hope or fear, or even common curiosity concerning them. But every thing they do or say respects the present life only; the good and ill of which are the sole objects of all their pursuits and aversions.§

Hear then the sum of all. The sacred writings are extremely various both in their subject, style, and composition. They contain an account

\* See note L L, at the end of this book.

‡ Deut. iv. 2; xii. 32.

† Bolingbroke's Works, vol. v. p. 513.

§ See note M M, at the end of this book.



of the creation, and origin of the human race; the history of a private family, of a chosen people, and of exemplary men and women. They consist of hymns and petitions to the Deity, precepts of civil life, and religious prophecies and predictions. Hence I infer that as, amidst all this variety of writing, the doctrine of a future state never once appears to have had any share in this people's thoughts; it never did indeed make part of their religious opinions.\* And when, to all this, we find their *occasional* reasoning only conclusive on the supposition that a future state was not amongst the religious doctrines of the people, the above considerations, if they needed any, would receive the strongest support and confirmation. To give one example out of many. The psalmist says; *for the rod of the wicked shall not rest upon the lot of the righteous: lest the righteous put forth their hands unto iniquity.*† That is, "God will vigorously administer that *extraordinary providence* which the nature of the dispensation required to be administered, lest the righteous, not seeing themselves exempt from the evils due to wickedness, should conclude that there was no moral Governor of the world; and so, by making their own private interest the rule of their actions, fall into the practice of all kinds of iniquity." But this could never be the consequence where an unequal dispensation of providence was attended with the knowledge and belief of a future state. And here I will appeal to those who are most prejudiced against this reasoning. Let them speak, and tell me, if they were now first shown some history of an old Greek republic, delivered in the form and manner of the Jewish, and no more notice in it of a future state, whether they could possibly believe that that doctrine was national, or generally known in it. If they have the least ingenuity, they will answer, They could not. On what then do they support their opinion here, but on religious prejudices? prejudices of no higher an original than some Dutch or German system: for, as to the BIBLE, one half of it is silent concerning *life and immortality*; and the other half declares that the doctrine was *brought to light through the gospel*.

But to set this argument in its fullest light. Let us consider the history of the rest of mankind, whether recorded by bards, or statesmen; by philosophers, or priests: in which we shall find the *doctrine of a future state* still bearing, throughout all the various circumstances of human life, a constant and principal share in the determinations of the will. And no wonder. We see how strong the Grecian world thought the sanction of it to be, by a passage in Pindar, quoted by Plutarch in his tract of *Superstition*, where he makes it one circumstance of the superior happiness of the gods over men, that they stood not in fear of Acheron.

But not to be distracted by too large a view, let us select from the rest of the nations, one or two most resembling the Jewish. Those

\* See note N N, at the end of this book.

† Ps. cxxv. 3.

which came nearest to them (and, if the Jews were only under human guidance, indeed extremely near), were the SUEVI of the north, and the ARABS of the south. Both these people were led out in search of new possessions, which they were to win by the sword. And both, it is confessed, had the doctrine of a *future state* inculcated unto them by their leaders, ODIN and MAHOMET. Of the Arabs we have a large and circumstantial history: of the Suevi we have only some few fragments of the songs and ballads of their bards; yet they equally serve to support our conclusion. In the large history of the Saracen empire we can scarce find a page, and in the Runic rhymes of the Suevi scarce a line, where the doctrine of a future state was not pushing on its influence. It was their constant viaticum through life; it stimulated them to war and slaughter, and spirited their songs of triumph; it made them insensible of pain, immovable in danger, and superior to the approach of death.\* For, what Cicero says of poetry in Rome, may be more truly applied to the doctrine of a future state amongst these barbarians: “Ceteræ neque temporum sunt, neque ætatum omnium, neque locorum. Hæc studia adolescentiam alunt, senectutem oblectant, secundas res ornant, ADVERSIS PERFUGIUM AC SOLATIUM PRÆBENT.”†

But this is not all. For we find, that when a future state became a popular doctrine amongst the Jewish people (the time and occasion of which will be explained hereafter) that then it made as considerable a figure in their annals, by influencing their determinations,‡ as it did in the history of any other people.

Nor is it only on the silence of the sacred writers, or of the speakers they introduce, that I support this conclusion; but from their positive declarations; in which they plainly discover that there was no popular expectation of a future state, or resurrection. Thus the woman of Tekoah to David: *For we must needs die, and are as water spilt on the ground, which cannot be gathered up again.*§ Thus Job: *As the cloud is consumed, and vanisheth away: so he that goeth down to the grave shall come up no more.*|| And again: “There is hope of a tree, if it be cut down, that it will sprout again—though the root thereof wax old in the earth, and the stock thereof die in the ground, yet through the scent of water, it will bud and bring forth boughs like a plant. But man dieth and wasteth away: yea, man giveth up the ghost, and where is he? As the waters fail from the sea, and the flood decayeth and drieth up: so man lieth down and riseth not till the heavens be no more, they shall not awake nor be raised out of their sleep.”¶ Here the Jewish writer, for such he was, as shall be shown hereafter (and might, indeed, be understood to be such from this declaration alone) opposes the revival of a *vegetable* to the irrecoverable death of a rational *animal*. Had he known as much as St Paul, he had doubtless used that circum-

\* See note O O, at the end of this book.

† See the 2d book of Maccabees.

|| See note P P, at the end of this book.

‡ Pro Archia Poeta, sect. 7.

§ 2 Sam. xiv. 14.

¶ Chap. xiv. ver. 7—12.

stance in the *vegetable* world (as St Paul did) to prove analogically, the revival of the rational *animal*.

The psalmist says: *In death there is no remembrance of thee : in the grave who shall give thee thanks ?\** And again : *What profit is there in my blood, when I go down to the pit ? Shall the dust praise thee, shall it declare thy truth ?†* And again: “ Wilt thou show wonders to the dead? Shall the dead **ARISE** and praise thee? Shall thy loving-kindness be declared in the grave, or thy faithfulness in destruction? Shall thy wonders be known in the dark? and thy righteousness in the land of forgetfulness?”‡

The writer of the book of Ecclesiastes is still more express: *For the living know that they shall die : but the dead know not any thing, neither have they any more a REWARD; for the memory of them is forgotten.§*

Hezekiah, in his song of thanksgiving for his miraculous recovery, speaks in the same strain: “ For the grave cannot praise thee, death cannot celebrate thee: they that go down into the pit cannot hope for thy truth. The living, the living, he shall praise thee, as I do this day: the father to the children shall make known thy truth.”||

Lastly, Jeremiah, in his *Lamentations* and complaints of the people, says, **OUR FATHERS HAVE SINNED AND ARE NOT, AND WE HAVE BORNE THEIR INIQUITIES.¶** Which implies, that the fathers being dead bore no part of the punishment of their sins, but that all was thrown upon the children. But could this have been supposed, had the people been instructed in the doctrine of future rewards and punishments?

Yet a learned *answerer*, in contradiction to all this, thinks it sufficient to say, that “ these passages may imply no more than that the dead cannot set forth God’s glory *before men*, or make his praise to be known *upon earth*.”\*\* Now I think it must needs *imply* something more, since the *dead* are said to be unable to do this under the earth as well as upon it. For it is the *grave* which is called the *land of forgetfulness*, or that where all things are forgotten. And in another place it is said, *The dead praise not the Lord, neither any that go down into silence.††* Surely, a plain intimation that all intercourse of praise between man and his Maker ceased on death, as well below ground as above; otherwise why did the sacred writer tell us it was the *grave* which was the place of *silence* to the dead? If the answerer’s interpretation be right, *this world*, and not the other, was the place. Had the psalmist supposed, as the doctor does, that the *dead* continued in a capacity of *remembering the goodness of God*, this remembrance could be no where more quickly or forcibly excited than in that world where the divine goodness is clearly unveiled to *the spirits of just men made perfect.‡‡* On the contrary, the *grave* is uniformly represented by all of them, as the *land of darkness, silence, and forgetfulness*.

\* Ps. vi. 6.

† Ps. xxx. 10.

‡ Ps. lxxxviii. 11—13.

§ See note Q Q, at the end of this book. || Is. xxxviii. 18, 19.

¶ Chap. v. ver. 7,

\*\* Dr Stebbing’s Exam., etc. p. 64.

†† Ps. cxv. 17.

‡‡ Heb xii. 23.

But since, of all the sacred writers, the psalmist is he who is supposed by the adversaries of the Divine Legation to have most effectually confuted the author's system, I shall quote a passage from his hymns, which, I think, fairly enough decides the controversy.—Hitherto we have only heard him say, that the *dead forget God*; we shall now find him go further, and say that *God forgets them*—"I am counted with them that go down into the pit.—FREE amongst the dead, like the slain that lie in the grave, *whom thou rememberest no more*: and THEY ARE CUT OFF FROM THY HAND.\* Let the serious reader take notice of the last words,—*they* (the dead) *are cut off from thy hand*, i. e. they are no longer the object of thy providence, or moral government. On this account it is, that in the beginning of the sentence he calls these *dead* FREE; that is, manumised, set at liberty; in the same sense that Uzziah the leper's *freedom* is spoken of by the sacred historian—*And Uzziah the king was a leper, and dwelt in a several house* [or, as the margin of our translation tells us, it signifies in the Hebrew, a FREE HOUSE, or *house of freedom*] *being a leper, for he was cut off from the house of the Lord*. The phrase of *cutting off*, &c., signifying the same in both places, the taking away all intercourse and relation between two: and if that intercourse consisted in *service* on the one side, and protection on the other, as between lord and subject, master and servant, he who owed *service* is with great propriety of figure said to be FREE or MANUMISED. Hezekiah, as quoted above, delivers the very same sentiment, though in a different expression—*they that go down into the pit cannot hope for THY TRUTH*. What this *truth* is, the following words declare,—*the living, the living, they shall praise thee*. THE FATHER TO THE CHILDREN SHALL MAKE KNOWN THY TRUTH. As much as to say, "the *truth* not to be hoped for by them who go down into the pit, is *the nature and the history of God's dispensation to his chosen people*;" in which, by a particular precept of the LAW, the fathers were commanded to instruct their children. Thus the psalmist and this other Jewish ruler agree in this principle, that the dead are no longer the object of God's *general* providence, or of his *particular*: which evinces what I was to prove, "THAT THE BODY OF THE EARLY JEWS HAD NO EXPECTATIONS OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS." And here let me take notice of a passage which the contenders for the contrary doctrine much confide in. It is where David, speaking of his dead child, says, *I shall go to him, but he will not return to me*. But whither was he to follow his departed child? He himself tells you—into a land of *darkness, silence, and forgetfulness*, where he was to be no longer in a capacity of *remembering the goodness and mercy of God*, or even of *being remembered by him*; but was to be *cut off from his hand*, that is, was to be no longer the object of his providence or moral government.

To proceed. If now we set all these passages together, we find it to be the same language throughout, and in every circumstance of life; as

\* Ps. lxxxviii. 4, 5.

well in the cool philosophy of the author of Ecclesiastes, as amidst the distresses of the psalmist, and the exultations of good Hezekiah.

But could this language have been used by a people instructed in the doctrine of life and immortality? or do we find one word of it, on any occasion whatever, in the writers of the New Testament, but where it is brought in to be confuted and condemned?\*

All this, to thoughtful men, will, I suppose, be deemed convincing. Whence it follows that their subterfuge is quite cut off, who pretend, that Moses did not indeed propagate the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments in *writing*, but that he delivered it to TRADITION, which conveyed it safely down through all the ages of the Jewish dispensation, from one end of it to the other. For we see, he was so far from teaching it, that he studiously contrived to keep it out of sight, nay provided for the want of it: and the people were so far from being influenced by it, that they had not even the idea of it. Yet the writers of the church of Rome have taken advantage of this silence in the law of Moses concerning a future state, to advance the honour of TRADITION: for, not seeing the doctrine in the WRITTEN LAW, and fancying they saw a necessity that the Jews should have it, they concluded (to save the credit of the Jewish church and to advance the credit of their own) that Moses had carefully inculcated it, in the TRADITIONAL. This weighty point, father Simon proves by the *second book of Maccabees*; and triumphs over the protestants and Socinians (as he calls them) for their folly in throwing that book out of the canon, and thereby disabling themselves from proving a future state, from the Old Testament.†

A very worthy protestant bishop does as much honour to *tradition*, in his way. In some *Miscellanies* of the bishop of Cloyne, published in 1752, we find these words—"Moses, indeed, doth *not insist on a future state*, THE COMMON BASIS OF ALL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.—The belief of a future state (which it is manifest the Jews were possessed of *long before the coming of Christ*) seems to have obtained amongst the Hebrews from primeval TRADITION, which might render it unnecessary for Moses to *insist* on that article."—P. 68. Though the bishop has not the merit of saying this with a professed design, like father Simon, *pour appuyer la tradition*, yet the church of Rome has not the less obligation to him for assigning so much virtue to this their powerful assistant, which has conveyed to them all they want; and indeed most of what they have. But if the *traditional* doctrine of a future state prevailed amongst the Jews, in the time of Moses, and that he would trust to the same con-

\* "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die. Be not deceived: evil communications corrupt good manners," &c.—1 Cor. xv. 32.

† Mons. Simon avoit dit, *pour appuyer la tradition*, que la resurrection des corps, ne peut se demontrer par le Vieux Testament—ces expressions plus claires de la resurrection et du siecle à venir, qui se trouvent dans le *second livre des Maccabees*, sont une preuve evidente que les Juifs avoient une tradition touchant la resurrection, dont il n'est fait aucune mention dans les anciens livres de l'écriture. Les protestans et les Sociniens qui ne recoivent point les *Maccabees* ne pourront pas la prouver solidement par le Vieux Testament.—Pere Simon, *Reponse au Sentimens de quelques Theologiens de Hollande*, &c. p. 39.

veyance for the safe delivery of it down to the times of Christ, how came it to pass that he did his best to weaken the efficacy, by studiously contriving to draw men off, as it were, from the doctrine, and always representing it under the impenetrable cover of temporal rewards and punishments?

2. If a future state obtained by *tradition*, What occasion was there for the law of punishing the transgression of the parent upon the children?

3. If it obtained by *tradition*, How happened it that the Jews are not represented in their history, sometimes at least, as acting on the motives, and influenced by the prospect of a future state, and expressing their hopes concerning it like the rest of mankind, who had it by *tradition*, or otherwise?

4. If it obtained by *tradition*, How came HEZEKIAH to say, that *they who go down into the pit cannot hope for the truth*: and DAVID, to represent the dead as going into the place of *silence* and *forgetfulness*, where they were no longer to praise and celebrate the goodness of God? On the contrary, are there not passages in the books of SOLOMON and JOB, which plainly show that no such tradition obtained in their respective times?

5. If it obtained by *tradition*, What occasion for the administration of an extraordinary providence under the law? Or from whence arose the embarrassment of DAVID and JEREMIAH (not to speak of the disputants in the book of JOB) to account for the prosperity of some wicked individuals, in the present life? In a word, to the maintainers of this *tradition* may be very appositely applied the words of Jesus to the *traditionists* in general, when he told them, *they made the word of God of none effect through their traditions*. For certainly, if any thing can render that *word of God* which *brought life and immortality to light by the gospel*, of none effect, it is the pretended PRIMEVAL TRADITION which the good bishop so much insists upon.

The learned prelate indeed observes, that *the Jews were possessed of a future state long before the coming of Christ*. But what is this to the purpose, if it can be shown, that the knowledge of it might be obtained from a quarter very distant from the old Hebrew *tradition*; and especially if, from the colour and complexion of the doctrine, it can be shown, that it did, in fact, come from a distant quarter? namely, from their pagan neighbours; patched up out of some dark and scattered insinuations of their own prophets, and varnished over with the metaphorical expressions employed to convey them. But not to anticipate what I have to say on this head in the last book, I proceed in the course of my argument.

## SECT. VI.

WHAT is yet of greatest weight, the inspired writers of the *New*



*Talmant* expressly assure us that the doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment did not make part of the Mosaic dispensation.

Their evidence may be divided into *two* parts. In the first, they prove that *temporal* rewards and punishments were the sanction of the Mosaic dispensation: and in the second, that it had NO OTHER.

I St PAUL, in his epistle to Timothy, enforcing, against certain judaizing Christians, the advantages of moral above ritual observances, says, "Bodily exercise profiteth little; but godliness is profitable unto all things; having the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come."\* That is, though numerous ritual observances were enjoined by the law, and some there must needs be, under the gospel wherever there is a Christian church, yet they are of little advantage in comparison of moral virtue; for that, under both religions, the rewards proper to each were annexed only to *godliness*: that is to say, under the Jewish, the reward of *the life that now is*; under the Christian, of that *which is to come*. This interpretation, which shows *temporal rewards* to be foreign to the nature of the Christian economy, I support,

1. From other passages of the same writer, where he expressly informs us that Christians have not the promise of the *life that now is*. For to the Corinthians he says, speaking of the condition of the followers of CHRIST, *if in this life only we have hope in CHRIST, we are of all men most miserable.*† To understand the force of which words, we must consider, that they were addressed to Jewish converts tainted with Sadducism, who argued from the Mosaic dispensation to the Christian: and holding that there was no future state in the former, concluded by analogy, that there was none in the latter. The argument on which they built their first position was, that the sanctions of the law were *temporal* rewards and punishments. Our apostle therefore argues with them, as is his usual way, on their own principles. "You deny," says he, "a resurrection from the dead, or a future state of reward and punishment. And why? Because there is no such doctrine in the law. How do you prove it? Because the sanctions of the law are *temporal* rewards and punishments. Agreed. And now on your own principle I confute your conclusion. You own that the Jews had an equivalent for future rewards and punishments, namely, the present. But Christians have no equivalent. So far from that, *they are*, with regard to this world only, *of all men most miserable*; having therefore no equivalent for the rewards of a future state, they must needs be entitled to them." This shows the superior force of the apostle's reasoning. And from hence it appears not only that Christians HAD NOT, but that the Jews HAD the promise of the life that now is.

2. If we understand the *promise of the life that now is* to extend to the Christian dispensation, we destroy the strength and integrity of St Paul's argument. He is here reasoning against judaizing Christians. So that his business is to show, that *godliness*, in every state, and under

\* 1 Tim. iv. 8.

† 1 Cor. xv. 19.

every dispensation unto which they imagined themselves bound, had the advantage of *bodily exercise*.\*

The author of the epistle to the Hebrews, speaking of Jesus, says: "After the similitude of Melchisedec there ariseth another priest, who is made not after the LAW OF A CARNAL COMMANDMENT, but after the power of an endless life."† The Jewish religion, called a *carnal commandment*, is here opposed to the Christian, called *the power of an endless life*. By *carnal commandment* then must needs be understood a law promising carnal things, or the things of this life.

II. That the Mosaic dispensation had ONLY the sanction of *temporal* rewards and punishments, or that it taught not *future*, let us hear St John; who in the beginning of his gospel assures us, that *the LAW was given by Moses, but that GRACE and TRUTH came by Jesus Christ*.‡ As certain then as the *law* did not come by Jesus Christ, so certain is it, according to this apostle, that *grace* and *truth* did not come by Moses. This grace and truth cannot be understood generically; for, the *grace* or favour of God was bestowed on the chosen race, and *truth*, or the revealed will of God, *did come* by Moses. It must therefore be some *species* of *grace* and *truth*, of which the apostle here predicates; the publication of which species constitutes what is called the gospel. And this all know to be redemption from death, and restoration to eternal life.

Again, to this part likewise, let us once more hear the learned apostle: "As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned: for until the law, sin was in the world, but sin is not imputed where there is no law. Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses."§ It is St Paul's purpose to show, that *death* came by ADAM through sin, and so passed upon all men; and that *life* came by JESUS CHRIST: but having said that sin, which brings forth death, is not imputed where there is no law, lest this should seem to contradict what he had said of death's passing upon *all men*, he adds, *nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses*; taking it for granted that his followers would understand it must needs reign from Moses to CHRIST, as having made *sin's being* IMPUTED to consist in there being a LAW given. Now I ask how the apostle could possibly say, *that death reigned under the Mosaic dispensation*, if that people had the knowledge of immortal life to be procured by a Redeemer to come, any more than it can be said to *reign now* with the same knowledge of a Redeemer past; since we agree that the efficacy of his death extends to all preceding as well as succeeding ages? Accordingly in his epistle to the Corinthians he calls the Jewish law, the MINISTRATION OF DEATH, and the MINISTRATION OF CONDEMNATION.¶

2. In his epistle to the Galatians, he says,—*Before FAITH came, we were kept under the law, shut up unto the FAITH which should afterwards be revealed*;¶ i. e. we were kept in subjection to the law of

\* See note R R, at the end of this book.

† Chap. vii. ver. 15, 16.

‡ Chap. i. ver. 17. § Rom. v. 12, et seq. || 2 Cor. iii. 7, et seq. ¶ Gal. iii. 23.

Moses; and, by that means, shut up and sequestered from the rest of the nations, to be prepared and made ready for the first reception of the **FAITH**, when it should in God's appointed time be revealed unto men. From these words therefore it appears, that till that time, the Jews had no knowledge of this **FAITH**. So much we must have concluded though he had not said, as he does afterwards, that till that time, the Jews *were in bondage under the elements of this world.*\* Now could men acquainted with the doctrine of *life and immortality* be said, with any sense of propriety, to be in such a state of bondage? For though men in bondage may have an idea of liberty, yet of this **LIBERTY** they could have no idea without understanding, at the same time, that they were partakers of its benefits.

3. In his second epistle to Timothy he expressly says, *That JESUS CHRIST HATH ABOLISHED DEATH, AND HATH BROUGHT LIFE AND IMMORTALITY TO LIGHT THROUGH THE GOSPEL.*† But now if *death* were abolished by JESUS CHRIST, it is certain it had reigned till his coming: and yet it is as certain, that it could reign no longer than while the tidings of the gospel were kept back; because we agree that CHRIST's death hath a retrospect operation: therefore those under the law had no knowledge of life and immortality. Again: *If life and immortality were brought to light through the gospel*, consequently, till the preaching of the gospel, it was kept hid and out of sight.‡ But if taught by Moses and the prophets, it was *not brought to light through the gospel*: therefore the generality of those under the law had no knowledge of a future state. But scripture is ever consistent, though men's systems be not. And for this reason we find that *life and immortality*, which is here said to be *brought to light through the gospel*, is so often called the **MYSTERY OF THE GOSPEL**:§ that is, a *mystery* till this promulgation of it by the disciples of CHRIST *Which had been hid from ages and from generations, but was then made manifest unto the saints.*|| The term was borrowed from those famous *rites* of paganism, so named; and is applied with admirable justness. For as the *mysteries* were communicated only to a few of the wise and great, and kept hid from the populace: so *life and immortality*, as we shall see, was revealed by God, as a special favour, to the holy patriarchs and prophets, but kept hid from the body of the Jewish nation.

4. The author of the epistle to the Hebrews says: **That THE LAW MADE NOTHING PERFECT, BUT THE BRINGING IN OF A BETTER HOPE DID.**¶ Now, that could not be said to be *brought in*, which was there before. And had it been there before, the *law*, it seems, had been perfect: and, consequently, would have superseded the use of the *gospel*. Therefore this *better hope*, namely of immortality in a future state, is not in the Mosaic dispensation. Let us observe farther, that as the *gospel*, by bringing in a *better hope*, made the *law perfect*, it appears,

\* Chap. iv. ver. 3.      † 2 Tim. i. 10.

§ See note T T, at the end of this book.

‡ See note S S, at the end of this book.

|| Col. i. 26.

¶ Chap. vii. ver. 19.

there was that relation between the *law* and *gospel* which is between the beginning and the completion of any matter. From whence these two consequences follow: 1. That the law wanted something which the gospel supplied: and what was that something but the doctrine of a future state? 2. That the law must needs make some preparation for that *better hope* which the gospel was to bring in. What it was, the same writer tells us, namely, that it *had* A SHADOW (*σκιά*) of good things to come, but *not* the VERY IMAGE (*εἰκόνα*) of the things.\* Hence it is evident that by this *shadow* is meant such a typical representation, so faintly delineated, as not to be perceived by vulgar eyes, intent only on a carnal dispensation. This was contrived for admirable purposes: for if, instead of a *shadow* or faint outline of a design, the image itself, in full relief, had glaringly held forth the object intended, this object, so distinctly defined, would have drawn the Jews from that economy to which it was God's pleasure they should long continue in subjection: and had there been no delineation at all, to become stronger in a clearer light, one illustrious evidence of the dependency between the two religions had been wanting.

Again, the same writer, to the same purpose, speaking of CHRIST, says, "But now hath he obtained a more excellent ministry, by how much also he is the mediator of a BETTER COVENANT, which was established upon BETTER PROMISES. For if the first covenant had been faultless, then should no place have been found for the second."† 1. We see that this *better covenant* was established by CHRIST, and not by Moses. 2. If the first covenant had been faultless, that is, had contained *better promises*, or taught the doctrine of a future state, there had been no room for a second.

To sum up all, this admirable writer gives in the last place, the fullest evidence to both parts of the proposition, namely, "That temporal rewards and punishments were the sanction of the Jewish dispensation; and that it had no other." For in the second chapter we find these remarkable assertions:

Ver. 2. *For if the word spoken by angels was stedfast, and every transgression and disobedience RECEIVED A JUST RECOMPENCE OF REWARD, How shall we escape, &c.*

Ver. 5. *For unto the angels hath he not put in subjection the WORLD TO COME, whereof we speak.*

Ver. 14, 15. *He [Christ] also himself likewise took part of the same [flesh and blood] that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death; that is, the devil; and deliver them, who through fear of death were ALL THEIR LIFETIME subject to bondage.*

Let us lay these three texts together. And we shall find, 1. From ver. 2, that the sanction of the law, or *the word spoken by angels*, was of a temporal nature—*every transgression received a just recompence*. 2. From ver. 5, that the law taught no future state—*the world to come*

\* Chap. x. ver. 1.

† Chap. viii. ver. 6, 7.

*not being put in subjection to these angels.* And 3. From ver. 14, 15, that the people had not the knowledge of such a state—*being all their lifetime subject to bondage.* For the devil is here said to have *power of death*, as he brought it into the world by the delusion of the FIRST MAN. Therefore, before *death* can be abolished, *he*, who had the power of it, must be destroyed. But his destruction is the work of the SECOND MAN. Till his coming therefore, the Jews, as we are here told, *were through fear of death all their lifetime subject to bondage.* Christ then brought them into *the glorious liberty of the children of God*,\* by setting before them *life and immortality.*†

To all this, I hope, the reader will not be so inattentive as to object, “That what is here produced from the New Testament, to prove that the followers of the law had no future state, contradicts what I have more than once observed, that the later Jewish prophets had given strong intimations of an approaching dispensation, with a future state.” For the question is concerning a future state’s being the sanction of the LAW, not of later intimations, of its being ready to become the sanction of the GOSPEL.

As inconsiderate would be this other objection, “That my point is to prove that this dispensation had *no future state of reward and punishment at all*, and my evidence from the New Testament only shows they had not the *Christian doctrine of it.*” For to this I answer, 1. That those I argue with, if they hold any difference between the Christian and general doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment, it is only this, that the Christian doctrine was *revealed*; the other, a conclusion of natural reason. Now if the Jews had this doctrine, they must needs have it, as *revealed*; consequently the same with the Christian. 2. That though I myself suppose the natural and the Christian doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment to be very different things; yet I shall show, in due time, that if Moses were indeed God’s messenger, and would teach a future state, it could be no other than the *Christian doctrine of it.* But as those, I have to do with, may be ready to tell me, that this *due time*, like that of the *Jews’ Messiah*, is either past or will never come, they will, I suppose, readily bear with me while I anticipate the subject, and in a very few words prove what is here asserted. Revelation teacheth that mankind lost the free gift of immortal life by the transgression of Adam; and, from thence, became mortal, and their existence confined to this life. Revelation likewise teacheth that the MEAN which divine wisdom thought fit to employ in restoring man from death to his first state of immortality, was *the sacrifice of Christ on the cross.* Hence it appears to be a thing impossible, that any messenger from God, any agent or instrument made use of for conducting this grand dispensation towards its completion, could (were it

\* Rom. viii. 21.

† For the further illustration of this matter, I would recommend to the reader’s serious perusal the first chapter of *The free and candid Examination of the Bishop of London’s Principles.*

in his *choice* or in his *office* to promulgate the doctrine of a future state) speak of any other but that purchased by Christ, and promulged and proclaimed in the gospel, since in fact, on the principles of revelation, there is no other; and to inculcate another would be impeaching the veracity of God, and the eternal stability of his councils.

To conclude, there is one thing which plainly evinceth, that if the Jews had the knowledge or belief of a FUTURE STATE of reward and punishment, they must have had the knowledge of the REDEMPTION of man by the death and suffering of Jesus Christ, likewise. And it is this, that all the sacrifices in the Jewish ritual regarded only temporal things. A very competent judge in these matters assures us,—*Universa Judæorum simul congesta sacrificia ad assequenda hujus vitæ commoda omnia facta erant.\** The consequence is this, that if the Jewish religion taught its followers a future state of rewards and punishments, it either afforded them no means of attaining future happiness, or it instructed them in the doctrine of the redemption. To say the first, contradicts the nature of all religion; to say the latter, makes the Jewish useless, and the Christian false, as contradicting its repeated declarations, that *life and immortality, or the doctrine of the redemption, was brought to light through the gospel.*

But what was asked by St Paul's adversaries, will perhaps be asked by mine, *Is the LAW then against the PROMISES of God?* Or does the LAW, because it had no future state, contradict the GOSPEL, which hath? The apostle's answer will serve me,—*God forbid: for if there had been a LAW which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the LAW.†* That is, if the genius of the law had produced such a dispensation as was proper to convey to mankind the free gift of life and immortality, this gift would have been conveyed by it. All this shows that the law was not *contrary* to the gospel, but only that it was not of sufficient excellence to be the vehicle of God's last best gift to mankind. And it shows too (and it is a very fit remark, as the result from the whole, with which to conclude this fifth book) that a future state was not the sanction of the law of Moses, or, in the apostle's more emphatic words, that the *law did not* (because it could not) *give life.*

Thus, I presume, it is now proved beyond all reasonable question, THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT IS NOT TO BE FOUND IN, NOR DID MAKE PART OF, THE MOSAIC DISPENSATION.

It will be asked, then, "What were the real sentiments of these early Jews, concerning the soul?" Though the question be a little out of time, yet as the answer is short, I shall give it here. They were doubtless the same with those of the rest of mankind, who have thought upon the matter; that IT SURVIVED THE BODY: but having, from Moses's silence and the establishment of another sanction, no expectation of future rewards and punishments, they simply concluded that *it returned to him who gave it.‡* But, as to any interesting speculations concerning its

\* Outram de Sacr. p. 305.

† Gal. iii. 21.

‡ Eccles. xii. 7.



state of survivorship, it is plain they had none. Indeed how should they have any? when PERSONALITY did not enter into the idea of this survivorship, that being only annexed to the *rewards and punishments* of a future state. Hence it was that those ancient philosophers (almost all the theistical philosophers of Greece) who considered the soul as a SUBSTANCE distinct from the body, and not a mere QUALITY of it (for they were not such idiots as to conceive, that *thought* could result from any combinations of *matter and motion*), those philosophers, I say, who considered the soul as a substance, and yet disbelieved a future state of rewards and punishments, denied it all future *personality*, and held the refusion of it into the *τὸ ἴν*, or the soul of the world.\* And just such INTERESTING SPECULATIONS concerning it had the few philosophic Jews of the most early times, as appears from the book of Ecclesiastes, which speaks their sentiments. *Who knoweth, says this author, the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?*† And again: “Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, AND THE SPIRIT SHALL RETURN UNTO GOD WHO GAVE IT.”‡ Yet this writer, perfectly conformable to what I have delivered, says, at the same time: *But the dead know not any thing, neither have they ANY MORE A REWARD, for the memory of them is forgotten.*§

And where was the wonder? that a matter which so little concerned them, namely, the future condition of a portion of etherial spirit divested of its personality, should only float idly in the brain, when we reflect that even the knowledge of the FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS, while he made no part of the *national worship*, was entertained by the gentiles (as appears from all antiquity) with the utmost unconcern, neither regulating their notions, nor influencing their actions.

But from this uninteresting state, in which the doctrine, concerning the soul, remained amongst the early Jews, the SADDUCEES concluded that their ancestors believed the *extinction* of the soul on death. Hence likewise came some late revivers of this opinion, of the *extinction of the soul*; though maintained under the softer name of its SLEEP between death and the resurrection: for they go upon the Sadducean principle, that the soul is a *quality* only, and not a *substance*.

In support of this opinion, the revivers of it proceed on the sophism, which polytheists employ to combat the unity of the Godhead. *All philosophical arguments*, says the reviver, after having quoted a number of wonderful things from scripture, to prove the soul a *quality*, and mortal, *drawn from our notions of matter; and urged against the possibility of life, thought and agency, being so connected with some portions of it as to constitute a compound being or person, are merely grounded on our ignorance.*|| Just so the polytheist. “All arguments, for the unity, from metaphysics, are manifestly vain, and merely grounded on our ig-

\* See Div. Leg. book iii.

† Chap. iii. 21, Vid. Cler. et Drus. in loc.

‡ Chap. xii. 7, Vid. Cler. in loc.

§ Chap. ix. ver. 5.

|| Considerations on the Theory of Religion, p. 398, ed. 3d.

norance. You believers," says he, "must be confined to scripture: Now scripture assures us, **THERE ARE GODS MANY,**" which, by the way, I think a stronger text, certainly a director, against the *unity of the Godhead*, than any this learned writer has produced for the *sleep of the soul*. But what say believers to this? They say, that scripture takes the *unity*, as well as the *existence* of the Deity, for granted; takes them for truths demonstrable by natural light. Just so it is with regard to that *immaterial substance*, the soul. Scripture supposes men to be so far informed of the nature of the soul, by the same light, as to know that it cannot be destroyed by any of those causes which bring about the extinction of the body. Our dreamers\* are aware of this, and therefore hold with unbelievers, that the soul is *no substance* but a *quality* only; and so have taken effectual care indeed, that its repose shall not be disturbed in this, which we may emphatically call, the **SLEEP OF DEATH**. *We can never prove*, says another of these sleepers,† *that the soul of man is of such a nature that it can and must exist and live, think, act, enjoy, &c., separate from, and independent of, the body. All our present experience shows the contrary. The operations of the mind depend CONSTANTLY and INVARIABLY upon the state of the body, of the brain in particular. If some dying persons have a lively use of their rational faculties to the very last, it is because death has invaded some other part, and the brain remains sound and vigorous.*‡ This is the long-exploded trash of Coward, Toland, Collins, &c. And he who can treat us with it at this time of day, has either never read CLARKE and BAXTER on the subject (in which he had been better employed than in writing upon it), or never understood them.—So far as to the abstract truth. Let us consider next the practical consequences. Convince the philosophic libertine that the soul is a quality arising out of *matter*, and vanishing on the dissolution of the *form*, and then see if ever you can bring him to believe the Christian doctrine of the **RESURRECTION**! While he held the soul to be an immaterial substance, existing, as well in its separation from, as in its conjunction with, the body, and he could have no reason, arising from the principles of true philosophy, to stagger in his belief of this revealed doctrine.—*Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die,*§ is good philosophy as well as good divinity: for if the body, instead of its earthly nature, were to have a heavenly, it must needs pass through death and corruption to qualify it for that change. But when this *body died*, what occasion was there for the *soul*, which was to suffer no change, to *fall asleep*?

But their *sleep of the soul* is mere cant: and this brings me to the last consideration, the sense and consistency of so ridiculous a notion. They go, as we observed, upon the Sadducean principle, that the soul is a *quality* of body, not a *substance* of itself, and so dies with its substratum. Now *sleep*, is a modification of existence, not of non-existence;

\* St Jude's *filthy dreamers* only defiled the flesh. These defile the spirit.

† Taylor of Norwich.

‡ Ib. p. 401.

§ St Paul. (1 Cor. xv. 36.)

so that though the sleep of a *substance* hath a meaning, the sleep of a *quality* is nonsense. And if ever this soul of theirs re-exerts its faculties, it must be by means of a RE-PRODUCTION, not by a mere AWAKING; and they may as well talk of the SLEEP of a mushroom turned again into the substance of the dunghill from whence it arose, and from which, not the same, but another mushroom shall, in time, arise. In a word, neither unbelievers nor believers will allow to these *middle men* that a new-existing soul, which is only a quality resulting from a glorified body, can be identically the same with an annihilated soul, which had resulted from an earthly body. But perhaps, as Hudibras had discovered the receptacle of the *ghosts of defunct bodies*, so these gentlemen may have found out the yet subtler corner, where the *ghosts of defunct qualities* repose.

END OF THE FIFTH BOOK.

## APPENDIX.

---

A LATE noble and voluminous author, \* who hath written with more than ordinary spleen against THE RELIGION OF HIS COUNTRY, as it is founded in revelation and established by law, hath attacked with more than ordinary fury the author of *The Divine Legation of Moses demonstrated*, and of *The Alliance between Church and State vindicated*.

I shall shortly find a fitter place to examine his reasoning against the *Alliance*. At present let us see what he has to urge against the argument of the *Divine Legation*, which is founded on these two facts, the *omission of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments* in the Mosaic dispensation; and the *administration of an extraordinary providence* in the same dispensation.

His Lordship begins with the OMISSION, which he acknowledges: and to evade the force of the argument arising from it, casts about for a reason, independent of the EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE, to account for it.

His first solution is this,—“MOSES DID NOT BELIEVE THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL, nor the rewards and punishments of another life, though it is possible he might have learnt these doctrines from the Egyptians, WHO TAUGHT THEM VERY EARLY, perhaps as they taught that of the unity of God. When I say, *that Moses did not believe the immortality of the soul*, nor future rewards and punishments, my reason is this, that he taught neither, when he had to do with a people whom a theocracy could not restrain; and on whom, therefore, terrors of punishment, *future as well as present, eternal as well as temporal*, could never be too much multiplied, or too strongly inculcated.” †

This reasoning is altogether worthy of his Lordship. Here we have a DOCTRINE, confessed to be plausible in itself, and therefore of easy admittance; most alluring to human nature, and therefore embraced by all mankind; of highest account among the Egyptians, and therefore ready to be embraced by the Israelites, who were fond of Egyptian notions; of strongest efficacy on the minds of an unruly people, and therefore of indispensable use; yet, all this notwithstanding, *Moses did not believe it, and, on that account, would not teach it*.—But then, had MOSES’S integrity been so severe, how came he to write a history which, my Lord thinks, is, in part at least, a fiction of his own? Did he *believe that*? How came he to leave the Israelites, as my Lord assures us he did, in possession of many of the superstitious opinions of Egypt? did he *believe* these too? No, but they served his purpose; which was, the better governing an unruly people. Well, but his Lordship tells us, the doctrine of a future state served this purpose best of all; for *having to do with a people whom a theocracy could not restrain, terrors of punishment, FUTURE as well as present, ETERNAL as well as temporal, could never be too much multiplied, or too strongly inculcated*. No matter for that. MOSES, as other men may, on a sudden grows scrupulous; and so, together with the maxims of common politics, throws aside the principles of common sense; and when he had employed all the other inventions of fraud, he boggles at this, which best served his purpose; was most innocent in itself; and was most important in its general, as well as particular use.

In his Lordship’s next volume, this *omission* comes again upon the stage; and then we have *another* reason assigned for MOSES’S conduct in this matter. “MOSES would not teach the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and of a future state, *on account of the many superstitions* which this doctrine had begot in Egypt, as we must believe, or *believe that he knew nothing of it*, or ASSIGN SOME WHIMSICAL REASON FOR HIS OMISSION.” ‡

We have seen before, that MOSES omitted a future state, *because he did not believe it*. This reason is now out of date; and one or other of the three following is to be assigned; either because it *begot superstitions*; or because *he knew nothing of it*; or if you will allow neither of these, you must have recourse, he tells you, to Warburton’s WHIMSICAL REASON, that *the Jews were under an extraordinary providence*.

Let us take him then, at his word, without expecting however, that he will stand to it; and having shown his two first reasons not worth a rush, leave the last, established, even on his own concessions.

---

\* Lord Bolingbroke.

† Vol. iii. p. 289.

‡ Vol. iv. p. 470.

1. *Moses*, says he, omitted a future state on account of the many superstitions, which this doctrine had begot in Egypt. But if the omission stands upon this principle, *MOSES* must have omitted an infinite number of things, which, Lord Bolingbroke says, he borrowed of the Egyptians; part of which, in his Lordship's opinion, were those very superstitions, which this doctrine had begot; such as the notion of TUTELARY DEITIES: and part, what arose out of that notion; in the number of which were distinction between things clean and unclean; an hereditary priesthood; sacerdotal habits; and rites of sacrifice.

2. However, he has another reason for the omission: *MOSES* might know nothing of it. To which, if I only opposed his Lordship's own words in another place, where (giving us the reasons why *MOSES* did know something of a future state) he observes, there are certain rites, which seem to allude or have a remote relation to this very doctrine,\* it might be deemed sufficient. But I will go further, and observe, that, from the very LAWS of *MOSES* themselves, we have an internal evidence of his knowledge of this doctrine. Amongst the laws against gentile divinations, there is one directed against that species of them, called by the Greeks NECROMANCY, or invocation of the dead; which necessarily implies, in the lawgiver who forbids it, as well as in the offender who uses it, the knowledge of a future state.

3. This being the fate of his Lordship's two reasons, we are now abandoned by him, and left to follow our own inventions, or to take up with SOME WHIMSICAL REASON FOR THE omission; that is, to allow that, as the Jews were under an extraordinary providence, *MOSES* in quality of lawgiver had NO OCCASION for the doctrine of a future state.

However, his Lordship, dissatisfied, as well he might, with the solutions hitherto proposed, returns again to the charge; and in his *Corona Operis*, the book of FRAGMENTS, more openly opposes the doctrine of the *Divine Legation*; and enlarges and expatiates upon the reason before given for the omission; namely, the many superstitions this doctrine had begotten in Egypt.

"ONE CANNOT SEE WITHOUT SURPRISE," says his Lordship, "a doctrine so useful to ALL religion, and therefore incorporated into ALL the systems of paganism, left wholly out of that of the JEWS. Many probable reasons might be brought to show, that it was an Egyptian doctrine before the exode, and this particularly, that it was propagated from Egypt, so soon, at least, afterwards, by all those who were instructed like *MOSES*, in the wisdom of that people. He transported much of his wisdom into the scheme of religion and government, which he gave the Israelites; and, amongst other things, certain rites, which may seem to allude, or have a remote relation to, this very doctrine. Though this doctrine, therefore, had not been that of ABRAHAM, ISAAC, and JACOB, he might have adopted it with as little scruple, as he did many customs and institutions merely Egyptian. He had to do with a rebellious, but a superstitious, people. In the first character, they made it necessary that he should neglect nothing which might add weight to his ordinances, and contribute to keep them in awe. In the second, their disposition was extremely proper to receive such a doctrine, and to be influenced by it. Shall we say that an hypothesis of future rewards and punishments, was USELESS among a people who lived under a theocracy, and that the future judge of other people, was their immediate judge and king, who resided in the midst of them, and who dealt out rewards and punishments on every occasion? Why then were so many precautions taken? Why was a solemn covenant made with God, as with a temporal prince? Why were so many promises and threatenings of rewards and punishments, temporal indeed, but future and contingent, as we find in the book of Deuteronomy, most pathetically held out by *MOSES*? Would there have been any more impropriety in holding out those of one kind than those of another, because the Supreme Being, who disposed and ordered both, was in a particular manner present amongst them? Would an addition to the catalogue of rewards and punishments more remote, but eternal, and in all respects far greater, have had no effect? I think neither of these things can be said.

"What shall we say then? How came it to pass, this addition was not made? I will mention what occurs to me, and shall not be over solicitous about the weight that my reflections may deserve. If the doctrines of the immortality of the soul and of a future state had been revealed to *MOSES*, that he might teach them to the Israelites, he would have taught them most certainly. But he did not teach them. They were therefore not revealed to him. Why they were not so revealed some PERT DIVINE OR OTHER WILL BE READY TO TELL YOU. For me, I dare not presume to guess. But this, I may presume to advance, that since these doctrines were not revealed by God to his servant *MOSES*, it is highly probable that this legislator made a scruple of teaching them to the Israelites, how well soever instructed he might be in them himself, and howsoever useful to government he might think them. The superstitious and idolatrous rites of the Egyptians, like those of other nations, were founded on the polytheism, and the mythology, that prevailed, and

were suffered to prevail, amongst the vulgar, and that made the sum of their religion. It seemed to be a point of policy to direct all these absurd opinions and practices to the service of government, instead of attempting to root them out. But then the great difference between rude and ignorant nations and such as were civilized and learned, like the Egyptians, seems to have been this, that the former had no other system of religion than these absurd opinions and practices, whereas the latter had an *inward* as well as an *outward* doctrine. There is reason to believe that natural theology and natural religion had been taught and practised in the ancient Theban dynasty; and it is probable that they continued to be an *inward* doctrine in the rest of Egypt; while polytheism, idolatry, and all the *mysteries*, all the impieties, and all the follies of magic, were the *outward* doctrine. MOSES might be let into a knowledge of both; and under the patronage of the princess, whose founding he was, he might be initiated into those *mysteries*, where the secret doctrine alone was taught; and the outward exploded. But we cannot imagine that the children of Israel, in general, enjoyed the same privilege, nor that the masters were so lavish, to their slaves, of a favour so distinguished, and often so hard to obtain. No. The children of Israel knew nothing more than the outside of the religion of Egypt; and if the doctrine, we speak of, was known to them, it was known only in the superstitious rites, and with all the fabulous circumstances in which it was dressed up and presented to vulgar belief. It would have been hard therefore to teach, or to renew this doctrine in the minds of the Israelites, without giving them an occasion the more, to recall the polytheistical fables, and practise the idolatrous rites they had learned during their captivity. Rites and ceremonies are often so equivocal, that they may be applied to very different doctrines. But when they are so closely connected with one doctrine that they are not applicable to another, to teach the doctrine is, in some sort, to teach the rites and ceremonies, and to authorize the fables on which they are founded. MOSES therefore being at liberty to teach this doctrine of rewards and punishments in a future state, or not to teach it, might very well choose the latter; though he indulged the Israelites, on account of the hardness of their hearts, and by the divine permission, as it is presumed, in several observances and customs which did not lead directly, though even they did so perhaps in consequence, to the polytheism and idolatry of Egypt.<sup>16</sup>

What a Babel of bad reasoning has his Lordship here accumulated out of the rubbish of false and inconsistent principles! And all, to insult the temple of God and the fortress of Mount Sion. Sometimes, he represents MOSES as a divine messenger, and distinguishes between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, unto him; and then, *a future state not being revealed to MOSES was the reason he did not teach it*. Sometimes again, he considers him as a mere human lawgiver, acquiring all his knowledge of religion and politics from the Egyptians, in whose *secret* learning he had been intimately instructed; and then, the reason of the omission is, *lest the doctrine of a future state should have drawn the Israelites into those Egyptian superstitions*, from which, it was MOSES's purpose to estrange them. All these inconsistencies in *fact* and *reasoning*, his Lordship delivers in the same breath, and without the least intimation of any change in his principles or opinions.

But let us follow him step by step, without troubling our heads about his real sentiments. It is enough, that we confute all he says, whether under his own, or any assumed character.

He begins with confessing, that "ONE CANNOT SEE WITHOUT SURPRISE a doctrine so useful to ALL religions, and therefore incorporated into ALL the systems of paganism, left wholly out of that of the Jews."

At length then it appears, that this OMISSION is no light or trivial matter, which may be accounted for, as he before supposed, by MOSES's *disbelief* of the doctrine; his *ignorance* of it; or the *imaginary mischiefs* it might possibly produce. We may be allowed then to think it deserved all the pains the author of the *Divine Legation of Moses* has bestowed upon it: whose WHIMSICAL REASONING, if it ended in a demonstration of the truth of revealed religion, is sufficiently atoned for, though it were a little out of the common road: for in this case the old proverb would hold true, that *the furthest way about is the nearest way home*.

His Lordship proceeds to show, in direct opposition to what he said before, that MOSES could not be ignorant of the doctrine of a future state, because the Egyptians taught it: his knowledge of it, my Lord tells us, further appears from an *internal* circumstance, *some of his rites seeming to allude, or to have a remote relation to, this very doctrine*. This I observe, to his Lordship's credit. The remark is just and accurate. But we are in no want of his *remote relation*: I have shown just above, that the Jewish laws against *accremancy* necessarily imply MOSES's knowledge of the doctrine.

He then goes on to explain the advantages which, humanly speaking, the Israelites must have received from this doctrine, in the temper and circumstances with which they left Egypt. MOSES, says he, *had to do with a rebellious and superstitious people*. This likewise I observe to his credit: it has the same marks of sagacity and truth: and brings us to the very verge of the *solution*, proposed by the author of the *Divine Legation*; which is, that



the Israelites were indeed under an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE, which supplied all the disadvantages of the OMISSION. Under a *common and unequal* providence, RELIGION cannot exist without the doctrine of a future state: for religion implying a just retribution of reward and punishment, which under such a providence is not dispensed, a future state must needs subvene, to prevent the whole edifice from falling into ruin. And thus we account for the fact, which his Lordship so amply acknowledges, viz. *that the doctrine of a future state was most useful to ALL religions, and therefore incorporated into ALL the religions of paganism.* But where an EXTRAORDINARY providence is administered, good and evil are exactly distributed; and therefore, in this circumstance, a FUTURE STATE is not necessary for the support of religion. It is not to be found in the Mosaic economy; yet this economy subsisted for many ages; religion therefore did not need it; or in other words, it was supported by an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE.

This is the argument of the *Divine Legation*. And now, let us consider his Lordship's present attempt to evade it.

Shall we say, that an hypothesis of future rewards and punishments was useless amongst a people who lived under a THEOCRACY, and that the future judge of other people was their immediate judge and king, who resided in the midst of them, and who dealt out rewards and punishments on every occasion? WHY THEN WERE SO MANY PRECAUTIONS taken? &c.

First, let me observe, that the PRECAUTIONS here objected to, are intended for an insinuation against the truth of Moses's promise of an *extraordinary providence*. A kind of *sophism* which his Lordship advances, and only holds in common with the rest who have written against the *Divine Legation*: and which I shall here, after much forbearance on my part, expose as it deserves.

MOSES affirms again and again, that his people were under an *extraordinary providence*. He affirms it indeed; but as it is not a self-evident truth, it needs to be proved. Till then, the unbeliever is at liberty to urge any circumstance in the Jewish law or history, which may seem to bring the *reality* of that providence into question: the same liberty too has the believer; if, at least, he can persuade himself to make use of it; as many, so professing themselves, have done both in their writings and discoursings against the *Divine Legation*. Things were in this train, when I undertook the defence of MOSES: and to obviate all objections to the legislator's credit, arising from any doubtful or unfavourable circumstance in the law or history of the Jews concerning this *extraordinary providence*, I advanced the INTERNAL ARGUMENT of the OMISSION. An argument which necessarily inferred "that an extraordinary providence was in fact administered in the Jewish republic." What change did this make in the state of the case? A very great one. Unbelievers were now indeed at liberty, and believers too, if so perversely inclined, to oppose, and, as they could, to confute the argument of the *Divine Legation*: but by no rules of good logic could they come over again with those scripture difficulties to Moses's credit, which the argument of the *Divine Legation* had entirely obviated, and which it still continued to exclude, so long as it remained unanswered. For while a demonstrated truth stands good, no difficulties arising from it, however inexplicable, can have any weight against that superior evidence. Not to admit this fundamental maxim of common sense, would be to unsettle many a physical and mathematical demonstration, as well as this *moral* one.

I say therefore, as things now stand, to oppose difficulties against the administration of an extraordinary providence, after that providence has been proved, and before the proof has been confuted, is the most palpable and barefaced imposition on our understanding. In which, however, his Lordship is but one of a hundred: and truly, in this, the least indecent and inconsistent of the hundred; as his declared purpose is to destroy the credit and authority of the Jewish lawgiver.

I shall not, however, decline to examine the weight of these objections: though they be so vainly and sophistically obtruded.

"If there was this EXTRAORDINARY providence administered," says his Lordship, "why so many precautions taken? Why was a solemn covenant made with God as with a temporal prince? Why were so many promises and threatenings of rewards and punishments, temporal indeed, but future and contingent, as we find in the book of Deuteronomy, most pathetically held out by Moses?" This difficulty is not hard to be resolved. We find throughout that book which we believers are wont to call the *history of providence*, but which his Lordship is pleased to entitle, *tales more extravagant than those of Amadis de Gaule*, that God, in his moral government of the world, always employs human means, as far as those means will go; and never interposes with his *extraordinary providence*, but when they will go no further. To do otherwise, would be an unnecessary waste of miracles; better fitted to confound our knowledge of NATURE, by obscuring the harmony of order, in such a control of its delegated powers, than to make manifest the presence of its sovereign Lord and Master. This method in God's moral government, all our ideas of wisdom seem to support. Now when He, the great Director of the Universe, had decreed to rule the Jewish people in an extraordinary way, he did not propose to supersede any of the measures

of civil regimen. And this, I hope, will be esteemed a sufficient answer to—WHY SO MANY PRECAUTIONS TAKEN, &c. But the reader will find this argument drawn out more at large, in my remarks on the same kind of sophistry employed by Dr SYKES.

“But,” says his Lordship, “would the hypothesis of a future state have been useless? &c. Would there,” as his Lordship goes on, “have been any more impropriety in holding out those [*sanctions*] of one kind than those of another, because the Supreme Being, who disposed and ordered both, was in a particular manner present amongst them? Would an addition of rewards and punishments (more remote, but eternal, and in all respects far greater) to the catalogue, have had no effect? I think neither of these things can be said.” His Lordship totally mistakes the drift of the argument of the *Divine Legation*, which infers no more, from the fact of the *omission*, than this, that the Jewish economy, administered by an *extraordinary* providence, could do without the service of the *omitted* doctrine; not, that that doctrine, even under such a dispensation, was of *no use*, much less that it was *improper*. But then one of his followers will be ready to say, “If a *future state* was not *improper*, much more if it was of *use*, under an extraordinary dispensation, how came MOSES not to give it?” I reply, for great and wise ends of providence vastly countervailing the use of that doctrine, which, in book sixth of this work, will be explained at large.

Lord Bolingbroke proceeds next to tell us, what occurs to him, concerning the *REASONS* of the *omission*; and previously assures us he is *not over-solicitous about their weight*. This, I suppose, is to make his *counters* pass current: for then they become the *money of fools*, as Hobbes expresses it, when we cease to be *solicitous* about their worth; when we try them by their colour, not their weight; their rhetoric, and not their logic. However, this must be said with an exception to the first, which is altogether logical, and very diverting.

“If,” says his Lordship, “the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and a future state had been revealed to Moses, that he might teach them to the Israelites, he would have taught them most certainly. But he did not teach them. They were, therefore, not revealed.” It is in mood and figure, you see; and, I warrant you, designed to supply what was wanting in the *Divine Legation*: though, as the author of that book certainly believed these *doctrines were not revealed*, it is ten to one but he thought Moses was not at liberty to teach them: unless you can suppose that his Lordship, who believed nothing of revelation, might believe Moses to be restrained from teaching what God had not revealed to him; and yet, that the author of the *Divine Legation*, who held Moses’s pretensions to be true, might think him at liberty to go beyond his commission. Thus far, then, we may be said to agree: but this good understanding does not last long. His Lordship’s *modesty* and my *pertness* soon make the breach as wide as ever.—*Why they were not so revealed*, says his Lordship, *some PERT DIVINE or other will be ready to tell you. For me, I dare not presume to guess*. My forwardness, and his Lordship’s backwardness, are equally well suited to our respective principles. Should his Lordship have guessed, it might have brought him to what he most dreaded, the divine original of the Jewish religion: had I forbore to guess, I had betrayed my cause, and left those *DATA* unemployed, which enabled me, I do not say to guess, but to discover, and to *demonstrate the Divine Legation of Moses*.

However, this, *his Lordship* “will presume to advance, that since those doctrines were not revealed by God to his servant MOSES, it is highly probable, that the legislator made a scruple of teaching them to the Israelites, howsoever well instructed he might be in them himself, and howsoever useful to government he might think them.”

Here, you see, he personates a believer, who holds MOSES to be an inspired lawgiver: but observe how poorly he sustains his part! Either MOSES did indeed receive the *LAW* from God, or he did not. If he did not, why are we mocked with the distinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when nothing was revealed? If MOSES did receive the *law* from God, why are we still worse mocked with the distinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when every thing regarding the dispensation must needs be revealed; as well, the direction to omit a *future state*, as the direction to *inculcate the unity of the Godhead*? Why was all this mockery? the reader asks. For a very good purpose: it was to draw us from the *TRUE* object of our inquiry, which is, what GOD intended by the *omission*; to that *FANTASTIC* object, which only respects what MOSES intended by it. For the intention of GOD supposes the mission and inspiration of a prophet; but the intention of MOSES, when considered in contradistinction to the intention of GOD, terminates in the human views of a mere politic lawgiver; which leads us back again to infidelity.

But he soon strips Moses of his mission, and leaves him to cool, in querpo, under his civil character as before. And here he considers, what it was, which under this character might induce Moses to *omit* a future state; and he finds it to be, lest this doctrine should have hurt the doctrine of the *UNITY*, which it was his purpose to inculcate amongst his people, in opposition to the Egyptian polytheism.

“Moses,” says his Lordship, “it is highly probable, made a scruple of teaching these

doctrines to the Israelites, howsoever well instructed he might be in them himself, and however useful to government he might think them. The people of Egypt, like all other nations, were polytheists, but different from all others: there was in Egypt an inward as well as outward doctrine: natural theology and natural religion were the INWARD doctrine; while polytheism, idolatry, and ALL THE MYSTERIES, all the impieties and follies of magic, were the OUTWARD doctrine. Moses was initiated into those mysteries where the secret doctrine alone was taught, and the outward exploded."—For an accurate as well as just divider, commend me to his Lordship. In distinguishing between the *inward* and *outward* doctrines of the Egyptians, he puts *all the mysteries* amongst the *outward*:—though if they had an *inward*, it must necessarily be part of those *mysteries*. But he makes amends presently (but his amends to truth is, as it should be, always at the expense of a contradiction), and directly says, that MOSES LEARNED THE INWARD DOCTRINE IN THE MYSTERIES. Let this pass: he proceeds—"Moses had the knowledge of both outward and inward. Not so the Israelites in general. They knew nothing more than the outside of the religion of Egypt. And if a future state was known to them, it was known only in the superstitious rites, and with all the fabulous circumstances, in which it was dressed up and presented to the vulgar belief. It would be hard therefore to teach or to renew this doctrine in the minds of the Israelites, without giving them an occasion the more to recall the polytheistical fables, and practise the idolatrous rites they had learned during the captivity."

The children of Israel, it seems, "knew no more of a future state, than by the superstitious rites and fabulous circumstances with which it was dressed up and presented to the public belief." What then? MOSES, he owns, *knew more*. And what hindered MOSES from communicating of his knowledge to the people, when he took them under his protection, and gave them a new law and a new religion? His Lordship gives us to understand that this people knew as little of the UNITY; for he tells us, it was amongst the *inward* doctrines of the Egyptians: yet this did not hinder Moses from instructing his people in the doctrine of the unity. What then should hinder his teaching them the *inward* doctrine of a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances? He had divested *religious worship* of the absurdities of demigods and heroes; what should hinder him from divesting a *future state* of Charon's boat and the Elysian fields? But the notion of a future state would have recalled those fabulous circumstances which had been long connected with it. And was not religious worship, under the idea of a *tutelary deity*, and a *temporal king*, much more apt to recall the polytheism of Egypt? Yet Moses ventured upon this inconvenience, for the sake of great advantages: why should he not venture on the other, for the sake of greater? for the doctrine of a future state is, as his Lordship confesses, even necessary both to civil and religious society. But why does he talk of the danger of giving entry to the fables and superstitions concerning the soul (superstitions, which, though learned indeed in the captivity, were common to all the nations under polytheism) when in other places he assures us, that Moses indulged the Israelites in the most characteristic superstitions of Egypt?

However, let us see how he supports this profound observation. "Rites and ceremonies," says his Lordship, "are often so equivocal, that they may be applied to very different doctrines. But when they are so closely connected with a doctrine, that they are not applicable to another, to teach the doctrine is, IN SOME SORT, to teach the rites and ceremonies."—*In some sort*, is well put in, to soften the deformity of this inverted logic. His point is to show that a superstitious rite, relating to, and dependent on, a certain doctrine, will obtrude itself whenever that doctrine is taught: and his reasoning is only calculated to prove, that where the rite is practised, the doctrine will soon follow. This may indeed be true. But then it does not hold in the converse, that the rite follows the doctrine: because a principal may stand without its dependent: but a dependent can never subsist without its principal.

Under cover of these grotesque shapes, into which his Lordship has travestied the Jewish lawgiver, he concludes, that MOSES being AT LIBERTY to teach this doctrine of rewards and punishments in a future state, or not to teach it, he might very well choose the latter.—Yet it was but at the very beginning of this paragraph that he tells us, *Moses was NOT AT LIBERTY to teach or not to teach*. His words are these, *Since this doctrine was not revealed by God to his servant Moses, it is highly probable that this legislator MADE A SCRUPLE of teaching it*. But his Lordship very well knows that statesmen soon get the better of their scruples: and then, by another fetch of political casuistry, find themselves more at liberty than ever.

I had observed above, that our noble discourser, who makes MOSES so *scrupulous* that he would, on no terms, afford a handle for one single superstition of Egypt to get footing among his people, has, on other occasions, charged him with introducing them in the lump. He was sensible that his inconsistency was likely to be detected, and therefore he now attempts to obviate it.—"Though he [Moses] indulged the Israelites, on account of the hardness of their hearts, and by the divine permission, as it is presumed, in several observations and

customs, which did not LEAD directly, though even they did so perhaps in consequence, to the polytheism and idolatry of Egypt." And could the teaching the doctrine of a future state possibly do more than LEAD IN CONSEQUENCE (as his Lordship elegantly expresses it) *to the polytheism and idolatry of Egypt*, by drawing after it those *superstitious rites and fabulous circumstances*, which, he tells us, then attended the popular notion of such a state. If, for the *hardness of their hearts*, they were indulged in *several observances and customs*, which only led in consequence to polytheism and idolatry, why, for the same hardness of heart, were they not indulged with the doctrine of a future state, which did not lead, but by a very remote consequence, to polytheism and idolatry? Especially since this *hardness of heart* would less bear denying them a DOCTRINE so alluring to the human mind, than denying them a RITE, to which habit only and old custom had given an occasional propensity. Again, those rites indulged to the people, for the *hardness of their hearts*, had, in themselves, little use or tendency to advance the ends of the Jewish dispensation; but rather retarded them: whereas a future state, by his Lordship's own confession, is *most useful to all religions, and therefore incorporated into all the systems of paganism*; and was particularly useful to the Israelites, who were, he says, both a *rebellious* and a *superstitious* people: dispositions, which not only made it necessary to omit nothing that might enforce obedience, but likewise facilitated the reception and supported the influence of the doctrine in question.

The reader has here the whole of his Lordship's boasted solution of this important circumstance of the OMISSION, in the Mosaic law. And he sees how vainly this resolver of doubts labours to elude its force. Overwhelmed, as it were, with the weight of so irresistible a power, after long wriggling to get free, he at length crawls forth; but so maimed and broken, so impotent and fretful, that all his remaining strength is in his venom. And this he now sheds in abundance over the whole Mosaic economy. It is pronounced to be a gross imposture; and this very circumstance of the OMISSION is given as an undoubted proof of the accusation.

—"Can we be surprised then," says his Lordship, "that the Jews ascribed to the all-perfect Being, on various occasions, such a conduct and such laws as are inconsistent with his most obvious perfections? Can we believe such a conduct and such laws to have been his, on the word of the proudest and most lying nation in the world? Many other considerations might have their place here. But I shall confine myself to one; *which I do not remember to have seen nor heard urged on one side, nor ANTICIPATED on the other*. To show then, the more evidently, how ABSURD, as well as IMPIOUS it is to ascribe these Mosaical laws to God, let it be considered, that NEITHER the people of Israel, nor their legislator perhaps, KNEW ANY THING OF ANOTHER LIFE, wherein the crimes committed in this life are to be punished. Although he might have learned this doctrine, which was not so much a secret doctrine, as it may be presumed that the unity of the supreme God was, amongst the Egyptians. Whether he had learned both or either, or neither of them in those schools, cannot be determined: BUT THIS MAY BE ADVANCED WITH ASSURANCE; if MOSES knew that crimes, and therefore idolatry, one of the greatest, were to be punished in another life, he deceived the people in the covenant they made, by his intervention with God. If he did not know it, I say it with horror, the consequence, *according to the hypothesis I oppose*, must be, that God deceived both him and them. In either case, a covenant or bargain was made, wherein the conditions of obedience and disobedience were not fully, nor by consequence, fairly stated. The Israelites had better things to hope, and worse to fear, than those which were expressed in it: and their whole history seems to show how much need they had of these additional motives to restrain them from polytheism and idolatry, and to answer the assumed purposes of divine providence."\*

This argument, "advanced with so much assurance," his Lordship says, "he does not remember to have seen, or heard urged on one side, nor anticipated on the other." A gentle reproof, as we are to understand it, of the author of the *Divine Legation*: for none but he, I think, could *anticipate* an objection to an ARGUMENT which none but he had employed. However, though it be now too late to *anticipate*, we have still time enough to answer.

"Let it be considered," says his Lordship, "that perhaps MOSES KNEW NOTHING of another life, wherein the crimes committed in this life are to be punished."—*Considered by whom?* Not by his Lordship, or his kind readers: for his former reasoning, which I will here again repeat, had brought them to *consider* otherwise. These are his words: "Many probable reasons might be brought to show, that this was an Egyptian doctrine before the exode; and this particularly, that it was propagated from Egypt, so soon at least afterwards, by all those who were instructed LIKE MOSES, in the wisdom of that people. He transported much of this wisdom into the scheme of religion and government which he gave the Israelites; and, among other things, certain rites, which SEEM TO ALLUDE, OR HAVE A REMOTE RELATION, TO THIS DOCTRINE."† This possibly might have recurred to his Lordship, while he was

\* Vol. v. pp. 194, 195.

† Vol. v. pp. 328, 329.

testing of his new and *unanticipated* objection; and therefore, in the tricking it up amongst his FRAGMENTS, to his *perhaps*, he adds, by a very happy corrective, "although Moses might have learned this doctrine, which WAS NOT SO MUCH A SECRET doctrine, as it may be presumed that the unity of the supreme God was amongst the Egyptians." But he had done better to leave his contradictions uncorrected, and trust to the rare sagacity of his readers to find them out. He had ever an ill hand at reconciling matters; so in the case before us, in the very act of covering one contradiction, he commits another. He is here speaking of a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances; "Perhaps," says he, "MOSES KNEW NOTHING OF ANOTHER LIFE.—Which was NOT SO MUCH A SECRET doctrine as that of the unity." Now, reader, turn back a moment, to the long quotation from his 229th page, and there thou wilt find, that a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances, WAS AS MUCH A SECRET doctrine, as that of the unity.—"There is reason to believe, that natural theology and natural religion were INWARD doctrines amongst the Egyptians: Moses might be let into a knowledge of BOTH by being initiated into those *mysteries* where the secret doctrine alone was taught. But we cannot imagine, that the children of Israel in general enjoyed the same privilege. No, *they knew nothing more than the outside* of the Egyptian religion: and if the doctrine we speak of [A FUTURE STATE] was known to them, it was known only in the superstitious rites, and with all the fabulous circumstances, in which it was dressed up and presented to vulgar belief."—Is not this, now, a plain declaration, that a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances, was as much a secret doctrine as the doctrine of the unity?

But his Lordship's contradictions are the least of my concern. It is his present argument I have now to do with: and this, he says, he *advances* WITH ASSURANCE. It is fit he should. Modesty would be very ill bestowed on such opinions.

He thinks he can reduce those who hold no future state in the Jewish economy, to the necessity of owning, that MOSES, or that GOD himself, acted unfairly by the Israelites. How so, you ask? Because one or other of them concealed that state. And what if they did? Why then they concealed one of the actual sanctions of moral conduct, *future punishment*. But who told him, that this, which, he confesses, was no sanction of the Jewish law, was yet a sanction in the moral conduct of the Jewish people? Who, unless the ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGER? the man he most despises and decries.

And, even in *artificial theology*, there is nothing but the CALVINISTICAL tenet of *original sin*, which gives the least countenance to so monstrous an opinion; every thing in the GOSPEL, every thing in NATURAL THEOLOGY, exclaims against it.

JESUS, indeed, to prove that the departed Israelites still existed, quotes the title God was pleased to give himself, of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; and this, together with their existence, proves likewise the happiness of their condition: for the relation they are said to stand in with God, shows them to be of his kingdom. But we must remember, that the question with his Lordship is, not of reward, but punishment. Again, JESUS speaks (indeed in a parable) of the deceased rich man, as in a place of torment. But we must remember that the scene was laid at a time when the doctrine of a future state was become national. To know our heavenly Master's sentiments on the question of subjection to an unknown sanction, we should do well to consider his words, "The servant which knew his Lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes; but he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes."\* Now the will of a master or sovereign, declared in his laws, never includes in it more than the sanctions of those laws. The author of the epistle to the Hebrews expressly distinguishes the sanction of the Jewish law from that of the gospel; and makes the difference to consist in this, that the one was of temporal punishments, and the other of future. "He that despised Moses's law DIED without mercy, under two or three witnesses: of how MUCH SORER PUNISHMENT, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God?"† Which appeal is without common sense or honesty, on a supposition that the apostle held the Jews to be subject to future punishments, before that sanction was promulged amongst them. From the GOSPEL therefore it cannot be inferred, that the Israelites, while only following the law of Moses, in which the sanction of a future state is not found, were liable or subject to the punishments of that state.

Let us see next, whether NATURAL THEOLOGY, or natural religion (as his Lordship is pleased, for some reason or other, to distinguish the terms), hath taught us, that a people, living under an extraordinary providence or the immediate government of God, to whom he had given a law and revealed a religion, both supported by temporal sanctions only, could be deemed subject to those future punishments, unknown to them, which natural religion before, and revealed religion since, have discovered to be due to bad men living under a common providence.

NATURAL RELIGION standeth on this principle, "That the Governor of the universe

\* Luke xii. 47, 48.

† Heb. x. 29, 29.



REWARDS and PUNISHES moral agents." The length or shortness of human existence comes not primarily into the idea of religion; not even into that complete idea of religion delivered by St Paul, in his general definition of it. The religionist, says he, *must believe that God is, and that he is A REWARDER of those who seek him.*

While God exactly distributed his rewards and punishments *here*, the light of reason directed men to look no further for the sanctions of his laws. But when it came to be seen, that he was *not always* a rewarder and punisher *here*, men necessarily concluded, from his moral attributes, that he would be so, *hereafter*; and consequently, that this life was but a small portion of the human duration. Men had not yet speculated on the permanent nature of the soul; and when they did so, that consideration, which, under an *ordinary* providence, came strongly in aid of the *moral argument* for another life, had no tendency under the *extraordinary*, to open to them the prospects of *futurity*; because, though they saw the soul unaffected by those causes which brought the body to destruction, yet they held it to be equally dependent on the will of the Creator; who, amongst the various means of its dissolution (of which they had no idea), had, for aught they knew, provided one, or more than one, for that purpose.

In this manner was a *FUTURE STATE* brought, by natural light, into religion: and from thenceforth became a necessary part of it. But under the Jewish *THEOCRACY*, God was an exact rewarder and punisher, *here*. Natural light therefore evinced that under such an administration, the subjects of it did not become liable to *future* punishments till this sanction was known amongst them.

Thus *NATURAL* and *REVEALED RELIGION* show, that his Lordship calumniated both, when he affirmed, that "according to the hypothesis he opposed, *MOSES DECEIVED* the people in the covenant they made, by his intervention with God: or, that, if Moses did not know the doctrine of a future state, then *GOD DECEIVED* both him and them."

Should it be asked, how God will deal with wicked men thus dying under the *Mosaic dispensation*? I will answer, in the words of Dr *SAMUEL CLARKE*, on a like occasion. He had demonstrated a self-moving substance to be immaterial, and so, not perishable like bodies. But, as this demonstration included the souls of irrational animals, it was asked, "How these were to be disposed of, when they had left their respective habitations?" To which he very properly replies, "Certainly, the omnipotent and infinitely wise God may, without any great difficulty, be supposed to have more ways of disposing of his creatures" [I add, with perfect justice and equity, and with equal measure, to all his creatures, as well accountable as unaccountable] "than we are, at present, let into the secret of."\*—But if the author of the *Divine Legation* has not promised more than he can perform (as his long delay gives his well-wishers cause to suspect and his ill-wishers to hope) this matter will be explained at large, in his account of the *SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF THE REDEMPTION*, which, he has told us, is to have a place in his last volume.†

Nothing now remains of this objection but what relates to the sanction of *future rewards*: and I would by no means deprive the faithful Israelites of these. His Lordship therefore has this to make his best of: and, in his opinion, the bestowing even of a *reward*, to which one has no title, is foul dealing; for he joins it with *punishment*, as if his consequence, against God's justice and goodness, might be equally deduced from either of them.—"A covenant," says he, "was made, wherein the conditions of obedience and disobedience were not *FULLY*, nor, by consequence, *FAIRLY* stated. The Israelites had *BETTER THINGS TO HOPE*, and worse to fear, than those which were expressed in it." Though it be hard on a generous *benefactor* to be denied the right of giving more than he had promised; it is still harder on the poor *dependent*, that he is not at liberty to receive more. True it is, that in this case, the conditions are not *FULLY* stated: and therefore, according to his Lordship's logic, *BY CONSEQUENCE NOT FAIRLY*. To strengthen this consequence, his Lordship concludes in these words—"And their whole history seems to show how much need they had of these additional motives [future rewards and punishments] to restrain them from polytheism and idolatry, and to answer the *ASSUMED* purpose of divine providence."

Whoever puts all these things together—"That Moses was himself of the race of Israel—was learned in all the wisdom of Egypt—and capable of freeing his people from their yoke—that he brought them within sight of the promised land; a fertile country, which they were to conquer and inhabit—that he instituted a system of laws, which has been the admiration of the wisest men of all ages—that he understood the doctrine of a *FUTURE STATE*; and, by his knowledge gained in Egypt, was not ignorant of the efficacy of it in general; and by his full experience of the rebellious and superstitious temper of his own people, could not but see how useful it would have been to them in particular."—Whoever, I say, puts all these things together (and all these things are amongst his Lordship's *CONCESSIONS*) and at the same time considers, that *MOSES*, throughout his whole system of law and religion, is entirely silent concerning a future state of rewards and punishments, will, I believe, con-

\* Octavo Tracts against Dodwell and Collins, p. 103.

† Book ix. of this edition.



chide, that there was something more in the *omission* than Lord BOLINGBROKE could fathom, or, at least, was willing to discover.

But let us turn from Moses's conduct, (which will be elsewhere considered at large) to his Lordship's, which is our present business.

1. First, he gives us his conjectures, to account for the *omission*, exclusive of Moses's *divine legation*: but, as if dissatisfied with them himself (which he well might be, for they destroy one another).

2. He next attempts, you see, to prove, that the *legation* could not be *divine*, from this very circumstance of the *omission*.

3. But now he will go further, and demonstrate that an *extraordinary providence*, such a one as is represented by Moses, and which, the author of the *Divine Legation* has proved, from the circumstance of the *omission*, was actually administered in the Jewish republic, could not possibly be administered without destroying *free-will*; without making *virtus servile*; and without *relaxing universal benevolence*.

4. And lastly, to make all sure, he shuts up the account by showing, that an *extraordinary providence* could answer no reasonable end or purpose.

In his first and last order of evasions, he seems to be alone; but in the second and third he had the pleasure of seeing many an orthodox writer against the *Divine Legation* in *con-federacy* with him, to use his Lordship's language, when he speaks of the good understanding between *DIVINES* and *ATHEISTS*.

I have examined his first and second order. The third and fourth remain to be considered; it is the last refuge of his infidelity.

1. His principal objection to the administration of an extraordinary providence, such as Moses promised to his people, on the part of God, is, that it would *DESTROY FREE-WILL*. But here let me observe, that he affects to disguise the immediate object of his attack; and, in arguing against an *extraordinary providence*, chooses to consider it in the general, as the point rises out of an imaginary dispute between himself and the *divines*; who, he pretends, are dissatisfied with the present order of things, and require, as the terms of their acquiescence in God's government, the administration of an *equal providence, here*. But, this obliquity in disguising the true object of his attack, not being of itself sufficient to embarrass the question, he further supports it by a prevarication; for it is not true, that *divines* are dissatisfied with the present order of things, or that they require a better. All the ground they ever gave his Lordship for imputing this scandal to them, being only their assertion, "That if the present state be the whole of man's existence, then the justice of God would have more exactly dispensed good and evil *here*; but, as he has not done so, it follows, that there will be a state of rewards and punishments *hereafter*."

This premised, I proceed to his first objection:—"In good earnest," says his Lordship, "is a system of particular providences, in which the Supreme Being, or his angels, like his ministers to reward, and his executioners to punish, are constantly employed in the affairs of mankind, much more reasonable?" [than the *gods* of *EPICURUS* or the *morals* of *POLEMO*.] "Would the *JUSTICE* of God be more *MANIFEST* in such a state of things than in the present? I see no room for *MERIT* on the part of man, nor for *JUSTICE* on the part of God, in such a state."\*

His Lordship asks, *whether the justice of God would be more manifest in such a state of things, where good is constantly dispensed to the virtuous, and evil to the wicked, than in the present, where good and evil happen indifferently to all men?* If his Lordship *by the present state of things*, includes the rectification of them in a future state, I answer, that the *justice of God would not be more manifest*, but equally and fully manifest in either case. If his Lordship does not include this rectification in a future state, then I answer his question by another. Would the justice of the civil magistrate be more manifest, where he exactly dispenses rewards to good men, and punishment to evil, than when he suffers the cunning and the powerful to carve for themselves?

But he sees no room for merit on the part of man, nor justice on the part of God. If he does not see, it is his own fault. It is owing to his prevaricating both with himself and his reader; to the turning his view from the scripture representation of an equal providence, to the iniquities of Calvinistical *election*, and to the partialities of fanatics concerning the favoured workings of the Spirit; and to his giving these to the reader, in its stead. How dexterously does he slide *enthusiasm* and *predestination* into the scripture doctrine of an equal providence!—*If some men were DETERMINED TO GOODNESS by the secret workings of the Spirit, &c.* Yes indeed, if you will be so kind to allow him, that under an equal providence, the will is overruled, he will be able to show you, there is an end of all merit and demerit. But this substituting *ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGY* (as he calls it when he is in a humour to abuse it) in the place of Bible-theology, is his usual leger-de-main. So again,—*I can conceive still less, that individual creatures before they have done either good or evil,*

may, before their actual existence, can be the objects of predilection or aversion, of love or hatred, to God. Who, of the gospel divines, against whom he is here writing, would let him conceive any thing of this at all? It is the ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGER, the depraver, as he says, of the gospel, who would draw him into so absurd a system. But what has exploded *theology*, that abounds only in human inventions, to do with the extraordinary providence, represented in holy writ! To say, that this providence takes away man's merit and God's justice, is confounding all our ideas of right and wrong. Is it not the high merit of a rational creature to comply with that motive which has most real weight? And is not God's justice then most manifest, when the order of things presents fewest difficulties and obscurities in our contemplation of it? His Lordship was plainly in these sentiments when, arguing against God's compliance with the Jewish *hardness of heart*, he thought more becoming the Master of the universe, to bend the perverse stiffness of their will, and, when arguing against a *future state* from the present good order of things, he will shew he says, AGAINST DIVINES AND ATHEISTS IN CONJUNCTION, that there is little or no irregularity in the present dispensations of providence; at least, not so much as the world commonly imagine. And why was this paradox advanced, but from a consciousness that the more exact the present administration of God's providence appeared, the more manifest it was to his justice? But now his Lordship's followers may be apt to say, that their master here done no more, indeed scarce so much, at least not in so express terms, as a celebrated prelate, in one of his *discourses* at the *Temple*; who tells us, "That an immediate visible interposition of providence in behalf of the righteous, and for the punishment of wicked, would INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF MORAL AGENTS, AND NOT LEAVE ROOM FOR THEIR TRIAL."\* But they who object this to us, have not considered the natural moral differences. For, as another learned prelate well observes, "A little experience will convince us, that the same thing, at different times, is not the same."† Now if *different times* may make such alterations in identity, what must *different men* do? The thing being, by all candid interpretation, to be regulated on the *purpose of saying*.

2. Lord Bolingbroke's second objection against an equal providence is, that it will MAKE VIRTUE SERVILE.—"If the good, besides the enjoyment of all that happiness which is inseparable from virtue, were exempted from all kinds of evil, and if the wicked, besides all those evils which are inseparable from vice, and those which happen to all men in the ordinary course of events, were exposed to others that the hand of God inflicted on them in an extraordinary manner, such good men would have VERY LITTLE MERIT; they would have, while they continued to be good, no other merit than that of children, who are cajoled into their duty; or than that of galley slaves, who ply at the oar, because they are afraid to see and fear the lash of the boatswain."‡

If the perfection of a rational creature consist in acting according to reason; and if merit rises in proportion as he advances in perfection; how can that state, which secures him from acting irrationally, lessen or take away his merit? Are the actions of the Deity of less worth for his moral incapacity of being unjust or malignant? The motive which induces to right action is indeed more or less *excellent* according to the dignity of the nature of the agent: but the question here is not concerning the *excellence*, but the power of the motive to turn ACTION into PASSION; which is the only way I can conceive of destroying merit in the subject. Now I hold, that this fancy,—that motives exterior to the being on which they work, are able to turn an agent into a patient, is one of the greatest of *metaphysical* absurdities; and therefore commonly goes about disguised in the garb of *metaphysics*. For while AGENCY remains, MERIT subsists: the degrees of which do not depend on the more or greater force which the motives have on the affections, but on the more or less reason in the choice. In a word, there is no other way of taking away the merit and demerit of human actions, than by taking away agency, and making MAN passive, or, in other terms, A MACHINE.

But, to expose in a more popular way the futility of this reasoning, it will be sufficient to observe, that the objection holds equally against all religious sanctions whatsoever. And indeed it was fairly urged by Lord Shaftesbury: who pretended that every motive regarding SELF, tended to servilize virtue. Without doubt, one sort, just as much as another, in a *future state*, just as well as an *equal providence*. Nay, if we were to appreciate motives very nicely, it would seem, that a *future state without an equal providence* (for they are always to be considered separately, as they belong to different dispensations) would more strongly incline the will, than an *equal providence without a future state*: as the value of the *future* above *present* good is, in this case, immensely great. But the human mind is so constituted, that the *distance* of good takes off proportionably from its influence, and brings the force of the two sanctions nearer to an equality; which at length prove but

\* Vol. ii. pp. 258, 259.

† Scripture vindicated from the Misrepresentations of the Bishop of Bangor, p. 165.

‡ Vol. v. p. 428.

That the objection to the *merit of virtue* holds against all religious sanctions whatsoever. In the use of which objection, Lord Shaftesbury was not only more ingenuous, as he urged it against them *all*, but more consistent, as he urged it on his doctrine of a perfect *disinterestedness* in our nature; whereas Lord Bolingbroke is amongst those who hold, that *self-love* and *social*, though coincident, are two essential principles in the human frame.

“ That two consistent motions act the soul,  
And one regards ITSELF, and one the WHOLE.”

But we might go further, and retort upon both these noble adversaries of religion, that the charge of *making virtue servile* affects all *moral*, as well as *religious* sanctions; as well that, whose existence they allow, as those which they would persuade us to be visionary; both these illustrious patrons of infidelity acknowledging that moral sanction which arises from *God's making the practice of virtue our INTEREST as well as duty*.<sup>\*</sup> Now *interest* and *servility* is, it seems, the same thing, with these generous spirits, as it was with the good old woman, Joinville speaks of, amongst the enthusiasts of Syria, who carried about a pan of live coals in one hand, and a dish of cold water in the other, to burn up paradise and to extinguish hell, that men might be brought to serve God dispassionately without hope or fear.—So near akin are fanaticism and freethinking, that their nature betrays them even when they strive most to hide their common parentage.

His Lordship's third cavil to an equal providence is, that it would RELAX GENERAL BENEVOLENCE.

—“ But would there not be, at the same time, some further defect in this scheme? I think there would. It seems to me, that these good men being thus distinguished by particular providences, in their favour, from the rest of mankind, might be apt either not to contract, or to LOSE THAT GENERAL BENEVOLENCE, which is a fundamental principle of the law of nature, and that PUBLIC SPIRIT, which is the life and soul of society. God has made the practice of morality our interest, as well as our duty. But men who found themselves constantly protected from the evils that fell on others, might grow insensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the common fate: and if they relaxed in their zeal for the public good, they would relax in their virtue; for public good is the object of virtue. They might do worse; spiritual pride might infect them. They might become in their own imaginations the little flock, or the chosen sheep. Others have been so by the mere force of enthusiasm, without any such inducements as those which we assume, in the same case; and experience has shown, that there are no wolves like these sheep.”<sup>†</sup>

The case assumed, to which his Lordship objects, and against which he pretends to argue, is that of an *equal providence which exactly distributes good to virtue, and to vice, evil*. Now the present objection to such a state is, an' please you, that this *favourable distinction* of good, to the virtuous man, would be apt to *destroy his general benevolence and public spirit*. These, in his Lordship's account, and so in mine too, are the most sublime of all virtues; and therefore, it is agreed, they will be most highly rewarded: but the tendency of this *favourable distinction*, if you will believe him, may prove *the loss of general benevolence and public spirit*. As much as this shocks common sense, his Lordship has his reason. “ God has made the practice of morality our INTEREST as well as duty. But men, who find themselves constantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow insensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the common fate.”

*God has made the practice of morality our INTEREST as well as duty*. Without doubt he has. But does it not continue to be our *interest*, under an equal, as well as under an unequal providence? Nay, is it not more evidently and invariably so, in the absence of those inequalities which hinder our seeing clearly, and feeling constantly, that *the practice of morality is our INTEREST as well as duty*?

—“ But men who found themselves constantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow insensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the COMMON FATE.” What are those *evils*, under an equal providence, which *fall on others*, and from which the good man is *protected*? Are they not the punishments inflicted on the wicked? And how is the good man protected from them? Is it not by his perseverance in virtue? It is therefore impossible he should grow unconcerned to those evils which his Lordship calls the *common fate*, when he sees his *interest* and his *duty* so closely connected, that there is no way of avoiding those evils but by persevering in virtue. But the name of *common fate*, which he gives unto them, detects his prevarication. He pretends to reason against an equal providence, yet slurs in upon us, in its stead, a *providence which only protects good men; or rather one certain species of good men; and leaves all other to their COMMON FATE*. But admit it possible, for the good man to *relax in his benevolence, and to grow insensible to the common fate*: there is, in the state here assumed, a speedy means of bringing him to himself; and that is, his being no longer *protected from the evils that fall*

\* Vol. v. p. 429.

† Ib.

were suffered to prevail, amongst the vulgar, and that made the sum of their religion. It seemed to be a point of policy to direct all these absurd opinions and practices to the service of government, instead of attempting to root them out. But then the great difference between rude and ignorant nations and such as were civilized and learned, like the Egyptians, seems to have been this, that the former had no other system of religion than these absurd opinions and practices, whereas the latter had an *inward* as well as an *outward* doctrine. There is reason to believe that natural theology and natural religion had been taught and practised in the ancient Theban dynasty; and it is probable that they continued to be an *inward* doctrine in the rest of Egypt; while polytheism, idolatry, and all the *superstitions*, all the impieties, and all the follies of magic, were the *outward* doctrine. MOSES might be let into a knowledge of both; and under the patronage of the princess, whose foundling he was, he might be initiated into those *mysteries*, where the secret doctrine alone was taught, and the outward exploded. But we cannot imagine that the children of Israel, in general, enjoyed the same privilege, nor that the masters were so lavish, to their slaves, of a favour so distinguished, and often so hard to obtain. No. The children of Israel knew nothing more than the outside of the religion of Egypt; and if the doctrine, we speak of, was known to them, it was known only in the superstitious rites, and with all the fabulous circumstances in which it was dressed up and presented to vulgar belief. It would have been hard therefore to teach, or to renew this doctrine in the minds of the Israelites, without giving them an occasion the more, to recall the polytheistical fables, and practise the idolatrous rites they had learned during their captivity. Rites and ceremonies are often so equivocal, that they may be applied to very different doctrines. But when they are so closely connected with one doctrine that they are not applicable to another, to teach the doctrine is, in some sort, to teach the rites and ceremonies, and to authorize the fables on which they are founded. MOSES therefore being at liberty to teach this doctrine of rewards and punishments in a future state, or not to teach it, might very well choose the latter; though he indulged the Israelites, on account of the hardness of their hearts, and by the divine permission, as it is presumed, in several observances and customs which did not lead directly, though even they did so perhaps in consequence, to the polytheism and idolatry of Egypt.\*

What a Babel of bad reasoning has his Lordship here accumulated out of the rubbish of false and inconsistent principles! And all, to insult the temple of God and the fortress of Mount Sion. Sometimes, he represents MOSES as a divine messenger, and distinguishes between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, unto him; and then, *a future state not being revealed to MOSES was the reason he did not teach it*. Sometimes again, he considers him as a mere human lawgiver, acquiring all his knowledge of religion and politics from the Egyptians, in whose *secret* learning he had been intimately instructed; and then, the reason of the omission is, *lest the doctrine of a future state should have drawn the Israelites into those Egyptian superstitions*, from which, it was MOSES's purpose to estrange them. All these inconsistencies in *fact* and *reasoning*, his Lordship delivers in the same breath, and without the least intimation of any change in his principles or opinions.

But let us follow him step by step, without troubling our heads about his real sentiments. It is enough, that we confute all he says, whether under his own, or any assumed character.

He begins with confessing, that "ONE CANNOT SEE WITHOUT SURPRISE a doctrine so useful to ALL religions, and therefore incorporated into ALL the systems of paganism, left wholly out of that of the Jews."

At length then it appears, that this OMISSION is no light or trivial matter, which may be accounted for, as he before supposed, by MOSES's *disbelief* of the doctrine; his *ignorance* of it; or the *imaginary mischiefs* it might possibly produce. We may be allowed then to think it deserved all the pains the author of the *Divine Legation of Moses* has bestowed upon it: whose WHIMSICAL REASONING, if it ended in a demonstration of the truth of revealed religion, is sufficiently atoned for, though it were a little out of the common road: for in this case the old proverb would hold true, that *the furthest way about is the nearest way home*.

His Lordship proceeds to show, in direct opposition to what he said before, that MOSES could not be ignorant of the doctrine of a future state, because the Egyptians taught it: his knowledge of it, my Lord tells us, further appears from an *internal* circumstance, *some of his rites seeming to allude, or to have a remote relation to, this very doctrine*. This I observe, to his Lordship's credit. The remark is just and accurate. But we are in no want of his *remote relation*: I have shown just above, that the Jewish laws against necromancy necessarily imply MOSES's knowledge of the doctrine.

He then goes on to explain the advantages which, humanly speaking, the Israelites must have received from this doctrine, in the temper and circumstances with which they left Egypt. MOSES, says he, *had to do with a rebellious and superstitious people*. This likewise I observe to his credit: it has the same marks of sagacity and truth: and brings us to the very verge of the *solution*, proposed by the author of the *Divine Legation*; which is, that

---

\* Vol. v. pp. 238—241.

the Israelites were indeed under an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE, which supplied all the disadvantages of the OMISSION. Under a *common and unequal* providence, RELIGION cannot subsist without the doctrine of a future state: for religion implying a just retribution of reward and punishment, which under such a providence is not dispensed, a future state must needs subvene, to prevent the whole edifice from falling into ruin. And thus we account for the fact, which his Lordship so amply acknowledges, viz. *that the doctrine of a future state was most useful to ALL religions, and therefore incorporated into ALL the religions of paganism.* But where an EXTRAORDINARY providence is administered, good and evil are exactly distributed; and therefore, in this circumstance, a FUTURE STATE is not necessary for the support of religion. It is not to be found in the Mosaic economy; yet this economy subsisted for many ages; religion therefore did not need it; or in other words, it was supported by an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE.

This is the argument of the *Divine Legation*. And now, let us consider his Lordship's present attempt to evade it.

*Shall we say, that an hypothesis of future rewards and punishments was useless amongst a people who lived under a THEOCRACY, and that the future judge of other people was their immediate judge and king, who resided in the midst of them, and who dealt out rewards and punishments on every occasion? WHY THEN WERE SO MANY PRECAUTIONS taken? &c.*

First, let me observe, that the PRECAUTIONS here objected to, are intended for an insinuation against the truth of Moses's promise of an *extraordinary providence*. A kind of SOPHISM which his Lordship advances, and only holds in common with the rest who have written against the *Divine Legation*: and which I shall here, after much forbearance on my part, expose as it deserves.

MOSES affirms again and again, that his people were under an *extraordinary providence*. He affirms it indeed; but as it is not a self-evident truth, it needs to be proved. Till then, the unbeliever is at liberty to urge any circumstance in the Jewish law or history, which may seem to bring the *reality* of that providence into question: the same liberty too has the believer; if, at least, he can persuade himself to make use of it; as many, so professing themselves, have done both in their writings and discoursings against the *Divine Legation*. Things were in this train, when I undertook the defence of MOSES: and to obviate all objections to the legislator's credit, arising from any doubtful or unfavourable circumstance in the law or history of the Jews concerning this *extraordinary providence*, I advanced the INTERNAL ARGUMENT of the OMISSION. An argument which necessarily inferred "that an extraordinary providence was in fact administered in the Jewish republic." What change did this make in the state of the case? A very great one. Unbelievers were now indeed at liberty, and believers too, if so perversely inclined, to oppose, and, as they could, to confute the argument of the *Divine Legation*: but by no rules of good logic could they come over again with those scripture difficulties to Moses's credit, which the argument of the *Divine Legation* had entirely obviated, and which it still continued to exclude, so long as it remained unanswered. For while a demonstrated truth stands good, no difficulties arising from it, however inexplicable, can have any weight against that superior evidence. Not to admit this fundamental maxim of common sense, would be to unsettle many a physical and mathematical demonstration, as well as this *moral* one.

I say therefore, as things now stand, to oppose difficulties against the administration of an extraordinary providence, after that providence has been proved, and before the proof has been confuted, is the most palpable and barefaced imposition on our understanding. In which, however, his Lordship is but one of a hundred: and truly, in this, the least indecent and inconsistent of the hundred; as his declared purpose is to destroy the credit and authority of the Jewish lawgiver.

I shall not, however, decline to examine the weight of these objections: though they be so vainly and sophistically obtruded.

"If there was this EXTRAORDINARY providence administered," says his Lordship, "why so many precautions taken? Why was a solemn covenant made with God as with a temporal prince? Why were so many promises and threatenings of rewards and punishments, temporal indeed, but future and contingent, as we find in the book of Deuteronomy, most pathetically held out by Moses?" This difficulty is not hard to be resolved. We find throughout that book which we believers are wont to call the *history of providence*, but which his Lordship is pleased to entitle, *tales more extravagant than those of Amadis de Gaule*, that God, in his moral government of the world, always employs human means, as far as those means will go; and never interposes with his *extraordinary providence*, but when they will go no further. To do otherwise, would be an unnecessary waste of miracles; better fitted to confound our knowledge of NATURE, by obscuring the harmony of order, in such a control of its delegated powers, than to make manifest the presence of its sovereign Lord and Master. This method in God's moral government, all our ideas of wisdom seem to support. Now when He, the great Director of the Universe, had decreed to rule the Jewish people in an extraordinary way, he did not propose to supersede any of the measures



of civil regimen. And this, I hope, will be esteemed a sufficient answer to—WHY SO MANY PRECAUTIONS TAKEN, &c. But the reader will find this argument drawn out more at large, in my remarks on the same kind of sophistry employed by Dr SYKES.

“But,” says his Lordship, “would the hypothesis of a future state have been useless? &c. Would there,” as his Lordship goes on, “have been any more impropriety in holding out those [*sanctions*] of one kind than those of another, because the Supreme Being, who disposed and ordered both, was in a particular manner present amongst them? Would an addition of rewards and punishments (more remote, but eternal, and in all respects far greater) to the catalogue, have had no effect? I think neither of these things can be said.” His Lordship totally mistakes the drift of the argument of the *Divine Legation*, which infers no more, from the fact of the *omission*, than this, that the Jewish economy, administered by an *extraordinary* providence, could do without the service of the *omitted* doctrine; not, that that doctrine, even under such a dispensation, was of *no use*, much less that it was *improper*. But then one of his followers will be ready to say, “If a *future state* was not *improper*, much more if it was of *use*, under an extraordinary dispensation, how came MOSES not to give it?” I reply, for great and wise ends of providence vastly countervailing the use of that doctrine, which, in book sixth of this work, will be explained at large.

Lord Bolingbroke proceeds next to tell us, what occurs to him, concerning the *REASONS* of the *omission*; and previously assures us he is *not over-solicitous about their weight*. This, I suppose, is to make his *counters* pass current: for then they become the *money of fools*, as Hobbes expresses it, when we cease to be *solicitous* about their worth; when we try them by their colour, not their weight; their rhetoric, and not their logic. However, this must be said with an exception to the first, which is altogether logical, and very diverting.

“If,” says his Lordship, “the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and a future state had been revealed to Moses, that he might teach them to the Israelites, he would have taught them most certainly. But he did not teach them. They were, therefore, not revealed.” It is in mood and figure, you see; and, I warrant you, designed to supply what was wanting in the *Divine Legation*: though, as the author of that book certainly believed these *doctrines were not revealed*, it is ten to one but he thought Moses was not at liberty to teach them: unless you can suppose that his Lordship, who believed nothing of revelation, might believe Moses to be restrained from teaching what God had not revealed to him; and yet, that the author of the *Divine Legation*, who held Moses’s pretensions to be true, might think him at liberty to go beyond his commission. Thus far, then, we may be said to agree: but this good understanding does not last long. His Lordship’s *modesty* and my *pertness* soon make the breach as wide as ever.—*Why they were not so revealed*, says his Lordship, *some PERT DIVINE or other will be ready to tell you. For me, I dare not presume to guess.* My forwardness, and his Lordship’s backwardness, are equally well suited to our respective principles. Should his Lordship have guessed, it might have brought him to what he most dreaded, the divine original of the Jewish religion: had I forbore to guess, I had betrayed my cause, and left those *DATA* unemployed, which enabled me, I do not say to guess, but to discover, and to *demonstrate the Divine Legation of Moses*.

However, this, *his Lordship* “will presume to advance, that since those doctrines were not revealed by God to his servant MOSES, it is highly probable, that the legislator made a scruple of teaching them to the Israelites, howsoever well instructed he might be in them himself, and howsoever useful to government he might think them.”

Here, you see, he personates a believer, who holds MOSES to be an inspired lawgiver: but observe how poorly he sustains his part! Either MOSES did indeed receive the *LAW* from God, or he did not. If he did not, why are we mocked with the distinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when nothing was revealed? If MOSES did receive the *law* from God, why are we still worse mocked with the distinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when every thing regarding the dispensation must needs be revealed; as well, the direction to omit a *future state*, as the direction to *inculcate the unity of the Godhead*? Why was all this mockery? the reader asks. For a very good purpose: it was to draw us from the *TRUE* object of our inquiry, which is, what GOD intended by the *omission*; to that *FANTASTIC* object, which only respects what MOSES intended by it. For the intention of GOD supposes the mission and inspiration of a prophet; but the intention of MOSES, when considered in contradistinction to the intention of GOD, terminates in the human views of a mere politic lawgiver; which leads us back again to infidelity.

But he soon strips Moses of his mission, and leaves him to cool, in *querpo*, under his civil character as before. And here he considers, what it was, which under this character might induce Moses to *omit* a future state; and he finds it to be, lest this doctrine should have hurt the doctrine of the *UNITY*, which it was his purpose to inculcate amongst his people, in opposition to the Egyptian polytheism.

“Moses,” says his Lordship, “it is highly probable, made a scruple of teaching these



doctrines to the Israelites, howsoever well instructed he might be in them himself, and howsoever useful to government he might think them. The people of Egypt, like all other nations, were polytheists, but different from all others : there was in Egypt an inward as well as outward doctrine: natural theology and natural religion were the INWARD doctrine; while polytheism, idolatry, and ALL THE MYSTERIES, all the impieties and follies of magic, were the OUTWARD doctrine. Moses was initiated into those mysteries where the secret doctrine alone was taught, and the outward exploded."—For an accurate as well as just divider, commend me to his Lordship. In distinguishing between the *inward* and *outward* doctrines of the Egyptians, he puts *all the mysteries* amongst the *outward*:—though if they had an *inward*, it must necessarily be part of those *mysteries*. But he makes amends presently (but his amends to truth is, as it should be, always at the expense of a contradiction), and directly says, that MOSES LEARNED THE INWARD DOCTRINE IN THE MYSTERIES. Let this pass: he proceeds—"Moses had the knowledge of both outward and inward. Not so the Israelites in general. They knew nothing more than the outside of the religion of Egypt. And if a future state was known to them, it was known only in the superstitious rites, and with all the fabulous circumstances, in which it was dressed up and presented to the vulgar belief. It would be hard therefore to teach or to renew this doctrine in the minds of the Israelites, without giving them an occasion the more to recall the polytheistical fables, and practise the idolatrous rites they had learned during the captivity."

The children of Israel, it seems, "knew no more of a future state, than by the superstitious rites and fabulous circumstances with which it was dressed up and presented to the public belief." What then? MOSES, he owns, *knew more*. And what hindered Moses from communicating of his knowledge to the people, when he took them under his protection, and gave them a new law and a new religion? His Lordship gives us to understand that this people knew as little of the UNITY; for he tells us, it was amongst the *inward* doctrines of the Egyptians: yet this did not hinder Moses from instructing his people in the doctrine of the unity. What then should hinder his teaching them the *inward* doctrine of a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances? He had divested *religious worship* of the absurdities of demigods and heroes; what should hinder him from divesting a *future state* of Charon's boat and the Elysian fields? But the notion of a future state would have recalled those fabulous circumstances which had been long connected with it. And was not religious worship, under the idea of a *tutelar deity*, and a *temporal king*, much more apt to recall the polytheism of Egypt? Yet Moses ventured upon this inconvenience, for the sake of great advantages: why should he not venture on the other, for the sake of greater? for the doctrine of a future state is, as his Lordship confesses, even necessary both to civil and religious society. But why does he talk of the danger of giving entry to the fables and superstitions concerning the soul (superstitions, which, though learned indeed in the captivity, were common to all the nations under polytheism) when in other places he assures us, that Moses indulged the Israelites in the most characteristic superstitions of Egypt?

However, let us see how he supports this profound observation. "Rites and ceremonies," says his Lordship, "are often so equivocal, that they may be applied to very different doctrines. But when they are so closely connected with a doctrine, that they are not applicable to another, to teach the doctrine is, IN SOME SORT, to teach the rites and ceremonies."—*In some sort*, is well put in, to soften the deformity of this inverted logic. His point is to show that a superstitious rite, relating to, and dependent on, a certain doctrine, will obtrude itself whenever that doctrine is taught: and his reasoning is only calculated to prove, that where the rite is practised, the doctrine will soon follow. This may indeed be true. But then it does not hold in the converse, that the rite follows the doctrine: because a principal may stand without its dependent: but a dependent can never subsist without its principal.

Under cover of these grotesque shapes, into which his Lordship has travestied the Jewish lawgiver, he concludes, that MOSES *being AT LIBERTY to teach this doctrine of rewards and punishments in a future state, or not to teach it, he might very well choose the latter*.—Yet it was but at the very beginning of this paragraph that he tells us, *Moses was NOT AT LIBERTY to teach or not to teach*. His words are these, *Since this doctrine was not revealed by God to his servant Moses, it is highly probable that this legislator MADE A SCRUPLE of teaching it*. But his Lordship very well knows that statesmen soon get the better of their scruples: and then, by another fetch of political casuistry, find themselves more at liberty than ever.

I had observed above, that our noble discourser, who makes MOSES so *scrupulous* that he would, on no terms, afford a handle for one single superstition of Egypt to get footing among his people, has, on other occasions, charged him with introducing them in the lump. He was sensible that his inconsistency was likely to be detected, and therefore he now attempts to obviate it.—"Though he [Moses] indulged the Israelites, on account of the hardness of their hearts, and by the divine permission, as it is presumed, in several observations and

customs, which did not LEAD directly, though even they did so perhaps IN CONSEQUENCE, to the polytheism and idolatry of Egypt." And could the teaching the doctrine of a future state possibly do more than LEAD IN CONSEQUENCE (as his Lordship elegantly expresses it) *to the polytheism and idolatry of Egypt*, by drawing after it those *superstitious rites and fabulous circumstances*, which, he tells us, then attended the popular notion of such a state. If, for the *hardness of their hearts*, they were indulged in *several observances and customs*, which only led in consequence to polytheism and idolatry, why, for the *same hardness of heart*, were they not indulged with the doctrine of a future state, which did not lead, but by a very remote consequence, to polytheism and idolatry? Especially since this *hardness of heart* would less bear denying them a DOCTRINE so alluring to the human mind, than denying them a RITE, to which habit only and old custom had given an occasional propensity. Again, those rites indulged to the people, for the *hardness of their hearts*, had, in themselves, little use or tendency to advance the ends of the Jewish dispensation; but rather retarded them: whereas a future state, by his Lordship's own confession, *is most useful to all religions, and therefore incorporated into all the systems of paganism*; and was particularly useful to the Israelites, who were, he says, both a *rebellious* and a *superstitious* people: dispositions, which not only made it necessary to omit nothing that might enforce obedience, but likewise facilitated the reception and supported the influence of the doctrine in question.

The reader has here the whole of his Lordship's boasted solution of this important circumstance of the OMISSION, in the Mosaic law. And he sees how vainly this resolver of doubts labours to elude its force. Overwhelmed, as it were, with the weight of so irresistible a power, after long wriggling to get free, he at length crawls forth; but so maimed and broken, so impotent and fretful, that all his remaining strength is in his venom. And this he now sheds in abundance over the whole Mosaic economy. It is pronounced to be a gross imposture; and this very circumstance of the OMISSION is given as an undoubted proof of the accusation.

—"Can we be surprised then," says his Lordship, "that the Jews ascribed to the all-perfect Being, on various occasions, such a conduct and such laws as are inconsistent with his most obvious perfections? Can we believe such a conduct and such laws to have been his, on the word of the proudest and most lying nation in the world? Many other considerations might have their place here. But I shall confine myself to one; *which I do not remember to have seen nor heard urged on one side, nor ANTICIPATED on the other*. To show then, the more evidently, how ABSURD, as well as IMPIOUS it is to ascribe these Mosaical laws to God, let it be considered, that NEITHER the people of Israel, nor their legislator perhaps, KNEW ANY THING OF ANOTHER LIFE, wherein the crimes committed in this life are to be punished. Although he might have learned this doctrine, which was not so much a secret doctrine, as it may be presumed that the unity of the supreme God was, amongst the Egyptians. Whether he had learned both or either, or neither of them in those schools, cannot be determined: BUT THIS MAY BE ADVANCED WITH ASSURANCE; if MOSES knew that crimes, and therefore idolatry, one of the greatest, were to be punished in another life, he deceived the people in the covenant they made, by his intervention with God. If he did not know it, I say it with horror, the consequence, *according to the hypothesis I oppose*, must be, that God deceived both him and them. In either case, a covenant or bargain was made, wherein the conditions of obedience and disobedience were not fully, nor by consequence, fairly stated. The Israelites had better things to hope, and worse to fear, than those which were expressed in it: and their whole history seems to show how much need they had of these additional motives to restrain them from polytheism and idolatry, and to answer the assumed purposes of divine providence."\*

This argument, "advanced with so much assurance," his Lordship says, "he does not remember to have seen, or heard urged on one side, nor anticipated on the other." A gentle reproof, as we are to understand it, of the author of the *Divine Legation*: for none but he, I think, could *anticipate* an objection to an ARGUMENT which none but he had employed. However, though it be now too late to *anticipate*, we have still time enough to answer.

"Let it be considered," says his Lordship, "that perhaps Moses KNEW NOTHING of another life, wherein the crimes committed in this life are to be punished."—*Considered by whom?* Not by his Lordship, or his kind readers: for his former reasoning, which I will here again repeat, had brought them to *consider* otherwise. These are his words: "Many probable reasons might be brought to show, that this was an Egyptian doctrine before the exode; and this particularly, that it was propagated from Egypt, so soon at least afterwards, by all those who were instructed LIKE MOSES, in the wisdom of that people. He transported much of this wisdom into the scheme of religion and government which he gave the Israelites; and, among other things, certain rites, which SEEM TO ALLUDE, OR HAVE A REMOTE RELATION, TO THIS DOCTRINE."† This possibly might have recurred to his Lordship, while he was

\* Vol. v. pp. 194, 195.

† Vol. v. pp. 328, 329.

heating of his new and *unanticipated* objection; and therefore, in the tricking it up amongst his FRAGMENTS, to his *perhaps*, he adds, by a very happy corrective, "although Moses might have learned this doctrine, which WAS NOT SO MUCH A SECRET doctrine, as it may be presumed that the unity of the supreme God was amongst the Egyptians." But he had done better to leave his contradictions uncorrected, and trust to the rare sagacity of his readers to find them out. He had ever an ill hand at reconciling matters; so in the case before us, in the very act of covering one contradiction, he commits another. He is here speaking of a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances; "Perhaps," says he, "MOSES KNEW NOTHING OF ANOTHER LIFE.—Which was NOT SO MUCH A SECRET doctrine as that of the unity." Now, reader, turn back a moment, to the long quotation from his 230th page, and there thou wilt find, that a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances, WAS AS MUCH A SECRET doctrine, as that of the unity.—"There is reason to believe, that natural theology and natural religion were INWARD doctrines amongst the Egyptians: MOSES might be let into a knowledge of BOTH by being initiated into those *mysteries* where the secret doctrine alone was taught. But we cannot imagine, that the children of Israel in general enjoyed the same privilege. No, *they knew nothing more than the outside* of the Egyptian religion: and if the doctrine we speak of [A FUTURE STATE] was known to them, it was known only in the superstitious rites, and with all the fabulous circumstances, in which it was dressed up and presented to vulgar belief."—Is not this, now, a plain declaration, that a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances, was as much a secret doctrine as the doctrine of the unity?

But his Lordship's contradictions are the least of my concern. It is his present argument I have now to do with: and this, he says, he *advances WITH ASSURANCE*. It is fit he should. *Modesty* would be very ill bestowed on such opinions.

He thinks he can reduce those who hold no future state in the Jewish economy, to the necessity of owning, that MOSES, or that GOD himself, acted *unfairly by the Israelites*. How so, you ask? Because one or other of them concealed that state. And what if they did? Why then they concealed one of the actual sanctions of moral conduct, *future punishment*. But who told him, that this, which, he confesses, was no sanction of the Jewish law, was yet a sanction in the moral conduct of the Jewish people? Who, unless the ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGER? the man he most despises and decries.

And, even in *artificial theology*, there is nothing but the CALVINISTICAL tenet of *original sin*, which gives the least countenance to so monstrous an opinion; every thing in the GOSPEL, every thing in NATURAL THEOLOGY, exclaims against it.

JESUS, indeed, to prove that the departed Israelites still existed, quotes the title God was pleased to give himself, of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; and this, together with their existence, proves likewise the happiness of their condition: for the relation they are said to stand in with God, shows them to be of his kingdom. But we must remember, that the question with his Lordship is, not of reward, but punishment. Again, JESUS speaks (indeed in a parable) of the deceased rich man, as in a place of torment. But we must remember that the scene was laid at a time when the doctrine of a future state was become national. To know our heavenly Master's sentiments on the question of subjection to an unknown sanction, we should do well to consider his words, "The servant which knew his Lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes; but he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes."\* Now the will of a master or sovereign, declared in his laws, never includes in it more than the sanctions of those laws. The author of the epistle to the Hebrews expressly distinguishes the sanction of the Jewish law from that of the gospel; and makes the difference to consist in this, that the one was of temporal punishments, and the other of future. "He that despised Moses's law DIED without mercy, under two or three witnesses: of how MUCH SORER PUNISHMENT, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God?"† Which appeal is without common sense or honesty, on a supposition that the apostle held the Jews to be subject to future punishments, before that sanction was promulged amongst them. From the GOSPEL therefore it cannot be inferred, that the Israelites, while only following the law of Moses, in which the sanction of a future state is not found, were liable or subject to the punishments of that state.

Let us see next, whether NATURAL THEOLOGY, or natural religion (as his Lordship is pleased, for some reason or other, to distinguish the terms), hath taught us, that a people, living under an extraordinary providence or the immediate government of God, to whom he had given a law and revealed a religion, both supported by temporal sanctions only, could be deemed subject to those future punishments, unknown to them, which natural religion before, and revealed religion since, have discovered to be due to bad men living under a common providence.

NATURAL RELIGION standeth on this principle, "That the Governor of the universe

\* Luke xii. 47, 48.

† Heb. x. 28, 29.

REWARDS and PUNISHES moral agents." The length or shortness of human existence comes not primarily into the idea of religion; not even into that complete idea of religion delivered by St Paul, in his general definition of it. The religionist, says he, *must believe that God is, and that he is A REWARDER of those who seek him.*

While God exactly distributed his rewards and punishments *here*, the light of reason directed men to look no further for the sanctions of his laws. But when it came to be seen, that he was *not always* a rewarder and punisher *here*, men necessarily concluded, from his moral attributes, that he would be so, *hereafter*; and consequently, that this life was but a small portion of the human duration. Men had not yet speculated on the permanent nature of the soul; and when they did so, that consideration, which, under an *ordinary* providence, came strongly in aid of the *moral argument* for another life, had no tendency under the *extraordinary*, to open to them the prospects of *futurity*; because, though they saw the soul unaffected by those causes which brought the body to destruction, yet they held it to be equally dependent on the will of the Creator; who, amongst the various means of its dissolution (of which they had no idea), had, for aught they knew, provided one, or more than one, for that purpose.

In this manner was a FUTURE STATE brought, by natural light, into religion: and from thenceforth became a necessary part of it. But under the Jewish THEOCRACY, God was an exact rewarder and punisher, *here*. Natural light therefore evinced that under such an administration, the subjects of it did not become liable to *future* punishments till this sanction was known amongst them.

Thus NATURAL and REVEALED RELIGION show, that his Lordship calumniated both, when he affirmed, that "according to the hypothesis he opposed, MOSES DECEIVED the people in the covenant they made, by his intervention with God: or, that, if Moses did not know the doctrine of a future state, then GOD DECEIVED both him and them."

Should it be asked, how God will deal with wicked men thus dying under the Mosaic dispensation? I will answer, in the words of Dr SAMUEL CLARKE, on a like occasion. He had demonstrated a self-moving substance to be immaterial, and so, not perishable like bodies. But, as this demonstration included the souls of irrational animals, it was asked, "How these were to be disposed of, when they had left their respective habitations?" To which he very properly replies, "Certainly, the omnipotent and infinitely wise God may, without any great difficulty, be supposed to have more ways of disposing of his creatures" [I add, with perfect justice and equity, and with equal measure, to all his creatures, as well accountable as unaccountable] "than we are, at present, let into the secret of."\*—But if the author of the *Divine Legation* has not promised more than he can perform (as his long delay gives his well-wishers cause to suspect and his ill-wishers to hope) this matter will be explained at large, in his account of the SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF THE REDEMPTION, which, he has told us, is to have a place in his last volume.†

Nothing now remains of this objection but what relates to the sanction of *future rewards*: and I would by no means deprive the faithful Israelites of these. His Lordship therefore has this to make his best of: and, in his opinion, the bestowing even of a *reward*, to which one has no title, is foul dealing; for he joins it with *punishment*, as if his consequence, against God's justice and goodness, might be equally deduced from either of them.—"A covenant," says he, "was made, wherein the conditions of obedience and disobedience were not FULLY, nor, by consequence, FAIRLY stated. The Israelites had BETTER THINGS TO HOPE, and worse to fear, than those which were expressed in it." Though it be hard on a generous *benefactor* to be denied the right of giving more than he had promised; it is still harder on the poor *dependent*, that he is not at liberty to receive more. True it is, that in this case, the conditions are not FULLY stated: and therefore, according to his Lordship's logic, BY CONSEQUENCE NOT FAIRLY. To strengthen this consequence, his Lordship concludes in these words—"And their whole history seems to show how much need they had of these additional motives [future rewards and punishments] to restrain them from polytheism and idolatry, and to answer the ASSUMED purpose of divine providence."

Whoever puts all these things together—"That Moses was himself of the race of Israel—was learned in all the wisdom of Egypt—and capable of freeing his people from their yoke—that he brought them within sight of the promised land; a fertile country, which they were to conquer and inhabit—that he instituted a system of laws, which has been the admiration of the wisest men of all ages—that he understood the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE; and, by his knowledge gained in Egypt, was not ignorant of the efficacy of it in general: and by his full experience of the rebellious and superstitious temper of his own people, could not but see how useful it would have been to them in particular."—Whoever, I say, puts all these things together (and all these things are amongst his Lordship's *concessions*) and at the same time considers, that MOSES, throughout his whole system of law and religion, is entirely silent concerning a future state of rewards and punishments, will, I believe, con-

\* Octavo Tracts against Dodwell and Collins, p. 103.

† Book ix. of this edition.

clude, that there was something more in the OMISSION than Lord BOLINGBROKE could fathom, or, at least, was willing to discover.

But let us turn from MOSES's conduct, (which will be elsewhere considered at large) to his Lordship's, which is our present business.

1. First, he gives us his conjectures, to account for the *omission*, exclusive of MOSES's *divine legation*: but, as if dissatisfied with them himself (which he well might be, for they destroy one another).

2. He next attempts, you see, to prove, that the *legation* could not be *divine*, from this very circumstance of the *omission*.

3. But now he will go further, and demonstrate that an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE, such a one as is represented by Moses, and which, the author of the *Divine Legation* has proved, from the circumstance of the OMISSION, was actually administered in the Jewish republic, could not possibly be administered without destroying *free-will*; without *making virtue servile*; and without *relaxing universal benevolence*.

4. And lastly, to make all sure, he shuts up the account by showing, that an *extraordinary* providence could answer no reasonable end or purpose.

In his first and last order of evasions, he seems to be alone; but in the second and third he had the pleasure of seeing many an orthodox writer against the Divine Legation in CONSPIRACY with him, to use his Lordship's language, when he speaks of the good understanding between DIVINES and ATHEISTS.

I have examined his first and second order. The third and fourth remain to be considered; it is the last refuge of his infidelity.

1. His principal objection to the administration of an extraordinary providence, such as MOSES promised to his people, on the part of GOD, is, that it would DESTROY FREE-WILL. But here let me observe, that he affects to disguise the immediate object of his attack; and, in arguing against an *extraordinary providence*, chooses to consider it in the general, as the point rises out of an imaginary dispute between himself and the divines; who, he pretends, are dissatisfied with the present order of things, and require, as the terms of their acquiescence in God's government, the administration of an *equal providence*, *here*. But, this obliquity in disguising the true object of his attack, not being of itself sufficient to embarrass the question, he further supports it by a prevarication; for it is not true, that divines are dissatisfied with the present order of things, or that they require a better. All the ground they ever gave his Lordship for imputing this scandal to them, being only their assertion, "That if the present state be the whole of man's existence, then the justice of God would have more exactly dispensed good and evil *here*; but, as he has not done so, it follows, that there will be a state of rewards and punishments *hereafter*."

This premised, I proceed to his first objection:—"In good earnest," says his Lordship, "is a system of particular providences, in which the Supreme Being, or his angels, like his ministers to reward, and his executioners to punish, are constantly employed in the affairs of mankind, much more reasonable?" [than the *gods* of EPICURUS or the *morals* of POLEMO.] "Would the JUSTICE of God be more MANIFEST in such a state of things than in the present? I see no room for MERIT on the part of man, nor for JUSTICE on the part of God, in such a state."\*

His Lordship asks, *whether the justice of God would be more manifest in such a state of things, where good is constantly dispensed to the virtuous, and evil to the wicked, than in the present, where good and evil happen indifferently to all men?* If his Lordship *by the present state of things*, includes the rectification of them in a future state, I answer, that the *justice of God would not be more manifest*, but equally and fully manifest in either case. If his Lordship does not include this rectification in a future state, then I answer his question by another. Would the justice of the civil magistrate be more manifest, where he exactly dispenses rewards to good men, and punishment to evil, than when he suffers the cunning and the powerful to carve for themselves?

But he sees no room for merit on the part of man, nor justice on the part of God. If he does not see, it is his own fault. It is owing to his prevaricating both with himself and his reader; to the turning his view from the scripture representation of an equal providence, to the iniquities of Calvinistical *election*, and to the partialities of fanatics concerning the favoured workings of the Spirit; and to his giving these to the reader, in its stead. How dexterously does he slide *enthusiasm* and *predestination* into the scripture doctrine of an equal providence!—*If some men were DETERMINED TO GOODNESS by the secret workings of the Spirit, &c.* Yes indeed, if you will be so kind to allow him, that under an equal providence, the will is overruled, he will be able to show you, there is an end of all merit and demerit. But this substituting ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGY (as he calls it when he is in a humour to abuse it) in the place of Bible-theology, is his usual leger-de-main. So again,—*I can conceive still less, that individual creatures before they have done either good or evil,*



may, before their actual existence, can be the objects of predilection or aversion, of love or hatred, to God. Who, of the gospel divines, against whom he is here writing, would have him conceive any thing of this at all? It is the ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGER, the depraver, as he says, of the gospel, who would draw him into so absurd a system. But what has this exploded *theology*, that abounds only in human inventions, to do with the extraordinary providence, represented in holy writ! To say, that this providence takes away man's merit and God's justice, is confounding all our ideas of right and wrong. Is it not the highest merit of a rational creature to comply with that motive which has most real weight? And is not God's justice then most manifest, when the order of things presents fewest difficulties and obscurities in our contemplation of it? His Lordship was plainly in these sentiments when, arguing against God's compliance with the Jewish *hardness of heart*, he thought more becoming the Master of the universe, to bend the perverse stiffness of their will, and, when arguing against a *future state* from the present good order of things, he will show he says, AGAINST DIVINES AND ATHEISTS IN CONJUNCTION, that there is little or no irregularity in the present dispensations of providence; at least, not so much as the world commonly imagine. And why was this paradox advanced, but from a consciousness that the more exact the present administration of God's providence appeared, the more manifest it made his justice? But now his Lordship's followers may be apt to say, that their master has here done no more, indeed scarce so much, at least not in so express terms, as a celebrated prelate, in one of his *discourses* at the *Temple*; who tells us, "That an immediate and visible interposition of providence in behalf of the righteous, and for the punishment of the wicked, would INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF MORAL AGENTS, AND NOT LEAVE ROOM FOR THEIR TRIAL."\* But they who object this to us, have not considered the nature of moral differences. For, as another learned prelate well observes, "A little experience may convince us, that the same thing, at different times, is not the same."† Now if *different times* may make such alterations in identity, what must *different men* do? The thing said being, by all candid interpretation, to be regulated on the *purpose of saying*.

2. Lord Bolingbroke's second objection against an equal providence is, that it would MAKE VIRTUE SERVILE.—"If the good, besides the enjoyment of all that happiness which is inseparable from virtue, were exempted from all kinds of evil, and if the wicked, besides all those evils which are inseparable from vice, and those which happen to all men in the ordinary course of events, were exposed to others that the hand of God inflicted on them in an extraordinary manner, such good men would have VERY LITTLE MERIT; they would have, while they continued to be good, no other merit than that of children, who are cajoled into their duty; or than that of galley slaves, who ply at the oar, because they hear and see and fear the lash of the boatswain."‡

If the perfection of a rational creature consist in acting according to reason; and if his merit rises in proportion as he advances in perfection; how can that state, which best secures him from acting irrationally, lessen or take away his merit? Are the actions of the Deity of less worth for his moral incapacity of being unjust or malignant? The motive which induces to right action is indeed more or less *excellent* according to the dignity or nature of the agent: but the question here is not concerning the *excellence*, but the *power* of the motive to turn ACTION into PASSION; which is the only way I can conceive of destroying merit in the subject. Now I hold, that this fancy,—that motives exterior to the being on which they work, are able to turn an agent into a patient, is one of the greatest of *physical* absurdities; and therefore commonly goes about disguised in the garb of *metaphysics*. For while AGENCY remains, MERIT subsists: the degrees of which do not depend on the less or greater force which the motives have on the affections, but on the more or less reason of the choice. In a word, there is no other way of taking away the merit and demerit of human actions, than by taking away agency, and making MAN passive, or, in other terms, A MACHINE.

But, to expose in a more popular way the futility of this reasoning, it will be sufficient to observe, that the objection holds equally against all religious sanctions whatsoever. And so indeed it was fairly urged by Lord Shaftesbury: who pretended that every motive regarding SELF, tended to servilize virtue. Without doubt, one sort, just as much as another; a *future state*, just as well as an *equal providence*. Nay, if we were to appreciate matters very nicely, it would seem, that a *future state without an equal providence* (for they are always to be considered separately, as they belong to different dispensations) would more strongly incline the will, than an *equal providence without a future state*: as the value of *future* above *present* good is, in this case, immensely great. But the human mind being so constituted, that the *distance* of good takes off proportionably from its influence, this brings the force of the two sanctions nearer to an equality; which at length prove but this,

\* Vol. ii. pp. 258, 259.

† Scripture vindicated from the Misrepresentations of the Bishop of Bangor, p. 115.

‡ Vol. v. p. 428.



That the objection to the *merit of virtue* holds against all religious sanctions whatsoever. In the use of which objection, Lord Shaftesbury was not only more ingenuous, as he urged it against them *all*, but more consistent, as he urged it on his doctrine of a perfect *disinterestedness* in our nature; whereas Lord Bolingbroke is amongst those who hold, that *self-love* and *social*, though coincident, are two essential principles in the human frame.

“ That two consistent motions act the soul,  
And one regards ITSELF, and one the WHOLE.”

But we might go further, and retort upon both these noble adversaries of religion, that the charge of *making virtue servile* affects all *moral*, as well as *religious* sanctions; as well that, whose existence they allow, as those which they would persuade us to be visionary; both these illustrious patrons of infidelity acknowledging that moral sanction which arises from *God's making the practice of virtue our INTEREST as well as duty*.<sup>\*</sup> Now *interest* and *servility* is, it seems, the same thing, with these generous spirits, as it was with the good old woman, Joinville speaks of, amongst the enthusiasts of Syria, who carried about a pan of live coals in one hand, and a dish of cold water in the other, to burn up paradise and to extinguish hell, that men might be brought to serve God dispassionately without hope or fear.—So near akin are fanaticism and freethinking, that their nature betrays them even when they strive most to hide their common parentage.

His Lordship's third cavil to an equal providence is, that it would RELAX GENERAL BENEVOLENCE.

—“ But would there not be, at the same time, some further defect in this scheme? I think there would. It seems to me, that these good men being thus distinguished by particular providences, in their favour, from the rest of mankind, might be apt either not to contract, or to LOSE THAT GENERAL BENEVOLENCE, which is a fundamental principle of the law of nature, and that PUBLIC SPIRIT, which is the life and soul of society. God has made the practice of morality our interest, as well as our duty. But men who found themselves constantly protected from the evils that fell on others, might grow insensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the common fate: and if they relaxed in their zeal for the public good, they would relax in their virtue; for public good is the object of virtue. They might do worse; spiritual pride might infect them. They might become in their own imaginations the little flock, or the chosen sheep. Others have been so by the mere force of enthusiasm, without any such inducements as those which we assume, in the same case; and experience has shown, that there are no wolves like these sheep.”<sup>†</sup>

The *case assumed*, to which his Lordship objects, and against which he pretends to argue, is that of an *equal providence which exactly distributes good to virtue, and to vice, evil*. Now the present objection to such a state is, an' please you, that this *favourable distinction* of good, to the virtuous man, would be apt to *destroy his general benevolence and public spirit*. These, in his Lordship's account, and so in mine too, are the most sublime of all virtues; and therefore, it is agreed, they will be most highly rewarded: but the tendency of this *favourable distinction*, if you will believe him, may prove *the loss of general benevolence and public spirit*. As much as this shocks common sense, his Lordship has his reason. “ God has made the practice of morality our INTEREST as well as duty. But men, who find themselves constantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow insensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the common fate.”

*God has made the practice of morality our INTEREST as well as duty*. Without doubt he has. But does it not continue to be our *interest*, under an equal, as well as under an unequal providence? Nay, is it not more evidently and invariably so, in the absence of those inequalities which hinder our seeing clearly, and feeling constantly, that *the practice of morality is our INTEREST as well as duty*?

—“ But men who found themselves constantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow insensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the COMMON FATE.” What are those *evils*, under an equal providence, which *fall on others*, and from which the good man is *protected*? Are they not the punishments inflicted on the wicked? And how is the good man protected from them? Is it not by his perseverance in virtue? It is therefore impossible he should grow unconcerned to those evils which his Lordship calls the *common fate*, when he sees his *interest* and his *duty* so closely connected, that there is no way of avoiding those evils but by persevering in virtue. But the name of *common fate*, which he gives unto them, detects his prevarication. He pretends to reason against an equal providence, yet slurs in upon us, in its stead, a *providence which only protects good men; or rather one certain species of good men; and leaves all other to their COMMON FATE*. But admit it possible, for the good man to *relax in his benevolence, and to grow insensible to the common fate*: there is, in the state here assumed, a speedy means of bringing him to himself; and that is, his being no longer *protected from the evils that fall*

\* Vol. v. p. 429.

† Ib.

on others: for when men *relax in their benevolence*, his Lordship tells you, *they relax in their virtue*: and, give me leave to tell his Lordship, that when men relax in their virtue an equal providence relaxes in its protection; or, to speak more properly, the rewards of virtue are abated in proportion.

However, *spiritual pride*, he says, *might infect the virtuous, thus protected*: and this will prove *à fortiori*, from the case of ENTHUSIASTS; who only imagine they have this protection, and have it not. Now, what if we should say, it is this very *enthusiastic spirit* itself, and not the visions of *protection* it is apt to raise, which is the true cause of *spiritual pride*? ENTHUSIASM is that temper of mind, in which the imagination has got the better of the judgment. In this disordered state of things, enthusiasm, when it happens to be turned upon religious matters, becomes FANATICISM: and this, in its extreme, begets the fancy of our being the peculiar favourites of Heaven. Now, every one sees, that SPIRITUAL PRIDE is the *cause*, and not the *effect* of the disorder. For what but spiritual pride, springing out of presumptive holiness, could bring the fanatic to fancy himself exalted above the common condition of the faithful? It is true, when he is got thus far, the folly which brought him hither, may carry him further; and then, all to come will be indeed the effect of this disorder. But suppose it were not the enthusiastic spirit, but the visions of protection, it is apt to raise, which is the cause of spiritual pride; is there no difference between a *vision* and a *reality*? Fancy may occasion those disorders which fact may remove. This, I persuade myself, is the case here: the real communication of grace purifies those passions, and exalts them into virtues, which the strong delusion of such a state only renders more gross and violent. And here it may be worth while to take notice, that his Lordship, in this objection to an extraordinary providence, from the hurt it does to general benevolence, seems to have had the *Jewish people* in his eye, who in the latter ages of their republic were commonly charged, and perhaps not altogether unjustly, with want of benevolence to the rest of mankind: a fact, which though it makes nothing for his purpose, makes very much for mine, as it furnishes me with an example to support what is here said of fanaticism; an infirmity pretty general amongst the Jews of those ages. They had outlived their extraordinary providence; but not the memory, nor even the effects of it; nay, the warmer tempers were hardly brought to think it had ceased. This filled them with spiritual pride, as the elect of God; a disposition which, it is confessed, tends readily to destroy or to *relax* general benevolence. But what now are the natural consequences, which the actual administration of an equal providence would have on the human mind? In this case, as in the other, a warm temper, whose object was religion, would be obnoxious to the common weakness of our nature, and too apt to disgrace itself by spiritual pride: but as this is one of the vices which an equal providence is always at hand to punish, the cure would be direct and speedy. The recovered votary, we will now suppose to be received again into the number of the good; and to find himself in the *little flock and chosen sheep*, as they are nicknamed by this noble writer. Well, but his danger is not yet over; the sense of this high prerogative of humanity might revive, in a warm temper, the still unmortified seeds of spiritual pride. Admit this to be the case; what follows? His pride revives indeed, but it is only to be again humbled: for punishment is still closely attendant on vice and folly. At length, this holy discipline, the necessary consequence of an equal providence, effectually does its work; it purifies the mind from low and selfish partialities, and adorns the will with general benevolence, public spirit, and love of all its fellow creatures.

What then could support his Lordship in so perverse a judgment concerning the state and condition of good men under an equal providence? That which supports all his other insults on religion; his sophistical change of the question. He objects to an equal providence (which, religionists pretend, hath been administered during one period of the dispensation of grace) where good men are constantly rewarded, and wicked men as constantly punished; and he takes the matter of his objection from the fanatical idea of a *favoured elect* (which never existed but in over-heated brains), where reward and punishment are distributed, not on the proportions of merit and demerit, but on the diabolic dreams of certain eternal decrees of election and reprobation, unrelated to any human principle of justice.

But now, reader, keep the question steadily in your eye, and his Lordship's reasoning in this paragraph discloses such a complication of absurdities as will astonish you. You see an equal providence, which, in and through the very act of rewarding benevolence, public spirit, and humility, becomes instrumental in producing, in those so rewarded, selfishness, neglect of the public, and spiritual pride.

His Lordship's last objection to an extraordinary providence is, that it would not ANSWER ITS END.

"I will conclude this head," says he, "by observing, that we have *example* as well as *reason* for us, when we reject the hypothesis of particular providences. God was the king of the Jewish people. His presence resided amongst them, and his justice was manifested daily in rewarding and punishing by unequivocal, signal, and miraculous interpositions of

his power. The effect of all was this, the people rebelled at one time, and repented at another. Particular providences, directed by God himself immediately, upon the spot, if I may say so, had particular temporal effects only, none general nor lasting: and the people were so little satisfied with this system of government, that they deposed the Supreme Being, and insisted to have another king, and to be governed like their neighbours."\*

In support of this last objection, the reader sees, his Lordship was forced to throw off the mask, and fairly to tell us what he aimed at; that is to say, to discredit the extraordinary providence mentioned by Moses. An equal providence, says he, will not answer its end. What is its end? Here, his prevarications bring us, as usual, to our distinctions.—When this providence is administered for the sake of *particulars*, its first end is to discipline us in virtue, and keep us in our duty: when administered for the sake of a *community*, its first end is to support the institution it had erected. Now his Lordship, proceeding from reason to example, gives us this of the Jewish republic, to prove that an equal or extraordinary providence does not answer one or other or both these ends.

But it is unlucky for him, that here, where he employs the example, he cannot forbear, any more than in numberless other places of his writings, to tell us that he believes nothing of the matter.—“How long this theocracy may be said to have continued,” says he, “I am quite unconcerned to know, and should be sorry to mispend my time in inquiring.” The example then is unreal, and only brought as an argument *ad hominem*. But, the misfortune is, that no laws of good reasoning will admit such an argument *ad hominem* on this question, of the EFFECTS of a REAL extraordinary providence; because the nature of the effects of a REAL providence can never be discovered by the effects of a PRETENDED one. To say the truth, his Lordship is at present out of luck. For had he indeed believed the extraordinary providence of the Jews to be *real*, his own representation of the case would, on his own principles, have proved it but *pretended*. For it is a principle with him, that where the means do not produce the end, such means (all pretences notwithstanding) are but human inventions. It is thus he argues against the divinity of the Christian religion; which he concludes to be an imposture from its not having effected that lasting reformation of manners, which he supposes was its principal design to accomplish.

So far as to the CHOICE of his example. He manages no better in the APPLICATION of it.

We have distinguished, concerning the *ends* of an extraordinary providence. Let us suppose now, that his Lordship takes the principal end of the Jewish theocracy to be the reformation of *particulars*. He refers to their history, and pretends to show they were not reformed. Now, whatever other consequences may attend this supposed fact, the most obvious and glaring is this; that his Lordship, in proceeding from *reason* to *example*, has given us such an example as overturns or supersedes all his reasoning. According to his reasoning, an extraordinary providence would tie virtue and good manners so fast down upon every individual, that his very will would be forced, and the merit of doing what he had it not in his power to forbear, absolutely destroyed. The reader would now perhaps expect his example should confirm this pretended fact. Just otherwise. His example shows his fact to be a fiction, and that men remained as bad as ever.

But I have no need of taking any artificial advantage of his Lordship's bad reasoning. For, when we see it so constantly opposed to truth, it is far from being an additional discredit to it, that it is as constantly opposed to itself.

The truth indeed is, that the great and principal end of the JEWISH THEOCRACY, was to keep that people a separate nation, under their own law and religion, till the coming of the MESSIAH: and to prepare things for his reception, by preserving amongst them the doctrine of the UNITY. Now, to judge whether the theocracy or extraordinary providence effected its end, we have only to consider, whether this people, to the coming of Christ, did continue a distinct nation separated from all the other tribes of mankind, and distinguished from them, by the worship of the one true God. And on inquiry, we shall find, they not only did continue thus distinct and distinguished, but have so continued ever since. A circumstance which, having no example amongst any other people, is sufficient to convince us, that there must have been some amazing power in that theocracy, which could go on operating for so many ages after the extraordinary administration of it had ceased. Let us conclude, therefore, that his Lordship having nothing to urge against the due efficacy of this extraordinary providence, but that, *the people rebelled at one time and repented at another, and that this providence had only temporary effects*, is the most ample confession of his defeat.

## NOTES ON BOOK V.

---

P. 237, A. YET some writers against the Divine Legation will have it, that from the very context [ver. 16, 17, *To Abraham and his seed were the promises made, &c. The COVENANT that was confirmed before of God in Christ, &c.*] it appears that St Paul means, the law was ADDED not barely to the patriarchal religion, but to *the promise of the inheritance, the covenant that was confirmed before of God*; and from thence, conclude that the Jewish religion had the doctrine of a future state. This it is to have a retrospective view, and with a *microscopic eye*! For had they, when they went *one step backward*, but gone *two*, they would have seen, St Paul could not possibly have had their meaning in view, for at ver. 15, he expressly says,—though it be but a MAN'S COVENANT [much less if it be GOD'S] *yet if it be confirmed, no man disannulleth or ADDETH thereto*. The law therefore mentioned as ADDED in the 19th verse, cannot be understood, in the apostle's sense, as being added to the COVENANT *that was confirmed before of God in Christ*, or indeed to any thing, but to the patriarchal religion of the unity.

P. 245, B. Il [Ninus fils de Belus] ne peut être inventeur de l'idolatrie qui étoit bien plus ancienne; je ne dis pas seulement en Egypte, mais même au delà de l'Euphrate, puisque Rachel déroba les teraphims, &c.—Il faut aller en Egypte pour trouver sur cela quelque chose du mieux fondé. Grotius croit que, du temps de Joseph, l'idolatrie n'étoit point encore commune en Egypt. Cependant on voit des-lors dans ce pays un extrême attachement à la magie, à la divination, aux augures, à l'interprétation des songes, &c.—Moïse défend d'adorer aucune figure, ni de ce qui est visible dans les cieux ni de ce qui est sur la terre, ni de ce qui est dans les eaux. Voilà la défense générale d'adorer les astres, les animaux, et les poissons. Le veau d'or étoit une imitation du dieu Apis. La niche de Moloch, dont parle Amos, étoit apparemment portée avec une figure du soleil. Moïse défend aux Hébreux d'immoler aux boucs, comme ils ont fait autrefois. La mort en l'honneur duquel il défend de faire le deuil, étoit le même qu'Osiris. Beelphegor, aux mystères duquel ils furent entraînés par les femmes de Madian, étoit Adonis. Moloch cruelle divinité, à laquelle on immoloit des victimes humaines, étoit commune du tems de Moïse, aussi-bien que ces abominables sacrifices. Les Chananéens adoroient des mouches et d'autres insectes, au rapport de l'auteur de la sagesse. Le même auteur nous parle des Egyptiens d'alors comme d'un peuple plongé dans toutes sortes d'abominations, et qui adoroit toutes sortes d'animaux, même les plus dangereux, et les plus nuisibles. Le pays de Chanaan étoit encore plus corrompu. Moïse ordonne d'y abattre les autels, les bois sacrés, les idoles, les monumens superstitieux. Il parle des enclos, où l'on entretenoit un feu éternel en l'honneur du soleil. Voilà la plus indubitable époque qui nous ayons de l'idolatrie. Mais ce n'est point une époque qui nous en montre sa source et le commencement, ni même le progrès et l'avancement: elle nous présente une idolatrie achevée, et portée à son comble; les astres, les hommes, les animaux mêmes adorés comme autant de divinités; la magie, la divination, l'impiété au plus haut point où elles puissent aller: enfin le crime, et les désordres honteux, suites ordinaires du culte superstitieux et de règle.—Calmet, Dissert. sur l'Origine de l'Idolatrie, tom. i. pp. 431, 432.—Thus far this learned writer. And without doubt, his account of the early and overbearing progress of idolatry is exact.—Another writer, who would pass for such, is in different sentiments. He thinks its rise and progress much lower. *If we look*, says he, *amongst the Canaanites, we shall find no reason to imagine that there was a religion different from that of Abraham. Abraham travelled up and down many years in this country, and was respected by the inhabitants of it, as a person in great favour with God, &c. And again, Abraham was entertained by Pharaoh without the appearance of any indisposition towards him, or any the least sign of their having a different religion from that which Abraham himself professed and practised.*—Connect. of Sac. and Prof. Hist. vol. i. pp. 309, and 312. But here the learned author was deceived by mere modern ideas. He did not reflect on that general principle of *intercommunity*, so essential to paganism, which made all its followers disposed to receive the God of Abraham as a

true, though tutelary, Deity. Josephus (the genius of whose times could not but give him a right notion of this matter) saw well the consistency between the veneration paid to Abraham's God, and the idolatry of the venerators; as appears from his making that patriarch the first who propagated the belief of one God, after the whole race of mankind was sunk into idolatry; and at the same time making all those with whom he had to do, pay reverence to his God. Of Abraham he thus speaks, *Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ φρονεῖν ἱπ' ἀρετῇ μίζω τῶν ἄλλων ἡργμίνας, καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ δόξαν, ἣν ἅπασι συνίβαιεν εἶναι, καίνισαι καὶ μεταβαλεῖν ἴγων.* *Πρῶτος οὖν τολμᾷ Θεὸν ἀποφύνασθαι δημιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων ἴνα.*—Lib. i. cap. 7. He makes the idolatrous priests of Egypt tell Pharaoh at once, that the pestilence was sent from God in punishment for his intended violation of the stranger's wife: *Κατὰ μῆνιν Θεοῦ τὸ διπλὸν αὐτῷ παρῆναι ἀπιστήματιν οἱ ἱερεῖς, ἵφ' οἷς ἐβίλησιν ἐνυβρίσαι τοῦ ξένου τὴν γυναῖκα.*—Cap. 8. And Abimelech, in the same circumstances, as ready to own the same author of his punishment. *Φράζω πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, ὡς ὁ Θεὸς αὐτῷ ταύτην ἱπαγάγει τὴν νόσον ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδας τοῦ ξένου φυλάσσειν ἀνύβριστον αὐτῷ τὴν γυναῖκα.*—Cap. 12. Antiq.

P. 250, C. These considerations will lead us to a right apprehension of that part of the history of Jesus, where James and John, on the inhospitable behaviour of a village of Samaria, say to their Master, in the legal spirit of the Jewish economy, *Lord, wilt thou that we command fire to come down from heaven and consume them, even as Elias did? But he turned, and rebuked them, and said; Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of. For the Son of man is not come to destroy men's lives, but to save them.*—Luke ix. 54, 55, 56, i. e. You consider not that you are no longer under the dispensation of works (in which a severity of this kind was just and necessary), but, of grace, in which all restraint and punishment of opinions would be mischievous and unlawful. Here we see the very disposition to intolerance in James and John is severely censured. Yet the same temper in Paul, even when proceeding into act, is passed over without reproof, when Jesus, after his resurrection, is pleased to reveal his truth to him in a miraculous manner. Our Lord, instead of condemning the nature of the practice, only assures him of the vanity of its effects, *It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks.*—Acts ix. 5. The reason of this different treatment is evident. James and John had given their names to the religion of Jesus, in which all force was unjust. Paul was yet of the religion of Moses, where restraint was lawful. On this account it is that this apostle, when speaking of his merits as a Jew, expresses himself in this manner, *For ye have heard of my conversation in time past; how that beyond measure I PERSECUTED the church of God, and wasted it: and PROFITED in the Jewish religion above many my equals in mine own nation.*—Gal. i. 13. Here he makes the persecution and the profiting to go hand in hand. And again, *Though I might also have confidence in the flesh. If any other man thinketh that he hath whereof he might trust in the flesh, I more: circumcised the eighth day, of the stock of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, an Hebrew of the Hebrews; as touching the law, a Pharisee; concerning zeal, PERSECUTING THE CHURCH; touching the righteousness which is in the law, blameless. But what things were gain to me, those I counted loss for Christ.*—Phil. iii. 4. Here he glories in the action, as plainly meritorious. And so indeed it was in a Jew, as appears from the commendations given to it in the case of Phineas, and others. Yet where he speaks of it, under his present character of a Christian, he condemns it as horrid and detestable; and this, in order to show his followers how it ought to be regarded in the religion of Jesus. To the Corinthians he says, *I am the least of the apostles; that am not meet to be called an apostle, because I PERSECUTED the church of God.*—1 Ep. xv. 9. And to Timothy, *I thank Christ Jesus our Lord, who hath enabled me, for that he counted me faithful, putting me into the ministry; who was before a blasphemer, and a PERSECUTOR, and injurious. But I obtained mercy, because I did it in IGNORANCE and UNBELIEF; I* Ep. i. 12, i. e. being a Jew.

P. 254, D. Dr Stebbing, though he differs from Mr Foster in most other matters, yet agrees with him in this, "That the justice and equity of the Jewish law in punishing idolaters with death, did not depend on the particular form of government."—*Hist. of Abraham.* In which he is much more consistent than his dissenting neighbour. For the Doctor approves of persecution for opinions; whereas the minister pretends to condemn it.

P. 255, E. It is strange to consider how much *Dr Spencer* has mistaken this matter, where, in his reasons of a theocracy *ex parte seculi*, as he calls them, he gives the following: "Seculi moribus ita factum erat, ut dii sui principatum quendam inter servos suos obtinerent, et nomine rituque regio colerentur. Nam seculo illo deos titulis illis *Moloch, Elohim, Baalim*, et hujusmodi aliis, regibus et magnatibus tribui solitis, insignire solebant: eos imperii arbitros plerumque ponebant, cum nec bella gerere, nec civitatem condere, nec regem eligere, nec grandius aliquid moliri solerent, priusquam deos per oracula vel auspicia consulissent."—Dissert. de Theoc. Jud. cap. iii. p. 237. Ed. Chap. But these are no marks that the pagans attributed any kind of civil regality to their gods. As to their regal titles, those were what they had retained from the time of their real kingship in the state of humanity. And as to the consulting their oracles on all public affairs of moment,



this was the consequence of pagan religion's having a *public as well as private part*. But, for an acknowledged God to be chosen and received by any people as their real monarch or civil magistrate, was a thing altogether unknown to paganism.—The learned Marsham, with his usual bias, endeavours to insinuate, that the institution of a *theocracy* was an imitation of pagan custom: Moses pridem Θεοκρατίαν declaravit Ebraeorum Rempublicam; ne sibi potestas regia deferretur: Athenienses autem Διονεκρατίαν suam ab Apolline retulerunt; ut regis nomen Jovi cederet; neque tam titulus quam potestas regia imminueretur.—Sec. xiii. p. 340.—But the question here is not about the *name*, but the *thing*. The pagans might call their national gods by the name of kings, and, by a bolder figure, might call their government, put under the protection of a tutelary deity, by the name of a *theocracy*: but a real theocracy is that only where the laws of the institution have all a reference to the actual rule of a tutelary god, whether the true God or false ones; and such a theocracy is nowhere to be found but in the land of Judea.

P. 270, F. For this was the only use the pagans ever thought of making of the gods of their enemies when they had stolen them, or taken them away by force. Apion had mentioned one Zabidus an Idumean, who, when the Jews were warring against his countrymen, made a bargain with the enemy to deliver Apollo, one of their tutelary gods, into their hands; and Josephus, when he comes to confute this idle tale, takes it for granted that the only supposed cause of such pretended traffic was to gain a new tutelary deity; and on this founds his argument against Apion: *How then, says he, can Apion persist in accusing us of not having gods in common with others, when our forefathers were so easily persuaded to believe that Apollo was coming into their service?* Τί δ' ἡμῶν ἱεὶ κατηγορεῖ τὸ μὴ κοινὰ ἔχυν τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς, εἰ ῥαδίως οὕτως ἐπίσθηναι οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν, ἄξιον τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα πρὸς αὐτούς.—Vol. ii. p. 478.

P. 282, G. I call them licentious, principally, for the extravagant reasonings concerning the authority of the Pentateuch, and the divine inspiration of scripture. The first he retracted and confuted, when the spirit of contradiction had given way to better principles; the other (which he had inserted into the *letters* as the work of another man) he never, that I know of, atoned for, by any retraction whatsoever.

P. 287, H. Dr Sykes has undertaken to confute the censure here passed upon Dr Spencer. "Here it is," says this answerer, "that Mr W. attacks Dr Spencer's dissertation on the Jewish theocracy. Are we not now from hence to IMAGINE that Dr Spencer was one of those writers that supposed the theocracy to have ended with the judges."—An examination of Mr W.'s account, &c. p. 168. What demands of *imagination* his trade of answering may have upon him, I do not know. But from my words, a fair reasoner would imagine nothing but that I meant to prove what I said: namely, that Dr Spencer's discourse of the theocracy is *weak and inconsistent*.

*His first charge, says he, against Spencer is, that he thought the theocracy was established by degrees, and abrogated by degrees.* "A conceit highly absurd," says Mr W. *But wherein lies the absurdity of this gradual progress and gradual declension?*—Pp. 170. The absurdity lies here. When God is pleased to assume the character of civil magistrate, he must, like all other magistrates, enter upon his office at once, and (as common sense requires) abdicate it at once. Now the government under such a magistrate is what we properly call a theocracy. Therefore to talk of *the gradual progress and gradual declension* of this mode of civil relation, is the same as to talk of the gradual progress and gradual declension of paternity, or any other mode of natural relation; of which, I suppose, till now, nobody ever heard.

He goes on—if there be any absurdity or inconsistency in this manner of speaking, it may be JUSTIFIED by Mr W.'s own authority. That is, my absurdity will justify another man's. But this is doing me an honour which I do not pretend to. Well, but how do I justify Dr Spencer? Why, I say, it seems, "that in the period immediately preceding the Jewish captivity, on the gradual withdrawing of the extraordinary providence from them, they began to entertain doubts concerning God's further peculiar regard to them as his chosen people." So that here, says Dr Sykes, he expressly owns a GRADUAL WITHDRAWING OF THE EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE from the Jews. And where is the absurdity of Dr Spencer's GRADUAL DECLENSION OR IMMINUTION OF THE THEOCRACY which Mr W.'s gradual withdrawing of the extraordinary providence is not liable unto? Or was not the gradual withdrawing of the extraordinary providence a proper imminution of the theocracy?—Pp. 171. He is so pleased with this argument that he repeats it at p. 218. Yet who would have suspected him of what he here discovers, a total ignorance of any difference between the FORM of government and the ADMINISTRATION of it? Now Dr Spencer talked of the gradual decline of the *form of government* which I thought absurd: I spoke of the gradual decline of the *administration* of it; which, whether it be equally absurd, let those determine who have seen (unless perhaps the rarity of the fact has made it escape observation) an *administration* of government grow worse and worse, while the *form* of it still continued the same.



So much as to Spencer's *absurdity*. We come next to his *inconsistency*, in supposing some footsteps of the theocracy till the time of Christ, and yet that it was entirely abrogated by the establishment of the kings. Of this inconsistency, Dr Spencer is absolved, by the dexterity of our answerer, in the following manner:—*Here again is Dr Spencer much misrepresented, from not considering WHAT HE MEANT by the ABROGATION of God's government. Not that the theocracy entirely ceased; but the government received an ALTERATION and ABATEMENT. And therefore he uses more than once the phrase of REGIMINIS MUTATI, in this very section; Where is the absurdity and inconsistency of this way of reasoning, unless abrogation is made to signify a total abolition, and duration is to be construed cessation?*

He asks, *where is the absurdity of this way of reasoning?* I did not accuse Spencer of *absurdity in his way of reasoning*, but of *contradiction in his way of expression*. I see no reasoning there is, or can be, in a man's delivering what he thinks a fact: such as his opinion of the duration of a form of government. But he who cannot distinguish *reasoning from expression*, may be well excused for confounding the *form of government*, and the *administration of government* with one another.

However, Spencer, he says, is *much misrepresented; he did not mean by ABROGATION a CEASING; but an ALTERATION and ABATEMENT*. It seems then, a writer is *much misrepresented* if, when he is charged with an inconsistent *expression*, his *meaning* may be proved consistent. A good commodious principle for the whole class of answerers! But he tells us that *abrogation* [regimen abrogatum] does not signify *ceasing*. Where did he get his Latin? for the Roman writers use it only in the sense of dissolution, abolition, or the *entire ceasing* of an office or command. What then does it signify? ALTERATION, he says, and ABATEMENT. But now where did he get his English? Our country writers, I think, use the word *alteration* to signify a change; and *abatement*, to signify no change; no alteration in the qualities of things, but a diminution only in the vigour of their operations. What the *alteration* of a theocracy, or any other form of government is, we well understand; but what the *abatement* of it is, one is much at a loss to conceive. However, this I know, that Dr Sykes here confirms what I charge upon him, the confounding the mode of government with the administration of it: *alteration* being applicable to the former, and *abatement*, only to the latter.

But his inference from this special reasoning, is worth all the rest—and THEREFORE Spencer uses, more than once, the phrase of regiminis MUTATI, in this very section. Therefore! Wherefore? Why, because by *abrogati* he meant only *abated*, therefore he uses *mutati*, more than once to explain himself. That is to say, “because, by *totum*, I mean *pars*, THEREFORE I use *omne* more than once, to explain my meaning.” Well, if he did not clear it up before, he has done it now.

—And where, says he, is the *absurdity or inconsistency of this way of reasoning?* Nay, for that matter, the *reasoning* is full as good as the criticism. But here he should have stopped; for so fatal is his expression, where the fit of answering is upon him, that he cannot ask quarter for one blunder without committing another—*Unless ABROGATION is made to signify a TOTAL ABOLITION, and duration is construed to be cessation.*—“I can find,” says he, “no absurdity nor inconsistency in Dr Spencer, without perverting the common signification of words:”—*without calling duration cessation.*—This is his argument; and so far was well. But he goes on—and *abrogation a total abolition*. Here he sinks again; for *abrogation* was *abolition*, amongst all nations and languages, till Dr Sykes first pleaded in *abatement*. Well, but our answerer will go farther: and having so ably vindicated Dr Spencer, he will now show, though the Doctor be *consistent*, yet so am not I: for that I hold, the extraordinary providence entirely ceased on the return from the captivity: from whence, says this subtle logician, I argue thus, “If the EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE entirely ceased on the full settlement of the Jews after their return, it ceased some centuries at least before the days of Christ; and CONSEQUENTLY the THEOCRACY must have ceased some centuries before the days of Christ. How then is Mr W. consistent about the duration of the theocracy, since he pleads for its continuance till Christ's time, and yet maintains that it entirely ceased so long before his time?”\*

The argument, we see, gathers even as it rolls from his mouth. In the beginning of the sentence, the *ceasing of an extraordinary providence* only implied in consequence, the *ceasing of the theocracy*; but, before we get to the end, an *extraordinary providence* and a *theocracy* are one and the same thing. “Mr W. pleads for its [a theocracy's] continuance till Christ's time, and yet maintains that it entirely ceased so long before his time. Thus again to the same purpose at p. 178: “Or by what rule does he form a judgment that WHAT was gradually decaying to the captivity, was entirely to cease after their return and full settlement; and yet was to continue till Christ's time?”—Nay, if he begins to talk of rules, let me ask him *by what rule* he found out, “that a *monarchy* and an *exact administration of justice* are one and the same thing?” The truth is, our examiner was thus

\* Examination of Mr W's Account, &c. pp. 173, 174.

grievously misled by the ambiguity of the *English* word THE GOVERNMENT; which signifies either the *MODE* of civil policy, or the *ADMINISTRATION* of it. But was this to be expected of a man who had been all his lifetime writing ABOUT GOVERNMENT?

To conclude this long note. The charge against SPENCER was of *absurdity* and *contradiction* in one single instance amidst a thousand excellences. Dr Sykes assumes the honour of his defence. But with what judgment, he soon gives us to understand, when he could find no other part of that immortal book to do himself the credit of supporting, but the *discourse concerning the theocracy*; much in the spirit of that ancient advocate of Cicero, who, while the patriot's character was torn in pieces by his enemies, would needs vindicate him from the imputation of a wart upon his nose, against his friends.

P. 306, I. It was one of the principal accusations which *Apion*, at that time, brought against the *Jews*, that they would not have gods in common with other nations; as we learn from *Josephus's* tract against him, τί δ' ἡμῶν ἴτι κατηγορεῖ τὸ μὴ κοινὸς ἔχειν τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς.—Vol. ii. pp. 477, 478. And *Celsus* calls that famous maxim, *A man cannot serve two masters* (on which he supposed *Christians* founded the same principle) THE VOICE OF SEDITION when men are for breaking off all society and commerce with the rest of mankind. Εἴθ' ἔξῃς ἱερίοις ἡμᾶς εισάγου λίγοντας πρὸς τὴν ἱσαπέρεσιν αὐτοῦ, θίλλοντες ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς Δαίμονας διαπραΰναι ὅτι οὐκ αἰνέτι δουλεύειν τὸν αὐτὸν πλείοσι κυρίως. Τοῦτο δ', ὡς αἶται ΣΤΑΣΕΩΣ ἵναί φωνήν, τῶν (ὡς αὐτὸς ὠνόμασιν) ἀποτυχιζόντων ἑαυτοὺς καὶ ἀποφρηγνόντων ἀπὸ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων.—*Orig. cont. Cels.* p. 380.

P. 306, K. In his tract against *Apion* he has these remarkable words:—*It is becoming men of prudence and moderation carefully to observe their own country laws concerning religious matters, and to avoid calumniating the customs of others. But this man [Apion] abandoned his own religion, and has since employed himself in inventing lies of ours.* Δὴ γὰρ τοὺς εὐφρονοῦντας τοῖς μὴ οἰκίαις νόμοις περὶ τὴν ἐυσέβειαν, ἀκριβῶς ἱμνέειν, τοὺς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων μὴ λοιδορεῖν· ὃ δὲ τούτους μὴ ἴφρυν, τῶν ἡμετέρων δὲ κατιψύσατο.—Vol. ii. p. 450. This was carrying his complaisance to the gentiles extremely far. But the necessity was pressing; and he misses no opportunity of conciliating their good-will. Thus in his *Antiquities*, a work, as we observed, entirely apologetical, he tells the reader, lib. iii. cap. 6. that the seven branches of the golden candlestick signified the *seven planets*. But in his *Wars of the Jews*, lib. vii. cap. 5. sect. 5. he assures they signify the reverence in which the *Jews* held the *number seven*. But, allegory for allegory, he thought, I suppose, one as good as the other, and therefore might be allowed to use what best served his occasions.

P. 306, L. The *Jews* succeeded in their endeavours to distinguish their case from the *Christians*. So that while the storm fell upon the latter, the other enjoyed a calm. As we may fully understand by that passage in St Paul to the *Galatians*;—*As many as desire to make a fair show in the flesh, they constrain you to be circumcised, only lest they should suffer persecution for the cross of Christ.*—Cap. vi. ver. 12. On which *Limborch* observes very justly,—*Qui non zelo pietatis, aut pro lege Mosis, moti id urgebant; sed tantum ut placerent Judæis; quia nempe videbant persecutiones quotidie magis magisque Christianis a gentibus inferri, Judæos autem ab illis esse immunes, hac ratione eas, tanquam ipsi essent Judæi, studuerunt declinare.*—*Amic. Collatio*, p. 164.

P. 307, M. "There is, amongst many other things that *Josephus's* copy appears to want, one omission of so important a nature—the heinous sin of the golden calf.—What makes it stranger is this, that *Josephus's* account is not only negative, by a bare omission, but positive, by affording an exact coherence without it, *nay such a coherence as is plainly inconsistent with it.* And what still makes it more surprising is, that *Josephus* frequently professes, neither to add to nor to take away from the sacred books."—*Dissert.* II. p. xlv. Some other liberties, which *Josephus* took with scripture for the end above explained, made this learned writer conclude that the historian had an *earlier and more uncorrupt copy of the Old Testament than any we now have: for that his accounts are more exact, consistent, and agreeable with chronology, with natural religion, and with one another.*—P. xxxv. Yet, after all, the fatal omission of the golden calf brings him to confess, that *Josephus's* copy appears to WANT many things which are in ours.—P. xlv. Thus sorely distressed is this good man in the support of a wild extravagant hypothesis; while every one else sees that all the omissions and alterations (which sometimes make his copy good, sometimes bad) were designed deviations from the sacred volumes to conciliate the good-will of his masters.

P. 310, N. Here Dr Sykes appears again upon the stage. "The scripture representation of the theocracy, as Mr Warburton," says he, "assures us, was, 1. *Over the state in general*: and 2. *Over private men in particular.* I have no doubts about the former of these cases: for where a law was given by God, and he condescended to become King of a nation, and a solemn covenant was entered into by the people and by God, as their King, and where blessings were solemnly promised upon obedience to the law, or curses were denounced upon disobedience: and this by one who was able to execute whatever he engaged; no doubt can be about the reciprocal obligations, or about God's performing his part of the obligation, since it is his property not to lie nor deceive. Temporal rewards and punishments being

then the sanction of the Jewish law, these must be dispensed by God so as to make the state happy and flourishing if they keep the law, or else miserable if they disobeyed it. The blessings and curses were general and national, agreeable to the character of a king, and a legal administration: such as related to them as a people; and not to particular persons."

—Exam. of Mr W.'s Account, &c. pp. 186, 187.

Here he assures us, *he has no doubts about the extraordinary providence over the state in general.* And he tells us his reason,—*Because the law was given by God, and he condescended to become the KING of the nation, by a solemn covenant made with the people.* Now if this very reason be found to hold equally strong for an extraordinary providence over PARTICULARS, the point will be soon decided between us. Let me ask him, then, what those reasons are whereby he infers that, from *God's becoming King of a nation*, he must administer an extraordinary providence over the *state in general*, which do not equally conclude for God's administering it over *particulars*? Is not his inference founded upon this, That where God condescends to assume a *civil* character, he condescends to administer it in a *civil* manner? which is done by extending his care over the whole. If our Doctor should say, his inference is not thus founded; I must then beg leave to tell him, that he has no foundation at all to conclude from God's being *King*, that there was an extraordinary providence exerted over the *state in general*. If he confesses that it is thus founded; then I infer, upon the same grounds, an extraordinary providence over *particulars*. For the justice of the regal office is equally pledged to extend its care to *particulars* as to the *general*. It may be asked then, what hindered our Doctor from seeing so self-evident a truth? I reply, the mistake with which he first set out; and which yet sticks to him. I have observed before what confusion he ran into by not being able to distinguish between the *form of government* and the *administration of it*. Here again he makes the same blind work, from not seeing the difference between a LEGISLATOR and a KING.—*For where a LAW, says he, was given by God, and he condescended to become the KING of a nation, &c.,* implying that in his opinion, the *giving a law*, and the *becoming a king*, was one and the same thing. Hence it was, that as the legislative power, in the institution of good laws, extended its providence only over the state in general, he concluded, that the executive power, in the administration of those laws, does no more. Which brings him to a conclusion altogether worthy both of himself and his premises.—*The blessings and curses, says he, were general and national, agreeable to the character of a King and a legal administration.*—What! Is it only agreeable to the character of a king and a legal administration to take care of the *state in general*, and not of *particulars*? So, according to this new system of policy, it is agreeable to the constitution of *England* to fit out fleets, to protect the public from insults, and to enact laws to encourage commerce; but not to erect courts of equity, or to send about itinerant judges. What makes his ignorance in this matter the more inexcusable is, that I had pointed out to him this distinction, in the following passage; the former part of which he has quoted, but dropt the latter, as if determined that neither himself nor his reader should be the better for it. My words are these: *it [the extraordinary providence] is represented as administered, 1. Over the state in general. 2. Over private men in particular. And such a representation we should expect to find from the nature of the republic; BECAUSE AS AN EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE OVER THE STATE NECESSARILY FOLLOWS GOD'S BEING THEIR TUTELARY DEITY [in which capacity he gave them laws], SO AN EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE TO PARTICULARS FOLLOWS AS NECESSARILY FROM HIS BEING THEIR SUPREME MAGISTRATE [in which capacity he administered them].*

P. 310, O. To this it has been objected, "That Solomon here prays for scarce so much in behalf of his own people, as he doth, ver. 32, for every *stranger* that shall come and worship in the temple." But the objector should have observed that there is this difference,—the prayer for the Israelites was founded on a covenant; the prayer for the stranger, on no covenant. That for the Israelites begins thus, *O Lord God of Israel, there is no god like thee, which KEEPETH COVENANT*—and as he proceeds, the reason of his petition all along goes upon their being possessors of the *promised land*, the great object of the covenant, ver. 25, 27, 31. But the prayer for the *stranger*, ver. 32, is founded altogether on another principle, namely, for the sake of God's glory amongst the heathen. *Moreover concerning the stranger [words implying a new consideration] if they come and pray in this house, then hear from the heavens*—THAT ALL PEOPLE OF THE EARTH MAY KNOW THY NAME AND FEAR THEE.

P. 311, P. But the whole book of psalms is one continued declaration of the administration of an extraordinary providence to particulars, in the exact distribution of rewards and punishments.—See the *argument of the Divine Legation fairly stated*, pp. 57 to 75, where the learned writer has evinced the truth in question beyond the possibility of a reply.

P. 311, Q. To this testimony from Ezekiel, Dr Sykes objects, that "It is but a parabolical command: and no argument can be drawn from parables for an equal providence over particulars, but at most for a particular and peculiar dispensation."—*Defence*, p. 61. This is the pleasantness of answerers.—If this *parabolical command* does not mean what itself says it does mean, namely, "that virtuous individuals should be distinguished from

the wicked, in a general calamity;" what then does it mean? Why, *at most, but a particular and peculiar dispensation*. And in what, I pray you, does a *particular and peculiar dispensation* consist, if not in a distinction between the virtuous and the wicked, in a general calamity? But he had some confused notion that there was a difference between a parabolical and a real representation: and therefore he makes it to consist in this, that *no argument can be drawn from the former*.—Now, if from Jesus's parable of the rebellious husbandmen (who wounded their Lord's servants and killed the heir, and for their pains were ejected from their possessions, and the vineyard let to other husbandmen) I should conclude, "that he meant the Jews, who had murdered the prophets which were sent unto them, and were ready to murder the Messiah likewise, and that for this crime they should be deprived of the blessing of the gospel, and the gentiles received into the kingdom of Christ, in their stead, I make no doubt but, if it served our Doctor's purpose of *answering*, he would reply, *It is but a parabolical tale, and no argument can be drawn from parables, of Christ's sufferings and the rejection of the Jews, &c. but, at most, that the Jews were rebels and murderers, and would be treated as such.*"

Another answerer is yet more shameless. "As to the parabolical command in Ezekiel," says Dr Rutherford, "the very same promises were exactly fulfilled to the Christians."—*Rev. vii. 1, 2, 3.* If you ask *when, where, and how*, you would embarrass, but not disconcert him. Yet, as he assures us, these promises were exactly fulfilled to Christians, he must give us leave to assure him, that it could be only in a *spiritual* sense: for St Paul tells us, that the Jews had the *promise of the life that now is*, and the Christians of *that which is to come*. I doubt then the learned professor was a little disoriented when he called the *promises* in Ezekiel and the Revelation *the same*. There is a strange perversity in these men. The promises under the *law*, they tell us, are to be understood SPIRITUALLY, and this, in order that they may bring Judaism to Christianity: but then, to bring Christianity back to Judaism, they tell us on the other hand, that the promises under the *gospel* are to be understood CARNALLY. But what is to be expected, or rather what is not to be expected, from a man who dares to assert, that there was no more an extraordinary providence under the Jewish than under the Christian dispensation; in open defiance of the prophets and the apostles, of Moses and of Jesus Christ.

P. 311, R. Yet Dr Sykes scruples not to say, "The passage from Amos does not prove an *equal* or *unequal* providence, but a peculiar interposition OCCASIONALLY administered."—Def. p. 61. As I would be willing that every thing of this learned answerer's should be put to use, I would recommend this observation to the reader as a paraphrase on the words of the apostle, where he says that, under the Mosaic dispensation, "the word spoken by angels was STEDFAST, and EVERY transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward."—Heb. ii. 2.

P. 312, S. To this Dr Sykes replies, "The equal providence over the Jews by his own confession had ceased some hundred of years, and therefore at the writing of this epistle, *tribulation* was deemed by nobody more an opprobrium of the Jews, or a punishment of their crimes, than it was of other people."—Defence, p. 62. This great divine did not perceive that St Paul is here speaking of the different *genius* of the two religions, Judaism and Christianity, not of the *condition* of the two people at the time he wrote: and consequently, as what was once true would be always true, the apostle considers the *nature* of the two dispensations as invariable.

P. 314, T. The writer of the *first book of Maccabees* appears to have lived in the times he wrote of; and we find no wonders nor prodigies in his history. But a long time after comes the author of the *second book*, an epitomizer of one Jason of Syrene; and he largely supplies what he thought the other wanted. This man is such a lover of prodigies, that, when he has made a monstrous lie, and so frightened himself at the size of it that he dare not tell it out, he insinuates it, as chap. xii. ver. 22.—*ἐν τῇς τοῦ πάρα ἱερουργίας ἐκφανίας*. Chap. xv. ver. 27. *τῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐκφανίᾳ*. Nay, he even ventures at an apology for *lying wonders*, chap. xv. ver. 11, and under this encouragement falls a-lying to some purpose, chap. xii. ver. 16.

P. 317, U. I will only observe at present, what the least reflection on this matter so naturally suggests, that this *complaint of inequality* never could have come from *good men*, as it did even from *Jeremiah* himself, who thus expostulates with the Almighty: "Righteous art thou, O Lord, when I plead with thee: yet let me talk with thee of thy judgments: Wherefore doth the way of the wicked prosper? Wherefore are all they happy that deal very treacherously? Chap. xii. ver. 1. It never, I say, could have come from such men, had they been *at all acquainted* with the doctrine of a *future state of rewards and punishments*; or had they not been *long accustomed* to an *extraordinary providence*.

P. 317, X. Mr Chubb, in some or other of his tracts, has, as I remember, made an unusual effort; an effort to be witty. He observes, that the author of the *Divine Legation* has done the unbeliever's business for him; "by proving that an equal providence was *promised*; while the Bible shows that it was not *performed*." But he might have known, that



the author did not furnish infidelity with this foolish objection; it lay open to them. And he might have seen, that the folly of it was here effectually exposed. However, Mr Chubb was a very extraordinary personage; and might have said with the reasoning rustic in *Moliere*,—*Oui, si j'avois étudié, j'aurois été songer à des choses ou l'on n'a jamais songé.* As it was, he did wonders. He began with defending the reasonableness of Christianity, and carried on his work so successfully, that, before he gave over, he had reasoned himself out of religion.

P. 323, Y. The atheist *Vanini*, indeed, seems to rank Moses in the number of those politicians, who, he says, promised a *future state* that the cheat might never be found out.—*In unica naturæ lege, quam natura, quæ Deus est (est enim principium motus) in omnium gentium animis inscripsit. Cæteras vero leges non nisi figmenta et illusiones esse asserebant, non a cacodæmone aliquo inductas, fabulosum namque illorum genus dicitur a philosophis, sed a principibus ad subditorum pædagogiam excogitatas, et a sacrificulis ob honores et auri aucupium confirmatas, non miraculis, sed scriptura, cujus nec originale ullibi adinvenitur, quæ miracula facta recitet, et bonarum ac malarum actionum repromissiones polliceatur, in futura tamen vita, ne fraus detegi possit.*—*De Admirandis Naturæ Arcanis.*

P. 325, Z. The miserable efforts of these men to evade the force of a little plain sense is deplorable. “Moses,” says one of them, “could not omit the mention of the *devil* for the reason given by the author of the Divine Legation, because he mentions him expressly, and represents him as the patron, if not as the author, of idolatry.” Deut. xxxii. ver. 17.—Rutherford’s Essay, p. 294.—The words of Moses are these,—“They sacrificed to devils, not to God; to gods whom they knew not, to new gods that came newly up, whom your fathers feared not.” The Hebrew word here translated *devils*, is *schedim*, which, the best interpreters tell us, has another signification. The true God being *Schaddei*, the *omnipotent and all-sufficient*; the gentile gods, by a beautiful opposition, are called *schedim*, *counterfeit gods*. And the context, where they are called *new gods*, shows this interpretation to be the true. But admit that, by *schedim* is to be understood *evil spirits*: by these spirits are not meant fallen angels, but the souls of wicked men. These were the *demons* of paganism; but the *devils* discovered by revelation have a different nature and original: accordingly the Septuagint, which took *schedim* in the sense of the souls of wicked men, translates it by *δαίμονια*.

P. 326, A A. Dr Sykes in disputing with me, as we have seen above, on this question; *Whether the extraordinary providence was only over the state in general, or whether it extended to particulars*, having sufficiently puzzled himself and his reader; to recover the ground he had lost, on a sudden changes the question, and now tells us that it is; “Whether an extraordinary providence was administered to particulars IN SUCH A MANNER that no transgressor of the law escaped punishment, nor any observer of the law missed his reward;”—“which Mr Warburton represents,” says he, “to be the state of the Jews under an equal providence.”—Exam. pp. 187, 188. Now what his drift was in this piece of management, is easily understood. It was to introduce a commodious fallacy under an ambiguous expression; which would be always at hand to answer his occasions. And indeed, the cautious reader (and I would advise no other to have to do with him) will suspect no less, when he observes that the words, [*no transgressor escaped punishment, nor any observer of the law missed his reward,*] quoted from me, are not to be found in that place where I state the nature of the extraordinary providence; but here, where I speak of the consequences of it, in the words above—*We have shown at large, &c.* What now has this ANSWERER done? He has taken the words [*no transgressor escaping punishment, nor any observer of the law missing his reward*] from their natural place; misrepresented their purpose; and given them to the reader as my DEFINITION of an extraordinary providence to particulars. And not content with all this, he has put a false and sophistical sense upon them, *viz.* THAT NO ONE SINGLE PERSON, WITHOUT EXCEPTION, ever escaped punishment, or missed his reward. And in this sense, by the vilest prevarication, he repeats and applies them, on every following occasion, as the sole answer to all my reasonings on the subject of an extraordinary providence. It will be proper then to show, that the words could not mean, by any rules of just construction, that every *single person, without exception*, was thus punished and rewarded; but only that this extraordinary providence over particulars was so exactly administered, that no one could hope to escape it, or fear to be forgotten by it.

First then, let it be observed, that the words are no absolute assertion; but a consequence of something asserted.—AND THEN *no transgressor escaping, &c.* which illative words the honest examiner omitted.—What I had asserted was simply this, that the extraordinary providence over the Jews, was in scripture represented as administered over particulars; but that this very administration would of necessity be attended with some inequalities. Must not then the consequence I draw from these premises be as restrained as the premises themselves? Secondly, I said, that God had promised an equal providence to particulars, but that he had declared, at the same time, how it should be administered, *viz.* in such a

manner as would occasion some few exceptions. If therefore Dr Sykes would not allow me, he ought to have allowed God Almighty at least, to explain his own meaning. Thirdly, Had the words been absolute, as they then might have admitted of two senses, did not common ingenuity require, that I should be understood in that which was easiest to prove, when either was alike to my purpose? But there was still more than this to lead an ingenuous man into my meaning; which was, that he might observe, that I used, throughout my whole discourse of the Jewish Economy, the words *extraordinary providence* and *equal providence*, as equivalent terms. By which he might understand that I all along admitted of exceptions. Fourthly, If such rare cases of exception destroyed an equal providence to *particulars*, (which providence I hold,) it would destroy, with it, the equal providence to the *state*, (which Dr Sykes pretends to hold.) But if not for the sake of truth in opinion, yet for fair dealing in practice, Dr Sykes should have interpreted my words, not absolutely, but with exceptions. For thus stood the case. He quoted two positions from the *Divine Legation*. 1. That there was an extraordinary providence over the state in general. 2. Over private men in particular. He grants the first; and denies the second. But is not the extent of that providence understood to be in both cases the same? Now in that over the *state*, he understands it to have been with exceptions, as appears from his own mention of the case of Achan, p. 190; and of David, p. 197. Ought he not, then, by all the rules of honest reasoning, to have understood the proposition denied, in the same sense he understands the proposition granted? If in the administration over the state in general, there were some few exceptions, why not in that over private men in particular?

But if now the candid reader shall ask me, why I employed expressions, which, when divorced from the context, might be abused by a caviller to a perverse meaning, I will tell him. I used them in imitation of the language of the apostle, who says that, under the Jewish economy, *EVERY transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward.*\* And if he be to be understood with latitude, why may not I?

P. 327, B B. But as GOD acted with them in the capacity of the Creator and Father of all men, as well as of tutelary God and King, he was pleased at the same time, to provide that they should never lose the memory of the attributes of the Almighty: and therefore adds,—“And showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my commandments.”—Numb. xiv. 18; Deut. v. 40.

P. 327, C C. “The author of the *Divine Legation*,” says Dr Sykes, “goes on, and observes that this punishment [of visiting the iniquities of fathers upon their children] was *only to supply the want of a future state*. But how will this extraordinary economy SUPPLY this want? The children at present suffer for their parents’ crimes; and are supposed to be punished when they have no guilt. Is not this a plain act of *HARDSHIP*? And if there be no future state or compensation made, the hardship done must continue for ever a hardship on the unhappy sufferer.”—Exam. of Mr W.’s Account, pp. 202, 203. For a reasoner, it would be hard to find his fellow. 1. The question is, whether this law of punishing, was a SUPPLY to the want of a future state? If it laid hold of the passions, as he owns it did, it certainly was a SUPPLY. However, he will prove it was none. And how? Because it was a *HARDSHIP*. 2. He supposes, I hold, that when children were punished, in the proper sense of the word, they were innocent; whereas I hold, that then they were always guilty. When the innocent were affected by their parents’ crimes, it was by the deprivation of benefits, in their nature forfeitable. 3. He supposes that if Moses taught no future state, IT WOULD FOLLOW, that there was none.

P. 327, D D. To this it hath been objected—“As to the proof, that visiting the iniquities of parents on their children was designed to supply the want of a future state, because in a *new dispensation*, it is foretold, that this mode of punishing will be changed; this argument will not be admitted by the deists, who do not allow that a *new dispensation* is revealed under the phrase of a *new covenant*.” Here the objector should have distinguished.—The deists make two different attacks on revelation. In the one, they dispute that order, connexion, and dependency between the two dispensations, as they are delivered in scripture, and maintained by believers: in the other, they admit (for argument’s sake) this representation of revealed religion; and pretend to show its falsehood, even upon that footing. Amongst their various arguments in this last method of attack, one is, that the Jewish religion had no sanction of a *future state*, and so could not come from God.—See Lord Bellingbroke’s Posthumous Writings. The purpose of this work is to turn that circumstance against them: and from the omission of the doctrine, demonstrate the divine original of the law. So that the reader sees, I am in order, when, to evince a *designed omission*, I explain the law of punishing the crimes of fathers on the children, from the different natures of the two dispensations; as going upon principles acceded to, though it be only *disputandi gratia*, by the deists themselves.

P. 327, E E. It hath been objected, “That the prophet here upbraids the Jews as

\* Heb. ii. 2.



blamable in the use of this proverb." Without doubt. And their fault evidently consisted in this, That they would insinuate that an *innocent* posterity were punished for the crimes of their forefathers; whereas we have shown, that when *the children's teeth were set on edge*, they likewise had been tasting.

P. 328, F F. Dr Stebbing has thought fit to support this charge of contradiction urged by Spinoza and Tindal, very effectually. He insults the author of the *Divine Legation* for pretending to clear up a difficulty, where there was none. "He [the author of the *Divine Legation*,] has also justified the equity of *another* law, that of *punishing posterity for the crimes of their forefathers*.—Though it is one of the plainest cases in the world, that God doth this EVERY DAY in the ordinary exercise of his providence."—*Hist. of Abr.* p. 89.—Moses says, *God will visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children*. JEREMIAH and EZEKIEL say as expressly, that *God will not do so*. See, exclaim Spinoza and Tindal, the discordances and contradictions amongst these prophets. Softly, replies the author of the *Divine Legation*. You mistake the matter; the contradiction is all a fiction of your own brains: Moses speaks of the *Jewish* dispensation; and Jeremiah and Ezekiel, of the *Christian*. I deny that, cries Dr Stebbing: *punishing posterity for the crimes of their fathers is done every day under the Christian dispensation*. And thus the objection of Spinoza and Tindal, by the kind pains of Dr Stebbing, remains not only unanswered, but unanswerable. And yet this is the man, whose zeal would not let him rest till he had rescued revelation from the dishonours brought upon it by the author of the *Divine Legation*.

P. 329, G G. Yet Dr Sykes modestly tells his reader, that "there is not any ground or foundation for this distinction; for that the innocent posterity were sometimes deprived of life for the crimes of their parents in virtue of this law."—But here, as the Doctor has not to do with me, but with the prophet, I leave it to be adjusted between them, as the public shall think fit to arbitrate.—Another has even ventured to ask, "How the posterity, if it suffer for its own guilt, can be said to suffer for the transgressions of its parents?" As this doubt arises from the prophet's words, *Your iniquity and the iniquities of your fathers together, &c.*, I think myself not concerned to satisfy it, till these writers have more openly rejected the authority of the prophets.

P. 329, H H. It is observable that by our own constitution, no forfeitures attend capital condemnations in the Lord High Admiral's and Constable's courts. And why? the reason is plain; those judicatures proceed on the Roman, and not on the municipal laws of a feudal government. Not but that the necessities of state frequently obliged other governments, which never had been feudal, to have recourse to an extemporaneous confiscation. Even Rome itself sometimes exercised the severity of this punishment, even before it fell under the foot of its tyrants. Cicero, to excuse the confiscations decreed against Lepidus, which affected his children, the nephews of Brutus, says to this latter; *Nec vero me fugit quàm sit acerbum, parentum scelera filiorum poenis lui. Sed hoc PRÆCLARE LEGIBUS COMPARATUM est, ut caritas liberorum amiciores parentes reipublicæ redderet.*—*Ep. ad Brutum*, lib. Ep. 12. And again. *In qua videtur illud esse crudele, quod ad liberos, qui nihil meruerunt, poena pervenit. SED ID ET ANTIQUM EST, ET OMNIUM CIVITATUM.*—*Ep. 15.* Again, the same necessities of state have obliged governments which had been originally feudal, but were so no longer, to retain this *law of forfeiture*, essential to feudal government even after all the feudal tenures had been abolished. But he, who would see the *LAW OF FORFEITURES* defended on the more general principles of natural justice and civil policy, may have full satisfaction, in the very elegant and masterly discourse so intitled.

P. 330, I I. Here Dr Sykes, who so charitably takes the *deists'* part, all the way, against the author of the *Divine Legation*, says, "It would have been well TO HAVE TOLD US what this doctrine was which was brought to light, and which held up these daring transgressors, and which continued them after death the objects of divine justice."—*Defence*, p. 83. Can the reader, when he casts his eye upon the text, and sees that *I had told him*, in so many words and letters, that it was a *FUTURE STATE*, think the grave Doctor in his senses? But this quotation from him will have its use. It will serve for a specimen and example of the miserable dispositions with which an *answerer by profession* addresses himself to confute writers who have taken some pains to consider their subject, and to express their meaning.

He goes on objecting to this *unknown* doctrine. He asks "*how this doctrine did these things?*" That is, how the doctrine of a *future state* could extend beyond the present life. This shows at least, he was in earnest in his ignorance, and perfectly well assured that *I had not told him what the doctrine was*.

He proceeds with his interrogations, and asks why the punishing children for their fathers' faults, had no further use after the bringing in a future state. I had told him long ago, it was because the punishment was employed only to supply the want of a future state. But to this, he replies,—*nothing hindered its being added to the doctrine of a future state*. It is very true: nor did any thing hinder *temporal rewards* from being added to the doctrine of a future state under the gospel; yet when a future state was brought to light, by that dispensation, both one and the other were abolished. But is it not a little strange that the Doctor,

in thus insisting on its *further use*, on account of its being able to restrain more daring spirits, by laying hold of their instincts, at all times, as well under an *unequal* as under an *equal* providence, should not see he was arguing against the DIVINE WISDOM, which by the mouth of the prophet declared it of no further use under the gospel dispensation?

P. 331, K K. Ezechielis sententias adeo sententiis Moësis repugnantes invenerunt Rabini, qui nobis illos (qui jam tantum extant) libros prophetarum reliquerunt, ut fere deliberaverint, ejus librum inter canonicos non admittere, atque eundem plane abscondissent, nisi quidam Chanania in se suscepisset ipsum explicare, quod tandem magno cum labore et studio (ut ibi narratur) alunt ipsum fecisse, qua ratione autem non satis constat.—*Spinoza Tract. Theologico-Pol.* pp. 27, 28. In the mean time it may be worth observing, that the explanation which I have here offered, cuts off the only means the modern Jews have of accounting for their long captivity upon the principle of the LAW's being still in force. Limborch urges Orobio with the difficulty of accounting for their present dispersion any other way than for the national crime of rejecting Jesus as the Messiah; seeing they are so far from falling into pagan idolatries, the crime which brought on their other captivities, that they are remarkably tenacious of the Mosaic rites. To which Orobio replies, "that they are not their own sins for which they now suffer, but the sins of their forefathers." Now Ezekiel has declared (and I have reconciled that declaration to the *law and the prophets*) that this mode of punishment hath been long abolished.

P. 332, L L. Having thus reconciled the two prophets, Moses and Ezekiel, on this point, one may be allowed to wonder a little at the want of good faith even in M. Voltaire, when it comes to a certain extreme.

This celebrated poet has, like an honest man, written in defence of RELIGIOUS TOLERATION: and to enforce his argument, has endeavoured (not indeed like a wise one, who should weigh his subject before he undertakes it) to prove, that all religions in the world, but the Christian, have tolerated diversities of opinion. This common weakness of rounding one's system, for the support of a plain right which requires no such finishing, hath led him into two of the strangest paradoxes that ever disgraced common sense.

The one, that the *pagan emperors* did not persecute the Christian faith: the other, that the *Jewish magistrate* did not punish for idolatry.

In support of the first, his *bad faith* is most conspicuous: in support of the latter, his *bad logic*.

If there be one truth in antiquity better established than another, it is this, That the pagan emperors did persecute the Christians, *for their faith only*; established, I say, both by the complaints of the persecuted, and the acknowledgment of their persecutors. But this being proved at large in the preface to this very volume,\* it is enough to refer the reader thither.

The other paradox is much more pleasantly supported. He proves that the Mosaic law did not denounce punishment on religious errors (though in direct words, it does so,) nor did the Jewish magistrate execute it (though we have several instances of the infliction recorded in their history.)—And what is the convincing argument he employs? It is this, *The frequent defections of the Jewish people into idolatry, in the early times of their apostasies.* An argument hardly so good as this,—*The church of Rome did not persecute, as appears from that general defection from it, in the sixteenth century.* I say, M. Voltaire's argument is hardly so good as my illustration of it, since the defection from the church of Rome still continues, and the Jewish defections into idolatries were soon at an end.

But we are not to think, this paradox was advanced for nothing, that is, for the sake of its own singular boldness (a motive generally sufficient to set reason at defiance), nor even for the support of his general question. It was apparently advanced to get the easier at his darling subject, THE ABUSE OF THE MOSAIC RELIGION, that *Marotte* of our party-coloured philosopher.—Take this instance, which is all that a cursory note will be able to afford.

M. Voltaire, speaking of the *rewards and punishments* of the Jewish dispensation, expresses himself in this manner: "Tout était temporel; et c'est la preuve que le saint Evêque Warburton apporte pour démontrer que la loi des Juifs, était divine; parce que Dieu même étant leur Roi, rendant justice immédiatement auprès la transgression ou l'obéissance, n'avoit pas besoin de leur révéler une doctrine qu'il réservait au tems, ou'il ne gouvernerait plus son peuple. Ceux qui par ignorance prétendent que Moïse enseignait l'immortalité de l'âme, ôtent au Nouveau Testament un de ses plus grands avantages sur l'ancien."—P. 132. Would not any one now believe (who did not know M. Voltaire) that he quoted this argument as what he thought a good one, for the divinity of the Mosaic religion? Nothing like it. It was only to find occasion to accuse the Old Testament of contradiction. For thus he goes on;—"Cependant malgré l'énoncé précis de cette loi, malgré cette déclaration expresse de Dieu, qu'il punirait jusqu' à la quatrième génération: *Ezechiel* annonce TOUT LE CONTRAIRE aux Juifs, et leur dit, que le fils ne portera point

\* See Preface to Books IV. V. VI. edit. 1754, in the first volume of this edition.—Ed.

l'iniquité de son père: il va même jusqu' à faire dire à Dieu, qu'il leur avait *donné des préceptes qui n'étaient pas bons.*"—P. 133.

As for the *precepts which were not good*, the reader will see that matter explained at large, as we go along. What I have to do with M. Voltaire at present, is to expostulate with him for his ill faith; that when he had borrowed my argument for the divinity of the *Mosaic mission* from that mode of punishment, he would venture to invalidate it from an apparent contradiction between MOSES and EZEKIEL; when, in that very place of the *Divine Legation* which he refers to, he saw the two prophets reconciled by an argument drawn from the true natures of two approximating dispensations; an argument which not only removes the pretended contradiction (first insisted on by *Spinoza*, and through many a dirty channel, derived, at length, to M. Voltaire), but likewise supports that very mark of divinity which I contend for.

But it is too late in the day to call in question the religion or the good faith of this truly ingenious man. What I want, in this Discourse *sur la Tolérance* is his CIVIL PRUDENCE. As an ANNALIST, he might, in his *General History*, calumniate the Jewish people just as his passions or his caprice inclined him: but when he had assumed the character of a divine, to recommend *toleration* to a Christian state, could he think to succeed by abusing *revelation*? He seems indeed, to have set out under a sense of the necessity of a different conduct: but coming to his darling subject an abuse of the Jews, he could not, for his life, sustain the personage he had assumed, but breaks out again into all the virulence and injustice with which he persecuted this unhappy people in his *General History*; and of which the reader will see a fair account, in the beginning of book fifth of this work.

P. 332, M M. This is the precise character of the writings of the Old Testament. And this state of them (to observe it only by the way) is more than a thousand answers to the wild suspicions of those writers, who fancy that the Jews, since Christ, have corrupted their sacred scriptures, to support their superstitions against the gospel; and amongst other erasements have struck out the doctrine of life and immortality; which, say these visionaries, was, till then, as plainly taught in the Old as in the New Testament: for had these supposed impostors ever ventured on so bold a fraud as the adulterating their sacred writings, we may be well assured their first attempt would have been to add the doctrine of a future state, had they not found it there, rather than to take it away if they had: since the omission of the doctrine is the strongest and most glaring evidence of the *imperfection of the law*; and the insertion of it would have best supported what they now hold to be one of the most *fundamental* points of their religion.—But this is not a folly of yesterday. Irenæus tells us that certain ancient heretics supported their wild fancies against scripture, which was against them, by the same extravagant suspicion, that it had been interpolated and corrupted. Notwithstanding, I am far from thinking these moderns borrowed it from them. They found it in our common nature, which always goes the nearest way to work, to relieve itself.

P. 333, N N. We shall now understand the importance of a remark, which the late translator of Josephus employs to prove the genuineness of a fragment or homily, given by him to that historian: "There is one particular observation," says he, "belonging to the contents of this fragment or homily, that seems to me to be DECRETORY, and to determine the question that some of this Jewish church, that used the Hebrew copy of the Old Testament, nay rather, that Josephus himself in particular was the author of it. The observation is this, that in the present address to the Greeks or gentiles there are near forty references or allusions to texts of the New Testament; AND NOT ONE, TO ANY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT either in Hebrew or Greek; and this in a discourse concerning HADES; which yet is almost five times as often mentioned in the Old Testament as in the New. What can be the reason of this but that the Jewish church at Jerusalem used the Hebrew Bible alone, which those Greeks or gentiles, to whom the address is here made, could not understand; and that our Josephus always and only used the same Hebrew Bible?"—*Mr Whiston's Dissert.* prefixed to his *Transl. of Josephus*, p. 105.—*What can be the reason*, says he, *of this mystery?* He unfolds it thus: *The Jewish church of Jerusalem used the Hebrew Bible alone, which those Greeks or gentiles, to whom the address is here made, could not understand.* So that because the audience did not understand Hebrew, the preacher could not quote the texts, he had occasion for, in Greek. But he supposes the author could not quote the Greek, because it must needs have been that of the *Septuagint*; which the Jewish church at Jerusalem would not use. Now admit there were no other Greek to be had, or allowed of, can any man believe that if this Jewish preacher would turn himself to the gentiles, he could be such a bigot as to be afraid of quoting the Old Testament in a language they understood, because his church used only the original, which they understood not? Or if he had been such a bigot, would he have dared to preach to the gentiles at all? What then but the fondness for an hypothesis could make men ramble after such reasons, when so obvious a one lies just before them? Why did he this, do you ask? For this plain reason: his subject was a *future state of reward and*

*punishment*, and he had more sense than to seek for it where it was not to be found. *But HADES is almost five times as often mentioned in the Old Testament as in the New.* Indeed! But the fragment is not about the *word*, but the *thing*. In the Old Testament it signified the receptacle of *dead bodies*; in the New, the receptacle of *living souls*. But though this learned writer can, without doubt, laugh at those who seek the *Trinity* in the Old Testament, yet he can in good earnest go thither in search of a *future state*. Yet this latter is not in any comparison so clearly hinted at as the other: and no wonder; a future state is circumscribed to the New Testament, as *brought to light* by the gospel; but the doctrine of the Trinity is no where said to be so circumscribed.

P. 334, O O. To all this Dr Stebbing has an *answer* ready. "The history of the persecution under Antiochus," says he, "is written by two historians, namely, the author of the first book of Maccabees, and the author of the second. This last writer has recorded the profession of the martyrs concerning their belief of the doctrine of the resurrection; but the first has entirely omitted it: nor is there one word about a resurrection or future state to be found throughout his whole history, though it is certain it was now the national belief. So UNSAFE a thing is it to rely upon the MERE silence of historians, when they undertake to write a history *not of doctrines* but of the transactions of men."—*Exam.* p. 116.

I will tell him of an unsafer thing: which is, venturing to draw *parallel cases*; as he has done here; for they may happen (as hath happened here) to be *cases most unlike*.

In a large and miscellaneous volume, composed by various writers of different times and states, and containing the law, the religion, and the history of the Jews, from Moses to the captivity, neither the doctrines of the resurrection nor a future state are ever once mentioned.

This is the fact. And to obviate my inference from it.—"That the Jews, during that period, were unacquainted with the doctrines," this able divine opposes the two books of *Maccabees*, containing the story of one short period, when, it is confessed, these doctrines were of national belief; in the first of which books, there is no mention of the doctrine, and in the second, a great deal: the reason both of the mention and of the silence being self evident. It is recorded in the *second* book, where there is a detailed account of the martyrs for the Jewish faith: it is omitted in the *first*, where there is no account of any such thing.

Yet these are brought as *parallel cases*: let us therefore do them all honour.

1. Several volumes of the sacred canon contain a *history of doctrines*.

The two books of Maccabees contain only a *history of civil transactions*.

2. None of the inspired writers of the canon before the captivity, ever once mention the doctrines of a resurrection or a future state.

Of the two books of Maccabees, one of them mentions the doctrines fully and at large.

3. The sacred canon comprises a vast period of time, and treats of an infinite variety of matters.

The two books of Maccabees are small tracts of a uniform subject, and contain only the story of one revolution in the Jewish state.

Unconscious, as should seem, of all this difference, the learned Doctor concludes—*So unsafe a thing is it to rely on the MERE SILENCE of historians, when they undertake to write a history NOT OF DOCTRINES, but of the transactions of men.* In which, these THREE FALSEHOODS are very gravely and magisterially insinuated: that the writers of the two books of Maccabees are equally *silent* with the writers of the canon: 2. That all the writers of the canon are writers of a history, *not of the doctrines*, but merely of the civil transactions of men, equally with the writers of the two books of Maccabees: and 3. That the thing relied on by me, is the MERE SILENCE of historians. Which falsehood if the reader does not see from what has been said above, he may be pleased to consider, that *mere silence* is when a writer omits to say a thing which it was indifferent to his purpose whether he said it or not. But when he omits to say a thing, which it was much to his purpose to say, this is not a *mere silence*. It is a *silence* attended with a *circumstance*, which makes the evidence drawn from that *silence* something more than negative, and consequently, something more than *mere silence*. So much for Dr Stebbing.

A Cornish writer \* pursues the same argument against the *Divine Legation*; but takes his *parallel* much higher. "There is no one," says he, "who reads HOMER, that can doubt whether a future state were the popular belief amongst the Greeks in the times he writes of. And yet, by what I remember of him, I believe it would be difficult to produce SIX instances, in all his poems, of any actions either entered upon or avoided from the EXPRESS motive of the rewards or punishments to be expected in the other world."

I infer it from a future state's NEVER being mentioned in the Jewish history, amongst the motives of men's actions (after it had been omitted in the Jewish law and religion), that it was not of popular belief amongst that people. Now here comes an answerer, and says, that it is not mentioned above SIX TIMES EXPRESSLY in Homer, and yet that nobody can

\* Mr Peters.

doubt whether it were not the popular belief amongst the Greeks. The good cautious man ! Had it been but ONCE EXPRESSLY mentioned in the Old Testament, I should no more have doubted of its being of popular belief amongst the Jews, than he does. Why then do we doubt so little, in the case of the Greeks, but for the same reason why we ought to doubt so much in the case of the Jews ! HOMER (who gives a detailed account of a future state), this writer allows, has mentioned it about *six times* as a motive. The SCRIPTURES (which, together with the history, deliver the law and religion of the Jews, in which a future state is omitted) mention it not *once* as a motive. But this answerer would make the reader believe, I made my inference from the *paucity*, and not from the *want*, of the mention. The same may be observed of another expression of this candid gentleman's—*express motive*. Now much less would have satisfied me ; and I should readily have allowed that the Jews had the popular belief amongst them, had the *motive been once fairly implied*.

But let us take him at the best, and suppose Homer did not afford one single instance. What, I pray you, has HOMER in common with MOSES ? Suppose, I should affirm from the Greek history, that the ancient WORTHIES always proportioned their work to their strength and bulk ; and that my answerer was not in a humour to let this pass ; but, to confute me, would press me with the high achievements of TOM THUMB, as they are recorded in his authentic story ; who was as famed for his turbulence in king Arthur's court, as Achilles was in Agamemnon's : would not this be just as much to the purpose, as to put the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* in parallel with the *law and the prophets* ?

But Homer's poems have been so long called the bible of the *pagans*, that this answerer appears, in good earnest, to have taken them for *religious history* ; otherwise how could it have ever entered into his head, to make so ridiculous a comparison ? my reasoning with regard to SCRIPTURE stood thus :—As all good history deals with the motives of men's actions, so the peculiar business (as it seems to me) of *religious history* is to scrutinize their *religious motives* : of these, the principal is the consideration of a future state. And this not being so much as once mentioned in the ancient Jewish history, it is natural to conclude that the Jews of those times had it not. But now, what have Homer's poems to do in this matter ? I apprehend they are no *religious history* ; but compositions as far removed from it as possible, namely, a *military and civil* romance, brimful of fabulous trumpery. Now in such a work, the writer surely would be principally solicitous about the *civil* motives of his actors. And Homer, who is confessed to understand what belonged to every kind of composition, would take care to keep within his subject ; and, to preserve decorum, would content himself with supplying his warriors and politicians with such motives as might best set off their wisdom and their heroism : such as the *love of power*, in which I comprise, revenge on their enemies ; the *love of plunder*, in which is included their passion for fair captives ; and the *love of glory*, in which, if you please, you may reckon their regard for their friends and their country.—But in Homer's military and political romances *there are hardly six instances in which a future state is mentioned as the express motive* ; therefore the perpetual silence on this point, in the *religious history* of the JEWS, and the perpetual mention of it in the *religious histories* of the SUXI and the SARACENS, conclude nothing in favour of the argument of the *Divine Legation*.

P. 334, P P. To this Dr Stebbing objects, that “ it means no more than that man was not to be restored to his earthly human state.”—Exam. p. 60. And, to confirm this, he appeals to the tenth verse of this chapter, which runs thus, *He shall return no more to his house, neither shall his place know him any more*. But the learned Doctor should have reflected, that if Job says the dead man *returns no more to his house*, he gives a reason for his so saying, very inconsistent with the Doctor's interpretation of the 9th verse of the viith chapter. It was, because the dead man was got into *the land of darkness and the shadow of death* [chap. x. 21.] it was because he was *not awake nor could be raised out of his sleep* [chap. xiv. 12.] But the very subject which Job is here treating, confutes the Doctor's interpretation : He is complaining that life is short, and that after death *he shall no more see good*, for that he *who goeth down to the grave shall come up no more ; he shall return no more to his house* [ver. 7, 8, 9, 10.] ; which at least *implies* that there was no good to be expected any where, but in this world : and this expectation is cut off in *express terms*.

P. 335, Q Q. To this sense of the text Dr Stebbing objects, and says, that *by no reward is meant none in this world*.—Exam. pp. 63, 64. And in support of his interpretation, quotes the words of the verse immediately following—*neither have they any more a portion for ever in any thing that is done under the sun*. Now I agree with the learned Doctor, that these words are an explanation of the foregoing, of the *dead's not having any more a reward* : and from thence draw just the contrary inference, that the sacred writer, from the consideration of the dead's not returning to life to enjoy their reward, concluded that, when once death had seized them, they could have no reward at all ; not even that imaginary one, the living in the memory of men, *for the memory of them*, says he, *is forgotten*. So again from the consideration in ver. 6. that the dead *had neither love, hatred, nor envy*, he had concluded, ver. 5, that THEY KNEW NOT ANY THING.—But the premises



and the conclusion not being in their usual order, our learned Doctor's logic did not reach to take the force of the preacher's.

P. 340, R R. To all this, it hath been said,—“Christians have the promise of the life that now is, excepting the case of persecution,” Mark x. 30. The words of Jesus in the evangelist are,—*there is no one that hath LEFT house or brethren, &c., for my sake and the gospel's, but he shall receive an hundred fold now in this time, houses and lands, &c., with persecutions, and in the world to come, eternal life.* But these words evidently allude to the first followers of Jesus, while the church was under an extraordinary providence, that is, during the age of miracles: and as that sort of dispensation is always aided by the course of natural and civil events, we easily see how it would be promoted by LEAVING a country doomed to the most horrid and exterminating destruction. But St Paul, where he assigns only *the life which is to come* to the followers of the gospel, is speaking of a different thing, namely, of the genius of the Christian dispensation in general, as it is opposed to Judaism.

P. 341, S S. The serious reader, who considers all this, will not be a little surprised to hear that eminent scholar and divine, Dr Samuel Clarke, talk in the following manner, where, after having spoken of the doubts and uncertainties of the ancient philosophers concerning a future state, he concludes in these words.—“From all which it appears, that, notwithstanding all the bright arguments and acute conclusions and brave sayings of the best philosophers, yet *life and immortality* were not FULLY and SATISFACTORILY brought to light by BARE NATURAL REASON.”—Evid. of Nat. and Rev. Relig. p. 146.—It would be very strange if they had; since scripture is so far from allowing any part of this discovery to *natural reason*, that it will not admit even the Mosaic revelation to a share, but reserves it all for the gospel of CHRIST: so that had natural religion brought *life and immortality to light*, though not *fully and satisfactorily*, the learned apostle would be found to have spoken much too highly of the prerogatives of the gospel.

The truth is, the very learned writer had two points to make out, in this famous work; the one was the *evidence of natural religion*; and, under that head, he is to show, that it taught life and immortality. His other point was, the *evidence of revealed religion*, and there, to show its use and necessity, he is to demonstrate that bare natural reason could not discover life and immortality. Thus the very method of his demonstration obliged him, in the former part, to give to natural religion an honour which, in the latter part, he was forced to take away: and to reconcile them with one another, was the purpose of the conciliating words above—*yet life and immortality were not FULLY and SATISFACTORILY brought to light by bare natural reason*: which indeed does the business; but it is at the expence of the learned apostle, who says it was not brought to light at all, till the preaching of the gospel.

P. 341, T T. To this it has been said, “that the *mystery of the gospel* here mentioned, is rather that which is meant by the word, chap. iii. ver. 3—9, namely, the calling in of the gentiles to be fellow-heirs with the Jews.”—For a confutation of this absurd fancy, read —*The Free and Candid Examination of the Principles advanced by the Lord Bishop of London*, chap. i. p. 24. et seq., where the learned and most judicious author has sufficiently exploded it.



THE  
DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES  
DEMONSTRATED.

---

BOOK VI.—SECT. I.

[I.] AFTER such convincing evidence that a FUTURE STATE did not make part of the religion of MOSES, the reader would not have suspected, he must once more be stopped to hear a long answer to a set of texts brought from the *Old* and *New* Testament to prove, *that the doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment DID make the most essential part of the Mosaic dispensation*: and this, not by a few fanciful allegorists, or outrageous bigots only, who will say or do any thing; but by many sober men of all sects and parties, of all times, and of all religions.

I. Several of the ancient CHRISTIAN writers were so persuaded of this point, that, not content to say, the doctrine of a future state made part of the Mosaic dispensation, they would be confident that the very pagans learned it all from thence. Some modern Christians have not been behind them in their *faith*, but have far outstripped them in their *charity*, while they treated the denial of this extravagant opinion as a new species of infidelity. It is true, they are all extremely confused and obscure about the way they represent it to have been taught: and there have not been wanting, at all times, men of the greatest eminence for parts and piety, who have not only doubted, but plainly denied this future state to be in the Mosaic religion; though, to be just to all, with the same inconsistency and embarrassment that the others have maintained it.\* However, the more current doctrine hath always been, *that a future state of rewards and punishments was taught by the law of Moses*.

As surprising as this may seem to those who have weighed the foregoing evidence, yet indeed no less could be expected from such a number of concurrent and oddly combined prejudices, which have served, till now, to discredit one of the clearest and most important truths of revelation.

1. The first was, that several patriarchs and prophets, both before and under the Mosaic dispensation, were certainly favoured with the

\* See note A, at the end of this book.

revelation of man's *redemption*; in which the doctrine of a future state is eminently contained: and they think it utterly incredible that these should not have conveyed it to their people and posterity.

2. They could not conceive how a religion could be worthy of GOD, which did not propose to its followers a future state of rewards and punishments; but confined their views to the carnal things of this life only.

3. The truth, here attempted to be established, had been received and *abused* by the enemies of all true religion and godliness; such as the Sadducees of the old Jewish church, the Gnostics of the old Christian, and unbelievers in all churches.

4. Lastly, men were kept fast within the error into which these prejudices had drawn them, by never rightly distinguishing between a future state of reward and punishment, as taught by what men call *natural religion*, and a future state as taught by *Christian revelation*; which is the **CLEW**, as we shall see hereafter, to conduct us through all the errors and perplexities of this *region of darkness*, till we come into the full and glorious *light of the gospel*.

But in religious matters, combinations much less strange are sufficient to defeat the credit of the plainest fact. A noted instance of what **OBSTINACY** alone can do against the self-evidence of truth, will abate our wonder at the perversity in question; at least it may be put to use, in the *history of the human mind*, towards which, will be found materials, neither vulgar nor few, in the course of this work. There is a sect, and that no inconsiderable one, which, being essentially founded in enthusiasm, hath, amongst other of its strange freaks, thrown out the institution of **WATER BAPTISM** from its scheme of Christianity. It is very likely that the illiterate founder, while rapt in his fanatic visions, did not reflect that, of all the institutions of our holy religion, this of *water baptism* was least proper to be called in question; being most invincibly established by the practice both of **PAUL** and **PETER**. This latter finding that the household of Cornelius the **GENTILE** *had received the Holy Ghost*, regarded it as a certain direction for him to admit them into the church of Christ, which he did by the initiatory rite of *water baptism*.—Acts x. 47. Paul, in his travels through the Lesser Asia, finding some of the **JEWISH** converts, who had *never heard of the Holy Ghost*, and, on inquiry, understanding they had been only baptized by water unto *John's baptism*, thought fit to baptize them with water in *the name of the Lord Jesus*, that is, to admit them into the church; and then *laying his hands upon them, the Holy Ghost came upon them, and they spake with tongues, and prophesied*.—Acts xix. 4, 5, 6.

In spite of these two memorable transactions, the Quakers have notwithstanding rejected *water baptism*. What is the pretence? "*Water baptism*," it seems, "is John's baptism, and only a type of baptism by the Holy Ghost or by fire; so that when this last came in use, the former ceased and was abolished." Yet in the two histories given above, both

these fancies are reprov'd; and in such a manner as if the stories had been recorded for no other purpose: for in the adventure of Paul, the *water baptism of Jesus* is expressly distinguished from the *water baptism of John*; and, in that of Peter, it appears, that *water baptism* was necessary for admittance into the church of Christ, even after the ministration of *baptism by fire*, or the communicated power of the Holy Ghost. It is further observable, that these two heads of the mission to the two great divisions of mankind, the JEWS and GENTILES, here acted in one another's province; Peter the apostle of the Jews administering baptism to the gentile household of Cornelius; and Paul the apostle of the gentiles administering the same rite to the Jewish converts. And why was this crossing of hands, but to obviate that silly evasion, that *water baptism* was only partial or temporary?

But what is reason, evidence, or truth, when opposed to religious prejudice! The Quakers do not hold it to be clearer, that *repentance from dead works* is necessary for obtaining the spiritual benefits of the gospel covenant, than that WATER BAPTISM is abolished, and of no use to initiate into the church of Christ.

II. But to proceed. The error in question is, as we said, not confined to the Christian church. The Jews too maintain it with equal obstinacy, but not with equal indiscretion; *the children of this world are, in their generation, wiser than the children of light*;\* their fatal adherence to their long abolished rites depending altogether upon this single prejudice, that Moses taught a future state of rewards and punishments: for if he taught it not, the consequence is inevitable, his religion could only be *preparatory* to one that did teach it. This therefore is their great support; and wisely have they enforced it by all the authority and power of the synagogue.† But what Christians gain by so doing, I confess I know not. What they lose hath been seen in part, and will be more fully shown hereafter: not one demonstration only, of the truth of the Mosaic mission, but all true conception of that divine harmony which inspires every part, and runs through the whole of God's great dispensation to mankind.

III. The error is still more extensive; and hath spread from true religion to the false; a fitter soil for its reception. For the MAHOMETANS, who hold the divine original of the Jewish law, are as obstinate as the best, in giving it this mistaken advantage: but, it must be owned under a modester pretext. Their expedient for saving the honour of the law is this: they confess the doctrine of a future state is not at present to be found there: BUT THOUGH IT BE NOT THERE, IT OUGHT TO BE; for that the Jews, in pure spite to them, have interpolated their Bible, and taken away all mention of it.‡

\* Luke xvi. 8.

† See Vol. i. book iv. Dedication to the Jews.

‡ *Taourat*.—Les Musulmans disent, que c'est l'ancien Testament, que Dieu revela à Moïse écrit en langue Hébraïque, livre qui a été altéré et corrompu par les Juifs.—C'est là le sentiment des Musulmans qui a été recueilli de plusieurs auteurs Arabes par *Hagi Khalfah*. Le même auteur dit—que l'on n'y trouve pas aussi aucun endroit où il soit

Matters being in this odd situation, the reader will excuse me, if I turn a little to consider those texts of scripture which CHRISTIAN writers have produced to prove, *That a future state of rewards and punishments does indeed make part of the Mosaic religion.*

[II.] But here let me observe, that the thing of most consequence in this part of my discourse will be to state the question clearly and plainly. When that is done, every common reader will be able, without my help, to remove the objections to my system; or rather, the question being thus truly stated, they will fall of themselves.

I. My declared purpose, in this work, is to demonstrate *the divine legation of MOSES*, in order to use it for the foundation of a projected defence of revelation in general, as the dispensation is completed in Christianity. The medium I employ for this purpose is, that there was *no future state of reward and punishment in the Mosaic religion.* I must needs therefore go upon these two principles:—1. That *Moses did not disbelieve a future state of reward and punishment.* 2. That *his religion was preparatory to the religion of JESUS which taught such future state.* Hence proceed these consequences:

1. From my holding that *Moses did not disbelieve a future state*, it follows, that all those texts of scripture which are brought to prove that *the ancient Jews believed the soul survived the body*, are nothing to the purpose: but do, on the contrary, greatly confirm my thesis: for which reason I have myself shown that the early Jews did indeed suppose this truth.

2. From my holding that *the religion of Moses was only preparatory to the religion of JESUS*, it follows, that all such texts as imply a *future state of rewards and punishments in their TYPICAL signification* only, are just as little to the purpose. For if Moses's religion was preparatory to one future, it is, as I have shown,\* highly reasonable to suppose, that the essential doctrine of that new religion was shadowed out under the rites, or by the inspired penmen, of the old. But such texts are not only inconclusive, but highly corroborative of the opinion they are brought to oppose. For if future rewards and punishments were taught to the people under the law, what occasion was there for any *typical* representation of them, which necessarily implies the throwing things into shade, and secreting them from vulgar knowledge? What ground was there for that distinction between a *carnal* and a *spiritual* meaning (both of which it is agreed the Mosaic law had, in order to fit it for the use of two dispensations) if it did not imply an ignorance of the *spiritual* sense during the continuance of the first? Yet as clear as this is, the contrary is the doctrine of my adversaries; who seem to think that the *spiritual* and the *carnal* sense must needs always go together, like the jewel and the foil in Aaron's breastplate.

parlé de l'autre vie, ni de la resurrection, ni du Paradis, ni de l'Enfer, et que cela vient peut être de ce que les Juifs ont corrompu leurs exemplaires.—Voyez la Bibliothèque Orientale de M. D'Herbelot, mot TAQVART.

\* See the last section of this book.

Both these sorts of texts, therefore, conclude only against SADDUCEES and INFIDELS. Yet hath this matter been so little attended to, in the judgments passed upon my argument, that both sorts have been urged as confutations of it. I speak not here of the dirty calumnies of one or two forgotten scribblers, but of the unequitable censures of some who better deserve to be set right.

II. But farther, as my position is, *that a future state of reward and punishment was not taught in the Mosaic dispensation*, all texts brought to prove the knowledge of it *after* the time of David are as impertinent as the rest. For what was known from this time, could not supply the want of what was unknown for so many ages before. This therefore puts all the prophetic writings out of the question.

And now, when all these texts are taken from my adversaries, what is there left, to keep up the quarrel? Should I be so severe as to insist on the common rights of authors, of not being obliged to answer to convict impertinences, this part of my task would be soon over. But I shall, in charity, consider these texts, such as they are. However, that I may not appear altogether so absurd as the enforcers of them, I shall give the reader my reasons for this condescension.

1. As to the FUTURE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL, we should distinguish between the mention of it by Moses, and by the following writers. These might, and as we have shown, did conclude for its existence from the nature of the thing. But Moses, who, we suppose, intentionally omitted the mention of *future rewards and punishments*, would not, we must needs suppose likewise, proclaim the preparatory doctrine of the *existence*. Nor could he, on the other hand, deny what he knew to be the truth. Thus, being necessitated to speak of Enoch's *translation*, it could not be, but that a *separate existence* might be inferred, how obscurely soever the story was delivered. But had he said any thing, in his account of the creation, which literally implied (as the words, of man's being *made in the image of God*, and the *breath of life* being breathed into his nostrils, are supposed to do) that man had an immortal soul, then must Moses be supposed, purposely, to have inculcated that immortality; contrary to what we hold, that he purposely omitted the doctrine built upon it, namely, a future state of reward and punishment. It will not be improper therefore to show that such texts have not this pretended meaning.

2. Concerning a FUTURE STATE OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT; several texts are brought as teaching it in a *typical sense*, which teach it in *no sense* at all: several as teaching it in a direct and *literal* sense, which only teach it in a *typical*. Both these, therefore, it may be proper to set in a true light.

3. Lastly, concerning the texts from the *later prophets*, which are *without* the period in question; I own, and it is even incumbent on my argument to prove, that these prophets opened the first dawning of the doctrine of a *resurrection*, and consequently of a *future state of reward*

*and punishment*: even these therefore shall in their proper place be carefully considered. At present let me just observe, that the dark veil under which the *first set* of prophets delivered their *typical* representations was gradually drawn aside by the *later*.

## SECT. II.

HAVING premised thus much to clear the way, and shorten the inquiry, I now proceed to my examination.

And first, of the *texts* brought from the OLD TESTAMENT.

Now as the book of JOB\* is supposed to teach both a SEPARATE EXISTENCE and a FUTURE STATE OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT; and is besides thought by some to be the first of Moses's writings; and by others to be written even before his time, and by the patriarch himself, I shall give it the precedence in this inquiry: which it deserves likewise on another account, the superior evidence it bears to the point in question; if indeed it bear any evidence at all. For it may be said by those who thus hold it to be the earliest scripture (allowing the words of *Job, I know that my Redeemer liveth, &c.* to respect a future state) that the Jewish people must not only have had the knowledge of a FUTURE STATE of *rewards and punishments*, but, what is more, of the RESURRECTION of the *body*, and still more, of the REDEMPTION of *mankind by the Son of God*: therefore Moses had no need to inculcate the doctrine of a future state.† But I much suspect that the clear knowledge of so sublime a mystery, which, St Paul says, *had been hid from ages, and from generations, but was now* (on the preaching of the gospel) *made manifest to the saints*,‡ was not at all suited to the times of Job or Moses. The learned and impartial divine will perhaps be rather inclined to think, that either THE BOOK OF JOB WAS WRITTEN IN A MUCH LATER AGE, or that THIS FAMOUS PASSAGE HAS A VERY DIFFERENT MEANING. I shall endeavour to show, that neither of these suspicions would be entertained without reason.

[I.] First, then, concerning the book itself.

As to the person of *Job*, the eminence of his character, his fortitude and patience in afflictions, and his preceding and subsequent felicity; these are realities so unquestionable, that a man must have set aside sacred antiquity before he can admit a doubt concerning them. But that the book which bears Job's name was written by him, or in any age near his own, a careful and capable examiner will, I persuade myself, be hardly brought to believe.—In the order of this discourse therefore I shall inquire,

- I. What kind of composition the book of Job really is.
- II. In what age it was written. And,
- III. Who was its author.

\* See note B, at the end of this book.

† See note C, at the end of this book.

‡ Col. i. 26.



I. Even those who are inclined to suppose this a work of the highest antiquity, and to believe it an exact history of Job's sufferings and patience, and of God's extraordinary dispensations towards him, recorded by his own hand, are yet forced to confess that the introduction and conclusion are of another nature, and added by a later hand, to give that fulness and integrity to the piece, which works of imagination, and only such works, require. This is a large concession, and plainly intimates that he who wrote the *prologue* and *epilogue*, either himself believed the body of the work to be a kind of *dramatic* composition; or, at least, intended that others should have that opinion of it. I shall therefore the less scruple to espouse the notion of those who conclude the **WHOLE TO BE DRAMATICAL**. For the transferring the *prologue* and *epilogue* to a late writer, was only an expedient to get rid of a circumstance which showed it to be such a sort of work; and which consequently might bring it down to an age remote from that of the subject. But those who contrived this expedient seem to have had but a slender idea of the ancient *drama*, which was generally rounded with a *prologue* and *epilogue* of this sort; to give, by way of narrative, information of such facts as fell not within the compass of the one entire action represented.\*

I am induced to embrace this opinion from the cast of the **STYLE**, the **SENTIMENTS**, and **COMPOSITION**: all perfectly suited to such a kind of work, and ill agreeing with any other.

1. As to the *style*, it hath been observed by the critics, even from the time of Jerom, that all but the introduction and conclusion is in measure. But as it was the custom of antiquity to write their gravest works of religion, law, and history, in verse; this circumstance alone should, I think, have little share in determining the nature of the composition. And as little, I think, on the other hand, ought the frequent use of the Arabic dialect to be insisted on, in support of its high original, since, if it be of the *nature*, and of the *date*, here supposed, an able writer would choose to give his fable that air of antiquity and verisimilitude.

2. But when we take the *sentiments* along, and find throughout the whole, not only verse but poetry, a poetry animated by all the sublimity of figures and luxuriance of description; and this, on the coolest and most abstracted subject; we cannot choose but conclude it to be a work of imagination. Nor is it sufficient to say, that this is owing to an eastern genius, whose kindling fancy heats all his thoughts into a glow of expression: for if the two ends be his who wrote the middle, as we have no reason to doubt, they show him not unused to the plainest form of narration. And as to that eastern genius itself, though distinguishingly sublime when a poetic subject has inflamed its enthusiasm, yet in mere history, nothing can be more cool and simple; as all acquainted either with their ancient or modern writers can inform us. But, what is more to our purpose, the sacred prophets themselves, though rapt in ecstasy

\* See note D, at the end of this book.

of the divine impressions, when treating of the question here debated, namely, *whether and wherefore the good are frequently unhappy, and the bad prosperous*, a question that came sometimes in their way, while they were reproofing their impious and impatient countrymen, who by their repeated apostasies had now provoked God to withdraw from them, by degrees, his extraordinary providence; when, I say, they touch upon this question, they treat the matter with the utmost plainness and simplicity.

3. But the last and most convincing circumstance is the *form* of the composition. And here I shall not urge, as of much weight, what hath been observed by some who take this side of the question, the scenical image of Job and his friends sitting together on the ground seven days and seven nights without a word speaking.\* Because we reasonably suppose no more to be meant than that excess of mutual grief making them unfit to give, and him to receive consolation, they were some days† before they entered on the subject of their visit.

This rather is the thing to be admired, (if we suppose it all historic truth) that three cordial friends should make a solemn appointment to go *to mourn with Job and to comfort him*;‡ that they should be so greatly affected with his extreme distresses, as to be unable to utter a word for *seven whole days* together; and yet, after this, to be no sooner set in, than entirely to forget their errand, and (*miserable comforters as they were*) instead of mourning with him in the bitterness of his soul, to wrangle, and contradict him in every word he spoke; and this without the least softening of friendship; but with all the fierceness and acrimony of angry disputants contending for a victory. It was no trifle neither that they insisted on, in which indeed disputations men are often the warmest, but a contradiction in the tenderest point. They would needs have it, against all Job's protestations to the contrary, that his misfortunes came upon him in punishment for his crimes. Suppose their friend had been wrong in the judgment he passed on things, was this a time to animadvert in so pitiless a manner on his errors? Would not a small share of affection, pity, or even common humanity, have disposed them to bear one *seven days* longer with their old distressed acquaintance? Human nature is ever uniform; and the greater passions, such as those of friendship and natural affection, show themselves to be the same at all times: but we have an instance in these very times, in that amiable domestic story of Joseph. This patriarch had been cruelly injured by his brethren. Providence at length put them into his power; and, in just resentment of their inhuman usage, he thought fit to mortify and humble them: but no sooner did he find them begin to be unhappy, than his anger subsided, violated affection returned, and he melted into their

\* Chap. ii. ver. 13.

† — Eo quod Hebræi soleant multiplicare per septem (h. e. septenarium numerum pro multitudine ponere).—Maimon. More Nevochim. P. 2<sup>da</sup>.

‡ Chap. ii. ver 11.

booms with all the tenderness of a fellow sufferer. This was nature: ~~this was~~ history. And shall we suppose the feelings of true friendship to be inferior to those of family affection? David thought otherwise, where, speaking of Jonathan, he declares their mutual love was wonderful, surpassing that of the strongest natural affection, the passion between the two sexes. The same have always been the friendships of good men, when founded on virtue, and strengthened by a similitude of manners.

So that it appears, these three friends were of a singular complexion; and deservedly gave occasion to a proverb which sets them in no very honourable or advantageous light.

But suppose now the work to be *dramatical*, and we immediately see the reason of their behaviour. For had they not been indulged in their strange captious humour, the author could never have produced a piece of that integrity of action, which a scenic representation demanded: and they might as well have held their tongues *seven days* longer, as not contradict, when they did begin to speak.\*

This, as to what the *drama* in general required. But had this been all we could say for their conduct, we should needs confess that the divine writer had here done, what mere mortal poets so frequently do; that is, had transgressed nature (in such a representation of friendship) for the sake of his plot. But we shall show, when we come to examine the MORAL of the poem, that nature is exactly followed: for that under these three *miserable comforters*, how true friends soever in the *fable*, certain false friends were intended to be shadowed out in the *moral*.†

But now the dispute is begun and carried on with great vehemence on both sides. They affirm, they object, they answer, they reply; till, having exhausted their whole stock of arguments, and made the matter more doubtful than they found it, the author, in this embarrassment, has recourse to the common expedient of dramatic writers, to draw him from his straits,—Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς. And if ever that precept of the masters of composition,

“Nec deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus,”

was well followed, it was here. For what can we conceive more worthy the presence of a God, than to interfere, with his authority, to silence those frivolous or impious disputes amongst men concerning the MYSTERIOUS WAYS OF PROVIDENCE? And that this interposition was nothing more, I think, is evident from hence: The subject, as we observe, was of the highest importance, namely, *whether, and why, good men are unhappy, and the evil prosperous*. The disputants had much perplexed the question by various answers and replies: in which each side had appealed to reason and experience: so that there wanted a superior wisdom to moderate and determine. But to the surprise of all who consider this attentively, and consider it as a strict history, they find God introduced to do this in a speech which clears up no difficulties: but

\* See note “ at the end of this book.

† See note F. at the end of this book.

makes all hopes of deciding the question desperate, by an appeal to his Almighty power.\* A plain proof that the interposition was no more than a piece of poetical machinery. And in that case we see the reason why the knot remains untied: for the sacred writer was no wiser† when he spoke poetically in the person of God, than when he spoke in the person of Job or his friends.

On these accounts, and on many more, which will be touched upon in the course of this dissertation, but are here omitted to avoid repetition. I conclude, that those critics who suppose the book of Job to be of the *dramatic* kind, do not judge amiss.

Nor does such idea of this truly divine composition at all detract from the proofs we have of the real existence of this holy patriarch, or of the truth of his exemplary story. On the contrary, it much confirms them: seeing it was the general practice of dramatic writers, of the serious kind, to choose an illustrious character or celebrated adventure for the subject of the piece, in order to give their poem its due dignity and weight. And yet, which is very surprising, the writers on both sides, as well those who suppose the book of Job to be dramatical, as those who hold it to be historical, have fallen into this paralogism, *that, if dramatical, then the person and history of Job are fictitious*. Which nothing but inattention to the nature of a dramatic work, and to the practice of dramatic writers, could have occasioned. Lactantius had a much better idea of this species of composition: "Totum autem, quod referas, fingere, id est, ineptum esse, et mendacem potius quam poetam."

But this fallacy is not of late standing. Maimonides, where he speaks of those whose opinion he seems to incline to, that say the book of *Job* is parabolical, expresses himself in this manner.‡ *You know there are certain men who say, that such a man as Job never existed. And that his HISTORY is nothing else but a parable*. These certain men were (we know) the Talmudists. Now, as, by *his history*, he means this book of Job, it is evident he supposed the fabulosity of the book concluded against the existence of the patriarch. Nay, so insensibly does this inveterate fallacy insinuate itself into our reasonings on this subject, that even GROTIUS himself appears not to be quite free from the entanglement. Who, although he saw these two things (a real Job and a dramatic representation of him) so reconcilable, that he supposed both; yet will not allow the *book* of Job to be later than Ezekiel, because that prophet mentions Job.§ Which argument, to have any strength, must suppose Job to be unknown until this book was written: consequently that his person was fictitious; contrary to his own supposition, that there was a real Job living in the time of Moses.|| After this, it is no wonder that the author of the *Archæologiæ Philosophicæ*, whose talent was not critical acumen, should have reasoned so grossly on the same fallacious

\* See note G, at the end of this book.

† See note H, at the end of this book.

‡ *Nosti quosdam esse, qui dicunt Jobum nunquam fuisse, neque creatum esse; sed HISTORIAM illius nihil aliud esse quàm parabolam.*

§ Chap. xiv. ver. 14.

|| Vid. Grotii Pref. in Librum Job.

principle.\* These learned men, we see, would infer a visionary Job from a visionary history. Nor is the mistake of another celebrated writer less gross, who would, on the contrary, infer a real history from a real Job. *Ezekiel and St James* (says Dr Middleton, in his Essay on the Creation and Fall of Man) *refer to the BOOK OF JOB in the same manner as if it were a real history.* Whereas the truth is, they do not refer to the BOOK OF JOB at all.

II. The second question to be considered, is in what age this book was composed.

1. First then we say in general, that it was written some time under the Mosaic dispensation. But to this it is objected, that, if it were composed in those times, it is very strange that not a single word of the Mosaic law, nor any distant allusion to the rites or ceremonies of it, nor any historical circumstance under it, nor any species of idolatry in use during its period, should be found in it.†

I apprehend the objection rests on one or other of these suppositions, either that the book is not a work of the dramatic kind: or that the hero of the piece is fictitious. But both these suppositions have been shown to be erroneous; so that the objection falls with them. For to observe DECORUM is one of the most essential rules of *dramatic* writing. He therefore who takes a real personage for the subject of his poem will be obliged to show him in the customs and sentiments of his proper age and country; unmixed with the manners of the writer's later time and place. Nature and the reason of the thing so evidently demand this conduct, and the neglect of it has so ungracious an effect, that the polite Roman historian thought the Greek tragic writers were to blame even for mentioning the more modern name of Thessaly, in their pieces of the Trojan war. And he gives this good reason for his censure, *Nihil enim ex persona poëtæ, sed omnia sub eorum, qui illo tempore vixerunt, dixerunt.*‡

But to lay no greater stress on this argument than it will bear; I confess ingenuously, that were there not (as the objection supposes) the least distant relation or allusion to the Jewish law or history throughout the whole book, it might reasonably create some suspicion that the author lived before those times. For though this rule of *decorum* be so essential to *dramatic* writing, yet, as the greatest masters in that art frequently betrayed their own times and country in their fictitious works,§

\* See note I, at the end of this book.

† *Jobus Arabs πολυκλυτὸς καὶ πολυμαθὴς*, in cujus historiâ multa occurrunt antiquæ sapientiæ vestigia, antiquior habetur Mose. Idque multis patet indiciis: Primo, quòd nullibi meminerit rerum à Mose gestarum sive in Ægypto, sive in exitu, sive in deserto.—Secundo, quòd, cùm vir pius et veri Numinis cultor fuerit, legi Mosaicæ contraiverit, in sacrificiis faciendis.—Tertio, ex ætatis et vitæ suæ mensura, in tertio, plus minus, à diluvio sæculo collocandus esse videtur: vixit enim ultra ducentos annos.—Cùm de idololatria loquitur, memorat primum ipsius genus solis et lunæ adorationem.—Neque sabbathi neque ullius legis factitiæ meminit.—His omnibus adducor ut credam, Mosi Jobum tempore antecisse.—Archæol. Philos. pp. 205, 206.

‡ See note K, at the end of this book.

§ See note L, at the end of this book.

we can hardly suppose a Jewish writer more exact in what only concerned the critical perfection of his piece. But as DECORUM is one of the plainest and simplest principles of composition, we cannot suppose a good writer ignorant of it; and so are not to look for such glaring absurdities as are to be found in the dramatic writings of late barbarous ages; but such only as might easily escape the most exact and best instructed writer.

Some slight *indecorums* therefore we may reasonably expect to find, if the author were indeed a Jew: and such, if I am not much mistaken, we shall find Job, speaking of the wicked man, says, *He that speaketh flattery to his friends, even the eyes of his children shall fail*\*—*God layeth up iniquity for his children.*† And in the course of the dispute, and in the heat of altercation, this peculiar dispensation is touched upon yet more precisely. Job, in support of his doctrine, paints at large the happy condition of prosperous wicked men; a principal circumstance of whose felicity is, *that they spend their days in wealth, and in a moment go down to the grave*, ‡ i. e. without sickness, or the terrors of slow approaching death. The lot which prosperous libertines of all times, who believe no future reckoning, most ardently wish for. Now in the declining times of the Jewish economy, pious men had always their answer ready. The prosperous wicked man, say they, shall be punished in his posterity, and the afflicted good man rewarded in them. To the first part of the solution concerning the wicked, Job answers thus, *God layeth up his iniquity for his children; he rewardeth him, and he shall know it.*§ As much as to say, the evil man sees and knows nothing of the punishment; in the mean time, he feels and enjoys his own felicity, as a reward. To the second part, concerning the good, he answers thus, “His eyes shall see his destruction, and he shall drink of the wrath of the Almighty: for what pleasure hath he in his house after him, when the number of his months is cut off in the midst?”|| i. e. The virtuous man sees and feels nothing but his own miseries; for what pleasure can the good things reserved for his posterity afford to him who is to taste and enjoy none of it; being not only extinct long before, but cut off untimely?

In another place, Job says, *That idolatry was an iniquity to be punished by the judge.*¶ Now both this and the former species of punishment were, as we have shown, peculiar to the Mosaic dispensation. But a Jew might naturally mistake them for a part of the general law of God and nature: and so, while he was really describing the economy under which he lived, suppose himself to be representing the notions of more ancient times: which that it was his design to do, in the last instance at least, appears from his mentioning only the most early species of idolatry, the worship of the *sun* and *moon*.\*\* Again, the language of Job

\* Chap. xvii. ver. 5. † Chap. xxi. ver. 19. See note M, at the end of this book

‡ Chap. xxi. ver. 13. § Chap. xxi. ver. 19. || Ver. 20, 21.

¶ Chap. xxxi. ver. 28. See note N, at the end of this book. \*\* Ver. 26.



with regard to a *future state* is the very same with the Jewish writers. *He that goeth down to the grave, says this writer, shall come up no more:—they shall not awake or be raised out of their sleep.* Thus the psalmist,—*In death there is no remembrance of thee.—Shall the dead arise and praise thee!*—And thus the author of Ecclesiastes,—*The dead know not any thing, neither have they any more a REWARD.\** And we know what it was that hindered the Jews from entertaining any expectations of a future state of rewards and punishments, which was a popular doctrine amongst all their pagan neighbours.

But there is, besides this of *customs* and *opinions*, another circumstance that will always betray a feigned composition, made in an age remote from the subject: and that is, the use of later *phrases*. These are more easily discovered in the modern, and even in what we call the learned languages: but less certainly, in the very ancient ones; especially in the Hebrew, of which there is only one, and that no very large volume, remaining. And yet even here, we may detect an author of a later age. For, besides the phrases of common growth, there are others, in every language, interwoven alike into the current style, which owe their rise to some singular circumstance of time and place; and so may be easily traced up to their original: though, being long used in common speech in a general acceptation, they may well escape even an attentive writer. Thus Zophar, speaking of the wicked man, says; *he shall not see the rivers, the floods, the BROOKS OF HONEY AND BUTTER.†* This in ordinary speech only conveyed the idea of *plenty* in the abstract; but seems to have been first made a proverbial saying from the descriptions of the holy land.‡ Again, Eliphaz says, *Receive, I pray thee, THE LAW FROM HIS MOUTH, and lay up his words in thine heart.§* That is, *be obedient*: but the phrase was taken from the verbal delivery of the Jewish law from mount Sinai. The Rabbins were so sensible of the expressive peculiarity of this phrase, that they say the LAW OF MOSES is here spoken of by a kind of prophetic anticipation. Again, Job cries out, *O that I were—as I was in the days of my youth, when the SECRET OF GOD WAS UPON MY TABERNACLE,||* that is, *in full security*: Evidently taken from the residence of the divine presence or SHEKINAH, in a visible form, on the ark, or on the tent where the ark was placed. And again—*O that one would hear me! Behold my desire is that the Almighty would answer me, and that mine adversary had written a book.¶* Surely I would take it upon my shoulder and bind it as a CROWN to me.¶ A phrase apparently taken from the use of their PHYLACTERIES; which at least were as ancient as their return from captivity, and coeval with their scrupulous adherence to the law.

A third circumstance, which will betray one of these feigned compositions, is the author's being drawn, by the vigour of his imagination, from

\* See the preceding book, p. 334.

† Chap. xx. ver. 17.

‡ See Exod. iii. 8.—xiii. 5.—xxxii. 3.—Deut. xxxi. 20.—2 Kings xviii. 32.

§ Chap. xxii. ver. 22.

|| Chap. xxix. ver. 4.

¶ Chap. xxxi. ver. 35, 36.

the seat of action and from the manners of the scene, to one very different; especially, if it be one of great fame and celebrity. So here, though the scene be the deserts of Arabia, amongst family-heads of independent tribes, and in the simplicity of primitive manners, yet we are carried by a poetic fancy, into the midst of EGYPT, the best policed, and the most magnificent empire then existing in the world.—“Why died I not from the womb,” says the chief speaker, “for now I should have lain still and been quiet, I should have slept; then had I been at rest; with **KINGS and COUNSELLORS OF THE EARTH**, which build **DESOLATE PLACES** for themselves,”\* i. e. magnificent buildings, in desolate places, meaning plainly the **PYRAMIDS** raised in the midst of barren sands, for the burying places of the kings of Egypt—*kings and counsellors of the earth*—was, by way of eminence, the designation of the Egyptian governors. So Isaiah —“the counsel of the wise counsellors of Pharaoh is become brutish. How say ye unto Pharaoh, I am the son of the wise, the son of ancient kings.”† But it may be observed in general, that though the scene confined the author to scattered tribes in the midst of deserts, yet his images and his ideas are, by an insensible allurement, taken throughout, from crowded cities and a civil policed people. Thus he speaks of the children of the wicked *being crushed in the gate*,‡ alluding to a city taken by storm, and to the destruction of the flying inhabitants pressing one another to death in the narrow passage of the city-gates.—Again, of the good man it is said, that *he shall be hid from the scourge of tongues*:§ that pestilent mischief which rages chiefly in rich and licentious communities. But there would be no end of giving instances of this kind, where they are so numerous.

Hitherto the author seems unwarily to have betrayed his times and country. But we shall now see that he has made numerous allusions to the miraculous history of his ancestors with serious *purpose and design*. For this poem being written, as will appear, for the comfort and solace of his countrymen, he reasonably supposed it would advance his principal end, to refresh their memories with some of the more signal deliverances of their forefathers. In the mean time, *decorum*, of which we find him a careful observer, required him to preserve the image of very different and distant times. This was a difficulty: and would have been so to the ablest writer. Both these were matters of importance; and neither one nor the other could be omitted, without neglecting his purpose, or deforming his composition. How then can we conceive a skilful artist would act, if not in this manner; he would touch those stories, but with so slight an outline and such airy colouring, as to make them pass unheeded by a careless observer; yet be visible enough to those who studied the work with care and attention. Now this artful temper

\* Chap. iii. ver. 12, 13, 14.

† Isa. xix. 11.

‡ Chap. v. ver. 4. The Septuagint renders it very expressively *πελαβριστίαν ἐν τῇ θύρᾳ ἡρώων*.

§ See note O, at the end of this book.

our divine writer, we say, hath observed. The conduct was fine and noble: and the cloud in which he was forced to wrap his studied allusions, will be so far from bringing them into question, that it will confirm their meaning; as it now appears, that if an able writer would, in such a work, make allusions to his own times, religion, and people, it must be done in this covert manner. Thus Job, speaking of the omnipotence of God,—“which commandeth the sun, and it riseth not, and sealeth up the stars,”\* plainly enough alludes to the miraculous history of the people of God, in the Egyptian darkness, and the stopping of the sun’s course by Joshua. This appeared so evident to a very learned commentator, though in the other opinion of the book’s being of Job’s own writing, that he was forced to suppose that his author spoke proleptically, as knowing by the gift of prophecy, what God in a future age would do.† So where Job says, “God divideth the sea with his power, and by his understanding he smiteth through the proud,”‡ he evidently refers to the destruction of Pharaoh and his host in the Red sea. Again, in the following words, “He taketh away the heart of the chief of the people of the earth, and causeth them to wander in a wilderness where there is no way,”§ who can doubt but that they allude to the wandering of the Israelites forty years in the wilderness, as a punishment for their cowardice, and diffidence in God’s promises? Eliphaz, speaking of the wonderful works of God, declares how he came to the knowledge of them, “I will show thee; hear me; and what I have seen I will declare; which wise men have told from their fathers, and have not hid it:”|| the very way in which Moses directs the Israelites to preserve the memory of the miraculous works of God. And who are these *wise men*? They are so particularly marked out as not to be mistaken: *unto whom alone the earth was given, and NO STRANGER PASSED AMONGST THEM.*¶ A circumstance agreeing to no people whatsoever but to the Israelites settled in Canaan. The same Eliphaz, telling Job to his face, that his misfortunes came in punishment for his crimes, says; “Thou hast taken a pledge from thy brother for nought, and stripped the naked of his clothing.”\*\* And Job, speaking of the most profligate of men, describes them, amongst other marks of their iniquity, by this, that *they caused the naked to lodge without clothing, that they have no covering in the cold;†† that they take a pledge of the poor, and cause him to go naked without clothing.‡‡* Who that sees this ranked amongst the greatest enormities, but will reflect that it must have been written by one well studied in the LAW OF MOSES, which says, “If thou at all take thy neighbour’s raiment to pledge, thou shalt deliver it unto him by that the sun goeth down; for that is his cover-

\* Chap. ix. ver. 7.

† Hoc videtur respicere historiam Josuæ vel Ezechiæ, quanquam ante illa Job extiterit. Sed hæc potuerunt per anticipationem dici, quod Jobum non lateret penes Deum esse id efficere quandocunque luberet.—*Codurcus in locum.*

‡ Chap. xxvi. ver. 12.

§ Chap. xii. ver. 24.

|| Chap. xv. ver. 17, 18.

¶ Ver. 19.

\*\* Chap. xxii. ver. 6.

†† Chap. xxiv. ver. 7.

‡‡ Ver. 9, 10. Exod. xxii. 26, 27. See also Deut. xxiv. 12, and 17.

ing only, it is his raiment for his skin: wherein shall he sleep? And it shall come to pass, when he crieth unto me, that I will hear, for I am gracious." Which law, as the learned Spencer observes, was *peculiar* to this institution.\* Elihu, speaking of God's dealing with his servants, says, "That he may *withdraw man from his purpose*, and hide *pride* from man; he keepeth back his soul *from the pit*, and his life from *perishing by the sword*. He is chastened also with pain upon his *bed*, and the multitude of his bones with strong pain. His soul draweth *nigh unto the grave*, and his life to the destroyers. If there be a *messenger* with him, an *interpreter*, one amongst a thousand, to show unto man his *uprightness*, then he is *gracious* unto him, and saith, *deliver him from going down to the pit, I have found a ransom*. His *flesh shall be fresher than a child's*, he shall return to the days of his youth. He shall *pray unto God*, and he will be favourable unto him, and he shall *see his face with joy*; for he will render unto man his righteousness."† This is the most circumstantial account of God's dealing with HEZEKIAH, as it is told in the books of *Chronicles* and *Kings*. God had delivered him from perishing by the sword of Sennacherib: "In those days Hezekiah was sick to death, and prayed unto the LORD: and he spake unto him, and he gave him a sign. But Hezekiah rendered not again, according to the benefit done unto him, for *his heart was lifted up*."‡ But the story is told more at large in the book of *Kings*:—"In those days was Hezekiah *sick unto death*; and the *prophet* Isaiah, the son of Amos, came to him, and said unto him, Thus saith the Lord, set thine house in order, for thou shalt die and not live. Then he turned his face to the wall, and *prayed unto the Lord*.—And it came to pass afore Isaiah was gone out into the middle court, that the word of the LORD came unto him, saying, Turn again, and tell Hezekiah, Thus saith the LORD, I have *heard thy prayer*, I have *seen thy tears*: behold I will heal thee; *on the third day thou shalt go up unto the house of the Lord*. And Isaiah said, Take a lump of figs; and they took and laid it on the boil, *and he recovered*."§ The following words as plainly refer to the destruction of the first-born in Egypt, and Sennacherib's army ravaging Judea: "In a moment shall they die, and the people shall be troubled at midnight and pass away, and the mighty shall be taken away without hand."|| These likewise clearly allude to the Egyptian darkness,—*from the wicked their light is withholden*.¶

No one, I think, can doubt but that the following description of God's dealing with monarchs and rulers of the world, is a transcript of, or allusion to, a passage in the second book of *Chronicles*. Elihu (who is made to pass judgment on the dispute) says, "He withdraweth not his eyes

\* —Leges illæ in Dei tantum pandectis inveniendæ sunt, nempe, de *vestibus pignori datis*, quibus de pecunia concredita cavebant debitores, ante solis occasum, restituendis.—De Leg. Hebr. Rit. vol. i. p. 263.

† Chap. xxxiii. ver. 17, et seq.

‡ 2 Kings xx. 1, et seq.

¶ Chap. xxxviii. ver. 15.

‡ 2 Chron. xxxii. 24, 25.

|| Job xxxiv. ver. 20.

from the righteous: but, with kings are they on the throne, yea he doth establish them for ever, and they are exalted." [This seems plainly to refer to the house of David, as we shall see presently.] He proceeds; "And if they be bound in fetters, and be holden in cords of affliction: then he showeth their work, and their transgressions that they have exceeded. He openeth also their ear to discipline, and commandeth that they return from iniquity. If they obey and serve him, they shall spend their days in prosperity and their years in pleasure; but if they obey not, they shall perish by the sword," &c.\* Now hear the sacred historian:—"God had said to David and to Solomon his son, In this house and in Jerusalem, which I have chosen before all the tribes of Israel, will I put my name for ever. Neither will I any more remove the foot of Israel from out of the land which I have appointed for your fathers, so that they will take heed to do all that I have commanded them.—So Manasseh made Judah and the inhabitants of Jerusalem to err.—And the Lord spake to Manasseh, and to his people, but they would not hearken. Wherefore the Lord brought upon them the captains of the host of the king of Assyria, which took Manasseh amongst the thorns, and bound him with fetters, and carried him to Babylon. And when he was in affliction, he besought the Lord his God, and humbled himself greatly before the God of his fathers, and prayed unto him, and he was entreated of him, and heard his supplication, and brought him again to Jerusalem, into his kingdom. Then Manasseh knew that the Lord he was God."†

But the most extraordinary allusion of all to the *Jewish economy*, and the most incontestable, is in the following words, where speaking of the *clouds of rain*, our translation has it, *He causeth it to come, whether for correction, or FOR HIS LAND, or for mercy.*‡ The Septuagint understood the sacred text in the same manner: Ταῦτα συντίτωκεται παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ἢ ἂν τι εἰς παιδείαν, ἢ ἂν εἰς τὴν γῆν αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἂν εἰς ἔλεος εὐρέσῃ αὐτόν. The meaning of which is, he bringeth it at such junctures, and in such excess, as to cause dearth, [*for correction* ;] or so timely and moderately, as to cause plenty, [*for mercy* ;] or lastly, so tempered, in a long continued course, as to produce that fertility of soil which was to make one of the blessings of the promised land, [*FOR HIS LAND* :] a providence as distinct from the other two, of *correction* and *mercy*, as the genus is from the species. This is a sufficient answer to the learned father Houbigant's criticism on this verse, who corrects the common reading of the Hebrew text, and thinks the words, *or for the land*, to be a marginal illustration crept into the text. St Jerome, and the vulgar Latin, instead of,—*whether for CORRECTION, or for his land*, translate, sive in UNA TRIBU, sive in terra sua. If this be the true rendering of the Hebrew, then it plainly appears that the writer of the book of Job alluded to the words of his contemporary prophet, Amos:—"And also I have withholden the rain from you, when there were yet three months to the harvest; and I caused it to rain upon one city, and caused it not to rain upon another

\* Chap. xxxvi. ver. 7—12

† 2 Chron. xxxiii. ver. 7—13.

‡ Chap. xxxvii. 13.

city: one piece was rained upon, and the piece whereupon it rained not, withered." Without controversy, however, the writer speaks of a SPECIAL PROVIDENCE upon God's own land, the land of Judea; which plainly shows that the *peculiarity of the Jewish economy* was still uppermost in his thoughts. In a word, this economy is described by MOSES\* as altogether different from that of other people. JOB's account of God's economy exactly quadrates with it. What are we then to think, but that there is a continued allusion to the LAW? in many places indeed so general, as not to be discovered without the assistance of those which are more particular. Besides (which is the last observation I shall make on this point), in the management of these allusions, we see, the author has observed a strict *decorum*: and, to take off any offensive glare, has thrown over them a sober image of ancient manners. So that here we have the plain marks of former times intermixed with circumstances peculiar to the latter. What are we therefore to conclude, but that the work is a species of dramatic writing, composed long after the age of the subject?

On the whole then it appears that this objection of no allusions, which, if well grounded, had made nothing against the low date of a poetic composition, is not indeed supported by fact: and this will be seen yet more fully hereafter.

But had the objection any real foundation, they who make it, had been still much puzzled to account for the author's silence concerning the *six days' creation*, and the institution of the *sabbath*; as it must reduce them to the necessity of supposing that these things were unknown to JOB. And consequently, that the *sabbath* was not a moral, but a positive law only of the Jews: though Moses, to impress the greater reverence upon it, seems to make it coeval with the creation. How they will get over this difficulty, I know not. On the other hand, they who, with the low date of this book of Job, hold the *sabbath* to be a positive law, will find no difficulty at all. For, as they would have put the mention of it, had it been mentioned, on the same footing with that of other things under the Mosaic economy; so, the silence they will easily account for, on the received opinion of that time, that the *sabbath* was a positive law, instituted to separate and distinguish the Israelites from all others; and that therefore the mention of a thing so well known to be a rite peculiarly Jewish, would have had an ill effect, in the mouths of men who lived before the Mosaic law was given.

After such clear evidence that the book of Job was written under the law, we have little need of Grotius's argument, for the support of this point, from the books containing many passages similar to what we find in the Psalms. And it is well we have not, because I think his argument very equivocal. For if the sacred writers must needs have borrowed trite moral sentences from one another; it may be as fairly said, that the authors of the Psalms borrowed from the book of Job; as that the author of Job borrowed from the book of Psalms. But M. Le Clerc

\* Deut. iv. 39.



would mend this argument, by refining upon it, a way that seldom mends any thing. He says, one may know an original from a copy, by the latter's having less nature and force; and he thinks he sees this in the book of Job.\* Now admitting the truth of the observation, it would be so far from supporting, that it would overturn his conclusion. M. Le Clerc seems to have been misled into this criticism by what he had observed of writers of less polished ages borrowing from those of more. In this case, the copy will be always much inferior to the original. But the effect would have been just the contrary in a writer of the time of David borrowing from one of the time of Moses. And as the common opinion places the two books in those two different periods, they are to be supposed rightly placed, till the contrary be shown. This observation we see verified in the Greek authors of the Socratic age, and in the Roman authors of the Augustan, when they borrowed from their very early country writers. But the matter of fact is, I think, just otherwise. The advantage of the sublime in the parallel passages seems to lie on the side of Job. And from hence we may draw M. Le Clerc's conclusion with much greater force. But indeed, take it either way, the argument, as I said, is of little weight. But it is pleasant to hear Schultens, and his epitomiser Dr Grey, speak of the grandeur, the purity, and sublimity of the language spoken in the time of Job, as if the Hebrew had partaken of the nature and fortunes of the two languages made perfect by a long study of eloquence, in the Socratic and Augustan ages; and as if it was equally impossible for a Hebrew after the captivity (though inspired into the bargain) to imitate these excellencies of style, as for a writer of the iron age of Latin to have expressed the *beauty and weight* of Ennius's elegance. We know what enthusiasm can do on every object to which it turns itself. There have been critics of this sort, who have found, even in the Hebrew of the rabbins, graces and sublimities of style to match those in the best Greek and Roman historians; though, in reality, the graces it boasts partake much of those we see in the law-French of our English reporters. The truth is, the language of the times of Job had its grandeur, its purity, and sublimities: but they were of that kind which the learned missionaries have observed in the languages of certain warrior tribes in North America. And this language of the time of Job preserved its genius to late ages, by the assistance of that uniformity of

\* — Grotius croit avec beaucoup plus de vrai-semblance, que cet auteur est postérieur à David et à Salomon, dont il semble qu'il ait imité divers endroits, et remarque fort judicieusement, qu'il y a dans ce livre des manières de parler, qu'on ne trouve que dans Esdras, dans Daniel, et dans les Paraphrases Caldaïques, *Codurc*, dans son Commentaire sur Job, a aussi remarqué plusieurs Caldaïsmes dans ce livre, et quelques personnes savautes soutiennent, que les Arabismes qu'on y croit avoir remarqué ne sont que des manières de parler Caldaïques. On y trouve des imitations de divers endroits des Pseaumes.—Mais vous me demanderez peut-être, comment on peut savoir, que c'est l'auteur du livre de Job qui a imité ces Pseaumes, et non pas les auteurs de ces Pseaumes qui ont imité le livre de Job? Il est aisé de vous satisfaire. On connoit, qu'un auteur en imite un autre, à ceci, c'est que l'imitation n'est pas si belle que l'original, qui exprime ordinairement les choses d'une manière plus nette et plus naturelle que la copie.—Sentimens de quelques Theologiens de Hollande, p. 183.

character which makes the more sequestered inhabitants of the east so tenacious of all their ancient modes and customs.

2. We now come closer to the question; and having proved the book of Job to be written under the *Mosaic economy*, we say further, that it must be *somewhere between the time of their approaching captivity, and their thorough re-establishment in Judea*. This is the widest interval we can afford it. The reason seems to be decisive. It is this, that no other possible period can be assigned, in which the GRAND QUESTION, debated in this book, could ever come into dispute. This deserves to be considered.

The question,\* a very foreign one to us, and therefore no wonder it should have been so little attended to, is, *Whether God administers his government over men here with an equal providence, so as that the good are always prosperous, and the bad unhappy; or whether, on the contrary, there be not such apparent inequalities, as that prosperity and adversity often happen indifferently to good and bad*. Job maintains the latter part,† and his three friends the former. They argue these points throughout the whole book, and each party sticks firm to his first opinion.

Now this could never have been made matter of dispute, from the most early supposed time of Job's existence,‡ even to ours, in any place out of the land of Judea; the administration of providence, which, throughout that large period, all people and nations have experienced, being visibly and confessedly unequal. Men, indeed, at all times, have been indiscreetly prone to inquire how this inequality could be made consistent with God's justice or goodness: but, amidst the great variety of human opinions, as extravagant as many of those are which philosophic men have some time or other maintained, we do not find any of them ever held or conceived that *God's providence was equally administered*. This therefore, as we say, could be no question any where out of the land of Judea. But we say farther,

Nor in that land neither, in any period of the Jewish nation either before or after the time wherein we place it. Not *before*, because the dispensation of providence to that people was seen and owned by all, to be equal: not *after*, because by the total ceasing of God's extraordinary administration, the contrary was as evident.

Of this period, then, there are three portions: 1. The time immediately *preceding* the captivity; 2. The *duration* of it; and 3. The *return* from it.

To the opinions which place it in either of the two first portions, as supposing it to be written for the consolation of the people going into or remaining in captivity, a celebrated writer has opposed an unanswerable objection: "The Jews," says he, "undoubtedly suffered for their iniquity: and the example of Job is the example of an innocent

\* See note P, at the end of this book.

† See note Q, at the end of this book.

‡ See note R, at the end of this book.

man suffering for no demerit of his own: apply this to the Jews in their captivity, and the book contradicts all the prophets before, and at the time of, their captivity, and is calculated to harden the Jews in their sufferings, and to reproach the providence of God." \*

There remains only the third portion; that is to say, the time of their return, and settlement in their own land. And this stands clear of the above objection. For the Jews came from the captivity with hearts full of zeal for the law, and abhorrence of their former idolatries. This is the account Ezra and Nehemiah† give of them: and with these dispositions, Jeremiah foretold, their restoration should be attended. "I will bring Israel again to his habitation, and he shall feed on Carmel and Bashan, and his soul shall be satisfied upon mount Ephraim and Gilead. In those days, and in that time, saith the Lord, the iniquity of Israel shall be sought for, and there shall be none; and the sins of Judah, and they shall not be found."‡

3. We say then (to come home to the question) that the BOOK OF JOB was written some time between the return, and the thorough settlement of the Jews in their own country.

Having suited the *time* to the people, let us try if we can suit the people to the *subject*; and see whether this, which was foreign and unnatural to every other period, was proper and seasonable to this here assigned.

The Jews had hitherto, from their entrance into the land of Canaan to their last race of kings, lived under an extraordinary, and, for the most part, equal providence. For these two states must be distinguished, and indeed are distinguished not only throughout this discourse, but throughout the whole scripture history, although the terms, in both, be sometimes used indifferently to signify either one state or the other, where the nature of the subject leads directly to the sense in which they are employed. As their sins grew ripe, and the time of their captivity approached, God so tempered justice with his mercy, as to mix, with the prophetic denunciations of their impending punishment, the repeated promises of a speedy return; to be attended with more illustrious advantages for the Jewish republic than it had ever before enjoyed. The appointed time was now come. And their return (predicted in so plain and public a manner) was brought about with as uncommon circumstances. Those most zealous for the law, and most confiding in the promises of God, as instructed by their parents in all his extraordinary dispensations, embraced this opportunity of returning to their own country, to promote the restoration of their law and religion. And who can doubt but that they expected the same manifestations of God's providence in their re-establishment, that their forefathers had experienced in their first settlement? That they were indeed full of these expectations, appears from the remarkable account Ezra gives us of his distress, when about to return with Artaxerxes's commission, to regulate the affairs of

\* See note S, at the end of this book.

† Ezra, chapters iii. and vi.; Neh. chapters iii. viii. and ix.      ‡ Chap I. ver. 19, 20.

Judea and Jerusalem. The way was long and dangerous; yet the Jews had told the king so much of their being under the peculiar protection of their God, that he was ashamed to ask a guard for himself and his companions; and therefore had recourse to prayer and fasting: "Then I proclaimed a fast there at the river Ahava, that we might afflict ourselves before our God, to seek of him a right way for us, and for our little ones, and for all our substance. For I was ashamed to require of the king a band of soldiers and horsemen, to help us against the enemy in the way; because we had spoken unto the king, saying, The hand of our God is upon all them for good that seek him, but his power and his wrath is against all them that forsake him."\* But in these their expectations of the old extraordinary providence, they were greatly deceived; and the long traverses they underwent from the malice and persecution of their idolatrous neighbours, made them but too sensible of the difference of their condition from that of their forefathers, in their first establishment. What then must be their surprise and disappointment to find their expectations frustrated, and their nation about to be reduced to the common level of the *people of the earth*, under the ordinary providence of Heaven? At first it would be difficult for many habituated to, and long possessed of, the notion of an extraordinary providence, to comprehend the true state of their present circumstances. This astonishment is finely described in the following words of Job, "As for me, is my complaint to man? and if it were so, why should not my spirit be troubled? Mark me, and be ASTONISHED, and lay your hand upon your mouth. Even when I remember, I am afraid, and TREMBLING taketh hold of my flesh. WHEREFORE do the wicked live, become old, yea are mighty in power," &c.†—But others less pious would fall into doubts about God's justice; as not conceiving how he could discharge the expectations he had raised, without some very special regard to the safety of his chosen people: nay there were some, as there always will be in national distresses of this nature, so impious as even to deny *the moral government* of God. Whom the prophet Zephaniah thus describes,— "Men that are settled on their lees; that say in their heart, THE LORD WILL NOT DO GOOD, NEITHER WILL HE DO EVIL."‡ All would be in a state of anxiety and disorder. And this greatly increased, 1. From the bad situation of affairs *without*: for, till the coming of Nehemiah, the walls of Jerusalem were in many places broken down; the gates taken away; and the inhabitants exposed not only to the insults and ravages of their enemies, but to the reproach and contempt of all their neighbours, as a despicable and abandoned people. 2. From the bad situation of affairs *within*: several disorders contrary to the law had crept in amongst them; as the *marrying strange wives*, and practising *usury* with one another. Add to all this (what would infinitely increase the confusion), that a future state of rewards and punishments was not yet become a popular doctrine. That this is a faithful account of their con-

\* Ezra viii. 21, 22.

† Chap. xxi. ver. 4—7.

‡ Chap. i. ver. 12.

dition, will be seen when we descend to particulars: that it would have this effect on the religious sentiments even of the better sort is evident from the expostulation of Jeremiah, in whose time this *inequality* first struck their observation; "Righteous art thou, O Lord," says he, "when I plead with thee; yet let me talk with thee of thy judgments. WHEREFORE doth the way of the wicked prosper? Wherefore are all they happy that deal very treacherously?"\* If it be said, "that the *inequality* could not now first strike their observation, in a dispensation where the equal providence had been gradually declining from the time of Saul;" I ask, Why not? Since there must be some precise point of time or other, when the fact was first attended to. And where can we find a more likely one than this?

Could any thing therefore be conceived more seasonable and necessary, at this time, than such a consolation as the book of Job afforded; in which, on a traditional story, of great fame and reputation over all the East, a good man was represented as afflicted for the trial of his virtue, and rewarded for the well bearing his afflictions; and in which, their doubts concerning God's providence were appeased by an humble acquiescence under his almighty power? And, therefore, I suppose it was, that in order to quiet all their anxieties, and to comfort them under their present distresses, one of their prophets at this very period composed the BOOK OF JOB. And here let me observe, that, to the arguments already given for fixing the date of the book of Job at this precise time of the Jewish republic, may be added the following: Job says, "He knoweth the way that I take: when he hath TRIED me, I shall come forth as GOLD."† But we have shown, in speaking of what Maimonides calls the *chastisements of love*, that they were unknown to the Jewish religion till the times of their later prophets.‡ Now here the *chastisements of love* are expressly described.

To proceed:—If such were the end of composing this poetic story, we cannot but believe that every thing in it would be fitted to the circumstances of the times. But this could not be done without making the poem ALLEGORICAL as well as *dramatic*. That is, without representing the real persons of that age under the persons of the *drama*. And this would be according to the exactest rules of good writing: for when some *general moral* fitted for all times is to be recommended, it is best shown in a simple DRAMATIC habit: but when the author's purpose is to convey some *peculiar truths*, circumscribed by time and place, they have need to be enforced by ALLEGORIC images. And in fact, we shall find this poem to be wholly allegorical: the reason is convincing. There are divers circumstances added to each character, which can by no means belong to the persons *representing*: we conclude, therefore, that others are meant under those characters, namely, the persons *represented*. Nor did the author seem much solicitous to conceal his purpose, while in his introduction to some of Job's speeches he expresseth him-

\* Chap. xii. ver. 1.

† Chap. xxiii. ver. 10.

‡ See book v.

self in this manner,—*moreover Job continued his PARABLE and said.\** Which word *parable* properly signifies in scripture the representing one thing by another. Jerome in his preface to the book of Job, if I understand him right, seems to say much the same thing:—“*OBLIQUUS enim etiam apud Hebræos totus liber fertur, et lubricus, et quod Græci rhetores ἰσχηματισμένος,† DUM QUI ALIUD LOQUITUR, ALIUD AGIT: ut si velis anguillam vel murenulam strictis tenere manibus, quanto fortius preseris tanto citius elabatur.*” This description of the work, and the comparison by which Jerome illustrates his description, is a lively picture of an ALLEGORY; in which the literal sense, when you begin to grasp it closely, slips through your fingers like an eel. And in this sense we shall find the speeches of Job to be extremely *parabolical*. For it is to be observed, that, from this place, where Job is said to *continue his parable*, from chap. xxvii. to chap. xxxi., which is the winding up of the controversy between him and his friends, there are more allusions to the Jewish state than in all the rest of the book together.—But to leave no room for doubt in this matter, let us now examine each character apart.‡

(1.) In the person of JOB we have a good man afflicted, and maintaining his innocence: equally impatient of pain and contradiction; yet, at length with all submission bowing to the hand of GOD; and finally rewarded for it. Had this been a fictitious character in an invented story, we could have only gathered this general moral from it, “That virtue and submission to the divine pleasure, notwithstanding the common frailties of humanity, will assuredly engage the care of providence.” But as this hero of the poem was a real personage; and so greatly famed for his exemplary patience in afflictions, that his case became proverbial;§ we can never, on the common principles, account for his behaviour, when we find him breaking out ever and anon into such excesses of impatience as border nearly upon blasphemy.|| The judicious Calmet cannot forbear observing on this occasion: “En effet Job avoit marqué dans ses plaintes une vivacité que pouvoit être interprétée en mauvaise part. Il s’étoit plaint de la rigueur de Dieu; il avoit déploré son malheur d’une manière qui avoit besoin d’une interpretation bénigne.”¶ And to the same purpose Albert Schultens; “In eo excessu ut ne nunc quidem Jobum culpa liberare possumus, ita facile intelligitur, multo magis talibus dictis offendi tunc debuisse Elihum, ignarum hactenus, quid Deus de Jobo ejusque causa pronunciaturus esset.”\*\* Thus softly do these commentators speak, in their embarrassment to reconcile this representation of Job to his traditional character for patience. The *writing* then and the *tradition* being so glaringly inconsistent, we must needs conclude, 1. That the fame of so great patience arose not from this book. And, 2dly,

\* Chap. xxvii. ver. 1.; chap. xxix. ver. 1.

† Λόγος.

‡ See note T, at the end of this book.

§ Ye have heard of the patience of Job, James v. 11.

|| See note U, at the end of this book.

¶ Sur chap. xxxiii. ver. 10.

\*\* On the same place.



That some other character, shadowed under that of Job, was the real cause of the author's deviation from the general tradition.

And this character, I say, was no other than the JEWISH PEOPLE. The singularity of whose situation as a *selected nation* is graphically described in the beginning of the book, where Satan is brought in, speaking of the distinguished honour done to Job by his Maker. *Hast thou not made a HEDGE about him, and about his house, and about all that he hath, on every side?*\* The great point which Job so much insists upon throughout the whole book is his *innocence*: and yet, to our surprise, we hear him, in one place, thus expostulating with God: *Thou writest bitter things against me, and makest me to possess the INIQUITIES OF MY YOUTH.*† This can be accounted for no otherwise than by understanding it of the PEOPLE: whose repeated iniquities on their first coming out of Egypt, were in every age remembered, and punished on their posterity. Again, the twenty-ninth chapter is an exact and circumstantial description of the prosperous times of the Jewish people; several parts of which can be applied with no tolerable propriety to the condition of a private man:—"O that I were as in the days when God preserved me, when his candle shined upon my head, and when by his LIGHT, I walked through darkness: As I was in the days of my youth, when the SECRET OF GOD was upon my TABERNACLE:—When I washed my steps with BUTTER, and the rock poured me out rivers of OIL—I put on righteousness and it clothed me: my judgment was as a robe and a diadem.—I brake the jaws of the WICKED, and plucked the spoil out of his teeth.—I CHOSE OUT THEIR WAY, and sat chief, and dwelt as a KING in the army."‡ In these words the writer evidently alludes to the *pillar of fire* in the wilderness;—The *Shekinah* in the tabernacle;—The *land flowing with milk and honey*;—The administration of the *judges*;—The curbing the ravages of the *Philistians*;—And the glory of their first *monarchs*. Well therefore might the writer, in his introduction to this speech, call it a PARABLE.

This will lead us next to consider the *age*, as well as *people* meant. Job, speaking of his misfortunes, says, "For the thing which I greatly feared is come upon me, and that which I was afraid of is come unto me. I was not in safety, neither had I rest, neither was I quiet, yet trouble came."§ But in other places he speaks very differently. He wishes *he were as in months past, for then*, says he, "I shall die in my nest, and I shall multiply my days as the sand."|| And again, "When I looked for good, then evil came upon me: and when I waited for light, there came darkness."¶ These things are very discordant, if understood of one and the same person; and can never be reconciled but on the supposition of an *allegorical* reference to another character; and, on that, all will be set right. For this disquiet, and fear of approaching trouble, was the very condition of the Jews on their first return from the

\* Chap. i. ver. 10.

† Chap. xiii. ver. 26.

‡ Chap. xxix. ver. 2, et seq.

§ Chap. iii. ver. 25, 26.

|| Chap. xxix. ver. 18.

¶ Chap. xxx. ver. 26.

captivity. Thus Ezra expresseth it: “And they set up the altar upon his bases (for *fear was upon them*, because of the people of those countries) and they offered burnt-offerings thereon unto the Lord.”\* And thus Zechariah, who prophesied at this time: “For before these days there was no hire for man, nor any hire for beast, neither was there any peace to him that went out or came in, *because of the affliction*; for I set all men every one against his neighbour.”† Job, amongst his other distresses complains to God:—*Thou scarest me with dreams, and terrifiest me with visions*;‡ this, I suppose, refers to the comminations of Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi, who all prophesied at this time, and were very troublesome on that account to the impatient Jews, to whose circumstances only, and spirit of complaint, these obscure words of Job, expostulating with God, can agree;—*and why dost thou not pardon my transgression, and take away mine iniquity? For now I shall sleep in the dust, and thou shalt seek me in the morning, but I shall not be.*§ There is not a more difficult passage in the whole book of Job; and yet, on the principles here laid down, it admits and conveys this natural and easy meaning, “In thus punishing, thou wilt defeat thy own design. It is thy purpose to continue us a peculiar people; yet such traverses as we have met with, on our return, will soon destroy those already come into Judea, and deter the rest from hazarding the same fortune.” Job goes on in the same strain: *Is it good unto thee that thou shouldest oppress? that thou shouldest despise the work of thine hands? and shine upon the counsel of the wicked?*|| The Jews of this time made this very complaint. *I have loved you, saith the Lord, yet ye say, Wherein hast thou loved us?*¶ And again, *And now we call the proud happy; yet they that work wickedness are set up; yet they that tempt God are even delivered.*\*\*—But Job goes on,—*O that thou wouldest hide me in the GRAVE, that thou wouldest keep me secret, until thy wrath be past; that thou wouldest appoint me a set time, and remember me.*†† By which words, the complaints of the Jews of that time are again referred to; which were, as appears from the words of Job, to this effect: “Would to God we had still continued in captivity [the *grave*, which was the very figure used by the prophets for the captivity] expecting a more favourable season for our restoration; or that we might be permitted to return unto it, till the remains of punishment for our forefathers’ sins are overpast, and all things fitly prepared for our reception.” And in these cowardly and impatient sentiments were they, on their return, as were their ancestors, on their first coming out of the land of Egypt; to which this return is frequently compared by the prophets.—Job goes on expressing his condition in this manner: “His troops come together, and raise up their way against me, and encamp round about my tabernacle. He hath put my brethren far from me, and mine acquaintance are verily estranged from me. My kinsfolk have failed, and my familiar friends

\* Ezra iii. 3.

† Zech. viii. 10.

‡ Chap. vii. ver. 14.

§ Chap. vii. ver. 21.

|| Chap. x. ver. 3.

¶ Mal. i. 2.

\*\* Mal. iii. 15.

†† Chap. xiv. ver. 13.

have forgotten me.”\* The first part of this complaint evidently relates to the *Arabians, the Ammonites, and the Ashdodites*; who, as Nehemiah tells us, “hearing that the walls of Jerusalem were made up, and that the breaches began to be stopped, were very wroth, and conspired all of them together to come and fight against Jerusalem and to hinder it.”† The second part relates to their rich brethren remaining in Babylon, who seemed, by Nehemiah’s account, to have much neglected the distressed remnant that escaped from the captivity to Jerusalem. “Then Hanani,” says he, “one of my brethren came, he and certain men of Judah, and I asked them concerning the Jews that had escaped, which were left of the captivity, and concerning Jerusalem. And they said unto me, The remnant that are left of the captivity there in the province are in great affliction and reproach: the wall of Jerusalem is also broken down, and the gates thereof are burnt with fire.”‡—Job goes on, “O that I knew where I might find him [God], that I might come even to his seat. Behold, I go forward, but he is not there; and backward, but I cannot *perceive* him: on the left hand where he doth work, but I cannot *behold* him: he hideth himself on the right hand, that I cannot *see* him.”§ Could any thing more pathetically express the lamentations of a people who saw the extraordinary providence, under which they had so long lived, departing from them?—From God, Job turns to man, and says, “But now they that are younger than I *have me in derision*, whose fathers I would have disdained to have set with the dogs of my flock. Yea, whereto might the strength of their hands profit me, in whom old age was perished? For want and famine they were solitary: fleeing into the wilderness in former time desolate and waste: who cut up mallows by the bushes, and juniper-roots for their meat. They were driven forth from among men (they cried after them as after a thief) to dwell in the cliffs of the valleys, in the caves of the earth, and in the rocks. Amongst the bushes they brayed, under the nettles they were gathered together. They were children of *fools*, yea children of *base* men: they were *viler* than the earth.”|| This is a description, and a very exact one, of the *Cutheans* or *Samaritans*; of their behaviour to the Jews: and the sentiments of the Jews concerning them. These *had him in derision*, he says, and so Nehemiah informs us: “But it came to pass, that when *Sanballat* heard that we builded the wall, he was wroth, and took great indignation, and *mocked the Jews*. And he spake before his brethren and the army of Samaria, and said: What do these feeble Jews? will they fortify themselves? will they sacrifice? will they make an end in a day? will they revive the stones out of the heaps of the rubbish, which are burnt? Now *Tobiah* the Ammonite was by him, and he said; Even that which they build, if a fox go up, he shall even break down their stone wall. Hear, O our God, for we are *despised*, and turn their *reproach* upon their own head.”¶ And God, by the prophet Malachi, tells

\* Chap. xix. ver. 12, 13, 14.

† Neh. iv. 7, 8.

‡ Neh. i. 2, 3.

§ Chap. xxiii. ver. 3, 8, 9.

|| Chap. xxx. ver. 1, et seq.

¶ Neh. iv. 1, et seq.

the Jews the reason why he suffered them to be thus humbled: "Therefore have I also made you *contemptible* and *base* before all the people, according as ye have not kept my ways, but have been partial in the law."\*—Job says "he would have disdained to have set these with the dogs of his flock, that they were younger than him, that they were children of fools, yea of base men, viler than the earth. It is well known in what sovereign contempt the Jews held the Cutheans or Samaritans above all people. The character here given of the baseness of their extraction, without doubt, was very just. For when a conqueror, as here the king of Assyria, would repeople, with his own subjects, a strange country entirely ravaged and burnt up by an exterminating war, none but the very scum of a people would be sent upon such an errand. And by the account Ezra gives us of this colony, as gathered out of many parts of the Assyrian empire, we may fairly conclude them to be the offscourings of the east. "Then wrote Rehum the chancellor, and Shimshai the scribe, and the rest of their companions, the *Dinaites*, the *Apharsathchites*, the *Tarpelites*, the *Apharsites*, the *Archevites*, the *Babylonians*, the *Susan-chites*, the *Dehavites*, and the *Elamites*, and the rest of the nations whom the great and noble Asnapper brought over and set in the cities of Samaria."†—Job describes them as being at first reduced to the utmost distresses for food and harbour, in *a desolate and waste wilderness*, living upon *roots*, and dwelling in *caves* and *clifts of the rock*: and assuredly such must have been the first entertainment of this wretched colony, transplanted into a country entirely wasted and destroyed by a three years' incessant ravage.‡ Nay, before they could come up to take possession of their *desolate places*, the wild beasts of the field were got before them, and a scourge of lions prepared to receive them for their idolatrous pollutions of the holy land.§

Job has now ended his *parable*; and GOD is brought in to judge the disputants; whose speech opens in this manner: "Then the Lord answered Job out of the whirlwind, and said, Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?|| The character which God here gives of Job is that which the prophets give of the people of this time. *Ye have wearied the Lord with your words*,¶ says Malachi. And again: *Your words have been stout against me, saith the Lord*.\*\* But on Job's repeated submission and humiliation, God at length declares his acceptance of him. And thus he received the people into grace, as we learn by the prophet Zechariah:—*Thus saith the Lord, I am returned unto Zion, and will dwell in the midst of Jerusalem*.†† It is added, *Also the Lord gave Job TWICE as much as he had before*:‡‡ and in the same manner GOD speaks to the people by the prophet: *Turn ye to the stronghold, ye prisoners of hope, even to-day do I declare that I will render DOUBLE unto thee*.§§—Job's brethren now came to comfort him, and

\* Mal. ii. 9.

† Ezra iv. 9, 10.

2 Kings xvii. 5.

§ Id. ib.

|| Chap. xxxviii. ver. 1, 2. ¶ Mal. ii. 17.

\*\* Mal. iii. 13.

†† Zech. viii. 3.

‡‡ Chap. xlii. ver. 10.

§§ Zech. ix. 12.

*every man gave him a piece of money, and every one an ear-ring of gold.\** This, without question, alludes to the presents which Ezra tells us the Jews of Babylon made to their brethren in Judea: *And all they that were about them strengthened their hands with vessels of silver, with gold, with goods, and with beasts, and with precious things, besides all that was willingly offered.†*—The history adds, *So the Lord blessed the latter end of Job more than the beginning;‡* and thus the future prosperity of the people was predicted by the prophets of this time: “The glory of this latter house shall be greater than the former, saith the Lord of Hosts: And in this place will I give peace, saith the Lord of Hosts.§ For I, saith the Lord, will be unto her a wall of fire round about, and will be the glory in the midst of her.”||—The book concludes with these words: *After this lived Job an hundred and forty years, and saw his sons, and his sons’ sons, even four generations. So Job died being old and full of days:¶* this too was the specific blessing promised by God to the people, in the prophet Zechariah: “Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, There shall yet *old men and old women* dwell in the streets of Jerusalem, and every man with his staff in his hand *for very age*. And the streets of the city shall be *full of boys and girls* playing in the streets thereof.”\*\*

(2.) The next person in the drama is Job’s WIFE. Let us take her, as she is presented to us, on the common footing. She acts a short part indeed, but a very spirited one. *Then said his wife unto him; Dost thou still retain thine integrity? Curse God, and die.††* Tender and pious! He might see, by this prelude of his spouse, what he was to expect from his friends. The devil indeed assaulted Job, but he seems to have got possession of his wife. Happiness was so little to be expected with such a woman, that one almost wonders, that the sacred writer, when he aims to give us the highest idea of Job’s succeeding felicity, did not tell us, in express words, that he lived to bury his wife. In these modern ages of luxury and polished manners, a character like this is so little of a prodigy, that both the learned and unlearned are accustomed to read it without much reflection: but such a woman in the age of Job had been thought to need a lustration. In the history of the patriarchs, we have a large account of their wives; but these are all examples of piety, tenderness, and obedience; the natural growth of old simplicity of manners. Something lower down, indeed, we find a *Delilah*; but she was of the *uncircumcised*, a pure pagan; as, on examination, I believe, this wife of Job will prove: another very extraordinary circumstance in her character. For the patriarchs either took care to marry believers, or, if haply idolaters, to instruct them in the true religion; as we may see by the history of Jacob.—*Then said his wife unto him; Dost thou still retain thine* INTEGRITY? THUMMAH, *perfectio*, that is, *religion*. This was altogether in the pagan mode; idolaters, as we find in ancient story,

\* Chap. xlii. ver. 11.    † Ezra i. 6.    ‡ Chap. xlii. ver. 12.    § Hag. ii. 10.  
 || Zech. ii. 5.    ¶ Chap. xlii. ver. 16, 17.    \*\* Zech. viii. 4, 5.    †† Chap. ii. ver. 9.

generally growing atheistical under calamities.\*—*Curse God*, BARECH, *benedic-maledic*: here rightly† translated *curse*. So the *Syriac* and *Arabic* versions, *Conticiare Deo tuo*. This was another pagan practice, when they had implored or bribed the gods to no purpose. Thucydides affords us a terrible instance: When the Athenians in the height of their prosperity went upon the Syracusan expedition, the fleet set sail amidst the prayers and hymns of the adventurers: but on its unhappy issue, these very men, on the point of their fatal dispersion, prosecuted the same gods with the direst curses and imprecations.‡—*Curse God and DIE*; that is, offer violence to yourself. Another impiety of paganism; which, under irretrievable misfortunes, deemed suicide not only just but laudable. A crime much abhorred by the Hebrews, as forbidden by their law; till, in after-times, they became corrupted by gentile manners. All this shows the woman to have been a rank idolater. But Job's reply seems to put this suspicion out of doubt: *Thou speakest as one of the FOOLISH WOMEN speaketh. What? Shall we receive good at the hand of God, and shall we not receive evil?*§ A FOOLISH WOMAN is a Hebrew phrase to signify a *foreign woman*, an *idolater*, a *prostitute*; for these qualifications were always joined together in their ideas. On this account the *Chald. Paraph.* explains it: *Sicut una de mulieribus quæ operantur ignominiam in domo patris sui*. So David, speaking of the condition of the pagan world, says, *The FOOL hath said in his heart*|| i. e. the PAGAN; and in the character Job gives of the *Cutheans*, quoted above, he calls them *children of FOOLS*;¶ that is, of gentile extraction, as indeed they were. Now can we suppose that Job would marry an infidel, in a country which abounded with true believers? Job, who thought idolatry *a crime to be published by the judge*? These are difficulties not to be gotten over on the received idea of this book: and appeared so great to Cocceius and Schultens, the two most elaborate of Job's commentators, that they are for glossing the kind woman's words into an innocent or excusable sense; though her husband's reply so unavoidably confines them to a bad one: "Thou speakest," says he, "as one of the foolish women speaketh. What? Shall we receive good at the hand of God, and shall we not receive evil?" Besides, they did not consider that *Satan* had, as it were, engaged that Job should *curse God to his face*;\*\* which impiety he was here endeavouring to bring about by his agent, the woman. But now, on our interpretation, it will be found that this character was introduced with exquisite art and contrivance. We have observed, that this *remnant of the captivity* returned into their own country with hearts full of zeal for the law. Yet, with this general good disposition, there was one folly they were still infected with, and that was the taking *strange wives* of the idolatrous nations round about; which, amongst other, had this terrible inconven-

\* See note X, at the end of this book.

† See note Y, at the end of this book.

‡ — ἀντὶ δ' ὑχῆς, τι καὶ παιάνων, μὴ ὡς ἱεῖς, πάλιν τούτων τοῖς ἱερῶν ἱεραμί-  
μασιν ἀφορμαῖς.—Lib. viii. sect. 75, ed. Hud.

§ Chap. ii. ver. 10. || Ps. xiv. l. liii. l. ¶ Chap. xxx. ver. 8. \*\* Chap. ii. ver 5.



ience, that the children, who in their tender years are principally under the care of the mother, would be early tainted with pagan principles : a mischief so general, that Hosea calls the children of such marriages, *strange children*,\* i. e. *idolatrours*. This soon became a crying enormity. Their prophets awaked them with the thunder of divine menaces; and their rulers improved their penitence to a thorough reformation. “Judah,” saith the prophet Malachi, “hath dealt treacherously, and an abomination is committed in Israel and in Jerusalem: for Judah hath profaned the holiness of the Lord which he loved, and hath married the daughter of a strange god. The Lord will cut off the man that doth this.”† Nehemiah informs us of his zeal against this offence: “In those days also saw I Jews that had married *wives of Ashdod, of Ammon, and of Moab*: And I contended with them, and cursed them, and smote certain of them, and plucked off their hair, and made them swear by God, saying, Ye shall not give your daughters unto their sons nor take their daughters unto your sons, or for yourselves.”‡ But Ezra gives us a very circumstantial account of the crime and of the reformation: “Now when these things were done, the princes came to me, saying; The people of Israel, and the priests, and the Levites, have not separated themselves from the people of the lands, doing according to their abominations: *for they have taken of their daughters for themselves and for their sons*; so that the holy seed have mingled themselves with the people of those lands: Yea, the hand of the princes and rulers hath been chief in this trespass.”§ Shechaniah then encourages Ezra to reform this abuse.|| Ezra assembles the people:¶ they promise amendment; and propose a method of inquiry: “Let now our rulers of all the congregation stand, and let all them which have taken *strange wives* in our cities, come at appointed times, and with them the elders of every city, and the judges thereof.”\*\* Ezra approved of this method. “And they sat down in the first day of the tenth month, to examine the matter. And they made an end with all the men that had taken *strange wives* by the first day of the first month.†† The state and condition of a weak and thin colony, it is probable, encouraged them in this transgression: yet, as it was so expressly against the LAW, they were altogether without excuse: and indeed, the prohibition was an admirable expedient against idolatry: *strange wives* inevitably drawing the wisest, as it did Solomon himself, into foreign idolatries. On this account the prophet quoted above, finely calls them *the daughters of a STRANGE god*. Jeremiah gives us a remarkable instance of their influence over their husbands in his time: “Then all the men which knew *that their wives had burnt incense unto other gods*, and all the women that stood by, a great multitude, even all the people that dwelt in the land of Egypt, in Pathros, answered Jeremiah, saying, As for the word that thou hast spoken unto us in the name of the Lord, we will not hearken unto thee.”‡‡

\* Chap. v. ver. 7. † Mal. ii. 11, 12. ‡ Neh. xiii. 23, 25. § Ezra ix. 1, 2.

|| Chap. x. ver. 2. ¶ Ver. 7. \*\* Ver. 14. †† Chap. x. ver. 16, 17. ‡‡ Jer. xlv. 15.

And Nehemiah had good reason to tell these transgressors,—“Did not Solomon king of Israel sin by these things? Yet among many nations was there no king like him, who was beloved of his God, and God made him king over all Israel: nevertheless even him did outlandish women cause to sin.”\* For Ezra expressly assures us, that those who had taken *strange* women were drawn into *the abominations of the people of the lands*.†

The sacred writer, therefore, who composed his work for the use of these people represented under the person of Job, could not better characterize their manners, nor give them a more useful lesson, than by making Job's wife, the author of such wicked counsel, a *heathen*. It was indeed the principal study of their rulers to deter them from these marriages, and to recommend the *daughters of Israel*; of whom the prophet *Malachi* thus speaks: “Because the Lord hath been witness between thee and the wife of thy youth, against whom thou hast dealt treacherously; yet is she thy companion, and the wife of thy covenant.”‡ This will help us to clear up a difficulty, in the conclusion of the book, which very much perplexes the commentators: (where, let it be observed, his *misfortunes* are called his CAPTIVITY:§ which figure, of the species for the genus, could hardly be of use in the Jewish language till after their repeated punishments by *captivities*.) “So the Lord blessed the latter end of Job.—He had also seven sons and three DAUGHTERS. And he called the name of the first *Jemima*, and the name of the second *Kezia*, and the name of the third *Keren-happuch*. And in all the land were no women found so fair as the daughters of Job, and their father gave them inheritance among their brethren.”|| *Albert Schultens* says,¶ “Men are wont to ask why the names of Job's sons are suppressed, and the names of his daughters only mentioned. The ancients have recourse to mystery in this case, and trifle strangely with the etymologies of *Jemima*, *Kezia*, and *Keren-happuch*: which are commonly supposed to signify Diana, or the day, cassia, and the horn of antimony. In these, they find just so many characters of the church; which to the splendour of truth, joins the odour of virtue, that she may stand a perfect beauty in presence of her spouse, &c. &c. Others make them symbolical appellations, by which the happy father would represent the former splendour, fame, and glory of his family returned again into it.” And M. Le Clerc on the same place; \*\* —“If it is asked why the names of the

\* Neh. xiii. 26.

† Ezra ix. 1.

‡ Mal. ii. 14. And see note Z, at the end of this book.

§ Chap. xlii. ver. 10.

|| Chap. xliii. ver. 12, et seq.

¶ “Cur suppressis filiorum nominibus, filiarum illa appo-ita sint, quæri solet. Ad *mysterium* confugiunt veteres, mirè ludentes in etymis et *Jeminae*, *Keziae*, et *Keren-happuchæ*, sive *Dianæ* vel *Diei*, *Cassiae*, et *Cornu stibii*, ut vulgato hæc convenire visum. In his inveniunt totidem characteres *ecclesiæ*, quæ cum splendore lucis conjungat odorem fragrantissimum virtutis, ut tota pulchra sponso suo sistatur, &c. &c. An symbolicas hæc faciunt appellationes, quibus familie suæ redvivam lucem, famam, gloriam representatam voluerit fortunatissimus pater.”

\*\* “Queritur cur sint filiarum nomina memorata, non filiorum; cujus rei ratio reddi non potest, nisi fortè illustriores fuerint filiae. Hæc nomina proferuntur, ut argumentum cer-

daughters are recorded, and not the sons: of this, no reason can be given, unless, perhaps, the daughters were more illustrious. These names are urged as a certain proof of its being a true history. But who can say how far the oriental writers were wont to go, in dressing out their parables? In a gospel parable we find the name of Lazarus; which does not on that account hinder us from considering the story as of that class. However, we think it best to leave the matter just as we found it." But now all this difficulty is removed, and the passage is seen in its full force and beauty. It was the writer's design to recommend the *daughters of Israel* as the most desirable parties, [*And in all the land were no women found so fair as the daughters of Job;*] and to commemorate the reformation now made amongst the *people*, when they put away their *strange wives*, and took an oath to share the holy inheritance, for the future, only with the *daughters of Israel*.—*And their father gave them inheritance amongst their brethren*: words that have been as troublesome to the commentators as the rest; and have occasioned many a learned dissertation de Jure Successionis apud Hebræos, Arabas, Græcos, Latinos, et quamplurimas gentes.

(3.) We come next to Job's THREE FRIENDS.—Their solemn appointment to go and comfort Job; the neglect of their errand when they came thither; their inhumanity and strange humour of contradiction; have been already taken notice of, and explained, and reconciled to decorum, on the nature and principles of a *dramatic* composition. But this is not all: we find, on the issue of their debate, so many marks of insult, falsehood, and malice, that we must needs conclude their friendship to have been all pretence; that they were enemies in their hearts; and that the true purpose of their visit was to embitter and aggravate his miseries. This requires other principles to explain it: for, in the *historical* part they are represented as *real* friends: and this makes such a difficulty as nothing but our idea of the work can remove. Who then will doubt but that, as the PEOPLE were represented under Job, these *three friends* were their three capital enemies, who so greatly hindered and obstructed the rebuilding Jerusalem and the temple, SANBALLAT, TOBIAH, and GESHEM? Of whom Nehemiah gives us this account; "Then I came to the governors beyond the river, and I gave them the king's letters. When *Sanballat* the Horonite, and *Tobiah* the servant, the Ammonite, heard of it, it grieved them exceedingly that there was come a man to seek the welfare of the children of Israel."\* And again: "But it came to pass that when *Sanballat*, and *Tobiah*, and the Arabians, and the Ammonites, and the Ashdodites heard that the walls of Jerusalem were made up, and that the breaches began to be stopped, then they were very wroth, and conspired all of them together, to come

tum, quo constet hanc veram esse historiam. Sed quis dicat quibusque orientales parabolas ornare solebant? In parabola evangelica est quidem nomen *Lazari*, quod non obstat quo minus parabola habeatur. Verum rem in medio relinquimus."

\* Neh. ii. 9, 10.

and to fight against Jerusalem and to hinder it.”\* When force would not do, they assayed fraud: “Now it came to pass, when *Sanballat*, and *Tobiah*, and *Geshem* the Arabian, and the rest of our enemies, heard that I had builded the wall, and that there was no breach left therein, then *Sanballat* and *Geshem* sent unto me, saying; Come, let us meet together in some one of the villages in the plain of Ono: but they thought to do me mischief.”† The writer of the book of *Tobit* seems to have had this idea of the three friends, where he says; *Nam sicut beato Job insultabant reges, ita isti parentes et cognati ejus irridebant vitam ejus.*‡ But we are to observe this is now only to be found in the Latin translation which, St Jerome tells us, he made from the Chaldee. But, what is still of more moment, is a paragraph at the end of the Septuagint translation of the book of Job, which makes of these three friends, two kings and a tyrant.

The marks of resemblance between the *allegorical* and *real* persons, are many and strong.

*Eliphaz*, *Bildad*, and *Zophar*, are delivered as the allies and friends of Job: so *Sanballat* the Horonite had given his daughter to one of the sons of Joiada the son of Eliashib the high priest:§ and *Tobiah* had made two alliances with the Jews: his son Johanan had married the daughter of Meshullam the son of Berechiah; and he himself had taken to wife the daughter of Shechaniah the son of Arah.||

*Eliphaz*, *Bildad*, and *Zophar*, came in a friendly manner with offers of service and assistance: so did these enemies of the Jews, as we are informed both by Ezra and Nehemiah: “Now when the ADVERSARIES of Judah and Benjamin heard that the children of the captivity builded the temple unto the Lord God of Israel: then they came to Zerubbabel, and to the chief of the fathers, and said unto THEM; LET US BUILD WITH YOU. But Zerubbabel and Jeshua, and the rest of the chief of the fathers of Israel, said unto them, You have nothing to do with us to build a house unto our God, but we ourselves will build unto the Lord God of Israel, as king Cyrus the king of Persia hath commanded us.”¶ And Nehemiah’s answer to *Sanballat*, *Tobiah*, and *Geshem*, shows they had made this request:—“then answered I them, and said unto them, The God of heaven he will prosper us; therefore we his servants will arise and build, *but you have no portion, nor right, nor memorial in Jerusalem.*”\*\* And of *Tobiah* in particular, he says: “Moreover in these days the nobles of Judah sent many letters unto *Tobiah*: and the letters of *Tobiah* came unto them. Also they reported his good deeds before me, and uttered my words to him. And *Tobiah* sent letters to put me in fear.”††

The *three friends* of JOB were worshippers of the true God; and so were these *adversaries* of the JEWS: for when, in the place quoted

\* Chap. iv. ver. 7, 8.

§ Neh. xiii. 28.

\*\* Neh. ii. 20.

† Chap. vi. ver. 1, 2.

|| Neh. vi. 18.

†† Neh. vi. 17, 19.

‡ Tob. ii. 14.

¶ Ezra iv. 1, 2, 3.

above, they asked to *build with* the Jews, they give this reason of their request: "FOR WE SEEK YOUR GOD *as ye do*, and we do sacrifice unto him since the days of Esarhaddon king of Assur, which brought us up hither."\*

The *three friends* were perpetually deriding and upbraiding him for his sins: and of this Job frequently complains in the course of the disputation.† So Nehemiah tells us, that "when *Sanballat* the Horonite, and *Tobiah* the servant, the Ammonite, and *Geshem* the Arabian, heard that they were set upon building the walls of Jerusalem, they laughed them to scorn, and despised them, and said, What is this thing that ye do? Will ye rebel against the king?"‡ And again: "But it came to pass that when *Sanballat* heard that we builded the wall, he was wroth, and took great indignation, and mocked the Jews. Now *Tobiah* the Ammonite was by him, and he said; Even that which they build, if a fox go up, he shall even break down their stone wall."§ God, by the prophet Malachi, tells them, "Judah hath profaned the holiness of the Lord which he loved, and hath married the daughter of a strange god."|| And it is remarkable that they with whom the Jews had committed this crime, as *Sanballat*, *Tobiah*, and *the Cutheans*, were made the instruments of their punishment. Eliphaz the Temanite charges and upbraids Job with the most flagitious crimes: "Is not thy wickedness great, and thine iniquities infinite?"¶ And thus the Cutheans represented the Jews to Artaxerxes: "Be it known unto the king, that the Jews, which came up from thee to us, are come unto Jerusalem, building the rebellious and the bad city, and have set up the walls thereof.—Therefore have we certified the king that search may be made in the book of the records of thy fathers, so shalt thou find in the book of the records, and know, that this city is a rebellious city, and hurtful unto kings and provinces; and that they have moved sedition within the fame of old time; for which cause was this city destroyed."\*\*—If their adversaries could accuse them thus unjustly, we are not to think they would spare them where there was more ground for condemnation. When Nehemiah came to the administration of affairs, the rich had oppressed the poor by a rigorous exaction of their debts: "And there was a great cry of the people and of their wives, against their brethren the Jews. For there were that said; We, our sons, and our daughters, are many: therefore we take up corn for them, that we may eat and live. Some also there were that said; We have mortgaged our lands, vineyards, and houses, that we may buy corn because of the dearth. There were also that said; We have borrowed money for the king's tribute, and that upon our lands and vineyards. Yet now our flesh is as the flesh of our brethren, our children as their children; and lo we bring into bondage

\* Ezra iv. 2.

† Chap. iv. 17. Chap. xii. ver. 4. Chap. xiii. ver. 4. Chap. xvi. ver. 1, 20. Chap. xvii. ver. 2. Chap. xix. ver. 2. Chap. xxi. ver. 3. Chap. xxvi. ver. 4.

‡ Neh. ii. 19.

§ Chap. iv. ver. 1, 3.

|| Mal. ii. 11.

¶ Chap. xxii. ver. 5.

\*\* Ezra iv. 12, 14, 15.

our sons and our daughters to be servants, and some of our daughters are brought into bondage already, neither is it in our power to redeem them; for other men have our lands and vineyards.”\* This abuse Nehemiah reformed: and in reproving the oppressors, he said, “It is not good that ye do: Ought ye not to walk in the fear of our God, because of the **REPROACH OF THE HEATHEN OUR ENEMIES?**”† Which *reproach* was intended to be represented in these words of Eliphaz: “For thou has taken a pledge from thy brother for nought, and stripped the naked of their clothing.”‡

But the *three friends* are at length condemned by God himself: “The Lord said to Eliphaz the Temanite, My wrath is kindled against thee and against thy two friends; for ye have not spoken of me the thing that is right, as my servant Job hath.”§ And in the same manner he speaks, by the prophet, concerning these *adversaries* of the Jews: “And I am very sore displeased with the heathen that are **AT EASE**; for I was but a **LITTLE DISPLEASED**, and they **HELPED FORWARD THE AFFLICTION.**”||—His sentence against the three friends goes on in these words: “Therefore take now unto you seven bullocks and seven rams, and go to my servant Job, and offer up for yourselves a burnt-offering, and my servant Job shall pray for you, for him will I accept: lest I deal with you after your folly, in that ye have not spoken of me the thing which is right, like my servant Job.”¶ This, I suppose, is designed to represent the defeat of their *adversaries*, in the decree which the Jews, by the good providence of God, procured from Darius, commanding the *Cutheans* (who had hitherto so much hindered) now to assist the Jews to the utmost of their power in rebuilding the temple: “Then Darius the king made a decree—Now therefore, Tatnai, governor beyond the river, Shetharboznai, and your companions the Apharsachites, which are beyond the river, be ye far from thence: let the work of this house of God alone, let the governor of the Jews, and the elders of the Jews, build this house of God in his place. Moreover I make a decree, what ye shall do to the elders of these Jews, for the building of this house of God: that, of the king’s goods, even of the tribute beyond the river, forthwith expenses be given unto these men, that they be not hindered. And that which they have need of, both young bullocks and rams, and lambs, for the **BURNT-OFFERINGS** of the God of heaven, wheat, salt, wine, and oil, according to the appointment of the priests which are at Jerusalem, let it be given them day by day without fail; that they may offer sacrifices of sweet savours unto the God of heaven, and pray **FOR THE LIFE OF THE KING AND OF HIS SONS.**”\*\*\*

The reason, why the *three friends* are condemned as *not having spoken of God the thing that was right*, was, 1. Because using the argument of an *equal providence* only to condemn Job with the heart of an

\* Neh. v. 1, et seq.

§ Job xlii. 7.

\*\* Ezra vi. 1, 6, et seq.

† Ver. 9.

|| Zech. i. 15.

‡ Chap. xxli. ver. 6.

¶ Job xlii. 8.



enemy, they made the honour of God a stale to their malignant purposes. To understand this more fully, we must consider that the great contest was concerning an *equal providence*: what occasioned it was their suspicion of Job's secret iniquity; consequently these two points take their turns occasionally in the course of the disputation. Job, after many struggles, at last gave up the general question; but the particular one of his own righteousness, he adheres to, throughout, and makes it the subject of all he says from chap. xxvii. to chap. xxxi. This ended the dispute: for, in the beginning of the next chapter,\* the writer tells us,—“So these three men ceased to answer Job, because he was righteous in his own eyes;” that is, they gave Job this contemptuous reason why they would argue no longer with him. By this we may see, how finely the dispute was conducted, to answer, what I suppose was, the end of writing the book. JOB, who represented the PEOPLE, was to speak their sentiments concerning their doubts of an equal providence; but he was at last to acquiesce, to teach them a lesson of obedience and submission. 2. The second reason of all the condemnation of these false *friends* was, because they had supported their condemnation of Job by a pretended revelation.—“Now a thing was secretly brought to me,” says Eliphaz, “and mine ear received a little thereof. In thoughts from the visions of the night, when deep sleep falleth on men, fear came upon me, and trembling, which made all my bones to shake: then a spirit passed before my face, the hair of my flesh stood up: I stood still, but I could not discern the form thereof: an image was before mine eyes, there was silence, and I heard a voice saying, Shall mortal man be more just than God,” &c.† This was the character, and conduct, of the enemies of the republic, as the prophet Ezekiel informs us; whose words are so very apposite, that we may well think they were the original to those above in the fourth chapter of Job. “Thus saith the Lord God; Wo unto the foolish prophets that follow their own spirit and have seen nothing! they have seen vanity and lying divination, saying, The Lord saith; and the Lord hath not sent them.—Have ye not seen a vain vision, and have ye not spoken a lying divination, whereas ye say, The Lord saith it, albeit I have not spoken? Therefore thus saith the Lord God; Because ye have spoken vanity and seen lies, therefore behold I am against you, saith the Lord God.”‡

(4.) The last person in the opposition is the devil himself, SATAN, the author and contriver of all the mischief. And now we are come to that part of the *allegory*, where the fable and the moral meet, and, as it were, concur to throw off the mask, and expose the true face of the subject; this assault upon JOB being that very attack which, the prophet Zechariah tells us, Satan made, at this time on the PEOPLE. The only difference is, that, in this poem, it is *Job*; in that prophecy it is *Joshua the high priest*, who stands for the *people*. In all the rest, the identity is so strongly marked, that this single circumstance alone is sufficient to

\* Job xxxii.

† Chap. iv. 12, et seq.

‡ Ezek. xiii. 3, et seq.

confirm the truth of our whole interpretation. There needs only setting the two passages together to convince the most prejudiced:—The historian says; “Now there was a day when the sons of God came to present themselves before the Lord, and SATAN came also among them. And the Lord said unto Satan, Whence comest thou? Then Satan answered the Lord, and said, From going to and fro in the earth, and from walking up and down in it. And the Lord said unto Satan, Hast thou considered my servant JOB, that there is none like him in the earth, a perfect and an upright man, one that feareth God, and escheweth evil? Then Satan answered the Lord, and said, Doth Job fear God for nought? But put forth thine hand now, and touch all that he hath, and he will curse thee to thy face. And the Lord said unto Satan, Behold, all that he hath is in thy power; only upon himself put not forth thine hand. So Satan went forth from the presence of the Lord.”\* The prophet’s account is in these words: “Be silent, O all flesh, before the Lord: for he is raised up out of his holy habitation. And he showed me JOSHUA the high priest, standing before the angel of the Lord, and SATAN standing at his right hand to resist him. And the Lord said unto Satan, The Lord rebuke thee, O Satan; even the Lord that hath chosen Jerusalem, rebuke thee: is not this a brand plucked out of the fire? Now *Joshua was clothed with filthy garments*, and stood before the angel. And he answered and spake unto those that stood before him, saying, *Take away the filthy garments from him*. And unto him he said, Behold, I have *caused thine iniquity to pass from thee*, and I will clothe thee with change of raiment. And I said, Let them set a fair mitre upon his head; so they set a fair mitre upon his head, and clothed him with garments. And *the angel of the Lord stood by*.”† JOB’s whole dramatic life lies here in its stamina. *Satan standing at the angel’s right hand to resist Joshua* is, (when drawn out more at length) his persecution of Job—*Joshua clothed with filthy garments*, is Job amidst the ashes—the *clothing of Joshua with change of raiment, and setting a fair mitre on his head*, is Job’s returning prosperity—and *the angel of the Lord standing by*, is God’s interposition from the whirlwind.

But we have not yet done with this character. The finding SATAN in the scene is a strong proof that the work was composed in the age we have assigned to it. This evil being was little known to the Jewish people till about this time. Their great lawgiver, where he so frequently enumerates, and warns them of, the snares and temptations which would draw them to transgress the law of God, never once mentions this capital enemy of Heaven; yet this was an expedient which the wisest pagan lawgivers ‡ thought of use, to keep the populace in the ways of virtue. Thus Zaleucus, in the preface to his Book of Laws, speaks of *an evil DEMON tempting men to mischief*: and in the popular religion there was always a FURY at hand, to pursue the more atrocious offenders

\* Job i. 6, et seq.

† Zech. ii. 13; iii. 1, et seq.

‡ See Divine Legation, vol. i. pp. 196, et seq.

through the world. Nay, when the end of that sacred history which Moses composed, obliged him to treat of *Satan's* first grand machination against mankind, he entirely hides this wicked spirit under the animal which he made his instrument. (The reason of this wise conduct hath been in part explained already, and will be more exactly treated of in the course of our general argument.)\* But, as the fulness of time drew near, they were made more and more acquainted with this their capital enemy. When Ahab, for the crimes and follies of the people, was suffered to be infatuated, we have this account of the matter in the first book of Kings: "And Micaiah said; Hear thou therefore the word of the Lord: I saw the Lord sitting on his throne, and all the host of heaven standing by him, on his right hand, and on his left. And the Lord said; Who shall persuade Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramoth-Gilead? And one said on this manner, and another said on that manner. And there came forth a SPIRIT, and stood before the Lord, and said; I will persuade him. And the Lord said unto him; Wherewith? And he said, I will go forth, and I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And he said, Thou shalt persuade him, and prevail also: Go forth, and do so."† SATAN is not here recorded by name; and so we must conclude that the people were yet to know little of his *history*: However this undertaking sufficiently declared his *nature*. On the return from the captivity, we find him better known; and things then are ascribed to him, as the immediate and proper author, which (while divine providence thought fit to keep back the knowledge of him) were before given, in an improper sense, to the first and ultimate cause of all things. Thus, in the second book of Samuel, it is said that God moved David to number the people,—“And again, the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel, and he moved David against them to say; Go number Israel and Judah.‡ But in the first book of Chronicles, which was written after the captivity, *Satan* is said to have moved David to this folly. “And Satan stood up against Israel, and provoked David to number Israel.”§ For, his history having an inseparable connexion with the *redemption* of mankind, the knowledge of them was to be conveyed together: and now, their later prophets had given less obscure descriptions of the REDEEMER and the other attendant truths.

Here let me stop a moment, though I anticipate my subject, to adore the visible splendour of the divine wisdom, in this period of God's moral dispensation: we have observed that, the fulness of time approaching, the writings of the prophets, after the captivity, had given less obscure intimations of the *redemption*; and that the truths, which had a necessary connexion with it, were proportionably laid open. Two of the principal of these were the HISTORY OF SATAN and the DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE; which, soon after this time, were conveyed to their knowledge. Now, besides the use of these two truths to the general

\* See note A A, at the end of this book.

‡ 2 Sam. xxiv. 1.

† 1 Kings xxii. 19, et seq.

§ 1 Chron. xxi. 1.

economy, they were of great advantage to the Jewish people at those very junctures when each was first made known unto them. The *history of Satan*, it is evident, they were brought acquainted with in their *captivity*: and nothing could better secure them from the dangerous error of the TWO PRINCIPLES, which was part of the national religion of the country into which they were led captive. The *doctrine of a future state* they learned some small time after their thorough *re-establishment*; and this being at a time when their extraordinary providence was departed from them, was of the highest advantage and support to them, as a nation and a people. But this, as I say, is anticipating my subject, and will be explained at large hereafter: the other is the point we are at present concerned with, namely, the knowledge of this wicked spirit; and the security this knowledge afforded, against the error of the *two principles*: which leads us to another use the writer of the book of Job hath made of this *personage* of the drama.

We have observed, that the principal design of the author of this work was to remove all errors, concerning the SUPREME CAUSE, from amongst a people now about to come under the *ordinary* providence of Heaven, after having been long accustomed to the *extraordinary*. The common fault which the ancients were prone to commit, on seeing good and bad happen indifferently to all men, was to bring in question the GOODNESS of their Maker. And they were apt to satisfy themselves in this difficulty, by another mistake as absurd as that was impious; the belief of TWO PRINCIPLES, a good and evil. The Jews, of this time particularly, were most obnoxious to the danger, as coming from a place where this strange doctrine made part of the public religion. It was of the highest importance therefore to guard against both these errors. And this the sacred writer hath effectually done, by showing that SATAN, or the *evil spirit* (whose history, misunderstood, or imperfectly told in the first ages of mankind, much favoured the notion of an *evil principle*) was, like all other immaterial beings, even of the highest rank, a creature of GOD; at enmity with him; but entirely in his power; and used by him as an instrument to punish wicked men; yet sometimes permitted to afflict the good, for a trial of their patience, and to render their faith and virtue more perfect and conspicuous. Hence we see (which deserves our serious reflection) how useful it was to this purpose (what little light soever it gave to the question) to resolve all when the dispute came to be moderated and determined, into the OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD, who is represented as the SOLE Creator and Governor of all things. And, what the wisdom of the Holy Spirit directed the writer of the book of Job to do, in this point, on their *coming* from the land which held the belief of TWO PRINCIPLES, the same wisdom directed Isaiah to do, on their going thither. This prophet, in the person of God, addressing his speech to Cyrus, whom God had appointed to be the instrument of his people's restoration, says: "I am the Lord, and there is none else, there is no God besides me: I girded thee, though thou hast not known me.—I FORM THE

LIGHT, AND CREATE DARKNESS: I MAKE PEACE, AND CREATE EVIL: I the Lord do all these things.”\*

This declaration of God by Isaiah naturally leads us, ere we conclude this head, to consider another text of the book of Job, which confirms all that is here said of SATAN and the TWO PRINCIPLES; and, by consequence, the opinion here advanced, of the time in which the book was written. Job, speaking of the works of creation and providence, says, “He divided the SEA with his power, and his understanding smiteth through the PROUD.”† This evidently alludes to the miracle of the *Red Sea*, and the destruction of *Pharaoh*. From these works of providence upon earth, the writer proceeds to speak of God’s work of creation above; both *material* and *intellectual*.—“By his Spirit he hath GARNISHED the heavens; his hand hath formed the CROOKED SERPENT;”‡ *i. e.* He made the material and intellectual world; and in this latter, the *evil being* himself, (that pretended rival of his power, and opposer of all his good) is equally the work of his hands. The progression and connexions of the parts, contained in this whole period, are extremely beautiful. His work of providence, as Lord of nature upon earth, led properly to his work of creation above, as the Maker and Governor of all things: and his chastisement of the proudest and most powerful monarch then on earth, in his character of Governor of the moral world, as naturally introduced the mention of his creating, and his keeping in subjection, the EVIL SPIRIT, in his character of the first Cause of all things. And, to connect these two relations together with the greater justness, the writer with much elegance calls the *evil spirit* by that name where-with the sacred writers, and especially Isaiah, (whom we shall see presently the writer of the book of Job had particularly in his eye) denote the king of Egypt. “In that day the Lord, with his sore and great and strong sword, shall punish Leviathan the piercing serpent, even Leviathan that CROOKED SERPENT, and he shall slay the dragon that is in the sea.”§ Let us observe, that the writer of the book of Job, in the last verse, evidently alludes to, or rather paraphrases those words of Isaiah quoted before—“I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and CREATE EVIL: I the Lord do all these things; for what is this but garnishing the heavens, and FORMING THE CROOKED SERPENT?” But the relation and connexion between the 12th and 13th verses|| not being observed, several eminent commentators, both Jews and Christians, were inclined to understand the *crooked serpent* as signifying the great constellation so named, situate near the arctic pole; or at least, that enormous trail of light called the galaxy or *via lactea*. And those moderns who have been as backward to find a devil for the tempter, as a God for their Redeemer, thought it agreed best with their Socinian reasoning scheme; the general mention of the *garniture of the heavens*, being well followed by a particular description of one of its pieces of furniture. But whatever their force of logic may be, their taste of rhetoric seems

\* Is. xlv. 5, 7. † Chap. xxvi. ver. 12. ‡ Ver. 13. § Chap. xxvii. 1. || Job xxvi.

none of the best. It is a strange kind of amplification to say, "He made all the constellations, and he made one of them." But that interpretation of scripture which receives its chief strength from the rules of human eloquence, and art of composition, hath often but a slender support. I shall go on therefore to show, that a Hebrew writer (and he who, after all that has been said, will not allow the author of the book of Job to be a Hebrew, may grant or deny what he pleases for me)—to show, I say, that *a Hebrew writer, by the crooked serpent* could not mean a *constellation*.

The rabbins tell us, (who in this case seem to be competent evidence) that the ancient Hebrews in their astronomy, which the movable feasts of their ritual necessitated them to cultivate, did not represent the stars, either single or in constellations, by the name or figure of any animal whatsoever; but distinguished them by the letters of their alphabet, artificially combined. And this they assure us was the constant practice, till, in the later ages, they became acquainted with the Grecian sciences: then, indeed, they learned the art of tricking up their *SPHERE*, and making it as picturesque as their neighbours. But still they did it with modesty and reserve; and hesitated even then, to admit of any human figure. The reason given for this scrupulous observance, namely, the danger of idolatry, is the highest confirmation of the truth of their account. For it is not to be believed, that, when the *ASTRONOMY* and *SUPERSTITION* of Egypt were so closely colleagued, and that the combination was supported by this very means, the *NAMES* given to the constellations, it is not to be believed, I say, that Moses, who, under the ministry of God, forbade the Israelites *to make any likeness of any thing in HEAVEN above* according to the old mode, would suffer them to make *new likenesses* there: which, if not in the first intention set up to be worshipped, yet, we know, never waited long to obtain that honour. To corroborate this rabbinical account relative to the Hebrew astronomy, we may observe, that the translators of the Septuagint, the heads and doctors of the Jewish law, who must needs know what was conformable to the practice derived from that law, understood the writer of the book of Job to mean no more nor less than the *DEVIL*, by this periphrasis of the *crooked serpent*; and so translated it, ΔΡΑΚΟΝΤΑ ΑΠΟΣΤΑΤΗΝ, *the apostate dragon*.

From all this it appears, that neither *MOSES* nor *ESDRAS* could call a constellation by the name of the *crooked serpent*.

(5.) The last actor in this representation, is Job's fourth friend, *ELIHU, the son of Barachel the Buzite*, who is brought upon the stage in the thirty-second chapter. He is made to reprove Job with great asperity; and, like the other three, to have his *wrath kindled against him*: and yet, to the surprise of all the commentators, he is not involved in their sentence, when *GOD* passes judgment on the controversy. Here again, the only solution of the difficulty is our interpretation of the book of Job. Elihu's opposition was the severity of a true friend; the others'



the malice of pretended ones. His severity against Job arose from this, that *Job justified himself rather than God*,\* that is, was more anxious to vindicate his own innocence than the equity of God's providence. For under the person of ELIHU was designed the *sacred writer himself*. He begins with the character of a true prophet, under which, as in the act of inspiration, he represents himself. "I am full of matter, the spirit within me constraineth me. Behold, my belly is as wine which hath no vent, it is ready to burst like new bottles."† And this, he contrasts with the character of the false prophets of that time,—“Let me not, I pray you, accept any man's person, neither let me give flattering titles unto man.”‡ But all this will appear from the following considerations.

Elihu, on the entrance upon his argument, addresses the three friends in the following manner: “Now he hath not directed his words against me: neither will I answer him with your speeches.”§ This sufficiently discriminates his cause and character from theirs. He then turns to Job: “My words,” says he, “shall be of the *uprightness* of my heart; and my lips shall utter *knowledge* clearly. The *Spirit of God hath made me*, and the *breath of the Almighty* hath given me *life*. If thou canst answer me, set thy words in order before me, and stand up. BEHOLD, I AM ACCORDING TO THY WISH, IN GOD'S STEAD: I also am formed out of the clay,”|| &c. This clearly intimates the character of God's chosen servant: these were of approved integrity, they received the divine inspiration, and were therefore in *God's stead* to the people. Elihu goes on in the same strain.—“He excites Job to attention,—accuses him of charging God with injustice,—reproves his impiety,—tells him that men cry in their afflictions, and are not heard for want of faith:—that his sins hinder the descent of God's blessings; whose wisdom and ways are unsearchable.”—But is this the conversation of one private man to another? Is it not rather a public exhortation of a Hebrew prophet speaking to the people? Hence too, we may see the great propriety of that allusion to the case of Hezekiah,¶ mentioned above, which the writer of the book of Job, in this place, puts into the mouth of Elihu. The spirit with which Elihu speaks is farther seen from his telling Job that *he desires to justify him*.\*\* And yet he accuses him of saying, “It profiteth a man nothing, that he should delight himself with God;”†† and expostulates with him yet further; “Thinkest thou this to be right that thou saidst, My righteousness is more than God's? For thou saidst, What advantage will it be unto thee, and what profit shall I have, if I be cleansed from my sin?”‡‡ Here the commentators are much scandalized, as not seeing how this could be fairly collected from what had passed; yet it is certain he says no more of Job than what the prophets say of the people represented under him. Thus Malachi: “Ye have wearied the Lord with your words: yet ye say; Wherein have we wearied him? When

\* Chap. xxxii. ver. 2.

† Chap. xxxii. ver. 18, 19.

‡ Ver. 21.

§ Ver. 14.

|| Chap. xxxiii. ver. 3, et seq.

¶ Chap. xxxiii. ver. 18, et seq.

\*\* Chap. xxxii. ver. 32.

†† Chap. xxxiv. ver. 9.

‡‡ Chap. xxxv. ver. 2, 3.

ye say; Every one that doeth evil is good in the sight of the Lord, and he delighteth in them; or, Where is the God of judgment?"\* And again; "Ye have said, *It is vain to serve God*: and what profit is it, that we have kept his ordinance, and that we have walked mournfully before the Lord of Hosts? And now we call the proud happy: yea they that work wickedness are set up; yea they that tempt God are even delivered."† It was this which kindled Elihu's wrath against Job; who, in this work, is represented to be really guilty; as appears not only from the beginning of God's speech to him;‡ but from his own confession,§ which follows. It is remarkable that Job, from the beginning of his misfortunes to the coming of his three comforters, though greatly provoked by his wife, *sinned not* (as we are told) *with his lips*.|| But, persecuted by the malice and bitterness of their words, he began to lay such stress on his own innocence as even to accuse the justice of God. This was the very state of the Jews at this time: so exactly has the sacred writer conducted his allegory! They bore their straits and difficulties with temper, till their enemies the *Cutheans*, and afterwards *Sanballat*, *Tobiah*, and the *Arabians*, confederated against them; and then they fell into indecent murmurings against God. And here let us observe a difference in the conduct of Elihu and the three friends, a difference which well distinguishes their characters: they accuse Job of *preceding* faults; Elihu accuses him of the *present*, namely, his impatience and impiety: which evidently shows that *his* charge was *true*, and that theirs was unjust.¶

Again, Elihu uses the very same reasonings against Job and his three friends,\*\* which are afterwards put into the mouth of God himself,†† resolving all into his OMNIPOTENCY. *Elihu's* speech is indeed in every respect the same with God's, except in the severity of his reproof to Job. And, in that, the writer hath shown much address in conducting his subject. The end and purpose of this work was to encourage the Jews to a perseverance in their duty from the assured care and protection of providence. At the same time, as they were growing impatient, it was necessary this temper should be rebuked. But as the ordonance of the poem is disposed, the putting the reproof into the mouth of the Almighty would have greatly weakened the end and purpose of the work. This part therefore is given to his servant Elihu: and God's sentence is all grace and favour on the side of Job, and indignation and resentment against his false friends. For this event, the writer had finely prepared us, in making Job, in the heat of the disputation, say to these friends; "Wilt thou speak wickedly for God? and talk deceitfully for him? Will ye accept his person? Will ye contend for God? Is it good that he should search you out? or as one man mocketh

\* Mal. ii. 17.

† Mal. iii. 14, 15.

‡ Chap. xxxviii.

§ Chap. xlii. ver. 1, et seq.

|| Chap. ii. ver. 10.

¶ See note B B, at the end of this book.

\*\* From chap. xxxii. to xxxvii.

†† From chap. xxxviii. to xlii.

another do ye so mock him? HE WILL SURELY REPROVE YOU, if ye do secretly accept persons."\* The judicious reader will observe another artful circumstance in the cast of Elihu's oration. The three friends, in the grand question concerning an *equal providence*, went directly over to one side, and Job to another: Elihu inclines to neither, but resolves all into submission to the almighty power of GOD. For it was yet inconvenient to acquaint the Jews, (who were just going to fall under a *common providence*) with the truth of their case. Hence, to observe it by the way, another circumstance arises to determine the date of the poem. We have shown that the *subject* suited only this time: we now see that the *manner* of treating the subject could agree to no other. On the whole, this intermediate speech of Elihu's was the finest preparative for the decisive one which was to follow.

Farther, the true character of Elihu is seen from hence, that Job replies nothing to these words, as conscious of the truth of his reproofs; and that they were the reproofs of a friend. And indeed, his submission, on this occasion, was to represent the repentance of the Jews on the preaching of their prophets, Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi.

But lastly, Elihu's not being involved in the condemnation of the three friends is the most convincing argument of his very different character. This, as we have said, exceedingly perplexed the commentators. But where was the wonder he should be acquitted, when he had said nothing but what GOD himself repeated and confirmed? What is rather to be admired is the severe sentence passed upon the three friends; and that, for the crime of *impiety*. A thing utterly inexplicable on the common interpretation. For let them be as guilty as you please, to Job, they are all the way advocates for GOD; and hold nothing concerning his government that did not become his nature and character. But let us once suppose, these three friends to represent the adversaries of the Jews, and the difficulty ceases. All their pretences are then hypocritical: and they impiously assume the patronage of GOD only to carry on their malice to more advantage against Job. Why the writer of this book did not *openly* expose the wickedness of their hearts, as is done in the book of Ezra and Nehemiah, was because the nature of the work would not suffer it; the question in debate, and the managers of the question, necessarily requiring that the part they took should have a specious outside of piety and veneration toward GOD. In a word, Job is made to say something wrong, because he represents the impatient Jews of that time: his three false friends, to say something right, because the nature of the drama so required: and Elihu to moderate with a perfect rectitude, because he represented the person of a prophet.

But to see the truth of this interpretation in its best light, one should have before one's eyes all those difficulties with which the commentators of the book of Job are entangled at almost every step. A view of this would draw us into an unreasonable length. I shall only take notice of

\* Chap. xiii. ver. 7, 8, et seq.

one of the most judicious of them, (who has collected from all the rest) in the very case of this Elihu. CALMET characterises the fourth friend in this manner: "There was now none but Elihu, the youngest and least judicious, that held out against Job's arguments—Elihu here by a vain parade and overflow of words gives a reason,"\* &c. Again: "Elihu was given to represent one who knew not how to be silent, a great talker."† And again: "It cannot be denied but that there is a mixture of ignorance and presumption in what Elihu says: and, above all, a strange prejudice and visible injustice in most of the accusations he brings against Job."‡ This he says indeed. But when he comes to find Elihu escape God's condemnation, in which the other three are involved, he alters his note, and unsays all the hard things he had thrown out against him. "Although Elihu," says he, "had mistaken the sense of his friend's words, yet, for all that, God seems, at least, to have approved his intention, because when he declares to Job's friends that they had spoken amiss, and commands them to offer up burnt-offerings for themselves, he only speaks of Bildad, Eliphaz, and Zophar, without mentioning Elihu. Besides, Job answers not a word to this last, and by his silence seems to approve of his discourse."§ GROTIUS, who strove to be more consistent in his character of Elihu, which yet his acquittal in God's sentence will not suffer any commentator to be, upon the received idea of this book, has run into a very strange imagination. He supposes Elihu might be a domestic, or retainer to one of the three friends, and so be involved in the condemnation of his principal.||—But, now mark the force of prejudice to inveterate notions! It is visible to every one who regards the two speeches of Elihu and God with the least attention, that the doctrine and the reasoning are the same. Yet Calmet's general character of Elihu is, that there is *a vain parade and overflow of words*; that there is *a mixture of ignorance and presumption*, and *a visible injustice*, in most of the accusations he brings against Job. And yet of God's speech he says, "Here we have A CLEAR SOLUTION of the difficulties which had perplexed and embarrassed these five friends."¶—Pity that this *clear solution* should turn out to be no *solution* at all.

III. Having thus fixed the date of the book, our next inquiry will be

\* Il n'y eut qu'Eliu, qui étoit le plus jeune et le moins judicieux, qui ne se rendit pas—par un vain étalage des paroles Eliu rend ici raison, &c.—Sur chap. xxxii. ver. 1.

† Pour designer un homme qui ne se peut taire, un grand causeur.—Sur chap. xxxii. ver. 18.

‡ On ne peut nier, qu'il n'y ait et de l'ignorance et de la presumption dans ce que dit Eliu, et, sur tout, une étrange prevention et une injustice visible dans la plupart des accusations, qu'il forma contre Job.—Sur chap. xxviii. ver. 2.

§ Quoiqu' Eliu eût mal pris le sens des paroles de son ami, toutefois Dieu semble approuver au moins son intention: puisque lorsqu'il declare aux amis de Job qu'ils ont mal parlé, et qu'il ordonne qu'on offre pour eux des holocaustes, il ne fait mention que de Bildad, d'Eliphaz, et de Sophar, sans parler d'Eliu. De plus, Job ne repoud point à ce dernier, et par son silence il semble approuver son discours.

|| Elihu hic non nominatur, ut nec supra ii. 11, forté quod assecla esset alicujus trium.—In chap. xlii. ver. 7.

¶ C'est ici le denouement de la piece, et la solution des difficultés, qui avoient été agitées entre ces cinq amis.

concerning its AUTHOR. That it was composed by an inspired writer is beyond all question. Not only its uncontroverted reception and constant place in the canon, and its internal marks of divinity, which this exposition has much illustrated and enlarged, but its being quoted as inspired scripture by St Paul, \* will suffer no reasonable man to doubt of it. By this time therefore, I suppose, the reader will be beforehand with me in judging it could scarce be any other than EZRA himself; who was a *ready scribe in the law of Moses*, and had *prepared his heart to seek the law of the Lord, and to do it, and to teach in Israel statutes and judgments.*† For he had the welfare of his people exceedingly at heart, as appears from the books of Ezra and Nehemiah. And this of Job, we have shown, was written purposely for their instruction and consolation. He made a correct edition of the scriptures, settled the canon, and *added in several places throughout the books of his edition, what appeared necessary for the illustrating, connecting, or completing of them.*‡ He is reasonably supposed to be the author of the two books of Chronicles and the book of Esther. It was a common tradition too amongst the Jews, that he was the same with Malachi. And his great reputation as a *ready scribe in the law of Moses*, apparently gave birth to that wretched fable of the destruction of the scriptures in the Babylonian captivity, and Ezra's reproduction of them by divine inspiration.

Thus is our interpretation of the BOOK OF JOB so far from taking away any dignity, or authenticity it was before possessed of, that it establishes and enlarges both. The showing it principally respected a whole people highly ennobles the subject: and the fixing an anonymous writing on one of the most eminent of God's prophets greatly strengthens its authority. But the chief advantage of my interpretation, I presume, lies in this, that it renders one of the most difficult and obscure books in the whole canon, the most easy and intelligible; reconciles all the characters to nature, all the arguments to logic, and all the doctrines to the course and order of God's dispensations. And these things showing it superior, in excellence, to any human composition, prove, what universal tradition hath always taught, that it is of divine original.

[II.] Having brought down the date of this book so low, it is of little importance to our subject, whether the famous passage in the nineteenth chapter be understood of a RESURRECTION *from the dead*, or only of TEMPORAL DELIVERANCE *from afflictions.*§ Yet as our interpretation affords new assistance for determining this long debated question, it will not be improper to sift it to the bottom.

I make no scruple then to declare for the opinion of those who say that the words ("I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth. And though after my skin, worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God. Whom I

\* 1 Cor. iii. 10. "He taketh the wise in their own craftiness."—Job v. 13.

† Ezra vii. 6, 10.

‡ Prideaux's Conn. p. i. book v.

§ See note C C, at the end of this book.

shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold, and not another,"\*) can signify no more than Job's confidence in a **TEMPORAL DELIVERANCE**; as all agree they *may* signify. And therefore I shall the less insist upon a common observation, "That our translators, who were in the other opinion, have given a force to their expression which the original will by no means bear."

My reasons are these, 1. To understand the words, of a *resurrection*, is repugnant to the whole tenor of the argument: and to understand them of a *temporal deliverance*, is perfectly agreeable thereto. 2. The end and design of the composition, as explained above, absolutely requires this latter sense, and disclaims the former. 3. The former sense is repugnant to Job's own express declaration in other places.

I. We must observe that the book of Job is strictly argumentative: and though sententious, and abounding with poetic figures, yet they are all subservient to the matter in dispute. In this respect, much unlike the writings of David and Solomon, which treat of divine or moral matters in short and detached sentences. On which account, the ablest of those, who go into the sense of a *resurrection*, have found the necessity of reconciling it to the context. Thus much being granted, we argue against the sense they put upon it, from these considerations:—1. First, the disputants are all equally embarrassed in adjusting the ways of providence. Job affirms that the good man is sometimes unhappy: yet he appears to regard that dispensation as a *new thing* and matter of wonder, *upright men shall be astonished at this*;† which, our interpretation well accounts for. The *three friends* contend that the good man can never be unhappy, because such a situation would reflect dishonour on God's attributes. Now the doctrine of a *resurrection*, supposed to be here urged by Job, cleared up all this embarrassment. If therefore his friends thought it true, it ended the dispute: if false, it lay upon them to confute it. Yet they do neither: they neither call it into question, nor allow it to be decisive. But, without the least notice that any such thing had been urged, they go on, as they began, to enforce their former arguments, and to confute that which, they seem to understand, was the only one Job had urged against them, *viz.* The *consciousness of his own innocence*. But to be a little more particular. It fell to Zophar's part to answer the argument contained in the words in question, which I understand to be this—"Take," says Job, "this proof of my innocence: I believe, and confidently expect, that God will visit me again in mercy, and restore me to my former condition." To this Zophar, in effect, replies: But why are you so miserable now? For he goes on, in the twentieth chapter, to describe the punishment of the wicked to be just such a state as Job then laboured under. He does not directly say; *The good are not miserable*; but that follows from the other part of the proposition (which he here enforces as being a little more decent) *The bad are*

\* Chap. xix. ver. 25, et seq.

† Chap. xvii. ver. 8.



*never happy.* Now suppose Job spoke of the *resurrection*, Zophar's answer is wide of the purpose. 2. But what is still more unaccountable, Job, when he resumes the dispute, sticks to the argument he first set out with; and though he found it gave his friends little satisfaction, yet he repeats it again and again. But this other argument of a *resurrection*, so full of piety and conviction, which they had never ventured to reply to, he never once resumes; never upbraids his adversaries for their silence; nor triumphs, as he well might, in their inability to answer it. But, if ever it were the object of their thoughts, it passed off like a dream or reverie to which neither side gave any attention. In a word, the dispute between Job and his friends stands thus: They hold, that if God afflicted the good man, it would be unjust; therefore the good man was not afflicted. Job says, that God did afflict the good man: but that reason must here submit, and own God's ways to be inscrutable. Could he possibly rest in that answer, how pious soever, if he had the more satisfactory solution of a FUTURE STATE? To this let me add, that if Job spoke of a *resurrection*, he not only contradicts the general tenor of his argument, maintained throughout the whole disputation, but likewise what he says in many places concerning the *irrecoverable dissolution* of the body.\* It is true, that even in the sense of a *temporal deliverance* he contradicts what he had said, in his despair, in the seventeenth chapter: but there is a manifest difference between a contradiction of *opinion and belief*, as in the first case; and of *passion and affection* only, as in the latter. And for this contradiction he seems to apologize, when he comes to himself, by desiring that this confidence in his deliverer might be engraved on a rock, as the opinion he would stand to. 3. But what is strangest of all, when each party had confounded themselves, and one another, for want, as one would think, of this principle of a *resurrection*, which so easily unraveled all the perplexities of the dispute, the fourth friend, the moderator, steps in, as the precursor of the Almighty, who afterwards makes his appearance as the great decider of the controversy. Here then we might reasonably expect the doctrine of the *resurrection* to be resumed; and that the honour of the solution which it affords, was reserved for these; but, to our great surprise, they neither of them give us the least hint concerning it.—Those who contend for this interpretation, suppose that the notion was here delivered in order to support its truth. What reason then can they give why neither the moderator nor decider should employ it, to clear up difficulties, when Job himself had touched upon it before? Elihu justifies God's conduct; God bears witness to Job's innocence: yet both concur in resolving all

\* See chap. vii. ver. 9, 21. Chap. x. ver. 21. Chap. xvi. ver. 22. Chap. xiv. ver. 7, et seq. Could one who said, "For there is hope of a tree, if it be cut down, that it will sprout again," &c. "But man dieth," &c., could such a one (I speak of the personated character) think of the body, like him who said; "But some man will say, How are the dead raised up, and with what body do they come? Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die. And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain; it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain," &c.

into power omnipotent. This tends more to cloud than clear up the obscurities of the debate: whereas the doctrine of a *resurrection* had rendered every thing plain and easy. In a word, no resolution is given, though a decision be made. All this, on the common system, is quite unaccountable to our faculties of understanding.

Let us see next whether my sense of the words agree better with the tenor of the dispute. Job, now provoked past sufferance at the inhumanity and malice of his pretended friends, gives himself up to despair;\* and seems, as we have observed, to contradict that part of his position which he had hitherto held,† “that God would at length bring the good man out of trouble.” For which being reproved by Bildad, (*Shall the earth be forsaken for thee? and shall the rock be removed out of his place?*‡ i. e. because it is thy pleasure so obstinately to maintain that God does not govern by equal laws, shall it therefore be so? The consequence of which would be a speedy desolation.—Shall the *rock*§ or providence of God be removed, to humour your passions?) Job recollects himself in the nineteenth chapter, and comes again to his former mind. He begins by complaining of their cruel usage: says, that if indeed he were in an error, his case was so deplorable that they ought rather to treat him with indulgence: that this was no season for severity: begs they would have pity on him; and then retracts what had fallen from him in the anguish and bitterness of his soul: and lastly delivers this as his fixed sentiment, in which he was determined to abide; (and in which he had indeed acquiesced, till made impatient and desperate by the harshness of their treatment) namely, that God would at length bring the good man out of trouble. I KNOW THAT MY REDEEMER LIVETH, &c. Which he introduceth thus: “Oh that my words were now written; oh that they were printed in a book! that they were graven with an iron pen and lead, in the rock for ever!”|| As much as to say, What I uttered just before, through the distemperature of passion, I here retract, and desire may be forgotten, and that this may be understood as my fixed and unshaken belief.¶ And in this sentiment, it is remarkable, he henceforward perseveres; never relapsing again into the like extravagance of passion. Which conduct agrees exactly with his general thesis, “that providence is not equally administered; for that the good man is frequently unhappy, and the wicked prosperous; yet that, at last, God will bring the good man out of trouble, and punish the wicked doers.”

II. In the second place, if I have given a right interpretation of the

\* Chap. xvii.

† Chap. xiii. 15, 16.—xiv. 13.

‡ Chap. xviii. ver. 4.

§ By the rock I suppose is meant the *extraordinary providence of God*; this being the common name by which it went amongst the Jewish people. “He is the rock, his work is perfect; for all his ways are judgment,” Deut. xxxii. 4. “The rock of his salvation,” ver. 15.—“Of the rock that begat thee,” ver. 18. “Except their rock had sold them,” ver. 30. “Their rock is not as our rock, even our enemies themselves being judges,” ver. 31. “Their rock in whom they trusted,” ver. 37. “Neither is there any rock like our God,” 1 Sam. ii. 2. “The rock of Israel spake to me,” 2 Sam. xxiii. 3. “O rock, thou hast established them,” Hab. i. 12. and a great number of other places.

|| Chap. xix. ver. 23, 24.

¶ See note DD. at the end of this book.

book of Job, a *temporal deliverance*, and not the *resurrection of the body*, must needs be meant: for the moral of the dramatic piece was to assure the *people*, represented under the person of this venerable patriarch, of those great temporal blessings which the three prophets, Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi, had predicted, in order to allay that tumult of mind which arose in every one, on seeing the extraordinary providence, which protected their forefathers, now just about to be withdrawn from them.

III. Thirdly and lastly, To understand these words of a *resurrection of the body*, expressly contradicts Job's plain declaration against any such hope, in the following words; "As the cloud is consumed and vanisheth away, so he that goeth down to the grave, shall come up no more."\* Again—"So man lieth down, and riseth not till the heavens be no more: they shall not awake, nor be raised out of their sleep."† And again, "If a man die, shall he live again?"‡ Clarius and Drusius on the words, *till the heavens be no more*, say, *Intellige in æternum*—est sensus, nullo unquam tempore, nam cœlum semper erit. It is not in human language to express a denial of the *resurrection of the body* in stronger or plainer terms. So that it is no wonder the SADDUCEES should, as they always did, urge the first of these texts as the palmary argument against the Pharisees; but as an argument *ad homines* only, for they refused to have their opinions tried by any thing but the *law of Moses*. However, to make it pertinent to the support of their impiety, they understood the book of Job to be an inspired relation of a *real* conference between the patriarch and his friends. And give me leave to observe, that my adversaries who have the same idea of this book will never be able to acquit the prophet of this impious Sadducean opinion. Whereas the dramatic nature of it, here contended for, frees him entirely from the charge; which I desire may be accepted as another proof of the truth of our general interpretation of the work. Manasseh Ben Israel, who holds that Job taught the very contrary to a future state (not apprehending the nature of the composition) has a whole chapter against the Sadducees, to show, that this makes nothing against the reality of such a state.

I cannot better conclude what hath been here said, on this famous passage, or better introduce what will be said on others to come next under examination, than with the judicious remark of an ancient catholic bishop, on this very book: IT IS FIT WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND NAMES AGREEABLY TO THE NATURE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER: AND NOT MOULD AND MODEL THE TRUTH OF THINGS ON THE ABUSIVE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS. § This, though a maxim of the most obvious reason, can never, in theologic matters especially, be too often inculcated. How usual is it, for instance, to have the following words of St Paul quoted as a proof for the general resurrection of the dead, by those who (as the good

\* Chap. vii. ver. 9.

† Chap. xiv. ver. 12.

‡ Ver. 14.

§ Πλὴν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα προσήκοντι τοῖς πρὸς τὴν ὑποκειμένην πραγματικὴν πραγμασίαν, καὶ οὐ πρὸς τὴν κατάχρησιν τῶν λέξεων τ' ἀληθῆ κανονίζουσιν.—Serv. in Catena Græca in Job.

bishop says) “mould the truth of things on the abusive signification of words.” “He that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you.”\*

But as the *terms*, in this passage of Job, are supposed, by me, to be metaphorical, and to *allude* to the restoration of a dead body to life, some have ventured to infer, that those who use such terms and make such allusions must needs have had the saving knowledge of the thing alluded to, *resurrection of the body*: and the following observation has been repeated, by more than one writer, with that air of complacency, which men usually have for arguments they think unanswerable—“If the scriptures speak of temporal misfortunes and deliverances, in terms of death and a resurrection, then the doctrine of a resurrection must have been well known, or the language would have been unintelligible. And here I will lay down this rule; All words that are used in a figurative sense, must be first understood in a literal.”†

This looks, at first sight, like saying something; but it is indeed an empty fallacy; in which two very different things are confounded with one another; namely, the *idea* of a resurrection, and the *belief* of it. I shall show therefore that the very contrary to the first part of the learned Doctor’s observation is true, and that the latter is nothing to the purpose.

I. The messengers of God, prophesying for the people’s consolation in disastrous times, frequently promise a restoration to the former days of felicity: and to obviate all distrust from unpromising appearances, they put the case even at the worst; and assure the people, in metaphorical expressions, that though the community were as entirely dissolved as a dead body reduced to dust, yet God would raise that community again to life. Thus Isaiah: “Thy dead men shall live, together with my dead body shall they arise: awake and sing, ye that dwell in the dust: for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast out the dead.”‡ And that we may have no doubt of the prophet’s meaning, he himself explains it afterwards in the following words:§ “And I will camp against thee round about, and I will lay siege against thee with a mount, and I will raise forts against thee. And thou shalt be brought down, and shalt speak out of the ground, and thy speech shall be low out of the dust, and thy voice shall be as one that hath a familiar spirit out of the ground, and thy speech shall whisper out of the dust.” Nothing could be more plain or simple than such a metaphoric image, even amongst men who had no knowledge that the natural body was indeed to rise again; because every man knowing what it is to *live* and to *die*, every man knows what it is to *revive*, this being only an idea compounded of the other two: so that we see there was no occasion for the *doctrine of the resurrection* to make the language intelligible.

Nay farther, this metaphorical expression must have there most effi-

\* Rom. viii. 11.

† Dr Felton’s two sermons before the University of Oxford, pp. 18, 19.

‡ Chap. xxvi. ver. 19.

§ Chap. xxix. 3, 4.

cacy where the *doctrine of the resurrection* was unknown. For we have observed it was employed to inspire the highest sentiments of God's omnipotency; but that always strikes the mind most forcibly which is as well *new as superior* to its comprehension. Therefore *life from the dead* was used, (and from the force with which a new idea strikes) it became almost proverbial in the writings of the prophets, to express the most unlikely deliverance, by the exertion of almighty power.

The following instance will support both these observations; and show, that the doctrine was unknown; and that the image was of more force for its being unknown. The prophet Ezekiel,\* when the state of things was most desperate, is carried, by the Spirit, into a valley full of dry bones, and asked this question, "Son of man, can these dry bones live?"—a question which God would hardly have made to a prophet brought up in the knowledge and belief of a resurrection. But supposing the question had been made, the answer by men so brought up, must needs have been, without hesitation, in the affirmative. But we find the prophet altogether surprised at the strangeness of the demand. He was drawn one way by the apparent impossibility of it to natural conceptions; he was drawn the other, by his belief in the omnipotence of God. Divided between these two sentiments, he makes the only answer which a man in such circumstances could make, "O Lord God thou knowest."† This surprising act of omnipotency is therefore shown in vision, either real or imaginary. The bones come together; they are clothed with flesh, and receive the *breath of life*.‡ And then God declares the meaning of the representation. "Then he said unto me; Son of man, these bones are the whole house of Israel: behold, they say, our bones are dried, and our hope is lost, we are cut off for our parts. Therefore prophesy and say unto them: Thus saith the Lord God; behold, O my people, I will open your graves, and cause you to come up out of your graves, and bring you into the land of Israel. And ye shall know that I am the Lord, when I have opened your graves, O my people, and brought you up out of your graves, and shall put my Spirit in you, and ye shall live: and I shall place you in your own land. Then shall ye know that I the Lord have spoken it, and performed it, saith the Lord."§

Here we see, in a prophecy delivered in action or vision, instead of *words* (the nature and original of which have been discoursed of elsewhere) and afterwards explained by *words*, to ascertain its meaning, that the figurative ideas of death and resurrection are used for temporal distresses and deliverance: and this, at a time when the *doctrine of the resurrection*, from whence the metaphor is supposed to arise, was so far from being well known, that the figure could never have acquired its force and energy but from the people's ignorance of such a doctrine; the scenical representation, without all question, alluding to that proverbial speech amongst the Jews: "Wilt thou show wonders to the

\* Ezek. xxxvii.

† Ver. 3.

‡ Ver. 8, 10.

§ Ver. 11, et seq.

dead? Shall the dead arise and praise thee?"\* On the whole then, nothing was ever worse grounded than the observation, that "if the scriptures speak of temporal misfortunes and deliverances in the terms of death and a resurrection, then the DOCTRINE of a resurrection must have been well known, or the language would have been unintelligible."

II. And now for the general rule which follows: *All words that are used in a figurative sense, must be first understood in a literal.* If no more be meant than that every figurative sense has a literal, the proposition is true, but trifling, because *figurative* is a relative term, and implies *literal* as its correlative. If it means, that he who uses words in a figurative sense, must have an *idea* of the literal, this is likewise true, but nothing to the purpose, because the *idea* of a thing does not imply either the *truth* or the *belief* of it. But if it means, that a figurative proposition implies the user's *belief* of its literal sense, this is to the purpose, but not true. The people had an *idea* of dry bones being clothed again with flesh, and the breath of life inspired into the carcass; but they were so far from *believing* that was to be the case of all mankind, that they did not know whether it was possible that those bones in the valley could be restored.

To conclude with the ANSWERERS of this dissertation, the miscellaneous *writers* on the book of Job; it may not be improper to remind them, that they would have done their duty better, and have given the learned and impartial public more satisfaction, if, instead of labouring to evade two or three independent arguments, though corroborative of my interpretation, they had, in any reasonable manner, accounted, how this interpretation, which they affect to represent as visionary and groundless, should be able to lay open and unfold the whole conduct of the poem upon one entire, perfect, elegant, and noble plan, which does more than vulgar honour to the writer who composed it. And that it should at the same time, be as useful in defining the parts as in developing the whole; so that particular texts, which, for want of sufficient light, had hitherto been an easy prey to critics from every quarter, are now no longer affected by the common opprobrium affixed to this book, of its being a *nose of wax*, made to suit every religious system. Of which, amongst many others, may be reckoned the famous text just now explained. All this, our hypothesis (as it is called) has been able to perform, in a poem become, through length of time and negligence, so desperately perplexed, that commentators have chosen, as the easier task, rather to find their own notions in it than to seek out those of the author.

For the rest, for any fuller satisfaction, he that wants it is referred to the third chapter of the *Free and Candid Examination of the Bishop of London's† Principles, &c.* where he will see, in a fuller light than perhaps he has been accustomed to see such matters, the great superiority of acute and solid reasoning over chicane and sophistry.

\* Ps. lxxxviii. 11.

† Dr Sherlock.



## SECT. III.

THE book of JOB hath engaged me longer than I intended: but I shall make amends, by dispatching the remainder of the objections with great brevity.

Those brought from the OLD TESTAMENT are of two kinds:

I. Such as are supposed to prove the *separate* existence, or, as it is called, the *immortality* of the soul.

II. Such as are supposed to prove a future state of *reward and punishment*, together with a *resurrection* of the body.

I. To support the first point,

1. The following words of Moses are urged: "And God said, Let us make man in *our image*, after our *likeness*: and let them have DOMINION, &c. And God created man in *his own image*, in the *image of God* created he him:"\* from whence it is inferred, that man was created with an *immaterial soul*. On the contrary, I suppose, that Moses was here giving intimation of a very different thing, namely, its *rationality*. My reasons are these:—I think, indeed, it may be strictly demonstrated that man's soul is *immaterial*; but then the same arguments which prove his *immateriality*, prove likewise that the souls of all living animals are *immaterial*; and this too without the least injury to religion.† An *immaterial* soul therefore being common to him with the whole brute creation, and it being something peculiar to man, in which the image of God is said to consist, I conclude the historian did not here teach any thing concerning an *immaterial soul*. The only two things peculiar to man, are his *shape* and his *reason*. None but an anthropomorphite will say it was his *shape*; I conclude therefore it was his REASON: and this farther appears from hence, when God says; "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness," he immediately adds, *and let him have* DOMINION over the whole brute creation: which plainly marks in what the *image* or *likeness* consisted: for what was it that could invest man with a dominion *de facto*, after he had it by this grant, *de jure*, but his REASON only? This dominion too was apparently given for some pre-eminence; but man's pre-eminence consists not in his having an *immaterial* soul, for that he has in common with all other animals: but in his *reason* alone, which is peculiar to him: the *likeness* therefore or *image* consisted in REASON. And thus Philo Judæus understood the matter, where alluding to this text, he says; λόγος ἐστὶν εἰκὼν Θεοῦ, *reason is the image of God*. So much for the first objection.

2. The next is drawn from the following words of the same writer: "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the *breath of life*, and man became a *living*

\* Gen. i. 27.

† See Dr Clarke against Mr Collins on the Soul; and the Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul, by Mr Baxter.

*soul* ;”\* that is, say these reasoners, he had an *immortal soul*. But this is only building on the strength of an English expression. Every one knows, that what the translation calls a *living soul*, signifies in the original, a *living animal*: hence the same writer speaks of a *dead soul*,† as well as a *living soul*. And indeed not only the propriety of the terms, but the very sense of the context requires us to confine the meaning of *living soul*, to *living animal*. God, the great plastic artist, is here represented as making and shaping out a figure of earth or clay, which he afterwards animates or inspires with life. He *breathed*, says the sacred historian, into this statue, *the breath of life*; and the lump became a *living creature*. But St Paul, I hope, may be believed, whatever becomes of my explanation: who thus comments the very text in question: “And so it was written, The first man, Adam, was made a LIVING SOUL, the last, was made a QUICKENING SPIRIT.”‡ Here we find the apostle is so far from understanding any *immortality* in this account of man’s creation, that he opposes the mortal animal ADAM, to the immortal-making Spirit of CHRIST.

3. Again, God in his sentence of condemnation denounced against all the parties concerned in Adam’s transgression, says to the serpent. “I will put enmity between thee and the woman; and between thy seed and her seed: it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.”§ It will be allowed, that even the most early mortals could not be so stupid as modern infidels would make them, to understand these words in their strict literal sense, that “serpents would be apt to bite men by the heel, and men as ready to crush their heads.” But to enable them to understand, by this part of the sentence, that “man should be restored to his lost inheritance of immortality by the sacrifice of Christ on the cross,” needed an express revelation of this mystery. What then did the Jews understand by it? This certainly, and nothing but this, that “the evil spirit, who actuated the serpent, would continue his enmity to the human race; but that man, by the divine assistance, should be at length enabled to defeat all his machinations.”

4. Again, the phrase used by the sacred historian to indicate the deaths of the patriarchs, is further urged in support of the opposition,—“He died, and was gathered to his people.”|| And *dying* is expressed by *going down into the grave*, or into *hell*, SHEOL.—“I will go down into the grave,” says Jacob [or into *hell*] “to my son mourning;”¶ which phrases are supposed to intimate the soul’s surviving the body, and retiring, on the dissolution of the union, to one common receptacle of souls: for that it is not only said, the man *died, and was buried*, but likewise that he *was gathered to his fathers*: and Jacob said, he *would go down into the grave to his son*, who was supposed to have been

\* Gen. ii. 7.

† Num. vi. 6; see also Lev. xxi. 1, 11.

‡ 1 Cor. xv. 45—49.

§ Gen. iii. 15.

|| Gen. xxv. 8, 17.—xxxv. 29.—xliv. 29, and 33.—Num. xx. 24, 26, 28.—xxvii. 13.

¶ Gen. xxxvii. 35.

devoured by wild beasts." But, 1. The objectors do not reflect on the genius of the eastern speech, which gives action and motion to every thing; in which to be reduced to one common lot or condition is called being *gathered to their people*; in this sense Jacob might properly say, he would go down to the grave to a dead son, who was never buried, *i. e.* that he should find no ease to his sorrows till he was reduced to the same condition. 2. The objectors forget too the peculiar genius of the Hebrew tongue, that delights so much in pleonasms; in which *to die*, and *to be gathered to their people*, are but two different phrases for the same thing. At the same time, I am ready to allow that this latter phrase originally arose (whatever people first employed it) from the notion of some common receptacle of souls. But we know how soon, and from what various causes, *terms* and *phrases* lose the memory of their original. 3. The truth of this interpretation is confirmed by the several contexts, where all these expressions occur; the historian's purpose being evidently nothing else than to record the period of their existence here on earth.

These (except such as have been considered elsewhere) are all the texts I can find objected to my position, that *immortality* was not taught by the LAW. How little they are to the purpose is now seen. But little or much, the reader will remember they make nothing against my general argument, which maintains that the early Jews, (those of them, I mean, and they certainly were but few, who thought any thing of the matter) had at least some vague notion of the soul's surviving the body. But the particular reason I had to examine them hath been given above.

II. We come next to those SCRIPTURES which are urged to prove, that *a future state of reward and punishment*, or a *resurrection of the body*, was taught by the Mosaic law. But before we proceed to the particular texts, it will be proper to consider the general argument brought from the genius of the whole Jewish law: "which, as they say, being entirely TYPICAL, or, as the apostle says, SPIRITUAL, all the promises and denunciations of temporal good and evil, did denote and obumbrate a future state of reward and punishment; for that it was *a shadow of things to come, but that the body was of CHRIST*."\* If the objectors mean by this, that the sanction of temporal reward and punishment was no more than a mere representation, in figurative expressions, of the doctrine of a *future state*, without any real meaning in the then providential disposition of the things of this life:† if, I say, this be their meaning, the whole pretence to Moses's divine mission is irrecoverably given up. Not to say, that the very *pretence* would be as absurd as it was false. For a THEOCRACY (from whence flowed temporal rewards and punishments) was no figurative expression, as appears from the real and substantial laws made in support of the thing. In a word, it is a vile and impious imagination, originally conceived by certain *Jewish* alle-

\* Col. ii. 17.

† See note F F, at the end of this book.

gorists after the *extraordinary providence* was departed from them: and only to be matched by a like madness in certain *Mahometan* allegorists, whose early success made them fancy this *extraordinary providence* was come to them; and therefore supposed, on the other hand, that hell and paradise in the *Alcoran* mean no more than the pleasures and afflictions of this life.\* In which, both have been outdone by a late madman of our own, in his discourses on the gospel-miracles. So oddly perverse is the human understanding when it has once forsaken the road of common sense.

But if by the law's being **TYPICAL** or **SPIRITUAL**, no more be meant (as I think no sober man can mean more) than that the **TEMPORAL REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS** equally and *really* distributed, and the **RITUAL WORSHIP**, daily performed, were typical or significative of the **GOSPEL DISPENSATION**, and of the *life and immortality* which that dispensation *brought to light*, I acknowledge it for a truth: and, what is more, I require nothing farther to prove my proposition, *that a future state of rewards and punishments was not taught to the Jewish people by their law*. The objectors suppose, as I do, that the Jewish and Christian religions are two parts of one entire dispensation. St Paul tells us the order of these two parts, **THAT WAS NOT FIRST WHICH IS SPIRITUAL, BUT THAT WHICH IS NATURAL; AFTERWARDS THAT WHICH IS SPIRITUAL.**† Yet, at the same time, he tells us, **THE LAW IS SPIRITUAL.**‡ How is this to be reconciled? No otherwise than thus, that the law was **TYPICAL** of the future spiritual part of the one entire dispensation.—Again, the apostles, in order to show the superior excellence of the **GOSPEL**, in their reasoning against Jews and Judaizing Christians, set the **LAW** in opposition to it, under the titles of *the law of a carnal commandment; the ministration of death; the law of works*: and call subjection to it, *subjection to the flesh*. Yet these very writers at the same time own that *the law was SPIRITUAL*, or had a spiritual meaning. But if by this they would teach that the spiritual meaning was generally understood *under the law*, their whole argument had concluded in a self-contradiction. For then it was not a *law of a carnal commandment, a ministration of death*; but, indeed, a *law of spirit, a ministration of life*; only under a dead and carnal cover; which being clearly seen through, or easily taken off, served for no more than a trick of *hocus pocus*. The consequence of all this would be, that the **LAW** was of equal dignity, and, though not of equal simplicity, yet, indeed, essentially the same with the **GOSPEL**. They owned, we see, that the *law* had a *spiritual sense*: but when, and by whom discovered, the apostle Paul informs us, by calling that sense the **NEWNESS OF SPIRIT**;§ which he opposes to *the oldness of the letter*, that is, the *letter of the law*. In

\* Il y a parmi les sectateurs d'Ali, une secte qui prend son nom d'un docteur nommé Alkhatthab, lequel a enseigné que les delices du Paradis et les peines de l'Enfer ne sont autre chose que les plaisirs et les afflictions de la vie.—Herbelot, Bibl. Orientale, mot AKHRAT, et AKHRET.

† 1 Cor. xv. 46.

‡ Rom. vii. 14.

§ Rom. vii. 6.

the former part of the verse, he speaks of the *law being dead*; and, here, of its being *revived* with a *new spirit*, in contradistinction to the *oldness of the letter*. So true was it, what in another place he observes, that *the law was a shadow of things to come; but the BODY was of Christ*.<sup>\*</sup> The *shadow* not of a *body* then to be seen or understood, as these answerers imagine, but of a *body that was to come*, and, by its presence, to explain the meaning and reason of the *shadow*. For the Jews being, as the apostle says, *in bondage under the elements of the world*,<sup>†</sup> were as men shut up in prison, with their faces kept turned from the light, toward the whited wall of CEREMONIES; on which indeed they saw many *shadows*; but the *body* or opposite substance at their backs, to which they could not turn, they saw not. And, in this state, says the apostle, they were *kept shut up unto the faith, which should afterwards be revealed*.<sup>‡</sup> Therefore till that time came, it appears that the great community of the Jews had no knowledge of this *faith*; one of the essential articles of which is *life everlasting*. This, we must needs have concluded even though he had not said, that till that time came, they were *in bondage under the elements of the world*. A proper character truly of a people acquainted with the revealed doctrine of *life and immortality*. But the objectors pretend that the reason why Moses did not PLAINLY teach a future state, in the manner that CHRIST hath taught it, was because the Jews were a carnal people, incapable of *spiritual* things. Now what is the consequence of this incapacity, but that the *spiritual* sense was reserved for better times, when their minds should grow more pure and defecated from carnal things; which all along continued so gross and bounded, that even the most easy of their typical informations, the *calling in of the gentiles*, was never understood by them; yet this truth the prophets had, from time to time, so plainly cultivated, that the veil of typical embroidery seems often to have been drawn aside, to assist their weak sight. But farther, the better part of the objectors, I suppose, will allow that *temporal* good and evil were not only proposed, but *actually dispensed* to the Jews, living for some time under an equal providence. And what was the consequence of this but to *confine* them to the *literal sense* of their sanction, and stop them from looking farther? Yet in defiance of reason, of scripture, of the order of things, nay even of their own systems, these men will suppose, because the LAW is said to be *spiritual*, or to have a spiritual sense, that therefore this sense always went along with, and was inseparably attached to, the *literal*, in the understandings of the Jewish people. Which is so strangely absurd, that it takes away the very cause and occasion of *two senses*. For, why, let me ask, had the law a spiritual sense, under a *carnal cover*, but for this reason, that the first Jews were so grossly minded as to be incapable of spiritual things; and were therefore, in order to direct and govern their affections, presented with the *carnal*, to repose upon? That *schoolmaster*, as St Paul calls the LAW, which

\* Col. ii. 17.

† Gal. iv. 3.

‡ Gal. iii. 23.

was to bring them by degrees, through those carnal elements, to the spiritual and sublime doctrines of CHRIST.—Yet see the scheme of these objectors. The early Jews are supposed of so sordid a taste as to be incapable of a spiritual repast, and therefore they had a carnal cover laid before them: yet were they, at the same time, so quick scented as to pierce through this carnal shell to which they were attached, into the spiritual substance, for which they had no relish.

This may be *reason*, say these men; but what is human *reason* when opposed to scripture? Just what it was, say I, before you set them at variance: and apparently for no other purpose than to silence and disgrace this modest handmaid of *revelation*.

However, scripture, it seems, informs us that the figurative and literal, the spiritual and carnal senses of the law, always went together. This, they say, the author of the epistle to the Hebrews plainly teaches. “There are priests who offer gifts according to the law; who serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was admonished of God when he was about to make the tabernacle. For see, saith he, that thou make all things according to the pattern showed thee in the mount.”\* But these words will never do the business. Could the objectors, indeed, find a text which tells us, that “as Moses was admonished of God about the spiritual sense of the law, so he informed the people of it,” this would be to the purpose. As it is, it will hardly follow, that because Moses was admonished of the spiritual sense, that therefore the spiritual and a carnal went together in the intellects and worship of the people. Moses’s knowledge of this secret I allow, as it seems to follow from the privilege of his mission; for if *Abraham desired to see Christ’s day, and saw it, and was glad*, we are not to suppose that Moses, who had a higher office in the ministry of God’s dispensations than Abraham had, should be less favoured than Abraham was. Yet though I believe this, the text here urged in support of it, does in strictness, prove little of the matter. The objectors suppose the sense of the text to be this—“that *the priests served unto the example and shadow of heavenly things*, and that of this truth *Moses was admonished*, by God in the mount.” But the apostle is here instructing us in a very different truth. The words—*as Moses was admonished of God*—are a similitude or comparison which conveys a sense to this purpose,—“The priests, who offer gifts according to the law, serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things, in as exact and close a manner as that tabernacle, which Moses was admonished to make, answered to the pattern showed him of it, in the mount.” Not only the argument which the apostle is upon, but the propriety of the word *χηματίζω* points us to this sense: which signifies to command or direct the doing of a thing by an oracle or magistrate; and this *χηματισμός* or direction we find in the place which the sacred writer refers to—“And look that thou make them after this pattern, which was showed thee in

\* Heb. viii. 4, 5.



the mount.”\* But there is nothing these men will not employ for the support of their absurdities. They will borrow aid even from a quibble or equivocation: and the following words of the same apostle have been urged to prove that the law taught its followers the doctrines of the gospel—“Unto us [Christians] was the GOSPEL preached as well as unto them” [Jews].†

1. And now to proceed to the particular texts produced from the PENTATEUCH, in support of this opinion, God says to Abraham, *In thee, shall all the families of the earth be blessed.*‡ The Jews understood this to signify a *formulary*, that men should use, when they invoked the choicest blessings on their friends and families, to this effect; *may God bless thee as he blessed Abraham.* And the first of Christian interpreters, Hugo Grotius, understands it to signify a promised blessing, which, in time, should be derived to the whole earth, from Abraham’s care that his posterity should continue in the belief and worship of the *one true God*. Indeed, when the fulness of time came, it would then be seen, both by Jews and Christians, that this blessing ultimately centred in the holy Jesus, the only begotten Son of God, to whom the Father hath delegated all power and dominion. Again, “God says to ABRAHAM, *I am thy exceeding great reward.*”§ And again: “I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee, in their generations, for an *everlasting covenant*; to be a God *unto thee*, and to thy seed after thee. And I will give *unto thee* and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession; and I will be their God.”|| “He repeats the same promise to Isaac and to Jacob *personally*; yet he gave Abraham no inheritance in the land, though he promised he would give it to him and to his seed after him.”—Thus have these texts been urged by an excellent writer¶ against the *Sadducean* opinion, as containing a promise of future rewards in another life: but urged by him, I will suppose, as proving such a *promise* in a *secondary* or *spiritual* sense only. Because that sense is sufficient for his purpose: and because in that sense only, is it true, that they do contain such a promise. For, 1. In the *literal* sense it is a promise of the land of Canaan to Abraham and to his posterity; and in this sense it was literally fulfilled, though Abraham was never *personally* in possession of it; since Abraham and his posterity, put collectively, signify the RACE OF ABRAHAM; and that race possessed the land of Canaan. And surely, GOD may be allowed to explain his own promise: now though he tells Abraham, he would give HIM the land, yet, at the same time, he assures him that it would be many hundred years before his POSTERITY should be put in possession of it; for when Abraham desired to know whereby he might be certain that he, *i. e.* his *seed*, should inherit the land of Canaan,\*\* he is ordered to offer a sacrifice; after which, GOD in a vision explains to him

\* Exod. xxv. 40. † Heb. iv. 2. ‡ Gen. xii. 3. § Gen. xv. 1. || Gen. xvii. 7, 8.

¶ Dr S. Clarke, Evid. of Nat. and Rev. Relig. p. 241, ed. 6.

\*\* Gen. xv. 8.

the import of his promise: "That his seed should be a stranger in the land that was not theirs, and should serve them, and that they should afflict them four hundred years: that afterwards they should come out with great substance, and in the fourth generation should come into CANAAN, for that the iniquity of the Ammonites was not yet full."\* And as concerning himself, that *he should go to his fathers in peace, and should be buried in a good old age.*† Thus we see, that both what God explained to be his meaning, and what Abraham understood him to mean, was, that his posterity, after a certain time, should be led into possession of the land. And lest any mistake should remain concerning the accomplishment of this promise, the sacred historian sums up the relation in these words: "In that same day the Lord made a covenant with Abram, saying, UNTO THY SEED HAVE I GIVEN this land."‡ But had the historian omitted so minute an explanation of the promise, yet common sense would instruct us how to understand it. A whole country is given to Abraham and to his seed. Could it possibly be God's design, who does nothing in vain, to place his family in the land of Canaan, till they were numerous enough to occupy and defend it? His posterity was his representative: and therefore the putting them into possession was the putting him into it. Not to say, that where a grant is made to a body of men collectively, as to a people or a family, no laws of contract ever understood the performance to consist in every individual's being a *personal* partaker. 2. Secondly, the giving a *heavenly* Canaan to Abraham could not be the literal sense of the text, because an *earthly* Canaan is owned to be the direct immediate subject of the promise. The JEWS indeed contend for this literal sense, and with some show of reason; for they hold, that the *future state* at the resurrection will be passed in the land of Judea, where Abraham, they say, is then to rise and take possession.§ This is consistent, however. But these CHRISTIAN objectors, who hold no such opinion, must be content at last to find a *future state* not only in the *spiritual* sense of the words: and that sense, we are by no means ambitious of taking from them.

2. "The days of the years of my pilgrimage," says Jacob to Pharaoh, "are an hundred and thirty years: few and evil have the days of the years of my life been, and have not attained unto the days of the years of the life of my fathers in the days of their pilgrimage."||—From this speech it is concluded, that Moses taught a *future state*: and, especially since the author of the epistle to the Hebrews hath brought ¶ it as a proof that Jacob and the patriarchs looked for a *better country*. That

\* Gen. xv. 13, et seq.

† Ver. 15.

‡ Ver. 18.

§ Deus Abrahamo loquens ait: dabo tibi, et semini tuo post te, terram peregrinationis tue. Atqui constat, Abrahamum, et reliquos patriarchas eam terram non possedisse: necesse ergo est, ut resuscitentur, quo bonis promissis fruantur; alioqui promissa Dei irrita et falsa forent. Hinc itaque non tantum ANIMÆ IMMORTALITAS probatur, sed etiam *essentials fundamentum legis*, RESURRECTIO scilicet MORTUORUM.—Manasseh Ben-Israel *de Resurrectione Mort.* p. 7.

|| Gen. xlvii. 9.

¶ Chap. xi. ver. 13.

Jacob did so, is unquestionable; but it can never be allowed that the words, in their *literal* and obvious meaning, express any such thing. Pharaoh is here questioning the patriarch, not of human life in general, but of his own. Therefore, to make the reply pertinent, Jacob must be understood to mean by *his pilgrimage*, the unsettled way of life, living in tents, and removing from place to place, as the convenience of pasturage gave him invitation: and, by the *evil of his days*, the straits he suffered from the fraud of Laban, and the hatred of his brother Esau. As for the complaint of the *fewness of his days*, he himself explains it to be, not on account of the shortness of human life in general, but, because he *had not attained unto the days of the years of the life of his fathers*. The sense, therefore, which the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews puts upon these words, must needs be the *spiritual* sense.

3. The same patriarch, in his last benediction of his sons, breaks in upon the prophetic blessings with this pious ejaculation, *I have waited for thy salvation, O Lord:*\* which is supposed to respect the salvation of mankind by JESUS CHRIST. I grant it doth so in a *spiritual* sense; nay, for aught I know, it may in a *literal*. But how should an early Jewish reader understand it in this sense, when the same terms of the *salvation of God*, or of the Lord, are perpetually employed, throughout the whole Bible, to signify God's temporal mercies to the patriarchs and their posterity; and when now, that the mystery of the gospel hath been so long revealed, Christian commentators understand it in a hundred different senses?

4. BALAAM, under the influence of the Holy Spirit, says, *Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like his:*† which is understood as a wish that he might be partaker with the righteous in another life. Had the apostate prophet said, *Let me live the life of the righteous*, it would have had a much fairer claim for such a meaning. As it is, both the force of the words, and their relation to the context, restrain us to this literal meaning,—“Let me die in a mature old age, after a life of health and peace, with all my posterity flourishing about me; as was the lot of the righteous observers of the LAW.” This vain wish, Moses, I suppose, recorded, that the subsequent account of his immature death in battle‡ might make the stronger impression on the serious reader, to warn him against the impiety and folly of expecting the last reward of virtue for a life spent in the gratification of every corrupt appetite. But if any one will say, the words have, besides, a sublimer meaning, I have no reason to contend with him.

5. The next is a stricture of the LAW in Leviticus, urged by Dr Stebbing in this manner, “Moses enforces the obedience of the Israelites upon this consideration, *Ye shall therefore keep my statutes and judgments, which if a man do he shall live in them.*§ Here is a promise of life made to those who should observe the statutes and judgments which God gave them by his servant Moses; which cannot be understood of

\* Gen. xlix. 15.

† Num. xxii. 16.

‡ Chap. xxxii. ver. 9.

§ Lev. xviii. 5.

this temporal life only, because the best men were often cut off in the midst of their days, and frequently suffered greater adversities than the most profligate sinners. The Jews therefore have constantly believed that it had a respect to the life to come. When the lawyer in the gospel had made that most important demand; *Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life,\** our blessed Lord refers him to what was written in the law; and, upon his making a sound and judicious answer, approves of it; and for satisfaction to his question, tells him, *This do, and thou shalt live."*

The objector would have the promise of *life* in Leviticus to signify *eternal life*. But St Paul himself had long ago decided this question, and declared for the negative. A dispute arose between him, and the judaizing Christians, concerning *what it was which justified before God*, or entitled to that eternal life brought to light by the gospel. They held it to be the *works of the law* (believing perhaps, as the objector assures us they did, that this text, in Leviticus, *had a respect to the life to come*): St Paul, on the contrary, affirms that it was *faith in Jesus the Messiah*. And thus he argues—"But that no man is justified by the law in the sight of God, it is evident: for *the just shall live by faith*. And the law is not of faith, but the man that *doeth* them shall live in them."† As much as to say—"That no man can obtain eternal life by virtue of the *law* is evident from one of your own prophets [Hab.], who expressly holds, that *the just shall LIVE by FAITH*.‡ Now, by the *law*, no rewards are promised to *faith*, but to *works only*. *The man that DOETH them,*" says the law in Leviticus, § "*shall live in them.*" Here then we see that this very text, which the objector brings to prove that *eternal life was by the law*, St Paul urges, to prove that it *was not by the law*. Let us attend to the apostle's argument. He is to show that *justification*, or eternal life, is by *faith*. This he does even on the concession of a Jew, the prophet Habakkuk; who expressly owns it to be by *faith*. But the law, says the apostle, attributes nothing to *faith*; but, to *DEEDS only*, *which if a man DO he shall live in them*. Now, if, by *life*, be here meant, as the objector supposes, *eternal life*, then St Paul's argument does not come out as he intended it; namely, *that faith, and not the works of the law, justifies*; but thus, that *both faith and the works of the law justify*, which would have satisfied these Judaizers, as reconciling on their own prejudices Moses and Habakkuk; but would, by no means, have satisfied our apostle; whose conclusion, on this question, where discussed at large, in his epistle to the Romans, is, "that a man is justified by faith WITHOUT the deeds of the law."|| The very drift of his argument therefore shows us, that he must necessarily understand the *life*, promised in this text of Leviticus, to be *TEMPORAL life only*. But charitably studious, as it were, to prevent all possible chance of our mistaking him on so important a point, he immediately subjoins, "Christ

\* Luke x. 25.  
Chap. xviii. 5.

† Gal. iii. 11, 12.  
.|| Rom. iii. 28.

‡ Chap. ii. 4.

hath redeemed us from the curse of the law.”\* Now we know that our redemption by Christ was from that *death* which the first man brought into the world; the *curse* which he entailed upon his posterity. Therefore the transferring this term from Adam to the law, shows plainly that in the apostle’s sentiments, the law had no more a share in the redemption of fallen man than Adam himself had. Yet it is certain, that if the law, when it is said, *He who keeps these statutes and judgments shall live in them*, meant, *for ever*, it proposed the redemption of mankind as completely as the blessed Jesus himself did, when he said, *he that believeth in me shall have everlasting life*. This becomes demonstrable, if St Paul’s reasoning will hold, who surely had heard nothing of this prerogative of the law, when he said, *If there had been a LAW given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law*. Where observe, I pray you, the force of the word ζωοποιῆσαι, which signifies to *quicken*, or to *make alive*; plainly intimating the same he had said in the place quoted before, that those in subjection to the law were under a *curse*, or in the state of *death*.—Let me add only this further observation, that if (as this objector pretends) by *life* in the text of Leviticus be meant *eternal life*; and if (as the apostle pretends) by *life*, in the text of Habakkuk, be meant *eternal life*; then will *Moses* and *Habakkuk* be made directly to contradict one another; the first giving that *eternal life* to WORKS, which the latter gives to FAITH. But Dr Stebbing would insinuate, that Jesus himself seems to have affixed this sense to the text in Leviticus; however, that the plain inference is that *eternal life* was *taught at least*, if not *obtained* by the law. “When the lawyer in the gospel,” says he, “had made that most important demand, *Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?*† our blessed Lord refers him to what was written in the law, and upon his making a sound and judicious answer, approves of it; and for satisfaction to his question, tells him, *This do and thou shalt live*.”—Would not any one now conclude, from the sense here put upon the words of Jesus, that the *sound and judicious answer* of the lawyer must have been a quotation of the text in Leviticus,—*Ye shall keep my statutes, which if a man do he shall live in them*;—or at least some general promise made to the observers of the whole law of Moses? No such matter. On the contrary, the lawyer’s answer was a quotation of only one precept of the law, *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, &c. and thy neighbour as thyself*. Now how much soever we may differ about a *future state’s* being held out by the law, through a Messiah to come, I suppose we are both agreed that *faith in the Messiah*, either actual or imputed, is necessary to obtain this *future state*. There are but two ways then of understanding this text of St Luke, neither of which is to his purpose. The first is the supposing that Jesus included *faith in himself* in this precept of *loving God with all the heart, &c.*, which will appear no forced interpretation to him who holds Jesus to be really and truly God;

\* Gal. iii. 13.

† Luke x. 25.

as, I imagine, the Doctor does; and may be supported by a circumstance in the story as told by St Matthew,\* though omitted by St Luke, which is, Jesus's saying, *that on these two commandments hang all the law and the PROPHETS*. The second and exacter interpretation is, that Jesus spoke to a professing follower, who pretended to acknowledge his mission, and wanted only a RULE OF LIFE. For Jesus was here preaching the gospel to his disciples, *and a lawyer stood up and TEMPTED him*, that is, on the false footing of a disciple, required a rule of life. Now in either case, this reference of Jesus to the law must imply this, and this only, *that without righteousness and holiness no man shall see the Lord*. A point in which, I suppose, we are agreed.—But still the Doctor will say that these words of Jesus *allude* to the words of Moses. Admit they do. It will not follow, as he seems to think, that they were given to *explain* them. How many allusions are there in the New Testament to passages in the Old, accommodated to a *spiritual* sense, where the texts alluded to are seen, by all but fanatics, to have only a *carnal*? And even in this very allusion, if it be one, we find that the promise made to the observers of the whole law is transferred to the observance of one single precept, in the moral part of it. But let us grant him all he would have; and admit that these words of Jesus were given to explain the words of Moses. What would follow from thence, but that the promise in Leviticus had a *secondary* sense of a *spiritual* and sublimer import? Will this give any advantage to the Doctor and his party? Surely none at all. And yet the *abuse* of this concession is all they have to support themselves in their determined opposition to common sense.

6. A law in Leviticus is delivered in these terms,—“Whoever he be of the children of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn in Israel, that giveth any of his seed unto Moloch, he shall surely be put to death.”† Let me first explain the text, before I show how it is perverted. There were two cases in which the offender here described might escape punishment:—either the crime could not be legally proved, or the magistrate might be remiss in punishing. The divine lawgiver obviates both: and declares that the infanticide, in such case, shall suffer death by God's own hand in an extraordinary manner. The suppliance of the first defect, is in these words,—“And I will set my face against the man, and will CUT HIM OFF FROM AMONGST HIS PEOPLE.”‡ The suppliance of the second is in these:—“And if the people of the land do any ways hide their eyes from the man, when he giveth of his seed unto Moloch, and kill him not, then I will set my face against that man and against his family, and will CUT HIM OFF.”§ So much for the *sense* of the text. And now for the *nonsense* of our interpreter, a professor of law and divinity, the egregious Dr RUTHERFORTH. This sage provision for the execution of the law our professor being totally unconscious of, he insists “that *cutting off from amongst his people* can only mean

\* Mat. xxii. 40.

† Lev. xx. 2.

‡ Ver. 3.

§ Ver. 4, 5.



eternal damnation, the being consigned to a state of punishment in another life.”—P. 33. He is, as I say, a dealer both in law and divinity: but not having yet learned the use of his tools, he confounds law by theology, and depraves theology by law: and of this the reader has already seen some delectable instances. But at present, to regulate a little his law ideas, let him turn to Exodus xii. 15, and Leviticus vii. 25, and he will find that the *cutting off from Israel*, and the *cutting off from the people*, are phrases which signify only capital punishment of a civil kind. Unless he will suppose that what is there threatened for eating *leavened bread* and *prohibited fat*, is ETERNAL LIFE IN TORMENTS.

7. The PSALMIST, in a holy confidence of God’s mercies, says, “Thou wilt not leave my soul in HELL, neither wilt thou suffer thy holy one to see corruption. Thou wilt show me the path of life; in thy presence is fulness of joy, at thy right hand there are pleasures for evermore.”\* —The scope of the whole psalm is to implore the protection of God, from this consideration, that the psalmist himself not only stedfastly adheres to the law of God, but is ready to give his aid and support to all those who do—That the vengeance of God pursues idolatry, which he carefully avoids—That the *God of Israel* is his *portion*, and the *land of Canaan* a *fair inheritance*—That this stedfast adherence to the Lord is his confidence and peace—Then follow the words in question,—That he is sure, God *will not leave his soul in hell*, &c., &c. that is, suffer him to fall immaturally, as was the lot of the transgressors of the law:—And concludes, that walking in the law of God is both the highest pleasure, and strongest security. All which is expressed in terms so magnificent, as to show, indeed, that this psalm hath a *spiritual* as well as *literal* meaning. And that spiritual meaning St Peter hath explained to us:† Indeed, if Dr Stebbing’s word were to be taken, the apostle hath explained it in a manner which overthrows all our reasoning. St Peter, says the Doctor, claims this passage [Ps. xvi. 10, 11.] as relating to Christ’s resurrection.”‡ But how does he claim it? No otherwise than by giving it a *secondary sense*. Now the learned Doctor himself contends that the *secondary* sense of the prophecies was purposely concealed and secreted from the Jewish church: consequently, the *resurrection*, the very doctrine which the *secondary* sense of this text conveys, was secreted from it. But then, the Doctor says, that “in the *primary* sense David declares his expectation of a future state, not in consequence of any promise of the law, but by faith in Jesus Christ.” The result then of the Doctor’s exposition is this, that the same text may serve to prove that the spiritual sense of the law *was and was not* revealed at this time. The verse has a primary sense which reveals a future state and a secondary sense which hides and secretes it.—But he insists much upon the following words of the text—*In thy presence is fulness of joy, and at thy right hand are pleasures evermore*. “Expressions,” says the Doctor, “much too great to describe any WORLDLY HAPPINESS.”§—I readily

\* Ps. xvi. 10, 11.

† Acts ii. 25—29.

‡ Exam. p. 49.

§ Id. ib.

confess it was no *worldly happiness* which is here described: for to be in the *presence of God* signified the same as to *appear before the ark*, Ps. xvii. 15, and to enjoy *pleasures* there *for evermore*, the same as *dwelling in the house of the Lord for ever*, i. e. all his days, Ps. xxiii. 6. a *spiritual happiness*, sure, though enjoyed in this world.

But the texts of texts, the precious ones indeed, are those where a HELL is mentioned; as here—*thou shalt not leave my soul in hell.*\* And of this orthodox consolation there is no scarcity in the Old Testament. Mr Whiston assures us, *it is almost five times as often mentioned as in the New.* It may be so. However, instead of examining into the justness of this nice calculation, I shall choose rather to consider what is to be understood by the word, than how often it is repeated. Now, I suppose neither I nor my answerers can have any reasonable objection to St John's authority in this matter; who speaking, in the book of revelation, of the useless old furniture of the LAW, says—and DEATH and HELL were cast into the LAKE OF FIRE: *this is the second death.*† From hence it appears that the HELL of the Old Testament was a very different thing from the HELL of the New, called, the *lake of fire*; since the one is made the punishment, or at least the extinction of the other. And to remove all doubt, the apostle, we see, calls this *casting into the lake*, a *second death*. Must not then the *lake* itself be a *second hell*? And if so, could the *first* or the Old Testament HELL be any other than the GRAVE? The next words tell us, that "whosoever was not found written in the book of life, was cast into the lake of fire."‡ So that the sense of the whole seems to be this, that at the consummation of things (the subject here treated of) all physical and moral evil shall be abolished.

8. Again, the psalmist says; "Deliver my soul from the wicked—from the men of the world—which *have their portion in this life*, and whose belly thou fillest with thy hid treasure.—As for me, I will behold thy face in righteousness: *I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with thy likeness.*"§ Many moral and mystical commentators (and perhaps our English translators themselves, as one would think from the turn of their language) understood these words as literally pointing, in one verse, to a *future state*, and in the other to a *resurrection*. And in this, the dissenter, *Leland*, as I remember, in some of his things, seems much to triumph. But I shall show that it means nothing less.

They have *their portion in THIS life*, say our translators, who, with great piety, had their heads full of ANOTHER. Whereas the original word literally signifies *in vitis*, the Hebrew being a plural word and having no singular: which, by the way, let me observe, is a convincing proof that the ideas of the common users of this language were only employed about this life; had they been conversant, like us, with another, they would soon have found a singular to their plural. This will be thought a strange paradox by those I have to do with, who do not know that plural nouns are often words of amplification, not of number.

\* Ps. xvi. 10.

† Chap. xx. 14.

‡ Ver. 15.

§ Ps. xvii. 14, 15.

As our translators render it, *in this life*, so the Chaldee Par. goes a step further, and renders it, *in life eternal*. The Sept. translators, who best understood their own idiom, interpret it better than either, *ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτῶν*, *in this life of theirs*. So that the true meaning of what we turn, *their portion of this life*, amounts to this—*they are perfectly prosperous*.

And now, concerning the words in the other verse, *I shall be satisfied, when I awake with thy likeness*.—For the sense of these I shall transcribe the following passage of an excellent critic, and, what is more, a very orthodox divine.—“The Chaldee,” says Dr Hammond, (and what sort of interpreters they were we have seen just above) “apply this *awaking* to *David*; *when I shall awake I shall be satisfied with the glory of thy countenance*. And so it hath *truth*, in respect of the resurrection of the just.—But all the other interpreters agree to apply it to *this glory*; *ἐν τῇ ἐφθῆναι τὴν δόξαν σου*, *at the appearing of thy glory*, say the LXX.—*cum apparuerit gloria tua*, says the Latin; (and so the Arabic and Æthiopic)—*When thy fidelity shall awake*, saith the Syriac: and so most probably it is to be understood. By [*God's glory awaking*] signifying his glorious and powerful interposition to David's PRESENT rescue from his enemies' hands.—And thus the learned Castallio took it; *tum satiandus, cum tua experrecta fuerit imago*; *I shall be satisfied when thy likeness shall be awaked*.”\* Other interpreters, and those of the first class, who make the *awaking* to refer to *David*, suppose it to signify his morning adorations before the ark, the symbolic residence of the divine presence.† But that David was here speaking in the language of the *law*, and not of the *gospel*, I think, all but determined bigots will confess.

9. And again: “Surely goodness and mercy shall follow me all the days of my life, and I will dwell in the house of the Lord for ever.”‡ By the *house of the Lord* can be meant nothing else but the *tabernacle* or the *temple*: so that, *for ever*, or as the Heb. says, *to length of days*, must mean that mature old age, which the law promised to its faithful adherents.

10. In the xxxvi psalm, the sacred writer says, “For with thee is the fountain of life: in thy light shall we see light.”§ Here, to prove the *immortality* of man, a text is produced, which teaches the *eternity* of God. But I know some, who think there is a necessary connexion between these two truths.

11. “Like sheep,” says the psalmist, “they [the wicked] are laid in the grave, death shall feed upon them; and the upright shall have dominion over them in the morning, and their beauty shall consume in the grave, from their dwelling. But God will redeem my soul from the power of the grave, for he shall receive me.”|| The literal meaning of which is,

\* Annot. on the xviith psalm.

† Videtur significare David arcam, quam singulis temporibus matutinis Deum adoraturus adibat.—Cleric. in locum. Pro more Hebr. poescos, ipsum in sanctuario quotidie in præsentia Dei ad arcam, quod divinæ præsentiae symbolum erat, sese velle sistere, quod illi ante omnia in votis fuit, summoque gaudio perfudit.—Hare in loc.

‡ Ps. xxiii. 6.

§ Ver. 9.

|| Ps. xlix. 14, 15.

as appears by the context, that “the wicked should be untimely cut off and destroyed,—*in the morning*, that is, by the judgment of the law, which was administered in the morning hours;\*” but that his life, and the life of the upright, should be preserved and prolonged.” Here, once for all, let me desire the objectors to consider, what it is that is ever opposed (in the many passages of this sort) to *life, redemption, &c.* It is not *misery, torments, &c.*, as it must have been, did *life* literally signify eternal life in a future state; but it is DEATH, which shows it was a *life here on earth*.

12. “Thou shalt guide me,” says he again, “with thy counsel, and afterwards receive me to glory.”† Or, as an excellent critic has it; *Consilio tuo deduxisti me, et postea cum gloria excepisti me.* “Thou wast, or shalt be, always present with me in difficulties and distresses; and shalt lead and conduct me to better fortunes.” This literal sense the context requires.

13. “But the mercy of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear him, and his righteousness unto children’s children; to such as keep his covenant, and to those that remember his commandments to do them.”‡ This is so far from intimating a *future state*, that it is the very temporal promise annexed to the second law of the decalogue—“Showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my commandments.”§

14. “For THERE the Lord commanded the blessing, even life for evermore.”||—Where? In the *habitation of brethren living together in unity*. Nothing else then can be meant, but that death and dangers should not approach a house so strongly united in itself.

15. In the book of Proverbs it is said—“The wicked is driven away in his wickedness: BUT THE RIGHTEOUS HATH HOPE IN HIS DEATH.”¶ That is, “the righteous hath hope that he shall be delivered from the most imminent dangers.” So the psalmist—“upon them that hope in his mercy; to deliver their soul from death, and to keep them alive in famine.”\*\*—And again, “Thou hast delivered my soul from death; wilt not thou deliver my feet from falling, that I may walk before God in the light of the living?”††

16. And again—“The way of life is above to the wise, that he may depart from hell beneath.”‡‡ That is, the wise man prolongs his days here on earth, and escapes that untimely death which attends vice and folly. A doctrine perpetually inculcated throughout this book; as at chap. x. ver. 2, 28, chap. xi. ver. 7, chap. xii. ver. 28, chap. xxi. ver. 16.

And again, “When a wicked man dieth, his EXPECTATION shall perish; and the hope of unjust men perisheth.”§§ And again,—“So shall the

\* See Jer. xxi. 12. “O house of David, thus saith the Lord, *execute judgment in the morning*, and deliver him that is spoiled, out of the hand of the oppressor, lest my fury go out like fire,—because of the evil of your doings.”

† Ps. lxxiii. 24.

‡ Ps. ciii. 17, 18.

§ Exod. xx. 6.

|| Ps. cxxxiii. 3.

¶ Chap. xiv. 32.

\*\* Ps. xxxiii. 18, 19.

†† Ps. lvi. 13.

‡‡ Prov. xv. 24.

§§ Prov. xi. 7.

knowledge of wisdom be unto thy soul: when thou hast found it, then there shall be a reward, and thy EXPECTATION shall not be cut off.”\* In the first of these two places it appears by the context (that is, by the whole tenor of these moral precepts and aphorisms) that the *expectation which should deceive* is that of worldly wicked men to establish a house in their posterity: and in the second, the *expectation which should not deceive* is that of wise and virtuous men in the success of their honest endeavours. But there is one common fallacy which runs through all the reasoning of these anti-critics; it is this, that having taken the point in question [whether a future state be taught in the Old Testament] for granted, they confine all expressions, capable of either sense considered alone, to the sense which supports their own opinion. Whereas, while the matter is in question, fair reasoning requires, that such texts be considered as indifferent to either sense, till determined by the context, and according to the analogy of the *law and the prophets*.

17. We conclude with the PREACHER, who says, that “wisdom giveth life to them that have it:”† and so says the law of Moses likewise (which is here alluded to) and yet it gives nothing but the things of *this life*.

18. Again: “Though a sinner do evil an hundred times, and his days be prolonged, yet surely I know that it shall be well with them that fear God.”‡ What is meant by this, the very following words declare: “But it shall not be well with the wicked, neither shall he prolong his days, which are as a shadow; because he feareth not before God.”§—That is, though the wicked be suffered to go on for some time, yet for all that, vengeance shall overtake and arrest him in the middle of his course.||

19. And again—“Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth, and let thy heart cheer thee in the days of thy youth, and walk in the ways of thy heart, and in the sight of thine eyes: but know thou, that for all these things God will bring thee into judgment. Therefore remove sorrow from thy heart, and put away evil from thy flesh; for childhood and youth are vanity.”¶ That is, “in giving an innocent and lawful indulgence to thy youth, take heed lest thou transgress the bounds of virtue and piety. For know, that God will certainly punish thy offences, either in thy own person, or in thy posterity.”

These are all the passages of moment (till we come to the PROPHETS) which I could find have been objected to the opinion, *That a future state of reward and punishment is not in the Mosaic dispensation*. By which it appears, that the objectors have been very inattentive to what an interpreter of the Old Testament should have his thoughts constantly attached, namely, to these three things; to the CONTEXT; to the genius of the EASTERN STYLE; and to the economy under which the early Hebrews lived, that is to say, an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE. But this last fault, though the most inexcusable of all, they all have in common with the late Jewish writers; who, considering only the dispensation under which

\* Prov. xxiv. 14.

† Eccl. vii. 12.

‡ Chap. viii. ver. 12.

§ Eccl. viii. 13.

|| See note G G, at the end of this book.

¶ Chap. xi. ver. 9, et seq.

themselves lived, thought it harsh and unnatural to interpret these texts with reference to worldly good and evil, which they saw unequally distributed.

On the whole therefore it appears, that all these passages, in their obvious and *primary* sense, relate to the *things of this life*; and that some of them are expressed by the Holy Spirit in such a manner, as makes it now evident, they had likewise a *spiritual* and sublimer being, and do indeed refer to the completion of the law, by the gospel.

The texts here examined are urged in common both by Jews and Christians. But, besides these, the Jews have a set of texts peculiar to themselves; which the Christians have never yet ventured to put upon duty. As they are most of them of the nature of *riddles*, riddles, for me, they shall remain: only, for the curious reader's satisfaction, I shall mark out what the rabbins bring from the PENTATEUCH to prove the *immortality of the soul, and the resurrection of the body*, as they are collected by the learned Manasseh Ben-Israel, in his tract *De Resurrectione Mortuorum*. For the IMMORTALITY, 1 Kings i. 31; Psal. cxvi. 7, 8, 9; Exod. xix. 6, chap. xxxiii. ver. 20; Levit. vii. 25; Deut. xiv. 1, 2, chap. xxii. ver. 7, chap. xxxii. ver. 47.—For the RESURRECTION, Gen. iii. 19, chap. xxxvii. ver. 10; Exod. xv. 6; Levit. xxv.; Numb. xv. 30, chap. xviii. ver. 28; Deut. iv. 4, chap. xxxii. ver. 39, chap. xxxiii. ver. 6. But though the reader will find many diverting things on this head in Manasseh Ben-Israel, yet they must all give place to the curious comment of Rabbi Tanchum on the following words of 1 Sam. xxv. 29. “The soul of my Lord shall be bound in the bundle of life with the LORD thy God: and the souls of thine enemies, them shall he sling out, as out of the middle of a sling.” Sententia est omnium interpretum (says this profound rabbi) quod ad hunc textum, esse ipsum per modum commonitionis [quâ declaratur] quisnam futurus sit animæ status, et ad quid tandem deventura sit, postquam à corpore separata fuerit; atque ostendere *duplicem* esse ipsi statum, viz. quibusdam animabus esse gradum sublimem et locum stabilem, apud Dominum suum, dum vitâ immortali fruuntur, nec morti nec perditioni obnoxie: aliis autem ludere fluctus naturæ, adeo ut requiem et consistendi locum non inveniant, verum *dolores perpetuos et cruciatus continuos*, cum *æterna duratione*, instar lapidis, qui è fundâ projectus circumrotatur in aëre pro ratione virium jacentis, dein vi sua naturali gravitate in terram decidit. Animæ vero nec inest gravitas quæ ipsam deorsum, nec levitas quæ sursum ferat; ideoque in perpetua est confusione, perturbatione, tristitia, et dolore usque *in æternum*. Atque hæc reverâ sententia est SAPIENTUM et PHILOSOPHORUM.—How profound a doctrine! and how noble an original! But this is not the first, by a thousand, which has been raised from a metaphor, out of the hot-bed of theologic *wisdom and philosophy*. An abuse, that some cooler thinkers of late have fancied they could never get well rid of, till they had turned the few *doctrines* of true Christianity back again into *metaphors*. And they have succeeded to admiration.



## SECT. IV.

WE come at length to the texts of the NEW TESTAMENT, which are urged to prove, against itself, that *life and immortality was brought to light* by the OLD.

I. The first is that famous argument of JESUS against the Sadducees: "Jesus answered and said unto them, Ye do err, not knowing the scriptures, nor the power of God.—But as touching the resurrection of the dead; Have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? God is not the God of the dead, but of the living."\* Now this very text, had it been impartially considered, would have been sufficient to convince these answerers of the truth here contended for. At least it convinced a much wiser man, the excellent HUGO GROTIUS, whose words to his friend Ger. Vossius are as follow: "In Mosis lege (non dico in veteri Testamento: nam de prophetis, præsertim posterioribus, res longe ælia est) æternæ vitæ non fieri mentionem nisi per umbras, aut rationis consequentiam, certissimum mihi videtur, Christi auctoritate, qui Sadduceos *non verbis directis, sed ratiocinando* refellit."† There is not, I repeat it, any plain text in the whole Bible (and this is amongst the plainest) so strangely mistaken and perverted: for, 1. The appellation of *the God of Abraham, &c.*, is generally understood to be quoted by our blessed Lord, as a direct proof‡ of the *resurrection of the dead body*, in the same manner that St Paul urges the case of JESUS:—"But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first fruits of them that slept."§ But can any thing be more irrational or absurd? The bodies of Abraham and the patriarchs were yet in dust, and reduced to their primitive earth: So that in this sense, the reasoning is so far from proving *that God was not the God of the dead*, that it proves, *he was*. For Abraham's body continued yet lifeless at the very time when God was called *his*

\* Mat. xxii. 29—32.

† Ep. 130. ed. Am. 1687. EPISCOPUS had the very same idea of this argument—"Et hæc opinio, quæ inter Judæos erat, circa vitam futuri sæculi discrepantia arguit promissiones lege factas tales esse ut ex iis certi quid de vita futuri sæculi non possit colligi. Quod et Servator noster non obscure innuit, cum resurrectionem mortuorum colligit, *Mat. xxii.* non ex promisso aliquo legi addito, sed ex generali tantum illo promisso Dei, quo se Deum Abrahami, Isaaci, et Jacobi futurum sponderat: quæ tamen illa collectio magis nititur cognitione intentionis divinæ sub generalibus istis verbis occultatæ aut comprehensæ, de qua Christo certò constabat, quam necessaria consequentia sive verborum vi ac virtute manifestà qualis nunc et in verbis Novi Testamenti, ubi vita æterna et resurrectio mortuorum prorsum et puppim faciunt totius religionis Christianæ, et tam clare ac diserte promittuntur ut nō hiscere quidem contra quis possit."—Inst. Theol. lib. iii. sect. 1. cap. 2.

‡ M. Le Clerc, in his *Defense des Sentimens sur l'Histoire Critique*, has fallen into this mistake.—Nôtre Seigneur presse ces termes, en sorte qu'il suppose qu'il ne faut qu'entendre la langue dans laquelle l'Ecriture parle pour *reconnoître la resurrection*, *Matt. xxii. 31.*—Il ne faut que lire ce raisonnement de Jesus Christ, pour sentir qu'il est tiré de cette expression, *être le Dieu de quelqu'un*, que l'on ne pourroit appliquer à Dieu, si celui, dont on dit qu'il est le Dieu, étoit *mort sans devoir jamais resusciter.*—Pp. 102, 103.

§ 1 Cor. xv. 20.

*God*: whatsoever was to be the future condition of it, that could not influence the present appellation of the God of Israel. What hath led men into this mistake is the introduction to the argument,—*but as touching the resurrection of the dead*,—which they supposed an exordium to a *direct* proof: whereas it is an intimation only, to what an *indirect* proof tended; namely, that the *resurrection of the body* might be inferred through the medium of the *separate existence of the soul*; which was the only point Jesus proposed to prove *directly* to them. The case stood thus: he was here arguing against the SADDUCEES. Now these supported their opinion, of *no resurrection of the body*, on a principle that *the soul had no separate existence*, but fell into nothing at the dissolution of its union with the body; which principle once overthrown, they had nothing left to oppose to the writings of the prophets, or the preaching of Jesus. Against this principle therefore our blessed Lord thus divinely argues:—"But as concerning the resurrection of the dead, you ground your denial of it on this supposition, that the soul dies with the body; but you err as much in not knowing the scriptures, as in not rightly conceiving of the power of God. For the words of the law, which you allow to be a good authority, directly prove that the soul doth not die with the body, but hath a separate existence. Now Moses tells us, that God, long after the death of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, called himself *their God*: but God is *not the God of the dead but of the living*; therefore the souls of those patriarchs are yet existing in a separate state."—This is the force of the argument.\*

2. The second mistake is, that JESUS, by these words, insinuates that Moses CULTIVATED the doctrine of a *resurrection*, or a *future state*. But here again the objectors seem to forget, against whom the argument is addressed, the SADDUCEES. Now these not only held that Moses did *not teach*, but that he did NOT BELIEVE that doctrine. This was the error JESUS aimed to confute; and only this; because the opinion that Moses did not *teach* or *cultivate* it, was no error at all, as appears, amongst many other reasons, even from hence: that the Jews might reasonably understand the title of the *God of Abraham, &c.* to mean the peculiar tutelary God of Abraham's family; for the terms *Jacob* and *Israel* are frequently used in scripture for the whole nation of the Jews; *Aaron* for the whole order of the priesthood; *Dan, Judah, &c.*, for the whole body of each tribe: and, as in reason they *might*, so by the history of the early Jews, we find in fact, they *did* understand it in this sense.

The real force therefore of the text, here urged, amounts to this, from JESUS's argument it appears, that the separate existence of the soul might be fairly inferred from the writings of Moses: which inference I not only grant some early Jews did make, but have proved likewise; though not indeed from these words, for the reason given above. And so much my answerers might have understood, had they only observed that this has

\* See note H H, at the end of this book.

all the marks of a new argument,\* unknown to the Pharisees; as indeed both the dignity of our Lord's character, and the impression he would make on his opposers, seemed to require it should be. Accordingly we find they are struck dumb; and *the multitude that heard this were astonished at his doctrine.*† But would either of them have been so affected with an old foundered argument, long hackneyed in the schools and synagogues‡ of the Pharisees? Nay, how should it be otherwise than new? for the words, *I am the God of Abraham, &c.* as delivered by Moses, were supposed, both by Pharisees and Sadducees, to be spoken of a NATIONAL GOD; as in Gen. xvii. 8, 9. xxvi. 3. xxviii. 13. They therefore could not see how it implied the continued existence of the patriarch Abraham, &c. But Jesus, in using the word GOD, to signify the Maker and Lord of all things, rightly inferred that the patriarchs still continued to exist. I am not ignorant, that the modern rabbins employed this argument very familiarly for a *resurrection*; but they borrowed it from the GOSPEL, as they have done many other things: the reason of which, our rabbinical commentators, such as Lightfoot, not apprehending, have supposed the *borrowing* to be all on the side of the lenders: but more of this matter in its place.

Thus much for this celebrated text. In which, however, the learned Dr Sherlock, the late bishop of London, finds enough to support himself in his own opinion, *That the law of Moses afforded a good proof of a future state to the ancient Jews.*§ But to whom did it afford this proof? To the ancient Jews, who understood the words in the text, in question, to relate to a *national God*; or to us Christians, who understand them of the Creator of the universe? Now though I cannot agree with his Lordship in this conclusion, yet I agree with him in a better thing, which is, *that the law of Moses affords a good proof of its own divinity*; indeed, by a medium his Lordship never thought of, namely, *that it afforded no proof of a future state at all.* But what if his Lordship meant no more than what his respectable father endeavoured to prove, || viz. that the EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE (which I hold to be the very circumstance which kept the Jews from the knowledge of a future state) indeed shows that they had the knowledge of it? If this be the case, all I have to say is, that their proof of a *future state* from the LAW, begins just where my proof of its *divinity* ends.

II. We come next to the parable of the *rich man and Lazarus*; where the former, being in hell, desires Abraham, whom he saw afar off in paradise, to send Lazarus to his father's house, to testify to his brethren, and to lead them to repentance, lest they too should come

\* See note I I, at the end of this book.

† Mat. xxii. 33.

‡ The learned Pococke, speaking of this argument, says, *His e lege depromptis cum Sadduceos ad silentium adegisset Christus, dicitur percussam fuisse turbam doctrinâ ejus. Unde patet luculentiori ipsum contra eos argumento usum, quam ullo adhuc usi fuerant Pharisei.*—Notæ miscell. ad Portam Mosis, cap. vi.

§ Sermons by the bishop of London.

|| Sermons by the Dean of St Paul's, on the Immortality of the Soul and a Future State, p 141.

into that place of torment: to which Abraham replies: "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead." \* Hence it is inferred, that both Moses and the prophets *taught a future state of rewards and punishments*. But, here again, the objectors are quite beside the matter. As, in the former case, they would not see, the argument was directed against the SADDUCEES; so here, by as perverse a connivance, they will not reflect, that this parable is addressed to the PHARISEES. It is certain we must judge of the drift and design of every rational discourse from the character of those to whom it is addressed. Now had this parable been told to the Sadducees, whose grand error it was, to deny a future state of rewards and punishments; and had the rich man been represented as a Sadducee, who was too late convinced of his mistake, and wanted to undeceive his father's house, which his evil DOCTRINES had perverted; had this, I say, been the case, there might have been some ground for the objector's inference, which I suppose to be this: that "it appears as plainly from Moses and the prophets, that there is a future state of rewards and punishments, as if one came back from that state to tell us so." On the contrary, the parable was particularly addressed to the Pharisees, the great patrons of a future state, and who sedulously taught it in opposition to the Sadducees. It is introduced in this manner: "And the PHARISEES also, who were COVETOUS [φιλάργυροι], heard all these things: and they derided him." † For which they are thus reproved: "Ye are they which justify yourselves before men; but God knoweth your hearts." ‡ And then presently follows the parable. Their capital errors therefore were errors of PRACTICE, *avarice* and *luxury*. And it was to reform these, that a *rich Pharisee* is represented as without any compassion for the poor, living in all kind of delicacy, and dying impenitent. This man, when he comes into the other world, finds so ill a reception there, that he wants one to be sent to his brethren (who believed, doubtless, as he did, the *doctrine of a future state*) to warn them of their evil ways, and to assure them, that luxury and inhumanity, unrepented of, would assuredly damn them. Which information, he thought, would be best enforced by a miracle: "If one went unto them from the dead, they will REPENT." § (Where observe, it is not—*they will BELIEVE*.) To this common mistake, Abraham's reply is extremely pertinent: "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead:" *i. e.* "If they will not hear Moses and the prophets, whose authority they acknowledge, || and whose missions were confirmed by so many and well-attested miracles, neither will they regard a new one, of the resurrection of a dead man. (Nor, in fact, were the Pharisees at all softened into repentance by the return of that Lazarus, the namesake of this in the parable, whom Jesus raised from the dead.) Now Moses and the prophets have denounced the most severe threaten-

\* Luke xvi. 31.

§ Ver. 30.

† Ver. 14.

|| See note K K, at the end of this book.

‡ Ver. 15.

ings, on the part of God, against vice and impemittence." This is the force of the argument; in which we see the question of a *future state* is no more concerned, than thus far only, that God will punish, either *here* or *hereafter*. Moses and the prophets threatened the punishment here; and, while here it was executed, the Jews looked no farther: but when the *extraordinary* providence, by which that punishment was administered, had ceased, the Jews began, from those very promises and denunciations, to entertain some hopes of an *hereafter*, where all inequalities should be set even, and God's threats and promises executed to the full: though still, with less confidence, if they reasoned rightly, than the pagans had to draw the same conclusion from the same principles; since their law had informed them of a truth unknown to the rest of mankind; namely, that the whole race was condemned to a state of death and mortality, a return to dust from whence man was taken, for the transgression of Adam. So that all which good logic or criticism will authorize the believers of a future state to draw from this parable, is this, *that God is a severe punisher of unrepentant luxury and inhumanity.*

But now admit the mistaken interpretation of the objectors; and what will follow! *That Moses taught a future state*, the proposition I oppose? No; but that from *Moses and the prophets together* a future state might be collected, a proposition I have no occasion to oppose. For when the *prophets* are joined to *Moses*, and have explained the *spiritual* meaning of his law, and developed the hidden sense of it, I may well allow that from both together a learned Pharisee might collect the truth of the doctrine, without receding one tittle from my argument.

III. "When the lawyer in the gospel," say these objectors, "had made that most important demand,\* *Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life*, our blessed Lord refers him to what was written in the law: and upon his giving a sound and judicious answer, approves of it, and for satisfaction to his question, tells him, *This do and thou shalt live.*" This is the objection. And to this St Paul shall give an answer—*Is the LAW then AGAINST the promises of God? God forbid. For if there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law. But the scripture hath concluded all under sin; that the promise by FAITH of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe.*† We must therefore think that this lawyer was better at distinctions than the objector who brings him into his cause, and inquired, (*in this most important demand*) of the AGENDA, not of the CREDENDA, in order to salvation. And so his words bear witness—*What shall I DO to be saved?*

IV. In what follows, I hardly think the objectors can be serious. *Search the scriptures* (says JESUS to the Jews) *for in them YE THINK YE HAVE eternal life*—*ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις ἐν αὐταῖς ζωὴν αἰώνιον ἔχετε*—and *they are they which testify of me. And ye will not come to me, that ye MIGHT HAVE LIFE.*‡ The homicide§ Jews, to whom these words are

\* Luke x. 25.

† Gal. iii. 21, 22.

‡ John v. 39, 40.

§ Ver. 16.

addressed, *THOUGHT they had eternal life in their scriptures*;—THEREFORE, say the objectors, *they had eternal life*. If I allow this *therefore*, they must allow me another—THEREFORE the mission of JESUS was vain, being anticipated by that of Moses, *who brought life and immortality to light by the LAW*.—And if righteousness came by the law, says the apostle, *then is Christ dead in vain*. This is a necessary consequence from the objectors' interpretation, and gives us, to be sure, a very high idea of the reasoning of the ever blessed JESUS.—By the same art of inferring, I suppose too they will conclude, that, when St Paul says to the unbelieving Jew—"And thou art confident that thou thyself art a guide to the blind, a light of them which are in darkness, an instructor of the foolish, and a teacher of babes;"\* they will conclude, I say, that THEREFORE it was the Jew, and not St Paul, who was indeed *the guide of the blind, a light of them which are in darkness, an instructor of the foolish, and a teacher of babes*. In earnest, if JESUS, in these words, taught, that the Jewish scriptures gave *eternal life*, (and the Jews could not have what their scriptures did not give) he certainly taught a very different doctrine from St PAUL, who expressly tells us, that IF THERE HAD BEEN A LAW GIVEN WHICH COULD HAVE GIVEN LIFE, VERILY RIGHTEOUSNESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN BY THE LAW.† All therefore that these words of Jesus teach us is, that the Jews *THOUGHT they had eternal life by the Mosaic dispensation*. For the truth of what is thus charged upon them, we have the concurrent testimony of the apostles; who wrote large portions of their EPISTLES to prove, not only that they *thought* so, but that they were greatly mistaken in so thinking. For the author of the epistle to the Hebrews says, that *unto the angels* [who delivered the law to Moses] *hath he* [God] *not put in subjection the WORLD TO COME, whereof WE speak*.‡

But though we should suppose, the words—*ye think ye have eternal life*, considered separately, did not necessarily imply that these were *only* their thoughts, yet being opposed to the following words: *Ye will not come to me that ye MIGHT HAVE LIFE*, (Καὶ οὐ θίλεις ἔλθειν πρὸς με, ἵνα ζωὴν ἔχητε,) they show, that whoever *thought* so besides, it was not JESUS, whose argument stands thus—"The scriptures, I affirm, and am ready to prove, do testify of me. What reason then have you to disown my character? it cannot surely be, because I preach up a *new doctrine* of life and immortality. For you yourselves teach that doctrine: and what is more, you understand several passages in your own scriptures, to signify *eternal life*; which I own, in their *spiritual* meaning do so. Now that life which you think you HAVE by your scriptures, but HAVE NOT, do I here offer unto you, THAT YE MIGHT indeed HAVE LIFE." But if men had duly considered this discourse of Jesus to the unbelieving Jews, they would have seen the main drift and purpose of it was to rectify this fatal mistake of theirs, in *thinking they had eternal life in their scriptures*. In one place he tells them, that those who

\* Rom. ii. 19.

† Gal. iii. 21.

‡ Chap. ii. ver. 5.



*heard his word had passed from DEATH to life.\** And again, *the hour is coming, and now is, when the DEAD shall hear the voice of the Son of God.†* Where, by *death*, and the *dead*, is meant the condition of those under the *law*, subject to the condemnation of mortality.

V. The objectors have produced St Paul likewise to confute the principle here laid down. This apostle, in his epistle to the Romans, says —“For as many as have sinned without law, shall also perish without law: and *as many as have sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law.‡* Now, say the objectors, “had the law concealed a future state from the Jews, it is plain they were not equitably dealt with, since they were to be judged in a future state.” This brings to mind an objection of Lord Bolingbroke’s against the divinity of Moses’s law; and the answer which this text enabled me to give to him, will show, that in these words of St Paul, the objectors have chosen the most unlucky text for their purpose in the whole New Testament. His Lordship’s objection is in these words, “If Moses knew that crimes were to be punished in another life, he deceived the people [in not acquainting them with the doctrine of a *future state*]. If he did not know it, I say it with horror, that God deceived both him and them.—The Israelites had better things to hope, and worse to fear,” &c. Now not to repeat what has been replied to this impious charge, elsewhere, § I will only observe, that the words of St Paul above are a full confutation of it, where he says, *that as many as have sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law*: that is, shall be judged on the principles of a law which denounced punishment to vice, and reward to virtue. Those who had already received the punishment which that law denounced should be *judged* to have done so; those, who in the times of the gradual decay of the *extraordinary* providence had escaped or evaded punishment, should have it hereafter. Nothing is clearer than this interpretation. For observe, I pray you, the difference of the predication between wicked men *without the law*, and the wicked men *under the law*. The first *shall perish*, ἀπολοῦνται: the second *shall be judged*, κριθήσονται, or *brought to trial*. For though κρίνω be often used in the New Testament for κατακρίνω, yet it is plain, that it is not so used here, both from the sense of the place, and the apostle’s change of terms, for which I think no good reason can be assigned but this, that κριθήσονται is opposed to ἀπολοῦνται. From all this, I think, it appears, that my objectors were as much mistaken in their urging this text against my principles, as the noble Lord in supposing that the reality of a *future state* was a condemnation of the equity of the law. But both took it for granted, and foolishly enough, that those who did not live under the sanction of a future state could never, consistently with justice, be summoned before the tribunal there erected.

[II.] WE are now got to the very *palladium* of the cause, the famous eleventh chapter to the Hebrews: where it is said, that by FAITH, Abel,

\* John v. 24.

† Ver. 25.

‡ Chap. ii. ver. 12.

§ See a view of Lord Bolingbroke’s philosophy, vol. ii. p. 354, &c., of this edition.

Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Moses, &c., performed all their acceptable works—That *they looked for a heavenly city*—That *they saw the promises afar off, and were persuaded of them, and embraced them, and desired a heavenly country*—That *they all died in faith*—That *Moses esteemed the reproach of CHRIST greater riches than the treasures of Egypt*—That *by faith the Jewish leaders did all their great and marvellous works*—That *their very women despised death, in hopes to obtain a part in the resurrection of the just*—And that *all these obtained a good report THROUGH FAITH*.—This, say the objectors, plainly shows, that a future state of rewards and punishments, or more properly, the Christian doctrine of *life and immortality*, was taught by the LAW.—To which I answer,

1. That if this be true, the eleventh chapter directly contradicts all the rest of the epistle: in which, as we have shown, there are more express declarations, that life and immortality was not known or taught by the law, than in all the other books of the New Testament besides. And for which, indeed, a very good reason may be assigned, as it was solely addressed to the Jews, amongst whom this fatal prejudice, that *a future state was taught by the law*, was then, and has continued ever since to be, the strongest impediment to their conversion. For is it possible, that a writer, who had said, that *the law made nothing perfect, but the BRINGING IN OF A BETTER HOPE DID*;—That *CHRIST hath obtained a more excellent ministry than MOSES, by how much also he is the MEDIATOR OF A BETTER COVENANT, which is established upon BETTER PROMISES*;—That the LAW WAS ONLY A SHADOW OF GOOD THINGS TO COME, *and not the very image*; is it possible, I say, that such a writer should forget himself before he came to the end of his epistle, and, in contradiction to all this, affirm that *life and immortality was known and taught under the law*? We may venture to say then, that this eleventh chapter must have a very different meaning. Let us see if we can find it out: and sure it requires no great search.

2. The whole argument of the epistle to the Hebrews is directed against Jews and judaizing Christians. The point in difference was this: the gospel taught JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH: the Judaizers thought it must needs be by WORKS. One consequence of which, in their opinion, was, that the law of Moses was still in force. They had no more conception than our modern Socinians and freethinkers, that there could be any merit in FAITH or belief, where the understanding was unavoidably determined by evidence. The reader sees then, that the dispute was not whether *faith in Moses* or *faith in JESUS* made men acceptable to God; but whether *works* or the *act of believing*; consequently, where the apostle shows it was *faith*, or the *act of believing*, he must mean *faith* in the generic sense, not in the specific, i. e. he did not mean *faith in Jesus*: for the Jews, even that part of them which embraced JESUS as the Messiah, denied it to be any kind of *faith* whatever. On the contrary, had they held *justification* to be by *faith* in

Moses, and not in Jesus, then it had been the apostle's business to prove, that it was the *specific faith* in Jesus. But as the dispute stood, all he had to do was to prove that it was *the act of believing*, and not *works*, which justified. And this we find he does with infinite address, by showing, that that thing which made all the patriarchs before the law, and all the rulers and prophets under the law, acceptable to God, was not *works*, but *faith*. But then what kind of *faith*? Doubtless *faith in God's promises*: for he is arguing on their own concessions. They admitted their ancestors to have had *that* faith;\* they did not admit that they had faith in Christ. For the apostle therefore to assert this, had been a kind of begging the question. Thus we see that not only the pertinency, but the whole force of the reasoning turns upon our understanding *faith*, in this chapter, to mean *faith in the God of their fathers*.

But the apostle's own definition of the word puts the matter out of question. We have said, the dispute between him and the Jewish converts necessarily required him to speak of the efficacy of *faith* in the generic sense. Accordingly his *definition* of FAITH is, that IT IS THE SUBSTANCE OF THINGS HOPED FOR, THE EVIDENCE OF THINGS NOT SEEN.† Not of *faith in the Messiah*, but of belief in general, and on good grounds. Indeed very general, according to this writer; not only *belief* of the future, but the past. It is, says he, *the substance of things hoped for*; and this he illustrates by Noah's dependence on God's promise to save him in the approaching deluge.‡ It is, again, *the evidence of things not seen*; and this he illustrates by our belief that *the worlds were framed by the word of God*.§ Having defined what he means by *faith*, he next proceeds to show its nature by its common efficacy, which still relates only to faith in the generic sense—"But without faith it is impossible to please him [God], for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him;"|| which very *faith* he immediately illustrates by that of Noah, Abraham, Sarah, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, and Moses. And that no doubt might remain, he farther illustrates it by the *faith* of the Jewish people passing the Red sea, and encompassing the walls of Jericho; and by the *faith* of Rahab the harlot. But was any of this the *faith* in Jesus the Messiah? or a belief of a future state of rewards and punishments?

As here the apostle tells us of the great *rewards of faith*, so in his third chapter he speaks of the *punishment of unbelief*; which was the shutting out a whole generation from the land of Canaan, and suffering them to perish in the wilderness: "So we see," says he, "they could not enter in because of unbelief."¶ But was this *unbelief* want of faith in the Messiah, or any thing but want of faith in the promise of the God of Israel, who assured them that he would drive out the Canaanite from before them? Lastly, to evince it impossible that *faith in the Messiah*

\* Thus their prophet Habakkuk had said, "The just shall live by his faith," chap. ii. ver. 4.

† Heb. xi. 1.

‡ Ver. 7.

§ Ver. 3.

|| Ver. 6.

¶ Ver. 19.

should be meant by the *faith* in this eleventh chapter, the apostle expressly says, that all those to whom he assigns this faith, **HAD NOT RECEIVED THE PROMISE.\*** Therefore they could not have *faith* in that which was never yet proposed to them for the object of *faith*: *for how should they believe in him of whom they have not heard?* says the apostle.

St Paul had the same argument to manage in his epistle to the Galatians; and he argues, from the advantages of *faith* or *belief in God*, in the very same manner. But of his argument, more in the next section.

Let us observe farther, that the sacred writers not only use the word *faith* in its *generic* sense of *believing on reasonable grounds*; but likewise the word **GOSPEL** (a more appropriated term) for *good tidings in general*. Thus this very writer to the Hebrews—*For unto us was the GOSPEL preached as well as unto them,†* i. e. the *Israelites*.

Having shown, that by the *faith*, here said to be so extensive amongst the Jewish people, is meant *faith in those promises of God* which related to their own dispensation, all the weight of this objection is removed. For as to the *promises seen afar off and believed and embraced*, which gave the prospect of a *better country, that is, a heavenly,‡* these are confined to the patriarchs and leaders of the Jewish people. And that *they* had this distant prospect, I am as much concerned to prove as my adversaries themselves. And if I should undertake to do it more effectually, nobody I believe will think that I pretended to any great matter. But then let us still remember there is a vast difference between **SEEING THE PROMISES AFAR OFF** and **RECEIVING THE PROMISE**: the latter implying a gift bestowed; the former, only the obscure and distant prospect of one to come. This indeed they had: but as to the other, the sacred writers assure us that, in general, they had it not.—“And these **ALL** *having* obtained a good report *through faith*, **RECEIVED NOT THE PROMISE.§** For though all the good Israelites in general had *faith in God*, and the patriarchs and leaders had the hope of a *better country*, yet neither the one nor the other *received the promise*.

I have said, that the *hopes of a better country*, is to be confined to the patriarchs and leaders of the ancient Jews: nor is this contradicted by what is said of “others *who* were tortured, not accepting deliverance, that they might obtain a better resurrection,” || for this refers (as our *English* Bibles show us) to the history of the Maccabees; in whose time it is confessed the doctrine of a *future state* was become national. How the people got it—of what materials it was composed—and from what quarters it was fetched, will be seen hereafter. It is sufficient to observe at present, that all this, the Jews soon forgot, or hid from themselves, and made this new flattering doctrine a part of the law. Hence the author of the second book of Maccabees makes one of the martyrs say—“For our brethren who now have suffered a short pain, are dead

\* Heb. xi. 13 & 39. † Chap. iv. ver. 2. ‡ Ver. 13—16. § Ver. 39. || Ver. 35.

unto God's COVENANT OF EVERLASTING LIFE."\* But it may be asked, how came this *covenant of everlasting life* to lie so perfectly concealed from the time of Moses to the great captivity, that, as appears from their history, neither princes nor people had the least apprehension or suspicion of such a covenant?

But here a proper occasion offers itself to remove a seeming contradiction between the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews, and St Paul, in his speech to the synagogue at Antioch, which will give still further light to the subject. The former says; "And these all having obtained a good report through faith, RECEIVED NOT THE PROMISE."† And the latter, "THE PROMISE WHICH WAS MADE UNTO THE FATHERS, God hath fulfilled the same unto us their children, in that he hath raised up JESUS again."‡ But the contradiction is only seeming. The two texts are, indeed, very consistent. The writer to the Hebrews is speaking of the condition of the heads and leaders of the faithful Israelites in general; who certainly had not the promise of the gospel revealed unto them. St Paul, in his speech to the synagogue, is speaking particularly of their father ABRAHAM: as appears from his introductory address, "Men and brethren, children of the stock of Abraham;"§ and Abraham certainly had the promise of the gospel revealed unto him, as appears from the words of JESUS himself: "Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day; and he saw it, and was glad." He saw the resurrection of Jesus in the restoration of his son Isaac. But of this, more hereafter. And to this solution, the author of the epistle to the Hebrews himself directs us, who, though he had said that the holy men in general *received not the promise*, yet when he reckons up the distinct effects of each particular man's faith, he expressly says, "who through faith subdued kingdoms, wrought righteousness, OBTAINED PROMISES, stopped the mouths of lions, quenched the violence of fire,|| &c. That is, some like David, through faith, *subdued kingdoms*; others, like Samuel, *wrought righteousness*; others, like Abraham, OBTAINED PROMISES; others, as Daniel, *stopped the mouths of lions*; and others, again, as his three companions, *quenched the violence of fire*. From whence I would infer these two conclusions:

1. That as the *promise* here said to be *obtained*, doth not contradict what the same writer says presently after, that the faithful Israelites in general *received not the promise*; and as the *promise*, said by St Paul to be *made to the fathers*, means the same thing with the PROMISES said, by the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews, to be obtained, namely, the promises made to Abraham, *who saw CHRIST's day*, and the oath sworn to David, that "of the fruit of his loins he would raise up Christ to sit on his throne;"¶ consequently, neither do the words of St Paul contradict the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews, where he says, "these all received not the promise." 2. As these gospel *promises* are

\* 2 Mac. vii. 36.

§ Ver. 26.

† Heb. xi. 39.

|| Heb. xi. 33.

‡ Acts xiii. 32.

¶ Acts ii. 30.

said to be *obtained by faith*, it follows that the FAITH mentioned in this famous eleventh chapter to the Hebrews, could not be faith in *the Messiah*: because the promises of a Messiah are here said to be the consequence of faith; but faith in *the Messiah* is the consequence of the *promises* of a Messiah: “For how could they believe in him of whom they had not heard?” From whence it appears, that the FAITH so much extolled in this chapter, was *faith in God’s veracity*, according to the interpretation given above.

[III.] THIS is all, as far as I can learn, that hath been objected to my proposition; and this *all* is such a confirmation of it, that I am in pain lest the reader should think I have prevaricated, and drawn out the strongest texts in the New Testament to support my opinion, under the name of a confutation of it. But I have fairly given them as I found them urged: and to show that I am no less severe, though a little more candid, to my own notions, than my answerers are, I shall produce an objection, which occurred to me in reading St Paul’s epistles, of more real moment than their whole bundle of texts weighed together. It is this:

The learned apostle, in his reasoning against the Jews, argueth upon a supposition, that “by the law they had eternal life offered to them or laid before them, on condition of their exact performance of the commandment; but that all coming short of perfect obedience, there was a necessity of recurring to FAITH.”—“For what the law could not do,” says he, “in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh; that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.”\*

This general argument, which runs through the epistles to the *Romans* and *Galatians*, wears indeed the face of an objection to what I have advanced: but to understand the true value of it, we must consider the apostle’s end and purpose in writing. It was to rectify an error in the Jewish converts, who would lay a necessity upon all men of conforming to the law of Moses. As strangely superstitious as this may now appear to us, it seems to have been a very natural consequence of opinions then held by the whole Jewish nation, as doctrines of Moses and of the law; namely, a *future state* of rewards and punishments, and the *resurrection* of the body. Now these doctrines, which easily disposed the less prejudiced part of the Jews to receive the *gospel*, where they were taught more directly and explicitly, at the same time gave them wrong notions both of the religion of Moses and of Jesus: which, by the way, I desire those, who so much contend for a *future state’s* being in the Mosaic dispensation to take notice of. Their wrong notion of the law consisted in this, that having taken for granted, that the reward of obedience proposed by Moses was *immortality*, and that this immortality could be obtained only by the *works* of the law, therefore those works were, of

\* Rom. viii. 3, 4.



necessity, to be observed. Their wrong notion of the GOSPEL consisted in this, that as *immortality* was attached to *works* by the *law*, so it must needs be attached to *works* by the *gospel* also.

These were fatal mistakes. We have seen in our explanation of the eleventh chapter to the Hebrews, how the apostles combated the last of them, namely, *justification by works*. The showing now in what manner St Paul opposed the other, of *obligation to the law*, will explain the reasoning in question. Their opinion of obligation to the law of Moses, was, as we say, founded on this principle, that it taught a *future state*, or offered *immortality* to its followers. The case was nice and delicate, and the confutation of the error required much address. What should our apostle do? Should he in direct terms deny a *future state* was to be found in the law? This would have shocked a general tradition supported by a national belief. Should he have owned that life and immortality came by the *law*? This had not only fixed them in their error, but, what was worse, had tended to subvert the whole gospel of Jesus. He has recourse therefore to this admirable expedient: the later Jews, in support of their national doctrine of a *future state*, had given a *spiritual* sense to the law. And this, which they did out of necessity, with little apparent grounds of conclusion then to be discovered, was seen, after the coming of the Messiah, to have the highest reasonableness and truth. Thus we find there were two *spiritual senses*, the one spurious, invented by the later doctors of the law; the other genuine, discovered by the preachers of the gospel; and these coinciding well enough in the main, St Paul was enabled to seize a *spiritual* sense, and from thence to argue on their own principles, that the law of Moses could not now oblige; which he does in this irresistible manner. “*The law*,” says he, “*we know is spiritual*;\* that is, in a spiritual sense promises immortality: for it says, *Do this and live*.† Therefore, *he who does the deeds of the law shall live*.‡ But what then? *I am carnal*:§ and *all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God*:|| so that no flesh can be justified by the deeds of the law,¶ which requires a perfect obedience. *Works* then being unprofitable, we must have recourse to *faith*: but *the law is not of faith*:\*\* therefore the law is unprofitable for the attainment of salvation, and consequently no longer obligatory.”—Never was an important argument more artfully conducted, where the erroneous are brought into the right way on their own principles, and yet the truth not given up or betrayed. This would have been admired in a Greek or Roman orator.

But though the *principle* he went upon was common both to him and his adversaries, and consequently true, that the law ~~was~~ *spiritual*, or had a spiritual meaning, whereby, under the species of those temporal promises of the law, the promises of the gospel were shadowed out; yet

\* Rom. vii. 14.

† Rom. x. 5.

¶ Gal. ii. 16; iii. 11.

‡ Lev. xviii. 5; Gal. iii. 12.

§ Rom. vii. 14.

\*\* Gal. iii. 12.

|| Rom. iii. 23.

the *inference* from thence, that the *LAW offered immortality* to its followers, was solely Jewish, and urged by St Paul as an argument *ad hominem* only; which appears certain from these considerations:

1. This *spiritual* sense, which St Paul owns to be in the law, was not a sense which was conveyed down with the literal, by Moses, to the followers of the law; but was a sense *invented* or *discovered* long after; —the spurious, by the later Jewish doctors; and the genuine and real, by the apostles; as appears from these words of St Paul: “But now we are delivered from the law, that being DEAD wherein we were held, that we should serve in NEWNESS OF SPIRIT, and not in the OLDNESS OF THE LETTER.”\* We see here, the apostle gives the *letter* to the Jewish economy, and the *spirit* to the Christian. Let me observe how exactly this quadrates with, and how well it explains, what he says in another place; where having told the Corinthians that he and his fellow apostles were “ministers of the New Testament, not of the letter but of the spirit,” he adds, “the letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth life.” The Jews had only the *letter* delivered to them by the law, but the letter killeth; the consequence is, that the *law* (in which was only the *letter*) had no future state.

2. Secondly, supposing St Paul really to hold that the *law offered immortality to its followers*, and that that immortality was attached (as his argument supposes it) to *works*, it would contradict the other reasoning which both he himself and the author of the epistle to the Hebrews urged so cordially against the second error of the Jewish converts; namely, of *immortality's* being attached to *works*, or that *justification* was by *works* under the gospel: for to confute this error, they prove, as we have shown, that it was *faith* which *justified*, not only under the gospel, but under the law also.

3. Thirdly, if immortality were indeed offered through *works*, by the *law*, then *justification by faith*, one of the great fundamental doctrines of Christianity,† would be infringed. For then *faith* could, at best, be only supposed to make up the defect of *works*, in such a sense as to enable *works* to *justify*.

4. Fourthly, it would directly contradict what St Paul in other places says of the law; as that *it is a shadow of things to come, but that the body is of CHRIST*.‡ But the offer of immortality on one condition, could never be called the *shadow* of the offer of it on another. *That it is the schoolmaster to bring men to Christ*.§ Now, by the unhappy dexterity of these men, who, in defiance of the apostle, will needs give the doctrines of *grace and truth*, as well as the doctrines of the *law*, to MOSES, his appointed SCHOOLMASTER, the law, is made to act a part that

\* Rom. vii. 6.

† This I shall show hereafter; and endeavour to rescue it from the madness of enthusiasm on the one hand, and the absurdity of the common system on the other, and yet not betray it, in explaining it away under the fashionable pretence of delivering the *scripture doctrine* of it.

‡ Col. iii. 17.

§ Gal. iii. 24.

would utterly discredit every other *schoolmaster*, namely, to teach his children, yet in their *elements*,\* the sublime doctrines of manly science.

5. Fifthly and lastly, if St Paul intended this for any more than an argument *ad hominem*, he contradicted himself, and misled his disciple Timothy, whom he expressly assured, that *our Saviour Jesus Christ hath ABOLISHED DEATH, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the gospel*. And lest, by this *bringing to light*, any one should mistake him to mean only that Jesus Christ had made life and immortality more clear and manifest, than Moses had done, he adds, that our Saviour had *abolished or destroyed death*, or that state of mortality and extinction into which mankind had fallen by the transgression of Adam; and in which they continued under the law of Moses, as appears from that law's having no other sanction than *temporal rewards and punishments*. Now this state must needs be abolished, before another could be introduced: consequently by *bringing life and immortality to light*, must needs be meant, the introduction of a new system.

I will only observe, that the excellent Mr Locke was not aware of the nature of the argument in question; and so, on its mistaken authority, hath seemed to suppose that the law did indeed offer immortality to its followers: this hath run him into great perplexities throughout his explanation of St Paul's epistles.

Thus we have at length proved our THIRD PROPOSITION, *that the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is not to be found in, nor did make part of, the Mosaic dispensation*; and, as we presume, to the satisfaction of every capable and impartial reader.

But to give these arguments credit with those who determine only by AUTHORITY, I shall, in the last place, support them with the opinions of three protestant writers; but these three worth a million. The first is the illustrious GROTIUS—"Moses in religionis Judaicæ institutione, si diserta legis respicimus, nihil promisit supra hujus vitæ bona, terram uberem, penum copiosum, victoriam de hostibus, longam et valentem senectutem, posteros cum bona spe superstites. Nam, si QUID EST ULTRA, in umbris obtegitur, aut sapienti ac DIFFICILI ratiocinatione colligendum est."

The second is the excellent EPISCOPUS.—"In tota lege Mosaica nullum vitæ æternæ præmium, ac ne æterni quidem præmii INDICIUM VEL VESTIGIUM extat: quicquid nunc Judæi multum de futuro seculo, de resurrectione mortuorum, de vita æterna loquantur, et ex legis verbis ea extorquere potius quam ostendere conentur, NE LEGEM MOSIS IMPERFECTAM ESSE COGANTUR AGNOSCERE cum Sadducæis; quos olim (et, uti observo ex scriptis rabbinorum, hodieque) vitam futuri sæculi lege Mosis nec promitti nec contineri adfirmâsse, quum tamen Judæi essent, certissimum est. Nempe non nisi per cabalam sive traditionem, quam illi in universum rejiciebant, opinionem sive fidem illam irrepsisse asseriebant. Et sane opinionum, quæ inter Judæos erat, circa vitam futuri

\* Gal. iv. 3—9.

sæculi discrepantia, arguit promissiones lege factas tales esse, ut ex iis certi quid de vita futuri sæculi non possit colligi. Quod et Servator noster non obscure innuit, cum resurrectionem mortuorum colligit Mat. xxii. non ex promisso aliquo legi addito, sed ex generali tantum illo promisso Dei, quo se Deum Abrahami, Isaaci, et Jacobi futurum spoponderat: quæ tamen illa collectio magis nititur cognitione intentionis divinæ sub generalibus istis verbis occultatæ aut comprehensæ, de qua Christo certo constabat, quàm necessaria consequentia, sive verborum vi ac virtute manifestâ, qualis nunc et in verbis Novi Testamenti, ubi vita æterna et resurrectio mortuorum proram et puppim faciunt totius religionis Christianæ, et tam clarè ac disertè promittantur ut ne hiscere quidem contra quis possit.” \*

And the third is our learned bishop BULL:—“Primo quæritur an in V. Testamento nullam omnino extet vitæ æternæ promissum? de eo enim à nonnullis dubitatur. Resp. Huic quæstioni optimè mihi videtur respondere Augustinus, distinguens nomen Veteris Testamenti: nam eo intelligi ait aut pactum illud, quod in Monte Sinai factum est, aut omnia, quæ in Mose, Hagiographis, ac Prophetis continentur. Si Vetus Testamentum posteriori sensu accipiatur, concedi FORSTAN possit, esse in eo nonnulla futuræ vitæ non obscura indicia; præsertim in Libro Psalmorum, Daniele, et Ezekiele: quanquam vel in his libris clarum ac disertum æternæ vitæ promissum VIX AC NE VIX quidem reperiatur. Sed hæc QUALIACUNQUE erant, non erant nisi præludia et anticipationes gratiæ Evangelicæ, AD LEGEM NON PERTINEBANT.—Lex enim promissa habuit *terrena*, et *terrena* TANTUM,—Si quis contra sentiat, ejus est locum dare, ubi æternæ vitæ promissio extat; QUOD CERTE IMPOSSIBILE EST.—Sub his autem verbis [legis ipsius] Dei intentione comprehensam fuisse vitam æternam, ex interpretatione ipsius Christi ejusque Apostolorum manifestum est. Verùm hæc non sufficiunt ut dicamus vitam æternam in foedere Mosaico promissam fuisse. Nam primo promissa, præsertim foederi annexa, debent esse clara ac diserta, et ejusmodi, ut ab utraque parte stipulante intelligi possint. Promissa autem hæc TYPICA et generalia, non additâ aliunde interpretatione, PENE IMPOSSIBILE ERAT, UT QUIS ISTO SENSU INTELLIGERET.” †

Thus these three capital supports of the protestant church. But let the man be of what church he will, so he have a superiority of understanding and be not defective in integrity, you shall always hear him speak the same language. The great ARNAULD, that shining ornament of the Gallican church, urges this important truth with still more frankness—“C'est LE COMBLE DE L'IGNORANCE (says this accomplished divine) de mettre en doute cette vérité, qui est une des plus communes de la religion Chretienne, et qui est ATTESTEE PAR TOUS LES PERES, que les promesses de l'Ancien Testament n'étoient que temporelles et ter-

\* Inst. Theol. lib. iij. sect. 1, cap. 2.

† Harmonia Apostolica, Dissertat. posterior, cap. x. sect. 8. p. 474, intro *Opera omnia*, ed. 1721.

*restres, et que les Juifs n'adoroient Dieu que pour les biens charnels.\** And what more hath been said or done by the author of the DIVINE LEGATION? Indeed, a great deal more. He hath shown, "that the absence or omission of a future state of rewards and punishments in the Mosaic religion is a certain proof that its original was from God." *Forgive him this wrong, my reverend brethren!*

## S E C T. V.

BUT though it appear that *a future state of rewards and punishments made no part of the Mosaic dispensation*, yet the LAW had certainly a SPIRITUAL meaning, to be understood when the fulness of time should come: and hence it received the nature, and afforded the efficacy, of PROPHECY. In the interim, the MYSTERY OF THE GOSPEL was occasionally revealed by GOD to his chosen servants, the fathers and leaders of the Jewish nation; and the dawning of it was gradually opened by the prophets, to the people.

And which is exactly agreeable to what our excellent church in its SEVENTH ARTICLE of religion teacheth concerning this matter.

ARTICLE VII.—"The Old Testament is not contrary to the New: for both in the Old and New Testament, everlasting life is offered to mankind by Christ, who is the only mediator between God and man. Wherefore they are not to be heard, which feign that the old fathers did look only for transitory promises."

—*The Old Testament is not contrary to the New*, is a proposition directed against the Manichean error, to which the opinions of some sectaries of these later times seemed to approach. The Manicheans fancied there was a good and an evil principle; that the old dispensation was under the *evil*, and that the new was the work of the *good*. Now it hath been proved, that the Old Testament is so far from being contrary to the New, that it was the foundation, rudiments, and preparation for it.

—*For both in the Old and New Testament, everlasting life is offered to mankind by CHRIST, who is the only Mediator between God and man*. That the church could not mean by these words, that everlasting life was offered to mankind by CHRIST in the Old Testament in the SAME MANNER in which it is offered by the New, is evident from these considerations:

1. The church, in the preceding words, only says, the *Old Testament is NOT CONTRARY to the New*; but did she mean that everlasting life was offered by both, in the *same manner*, she would certainly have said, *The Old Testament is THE SAME with the New*. This farther appears from the inference drawn from the proposition concerning everlasting life—WHEREFORE *they are not to be heard, which feign that the old FATHERS did look only for transitory promises*. But was this pretended

\* Apologie de Port Royal. And see note L L, at the end of this book.

sense the true, then the inference had been, *That ALL THE ISRAELITES were instructed to look for more than transitory promises.*

2. The church could not mean, that everlasting life is offered in the Old and New Testament in the *same manner*, because we learn from St Austin, that this was one of the old Pelagian heresies, condemned by the catholics in the synod of Diospolis,—*QUOD LEX SIC MITTAT AD REGNUM [CÆLORUM] QUEMADMODUM ET EVANGELIUM.\**

What was meant therefore by the words—*both in the Old and New Testament, everlasting life is offered to mankind by CHRIST*, was plainly this; “That the offer of everlasting life to mankind by CHRIST in the New Testament was SHADOWED OUT in the Old; the SPIRITUAL meaning of the law and the prophets referring to that life and *immortality, which was brought to light by JESUS CHRIST.*”

3. But lastly; Whatever meaning the church had in these words, it cannot at all affect our proposition, *that a future state was not taught by the law of Moses*; because by *the Old Testament* is ever meant both the *law*, and the *prophets*. Now I hold that the prophets gave strong intimations, though in figurative language borrowed from the Jewish economy, of the *everlasting life* offered to mankind by JESUS CHRIST.

The concluding words of the article which relate to this matter say,—*Wherefore they are not to be heard, which feign that the OLD FATHERS did look only for transitory promises*; and so say I: because JESUS himself is to be heard, before all such: and he affirms the direct contrary, of the *father of the faithful* in particular. *Your father Abraham*, says he to the unbelieving Jews, *rejoiced to see my day: and he saw it, and was glad.†* A fact not only of the utmost certainty in itself, but of the highest importance to be rightly understood. That I may not therefore be suspected of prevarication, I choose this instance (the noblest that ever was given of the HARMONY between the Old and New Testament) to illustrate this consistent truth.

[I.] AND I persuade myself that the learned reader will be content to go along with me, while I take occasion, from these remarkable words of JESUS, to explain the history of the famous COMMAND TO ABRAHAM TO OFFER UP HIS SON; for to this history, I shall prove, the words refer: and by their aid I shall be enabled to justify a revolting circumstance in it, which has been long the stumblingblock of infidelity.

In the sense in which the history of the COMMAND hath been hitherto understood, the best apology for Abraham's behaviour (and it is hard we should be obliged, at this time of day, to make apologies for an action, which, we are told, had the greatest merit in the sight of God) seems to be this, that having had much intercourse with the God of heaven, whose revelations (not to say, his voice of nature) spoke him a good and just being, Abraham concluded that this *command to sacrifice his son*, conveyed to him like the rest, by the same strong and clear impression on the sensory, came also from the same God. How rational soever this

\* De Gestis Pelagii, cap. xi. sect. 24.

† John viii. 56.



solution be, the deist, perhaps, would be apt to tell us it was little better than Electra's answer to Orestes, who, staggering in his purpose to kill his mother by the command of Apollo, says: *But if, after all, this should be an evil demon, who, bent upon mischief, hath assumed the form of a god?* She replies, *What, an evil demon possess the sacred tripod! It is not to be supposed.\**

But the idea hitherto conceived of this important history has subjected it even to a worse abuse than that of infidelity: fanatics, carnally as well as spiritually licentious, have employed it to countenance and support the most abominable of their doctrines and practices. Rimius in his *Candid Narrative* hath given us a strange passage from the writings of the *Moravian Brethren*, which the reader, from a note of his, will find transcribed here below.†

However, after saving and reserving to ourselves the benefit of all those arguments, which have been hitherto brought to support the history of the COMMAND; I beg leave to say, that the source of all the difficulty is the very wrong idea men have been taught to entertain of it, while it was considered as given for a TRIAL ONLY of Abraham's faith; and consequently as a revelation unsought by him, and unrelated to any of those before vouchsafed unto him: whereas, in truth, it was a revelation ARDENTLY DESIRED, had the CLOSEST CONNEXION with, and was, indeed, the COMPLETION OF ALL THE FOREGOING; which were all directed to one end; as the gradual view of the orderly parts of one entire dispensation required: consequently, the principal purpose of the COMMAND was not to try Abraham's faith, although its nature was such, that in the very giving of it, *God did, indeed, tempt or try Abraham.*‡

In plain terms, the action was enjoined as the conveyance of information to the actor, of something he had requested to know: this mode of information by *signs* instead of *words* being, as we have shown, of common practice in those early ages: and as the force of the following reasoning is founded on that ancient custom, I must request the reader carefully to review what hath been said in book iv. sect. 4, concerning the origin, progress, and various modes of personal converse; where it is seen, how the conveying information, and giving directions, to another, by *signs* and *actions*, instead of *words*, came to be of general practice in the first rude ages; and how, in compliance therewith, God was pleased frequently to converse with the holy patriarchs and prophets in that very manner.

\* Οε. 'Αρ' αὐτ' ἀλάστορ εἶπ' ἀπεικασθεὶς θεῷ;  
 Ηλ. 'Ἰερὸν καθίζων τρίποδ'; Ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ δεκῶ.—Eurip. Electra, ver. 979.

† "He," the Saviour, "can dispose of life and soul; he can make the economy of salvation, and change it every hour, that the hindermost be the foremost; he can make laws, and abrogate them; HE CAN MAKE THAT TO BE MORAL, WHICH IS AGAINST NATURE; the greatest virtue to be the most villanous action, and the most virtuous thoughts to be the most criminal: he can in a quarter of an hour, make ABRAHAM willing to kill his son, which however is the most abominable thought a man can have."—Count Zinzendorf's Serm. in Rimius, p. 53.

Gen. xxii. 1.

Laying down therefore what hath been said on this subject, in the place referred to, as a postulatum; I undertake to prove the following proposition:

I. THAT WHEN GOD SAYS TO ABRAHAM, TAKE NOW THY SON, THINE ONLY SON ISAAC, &c.\* THE COMMAND IS MERELY AN INFORMATION BY ACTION, INSTEAD OF WORDS, OF THE GREAT SACRIFICE OF CHRIST FOR THE REDEMPTION OF MANKIND, GIVEN AT THE EARNEST REQUEST OF ABRAHAM, WHO LONGED IMPATIENTLY TO SEE CHRIST'S DAY; and is, in its nature, exactly the same as those informations to the prophets, where, to this man, God says: *Make thee bonds and yokes, and put them on thy neck;*† to another—*Go take unto thee a wife of whoredoms,*‡ &c.; and to a third—*Prepare thee stuff for removing,*§ &c. that is, AN INFORMATION OF HIS PURPOSE BY ACTION INSTEAD OF WORDS; in the first case, foretelling the conquests of Nebuchadnezzar over Edom, Moab, Ammon, Tyre, and Sidon; in the second, declaring his abhorrence of the idolatries of the house of Israel; and in the third, the approaching captivity of Zedekiah.

The foundation of my thesis I lay in that scripture of St John, where JESUS says to the unbelieving *Jews*, YOUR FATHER ABRAHAM REJOICED TO SEE MY DAY; AND HE SAW IT, AND WAS GLAD.||

1. If we consider Abraham's personal character, together with the choice made of him for head and origin of that people which God would separate and make holy to himself; from whence was to arise the REDEEMER of mankind, the ultimate end of that separation; we cannot but conclude it probable, that the knowledge of this Redeemer would be revealed to him. "Shall I hide from Abraham that thing which I do?"¶ says GOD, in a matter that much less concerned the father of the faithful. And here, in the words of JESUS, we have this probable truth arising from the nature of the thing, made certain and put out of all reasonable question—*Abraham rejoiced*, says JESUS, *to see my DAY,\*\** τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμὴν. Now when the figurative word *day* is used, not to express in general *the period of any one's existence*, but to denote his peculiar *office and employment*, it must needs signify that very circumstance in his life, which is *characteristic* of such office and employment. But JESUS is here speaking of his peculiar office and employment, as appears from the occasion of the debate, which was his saying, *If any man keep my commandments, he shall never taste of death*, intimating thereby the virtue of his office of Redeemer. Therefore, by the word DAY must needs be meant that *characteristic* circumstance of his life; but that circumstance was the laying down his life for the redemption of mankind. Consequently, by the word DAY is meant *the great sacrifice of CHRIST.*†† Hence we may discover the real or affected ignorance of the *Socinian* comment upon this place; which would have *day* only

\* Gen. xxii. 2.

† Jer. xxvii. 2.

‡ Hos. i. 2.

§ Ezek. xii. 3.

|| Chap. viii. ver. 56.

¶ Gen. xviii. 17.

\*\* John viii. 56.

†† See note M M, at the end of this book.

to signify in general the life of CHRIST, or the period of his abode here on earth.

To reconcile the learned reader to the propriety and elegance as well as to the truth of this sense of the word, *day*, he may observe, that as Jesus entitles his great work, in his state of humiliation, the *redemption of mankind*, by the name of HIS DAY; so is he pleased to give the same appellation to his other great work, in his triumphant state, *the judgment of mankind*. “For as the lightning,” says he, “that lightneth out of the one part under heaven,—so shall also the Son of man be in HIS DAY.”\* But this figure is indeed as usual in scripture as it is natural in itself. Thus that signal catastrophe in the fortunes of the Jewish people, both temporal and spiritual, *their restoration*, is called their DAY—“Then shall the children of Judah,” says God by the prophet Hosea, “and the children of Israel, be gathered together, and appoint themselves one head, and they shall come up out of the land: for great shall be THE DAY of Israel.”†

2. But not only the *matter*, but the *manner*, likewise of this great revelation, is delivered in the text—*Abraham rejoiced to see my day: and he saw it, and was glad.*—Ἰνα ἸΔΗι τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμήν· καὶ ΕἶΔΕ. —This evidently shows the revelation to have been made, not by *relation* in words, but by REPRESENTATION in action. The verb εἶδω is frequently used in the New Testament, in its proper signification, to *see sensibly*. But whether used literally or figuratively, it always denotes a full intuition. That the expression was as strong in the Syrian language used by JESUS, as here in the Greek of his historian, appears from the reply the Jews made to him—“Thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast thou SEEN Abraham?”‡ Plainly intimating that they understood the assertion of *Abraham seeing Christ's day* to be a real beholding him in person. We must conclude therefore, from the words of the text, that the redemption of mankind was not only revealed to Abraham, but was revealed likewise by *representation*. A late writer, extremely well skilled in the style of scripture, was so sensible of the force of JESUS's words, that, though he had no suspicion they related to any part of Abraham's recorded history, yet he saw plainly they implied an information by representation—“Thus also Abraham,” says he, “saw the day of CHRIST, and was glad. But this must be in a typical or prophetic vision.”§—The excellent Dr Scott is of the same opinion. He supposes “the words refer to some peculiar discoveries, which the Spirit of God might make to Abraham, for his own private consolation, though not recorded in scripture.”||

So far, then, is clear, that Abraham had indeed this revelation. The next question will be, whether we can reasonably expect to find it in the history of his life, recorded in the Old Testament? And that we may find it here, both the words of JESUS, and the nature of the thing, assure us.\*

\* Luke xvii. 24.

† Chap. i. ver. 11.

‡ John viii. 57.

§ See note N N, at the end of this book.

|| Christian Life, vol. v. p. 194.

1. We learn, by the history of CHRIST's ministry, that in his disputations with the Jews, he never urged them with any circumstance of GOD's dispensations to their forefathers, which they either were not, or might not be, well acquainted with by the study of their scriptures. The reason is evident. His credentials were twofold, **SCRIPTURE** and **MIRACLES**. In the first way therefore of confirming his mission, if, instead of appealing to the course of GOD's dispensation to his chosen people, as delivered in scripture, he had given them an unknown history of that dispensation, (as was one of the tricks of Mahomet in his Alcoran) such a method had been so far from supporting his character, that it would have heightened the unfavourable prejudices of unbelievers towards him: as looking like a confession that the known history was against him; and that he was forced to invent a new one, to countenance his pretensions. He must, therefore, for the necessary support of his character, appeal to some acknowledged facts. These were all contained in **SCRIPTURE** and **TRADITION**. But, we know, he always studiously declined supporting himself on their *traditions*, though they were full of circumstances favourable to the religion he came to propagate, such as the doctrines of *eternal life*, and the *resurrection of the body*: nay, he took all occasions of decrying their **TRADITIONS** as impious corruptions, by which they *had rendered the WRITTEN word of none effect*. We conclude, therefore, from JESUS's own words, that the circumstance of Abraham's knowledge of his *day* is certainly to be found in Abraham's history: not in so clear a manner, indeed, as to be understood by a carnal-minded Jew, nor even by a system-making Christian, for reasons hereafter to be explained; yet certainly there; and certainly proved to be there, by the best rules of logic and criticism.

2. But though this did not (as it does) appear from the words of JESUS, yet it might be collected from the very nature of the thing. For, admit only the fact (as we now must) that *Abraham did see CHRIST's day*, and it is utterly incredible that so capital a circumstance should be omitted in his history, a sacred record, pre-ordained for one of the supports and evidences of CHRIST's religion. That it could not be delivered in the book of Genesis, in terms plainly to be understood by the people, during the first periods of a preparatory dispensation, is very certain; as will be seen hereafter: but then, this is far from being a reason why it should not be recorded at all: great ends, such as supporting the truth of the future dispensation, being to be gained by the delivery of it even in so obscure a manner.

Having thus far cleared our way, and shown, that *the doctrine of redemption* was revealed to Abraham; and that the history of that revelation is recorded in scripture; we proceed to the proof of these two points:

I. That there is no place, in the whole history of *Abraham*, but this, where he is commanded to offer up his son, which bears the least marks or resemblance of such a revelation.

II. That this command to offer up his son, has all the marks of such a revelation.

I. On the first head, it will be necessary to give a short abstract of Abraham's story: in which we find a regular account of the course and order of God's dispensations to him, from the time of his being called out of Chaldea, to the command to offer up his son Isaac; the last of God's revelations to him, recorded in scripture.

The first notice given us of this patriarch is in the account of his genealogy, family, and country.\* We are then told,† that God called him from his father's house to *a land which he should show him*: and to excite his obedience, he promises to make of him *a great nation*:‡ to have him in his peculiar protection, and to *make all the nations of the earth blessed through him*.§ The last part of this promise is remarkable, as it contains the proper end of God's choice and separation of him and his posterity; and so, very fitly made, by the sacred writer, the foundation of the history of God's dispensations to him; and a mark to direct the reader to what they are all ultimately to be referred. Which, by the way, exposes the extreme absurdity in Collins and Tindal, who would have the *blessing* here promised to be only an Eastern form of speech, honourable to the father of the faithful.—When Abraham, in obedience to this command, was come into the land of Canaan,|| God vouchsafed him a farther revelation of his will; and now told him, that this was the land (which he had before said he *would show him*) to be inherited by *his seed*.¶ When he returned from Egypt, God revealed himself still farther, and *marked out the bounds*\*\* of that land, which he assured him should be *to him and his seed for ever*.†† Which *seed* should be *as the dust of the earth* for number.‡‡ After all these gracious and repeated assurances, we may well suppose Abraham to be now grown uneasy at his wife's barrenness, and his own want of issue to inherit the promises. Accordingly, we find him much disturbed with these apprehensions;§§ and that God, to remove them, appeared to him in a *vision*, and said, *Fear not, Abram; I am thy shield, and exceeding great reward*. Abraham, thus encouraged to tell his grief, confessed it to be for his want of issue, and for that he suspected the promised blessings were to be inherited by his adopted children, the sons of his servant *Eliezer of Damascus*.||| To ease him of this disquiet, God was now pleased to acquaint him, that his design was not, that an adopted son should inherit, but one *out of his own bowels*.¶¶ And, for farther assurance, he instructs him in the various fortunes of his posterity—"That his seed should be a stranger in a land that was not theirs, which land should afflict them four hundred years, and that then he would judge that nation, and afterwards bring them out with great substance to inherit the land of Canaan."\*\*\* At the same time God more particularly marks out

\* Gen. xi. 27, et seq.

† Chap. xii. ver. 1.

‡ Ver. 2.

§ Ver. 3.

|| Ver. 5. ¶ Ver. 7.

\*\* Chap. xiii. ver. 14.

†† Ver. 15.

‡‡ Ver. 16.

§§ Chap. xv. ver. 1.

||| Chap. xv. ver. 2, 3.

¶¶ Ver. 4.

\*\*\* Ver. 13, 14.

the bounds of the promised land, and reckons up the several nations which then inhabited it.\* Things being in this train, and Abraham now satisfied that the seed of his loins was to inherit the promises; Sarah, on account of her sterility, persuaded her husband to go in unto her handmaid Hagar, the Egyptian.† In this she indulged her own vanity and ambition; she would have a son whom she might adopt; *It may be*, says she, *that I may obtain children by her*;‡ and she flattered herself with being, at the same time, an instrument to promote the designs of providence: *behold now*, says she, *the Lord hath restrained me from bearing*. To this project Abraham consented. Hagar conceived, and bare a son, called Ishmael.§ The good patriarch was now fully satisfied: he grew fond of Ishmael; and reckoned upon *him* for the inheritor of the promises. To correct this mistake, God vouchsafed him a new revelation;|| in which he is told, that God would not only (as had been before promised) bless and multiply his posterity in an extraordinary manner, but would separate them from all other nations, and he would be their God, and they should be his PEOPLE.¶ And this *national adoption* requiring a mutual covenant, the rite of CIRCUMCISION is at the same time enjoined as the mark of the covenant.\*\* Lastly, Abraham is shown his fond mistake, and told, that it was not the *son of the bond woman*, but of his wife Sarah, who was ordained to be heir of the promises.†† But Abraham had so long indulged himself in his mistake, and consequently in his affection for Ishmael, that he begs God would indulge it too—*O that Ishmael might live before thee*.‡‡ And God, in compassion to his paternal fondness, graciously promises that the posterity of Ishmael should become exceeding great and powerful,§§ but, that, nevertheless, his covenant should be with *Isaac, and with his seed after him*.||| However, this revelation having been received with some kind of doubt, as appears by the words of the historian,¶¶ God was pleased to repeat the promise of a son by Sarah:\*\*\* and even to mark the time of his birth;††† according to which, *Sarah conceived and bore Abraham a son*.‡‡‡ After this, God revealed himself yet again to Abraham,§§§ with a command to put away his son Ishmael; and to assure him, that the CHOSEN POSTERITY should come from Isaac: for Abraham was not yet weaned from his unreasonable partiality for Ishmael; but still reckoned upon him as his *second hope*, in case of any disaster or misfortune, that should happen to Isaac. This appears from Ishmael's insolent behaviour;|||| from Abraham's great unwillingness to dismiss him;¶¶¶ and from God's assuring him, in order to make him easy, *That in Isaac his seed should be called*.\*\*\*\*—We now come to the famous history of the command to offer up his son Isaac—"And it came to pass," says the sacred historian, "AFTER THESE THINGS, that God did tempt

\* Gen. xv. 18, to the end. † Chap. xvi. ‡ Ver. 2. § Ver. 15. || Chap. xvii.  
¶ Ver. 7, et seq. \*\* See note O O, at the end of this book. †† Ver. 16.  
‡‡ Ver. 18. §§ Ver. 20, et seq. ||| Ver. 19. ¶¶ Ver. 17.  
\*\*\* Chap. xviii. ††† Ver. 10, 14. ‡‡‡ Chap. xxi. ver. 2. §§§ Ver. 12.  
|||| Ver. 9. ¶¶¶ Ver. 11. \*\*\*\* Ver. 12.



Abraham, and said, Take now thy son, THINE ONLY SON Isaac, whom thou lovest, and get thee unto the *land of Moriah*: and offer him there for a burnt-offering upon one of the mountains which I will tell thee of. And Abraham arose,"\* &c. This was the last of God's revelations to Abraham—*And it came to pass after these things.*—And with this, the history of them is closed.

Here we see all these revelations, except the last, are plain and clear, as referring to TEMPORAL felicities to be conferred on Abraham and his posterity after the flesh; through whom, some way or other, a BLESSING was to extend to all mankind. Not one of these therefore can pretend to be that revelation of the *redemption of the world*. The last is the only dark and obscure one of the whole; which, if indeed a revelation of this grand mystery, must of necessity, as we shall show, be darkly and obscurely recorded.

But to this perhaps it may be objected, that the famous promise of God to Abraham, that *in him should all the families of the earth be blessed*,† is that revelation; because St Paul calls this the preaching of the gospel unto him—"And the scripture foreseeing that God would justify the heathen *through faith*, preached before the gospel unto Abraham, saying, In thee shall all nations of the earth be blessed."‡ To this I reply, that the apostle is here convincing the Galatians, that the gospel of CHRIST is founded on the same PRINCIPLE with that which justified Abraham, namely, FAITH;—"Abraham believed God, and it was accounted to him for righteousness."§ He then pursues his argument in this manner, "Therefore, they which be of faith, are blessed with faithful Abraham."|| The reason he gives is from the promise in question, given in reward of Abraham's *faith*, that *in him should all nations be blessed*. This is the force of the argument; and it is very finely managed. But then the terms, *faith* and *gospel*, are here used, as they very often are in the apostolic writings,¶ not in their specific but generic sense, for *confidence in any one*, and *glad tidings in general*. For it is plain, Abraham's *faith* here recommended, was not that *Christian faith* in JESUS the MESSIAH, but, faith in GOD, who had promised to make his posterity according to the flesh, as numerous as the stars of heaven, when as yet he had no offspring.\*\* In a like latitude of expression, St Paul uses the word προεναγγelizομαι, to *preach the gospel beforehand*; not the tidings of the Messiah the Redeemer, but the *effects* of the *redemption* wrought by him, a BLESSING on the whole race of mankind. Tidings which indeed referred to a future dispensation: and, in this, differing from his use of the word *faith*, which did not. But then, this is very far from his SEEING CHRIST'S DAY; of which indeed he speaks in another place, as we shall see presently. It is true, this promised BLESSING was the preparatory revelation, by which, we were to estimate

\* Chap. xxii. ver. 1, 2, 3. † Chap. xii. ver. 3. ‡ Gal. iii. 8. § Ver. 6. || Ver. 9.

¶ See what hath been said on this subject in the preceding discourse on the 11th chapter to the Hebrews.

\*\* Gen. xv. 6.

the ultimate end of all the following; and on which, we must suppose them to be built: and so much we are concerned to prove it was. I conclude therefore, that when Jesus says, *Abraham saw his day*; and when St Paul says, that he *had the gospel preached before unto him*, they spoke of two different revelations. We come, therefore,

II. To the second point: which is to show, that the **COMMAND** to offer up Isaac was the very revelation of **CHRIST'S DAY**, or the redemption of mankind, by his death and sufferings.

1. We may observe, from this short view of Abraham's history, that all God's revelations to him, even unto this last, open by degrees; and relate, primarily indeed, to his posterity according to the flesh, but ultimately, to the whole race of mankind: as appears from that **MYSTIC** promise so early made to him as the foundation of all the following, that *in him should all the families of the earth be blessed*. These are the two great coincident truths, to which all these revelations tend. But the last, the famous *command* in question, which one would naturally expect to find the confirmation and completion of the rest, hath, if the common interpreters understand it right, no kind of relation to them, but is entirely foreign to every thing that preceded. Hence we conclude, and surely not unreasonably, that there is something more in the *command* than these interpreters, resting in the outside relation, have yet discovered to us.

2. But this is not all. The *command*, as it hath been hitherto understood, is not only quite disjoined from the rest of Abraham's history, but likewise occupies a place in it, which, according to our ideas of things, it hath certainly usurped. The *command* is supposed to be given as a *trial* only.\* Now when the great *Searcher of hearts* is pleased to try any of his servants, either for example's sake, or for some other end favourable of his dispensations to mankind; as in this, he condescends to the manner of men, who cannot judge of the merits of their inferior agents without trial, so we may be assured, he would accommodate himself to their manner likewise, in that which is the material circumstance of a trial: but, amongst men, the agent is always tried *before* he be set on work, or rewarded; and not *after*: because the trial is in order to know, or to make it known, whether he be fit for the work, or deserving of the reward. When we come therefore to this place, and see a *command* only to tempt or *try* Abraham, we naturally expect, on his answering to the trial, to find him importantly employed or greatly rewarded. On the contrary, we are told, that this trial was made after all his work was done, and all his reward received—*And it came to pass after these things*. Nay, what is still more strange, after he had been once *tried* already. For the promise to him, when he was yet childless, his wife barren, and both of them far advanced in years, that *his seed should be as the stars of heaven for multitude*, was a trial of his *faith*: and his believing, against all probability in a natural way, the sacred

\* See note P P, at the end of this book.

historian tells us, was *accounted to him for righteousness*.<sup>\*</sup> Such therefore being the method both of God and men in this matter, we must needs conclude, that the *command* was not, according to the common notion, a *trial only*, because it comes *after* all God's dispensations.† Yet as the sacred text assures us it was a *trial*; and as a *trial* necessarily precedes the employment or reward of the person tried; we must needs conclude, that as no *employment*, so some *benefit* followed this trial. Now, on our interpretation, a *benefit*, as we shall see, did follow: we have reason therefore to conclude that this interpretation is the true.

3. Having seen the difficulties arising from the common interpretation of the command, let us view it now on the other side; in the new light in which we have adventured to place it. And here we shall find that every circumstance of the story concurs to support our interpretation. From the view given of Abraham's history, we see, as was said before, how all God's revelations to him, to this last, ultimately related to that mystic fundamental promise made to him, on his first vocation, *that in him should all the families of the earth be blessed*. God opens the scheme of his dispensations by exact and regular steps; and the revelations follow one another gradually and in order. Abraham is first commanded to go into a land which should be shown to him—then that land, to be possessed by his numerous posterity, is exhibited before him—Its distinct boundaries are afterwards marked out—He is next assured, while yet childless, that his posterity, to which so much was promised, should not be from an adopted son, but from one out of his own loins—He is then told that his son should be born of Sarah—which is followed by a formal execution of the COVENANT confirmed by the seal of *circumcision*—After all this, the birth of Isaac is predicted:—who being born at the appointed time, Ishmael is ordered to be sent away; to design with more certainty the succession of the son by Sarah. Here we see throughout, a gradual opening, and fit preparative for some farther revelation; which, in pursuance of this regular scheme of progressive dispensations, could be no other than that of the REDEMPTION OF MANKIND BY THE MESSIAH, the completion of the whole economy of grace, as it only is the explanation of his first and fundamental promise, *that in Abraham should all the families of the earth be blessed*. But now, the sole remaining revelation of God's will to Abraham, recorded by the sacred historian, is the command to offer up his son Isaac. This COMMAND, then, as there is no other that can pretend to be the revelation in question, and as we have shown it must be somewhere or other recorded in Abraham's story, is the very revelation we seek; which perfects all the foregoing, and makes the whole series complete and uniform. And the place in which we find it is its proper station; for, being the completion of the rest, it must needs be the last in order.

Such, in the *intention* of the Holy Spirit, doth St CHRYSOSTOM, in his comment on the place, understand it to be—τὴν δὲ ἩΜΕΡΑΝ ἰσταυθεῖ μοι

<sup>\*</sup> GEN. xv. 6.

† See note Q Q, at the end of this book.

δοκῇ λέγειν τὴν τοῦ σταυροῦ, ἣν ἐν τῇ τοῦ κριοῦ προσφορᾷ καὶ τοῦ Ἰσαὰκ προδιτύπτει. And in this he is joined or followed by ERASMUS, in his paraphrase. Hoc ænigmate Jesus significavit, Abraham, quum pararet immolare filium Isaac, per prophetiæ spiritum vidisse Dominum Jesum in mortem crucis a patre tradendum pro mundi salute.—But these excellent men, not reflecting on that ancient mode of information, where the inquirer is answered by a significative *action* instead of *speech*, never conceived that this command was an *imparted* information of that kind, but rather a *typical* representation unsought, and given in an enjoined rite; of whose import Abraham had then no knowledge.\*

4. Again, we find the revelation of the *redemption of mankind* in that very place, where, if considered only in itself, and not relatively, as the completion of the rest, we should, according to all the rules of plain sense, be disposed to seek it. We must know then that this revelation, as shall be proved from the words of JESUS, *Abraham rejoiced to see my day, and he saw it, and was glad*, was ardently desired and sought after by the patriarch. Now the *happiness* or REDEMPTION of mankind, promised, on Abraham's first vocation, to come through him, could not but make him more and more inquisitive into the manner of its being brought about, in proportion as he found himself to be more and more personally concerned as the instrument of so great a blessing. But every new revelation would show him still farther interested in this honour: therefore, by the time Ishmael was ordered to be sent away, and the *promised seed* fixed in Isaac, we must needs suppose him very impatient to understand the mystery of *redemption*; and so, fitly prepared to receive this last and supreme revelation. This, in the like cases, we find to be the disposition and state of mind in the holy men of old. Thus Daniel, by the study of the prophecies of Jeremiah, understanding the approaching restoration of the Jews, applies himself by fasting and prayer for God's further information: and the angel Gabriel is sent unto him. So John, anxious and solicitous for the suffering church, being in prayers on the Lord's day, was favoured with all his glorious revelations.

5. Again, the new light in which this command is placed, dispels all that perplexity in the common interpretation (taken notice of above) arising from our ideas of a *trial*; where *that* which should in use and reason go before some extraordinary favour, is made to come after all. But now, according to our sense of the *command*, the trial, as is meet, precedes the last and greatest favour ever bestowed by God on Abraham.

6. To confirm all this, we may consider that this interpretation of the *command* is most easy and natural, as being entirely agreeable to the ancient way of communicating information. We have shown† it to have been the general custom of antiquity, in personal conferences, to instruct by *actions* instead of *words*; a custom begun out of necessity, but continued out of choice, for the superior advantages it hath in making an impression. For *motion*, *naturally* significative, which enters at the

\* See note R R, at the end of this book.

† See book iv. § 4.

eye, hath a much stronger effect than articulate *sound*, only *arbitrarily* significative, which enters at the ear. We have shown likewise, by numerous examples, that God himself vouchsafed, in compliance to a general custom, to use this way of information, when he instructed the holy patriarchs and prophets in his will.

7. Again, as the high importance of this revelation seemed to require its being given in the strong and forcible way of action,\* so nothing can be conceived more apposite to convey the information required, than *this very action*. Abraham desired earnestly to be let into the mystery of the REDEMPTION; and GOD, to instruct him (in the best manner humanity is capable of receiving instruction) in the infinite extent of divine goodness to mankind, *who spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all*,† let Abraham feel, by experience, what it was to lose a beloved son;—*Take now thy son, thine only son Isaac*; the son born miraculously when Sarah was past childbearing, as Jesus was miraculously born of a pure virgin. The duration too of the action was the same as that between CHRIST's death and resurrection; both which were designed to be represented in it: and still farther, not only the *final architypical* sacrifice of the Son of God was figured in the *command* to offer Isaac, but the *intermediate typical* sacrifice, in the Mosaic economy, was represented, by the permitted sacrifice of the ram offered up instead of Isaac.

8. The last reason I shall offer in support of this point, that the *command* concerning Isaac was this revelation of Christ's *day*, or the redemption of mankind by his death and sufferings, is the allusion which Jesus makes (in these words, *Abraham rejoiced to see my day*, &c.) to the following words of Moses, in the history of the command—"And Abraham called the name of that place Jehovah-jireh; as it is said to this day; In the mount of the Lord it shall be seen."

To show that Jesus alluded to these words of Moses, and had them in his eye, when he speaks of *Abraham rejoicing to see his day*, it will be proper to consider the true force and meaning of either text. The words of Jesus have been fully considered already.‡

And, in the words of Moses—"Abraham called the name of that place Jehovah-jireh: as it is said to this day, In the mount of the Lord it shall be seen,"—we have the assertion of Jesus confirmed, that *Abraham saw Christ's day, and was glad*. 1. *Jehovah-jireh* signifies, as several of the best interpreters agree, THE LORD SHALL BE SEEN.§ But with what propriety could this name be given to it by Abraham, if, in this transaction, he had not *seen* the representation of the Lord's passion,

\* See note S S, at the end of this book. † Rom. viii. 32. ‡ See p. 468, et seq.

§ "*Dominus videbitur*," says the learned Father Houbigant, "1, Non *videtur*, ne ab futuro verbi aberremus. 2, Non *videbit*, non modo quia non additur quid sit Deus visurus, sed etiam quia in tota illà visione, hominis est *videre*, Domini, *videri*; propter quam causam Deus locum istum mox nomine *visionis* insigneabat. Nimirum Deus Abrahamo id ostendit, quod *Abraham vidit et gavisus est*." The near relation of these words of Jesus to those of Moses, was too strongly marked to be overlooked by this very judicious critic, though he considered the transaction in no other light than as a *type* of the death and passion of Jesus.

which was to happen in a future age? And if he did see it, how apposite was the name! The historian goes on—as it is said to this day, in the mount of the Lord it shall be seen; or more exactly to the Hebrew—for he said, in the mount THE LORD SHALL BE SEEN. In the first part of the verse, the sacred historian tells us that Abraham called the mount, *The Lord shall be seen*; and in the latter part he acquaints us with the manner how Abraham imposed that appellation, namely, by the use of a proverbial speech implying the reason of the name—*To-day in the mount, the Lord shall be seen.*\* Proverbial speeches, before the general use of recording abstract names and things by writing, being the best and safest conveyance of the memory of events to posterity. Conformably to this interpretation of the text, the historian on his entrance on the transaction calls the land of Moriah, to which Abraham went with Isaac (according to Jerome's interpretation,) the LAND OF VISION, which shows that the words of Jesus, *Abraham saw my day, and was glad*, evidently allude to this extraordinary circumstance; namely, the disposition of Abraham's mind on the occasion, expressed in his memorial of a new name imposed on the scene of action; the ancient way of commemorating joyful and happy events. In a word, Jesus says, *Abraham saw his day*; and Abraham, by the name he imposed upon the mount, declares the same thing. But as the vision was of a public, not of a private nature, he expresses himself in terms which signify what mankind in general *shall see*, not what he himself *had seen*—THE LORD SHALL BE SEEN. From a vague allusion, therefore, of the words of Jesus, to this history of the *command* in general, we have now fixed them to the very words of Moses, to which they more particularly refer.

The sum then of the argument is this—JESUS expressly says, that *Abraham saw, and rejoiced to see, his day*, or the great *sacrifice* for the sins of mankind by *representation*—the records of sacred history must needs verify his assertion—but there is no place in scripture which presents the least traces of this revelation, except the history of the command to offer Isaac. This history not only easily and naturally *admits* of such a sense, but even *demand*s it—and reciprocally, this sense gives all imaginable light to the history; and removes the greatest difficulties attending the common interpretation of it. Hence, we conclude with certainty, that the *command to Abraham to offer up his son* was only

\* Atque hoc illud est, says Father Honbigan, quod memorie sempiternæ Abraham consecrabit, cum ita subjungeret *hodie in monte, Dominus videbitur*; illud *hodie* sic accipiens, ut accepit Paulus apostolus, illud Davidis, *hodie si vocem ejus audieritis*; quod *hodie* tamdiu durat, quamdiu secula illa durabunt, de quibus apostolus *donec hodie cognominatur*. Propterea Abraham non dicit, *hodie Dominus videtur*. Nam id spectaculum nunc solus videt Abraham, postea omnes visuri sunt, et ad omnes pertinebit istud, *videbitur*, generatim dictum, cum omnes Unigenitum in monte viderint generis humani victimam factam. Nec aliam sententiam series verborum paritur. Ex qua serie illi deviant, qui hæc verba, *dixit enim hodie in monte Dominus*—Mosi sic narranti attribuant, *propterea dicitur hodie in monte Domini*—quasi renarret Moyses usurpatum sua ætate proverbium. Nam si sic erit non jam docebit Abraham, cur huic loco nomen fecerit *Dominus videbitur*; quam tamen nomen notationem in sacris paginis non omittunt ii, quicumque nomina rebus imponunt. Quod contra plane docebit Abraham si de eo Moysis sic narrat, *vocavit nomen loci hujus, DEUS VIDEBITUR*; nam dixit, *in monte Deus videbitur*.



AN INFORMATION IN ACTION, which, at Abraham's earnest request, God was graciously pleased to give him of the *great sacrifice of Christ for the redemption of mankind*. The thing to be proved. Two great ends seem to be gained by this interpretation: the one, to free the command from a supposed violation of natural law; the other, to support the connexion and dependency between the two revelations; for this interpretation makes the history of the command a DIRECT prophecy of Christ as Redeemer of the world; whereas the common brings it, at most, but to a TYPICAL intimation. Now the defenders\* of the common interpretation confess, that "the evidence of *direct* prophecies is superior to that of *types*."

The only plausible objection which can be made to my explanation, I conceive to be the following:—"That what is here supposed the principal and proper reason of the *command*, is not at all mentioned by the sacred historian; but another, of a different nature; namely, the trial of Abraham's faith and obedience—*And it came to pass after these things, God did tempt Abraham, and said; Take now thy son, thine only son Isaac*—And when the affair is over, the same reason is again insinuated:—*By myself have I sworn, saith the Lord, for because thou hast done this thing, and hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, that in blessing I will bless thee,*"† &c.

1. To the first part of the objection I answer, that the knowledge of God's future dispensation in the redemption of mankind by the death of his Son, revealed, as a singular grace, to the father of the faithful, was what could by no means be communicated to the Hebrew people, when Moses wrote this history for their use; because they being then to continue long under a carnal economy, this knowledge of the END OF THE LAW, would have greatly indisposed them to a dispensation, with which (as a *schoolmaster*, that was to bring them by degrees, through a harsh and rugged discipline, to the easy yoke of CHRIST) GOD, in his infinite wisdom, thought fit to exercise them.‡ But he who does not see, from the plain reason of the thing, the necessity of the historian's silence, is referred, for farther satisfaction, to what hath been already, and will be hereafter said, to evince the necessity of such a conduct, in other momentous points relating to that future dispensation.

In the mean time, I give him St Paul's word for this conduct of Moses, who expressly tells us, that he obscured some parts of his history, or put a *veil over his face, that the Israelites might not see to the end of that law which was to be abolished*. And what was that *end*, if not the *redemption of mankind* by the death and sacrifice of Christ?—"Moses," says he, "put a veil over his face, that the children of Israel could not stedfastly look to the end of that which was abolished. But their minds were blinded: for until this day remaineth the same veil untaken away, in the reading of the Old Testament; which veil is done away in CHRIST."§

\* Dr Stebbing. † Gen. xxii. 16, 17. ‡ See note T T, at the end of this book.  
§ 2 Cor. iii. 13, 14. And see note U U, at the end of this book.

But it may be asked, perhaps, “if such revelations could not be *clearly* recorded, why were they recorded at all?” For a very plain as well as weighty reason; that when the *fulness of time* should come, they might rise up in evidence against infidelity, for the real relation and dependency between the two dispensations of *Moses* and of *Christ*;\* when from this, and divers the like instances, it should appear, that the *first* dispensation could be but very imperfectly understood without a reference to the *latter*.

But had not the sacred writer designedly obscured this illustrious revelation, by an omission of the attendant circumstances, yet the narrative of such a *conversation by action* was not in its nature so intelligible or obvious, as that where God is shown *conversing by action*, to the prophets, in the several instances already given.† And the reason is this. Those informations, as they are given to the prophets for the instruction of the people, have necessarily, in the course of the history, their explanations annexed. But the information to Abraham being solely for his *own private consolation* (as Dr Scott expresses it above) there was no room for that formal explanation, which made the commanded actions to the prophets so clear and intelligible.—Yet, as if I had never said this, Dr Stebbing tells the world, I make this action of Abraham’s parallel to those of the prophets; “whereas,” says he, “it differs from them all in a very material circumstance, as they had their several explanations annexed, and this had not.” But to show by example, as well as comparison, that obscurity is naturally attendant on the relation of *converse by action*, where the information is for the sake of the actor only, I shall instance in a case where no obscurity was affected by the historian. It is the relation of Jacob’s wrestling with the angel.‡ The patriarch, on his return from Haran to his native country, hearing of his brother Esau’s power, and dreading his resentment for the defrauded birthright, addresses himself for protection in this distress to the God of his fathers, with all humility and confidence. God hears his prayer; and is pleased to inform him of the happy issue of the adventure, by a *significative action*: the following night, he has a struggle with an angel, with whom he is suffered to make his part so good, that from thence he collected God had granted his petition. This is the circumstance in Jacob’s history, which affords such mirth to our illiterate libertines: for this *information by action* concerning only the actor, who little needed to be told the meaning of a mode of instruction, at that time in vulgar use, hath now an obscurity which the scripture-relations of the same mode of information to the prophets are free from, by reason of their being given for the use of the people, to whom they were explained.

But it may perhaps be asked, “Why, when the *fulness of time was come*, scripture did not break its long silence, and instruct us in the principal and proper reason of the *command* to offer Isaac?” I answer,

\* See note X X, at the end of this book. † See book iv. sect. 4. ‡ Gen. xxii. 24, &c.

that it has done so. The words of Jesus are a convincing proof. Nay, I might go farther, and say that this is not the only place where the true reason of the *command* is plainly hinted at. The author of the epistle to the Hebrews, speaking of this very *command*, says—"By faith Abraham, when he was tried, offered up Isaac—accounting that God was able to raise him up even from the dead, from whence also he received him **IN A FIGURE**;"\* EN ΠΑΡΑΒΟΛΗ, *in a parable*: a mode of information either by *words* or *actions*, which consists in *putting one thing for another*. Now, in a writer who regarded this commanded action as a representative information of the redemption of mankind, nothing could be more fine or easy than this expression. For, though Abraham did not indeed receive Isaac restored to life after a real dissolution, yet the son being in this action to represent CHRIST suffering death for the sins of the world, when the father brought him safe from mount Moriah after three days, (during which the son was in a state of condemnation to death,) the father plainly received him, under the character of CHRIST's representative, as restored from the dead. For, as his being brought to the mount, there bound, and laid upon the altar, figured the death and sufferings of CHRIST; so his being taken from thence alive, as properly figured CHRIST's resurrection from the dead. With the highest propriety therefore and elegance of speech, might Abraham be said to receive Isaac from the dead *in a parable*, or in representation.† But the nature of the *command* not being understood, these words of the epistle have been hitherto interpreted, to signify only that *Isaac was a type of Christ*, in the same sense that the *old tabernacle*, in this epistle,‡ is called a *type*—ἡτις ΠΑΡΑΒΟΛΗ, that is, a thing designed by the Holy Spirit to have both a present significancy and a future. Which amounts but just to this, that Abraham receiving Isaac safe from mount Moriah, in the manner related by scripture, he thereby became a *type*. An ancient interpretation, as appears from the reading of the vulgar Latin—*Unde eum et IN PARABOLAM accepit*, for *in parabola*, as it ought to have been translated conformably to the Greek. However, I desire it may be observed, in corroboration of my sense of the *command*, that the resemblance to Christ's sacrifice in all the circumstances of the story was so strong, that interpreters could never overlook the resemblance, in their comments on the passage.

2. To the second part of the objection, I answer thus; it is the office of history to assign the causes of the facts related. In those facts therefore, which have several causes, of which the principal cannot be conveniently told, the inferior come in properly to take its place. Thus, in the case before us; though it be made, I presume, very evident that the principal design of the *command* was to reveal to Abraham, by *action* instead of *words*, the redemption of mankind; yet as this was a favour of a very high nature, and conferred on Abraham at his earnest request, it was but fit he should approve himself worthy of it by some

\* Chap. xi. ver. 17—19. † See note Y Y, at the end of this book. ‡ Chap. ix. ver. 9.

proportionable trial; agreeably to what we find in scripture to be God's way of dealing with his favoured servants. On this account, therefore, God was pleased, by the very manner in which this mystery was revealed, to tempt or try Abraham. Where the making the *favour* itself the *trial* of his deserving it, hath all that superior elegance and beauty which is to be conceived in the dispensations of divine wisdom only. Now, as the principal reason of the command could not be conveniently told by the historian, this inferior one of the *trial* is assigned with great truth and propriety—*And it came to pass after these things, God did tempt Abraham, and said, Take now thy son, &c.* And it is to be observed, that the very manner of recording this reason shows it to be indeed what we suppose it, an inferior one. For it is not said that God gave this command in order to try Abraham, which expresses a principal reason; but that, in giving the command, God did try him, which at most only implies an inferior one. We have said, that a trial, when approved, implied a following reward. Now, as there may be more reasons than one for giving a *command*, so there may be more rewards than one attendant on a *trial*. Thus it was in the case before us. And it is remarkable, that the sacred historian has observed the same rule with regard to the reward of the trial as to the reason of the command. The principal and peculiar reward of Abraham's trial here was the revelation of the mystery of redemption: this the historian could not mention, for the reasons given above: but besides this, God rewarded him with a repetition of all the former promises. Thus the historian could, and, in pursuance of the rules of history, does mention:—"By myself have I sworn, saith the Lord, for because thou hast done this thing, and hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, that in blessing I will bless thee, and in multiplying I will multiply thy seed as the stars of heaven, and as the sand which is upon the sea shore; and thy seed shall possess the gate of his enemies; and in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed, because thou hast obeyed my voice."\*

On the whole, this objection to the interpretation, the only one I can think of, is so far from obscuring, and weakening, that it adds great light and strength unto it. For, admitting the sense here proposed, to be indeed the true, we see the story must of necessity have been told in the very manner we find it to be recorded.†

Before I conclude this part of the discourse, I shall but just take notice how strongly this interpretation of the command concludes against the SOCINIANS, for the real *sacrifice* of CHRIST, and the proper *redemption* of mankind. For if the command was an information by *action* instead of *words*, the proof conveyed in it is decisive; there being here no room for their evasion of its being a *figurative expression*, since the *figurative action*, the original of such expression, denotes either a *real sacrifice*, or nothing at all.

[II.] I COME now to the other part of this discourse, viz., to show

\* Gen. xxii. ver. 16 et seq.

† See note Z Z, at the end of this book.

that the interpretation here given entirely dissipates all those blustering objections which infidelity hath raised up against the historic truth of the relation.

They say, "God could not give such a command to Abraham, because it would throw him into inextricable doubts concerning the author of it, as whether it proceeded from a good or an evil being. Or if not so, but that he might be satisfied it came from God, it would then mislead him in his notions of the divine attributes, and of the fundamental principles of morality. Because, though the revocation of the command prevented the homicide, yet the species of the action commanded not being condemned when it was revoked, Abraham and his family must needs have thought HUMAN SACRIFICES grateful to the Almighty: for a simple revoking was not condemning; but would be more naturally thought a peculiar indulgence for a ready obedience. Thus, the pagan fable of Diana's substituting a hind in the place of Iphigenia, did not make idolaters believe that she therefore abhorred *human sacrifices*, they having before been persuaded of the contrary, from the command of that idol to offer up the daughter of Agamemnon."—This is the substance, only set in a clearer light, of all their dull, cloudy dissertations on the case of Abraham.\*

1. Let us see then how this case stood: God had been pleased to reveal to him his eternal purpose of making all mankind blessed through him: and likewise to confirm this promise, in a regular course of successive revelations, each fuller and more explicit than the other. By this time we cannot but suppose the *father of the faithful* must, from the nature of the thing, be become very desirous of knowing the manner how this blessing was to be brought about: a mystery, if we will believe the Author of our faith, that engaged the attention of other holy men, less immediately concerned than Abraham, and consequently less stimulated and excited by their curiosity: "And JESUS turned to his disciples, and said privately; Blessed are the eyes which see the things which ye see. For I tell you that many prophets and kings have DESIRED to see those things which ye see, and have not seen them, and to hear those things which ye hear, and have not heard them."† But we are assured, by the same authority, that Abraham had, in fact, this very *desire* highly raised in him; *Abraham rejoiced to see my day*, says JESUS, *and he saw it, and was glad*; or rather, he rejoiced THAT HE MIGHT SEE, 'INA IΔΗ; which implies, that the period of his joy was in the space between the promise made, and the actual performance of it by the delivery of the command; consequently, that it was granted at his earnest request.‡ In the second place, we shall show from the same words, that Abraham, at the time when the command was given, KNEW

\* See note A A A, at the end of this book.

† Luke x. 23, 24.

‡ Thus all the *eastern* versions understand it: *Syr.* Cupidus fuit videndi.—*Pers.* Cupidus erat ut videret.—*Arab.* Exoptavit videre.—*Æthiop.* Desideravit, gavisus est ut videret.

it to be that revelation he had so earnestly requested. This is of the highest importance for the understanding the true nature of the command.—*Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day, and he saw it, and was glad.* Ἀβραὰμ ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ἠγαλλιάσατο ἵνα ἴδῃ τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμὴν καὶ εἶδε, καὶ ἠγάγη. We have observed that *ἴνα ἴδῃ*, in strict propriety, signifies *that he might see*. The English phrase, *to see*, is equivocal and ambiguous, and means either the present time, *that he then did see*; or the future, *that he was promised he should see*: but the original *ἴνα ἴδῃ*, has only the latter sense. So that the text plainly distinguishes two different periods of joy; the first, when *it was promised he should see*; the second, when *he actually saw*: and it is to be observed\* that, according to the exact use of the words, in ἀγαλλιάσθαι is implied the tumultuous pleasure which the certain expectation of an approaching blessing, understood only in the gross, occasions; and, in χαίρειν that calm and settled joy which arises from our knowledge, in the possession of it. But the translators, perhaps, not apprehending that there was any time between the *grant to see*, and the *actual seeing*, turned it, *he rejoiced to see*; as if it had been the paraphrase of the poet Nonnus,

ἰδοῖν ἠγάλλετο θυμῷ.

Whereas this history of Abraham hath plainly three distinct periods. The first contains God's promise to grant Abraham's request, when he *rejoiced that he should see*; this, for reasons given above, was wisely omitted by the historian: within the second period was the delivery of the *command*, with which Moses's account begins: and Abraham's obedience, through which he *saw CHRIST's day, and was glad*, includes the third.† Thus the patriarch, we find, had a promise that his request should be granted; and, in regard to that promise, an *action* is commanded, which, at that time, was a common mode of information; Abraham therefore must needs know it was the very information so much requested, so graciously promised, and so impatiently expected. We conclude then, on the whole, that this *command* being only the grant of an earnest request, and known by Abraham, at the time of imposing, to be such grant, he could not possibly have any doubt concerning the author of it. He was soliciting the God of heaven to reveal to him the mystery of man's redemption, and he received the information, in a command to offer Isaac; a revelation, that had the closest connexion with, and was the fullest completion of, the whole series of the preceding revelations.

2. For, (as we shall now show, in answer to the second part of the objection) the *command* could occasion no mistakes concerning the divine attributes; it being, as was said, only the conveyance of an information by *action* instead of *words*, in conformity to the common mode of converse in the more early times. This *action* therefore being

\* See note B B B, at the end of this book. † See note C C C, at the end of this book.



mere scenery, had NO MORAL IMPORT; that is, it conveyed or implied none of those *intentions* in him who commanded it, and in him who obeyed the command, which go along with actions that have a *moral import*.\* Consequently the *injunction* and *obedience*, in an action which hath no such import, can no way affect the moral character of the persons concerned: and consequently, this command could occasion no mistakes concerning the divine attributes, with regard to God's delighting in human sacrifices. On the contrary, the very information conveyed by it, was the highest assurance to the person informed, of God's good-will towards man. Hence we see there was not the least occasion, when God *remitted* the offering of Isaac, that he should *formally condemn human sacrifices*, to prevent Abraham or his family's falling into an opinion, that such sacrifices were not displeasing to him, † any more than for the prophet Ahijah, ‡ when he had rent Jeroboam's garment into twelve pieces to denote the ensuing division in the tribes of Israel, to deliver a moral precept against the sin of despoiling, and insulting our neighbour: for the command having *no moral import*, as being only an information by action, where one thing stood for the representative of another, all the consequence that could be deduced from it was only this, that the Son of God should be offered up for the sins of mankind: therefore the conceptions they had of HUMAN SACRIFICES, *after the command*, must needs be just the same with those they had *before*; and therefore, instruction, concerning the execrable nature of this rite, was not only needless, but altogether beside the question.

But this assertion that A SCENICAL REPRESENTATION HAS NO MORAL IMPORT, having been misunderstood by many, and misrepresented by more (though nothing, as I then thought, could be clearer to men versed in moral matters) I shall beg leave to explain myself.—He who affirms that a *scenical representation has no moral import*, cannot possibly be understood to mean (if interpreted on the ordinary rules of logic and common sense) any thing else than that the representation or the feigned action has none of that *specific morality* which is in the real action. He can never be supposed to mean, that such a representation could never, even by accident, give birth to a moral entity, of a different species; though it kept within, much less if it transgressed the bounds, of its scenical nature. Give me leave to explain this by an instance or two. The tragic scene we will suppose to exhibit a pagan story, in which a lewd sacrifice to Venus is represented. Now I say this scenical representation has *no moral import*. But do I mean by this, that there was

\* See note D D D, at the end of this book. † See note E E E, at the end of this book.

‡ “ And it came to pass at that time, when Jeroboam went out of Jerusalem, that the prophet Ahijah, the Shilonite found him in the way: and he had clad himself with a new garment: and they two were alone in the field. And Ahijah caught the new garment that was on him, and rent it in twelve pieces. And he said to Jeroboam, Take thee ten pieces; for thus saith the Lord, the God of Israel, Behold, I will rend the kingdom out of the hand of Solomon, and will give ten tribes to thee.”—1 Kings xi. 29—31. The circumstance of the *new garment* was not insignificant: it was to denote the power of the kingdom, at that time in its full strength and lustre.

no immorality of any kind in the scene? Far from it. I only mean that that *specific immorality* was absent, which would have existed there, had the action been real and not feigned; I mean *idolatry*. Again, another set of tragedians represent the conspiracy against Julius Cæsar in the senate-house. This, I say, has *no moral import*: for neither could the followers of Cæsar's cause call these fictitious conspirators, enemies to their country; nor could the warmest lovers of liberty call them patriots. But if in this representation, the actors, instead of exhibiting an imaginary assassination, should commit a real one, on the body of the personated Cæsar, who ever supposed that such a dramatic representation continued still to have *no moral import*? The men who committed the action dropped their personated, and assumed their real character, being instigated by interest, malice, or revenge; and only waited a fit opportunity to perpetrate their designs under the cover of a drama. Here indeed the parallel ceases. The feigned conspirators transgressed the bounds of a representation: while the real death of Isaac must be supposed to make part of the scenical representation, in the command to Abraham. But it should have been considered, and was not, that I employed the principle of a *feigned representation's having no moral import*, to free the *command* from the infidel objection that it was *an enjoined sacrifice*; not from the objection of its being *an enjoined death, simply*: for a *human sacrifice commanded* was supposed to discredit revelation, as giving too much countenance and encouragement to that horrid superstition: whereas, with regard to a *simple death commanded*, to justify this, I was ready to confide in the common argument of divines, taken from God's sovereign right over his creatures: whose power could instantaneously repair the loss, or whose goodness could abundantly reward the act of obedience. Yet the fair and candid Dr Rutherford represents my position of a *scenical representation's having no moral import*, to be the same with saying, that *though an action be ever so vile in itself, yet, if it be done to represent somewhat else, it loses its nature and becomes an indifferent one*.—Had I the presumption to believe, that any thing I could say would better his heart or mend his head, I should recommend what hath been here said to his serious consideration.

3. And now we see the weakness of the third and last part of the objection, which supposes this command capable of affording a temptation to transgress the fundamental principles of the law of nature, one of which obliges us to cherish and protect our offspring; and another, not to injure our neighbour. For as, by the *command*, Abraham understood the nature of man's redemption: so by the nature of that redemption, he must know how the scenical representation was to end. Isaac, he saw, was made the person or representative of *Christ dying for us*: the Son of God, he knew, could not possibly lie under the *dominion of the grave*. Hence he must needs conclude one of these two things, either that God would stop his hand when he came to give the sacrificing

stroke: or that, if the relation of this mystery was to be represented throughout in action, that then his Son, sacrificed under the person of CHRIST, was, under the same person, soon to be restored to life: *accounting* (as he well might) *that God was able to raise him up even from the dead*, as the author of the epistle to the Hebrews,\* who seems to have been full of the idea here explained, assures us he did believe.

Now where was the temptation to violate any principle of morality in all this? The law of nature commands us to cherish and protect our offspring: was that transgressed in giving a stroke whose hurt was presently to be repaired? Surely no more than if the stroke had been in vision. The law of nature forbids all injury to our fellow creature: and was he injured, who, by being thus highly honoured, in becoming the representative of the Son of God, was to share with his father Abraham in the reward of his obedience? But though, as we see, Abraham could have no struggles with himself, from any doubts that he might violate morality in paying obedience to the command; yet did the merit of that obedience, where the natural feelings were so alarmed, deserve all the encomiums bestowed upon it in holy writ. For, in expressing his extreme readiness to obey, he declared a full confidence in the promises of God.

From hence we may deduce these two corollaries.

1. That the noble author of *the Characteristics* hath shown as much ignorance as malevolence, when he supposed that Abraham's showing no *extreme surprise on this trying revelation* was from the favourable notion he had of human sacrifices, *so common amongst the inhabitants of Palestine and other neighbouring nations.*† For we see the reason, why Abraham, instead of being under any *extreme surprise*, was (as JESUS assures us) under an *extreme joy*, was because he understood the *command* to be a communication of that mystery in which he had so earnestly requested to participate; and, consequently, that Isaac must needs, at length, come safe and unhurt from that scenical representation, in which he bore the principal part.

2. That Sir John Marsham's suspicion of Abraham's being struck by a superstitious imagination ‡ is as groundless, as it is injurious to the holy patriarch. Nay, the very examples he gives might have shown him the folly of such insinuations: for, according to his inferences, human sacrifices were never offered but in cases of great distress: now Abraham was at this time in a full state of peace, security, and affluence.

\* Chap. xi. ver. 19.

† See note F F F, at the end of this book.

‡—Ex istis satius est colligere hanc Abrahami tentationem non fuisse *παρανομήματα*, *actionem innovatam*; non recens excogitam, sed ad pristinos Cananæorum mores designatam. Horrendi sacrificii usum apud Phœnices frequentem indicat Porphyrius: "Phœnices, inquit, in magnis periculis ex bello, fame, pestilentia, clarissimorum aliquem ad id suffragiis publicis delectum, sacrificabant Saturno. Et victimarum talium plena est Sanchoniathonis historia Phœnicice scripta, quam Philo-Biblius Græce interpretatus est libris octo."—Canon. Chron. p. 79.

Thus, we presume, it appears that this *command* was a mere *information by action*: and that, when regarded in this view, all the objections against God's giving it to Abraham are absolutely enervated and overthrown.

For thus stands the case. If the trial of Abraham's faith and obedience were the commanding a real sacrifice, then was Abraham an *agent*, and not a bare *instrument*; and then it might be pretended that God commanded a human *agent* to act against humanity. And his right over his creatures cannot solve the difficulty, as it may when he employs a mere instrument to perform his will upon them. But if the trial were only the commanding a scenical representation, the command had *no moral import*; and consequently Abraham was not put upon any thing morally wrong; as is the offering up a human sacrifice.

I have transcribed into the notes, as I have gone along, some of the most considerable objections my adversaries have been able to oppose to this interpretation of the COMMAND TO ABRAHAM: which, I presume, when fairly considered, will be no light confirmation of it. But, as I have no notions to advance, not founded in a sincere desire to find out, and do honour to, truth, I would by no means take advantage of an adversary's weakness to recommend them to the public favour. I hold it not honest, therefore, to conceal the force of an objection which I myself have to offer, by far more plausible than any that these learned divines have urged against it. The objection is this, "That it is difficult to conceive why a CIRCUMSTANCE of such importance to revelation, which removes one of the strongest arguments against its truth, and at the same time manifests a REAL CONNEXION between the two dispensations of it, should never be directly and minutely explained and insisted on by the writers of the New Testament, though Abraham's historian might have had his reasons for concealing it." Now, to my own objection, I suppose, I may have leave to reply, that many truths of great importance, for the support of religion, against infidelity, were taught by Jesus to his disciples (amongst which, I reckon *this interpretation* to be one) which never came down, by their conveyance, to the church. But being, by the assistance of God's Holy Spirit, discoverable by those who devote themselves to the study of the scriptures with a pure mind, have, for the wise ends of providence (many of which are inscrutable to us) been left for the industry of men to find out: that, as occasion required, every age might supply new evidence of God's truth, to *put to silence the ignorance of foolish men*: and in proportion as the powers of darkness prevailed, so might the gospel light break out again with fresh splendour to curb and repress them. In support of what is here said, I beg the reader to reflect on what is told us by the evangelist, of the conversation between JESUS (after his resurrection) and the two disciples journeying to Emmaus; where their Master says unto them, "O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken! Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory? And beginning

at MOSES and all the prophets, HE EXPOUNDED UNTO THEM the things concerning himself.\* Now, who can doubt but that many things were at this time revealed, which, had they been delivered down to posterity, in writing, would have greatly contributed to the improvement of Eusebius's *Evangelical Demonstration*? Yet hath providence thought fit to order matters otherwise. But, that the apostles used, and made good use too, of those EXPOSITIONS, long since forgotten and lost, we have great reason to believe from their amazing success in the conversion of the world, by such an application of *Moses and the prophets, to Christ*. And if I be not much deceived, amongst the truths thus inforced, *that*, which I presume to have discovered in the *command to Abraham*, held no inferior place. Let the unprejudiced reader judge. St PAUL, making his apology before king Agrippa, concludes his defence in these words: "Having therefore obtained help of God, I continue unto this day witnessing both to small and great, saying none other things than those which the prophets and MOSES DID SAY SHOULD COME: *that CHRIST should suffer, and that he should be the first that should rise from the dead.*† The Greek is rather stronger, in predicating this circumstance of Moses,—ὅν τε οἱ προφῆται ἐλάλησαν μελλόντων γίνεσθαι, ΚΑΙ ΜΩΥΣΗΣ. Now where, let me ask, in all his writings, but in the *command to Abraham*, is there the least trace of any such circumstance, as *that Christ should suffer, and that he should be the first that should rise from the dead*? Nor is it to be found there, unless the *command* be understood in the sense I have given to it.

But this is the state in which it hath pleased providence to place the church of Christ: with abundant evidence in hand, to support itself against the attacks of infidelity; yet much of this divine treasure left sealed up, to exercise our *faith*, and, in time of need, to excite our *industry*: for it was not the intent of Providence that one of these virtues should thrive at the expense of the other; but that industry should as well be rewarded by a successful search, as faith, by *peace in believing*. Therefore when my learned adversary,‡ in order, I will believe, to advance the Christian faith, would discourage Christian industry, by calumniating, and rendering suspected what he is pleased to call EXPERIMENTS in religion, it is, I am afraid, at best but a *zeal without knowledge*. Indeed, M. Pascal ascribes this contempt of *experiments* to a different cause—"Ceux qui sont capables de inventer sont rares," says he. "Ceux qui n'inventent point sont en plus grand nombre, et par consequent, les plus fortes; et voilà pourquoi, lors que les inventeurs cherchent la gloire qu'ils meritent, tout ce qu'ils y gagnent, c'est qu'on les traite de VISIONNAIRES." It is true, if men will come to the study of scripture with unwashen hands, that is, without a due reverence for the dignity of those sacred volumes, or, which is as ill, with unpurged heads, that is, heads stuffed with bigot systems, or made giddy with cabalistic flights, they

\* Luke xxiv. 25, 26, 27. † Acts xxvi. 22, 23; and to the same purpose, xiii. 31.

‡ Dr Stebbing.

will deserve that title which Pascal observes is so unjustly given to those who deserve best of the public.

But to return to those with whom I have principal concern. I make no question but my freethinking adversaries, to whose temper and talents I am no stranger, will be ready to object.

I. “That the giving a solution of a difficulty in the *Old* Testament by the assistance of the *New*, considered together as making up one entire dispensation, is an unfair way of arguing against an unbeliever: who supposing both the Jewish and Christian religions to be *false*, of consequence supposes them to be *independent* on one another; and that this pretended relation was a contrivance of the authors of the later imposture to give it strength, by ingrafting the young shoot into the trunk of an old flourishing superstition. Therefore, will they say, if we would argue with success against them, we must seek a solution of their difficulties in that religion alone, from which they arise.”—Thus I may suppose them to argue. And I apprehend they will have no reason to say I have put worse arguments into their mouths than they are accustomed to employ against revelation.

I reply then, that it will admit of no dispute, but that, if they may have the liberty of turning JUDAISM and CHRISTIANITY into two phantoms of their own devising, they will have a very easy victory over both. This is an old trick, and has been often tried with success. By this slight of hand conveyance TINDAL hath juggled fools out of their religion. For, in a well-known book written by him against revelation, he hath taken advantage of the indiscretion of some late divines to lay it down as a principle, *that Christianity is ONLY a republication of the religion of nature*: the consequence of which is, that CHRISTIANITY and JUDAISM are *independent* institutions. But sure the deist is not to obtrude his own inventions, in the place of those religions he endeavours to overthrow. Much less is he to *beg the question* of their falsity; as the laying it down that the Jewish and Christian are two *independent* religions, certainly is: because Christianity claims many of its numerous titles to divinity from and under Judaism. If therefore deists will not, yet Christians of necessity must take their religion as they find it. And if they will remove objections to either economy, they must reason on the principle of *dependency*. And while they do so, their reasonings will not only be fair and logical, but every solution, on such a principle, will, besides its determination on the particular point in question, be a new proof of the divinity of both, in general; because such a relation, connexion, and dependency between two religions of so distant times, could not come about by chance, or by human contrivance, but must needs be the effect of divine prevision. For a deist, therefore, to bid us remove his objections on the principle of *independency*, is to bid us prove our religion *true* on a principle that implies its *falsehood*; the New Testament giving us no other idea of Christianity than as of a religion dependent on, connected with, and the completion of Judaism.



But now suppose us to be in this excess of complaisance for our adversaries ; and then see whether the ingenuity of their acceptance would not equal the reasonableness of their demand. Without doubt, were we once so foolish to swallow their chimeras for the heavenly manna of revelation, we should have them amongst the first to cry out upon the prevarication. I speak not this at random. The fact hath already happened. Certain advocates of religion, unable to reconcile to their notions of logic, the sense of some prophecies in the Old Testament, as explained in the *applications* of the writers of the New, thought it best to throw aside the care of the JEWISH RELIGION, a burden which they could as ill bear as the rebellious Israelites themselves, and try to support the CHRISTIAN, by proving its divine original, independently and from itself alone. Upon this Mr COLLINS, for I have chosen to instance in these two general dealers in freethinking ; the small retailers of it vanishing as fast as they appear ; for who now talks of *Blount* or *Coward*? or who hereafter will talk of *Strutt* or *Morgan*?\* that the world may see how little they agreed about their own principles, or rather how little regard they paid to any principles at all ; Mr Collins, I say wrote a book to exclaim against our ill faith ; and to remind us of, and to prove to us, the inseparable connexion between the Old and New Testament. This was no unseasonable reproof, howsoever intended, for so egregious a folly. I will endeavour to profit by it ; and manage this controversy on their own terms. For whatever prevarication appeared in the objectors, I conceived they had demanded no more than what they might reasonably expect. But the advantages arising to us from this management soon made them draw back, and retract what they had demanded ; and now they chicane with us for calling in the assistance of the New Testament to repel their attacks upon the Old ;† while, at the same time, they think themselves at liberty to use the assistance of the Old to overthrow the New. Let the friends of revelation, however, constantly and uniformly hold the inseparable connexion between the two dispensations ; and then, let our enemies, if they will, as they fairly may, take all the advantages they fancy they have against us, from the necessity we lie under of so doing.

In a word, we give them Judaism and Christianity as religions equally from heaven ; with that reciprocal dependence on each other, which arises between two things bearing the mutual relation of *foundation* and *superstructure*. They have it in their choice to oppose our pretensions, either by disputing with us that dependency, or raising difficulties on the foot of it. But while they only *suppose* it visionary ; and then argue against each religion on that supposition, they only beg the question. And while they do that, we keep within the rules of good logic, when we remove their objections on that principle of *dependency* laid down in scripture. This restrictive rule of interpretation being however still observed, that, in explaining any difficulty in the Old Testament, we

\* See note G G G, at the end of this book. † See note H H H, at the end of this book.

never, on pretence of such *dependency*, forsake the genius and manners of the times in question, and serve ourselves of those of the later Christian period, as Collins (whether truly or no, let them look to, who are concerned in it) upbraids some defenders of Christianity for doing. This rule is here, I presume, observed with sufficient exactness; the foundation of my interpretation of the *command* being that ancient mode of converse, so much at that time in use, of *conversing by actions*.

II. But the adversaries of revelation, how easily soever they may be confuted, are not so easily silenced. They are ready to object, that we fly to the old exploded refuge of a *TYPE*, which the author of *the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion* hath shown to be *visionary* and *senseless*; the mere illogical whimsy of cabalistic Jews. To this I answer,

1. They are doubly mistaken. This interpretation is not founded in any *typical* sense whatsoever; the person of Isaac on the mount being no more a *type* of Christ than the six letters that compose the name are a *type* of him; but only an arbitrary mark to stand for the idea of *Christ*, as that word does. So that their cry against *types*, whatever force it may have, does not at all affect this interpretation.

2. But, secondly, I say, A *TYPE* is neither *visionary* nor *senseless*, notwithstanding the disgrace which this mode of information hath undergone by the mad abuses of fanaticism and superstition. On the contrary, I hold it to be a just and reasonable manner of denoting one thing by another: not the creature of the imagination, made out of nothing to serve a turn; but as natural and apposite a figure as any employed in human converse. For *types* arose from that original mode of communication, the *conversing by actions*: the difference there is between these two modes of information being only this, that, where the action is *simply significative*, it has *no moral import*: for example, when Ezekiel is bid to *shave his beard, to weigh the hair in balances, to divide it into three parts, to burn one, to strike another with a knife, and to scatter the third part in the wind,\** this action having *no moral import* is merely *significative* of information given. But when the Israelites are commanded to take a *male lamb without blemish, and the whole assembly of the congregation to kill it, and to sprinkle the blood upon the door-posts,†* this action having a *moral import* as being a religious rite, and, at the same time, representative of something future, is properly *typical*. Hence arose the mistake of the interpreters of the *command* to offer Isaac. These men supposing the action commanded to have a *moral import*, as being only for a trial of Abraham's faith; and, at the same time, seeing in it the most exact resemblance of the death of *CHRIST*, very wrongly concluded that action to be *typical* which was merely *significative*: and by this means, leaving in the action a *moral import*, subjected it to all those cavils of infidelity, which, by taking away all *moral import*, as not belonging to it, are here entirely evaded.

\* Ezek. v. 1, 2.

† Exod. xii. 5, 6, 7.

But it being of the highest importance to revelation in general, and not a little conducive to the support of our arguments for the divine legation of Moses in particular, to show the logical truth and propriety of *types* in *action*, and *secondary senses* in *speech*, I shall take the present opportunity to sift this matter to the bottom. For having occasionally shown, in several parts of the preceding discourse, that the references in the LAW to the GOSPEL are in *typical representations*, and *secondary senses*; and the truth of Christianity depending on the real relation (which is to be discovered by such references) between the two dispensations, it will be incumbent on me to prove the logical truth and propriety of TYPES in action, and SECONDARY SENSES in speech.

And I enter on this subject with the greater pleasure, as one of the most plausible books ever written, or likely to be written, against Christianity, is entirely levelled at them. In this inquiry I shall pursue the same method I have hitherto taken with unbelieving writers; examine only the grounds and principles on which they go; and having removed and overthrown these, in as few words as I am able, leave the superstructure to support itself, as it may.

## SECT. VI.

THE book I speak of is entitled, “A Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion,” written, as is generally supposed, by Mr Collins; a writer, whose dexterity in the arts of controversy was so remarkably contrasted by his abilities in reasoning and literature, as to be ever putting one in mind of what travellers tell us of the genius of the proper Indians, who, although the veriest bunglers in all the fine arts of manual operation, yet excel every body in sleight of hand and the delusive feats of activity,

The purpose of his book is to prove that JESUS was an impostor: and his grand argument stands thus,—“JESUS (as he shows) claims under the promised Messiah of the Jews; and proposes himself as the deliverer prophesied of in their sacred books; yet (as he attempts to show) none of these prophecies can be understood of JESUS but in a *secondary sense* only; now a secondary sense (as he pretends) is fanatical, chimerical, and contrary to all scholastic rules of interpretation: consequently, JESUS not being prophesied of in the Jewish writings, his pretensions are false and groundless.”—His conclusion, the reader sees, stands on the joint support of these two propositions, *That there is no Jewish prophecy which relates to JESUS in a primary sense*; and *that a secondary sense is enthusiastical and unscholastic*. If either of these fail, his phantom of a conclusion sinks again into nothing.

Though I shall not omit occasionally to confute the first, yet it is the falsehood of the second I am principally concerned to expose—That there are Jewish prophecies which relate to JESUS in their direct and

primary sense, hath been proved with much force of reason and learning; but, that *secondary prophecies are not enthusiastical and unscholastic*, hath not been shown and insisted on, by the writers on this question, with the same advantage. The truth is, the nature of a **DOUBLE SENSE** in prophecies hath been so little seen or inquired into, that some divines, who agree in nothing else, have yet agreed to second this assertion of Mr Collins, and with the same frankness and confidence to pronounce that a *double sense* is indeed enthusiastical and unscholastic. To put a stop therefore to this growing evil, sown first by **SOCINUS**, and since become so pestilent to revelation, is not amongst the last purposes of the following discourse.

I. It hath been shown, that one of the most ancient and simple modes of human converse was communicating the conceptions by an expressive **ACTION**. As this was of familiar use in civil matters, it was natural to carry it into religious. Hence, we see God giving his instructions to the prophet, and the prophet delivering God's commands to the people, in this very manner. Thus far the nature of the action, both in civil and religious matters, is exactly the same.

But in religion it sometimes happens that a **STANDING** information is necessary, and there the action must be continually repeated: this is done by holding out the particular truth (thus to be preserved) in a religious *rite*. Here then the action begins to change its nature; and, from a mere significative mark, of only *arbitrary import* like words or letters, becomes an action of *moral import*, and acquires the new name of **TYPE**. Thus God, intending to record the future sacrifice of **CHRIST** in action, did it by the periodic sacrifice of a *lamb without blemish*. This was not *merely* and so **DIRECTLY significative** of **CHRIST** (like the command to Abraham); but being a religious rite, and so having a *moral import*, it was *typical*, though **NOT DIRECTLY significative**, of him. The very same may be said of the temporal rewards of the law; they were properly *typical* of the spiritual rewards of the gospel, and had a *moral import* of their own, as being the real sanction of the law.

Again, it hath been shown,\* how, in the gradual cultivation of speech, the expression by *action* was improved and refined into an **ALLEGORY** or *parable*; in which the words carry a double meaning; having, besides their obvious sense which serves only for the envelop, one more material, and hidden. With this figure of speech all the moral writings of antiquity abound. But when this figure is transferred from civil use to religious, and employed in the writings of inspired men, to convey information of particular circumstances in two distinct dispensations, to a people who had an equal concern in both, it is then what we call a **DOUBLE SENSE**; and undergoes the very same change of its nature that an *expressive action* underwent when converted into a *type*; that is, both the meanings, in the **DOUBLE SENSE**, are of *moral import*; whereas

\* In the preceding volume.

in the *allegory*, one only of the meanings is so: and this (which arises out of the very nature of their conversion, from civil to religious matters) is the only difference between *expressive actions* and TYPES; and between *allegories* and DOUBLE SENSES.

From hence it appears, that as TYPES are only religious *expressive actions*, and DOUBLE SENSES only religious *allegories*, and neither receive any change but what the very manner of bringing those *civil* figures into *religion* necessarily induces, they must needs have, in this their tralatitious state, the same LOGICAL FITNESS they had in their natural.\* Therefore as *expressive actions*, and *allegories*, in civil discourses, are esteemed proper and reasonable modes of information, so must TYPES and DOUBLE SENSES in religious; for the end of both is the same, namely, COMMUNICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. The consequence of this is, that Mr Collins's proposition, that *a secondary or double sense is enthusiastical and unscholastic* (the necessary support of his grand argument) is entirely overthrown.

This is the true and simple origin of TYPES and DOUBLE SENSES; which our adversaries, through ignorance of the rise and progress of speech, and unacquaintance with ancient manners, have insolently treated as the issue of distempered brains, and the fondlings of visionaries and enthusiasts.

II. Having thus shown their *logical propriety*, or that they are rational modes of information, I come now to vindicate their *religious use*, and to show that they are well suited to *that* religion in which we find them employed. An objection which I conceive, may be made to this use, will lead us naturally into our argument. The objection is this: "It hath been shown,† that these oblique modes of converse, though at first invented out of *necessity*, for general information, were employed, at length, to a *mysterious secretion of knowledge*; which though it might be expedient, useful, and even necessary both in CIVIL MATTERS and in FALSE RELIGION, could never be so in MORAL MATTERS, and in THE TRUE RELIGION; for this having nothing to hide from any of its followers, *types* and *double senses* (the same mysterious conveyance of knowledge in sacred matters, which *allegoric words* or *actions* are in civil) were altogether unfit to be employed in it."

To this I answer, the JEWISH RELIGION, in which these *types* and *secondary senses* are to be found, was given to one single people only; just as the CHRISTIAN is offered to all mankind: now the Christian, as Mr Collins‡ himself labours to prove, professes to be grounded on the

\* See note III, at the end of this book.

† In the preceding volume.

‡ "Christianity is founded on Judaism, and the New Testament on the Old; and JESUS is the person said in the New Testament to be promised in the Old, under the character of the MESSIAH of the Jews, who, as such only, claims the obedience and submission of the world. Accordingly it is the design of the authors of the *New*, to prove all the parts of Christianity from the Old Testament, which is said to contain *the words of eternal life*, and to represent JESUS and his apostles as *fulfilling* by their mission, doctrines, and works, the predictions of the *prophets*, the historical parts of the Old Testament, and the Jewish law; which last is expressly said to *prophecy* of, or *testify* Christianity."—Grounds and Reasons, &c., pp. 4, 5.

Jewish. If therefore Christianity was not only professedly, but really grounded on Judaism (and the supposition is strictly logical in a defence of *types* and *double senses*, whose reality depends on the reality of that relation) then Judaism was *preparatory* to Christianity, and Christianity the *ultimate end* of Judaism: but it is not to be supposed that there should be an entire *silence* concerning this ultimate religion during the preparatory, when the *notice* of it was not only highly proper, but very expedient: 1. First, to draw those under the preparatory religion, by just degrees to the ultimate; a provision the more necessary, as the nature and genius of the two religions were different, the one carnal, the other spiritual: 2. Secondly, to afford convincing evidence to future ages, of the truth of that ultimate religion; which evidence, a circumstantial prediction of its advent and nature so long beforehand, effectually does afford.\* The ultimate religion therefore must have had some notice given of it, in the preparatory: and nothing was better fitted for this purpose than the hyperbolical genius of the eastern speech. Thus, when Isaiah says, *Unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the Mighty God, the Everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace*, Mr Collins observes, it is the eastern hyperbole which prevents our seeing that a Jewish monarch is literally and directly spoken of. Should we allow this, yet we still see, that such a language was admirably fitted to connect together the *first* and *second* senses: the *hyperbole* becoming a *simple speech*, when transferred from a Jewish monarch to the monarch of the world.

Our next inquiry will be, *in what manner* this notice must needs be given. Now the nature of the thing shows us it could not be directly and openly; so as to be understood by the people, at the time of giving: because this would have defeated God's intermediate purpose; which was to train them, by a long discipline, under his preparatory dispensation. For, this being a religion founded only on *temporal sanctions*, and burdened with a *minute and tiresome ritual*, had the people known it to be only preparatory to another, founded on *better promises* and easier observances, they would never have borne the yoke of the law, but would have shaken off their subjection to Moses before the *fulness of time* had brought their spiritual Deliverer amongst them; as, without this knowledge, they were but too apt to do, on every imaginary prospect of advantage. But St CHRYSOSTOM will enforce this observation with more advantage. "Had the Jews," says he, "been taught from the beginning that their law was temporary and to have an end, they would have certainly despised it. On this account, it seemed good to the divine wisdom to throw a veil of obscurity over the prophecies which related to the Christian dispensation."† This information, therefore, was to be delivered with caution; and conveyed under the covert lan-

\* See note K K K, at the end of this book.

† Homilia prima, de Prophetarum Obscuritate.



guage of their present economy. Hence arose the fit and necessary use of **TYPES** and **SECONDARY SENSES**. For the only safe and lasting means of conveyance were their **PUBLIC RITUAL**, and the **WRITINGS OF THE PROPHETS**. And a *speaking action*, and an *allegoric speech*, when thus employed, had all the secrecy that the occasion required. We have observed, that in the simpler use of speaking by *action*, the action itself hath no *moral import*; and so, the information having but one moral meaning, that which it conveys is clear and intelligible. But where a rite of religion is used for this *speaking action*, there the action hath a *moral import*; and so the information having two moral meanings, that which it conveys is more obscure and mysterious. Hence it appears that this mode of *speaking by action*, called a **TYPE**, is exactly fitted for the information in question. Just so it is again with the **SECONDARY SENSE**: in the *mere allegory*, the representing image has no moral import: in the *secondary sense*, for a contrary reason (which the very term imports), the representing image hath a moral import; and so, acquires the same *fitting obscurity* with information by *types*. For the *typical ritual*, and the *double prophecy*, had each its obvious sense in the present nature and future fortune of the Jewish religion and republic. And here we are easily led into the essential difference (so much to the honour of revelation) between the pagan oracles or prophecies, and the Jewish. The obscurity of the pagan arose from the *ambiguity, equivocation, or jargon* OF **EXPRESSION**; the obscurity of the Jewish from *the figurative representation* OF **THINGS**. The first (independent of any other religion) proceeded from ignorance of futurity; the latter, dependent on the Christian, proceeded from the necessity that those to whom the prophecies were delivered should not have too full a knowledge of them.

Dr Middleton, indeed, would fain persuade us, that the *oracles*, or, as he chooses to call them, “the *prophecies* of the Pythian Apollo, were neither better nor worse, but exactly of the same absurd construction with the *scripture prophecies*.” He would hardly venture to controvert what I have said of their logical fitness and propriety, as a mode of information in the abstract, because this would show him ignorant of the nature and progress of human converse. Much less, I suppose, would he say, that this mode of information was not suited to the genius of the Jewish religion; since he owns *that* to be only a preparatory system calculated to open and to prepare the way for one more perfect; and consequently, that it must be so contrived as to *connect*, and at the same time to *hide* from the vulgar eye, the two parts of the dispensation, and the relation they have to one another. Now there is no conceivable way of doing this but by *types* and *secondary senses*. What then occasioned this insult upon them? That which supports all our free writers in their contemptuous treatment of religion, their mistaking the **ABUSE** of the thing for the thing **ITSELF**; and giving the interpretations of men, or the doctrines of churches, for articles of faith or scripture history. What hath been here said will show the extreme weakness of this ingenious

man's parallel between the scripture prophecies and the oracles of the Pythian Apollo.—“The PROPHECIES of the Pythian Apollo,” says he, “were indeed obscure, equivocal and ambiguous, admitting not only different but contrary senses; so that the character here given of the scripture prophecies was undoubtedly true of them, *that no event could restrain them to one determinate sense, when they were originally capable of many.* For if the obvious sense failed, as it often did, to the ruin of those who acted upon it, there was another always in reserve, to secure the veracity of the oracle: till this very character of its ambiguous and enigmatical senses, confirmed by constant observation, gradually sank its credit, and finally detected the imposture.”\* *The prophecies of the Pythian Apollo were obscure, equivocal and ambiguous. And this, says he, was the character of the scripture prophecies.* Just otherwise, as is seen above. Scripture prophecies were *obscure*; but the obscurity arose neither from *equivocation* nor *ambiguity* (which two qualities proceed from the **EXPRESSION**) but from *the figurative representation of THINGS*. So that the *obscurity*, which the Pythian oracle and the scripture prophecies had in common, arising from the most different grounds, the character given of the oracles, *that no event could restrain them to one determinate sense when they were originally capable of many*, by no means belongs to the scripture prophecies, whatever the men he writes against (who appear to know as little of the **DOUBLE SENSE** of prophecies as himself) might imagine. For though *equivocal and ambiguous EXPRESSION* may make a speech or writing, where the objects are unconfined, capable of *many senses*, yet a *figurative representation of THINGS* can give no more senses than *two* to the obscurest prophecy. Hence it will follow, that while the expedient in supporting the Pythian oracles, by having a sense always in reserve to satisfy the inquirer, *would gradually sink their credit, and finally detect the imposture*; the discovery of a **SECONDARY SENSE** of prophecy, relative to the completory dispensation, will necessarily tend to confirm and establish the divine origin of scripture prophecy.

Such was the wonderful economy of divine wisdom, in connecting together two dependent religions, the parts of one grand dispensation: by this means, making one preparatory of the other; and each mutually to reflect light upon the other. Hence we see the desperate humour of that learned man, and very zealous Christian,† who, because most of the prophecies relating to JESUS, in the Old Testament, are of the nature described above, took it into his head that the Bible was corrupted by the enemies of JESUS. Whereas, on the very supposition of a *mediate* and an *ultimate* religion, which this good man held, the main body of prophecies in the Old Testament relating to the New must, according to all our ideas of fitness and expediency, needs be prophecies with a **DOUBLE SENSE**. But it is the usual support of folly to throw its dis-

\* Examination of the Bishop of London's Discourses on Prophecy, &c. pp. 89, 90.

† Mr Whiston.

tresses upon knavery. And thus, as we observed, the Mahometan likewise, who pretends to claim under the Jewish religion, not finding the doctrine of a *future state of rewards and punishments* in the law, is as positive that the Jews have corrupted their own scriptures in pure spite to his great prophet.\*

III. Having thus shown the reasonable use and great expediency of these modes of sacred information, under the Jewish economy; the next question is, whether they be indeed there. This we shall endeavour to show.—And that none of the common prejudices may lie against our reasoning, the example given shall be of **TYPES** and **DOUBLE SENSES** employed even in subjects relating to the *Jewish dispensation only*.

1. The whole ordinance of the *passover* was a **TYPE** of the *redemption from Egypt*. The striking the blood on the side-posts, the eating flesh with unleavened bread and bitter herbs, and in a posture of departure and expedition, were all significative of their bondage and deliverance. This will admit of no doubt, because the institutor himself has thus explained the *type*—“And thou shalt show thy son,” says he, “in that day, saying, This is done because of that which the Lord did unto me when I came forth out of *Egypt*. And it shall be for a sign unto thee upon thine hand, and for a memorial between thine eyes; that the Lord’s law may be in thy mouth: for with a strong hand hath the Lord brought thee out of *Egypt*. Thou shalt therefore keep this ordinance in his season from year to year.”† As therefore it was of the genius of these holy rites to be *typical* or significative of God’s past, present, and future dispensations to his people, we cannot in the least doubt, but that *Moses*, had he not been restrained by those important considerations explained above, would have told them that the *sacrifice of the lamb without blemish* was a *type*, a sign or memorial of **THE DEATH OF CHRIST**.

2. With regard to **DOUBLE SENSES**, take this instance from Joel: who, in his prediction of an approaching ravage by *locusts*, foretells likewise, in the same words, a succeeding desolation by the *Assyrian army*. For we are to observe that this was God’s method both in warning and in punishing a sinful people. Thus, when the *seven nations* for their exceeding wickedness were to be exterminated, God promises his chosen people to send hornets before them, which should drive out the Hivite, the Canaanite, and the Hittite from before them.‡ Now Joel, under one and the same

\* See note L L L, at the end of this book.

† Exod. xiii. 8, et seq.

‡ Exod. xxiii. 23. This, the author of the book called the “*Wisdom of Solomon*” admirably paraphrases:—“For it was thy will to destroy by the hands of our fathers both those old inhabitants of thy holy land, whom thou hatedst for doing most odious works of witchcrafts, and wicked sacrifices; and also those merciless murderers of children, and devourers of man’s flesh, and the feasts of blood, with their priests out of the midst of their idolatrous crew, and the parents that killed, with their own hands, souls destitute of help: that the land which thou esteemedst above all other might receive a worthy colony of God’s children. Nevertheless even *those* thou sparedst as men, and didst send wasps, forerunners of thine host, to destroy them by little and little. Not that thou wast unable to bring the ungodly under the hand of the righteous in battle, or to destroy them at once with *cruel beasts*, or with one rough word: but executing thy judgments upon them by little and little, thou

prophecy, contained in the first and second chapters of his book, foretells, as we say, both these plagues; the *locusts* in the *primary* sense, and the *Assyrian army* in the *secondary*—"Awake, ye drunkards, and weep; and howl all ye drinkers of wine, because of the new wine, for it is cut off from your mouth. For a nation is come up upon my land, strong, and without number, whose teeth are the teeth of a lion, and he hath the cheek-teeth of a great lion. He hath laid my vine waste, and barked my fig-tree: he hath made it clean bare, and cast it away: the branches thereof are made white—The field is wasted, the land mourneth; for the corn is wasted: the new wine is dried up, the oil languisheth. Be ye ashamed, O ye husbandmen; howl, O ye vine-dressers, for the wheat and for the barley; because the harvest of the field is perished.\*—Blow ye the trumpet in *Zion*, and sound an alarm in my holy mountain: let all the inhabitants of the land tremble: for the day of the Lord cometh, for it is nigh at hand; a day of darkness and of gloominess, a day of clouds and of thick darkness, as the morning spread upon the mountains: a great people and a strong; there hath not been ever the like—A fire devoureth before them, and behind them a flame burneth: the land is as the garden of *Eden* before them, and behind them a desolate wilderness; yea, and nothing shall escape them. The appearance of them is as the appearance of horses; and as horsemen, so shall they run. Like the noise of chariots on the tops of mountains shall they leap, like the noise of a flame of fire that devoureth the stubble, as a strong people set in battle array. Before their face the people shall be much pained: all faces shall gather blackness. They shall run like mighty men, they shall climb the wall like men of war; and they shall march every one on his ways, and they shall not break their ranks. Neither shall one thrust another, they shall walk every one in his path; and when they fall upon the sword, they shall not be wounded. They shall run to and fro in the city; they shall run upon the wall, they shall climb up upon the houses, they shall enter in at the windows like a thief. The earth shall quake before them, the heavens shall tremble; the sun and the moon shall be dark, and the stars shall withdraw their shining."†

The fine conversion of the subjects is remarkable. The prophecy is delivered in the first chapter,—*Awake, ye drunkards, &c.* and repeated in the second—*Blow ye the trumpet in Zion, &c.* In the first chapter, the LOCUSTS are described as a *people*;—*For a nation is come up upon my land, strong and without number.* But, that we may not be mistaken in the PRIMARY sense, namely, the plague of locusts, the ravages described are the ravages of insects: "They lay waste the vine, they bark the fig-tree, make the branches clean bare, and wither the corn and fruit-trees." In the second chapter, the hostile PEOPLE are described as *locusts*:—AS THE MORNING SPREAD UPON THE MOUNTAINS. *The ap-*

gavest them place of repentance, not being ignorant that they were a naughty generation, and that their malice was bred in them, and that their cogitation would never be changed."

—Chap. xii. ver. 3, et seq.

\* Chap. i. ver. 5, et seq.

† Chap. ii. ver. 1 to 10.

*pearance of them is as the appearance of horses, and as horsemen so shall they run, as a strong people set in battle array. They shall run like mighty men, they shall climb the wall like men of war.* But that we may not mistake the **SECONDARY** sense, namely, the invasion of a foreign enemy, they are compared, we see, to a mighty army. This art, in the contexture of the prophecy, is truly divine; and renders all chicane to evade a *double sense* ineffectual. For in some places of this prophecy, *dearth by insects* must needs be understood; in others, *desolation by war*. So that both senses are of necessity to be admitted. And here let me observe, that had the commentators on this prophecy but attended to the nature of the *double sense*, they would not have suffered themselves to be so embarrassed; nor have spent so much time in freeing the prophet from an imaginary embarrassment (though at the expense of the context) on account of the same prophecy's having in one part that signification *primary*, which, in another, is *secondary*: a circumstance so far from making an inaccuracy, that it gives the highest elegance to the discourse; and joins the *two* senses so closely as to obviate all pretence for a division, to the injury of the Holy Spirit. Here then we have a **DOUBLE SENSE**, not arising from the interpretation of a single verse, and so obnoxious to mistake, but of a whole and very large descriptive prophecy.

But as this species of *double prophecy*, when confined to the events of one single dispensation, takes off the most plausible objection to *primary* and *secondary* senses in general, it may not be improper to give another instance of it, which shall be taken from a time when one would least expect to find a *double prophecy* employed, I mean under the gospel dispensation. I have observed, somewhere or other, that the **ECONOMY OF GRACE** having little or nothing to hide or to shadow out, like the **LAW**, it had small occasion for *typical* rites or celebrations, or for prophecies with a *double sense*; and that therefore they are not to be expected, nor indeed are they to be found, under the gospel.

Yet the example I am about to give is an illustrious exception to this general truth. The explanation of this example will rectify a great deal of embarrassment and mistake concerning it, and, at the same time, support the general truth. The prophecy I mean, is that in which Jesus foretels his **FIRST** and **SECOND COMING IN JUDGMENT**, not only under the same ideas, but in one and the same prediction, as it is recorded, in nearly the same terms, by Matthew, Mark, and Luke; though omitted by St John, for the reason hereafter to be given.

But to comprehend the full import of this prophecy, it will be proper to consider the occasion of it. Jesus, after having warmly upbraided the scribes and Pharisees whom he found in the temple, with their superstitious abuses of the law; with their aversion to be reformed:—and their obstinate rejection of their promised Messiah; left them with a dreadful denunciation of the ruin\* then hanging over their civil and religious policy. His disciples, who followed him through the temple, greatly

\* Mat. xxiii. Mark xii. 34. Luke xvi. 25.

affected with these threats, and yet possessed with the national prejudices of the eternity of the law, pointed as he passed along, at the temple buildings, and desired him to observe the stupendous solidity and magnificence of the work. As much as to say, "Here are no marks of that speedy destruction which you have just now predicted: on the contrary, this mighty mass seems calculated to endure till the general dissolution of all things." To which, Jesus, understanding their thoughts, replied, that in a very little time *there should not be left one stone upon another*, of all the wonders they saw before them. And from thence takes occasion to prophesy of the speedy destruction of the Jewish nation. But as the bare prediction of the ruin of that splendid economy would be likely to scandalize these carnal-minded men, while they saw nothing erected in its stead, by their Messiah and deliverer, it seemed good to divine wisdom to represent this destruction under the image of their Messiah's coming to execute judgment on the devoted city, and of his raising a new economy on its ruin; as was done by the establishment of the Christian policy.\*

But yet, as this was to be unattended with the circumstances of exterior grandeur, he relieves the picture of the *church-militant*, erected on his coming TO JUDGE JERUSALEM, with all the splendours of the *church-triumphant*, which were to be displayed at his second coming TO JUDGE THE WORLD. And this, which was so proper for the ornament, and useful for the dignity of the scene, was necessary for the completion of the subject, which was a full and entire view of the *dispensation of grace*. Thus, as JOEL in one and the same description had combined the previous ravages of the locusts, with the succeeding devastations of the Assyrians, so here, JESUS hath embroidered into one piece the intermediate judgment of the Jews, and the final judgment of mankind.†

Let us now see what there was in the *notions* and *language* of the Jewish people, that facilitated the easy introduction of the *secondary sense*; and gave the style, which was proper to that sense, an expressive elegance when applied to the *primary*.

The Jews, besotted with their fancied eternity of the law, had entertained a notion that the destruction of Jerusalem was to be immediately followed with the destruction of the world. This made the closeness in the connexion between the *primary* and *secondary* sense of the descriptive prophecy, easy and natural; and as it made the two destructions scarce dividual, so it left no room to distinguish, in any formal manner, between the *first* and *second* coming in judgment.

The old *prophetic language* was of equal use and advantage to interweave the two senses into one another, which the *notion* here mentioned had drawn together and combined. The change of magistracy, the fall of kingdoms, and the revolutions of states, are described, in the old language of inspiration, by disasters in the heavens, by the fall of stars,

\* See Julian, or a Discourse concerning his Attempt to rebuild the Temple.

† Mat. xxiv. Mark xiii. Luke xxi.



and by eclipses of the greater luminaries. This admirably served the purpose of conveying both events under the same set of images; indeed, under one and the same description; namely, the destruction of Jerusalem in the FIGURATIVE sense; and the destruction of the world in the LITERAL. —“The sun shall be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light: and the stars of heaven shall fall, and the powers that are in heaven shall be shaken. And they shall see the Son of man coming in the clouds with great power and glory.”\*

So that we see, the representation of a *double sense* in this prophecy hath all the ease, and strength, and art, which we can conceive possible to enter into a sacred information of this nature. And the close texture of its parts is so far from obscuring any thing in the two great correlative pictures, portrayed upon it, that it serves to render each more distinct, and better defined. Different indeed in this from most of the Jewish prophecies of the same kind: and the reason of the difference is obvious. In the Jewish prophecies, the *secondary sense*, relating to matters in another dispensation, was of necessity to be left obscure, as unsuitable to the knowledge of the time in which the prophecy was delivered. Whereas the *first* and *secondary* senses of the prophecy before us, were equally objective to the contemplation of Christ's disciples; as the two capital parts of the dispensation to which they were now become subject.

But it will be said, “That before all this pains had been taken to explain the *beauties* of the double sense, we should have proved the *existence* of it; since, according to our own account of the matter, the magnificent terms employed, which are the principal mark of a SECONDARY sense, are the common prophetic language to express the subject of the PRIMARY: and because, when Jesus, in few words, repeats the substance of this prophecy to the high priest, on the like occasion for which he delivered it at large to his disciples, he describes the destruction of Jerusalem in those high terms from whence the SECONDARY sense is inferred: for when Jesus was accused of threatening, or of designing to destroy the temple, and was urged by the high priest to make his defence, he says—‘Hereafter shall ye see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven:’† which words the context necessarily confines to his *coming* in judgment on Jerusalem.”

To this I answer, That it was not for fear of being put to the proof, that it was taken for granted that this prophecy had a *double sense*, a primary and a secondary; because it is only quoting a passage or two in it, to show that it must necessarily be confessed to have both.

1. That Jesus prophesies of the destruction of Jerusalem, appears from the concluding words recorded by all the three evangelists—“Verily, I say unto you, that THIS GENERATION *shall not pass away till ALL these things be done, or fulfilled.*”‡ Hence, by the way, let

\* Mark xiii. 24—26. Mat. xxiv. 29, 30.

† Mat. xxvi. 64. Mark xiv. 62. Luke xxii. 69.

‡ Mat. xxiv. 34. Mark xiii. 30. Luke xxi. 32.

me observe, that this fulfilling in the *primary* sense being termed the *fulfilling all*, seems to be the reason why St John, who wrote his gospel after the destruction of Jerusalem, hath omitted to record this prophecy of his Master.

2. That Jesus at the same time speaks of the destruction of the world, at his coming to judge it, appears likewise from his own words recorded by the same Evangelists—*But of that day and hour knoweth no man; no not the angels of heaven, neither the Son, but the Father.\** For if the whole be to be understood only of one single event, then do these two texts expressly contradict one another; the first telling us that the event should come to pass near the close of that very generation; the latter telling us that the time is unknown to all men, nay even to the angels and to the Son himself:—then does the last quoted text expressly contradict the prophecy of Daniel,† that very prophecy to which Jesus all the way refers; for in that prophecy, the *day and hour*, that is, the precise time of the destruction of Jerusalem, is minutely foretold.

Hence it follows that this famous prophecy hath indeed a **DOUBLE SENSE**, the one *primary*, and the other *secondary*.

It is true, the infant-church saw the destruction of the world so plainly foretold in this prophecy, as to suffer an error to creep into it, of the speedy and instant consummation of all things. This, St Paul found necessary to correct—“Now I beseech you,” says he, “that ye be not soon shaken in mind, or troubled, as that *the day of Christ is at hand,*” &c.‡ And it was on this account, I suppose, that St Luke, who wrote the latest of the three evangelists, records this prophecy in much lower terms than the other two, and entirely omits the words in the text quoted above, which fixes the *secondary* sense of the prophecy—*of that day and hour*, &c.

If St Paul exhorted his followers not to be *shaken in mind* on this account; his fellow-labourer St Peter, when he had in like manner reproved the *scoffers*, who said, *where is the promise of his coming?* went still farther, and, to show his followers that the church was to be of long continuance here on earth, explains to them the nature of that evidence which *future times* were to have of the truth of the gospel; an evidence even superior to that which the primitive times enjoyed of **MIRACLES**;§ “We have also *a more sure word of PROPHECY*; whereunto ye do well that ye take heed, as unto a light which shineth in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day-star arise in your hearts.”|| This evidence of **PROPHECY** is justly qualified *a more sure word*,¶ when compared to **MIRACLES**, whose demonstrative evidence is confined to that age in which the power of them was bestowed upon the church: whereas the *prophecies* here meant, namely, those of St Paul and St John,\*\* concerning the

\* Mark xiii. 32.

† Chap. viii. ver. 13, 14.

‡ 2 Thess. ii. 1. et seq.

§ 2 Peter i. 17.

|| Ver. 19.

¶ Βεβαιώσις, more firm, constant, and durable.

\*\* See Sir Isaac Newton on the Prophecies, chap. i. of his Observations upon the Apocalypse of St John.

GREAT APOSTASY, were always fulfilling even to the last consummation of all things; and so, affording this demonstrative evidence to the men of all generations.

However, if from this prophecy the first Christians drew a wrong conclusion, it was not by the fault of the divine prophet, but their own. Jewish tradition might at first mislead the followers of Jesus to believe that the destruction of the world was very soon to follow the destruction of Jerusalem: but these men soon put off tradition, with the law: and scripture, which was then recommended to them as their only study, with the **DOUBLE SENSES** with which it abounds, might easily have led them to a *distinction of times* in this prophecy, a prophecy formed, as they must needs see, upon the ancient models.

But as providence is always educing good out of evil (though neither for this, nor any other reason, is evil ever connived at by the disciples of Christ, as appears from the conduct of St Paul, just mentioned above) this error was fruitful of much service to truth. It nourished and increased a spirit of piety, seriousness, and charity, which wonderfully contributed to the speedy propagation of the gospel.

Before I conclude, let me just observe (what I have always principally in view,) that this explanation of the prophecy obviates all those impious and absurd insinuations of licentious men, as if Jesus was led either by craft or enthusiasm, either by the gloominess of his own ideas, or by his knowledge of the advantage of inspiring such into his followers, to prophesy of the speedy destruction of the world.

—But by strange ill fortune even some *believers*, as we have observed, are come at length to deny the very existence of *double senses* and *secondary prophecies*. A late writer hath employed some pages to proclaim his utter disbelief of all such fancies. I shall take the liberty to examine this bold rectifier of prejudices: not for any thing he hath opposed to the principles here laid down; for I dare say these were never in his thoughts; but only to show, that all he hath written is wide of the purpose: though, to say the truth, no wider than the notions of those whom he opposes; men who contend for types and secondary senses in as extravagant a way as he argues against them: that is, such who take a handle from the doctrine of *double senses* to give a loose to the extravagancies of a vague imagination: consequently his arguments, which are aimed against their very being and *use*, hold only against their *abuse*. And that *abuse*, which others indeed have urged as a proof against the *use*, he sets himself to\* confute: a mighty undertaking: and then mistakes his reasoning for a confutation of the *use*.

His argument against *double senses* in prophecies, as far as I understand it, may be divided into two parts, 1. Replies to the reasoning of others for *double senses*. 2. His own reasoning against them.—With his replies I have nothing to do (except where something of argument

\* The Principles and Connexion of Natural and Revealed Religion, distinctly considered, p. 221, by Dr Sykes.

against the *reality* of double senses is contained) because they are replies to no reasonings of mine, nor to any that I approve. I have only therefore to consider what he hath to say against the thing itself.

1. His first argument against more senses than one, is as follows—“Supposing that the opinion or judgment of the prophet or apostle is not to be considered in matters of *prophecy* more than the judgment of a mere *amanuensis* is,—and that the point is not what the opinion of the *amanuensis* was, but what the *inditer* intended to express; yet it must be granted, that if God had any views to some remoter events, at the same time that the words which were used were equally applicable to, and designed to express, *nearer* events: those *remoter* events, as well as the *nearer*, were in the intention of God: and if both the nearer and remoter events were equally intended by God in any proposition, then the LITERAL SENSE OF THEM IS NOT THE ONE NOR THE OTHER SINGLY AND APART, BUT BOTH TOGETHER must be the full meaning of such passages.”—P. 219.

—Then the literal sense of them is not the one nor the other singly and apart, but both of them together, &c. i. e. if both together make up but one literal sense, then there is neither a *secondary* nor a *double sense*: and so there is an end of the controversy. A formidable adversary truly! He threatens to *overthrow the thing*, and gives us an argument against the *propriety of the name*. Let him but allow his adversaries that a *nearer* and a *remoter* event are both the subjects of one and the same prediction, and, I suppose, it will be indifferent to them whether he call it, with them, a *prophecy of a double and figurative sense*, or they call it, with him, a *prophecy of a single literal sense*: and he may be thankful for so much complaisance; for it is plain, they have the better of him even in the *propriety of the name*. It is confessed that God, in these predictions, might have views to *nearer* and *remoter* events: now these nearer and remoter events were events under two different dispensations, the Jewish and the Christian. The prediction is addressed to the Jews, who had not only a more immediate concern with the first, but, at the time of giving the prophecy, were not to be let into the secrets of the other: hence the prediction of the *nearer* event was properly the *literal* or *primary* sense, as given for the present information of God’s servants; and the more *remote* event for their future information, and so was as properly the *secondary* sense, called with great propriety *figurative*, because conveyed under the *terms* which predicted the *nearer* event. But I hope a *first* and a *second*, a *literal* and a *figurative*, may both together at least make up a DOUBLE SENSE. SELDEN understood this matter better, when he said, “The scripture may have more senses besides the *literal*, because God understands all things at once; but a man’s writing has but one true sense, which is that which the author meant when he writ it.”\*

2. His second argument runs thus,—“WORDS are the signs of our

\* Table Talk.

thoughts, and therefore stand for the ideas in the mind of him that uses them. If then words are made use of to signify *two or more things at the same time*, their significancy is really lost, and it is impossible to understand the real certain intention of him that uses them. Were God therefore to discover any thing to mankind by any written revelation, and were he to make use of such TERMS as stand for ideas in men's minds, he must speak to them so as to be understood by them. They must have in their minds the ideas which God intended to excite in them, or else it would be in vain to attempt to make discoveries of his will; and the TERMS made use of must be such as were wont to raise such certain ideas, or else there could be no written revelation. The true sense therefore of ANY PASSAGE of scripture can be but ONE; or if it be said to contain more senses than one, if such multiplicity be not revealed, the revelation becomes useless, because unintelligible."—Pp. 222, 223.

Men may talk what they please of the obscurity of writers who have *two senses*, but it has been my fortune to meet with it much oftener in those who have *none*. Our reasoner has here mistaken the very question, which is, whether a scripture PROPOSITION (for all prophecies are reducible to propositions) be capable of two senses; and, to support the negative, he labours to prove that WORDS OR TERMS can have but one.—*If then WORDS are made use of to signify two or more THINGS at the same time, their significancy is really lost—such TERMS as stand for ideas in men's minds—TERMS made use of must be such as are wont to raise such certain ideas*—All this is readily allowed; but how wide of the purpose, may be seen by this instance: Jacob says, *I will go down into SHEOL unto my son mourning*. Now if SHEOL signify in the ancient *Hebrew*, only the *grave*, it would be abusing the TERM to make it signify likewise, with the vulgar *Latin*, *in infernum*, because if WORDS, as he says, *be made to signify two or more things at the same time, their significancy is lost*.—But when this PROPOSITION of the psalmist comes to be interpreted, "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell [SHEOL] neither wilt thou suffer thy holy one to see corruption;" though it literally signifies security from the curse of the law, upon transgressors, viz. immature death, yet it is very reasonable to understand it in a spiritual sense, of the resurrection of CHRIST from the dead; in which, the *words* or *terms* translated *soul* and *hell*, are left in the meaning they bear in the Hebrew tongue, of *body* and *grave*.

But let us suppose our reasoner to mean that a PROPOSITION is not capable of *two senses*, as perhaps he did in his confusion of ideas, for notwithstanding his express words to the contrary, before he comes to the end of his argument, he talks of *the true sense of ANY PASSAGE being but one*; and then his assertion must be, "That if one proposition have two senses, its significancy is really lost; and that it is impossible to understand the real certain intention of him that uses them; consequently revelation will become useless, because unintelligible."

Now this I will take the liberty to deny. In the following instances,

a *single proposition* was intended by the writers and speakers to have a *double sense*. The poet Virgil says,

—Talia, per clypeum Volcani, dona parentis  
Miratur: rerumque ignarus, imagine gaudet,  
ATTOLLENS HUMERO FAMAMQUE ET FATA NEPOTUM.\*

The last line has these *two senses*: first, that Æneas bore on his shoulders a shield, on which was engraved a prophetic picture of the fame and fortunes of his posterity: secondly, that under the protection of that piece of armour he established their fame and fortunes, and was enabled to make a settlement in Latium, which proved the foundation of the Roman empire.†

Here then is a *double sense*, which, I believe, none who have any taste of Virgil will deny. The preceding verse introduces it with great art,

*Miratur, rerumque ignarus imagine gaudet;*

and prepares us for something mysterious, and hid behind the *letter*.

On Peter's refusing to eat of clean and unclean meats promiscuously, in the vision presented to him, the Holy Spirit says, *What God hath cleansed, that call not thou common.*‡ The single proposition is, *that which God hath cleansed is not common or impure*; but no one who reads this story can doubt of its having this double sense: 1. *That the distinction between clean and unclean meats was to be abolished.* 2. *And that the gentiles were to be called into the church of CHRIST.* Here then the true sense of these PASSAGES is not *one*, but *two*: and yet the intention or meaning is not, on this account, the least obscured or lost, or rendered doubtful or unintelligible.

He will say, perhaps, "that the very nature of the subject, in both cases, determines the two senses here explained." And does he think, we will not say the same of *double senses in the prophecies*? But he seems to take it for granted, that Judaism and Christianity have no kind of relation to one another: why else would he bring, in discredit of a *double sense*, these two verses of Virgil:

Hi motus animorum, atque hæc certamina tanta  
Pulveris exigui jactu composta quiescunt.

On which he thus descants—"The words are determinate and clear.—Suppose now a man having occasion to speak of intermitting fevers and the ruffle of a man's spirits, and the easy cure of the disorder by pulverized bark," &c., p. 225.—To make this pertinent, we must suppose no more relation between the fortunes of the Jewish church and the Christian, than between a *battle of bees*, and the *tumult of the animal spirits*: if this were not his meaning, it will be hard to know what was, unless to show his happy talent at a parody.

But as he seems to delight in classical authorities, I will give him one not quite so absurd; where he himself shall confess that a *double meaning* does in fact run through one of the finest odes of antiquity. Horace

\* Æneid. lib. viii. in fin.

† See note M M M, at the end of this book.

‡ Acts x. 15.



thus addresses a crazy ship in which his friends had embarked for the *Ægean* sea :

O navia, referent in mare te novi  
Fluctus! ô quid agis? fortiter occupa  
Portum: nonne vides ut  
Nudum remigio latus,\* &c.

In the first and *primary* sense, he describes the dangers of his friends in a weak unmanned vessel, and in a tempestuous sea: in the *secondary*, the dangers of the republic in entering into a new civil war, after all the losses and disasters of the old. As to the *secondary sense*, which is ever the most questionable and obscure, we have the testimony of early antiquity delivered by Quintilian: As to the *primary sense*, the following will not suffer us to doubt of it:

Nuper sollicitum quæ mihi tædium,  
Nunc desiderium, curaque non levis,  
Interfusa nitentes  
Vites æquora Cycladas.

But there being, as we have shown above, two kinds of allegories; the first, *viz.*, the *proper* allegory; which hath but *one real sense*, because the literal meaning, serving only for the *envelop*, and without a *moral import*, is not to be reckoned; the second, the *improper*, which hath *two*, because the literal meaning is of *moral import*; and of this nature are prophecies with a *double sense*, the critics on Horace, not apprehending the different natures of these two kinds, have engaged in very warm contests. The one side seeing some parts of the ode to have a necessary relation with a real ship, contend for its being *purely historical*; at the head of these is Tanaquil Faber, who first started this criticism, after fifteen centuries peaceable possession of the allegory: the other side, on the authority of Quintilian, who gives the ode as an example of this figure, will have it to be *purely allegorical*. Whereas it is evidently both one and the other; of the nature of the *second kind* of allegories, which have a *double sense*; and this double sense, which does not in the least obscure the meaning, the learned reader may see, adds infinite beauty to the whole turn of the apostrophe. Had it been *purely historical*, nothing had been more cold or trifling; had it been *purely allegorical*, nothing less natural or gracious, on account of the enormous length into which it is drawn.—Ezekiel has an allegory of that sort which Quintilian supposes this to be, namely, a *proper allegory with only one real sense*, and he manages it with that brevity and expedition which a *proper allegory* demands, when used in the place of a metaphor. Speaking of Tyre under the image of a ship, he says, “Thy rowers have brought thee into great waters: the east wind hath broken thee in the midst of the seas.”† But suppose the ode to be both *historical* and *allegorical*, and that, under his immediate concern for his friends, he conveyed his more distant apprehensions for the republic; and then there appears so much ease, and art, and dignity, in every

\* Hor. lib. i. Od. 14.

† Chap. xxvii. ver. 26.

period, as make us justly esteem it the most finished composition of antiquity.

What is it then which makes the *double sense* so ridiculous and absurd in, *Hi motus animorum*, &c., and so noble and rational in, *O navis referent*, &c., but this, that, in the latter case, the subject of the *two senses* had a close connexion in the INTERESTS OF THE WRITER; in the former, none at all? Now that which makes two senses *reasonable*, does, at the same time, always make them *intelligible* and obvious. But if this be true, then a double sense in prophecies must be both reasonable and intelligible: For I think no believer will deny that there was the closest connexion between the Jewish and Christian systems, in the dispensations of the Holy Spirit.—This will show us, with what knowledge of his subject the late Lord Bolingbroke was endowed, when he endeavoured to discredit *types* and *figures* by this wise observation, “That Scripture types and figures have NO MORE RELATION TO the things said to be typified, than to any thing that passes now in France.”\*

3. His next argument runs thus—“If God is disposed to reveal to mankind any truths—he must convey them in such a manner that they may be understood—if he speaks to men, he must condescend to their infirmities and capacities.—Now if he were to contrive a proposition in such a manner—that the same proposition should relate to *several* events; the consequence would be, that as often as events happened which agreed to any proposition, so often would the revelation be accomplished. But this would only serve to increase the confusion of men’s minds, and never to clear up any prophecy: no man could say what was intended by the Spirit of God: And if MANY events were intended, it would be the same thing as if no event was intended at all.”—P. 226.

I all along suspected he was talking against what he did not understand. He proposed to prove the absurdity of a *double* or *secondary sense*, (p. 221,) of prophecies; and now he tells us of MANY senses; and endeavours to show how this would make prophecy useless. But sure he should have known, what the very phrase itself intimates, that no prophetic proposition is pretended to have more than TWO senses: and farther, that the subject of each is supposed to relate to *two* connected and successive dispensations: which is so far from creating *any confusion in men’s minds*, or *making a prophecy useless*, that it cannot but strengthen and confirm our belief of, and give *double* evidence to, the divinity of the prediction. On the contrary, he appears to think that what orthodox divines mean by a *second sense*, is the same with what the Scotch prophets mean by a *second sight*; the seeing one thing after another as long as the imagination will hold out.

4. His last argument is—“Nor is it any ground for such a supposition, that the prophets being FULL OF THE IDEAS of the *Messiah*, and his glorious kingdom, MADE USE OF IMAGES taken from thence, to express

\* Works, vol. iii. p. 306.

the points upon which they had occasion to speak. From *whencesoever* they took their ideas, yet when they spoke of *present facts*, it was *present facts* only that were to be understood. Common language, and the figures of it, and the manner of expression; the *metaphors*, the *hyperboles*, and all the usual forms of speech, are to be considered: and if the occasions of the expression are taken from a *future state*, yet still the proposition is to be interpreted of that *one* thing to which it is particularly applied.”—P. 227.

Orthodox divines have supported the reasonableness and probability of *double senses* by this material observation, that the inspired writers were *full of the ideas of the Christian dispensation*. That is, there being a close relation between the Christian and the Jewish, of which the Christian was the completion, whenever the prophets spoke of any of the remarkable fortunes of the one, they interwove with it those of the other. A truth which no man could be so hardy as deny, who believes, 1. That there is that relation between the two religions; and, 2. That these inspired men were let into the nature and future fortunes of both. See now in what manner our author represents this observation. *It is no ground*, says he, *for a double sense, that the prophets were full of the ideas of a Messiah and his glorious kingdom, and made use of images taken from thence*; [that is, that they ennobled their style by their habitual contemplation of magnificent ideas.] *For*, continues he, *whencesoever they took their ideas, when they spoke of present facts, present facts alone were to be understood. Common language and the figures of it, &c.*—Without doubt from such a *fulness of ideas*, as only raised and ennobled their style, it could be no more concluded that they meant future facts, when they speak of present, than that Virgil, because he was full of the magnificent ideas of the Roman grandeur, where he says, “*Priami imperium—divûm domus, Ilium, et ingens gloria Teucrorum*,” meant *Rome* as well as *Troy*. But what is all this to the purpose? Orthodox divines talk of a *fulness of ideas* arising from the Holy Spirit’s revealing the *mutual dependency* and *future fortunes* of the two dispensations; and revealing them for the information, solace, and support of the Christian church: and Dr Sykes talks of a *fulness of ideas* got nobody knows how, and used nobody knows why,—*to raise*, I think he says, *their style and ennoble their images*. Let him give some good account of this representation, and then we may be able to determine, if it be worth the trouble, whether he here put the change upon himself or his readers. To all this Dr Sykes replies, “It was no answer, to show that there are *allegories and allegorical interpretations*, for these were never by me denied.”—Exam. p. 363. Why does he tell us of his never denying *allegories*, when he is called upon for denying *secondary senses*? Does he take these things to be *different*? If he does, his answer is nothing to the purpose, for he is only charged, in express words, with denying *secondary senses*. Does he take them to be the *same*? He must then allow *secondary senses*; and so give up

the question; that is, retract the passages here quoted from him. He is reduced to this dilemma,—either to acknowledge that he first writ, or that he now answers, to no purpose.\*

From hence, to the end of the chapter, he goes on to examine particular texts urged against his opinion; with which I have at present nothing to do: first, because the proper subject of this section is the *general nature* only of types and double senses: and secondly, because what room I have to spare, on this head, is for a much welcomer guest, whom I am now returning to, the original author of these profound reasonings, Mr COLLINS himself.

[II.] WE have shown that *types* and *secondary senses* are rational, logical, and scholastic modes of information: that they were expedient and highly useful under the Jewish economy: and that they are indeed to be found in the institutes of the law and the prophets. But now it will be objected, “that, as far as relates to the Jewish economy, a *double sense* may be allowed; because the future affairs of that dispensation may be well supposed to occupy the thoughts of the prophet; but it is unreasonable to make one of the senses relate to a different and remote dispensation, never surely in his thoughts. “For the books of the Old Testament,” Mr Collins tells us, “seem the most plain of all ancient writings, and wherein there appears not the least trace of a typical or allegorical intention in the authors, or in any other Jews of their time.”†

I reply, that was it even as our adversaries suggest, that *all* the prophecies, which, we say, relate to JESUS, relate to him only in a *secondary* sense; and that there were no other intimations of the New dispensation but what such prophecies convey; it would not follow that *such* sense was false or groundless. And this I have clearly shown in the account of their nature, original, and use. Thus much I confess, that without miracles, in confirmation of such sense, some ‡ of them would with difficulty be proved to have it; because we have shown, that a commodious and designed obscurity attend both their nature and their use. But then, this let me add, and these pretenders to superior reason would do well to consider it, that the authority of divine wisdom as rationally forces the assent to a *determined meaning* of an obscure and doubtful proposition, as any other kind of logical evidence whatsoever.

But this which is here put is by no means the case. For we say,  
1. That some of the prophecies relate to JESUS in a *primary* sense.  
2. That besides these, there are in the prophetic writings the most clear and certain intimations of the *gospel economy*, which are alone sufficient to ascertain the reality of the *secondary*.

I. That SOME prophecies relate to the MESSIAH in a *primary* sense, hath been invincibly proved by many learned men before me: I shall mention therefore but ONE; and that, only because Mr Collins hat

\* See note N N N, at the end of this book.

† Grounds, p. 82.

‡ See note O O O, at the end of this book.

made some remarks upon it, which will afford occasion for a farther illustration of the subject. JESUS declares, of John the Baptist—*This is the ELIAS that was for to come*. “Wherein,” says the author of *the Grounds, &c.*, “he is supposed to refer to these words of Malachi, *Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet before the coming of the great and terrible day of the Lord*; which, according to their LITERAL sense, are a prophecy that *Elijah* or *Elias* was to come in person, and therefore not LITERALLY but MYSTICALLY fulfilled in *John the Baptist*.”—Pp. 47, 48. And again, in his *Scheme of Literal Prophecy Considered*, speaking of this passage of *Malachi*, he says, “But to cut off all pretence for a *literal* prophecy, I observe, first, that the literal interpretation of this place is, that *Elias*, the real *Elias*, was to come. And is it not a MOST PLEASANT literal interpretation to make *Elias* not signify *Elias*, but somebody who resembled him in qualities?—Secondly, I observe, that the *Septuagint* translators render it, *Elias the Tishbite*; and that the *Jews*, since CHRIST’S time, have generally understood, from the passage before us, that *Elias is to come in person*.—But *John Baptist* himself, who must be supposed to know who he was himself, when the question was asked him, *whether he was Elias*, denied himself to be *Elias*; and when asked who he was, said, he was the voice of one crying in the wilderness, &c., which is a passage taken from *Isaiah*.”—P. 127.

1. The first thing observable in these curious remarks is, that this great advocate of infidelity did not so much as understand the terms of the question. The words, says he, *according to their literal sense, are a prophecy that Elijah was to come in person, and therefore not literally but mystically fulfilled in John the Baptist*. He did not so much as know the meaning of a *primary* and *secondary sense*, about which he makes all this stir. A *secondary* sense indeed implies a *figurative* interpretation; a *primary* implies a *literal*: but yet this *primary* SENSE does not exclude *figurative* TERMS. The *primary* or literal sense of the prophecy in question is, that, before the great and terrible day of the Lord, a messenger should be sent, resembling in character the prophet *Elijah*; this messenger, by a *figure*, is called the prophet *Elijah*. A figure too of the most easy and natural import; and of especial use amongst the Hebrews, who were accustomed to denote any character or action by that of the kind which was become most known or celebrated. Thus the prophet *Isaiah*: “And the Lord shall utterly destroy the *tongue* of the *Egyptian* sea, and with his mighty wind shall he shake his hand over the river, and shall smite it in the *seven streams*.”\* Here, a second passage through the *Red sea* is promised in *literal terms*: but who therefore will say that this is the *literal meaning*? The literal meaning, though the prophecy be in *figurative terms*, is simply redemption from bondage. For *EGYPT*, in the Hebrew phrase, signified a *place of bondage*. So again *Jeremiah* says; “A voice was heard in *Ramah*, lamentation and bitter weeping: *RACHEL* weeping for

\* Is. xi. ver. 15.

her children, refused to be comforted because they were not.”\* The primary sense of these words, according to Grotius, is a prediction of the weeping of the Jewish matrons for their children carried captive to Babylon by Nabuzaradan. Will he say therefore that this prophecy was not *literally* fulfilled, because *Rachel* was dead many ages before, and did not, that we read of, return to life on this occasion? Does not he see that, by the most common and easy figure, the matrons of the tribe of Benjamin were called by the name of this their great parent? As the Israelites, in Scripture, are called *Jacob*, and the posterity of the son of Jesse by the name of *David*: so again, Isaiah says, “Hear the word of the Lord, ye rulers of SODOM; give ear unto the law of our GOD, ye people of GOMORRAH.”† Will he say, the people of *Sodom* and *Gomorrhah* are here addressed to in the *primary* sense, and the people of the Jews only in the *secondary*? But the preceding words, which show the people of *Sodom* and *Gomorrhah* could not now be addressed to, because there were none left, show likewise that it is the Jewish nation which is called by these names. *Except the Lord of Hosts had left us a very small remnant, we should have been as Sodom, and we should have been like unto Gomorrhah.*‡ Would not he be thought an admirable interpreter of *Virgil*, who should criticise the Roman poet in the same manner?—“*Virgil* seems the most plain of all ancient writings: and he says,

Jam redit et virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna.

Which, according to its literal meaning, is, that the *virgin* returns, and old *Saturn* reigns again, in person; and therefore not LITERALLY, but MYSTICALLY fulfilled in the justice and felicity of *Augustus's* reign. And it is a MOST PLEASANT literal interpretation, to make the *virgin* and *Saturn* not signify the *virgin* and *Saturn*, but somebody who resembled them in qualities.” Such reasoning on a classic, would be called *nonsense* in every language. But freethinking sanctifies all sorts of impertinence. Let me observe further, that this was a kind of compound blunder: LITERAL, in common speech, being opposed both to *figurative* and to *spiritual*; and MYSTICAL signifying both *figurative* and *spiritual*; he fairly confounded the distinct and different meanings both of LITERAL and of MYSTICAL.

He goes on—“I observe, that the Septuagint translators render it *Elias* the *Tishbite*—and that the *Jews* since CHRIST's time have generally understood from this passage, that *Elias* is to come in person. And *John Baptist* himself, who must be supposed to know who he was himself, when the question was asked him, denied himself to be *Elias*.”—Why does he say, *since* CHRIST's time, and not *before*, when it appears to be before as well as since, from his own account of the translation of the Septuagint? For a good reason. We should then have seen why *John the Baptist*, when asked, denied himself to be *Elias*;

\* Jer. xxxi. ver. 15.

† Is. i. ver. 10.

‡ Chap. i. ver. 9.



which it was not Mr Collins's design we should see; if indeed we do not ascribe too much to his knowledge in this matter. The case stood thus: at the time of the Septuagint translation, and from thence to the time of CHRIST, the doctrine of a *transmigration*, and of a *resurrection of the body, to repossess the land of Judea*, were national opinions; which occasioned the Jews by degrees to understand all these sorts of *figurative* expressions *literally*. Hence, amongst their many visions, this was one, that Elias should come again in person. Which shows what it was the Jews asked John the Baptist; and what it was he answered, when *he denied himself to be Elias*: not that he was not the messenger prophesied of by Malachi (for his pretending to be that messenger evidently occasioned the question), but that he was not, nor did the prophecy imply that the messenger should be, *Elias in person*.

But to set his reasoning in the fullest light, let us consider a similar prophecy of Amos: "Behold the days come, saith the Lord God, that I will send a FAMINE in the land, not a famine of bread, nor a thirst of water, but of *hearing the words of the Lord*."\* I would ask, is this a prophecy of a *famine of the word* in a *literal*, or in a *mystical* sense? Without doubt the deist will own, (if ever he expects we should appeal again to his ingenuity) in a *literal*. But now strike out the explanation [*not a famine of bread, nor a thirst of water*] and what is it then? Is it not still a *famine of the word* in a *literal* sense? *mystical*, if you will, in the meaning of *metaphorically obscure*, but not in the meaning of *spiritual*. But *mystical* in this latter signification only, is opposed to *literal*, in the question about *secondary senses*. It appears then, that a *want of preaching the word* is still the *literal* meaning of the prophecy, whether the explanation be in or out, though the *figurative* term [*famine*] be used to express that meaning. And the reason why the prophet explains the term was not, because it was a harsh or unnatural *figure*, to denote *want of preaching*, any more than the term *Elijah* to denote a similar character, which Malachi does not explain; but because the prophecy of Amos might have been for ever mistaken, and the *figurative* term understood *literally*; the people being at that time, often punished for their sins by a *famine of bread*.

But this abusive cavil at *figurative terms* will remind us of his observations on the following prophecy of Isaiah—"Even them will I bring to my holy mountain, and make them joyful in my house of prayer: their burnt offerings and their sacrifices shall be accepted upon mine altar; for mine house shall be called an house of prayer FOR ALL PEOPLE."† This, he says, must needs relate to Jewish, not to Christian times. Why? Because *sacrifices* are mentioned. But how could this truth be told the Jewish people, *that all nations should be gathered to the true God*, otherwise than by using terms taken from rites familiar to them; unless the nature of the Christian dispensation had been previously explained? A matter evidently unfit for their information, when they were yet to

\* Amos viii. ver. 11.

† Is. lvi. ver. 7.

live so long under the Jewish. For though the prophets speak of the little value of, and small regard due to the *ceremonial* law; they always mean (and always make their meaning understood) when the *ceremonial law* is superstitiously observed, and observed to a neglect of the *moral*; which last they describe in the purity and perfection of the gospel. So admirable was this conduct! that while it hid the future dispensation, it prepared men for it.

Thus then stands the argument of this mighty reasoner. There are *no* prophecies, he says, which relate to JESUS but in a *secondary sense*. Now a secondary sense is *unscholastic* and *enthusiastical*. To this we answer, that the prophecy of Malachi about Elijah, and of Isaiah about bringing all people to his holy mountain, relate to JESUS in a *primary sense*. He replies; No, but in a *mystical, only*. Here he begins to quibble, the sure sign of an expiring argument: *Mystical* signifies as well *secondary* as *figurative*. In the sense of *secondary*, the interpretation of these prophecies to JESUS is *not mystical*; in the sense of *figurative* it is. But is the use of a *figurative term* enthusiastical or unscholastic, when the end is only to convey information concerning a less known thing in the *terms* of one more known? Now whether we are to charge this to ill faith or a worse understanding, his followers shall determine for me.

2. But we will suppose all that an ingenuous adversary can ask—“That most of the prophecies in question relate to JESUS in a *secondary sense, only*; the rest in a *primary*, but expressed in *figurative* terms; which, till their completion, threw a shade over their meaning, and kept them in a certain degree of obscurity.” Now, to show how all this came about, will add still farther light to this very perplexed question.

We have seen, from the nature and long duration of the Jewish economy, that the prophecies which relate to JESUS, must needs be darkly and enigmatically delivered: we have seen how the *allegoric* mode of speech, then much in use, furnished the means, by what we call a *double sense* in prophecies, of doing this with all the requisite obscurity. But as some of these prophecies by their proper light alone, without the confirmation of miracles, could hardly have their sublimer sense so well ascertained; to render all opposers of the gospel without excuse, it pleased the Holy Spirit, under the last race of the prophets, to give credentials to the mission of JESUS by predictions of him in a *primary* and *literal* sense. Yet the Jewish economy being to continue long, there still remained the same necessity of a covert and mysterious conveyance. That figurative expression therefore, which was before employed in the *proposition*, was now used in the *terms*. Hence, the prophecies of a *single sense* come to be in highly figurative words: as before, the earlier prophecies of a *double sense* (which had a *primary* meaning in the affairs of the Jewish state, and, for the present information of that people) were delivered in a much simpler phrase.

The Jewish doctors, whose obstinate adherence, not to the *letter* of

*the law*, as this writer ignorantly or fraudulently suggests, but to the mystical interpretations of the *Cabala*, prevents their seeing the true cause of this difference in the LANGUAGE, between the earlier and later prophets; the Jewish doctors, I say, are extremely perplexed to give a tolerable account of this matter. What they best agree in is, that the *figurative enigmatic style* of the later prophets (which however they make infinitely more obscure by cabalistic meanings, than it really is, in order to evade the relation which the predictions have to JESUS) is owing to the *declining state* of prophecy. "Every prophet," says the famous rabbi, Joseph Albo, "that is of a strong, sagacious, and piercing understanding, will apprehend the thing nakedly without any similitude; whence it comes to pass that all his sayings are distinct and clear, and free from all obscurity, having a literal truth in them: but a prophet of an inferior rank or degree, his words are obscure, enwrapped in riddles and parables; and therefore have not a literal but allegorical truth contained in them."\* And indeed our fictitious rabbi seems to have had as little knowledge of this matter as the other; for in answer to what Mr Whiston, who, extravagant as he was in rejecting all *double senses*, yet knew the difference between a *secondary* and *enigmatic* prophecy, which, we shall see, Mr Collins did not, in answer, I say, to Mr Whiston, who observed *that the prophecies* [meaning the *primary*] *which relate to Christianity are covered, mystical, and enigmatical*, replies; "This is exactly equal mysticism with, and just as remote from the real literal sense, as the mysticism of the allegorists [i. e. the contenders for a double sense] and is altogether as OBSCURE to the understanding."† His argument against *secondary senses* is, that they are *unscholastic* and *enthusiastical*. Mr Whiston, to humour him, presents him with *direct* and *primary* prophecies, but tells him at the same time, they are expressed in *covered, mystical, and enigmatic terms*. This will not satisfy him: *it is no better than the mysticism of the allegorists*. How so? We may think perhaps, that he would pretend to prove, because his argument requires he should prove, that *enigmatical expressions* are as *unscholastic* and *enthusiastical* as *secondary senses*. No such matter. All he says is, that they are *as OBSCURE to the understanding*. But *obscurity* is not his quarrel with *secondary senses*. He objects to them as *unscholastic* and *enthusiastical*. But here lay the difficulty; no man who pretended to any language, could affirm this, of *figurative enigmatical expressions*; he was forced therefore to have recourse to his usual refuge, OBSCURITY.

It is true, he says, these *mystical enigmatic prophecies* (as Mr Whiston calls them) *are equally remote from the real literal sense, as the mysticism of the allegorists*. But this is only a repetition of the blunder exposed above, where he could not distinguish between the literal sense of a *term*, and the literal sense of a *proposition*. And how gross that ignorance is we may see by the following instance. Isaiah says: "The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall

\* Smith's Select Discourses, p. 180.

† The Grounds, &c. p. 242.

lie down with the kid; and the calf, and the young lion, and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them.”\* Now I will take it for granted that his followers understand this, as Grotius does, of the profound peace which was to follow after the times of Sennacherib, under Hezekiah: but though the *terms* be *mystical*, yet sure they call this the *literal sense* of the prophecy: for Grotius makes the *mystical sense* to refer to the gospel. Mr Whiston, I suppose, denies that this has any thing to do with the times of Hezekiah, but that it refers to those of CHRIST only. Is not his interpretation therefore *literal* as well as that of Grotius? unless it immediately becomes *oddly typical, unscholastic, and enthusiastical*, as soon as ever JESUS comes into the question.

II. But now, besides the *literal primary* prophecies concerning the PERSON OF JESUS, we say, in the second place, that there are other, which give a *primary* and *direct* intimation of the CHANGE OF THE DISPENSATION. Isaiah foretels great mercies to the Jewish people, in a future age; which, though represented by such metaphors as bore analogy to the blessings peculiar to the Jewish economy, yet to show that they were indeed different from what the *figurative terms* alluded to, the prophet at the same time adds; “My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord.”† This surely implies a *different* DISPENSATION. That the change was from *carnal* to *spiritual*, is elegantly intimated in the subjoining words,—“For as the HEAVENS are higher than the EARTH, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts.”‡ But this higher and more excellent dispensation is more plainly revealed in the following figure: “Instead of the thorn shall come up the fir-tree, and instead of the brier shall come up the myrtle-tree;” § i. e. the *new* religion shall as far excel the *old*, as the fir-tree does the thorn, or the myrtle the brier. In a following prophecy he shows the EXTENT of this new religion, as here he had shown its NATURE; that it was to spread beyond Judea, and to take in the whole race of mankind,—“The GENTILES shall come to thy light, and kings to the brightness of thy rising,” || &c. Which idea the prophet Zephaniah expresses in so strong a manner, as to leave no room for evasion: “The Lord will be terrible unto them, for he will FAMISH all the GODS OF THE EARTH; and men shall worship him *every one* FROM HIS PLACE, even all the isles of the GENTILES.”¶ The expression is noble, and alludes to the popular superstitions of paganism, which conceived that their gods were nourished by the steam of sacrifices. But, when were the pagan gods thus *famished*, but in the first ages of Christianity?—*Every one from his place*; that is, they were not to go up to JERUSALEM to worship.—*Even all the isles of the gentiles*: but when did these worship the God of Israel *every one from his place*, before the preaching of the apostles? Then indeed their speedy and general conversion distinguished them from the rest of

\* Is. xi. ver. 6.

§ Ver. 13.

† Chap. lv. ver. 8.

|| Chap. lx. ver. 3.

‡ Ver. 9.

¶ Zeph. ii. ver. 11.

the nations. This he expresses yet more plainly in another place. "In that day shall there be an *altar* to the Lord in the midst of the land of *Egypt*;"\* i. e. the temple-service shall be abolished; and the God of Israel worshipped with the most solemn rites, even in the most abhorred and unsanctified places, such as the Jews esteemed Egypt. Which Malachi thus diversifies in the expression, *And in every place incense shall be offered unto my name, and a PURE OFFERING*)† i. e. it shall not be the less acceptable for not being at the *temple*.

But Isaiah, as he proceeds, is still more explicit, and declares, in direct terms, that the dispensation should be changed: "Behold I create NEW HEAVENS and a NEW EARTH; and the former shall not be remembered nor come into mind."‡ This, in the prophetic style, means a NEW RELIGION and a NEW LAW; the metaphors, as we have shown elsewhere, being taken from hieroglyphical expression. He speaks in another place, of the consequence of this *change*; namely, the transferring the benefits of religion from the Jewish to the Christian dispensation. Is it not yet a very little while, "and Lebanon [*the isles of the gentiles*] shall be turned into a fruitful field, and the fruitful field [*the land of Judea*] shall be esteemed as a forest?"§ To make it yet more clear, I observe farther, that the prophet goes on to declare the *change* of the SANCTION; and this was a necessary consequence of the change of the dispensation.—"There shall be no more thence an infant of days, nor an old man that hath not filled his days: for the child shall die an hundred years old, but the sinner being an hundred years old shall be accursed;"|| i. e. the SANCTION OF TEMPORAL REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS shall be no longer administered in an extraordinary manner; for we must remember, that long life for obedience, and sudden and untimely death for transgressions, bore an eminent part in the sanction of the Jewish law. Now these are expressly said to be abrogated in the dispensation promised, it being declared that the virtuous, though dying immaturely, should be as if they had lived an hundred years; and sinners, though living to an hundred years, as if they had died immaturely.

The very same prophecy in Jeremiah, delivered in less figurative terms, supports this interpretation beyond all possibility of cavil: "Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a NEW COVENANT with the house of *Israel*, and with the house of *Judah*; not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers, in the day that I took them by the hand, to bring them out of the land of *Egypt*.—But this shall be the covenant that I will make with the house of *Israel*, After those days, saith the Lord, I will put my law in their INWARD PARTS, and write it in their hearts."¶

What Isaiah figuratively names a *new heaven and a new earth*, Jeremiah simply and literally calls a *new covenant*. And what kind of covenant? Not such a one as was made with their fathers. This was

\* Zeph. xix. ver. 19.

† See note P P P, at the end of this book.

‡ Is. lxxv. 17.

§ Chap. xxix. ver. 17.

|| Chap. lxxv. ver. 20.

¶ Chap. xxxi. ver. 31.

declarative enough of its nature; yet, to prevent mistakes, he gives as well a *positive* as a *negative* description of it: *This shall be the covenant, I will put my law in their inward parts, &c. i. e.* this law shall be *spiritual*, as the other given to their fathers was *carnal*: for the ceremonial law did not scrutinize the heart, but rested in external obedience and observances.

Lastly, to crown the whole, we may observe, that Jeremiah too, like Isaiah, fixes the true nature of the dispensation by declaring the CHANGE of the SANCTION: "In those days they shall say no more, the fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge. But every one shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eateth the sour grape, his teeth shall be set on edge."\* For it was part of the sanction of the Jewish law, that children should bear the iniquity of their fathers, &c., a mode of punishing which hath been already explained and justified. Yet all these prophecies of the GOSPEL being delivered in terms appropriate to the LAW, the Jews of that time would naturally, as they in fact did, understand them as speaking of the extension and completion of the OLD dispensation, rather than the perfection of it by the introduction of a NEW. And thus their reverence for the present system, under which they were yet to continue, was preserved. The necessity of this proceeding, for the present time;—the effects it would afterwards produce through the perversity of the superstitious followers of the law;—and the divine goodness as well as wisdom manifested in this proceeding, are all finely touched in the following passage of Isaiah:†—"Whom shall he teach knowledge? and whom shall he make to understand doctrine? Them that are weaned from the milk, and drawn from the breasts.‡ For precept must be [or *hath been*] upon precept, precept upon precept, line upon line, line upon line,§ here a little and there a little. For with stammering lips and another tongue will he speak to this people.|| To whom he said, This is the rest, and this is the refreshing,¶ yet they would not hear. But the word of the Lord was unto them, precept upon precept, precept upon precept, line upon line, line upon line, here a little and there a little; that they might go and fall backward, and be broken and snared and taken."\*\*

Notwithstanding all this, if you will believe our adversary, "The books of the Old Testament seem the most PLAIN of all ancient writings, and wherein there appears NOT THE LEAST TRACE OF A TYPICAL OR ALLEGORICAL INTENTION in the authors, or in any other *Jews* of their times."†† He that answers a freethinker will find employment enough.

\* Jer. xxxi. ver. 29, 30.

† Is. xxviii. 9, et seq.

‡ i. e. Those who were most free from the prejudices of the *eternity* of the law.

§ This reduplication of the phrase was to add force and energy to the sense.

|| i. e. Gospel truths delivered in the language of the law.

¶ i. e. The glad tidings of the gospel.

\*\* i. e. This gradual yet repeated instruction, which was given with so much mercy and indulgence, to lead them by slow and gentle steps from the law to the gospel, being abused so as to defeat the end, God in punishment made it the occasion of blinding their eyes and hardening their hearts.

†† Grounds, &c., p. 22.



—*Not the least trace of a typical or allegorical intention!* He might as well have said there is *not the least trace* of poetry in Virgil, or of eloquence in Cicero. But there is none, he says, *either in the authors, or in any other Jews of their times.* Of both which assertions, this single text of Ezekiel will be an abundant confutation—*Ah, Lord, THEY SAY OF ME, DOTH HE NOT SPEAK PARABLES?\** The prophet complains that his ineffectual mission proceeded from his speaking, and from the people's conceiving him to speak, of things mysteriously, and in a mode of delivery not understood by them. The author of the book of Ecclesiasticus, who is reasonably supposed to have been contemporary with Antiochus Epiphanes, represents holy scripture as fully fraught with typical and allegoric wisdom: "He that giveth his mind to the law of the Most High, and is occupied in the meditation thereof, will seek out the wisdom of the ancients, AND BE OCCUPIED IN PROPHECIES. He will keep the sayings of the renowned men; and where SUBTILE PARABLES are, he will be there also. He will seek out the SECRETS OF GRAVE SENTENCES, and be conversant in DARK PARABLES."† Hence it appears that the Jewish prophecies were not so *plain* as our adversary represents them; and that their obscurity arose from their having *typical* or *allegorical intentions*: which figures too related not to the *present*, but to a *future* dispensation, as is farther seen from what Ezekiel says in another place:—*Son of man, behold they of the house of Israel say, THE VISION THAT HE SEETH IS FOR MANY DAYS TO COME, AND HE PROPHESIETH OF TIMES THAT ARE FAR OFF.‡* So that these people to whom the prophecies were so *plain*, and who understood them to respect their own times only, *without any typical or allegoric meaning*, complain of *obscurities* in them, and consider them as referring to very *remote times*. But I am ashamed of being longer serious with so idle a caviller. The *English Bible* lies open to every FREETHINKER of Great Britain: where they may read it that will, and understand it that can.

As for such writers as the author of the *Grounds and Reasons*, to say the truth, one would never wish to see them otherwise employed: but when so great and so good a man as GROTIUS hath unwarily contributed to support the dotages of infidelity, this is such a misadventure as one cannot but lament.

This excellent person (for it is not to be disguised) hath made it his constant endeavour throughout his whole Comment on the Prophets, to find a *double* sense even in those *direct* prophecies which relate to JESUS; and to turn the *primary* sense upon the affairs of the Jewish dispensation; only permitting them to relate to JESUS in a *secondary*: and by that affected strain of interpretation, hath done almost as much harm to revelation as his other writings have done it service: not from any strength there is in his criticisms (for this, and his Comment on the

\* Ezek. xx. ver. 49.

† ——— ἐν προφητείᾳ ἀσχοληθήσεται—ἐν στεροφαῖς παραβολῶν συνιενελεύσεται—ἐν αἰνίγμασι παραβολῶν ἀναστραφήσεται.—Chap. xxxix. ver. 1, 2, 3.

‡ Chap. xii. ver. 27.

Apocalypse, are the opprobrium of his great learning), but only from the name they carry with them.

The principle which *Grotius* went upon, in commenting the Bible, was, that it should be interpreted on the same rules of criticism that men use in the study of all other ancient writings. Nothing could be more reasonable than his principle: but unluckily he deceived himself in the *application* of it. These rules teach us that the GENIUS, PURPOSE, and AUTHORITY of the writer should be carefully studied. Under the head of his *authority*, it is to be considered, whether he be a mere *human* or an *inspired* writer. Thus far Grotius went right: he examined that authority; and pronounced the writers to be *inspired*, and the prophecies *divine*: but when he came to apply these premises, he utterly forgot his conclusion; and interpreted the prophecies by rules very different from what the confession of their divine original required: for seeing them pronounced by Jewish prophets, occupied in Jewish affairs, he concluded their sole object was Jewish; and consequently that the proper sense of the prophecies referred to these only. But this was falling back from one of the grounds he went upon; that the writers were *inspired*: for his interpretation was only reasonable on the supposition that these writers prophesied in the very manner which the pagans understood their prophets sometimes to have done, by a *natural sagacity*: for, on the allowance of a real inspiration, it was God, and not the writer, who was the proper author of the prophecy. And to understand *his purpose*, which the rules of interpretation require us to seek, we must examine the nature, reason, and end of that religion which he gave to the Jews: for on *these*, common sense assures us, the meaning of the prophecies must be entirely regulated. Now if, on inquiry, it should be found, that this which Grotius admitted for a divine dispensation, was only preparatory of another more perfect, it would then appear not to be improbable that some of these prophecies might relate, in their *literal, primary, and immediate* sense, to that more perfect dispensation. And whether they did so or not was to be determined by the joint evidence of the context, and of the nature of God's whole dispensation to mankind, so far forth as it is discoverable to us. But Grotius, instead of making the matter thus reasonably problematical, and to be determined by evidence, determined first, and laid it down as a kind of principle, that the prophecies related directly and properly to Jewish affairs: and into this system he wiredrew all his explanations. This, as we say, was falsely applying a true rule of interpretation. He went on this reasonable ground, that the prophecies should be interpreted like all other ancient writings: and, on examining their *authority*, he found them to be truly *divine*. When he had gone thus far, he then preposterously went back again, and commented as if they were confessed to be merely *human*: the consequence was, that several of his criticisms, to speak of them only as the performance of a man of learning, are so forced, unnatural, and absurd, so opposed to the rational

canon of interpretation, that I will venture to affirm they are, in all respects, the worst that ever came from the hand of an acute and able critic.

[III.] HAVING now proved that the principles which Mr Collins went upon are in themselves false and extravagant, one has little reason to regard how he employed them. But as this extraordinary writer was as great a freethinker in logic as in divinity, it may not be improper to show the fashionable world what sort of man they have chosen for their guide, to lead them from their religion, when they would no longer bear with any to direct them in it.

His argument against what he calls *typical, allegorical*, but properly, *secondary* senses, stands thus:—"Christianity pretends to derive itself from Judaism. JESUS appeals to the religious books of the Jews as prophesying of his mission. None of these prophecies can be understood of him but in a *typical allegoric* sense. Now that sense is absurd, and contrary to all scholastic rules of interpretation. Christianity, therefore, not being really predicted of in the Jewish writings, is consequently false."—The contestable proposition, on which the whole argument rests, is, *that a typical or allegoric sense is absurd, and contrary to all scholastic rules of interpretation.*

Would the reader now believe that Mr Collins has himself, in this very book, given a thorough confutation of his own capital proposition? Yet so it is; and, contrary too to his usual way of reasoning, he has done it in a very clear and convincing manner; by showing, that the *typical* and *allegorical* way of writing was universally practised by antiquity—"Allegory," says he, "was much in use amongst the *pagans*, being cultivated by many of the philosophers themselves as well as theologers. By SOME, AS THE METHOD OF DELIVERING DOCTRINES; but, by most, as the method of explaining away what, according to the letter, appeared absurd in the ancient fables or histories of their gods. Religion itself was deemed a mysterious thing amongst the *pagans*, and not to be publicly and plainly declared. Wherefore it was never simply represented to the people, but was most obscurely delivered and veiled under allegories, or parables, or hieroglyphics; and especially amongst the Egyptians, Chaldeans, and the oriental nations.—They allegorized many things of nature, and particularly the heavenly bodies.—They allegorized all their ancient fables and stories, and pretended to discover in them the secrets of natural philosophy, medicine, politics, and in a word all arts and sciences. The works of *Homer* in particular have furnished infinite materials for all sorts of allegorical commentators to work upon.—The ancient Greek poets were reputed to involve divine, and natural, and historical notions of their gods under mystical and parabolical expressions.—The *Pythagorean* philosophy was wholly delivered in mystical language, the signification whereof was entirely unknown to the world abroad.—The *stoic* philosophers are particularly famous for allegorizing the whole heathen theology.—We have several

treatises of heathen philosophers on the subject of allegorical interpretation." \*

If now this kind of *allegorizing*, which involved the proposition in a *double sense*, was in use amongst the pagan oracles, divines, philosophers and poets, is not the understanding ancient writings *allegorically*, or in a *double sense*, agreeable to all rational, scholastic rules of interpretation? Surely, as much so as the understanding mere *metaphorical* expressions in a *tropical* signification; whose propriety no one ever yet called in question. For the sense of *propositions* is imposed as arbitrarily as the sense of *words*. And if men, in the communication of their thoughts, agree to give, on some occasions, a *double* sense to *propositions*, as well as on others, a *single*, the interpreting the first in *two* meanings is as agreeable to all scholastic rules, as interpreting the other in *one*: and *propositions*, with a double and single sense, are as easily distinguishable from each other, by the help of the context, as *words* with a literal and figurative meaning. But this great philosopher seems to have imagined, that the *single sense of a proposition* was imposed by nature; and that therefore, giving them a *double meaning*, was the same offence against reason as the deviating from the unity of pure *theism* into *polytheism*; and, consequently, that the universal lapse into ALLEGORY and IDOLATRY rendered neither the one nor other of them the less absurd.†

I say, he seems to think so. More one cannot say of such a writer. Besides, he seems to think otherwise, where, in another place, as if aware that *use* would rescue a *double sense* from his *irrational* and *unscholastic* censure, he endeavours to prove, that the Jews, during the prophetic period, did not use this allegoric way of expression. Now if we be right in this last conjecture about his meaning, he abuses the terms he employs, under a miserable quibble; and, by *scholastic* and *unscholastic rules*, only means interpreting in a *single* or a *double sense*.

The reader perhaps will be curious to know how it happened, that this great reasoner should, all at once, overthrow what he had been so long labouring to build. This fatal issue of his two books of the GROUNDS, &c. and SCHEME, &c. had these causes:

1. He had a pressing and immediate *objection* to remove. And, as he had no great stock of argument, and but small forecast, any thing, at a plunge, would be received, which came to his relief.

The objection was this—"That the allegorical interpretations of the apostles were not designed for absolute proofs of Christianity, but for arguments *ad homines* only to the Jews, who were accustomed to that way of reasoning."—P. 79.—Thus, he himself tells us, some divines are accustomed to talk. He gives them indeed a solid answer; but he dreams not of the consequence. He says, this *allegoric reasoning* was common to all mankind. Was it so? Then the grand proposition on which his whole work supports itself is entirely overthrown. For if all

\* Grounds, &c., pp. 83—86.

† See note Q Q Q, at the end of this book.

mankind used it, the method must needs be *rational* and *scholastic*. But this he was not aware of. What kept him in the dark, was his never being able to distinguish between the USE and the ABUSE of this mode of information. These two things he perpetually confounds, *the pagan oracles delivered themselves in allegories*;—this was the use: *their later divines turned all their religion into allegory*;—this was the abuse. *The elder Pythagoreans gave their precepts in allegory*;—this was the use: *the later stoics allegorized every thing*;—this was the abuse. *Homer had some allegories*;—this was the use: *his commentators turned all to allegory*;—and this again was the abuse. But though he has talked so much of these things, yet he knew no more of them than old JOHN BUNYAN; whose honester ignorance, joined to a good meaning, disposed him to *admire* that which the malignity of our author's folly inclined him to *decry*: and each in the like ridiculous extreme.

2. But the other cause of this subversion of his own system was the delight he took to blacken the splendour of religion. He supposed, we may be sure, it would prove an effectual discredit to revelation, to have it seen, that there was this conformity between the pagan and Jewish method of delivering religion and morality. His attempt hath been already exposed as it deserves.\* But in this instance it labours under much additional folly. For the *different* reasons which induced the propagators of paganism, and the author of Judaism, to employ the *same* method of information, are obvious to the meanest capacity, if advanced but so far in the knowledge of nature to know, that *different ends* are very commonly prosecuted by the *same means*. The pagans allegorized in order to hide *the weakness and absurdities of their national religions*; the author of Judaism allegorized in order to prepare his followers for the reception of a more perfect dispensation, founded on Judaism, which was preparatory of it; and, at the same time, to prevent their premature rejection of Judaism, under which they were still to be long exercised.

Thus we see how this formidable enemy of our faith has himself overturned his whole argument by an unwary answer to an occasional objection. But this is but *one*, of a work full of contradictions. I have no occasion to be particular, after removing his main principles; yet, for the reader's diversion, I shall give him a taste of them. In his 81st page, he says—“And there has been for a long time, and is at this time as little use of allegory in those respects amongst them [*the Jews*] as there seems to have been during the time the books of the Old Testament were written, which seem the most plain of all ancient writings, and wherein there appears not the least trace of a typical or allegorical intention in the authors, or in any other *Jews* of their times.” Yet it is but at the 85th page that we find him saying—“And in this [*viz.* in delivering his philosophy in mystical language] PYTHAGORAS came up to SOLOMON's character of wise men, who dealt in dark sayings, and

\* See book iv. sect. 1, at the end.

acted not much unlike the most divine teacher that ever was. Our Saviour spake with many parables," &c. Now it seems, it was Solomon's character of *wise men*, that they dealt in *dark sayings*. But these wise men were the authors of the Jewish scriptures. And yet he had but just before assured us, "That the books of the Old Testament seem the most plain of all ancient writings, and wherein there appears not the least trace of a typical or allegorical intention in the authors, or in any Jews of their times."

Again, in his pages 85, 86, he says, "The Pythagorean philosophy was wholly delivered in mystical language; the signification whereof was entirely unknown to the world abroad, and but gradually explained to those of the sect, as they grew into years, or were proper to be informed—the stoic philosophers were particularly famous for *allegorizing*—we have several treatises of heathen philosophers on the subject of allegorical interpretation—and from philosophers, Platonists, and stoics, the famous Origen is said to have derived a great deal of his skill in allegorizing the books of the Old Testament." This he says, and yet at the 94th page he tells us,—“That the apostles, and particularly St Paul, wholly discarded all other methods of reasoning used by philosophers, except the *allegorical*: and set that up as the true and ONLY reasoning proper to bring all men to the faith of CHRIST: and the gentiles were to be WHOLLY beat out of the literal way of arguing, and to argue as *became Jews*. And the event of preaching the gospel has been suited to matters considered in this view and light. For we know that the WISE did not receive the gospel at first, and that they were the latest converts: *which PLAINLY arose from their using maxims of reasoning and disputing WHOLLY opposite to those of Christians*.” By these *wise*, can be meant none but the pagan philosophers: and these, according to our author, were altogether given up to mystery and allegory. Yet St Paul, and the rest of the apostles, who, he says, were likewise given up to the same method, could make no converts amongst these *wise men*. Why? It would now methinks have suited his talents as well as temper, to have told us, it was *because two of a trade could not agree*: “No,” says this incomparable logician, “it was because the philosophers used maxims of reasoning and disputing wholly opposite to the Christians.”

What now but the name and authority of *freethinking* could hinder such a writer from becoming the contempt of all who know either how to make, or to understand an argument? These men profane the *light* they receive from *revelation* in employing it to rob the treasures of the *sanctuary*. But RELIGION arrests them in the *manner*, and pronounces one common doom upon the whole race.

——— Ne IGNIS NOSTER facinori præluceat,  
Per quem colendos censuit pietas deos,  
VETO ESSE TALE LUMINIS COMMERCIUM.\*

Hence the fate that attends them all, in the inseparable connexion be-

\* Phæd. lib. iv. fab. 10.



tween *impiety* and *blundering*; which always follow one another as the crime and the punishment.

If it be asked then, what it is that hath so strangely prejudiced our modern reasoners against this ancient mode of information by **TYPICAL** and **SECONDARY** senses? I answer, the folly of fanatics, who have abused it in support of the most abominable nonsense. But how unreasonable is this prejudice! Was there ever any thing rational or excellent amongst men, that hath not been thus abused? Is it any disparagement to the *method of geometers*, that some conceited writers on morality and religion have of late taken it up, to give an air of weight and demonstration to the whimsies of pedantic importance? Is there no truth of nature, or reasonableness of art, in *grammatical construction*, because cabalistic dunces have in every age abused it to pervert all human meaning? We might as well say that the ancient Egyptians did not write in hieroglyphics, because Kircher, who endeavoured to explain them, hath given us nothing but his own visions, as that the ancient Jews had not *types* and *secondary senses*, because modern enthusiasts have allegorized their whole story.

But I from these *abuses* would draw a very contrary conclusion. The rage of *allegorizing* in religion hath infected all ages: can there be a stronger proof that the original mode was founded in the common conceptions of mankind? The pagans began the *abuse*; and the pestilent infection soon spread amongst the followers of true religion.

1. The early propagators of **PAGANISM**, in order to hide the weakness of the national religion, delivered many things in types and allegories. But a growing superstition, accompanied with an equal advance in knowledge, made it at length impossible to screen the folly even of the less obnoxious parts from common observers. Their successors therefore, to support its credit, went on where the others had left off; and allegorized all the traditional stories of their gods into *natural, moral, and divine* entities. This, notwithstanding the extravagance of the means, fully answered the end.

2. The Jews engrafted on *their* predecessors, just as the pagans had done on *theirs*; and with the same secular policy: for being possessed with a national prejudice, that their religion was to endure for ever, and yet seeing in it the marks of a carnal, temporary, and preparatory dispensation, they cunningly allegorized its rites and precepts into a *spiritual* meaning, which covered every thing that was a real deficiency in a religion which they considered as perfect and perpetual. Both these sorts of allegorists therefore had reason in their rage.

3. Afterwards came a set of **CHRISTIAN** writers, brought out from amongst *Jews* and *gentiles*; and these too would needs be in the fashion, and allegorize their religion likewise; but with infinitely less judgment than the others; though alas! with equal success. In their hands, the *end* proved as hurtful to truth as the *means* were extravagant in nature. And how should it be otherwise in a religion both *divine* and *perfect*?

For in such a one, there was nothing either to **HIDE** or to **SUPPLY**. We have shown that *types* and *secondary senses* were employed in the Jewish religion for the *sake of the Christian*, of which the Jewish was the groundwork and preparation. When therefore the *Christian* was come, these modes of information must needs cease, there being no farther occasion, nor indeed room, for them. As clear as this is to the lowest understanding, yet would some primitive doctors of the church needs contend with Jewish rabbins, and pagan philosophers, in all the rage of *allegorizing*; deaf to the voice of reason, which called aloud to tell them, that those very arguments, which proved that there were, and must needs be, *types* and *secondary senses* in the *Old Testament*, proved as plainly that there neither were, nor could be any, in the *New*. Thus, to the inexpressible damage of Christianity, they exposed a *reasonable service*, and a *perfected dispensation* (where nothing was taught but truth, plain, simple, and open) to the laughter and contempt of infidels: who, bewildered in the universal maze of this *allegoric* mode of information, were never able to know what it was in its original, nor how to distinguish between the *use* and the *abuse*.

To **CONCLUDE**, let not the reader think I have been all this while leading him out of the way, while I have engaged his attention to the *book of JOB*; to the *case of ABRAHAM*; and to *TYPES and secondary senses* under the Jewish dispensation. All these strictly belong to the argument:

1. First, as they greatly contribute to show the **HARMONY of truth**; and how all the parts of the Jewish dispensation support and illustrate one another.

2. Secondly, as they contribute to show the **UNIFORMITY** of it; and how the Holy Spirit, quite throughout God's grand economy, from his first giving of the law to the completion of it by the gospel, observed the same unvaried method of the **GRADUAL COMMUNICATION of truth**.

3. Thirdly, as they contribute to show the **FOLLY** of those who contend that the Christian doctrine of a future state was revealed to the early Jews; since this opinion destroys all the reason of a *secondary sense* of prophecies: and of how great importance the reality of *this sense* is to the truth of Christianity hath been largely explained: for how can it be known with certainty, from the prophecies themselves, that they contain *double senses*, but from hence, that the *old* law was preparatory to, and the rudiment of, the *new*? How shall this *relation* be certainly known, but from hence, that *no future state* of rewards and punishments is to be found in the Mosaic dispensation? \* So close a dependance have all these important principles on one another.

### RECAPITULATION.

AND NOW if the length of the demonstration have not tired out the

\* See note R R R, at the end of this book.

reader's patience, or, to speak more properly, if length of time have not worn out his attention to the subject, it may be proper (the argument being here concluded) to take a retrospective view of the whole, as it hath been enforced in this and the preceding volume.\* For the deep professor, who hath digested his theology into sums and systems, and the florid preacher, who never suffered his thoughts to expatiate beyond the limits of a pulpit essay, will be ready to tell me, that I had promised to DEMONSTRATE THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES; and that now, that I had written two large volumes on that subject, "all that they could find in them were Discourses on the foundation of Morality—the Origin of civil and religious Society—the Alliance between Church and State—the Policy of Lawgivers—the Mysteries of the Priests—and the Opinions of the *Greek* Philosophers—the Antiquity of Egypt—their Hieroglyphics—their Heroes—and their Brute-worship. That, indeed, at last I speak a little of the Jewish policy; but I soon break away from it, as from a subject I would avoid, and employ the remaining part of the volume on the Sacrifice of Isaac—on the book of Job—and on primary and secondary prophecies. But what, say they, is all this to *the divine legation of Moses*?

*Dic, Posthume! de tribus capellis.*

To call the topic I went upon a PARADOX, was said, without doubt, to my discredit; but not to see that I had proved it in form, will, I am afraid, redound to their own. Yet I had already bespoke their best attention in the words of Cicero, who, I believe, often found himself in my situation: "Video hanc primam ingressionem meam non ex ORATORIS disputationibus ductam, sed è media philosophia repetitam, et eam quidem cum antiquam tum subobscuram, aut REPREHENSIONIS aliquid, aut certe ADMIRATIONIS habituram. Nam aut mirabantur QUID HÆC PERTINEANT AD EA QUÆ QUÆRIMUS: quibus satisfaciet res ipsa cognita, ut non sine causa ALTE repetita videatur: aut reprehendent, QUOD INUSITATAS VIAS INDAGEMUS, TRITAS RELINQUAMUS. Ego autem me sæpe *nova* videre dicere intelligo cum *pervetera* dicam, sed *inaudita* plerisque."†

But as this apology hath not answered its purpose, and as the ARGUMENT is indeed drawn out to an uncommon length; raised upon a great variety of supports; and sought out from every quarter of antiquity, and sometimes out of corners the most remote and dark; it was the less to be admired if every *inattentive* reader did not see their force and various purpose; or if every *attentive* reader could not combine them into the body of a completed syllogism; and still less if the envious and the prejudiced should concur to represent these volumes as an indigested and inconnected heap of discourses, thrown out upon one another, to disburden a common place. For the satisfaction therefore of the more candid, who acknowledge the fairness of the attempt, who saw something of the progress of the argument, but misled by the notice of a re-

\* Books i. ii. iii. and iv. v. vi. originally appeared in two vols. 4to.

† Cicero.

maining part, neglected to pursue the proof to the conclusion here deduced, I shall endeavour to lay open, in one plain and simple view, the whole conduct of these mysterious volumes.

Nor shall I neglect the other sort of readers, though it be odds we part again as dissatisfied with one another as the toyman of Bath and his customer; of whom the story goes, that a grave well dressed man coming into the shop of this ingenious inventor, and reliever of the distresses of those who are too dull to know what they want, and too rich to be at ease with what they have, demanded to see some of his best reading-glasses; which when he had tried to no purpose, he returned. The toyman surprised at so strange a phenomenon, gravely asked him, whether ever he had learned to read? to which the other as gravely replied, that if he had been so happy, he should have had no need of his assistance. Now, before I bring the distant parts of my argument to converge, for the use of these dim-sighted gentlemen, may I ask them, without offence, a similar question? They have ANSWERED; without asking; but not with the same ingenuity.

In reading the LAW and HISTORY of the JEWS, with all the attention I could give to them, amongst the many circumstances peculiar to that amazing dispensation (from several of which, as I conceive, the divinity of its original may be fairly proved) these two particulars most forcibly struck my observation, THE OMISSION OF THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE, and THE ADMINISTRATION OF AN EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE. As unaccountable as the first circumstance appeared when considered separately and alone, yet when set against the other, and their mutual relations examined and compared, the *omission* was not only well explained, but was found to be an invincible medium for the proof the DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES: which, as unbelievers had been long accustomed to decry from this very circumstance, I chose it preferably to any other. The argument appeared to me in a supreme degree strong and simple, and not needing many words to enforce it, or, when enforced, to make it well understood.

RELIGION hath always been held necessary to the support of CIVIL SOCIETY, because human laws alone are ineffectual to restrain men from evil, with a force sufficient to carry on the affairs of public regimen: and (under the common dispensation of providence) a FUTURE STATE of rewards and punishments is confessed to be as necessary to the support of RELIGION, because nothing else can remove the objections to God's moral government under a providence so apparently unequal, whose phenomena are apt to disturb the serious professors of RELIGION with doubts and suspicions concerning it, as it is of the essence of religious profession to believe, "that God is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him."

Moses, who instituted a RELIGION and a REPUBLIC, and incorporated them into one another, stands single amongst ancient and modern law-givers, in teaching a RELIGION without the *sanction*, or even so much as the *mention* of a FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. The

same Moses, with a singularity as great, by uniting the religion and civil community of the Jews into one incorporated body, made God, by natural consequence, their supreme civil magistrate, whereby the form of government arising from thence became truly and essentially a THEOCRACY. But as the *administration* of government necessarily follows its *form*, that before us could be no other than AN EXTRAORDINARY OR EQUAL PROVIDENCE. And such indeed not only the Jewish lawgiver himself, but all the succeeding rulers and prophets of this republic, have invariably represented it to be. In the mean time, no lawgiver or founder of religion amongst any other people ever promised so singular a distinction; no historian ever dared to record so remarkable a prerogative.

This being the true and acknowledged state of the case; whenever the unbeliever attempts to disprove, and the advocate of religion to support, the divinity of the Mosaic dispensation, the obvious question (if each be willing to bring it to a speedy decision) will be, “Whether the EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE thus prophetically promised, and afterwards historically recorded to be performed, was REAL OR PRETENDED only?”

We believers *hold* that it was REAL: and I, as an advocate for revelation, undertake to *prove* it was so; employing for this purpose, as my medium, THE OMISSION OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. The argument stands thus:

If religion be necessary to civil government, and if religion cannot subsist, under the common dispensation of providence, without a future state of rewards and punishments; so consummate a lawgiver would never have neglected to inculcate the belief of such a state, had he not been well assured that an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE was indeed to be administered over his people: or were it possible he had been so infatuated, the impotency of a religion wanting a future state must very soon have concluded in the destruction of his republic: yet nevertheless it flourished and continued sovereign for many ages.

These two proofs of the proposition (*that an extraordinary providence was really administered*) drawn from the THING OMITTED and the PERSON OMITTING, may be reduced to the following SYLLOGISMS.

I. Whatsoever religion and society have no future state for their support, must be supported by an extraordinary providence.

The Jewish religion and society had no future state for their support:

Therefore the Jewish religion and society were supported by an extraordinary providence.

And again,

II. The ancient lawgivers universally believed, that a religion without a future state could be supported only by an extraordinary providence.

Moses, an ancient lawgiver, learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians (the principal branch of which wisdom was inculcating the doctrine of a future state) instituted such a religion:

Therefore Moses believed that his religion was supported by an extraordinary providence.

This is the ARGUMENT OF THE DIVINE LEGATION; plain, simple, and convincing, in the opinion of the author; a PARADOX, in the representation of his adversaries; attempts of this nature being still attended with the fortune they have long undergone. *William of Newbourg*, speaking of Gregory the eighth, tells us, that he was, “*Vir plane et sapientiæ et vitæ sinceritate conspicuus, æmulationem Dei habens in omnibus secundum scientiam; et superstitiosarum consuetudinum quarum in ecclesia per quorundam rusticam simplicitatem citra Scripturarum auctoritatem multitudo inolevit, reprehensor acerrimus. Unde a quibusdam minus discretis putatus est turbato per nimiam abstinenciam cerebro delirare.*” This curious passage shows what hath been, and what is likely to be, the fate of all opposers of foolish and superstitious practices and opinions, when opposers are most wanted, that is to say, to be thought mad. Only one sees there was this difference between *William’s* age and our own. In the time of good Gregory, they were the *people of least discretion* who passed this judgment on every reformer’s head-piece; whereas in our times, they are the *more discreet* who have made this discovery.

Our author’s adversaries proved to be of two sorts, FREETHINKERS and SYSTEMATICAL DIVINES. Those denied the major of the two syllogisms; these, the minor: yet one could not be done without contradicting the universal voice of antiquity; nor the other, without explaining away the sense, as well as letter, of sacred scripture. Had it not been for this odd combination, my *demonstration of the Divine Legation of Moses* had not only been as *strong* but as *short* too as any of Euclid’s: whose theorems, as Hobbes somewhere observes, should they happen to be connected with the passions and interests of men, would soon become as much matter of dispute and contradiction as any moral or theological proposition whatsoever.

It was not long, therefore, before I found that the discovery of this important truth would engage me in a full dilucidation of the three following propositions:—

1. “That inculcating the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, is necessary to the well-being of civil society.

2. “That all mankind, especially the most wise and learned nations of antiquity, have concurred in believing and teaching, that this doctrine was of such use to civil society.”

3. “That the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is not to be found in, nor did make part of, the Mosaic dispensation.”

—Neither a short nor an easy task. The two first requiring a severe search into the *religion*, the *politics*, and the *philosophy* of ancient times: and, the latter, a minute examination into the *nature and genius of the Hebrew constitution*.



To the first part of this inquiry, therefore, I assigned the first volume of this work;\* and to the other, the second.†

[I.] THE *first* volume begins with,

I. The first book, which proves the MAJOR of the first syllogism, *that whatsoever religion and society have, no future state for their support, must be supported by an extraordinary providence.* In order to which, the FIRST PROPOSITION was to be enforced, that *the inculcating the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is necessary to the well-being of society.*

This is done in the following manner—By showing that CIVIL SOCIETY, which was instituted as a remedy against force and injustice, falls short, in many instances, of its effects—as it cannot, by its own proper force, provide for the observance of above one third part of moral duties; and, of that third, but imperfectly: and further, which is a matter of still greater importance, that it totally wants the first of those two great hinges on which government is supposed to turn, and without which it cannot be carried on, namely, REWARD and PUNISHMENT. Some other coercive power was therefore to be added to civil society, to supply its wants and imperfections. This power is shown to be no other than RELIGION; which teaching the just government of the Deity, provides for all the natural deficiencies of civil society. But this government, it is seen, can be no otherwise supported than by the general belief of a *future state*; or of an *extraordinary providence*, that is, by a dispensation of things very different from what we see administered at present.

This being proved, the discourse proceeds to remove objections.—The reader observes, that the steps and gradations of this capital truth advance thus,—A future state is necessary as it supports religion—religion is necessary as it supports morality—and morality as it supports (though it be reciprocally supported by) civil society, which only can procure such accommodations of life as man's nature requires. Hence I conclude, that the doctrine of a future state was necessary to civil society, under the present administration of providence.

Now there are various kinds or rather degrees of LIBERTINISM. Some, though they own morality to be necessary to society, yet deny religion to be necessary. Others again deny it even to morality.—As both equally attempt to break the chain of my reasoning, both come equally under my examination. And, opportunely for my purpose, a great name in the first instance, and a great book, in the second, invited me to this entertainment.

1. The famous M. BAYLE had attempted to prove, that *religion* was not necessary to society; and that, simple *morality*, as distinguished from religion, might well supply its place: which morality too, an ATHEIST might completely possess. His arguments in support of these propositions I have carefully examined: and having occasion, when I came to

\* That is, books i. ii. and iii. which formed the first volume in the first edition of The Divine Legation.

† Books iv. v. and vi.

the last of them, to inquire into *the true foundation of morality*, I state all its pretences, consider all its advantages, and show that OBLIGATION, properly so called, proceeds from WILL and from WILL only. This inquiry was directly to my point, as the result of it proves that the *morality* of the *atheist* must be without any true foundation, and consequently weak and unstable. It had a further propriety, as the religion, whose divine original I am here attempting to demonstrate, has founded *moral obligation* in *will* only; and had a peculiar expediency likewise, as it is become the fashion of the times to seek for this *foundation* any where but there where religion has placed it.

2. But MANDEVILLE, the author of *the Fable of the Bees*, went a large step further; and pretended to prove that MORALITY was so far from being necessary to society, that it was *vice* and not *virtue* which rendered states flourishing and happy. This execrable doctrine, that would cut away my argument by the roots, was presented to the people with much laboured art and plausible insinuation. It was necessary therefore to confute and expose it. This I have done with the same care, but with better faith than it was enforced.

In this manner I endeavoured to prove the MAJOR PROPOSITION of the first syllogism: and with this, the first book of *the Divine Legation of Moses* concludes.

II. The second book begins with establishing the MAJOR of the second syllogism, *That the ancient lawgivers universally believed that a religion without a future state could be supported only by an extraordinary providence*. In order to which, the SECOND PROPOSITION was to be enforced, *That all mankind, especially the most wise and learned nations of antiquity, have concurred in believing and teaching, that the doctrine of a future state was necessary to the well-being of civil society*.

The proof of this proposition divides itself into two parts—The *conduct of the LAWGIVERS*; and *the opinion of the PHILOSOPHERS*.

The first part is the subject of the *present* book; as the second part is of the *following*.

In proving this proposition from the *conduct of the lawgivers*, I show,

1. Their care to PROPAGATE *religion in general*, 1. As it appears from the *effects*, the state of religion every where in the civilized world. 2. As it appears from the *cause*, such as their universal pretence to *inspiration*, in order to instil the belief of the Divine superintendency over human affairs; and such as their universal practice in *prefacing their laws*, in order to establish the belief of that superintendency. And here it should be observed, that in proving their care to propagate *religion in general*, I prove their care to propagate the doctrine of a *future state of rewards and punishments*; since there never was a formed religion in the world, the *Jewish* excepted, of which this doctrine did not make an essential part.

2. But I show, in the second place, their care to propagate *this doctrine*, with more than common attention and assiduity. And as the most effectual method they employed to this end, was the institution of the

**MYSTERIES**, a large account is given of their rise and progress, from Egypt into Greece, and from thence, throughout the civilized world. I have attempted to discover the **ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ**, or hidden doctrines of these mysteries, which were **THE UNITY OF THE GODHEAD** and the **ERROR OF THE GROSSER POLYTHEISM**, namely, *the worship of dead men, deified*. This discovery not only confirms all that is advanced, concerning the rise, progress, and order of the several species of idolatry, but clears up and rectifies much embarrassment and mistake even of the most celebrated moderns, such as *Cudworth, Stillingfleet, Prideaux, Newton, &c.*, who, contrary to the tenor of holy scripture, in order to do imaginary honour to religion, have ventured to maintain, that *the one true God was generally known and worshipped in the pagan world*; for, finding many, in divers countries, speaking of the *one true God*, they concluded, that he must needs have a *national worship*. Now the discovery of the *ἀπορρήτα* of the *mysteries* enables us to explain the perfect consistency between sacred and profane antiquity; which, left to speak for themselves, concur to inform us of this plain and consistent truth, “That the doctrine of the *one true God* was indeed taught in all places, but as a profound secret, to the **FEW**, in the celebration of their mysterious rites; while, in the land of **JUDEA** alone, he had a *public and national worship*.” For to the *Hebrew PEOPLE alone*, (as Eusebius expresses it) *was reserved the honour of being INITIATED into the knowledge of the Creator of all things*. And of this difference, God himself speaks by the prophet,—*I have not spoken IN SECRET, IN A DARK PLACE OF THE EARTH.\** And the holy apostle Paul informs us of the *consequence* of that *mysterious* manner of teaching the true God amongst the pagan nations, that when, by this means, they came to the *knowledge* of him, *they glorified him not as God.†*

To confirm and illustrate my account of the **MYSTERIES**, I subjoin a dissertation on *the sixth book of Virgil's Æneis*; and another on *the Metamorphosis of Apuleius*. The first of which books is shown to be one continued description of the *Eleusinian mysteries*; and the other to be purposely written to recommend the use and efficacy of the *pagan mysteries in general*.

And here the attentive reader will observe, that throughout the course of this whole argument, on the conduct of the ancient **LAWGIVERS**, it appears, that all the fundamental principles of their policy were borrowed from **EGYPT**. A truth which will be made greatly subservient to the *minor* of the second syllogism; that *Moses*, though learned in all the wisdom of Egypt, yet *instituted the Jewish religion and society without a future state*.

From this, and from what has been said above of **MORAL OBLIGATION**, the intelligent reader will perceive, that, throughout *the Divine Legation*, I have all along endeavoured to select for my purpose such kind of arguments, in support of the *particular* question in hand, as may, at the same time, illustrate the truth of *revelation in general*, or serve as principles to proceed upon in the *progress of the present argument*. Of which will

\* Isa. xlv. 19.

† Rom. i. 21.

be given, as occasion serves, several other instances in the course of this review.—And now having shown the legislator's care to *propagate* religion in general, and the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments in particular (in which is seen their sense of the inseparable connexion between them); I go on, to explain the contrivances they employed to perpetuate the knowledge and influence of them: by which it appears that, in their opinion, RELIGION was not a temporary expedient, useful only to secure their own power and authority, but a necessary support to civil society itself.

1. The first instance of this care was, as we show, their **ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL RELIGION**, *protected by the laws of the state*, in all places where they were concerned. But as men, ignorant of *true religion*, could hardly avoid falling into mistakes in contriving the *mode* of this *establishment*, I have therefore, (the subject of my work being no idle speculation, but such a one as affects us in our highest interests, as men and citizens) attempted to deliver the true *theory* of the *alliance between church and state*, as the best defence of the justice and equity of an ESTABLISHED RELIGION.

2. The second instance of their care, I show to have been the allowance of a GENERAL TOLERATION; which as it would, for the like reason, be as imperfectly framed as an *establishment*, I have ventured to give the true *theory* of that likewise. The ancient lawgiver contrived to *establish* one mode of religion, by *allying* it to the state, for the sake of its DURATION: he *tolerated* other modes of it, for the sake of their INFLUENCE, for a religion forced upon man, has none; and the lawgiver concerns himself with religion only for the sake of its *influence*.—Discoursing upon this subject, I was naturally led to vindicate *true religion* from an aspersion of infidelity: where, I show, that the first persecution for religion was not that which was *committed*, but that which was *undergone* by the Christian church: and that the ill success attending its propagation amongst barbarous nations in our times, is altogether owing to the preposterous method employed for that purpose.—And with this, the second book of the Divine Legation concludes.

III. The third book goes on in supporting the MAJOR of the second syllogism, by *the opinions of the PHILOSOPHERS*. For as the great waste and ravages of time have destroyed most of the monuments of ancient *legislation*, I held it not improper to strengthen my position of the sense of their lawgivers, by that of their sages and philosophers. In this is shown,

1. From their own words, the conviction they in general had of the necessity of the doctrine of a *future state of rewards and punishments* to civil society. And, to set this conviction in the strongest light, I endeavour to prove, that even such of them (*viz.* the several sects of Grecian philosophers) who did not believe a *future state of rewards and punishments*, did yet for the sake of society, diligently teach and propagate it.—That they *taught* it, is confessed; that they did *not believe* it,

was my business to prove: which I have done by showing, 1. That they all thought it lawful to say one thing, and think another. 2. That they constantly practised what they thus thought to be lawful: and, 3. That they practised it on the very doctrine in question.—To explain and verify the two first of these assertions, I had occasion to inquire into the rise, progress, perfection, decline, and genius of the ancient *Greek philosophy*, under all its several divisions. In which, (as its rise and progress are shown to have been from *Egypt*) still more materials are laid in for enforcing the *minor* proposition of the second syllogism.—I then proceed to a *more particular* inquiry into the sentiments of each sect of philosophy, on this point; and show from the character and genius of each school, and from the writings of each man, that none of them did indeed believe the doctrine of *a future state of rewards and punishments*. At the same time it appears, from almost every proof brought for this purpose, that they all thought the doctrine to be of the highest utility to the state.—Here, in examining the philosophy of PYTHAGORAS, the subject led me to consider his so celebrated *Metempsychosis*; in which, I take occasion to speak of the *origin of the pagan fables*, and the nature of the *Metamorphoses of Ovid*, here shown to be a *popular history of providence*, very regularly and artfully deduced from the most early times to his own: from the whole I draw this conclusion, “that Pythagoras, who so sedulously propagated this species of a future state of rewards and punishments (the *metempsychosis*) that he was thought by some to be the author of it, considered it only as a commodious fable to restrain the unruly populace.”

2. To support this fact, it is shown, in the next place, that these philosophers not only *did not*, but that they *could not* possibly believe the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, because the belief of it contradicted two metaphysical principles universally held and *believed* by them, concerning the nature of God and of the soul; which were, that *the Deity could not hurt any one*; and that *the soul was part of the substance of the Deity, and resolvable again into him*. In explaining and verifying their reception of this latter principle, I take occasion to speak of its original; which, I prove, was *Grecian* and not *Egyptian*; as appears from the genius and character of the two philosophies; though the spurious books going under the name of *Hermes*, but indeed written by the later Platonists, would persuade us to the contrary. The use of this inquiry likewise (i. e. concerning the *origin* of this principle) will be seen when we come to settle the *character of Moses*, as aforesaid.—But, with regard to the *belief* of the philosophers on both points, besides the direct and principal use of it, for the support of the *major* of the second syllogism, it hath (as I said before, it was contrived my arguments should have) two further uses; the one, to serve as a principle in the progress of my general argument: the other, to illustrate the truth of revelation in general. For, 1. It will be a sufficient answer to that solution of the deists, (to be considered hereafter)

that *Moses did not teach the doctrine of a future state because he did not believe it*, since it is shown by the strongest evidence, that the not believing a doctrine so useful to society, was esteemed no reason why the legislator should not propagate it. 2. It is a convincing proof of the *expediency* of the gospel of Jesus, that the sages of Greece, with whom all the wisdom of the wise was supposed to be deposited, had *philosophized* themselves out of one of the most evident and useful truths with which mankind has any concern; and a full *justification* of the severity with which the holy apostles always speak of the *philosophers* and the *philosophy of Greece*, since it is hereby seen to be directed only against these pernicious principles; and not, as *deists* and *fanatics* concur to represent it, a condemnation of human learning in general.

3. But as now, it might be objected, “that by this representation, we lose on the one hand what we gain on the other; and that while we show the *expediency* of the gospel, we run a risk of discrediting its *reasonableness*; for that nothing can bear harder upon this latter quality, than that the best and wisest persons of antiquity did not believe that which the gospel was sent to propagate, namely, the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments.” As this, I say, might be objected, we have given (besides explaining on what absurd principles their *unbelief* rested) a further answer; and, to support this answer, shown, that the two extremes into which divines have usually run, in representing the state and condition of *revealed religion*, are attended with great and real mischiefs to it; while the only view of antiquity which yields solid advantage to the Christian cause, is such a one as is here represented for the true: such a one as shows *natural reason* to be *clear* enough to *perceive* TRUTH, and the necessary deductions from it *when proposed*, but not generally *strong* enough to *discover* it. He, who of all the pagan world best knew its force, and was in that very state in which only a true judgment could be passed, has with the greatest ingenuity confessed this truth, “*Nam neque tam est acris acies in naturis hominum et ingeniis, ut res tantas quisquam, nisi monstratus possit videre; neque tanta tamen in rebus obscuritas, ut eas peritus acri vir ingenio cernat, si modo aspexerit.*” In explaining this matter, it is occasionally shown, that the great and acknowledged superiority of the modern systems of *deistical morality* above the ancient, in point of excellence, is entirely owing to the unacknowledged, and perhaps unsuspected, aid of revelation.

Thus the reader sees, in what manner we have endeavoured to prove the MAJOR PROPOSITIONS of the two syllogisms, that *whatsoever religion and society have no future state for their support, must be supported by an extraordinary providence*. And that, *the ancient lawgivers universally believed, that a religion without a future state could be supported only by an extraordinary providence*. For having shown, that religion and society were unable, and believed to be unable, to support themselves under an *ordinary providence*, without a future state; if they



were supported without that doctrine, it could be, and could be believed to be, only by an *extraordinary providence*.

But now as the proof is conducted through a long detail of circumstances, showing the *absolute necessity* of *religion* to civil society; and the *sense* which all the wise and learned amongst the ancients had of that necessity; lest this should be abused to countenance the idle and impious conceit that RELIGION WAS THE INVENTION OF POLITICIANS, I concluded the third book and the volume together, with proving that the conceit is both IMPERTINENT and FALSE.

1. *Impertinent*, for that, were this account of the origin of religion true, it would not follow, that the thing itself was visionary; but, on the contrary, most real, evidently so even from that *universal utility* on which this its pretended origin is supported. Indeed, against this *utility*, paradoxical men, or men in a paradoxical humour, have often reasoned; such as BAYLE, PLUTARCH, and BACON: their arguments are here examined: and the *master sophism*, which runs through the reasoning of all three, is detected and exposed.

2. *False*; for that, in fact, *religion* existed before the *civil magistrate* was in being. In proving this point, the matter led me to speak of the *origin of idolatry*; to distinguish the several species of it; to adjust the order in which they arose out of one another; and to detect the ends of the later Platonists, in their attempts to turn the whole into an ALLEGORY (in which the reasonings of a late writer in his *Letters concerning Mythology* are considered). And because the rage of ALLEGORISING had spread a total confusion over all this matter, the origin, and progress of the folly, and the various views of its sectators in supporting it, are here accounted for and explained.

But my end and purpose in all this, was not barely to remove an objection against the truths delivered in this place, but to prepare a reception for those which are to *follow*: for if religion were so useful to society, and yet not the invention of the magistrate, we must seek for its original in another quarter; either from NATURE OR REVELATION, OR from BOTH.

Such is the subject-matter of the FIRST volume of *the Divine Legation*; which, as it was thought proper to publish separately, I contrived should not only contain a *part* of that general argument, but should likewise be a complete treatise of itself, establishing one of the most important truths with which man has any concern; namely, THE NECESSITY OF RELIGION FOR THE SUPPORT OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. And if, in support of this truth, I have entered into a long detail of some capital articles of antiquity, I presume I shall not need an apology.

[II.] WE come now to the SECOND VOLUME of *the Divine Legation*, which is employed in proving the MINOR PROPOSITION of the two syllogisms; the first, that the *Jewish religion and society had no future state for their support*: the other, that *Moses, an ancient lawgiver, and learned in all the wisdom of Egypt, purposely instituted such a religion,*

in order to which the **THIRD GENERAL PROPOSITION** was to be enforced; that *the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is not to be found in, nor did make part of, the Mosaic dispensation.* But in proving the **MINOR**, a method something different from that observed in proving the **MAJOR PROPOSITIONS** was to be followed. *These*, in the first volume, were proved *successively* and in order. But here the **MINOR PROPOSITIONS** are enforced all the way *together*. And this difference arises from the reason of the thing; the facts, brought to prove the doctrine to be omitted, do, at the same time, *accidentally* show that the omission was designed: and the reasons, brought to prove the uses in a designed omission, *necessarily* show that the doctrine was omitted.

To proceed therefore with the subject of the **SECOND VOLUME**.\*

IV. I just before observed, that the conclusion of the first volume, which detected the absurdity and falsity of the atheistic principle, that *religion was an invention of politicians, and a creature of the state*, opened the way to a fair inquiry whether its true original was not as well from **REVELATION** as from **NATURAL REASON**.

In the introduction therefore to this second volume, I took the advantage which that opening afforded me, of showing that the universal pretence to *revelation* proves *some* revelation must be true: that this *true* revelation must have some characteristic marks to distinguish it from the *false*: and that these *marks* are to be found in the institutions of **Moses**.

But this was only by way of *introduction*; and to lead the reader more easily into the main road of our inquiry; by showing that we pursued no desperate adventure, while we endeavoured to deduce the *divinity* of **Moses's** law from the circumstances of the law itself.

I proceeded then to the proof of the **MINOR PROPOSITIONS**, that *the Jewish religion and society had no future state for their support*: and that *Moses, an ancient lawgiver, and learned in all the wisdom of Egypt, purposely instituted such a religion.* To evince these truths with sufficient evidence, the *nature* of that institution was to be first understood; which again required a general knowledge, at least, of the *manners* and *genius* of the Hebrew people, and of the *character* and *abilities* of their lawgiver. Now these having been entirely fashioned on Egyptian models, it was further expedient that we should know the *state of Egyptian superstition and learning* in that early period.

1. In order to this, the following proposition is advanced, that *the Egyptian learning celebrated in scripture, and the Egyptian superstition there condemned, were the very learning and superstition represented by the Greek writers as the honour and opprobrium of that kingdom.* Where I first state the question; and then show the equal extravagance of each of those two parties amongst the learned, who have been accustomed to *advance* or to *depress* the high antiquity of Egypt.

First. I corroborate the proposition, first, by **FACT**, the testimony of scripture, and of the ancient Greek writers, set together and supporting

\* Book iv. v. and vi. formed the second volume in the first edition.

one another; and both supported by circumstances regarding the peculiar situation of the land of Egypt. And here the *objections* of the author of *the Sacred and Profane History of the World Connected*, frightened by the common panic of the high antiquity of Egypt, are confuted and exposed.

Secondly, by REASON, in an argument drawn from the nature, origin, and various uses of their so famed HIEROGLYPHICS. Where it is shown,

(1.) That this species of writing was employed by the Egyptians as the vehicle of learning, even *after* the invention of LETTERS: for which no good reason can be assigned but this, that they were applied to the same purpose *before*. Now LETTERS were in use amongst them before the time of *Moses*.

(2.) Again, it is shown that the ONEIROCRITICS borrowed their art of deciphering dreams from *hieroglyphic symbols*; but *hieroglyphic symbols* were the mysterious vehicle of the civil science and of the theology of the Egyptians. Now ONEIROCRITIC, or the art of interpreting dreams, was practised in the time of Joseph.

(3.) And again, it is shown that ANIMAL WORSHIP in Egypt arose from the mysterious use of the same *hieroglyphic symbols*. Now ANIMAL WORSHIP was established amongst them before the time of *Moses*.

From all this it appears, that EGYPT was of that high antiquity which *scripture* and the best *Greek* writers concur to represent it. By which, we come to understand what were the *specific manners and superstitions* of Egypt in the time of Moses; these being, as it now appears, identically the same with what the Greek writers have delivered to us.

In the course of this proof from *reason*, which opens at large the nature, origin, and various kinds of EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPHICS, I interweave (as the explanation of my subject necessarily required) a detailed history of the various modes of ancient communication amongst men, as well by *real* and *literary* characters, as by *words* and *action*; and show how SPEECH and WRITING ran parallel in their progress; and influenced, and were influenced by, one another. On the same account, when I come to the origin of BRUTE WORSHIP, I give the history of the various modes of ancient idolatry, in the order in which they rose, one out of another.

These things I have not only made to serve in support of the question I am *here* upon, but likewise in support of one question *preceding*, and of one which is to *follow*.

For in the history of the *various modes of ancient communication* was laid, as the reader will find, the foundation of my discourses on the *nature of ancient propheies* in the sixth book.

And, in the history of *the various modes of ancient idolatry*, the reader hath a necessary supplement to what had been said before on the same subject, in the latter end of the third book, against the atheist's pretended origin of religion.

So studious have I been to observe, what a great master of reason lays down as the *rule* and *test* of good order in composition, *That every*

*former part may give strength to all that follow; and every latter bring light unto all before.\**

But the *high antiquity of Egypt*, though proved from *antiquity* itself, seemed not to be enough secured, while the authority of one *great modern* remained entire, and his reasonings unanswered.

In the next place, therefore, I examine Sir ISAAC NEWTON'S *Chronology of the Egyptian Empire*; a chronology erected on the supposed *identity of Osiris and Sesostris*; which is a fancy that not only contradicts all *sacred* as well as *profane* antiquity, but, what is still more, the very *nature of things*.

In the course of this confutation, *the causes of that endless confusion in the early Greek history and mythology*, are inquired into and explained: which serves, at the same time, to confirm and illustrate all that hath been occasionally said in the latter end of the *third* book, and, here again, in this *fourth*, concerning—the origin and progress of idolatry—the genius of pagan religion—the gentile modes of worship—and their theological opinions.

Thus far concerning *the high antiquity of Egypt*. Which, besides the *immediate* purpose of leading us into the true idea of the *Jewish institution* in general, hath these further uses:

We have seen, in the foregoing volume, that EGYPT, as it was most famed for the arts of legislation, so it most of all inculcated the doctrine of a *future state of rewards and punishments*. Now, if Egypt were indeed of the high antiquity here assigned unto it, that doctrine must needs be of national belief, at the time the Hebrews lived there in slavery. But then they having, as we find in scripture, thoroughly imbibed the religious notions of the place, must needs be much prejudiced in favour of so reasonable and flattering a doctrine: consequently their lawgiver, who likewise had been bred up in all the learning of Egypt, would, if he had acted only by human direction, have, in imitation of his masters, taken advantage of this favourable prejudice to make the doctrine of a future state the grand SANCTION of his religion and law.

Again, the proof of the *high antiquity of Egypt* was necessary to vindicate *sacred scripture*; which all along declares for that antiquity; and which the DEIST having endeavoured to take advantage of, in opposing Moses's pretence to inspiration, some imprudent BELIEVERS were grown not unwilling to explain away. Sir Isaac Newton's CHRONOLOGY afforded them the aid they wanted: and while it offered itself in support of the *Bible-divinity*, they seemed little attentive to the liberties it had taken with the *Bible-history*.

2. In order to bring on this truth of the *high antiquity of Egypt* nearer to my purpose, I proceeded to the *second* proposition, *That the Jewish people were extremely fond of Egyptian manners, and did frequently fall into Egyptian superstitions: and that many of the laws given to them by the ministry of Moses were instituted partly in com-*

\* Hooker.

*pliance to their prejudices, and partly in opposition to those superstitions.* In the proof of the first part of this proposition, I show the high *probability* that the law was instituted with reference to Egyptian manners; and, through the proof of the second, is deduced a *demonstration* that it was actually so framed.

For a further illustration of this argument, I give an historical account of the degeneracy of the Hebrew people, and of their amazing propensity to imitate the manners of Egypt, from the time that Moses was first sent upon his mission, to their entire settlement in the land of Judea; which fully shows (what will stand us in stead hereafter) that a people so perverse and headstrong needed, in the construction of their civil and religious institutions, all possible curbs to disorder: now of all such curbs, the doctrine of a *future state* was ever held the chief in ancient policy; and as this doctrine was so peculiarly Egyptian, they must needs have the most favourable prejudice towards it.

3. But then, as it might perhaps be objected, that while I am endeavouring to get this way into the interior of the Jewish constitution, I open a back door to the ravages of infidelity; it was thought necessary, in order to prevent the deist's taking advantage of the great truth contained in the preceding proposition (which is the second), to guard it by the following (which is the third), viz. *That Moses's Egyptian learning, and the laws instituted in compliance to the people's prejudices, are no reasonable objection to the divinity of his mission.* Where, in explaining the *first part*, which shows what this learning was, and how well it suited with Moses's mission, I had occasion to inquire into the origin and use of the SCHOOLS OF THE PROPHETS: which the reader will find of this further use, viz. to give strength and support to what is said, in this sixth book, of the NATURE OF THE JEWISH PROPHECIES; and particularly to what is there observed of GROTIUS's fatal error, in his mode of interpreting them.

And in explanation of the *second part*, having proved the proposition, That to institute laws in compliance to popular prejudices, is no reasonable objection to their divine original; having proved this, I say, from the nature of things; the discourse proceeds to examine all the arguments which have been urged in support of the contrary opinion, by HERMAN WITSIUS, in his learned treatise intitled *Ægyptiaca*, that book having been publicly recommended by *Dr Waterland*, for a *distinct and solid confutation of Spencer's De Legibus Hebræorum ritualibus.*

And the answer to Whiston's last argument bringing into question the intrinsic value of the *ritual law*; the famous character of it given by the prophet EZEKIEL, "of statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live"—is explained in a large analysis of the whole prophecy, against an old foolish notion revived by Dr Shuckford, that these *statutes* and *judgments*, here said to be *given* by God, were the *pagan idolatries*, which in defiance of God, they took without leave.

4. But I go yet further in support of the fourth proposition, and

prove, that *these very circumstances of Moses's Egyptian learning, and the laws instituted in compliance to the people's prejudices, are a strong confirmation of the divinity of his mission.*

1st, For, that one bred up in the arts of Egyptian legislation could never, on his own head, have thought of reducing an unruly people to government, on maxims of religion and policy, fundamentally opposite to all the principles of Egyptian wisdom, at that time the universal model on which all the legislators worked, in reducing a barbarous people to society. Yet Moses went upon principles diametrically opposite to that wisdom, when he enjoined the PUBLIC WORSHIP of the *one true God only, and OMITTED the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments*, in the institution of his law and religion.

2dly, For, that one who *falsely* pretended to receive the whole frame of a national constitution from God, would never have risked his pretensions by a *ritual law*, which the people might see was politically instituted, partly in compliance to their prejudices, and partly in opposition to Egyptian superstitions.

Here, all the imaginable motives are inquired into, which Moses, though a mere human lawgiver, might have had, to act in the manner he did; and these motives are shown to be insufficient to induce a wise legislator thus to act.—In conclusion, it is made apparent, *that a ritual, contrived to oppose to the reigning superstitions; and, at the same time, to prefigure, by its typical nature, all the essential parts of a future dispensation, contains a strong INTERNAL ARGUMENT THAT THE RITUAL LAW WAS NOT A MERE HUMAN INVENTION.* And with this the fourth book concludes.

V. What hath been hitherto said, was to let the reader into the genius of the Jewish policy in *general*, in order to his judging more exactly of the *peculiar nature* of its government; that, from thence, he might be enabled to determine, with full certainty, of the matters in question, as they are contained in the two MINOR terms.

1. The *fifth book*, therefore, comes still nearer to the point, and shows that the government instituted by Moses was a THEOCRACY, properly so called, where God himself was the supreme civil magistrate. It begins with assigning and settling the true reason of the separation of the posterity of Abraham from the rest of mankind;—because this separation has been greatly misunderstood—but principally because the true reason of the *separation* leads us into the use and necessity of a *theocratic* form of government.

In evincing this necessity, the justice of the law for punishing idol worship capitally, under a theocracy, is explained: and because the deist hath been accustomed to urge *this law* against the divine original of the whole institution, it is here justified at large, on the principles of natural equity: which serves, as well a past purpose, viz. the adding strength and support to what hath been said on the subject of TOLERATION, in the second book; as it does at present, viz. to confirm the *reality*



of *this theocracy*, which a celebrated dissenting minister has preposterously gone out of his way to bring in question: whose *reasoning*, therefore, is examined and exposed.

2. This THEOCRACY, thus proved to be *necessary*, was likewise of the most easy introduction, as I have shown from the notions and opinions of those times, concerning *tutelary deities*. And here, speaking of the method of Divine providence, in applying the prejudices and manners of men to the great ends of his dispensations, I observe, that he is always accustomed to impress on his institution, some characteristic note of difference, to mark it for his own: which leading me to give instances in some of these *notes*, I insist chiefly upon this, “that the Mosaic religion was *built upon a former*, namely, the patriarchal: whereas the various religions of the pagan world were all unrelated to, and independent of one another.” As this was a circumstance necessary to be well attended to, by all who would fully comprehend the nature of the Mosaic policy, I took the advantage, which the celebrated author of the *Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion* had afforded me, to support this characteristic note, against his idle attempt to prove, that the pagans, likewise, were accustomed to build one pretended revelation on another.

3. I proceed, in the next place, to show that those prejudices which made the *introduction of a THEOCRACY so easy*, occasioned *as easy a defection from it*. In which, I had occasion to explain the nature of the *worship of tutelary gods*; and of that *idolatry* wherewith the Israelites were so obstinately besotted.

Both of which discourses serve these further purposes: the *former*, to support and explain what hath been said in the second book concerning the *pagan intercommunity of worship*; and the *latter* (besides a peculiar use to be made of it in the third volume\*) to obviate a popular objection of unbelievers: who, from this circumstance, of the perpetual defection of the Israelites into idolatry, would infer, that God’s dispensation to them could never have been so convictive as their history represents it; the objectors having taken it for granted, on the allowance of believers, that this idolatry consisted in renouncing the law of Moses, and renouncing it as dissatisfied with its truth. Both which suppositions are here shown to be false. This affords an occasion to confute the false reasoning of Lord Bolingbroke; who, from this frequent lapse into idolatry, infers such a defect and political inability in the law, as shows its pretence to a divine original to be an imposture.

4. The nature of the THEOCRACY, and the circumstances attending its *erection*, being thus explained, we come next to inquire concerning its *duration*. Here we show, that, in strict truth and propriety, it subsisted throughout the whole period of the Jewish economy, even to the coming of Christ: in which discourse, the contrary opinions, of an earlier abolition, are all considered and confuted, and the above truth sup-

\* Concerning the volume here referred to, see note in first page of book vii.

ported and established. In the course of this reasoning, it is shown, that the famous prophecy of Jacob, of the *sceptre's not departing from Judah till the coming of Shiloh*, is a promise or declaration of the existence of the THEOCRACY till the coming of Christ. And as the truth of this interpretation is of the highest importance to revelation, all the different senses given to this prophecy are examined, and shown to be erroneous. And the last of them being one borrowed by Dr Sherlock, bishop of London, and received into his book of *the Use and Intent of Prophecy*, is particularly discussed.

The use to be hereafter made of *the duration of the theocracy to the coming of Christ*, is to enforce, by this circumstance, amongst many others, the CONNEXION between the two religions: a truth, though too much neglected, yet incumbent on every rational defender of revelation to support.

The argument then proceeds to a consideration of the *peculiar consequences* attending the administration of a theocracy, which brings us yet nearer to our point. Here it is shown, that one necessary *consequence* was an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE. And agreeably to this deduction from the *nature of things*, we find, that holy scripture, does *in fact*, exhibit this very representation of God's government of Judea; and that there are many favourable circumstances in the character of the Hebrew people to induce us to believe the representation to be true. Here, many cloudy cavils of the three doctors, SYKES, STEBBING, and RUTHERFORTH, are occasionally removed and dispersed. But the attentive reader will observe, that my argument does not require me to prove more in this place, than that holy scripture REPRESENTS an *extraordinary providence* to have been administered. The proof of its REAL administration is established by the MEDIUM of my thesis, *the omission of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments*. Which answers all objections as to our inadequate conceptions of such an administration; as well as to certain passages of scripture that seem to clash with its general representation of it. Yet both these sort of objections are, however, considered *ex abundanti*.

As important as the fact is, to our present purpose of an extraordinary providence thus represented, it has still a further use, when employed amongst those distinguishing *marks* of the truth of Moses's divine mission in general: for it shows us, the unnecessary trouble and hazard to which he exposed himself, had that mission been feigned. Had he, like the rest of the ancient lawgivers, only pretended to *inspiration*, he had then no occasion to propagate the belief of an *extraordinary providence*; a dispensation so easy to be confuted. But by deviating from their practice, and announcing to his people, that their *tutelary God* was become their KING, he laid himself under a necessity of teaching an *extraordinary providence*; a dead weight upon an imposture, which nothing but downright folly could have brought him to undergo.

To proceed. After having laid this strong and necessary foundation.

we come at length DIRECTLY to the point in question. If the Jewish government were a THEOCRACY, administered, as it must be, by an *extraordinary providence*, the next consequence is, that TEMPORAL REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, and not FUTURE, were the SANCTION of their law and religion. Thus far, therefore, have our considerations on the *nature alone* of the Jewish government conducted us: and it is almost to our journey's end: for it fairly brings us up to the proof of our two MINOR propositions. So necessary, as the reader now sees, is the long discourse of *the nature of the Jewish government*.

But, to prevent all cavil, the argument goes on, and proves in the next place, that the doctrine of *a future state of rewards and punishments*, which could not, from the *nature* of things, be the SANCTION of the Jewish economy, was not in *fact* contained in it at all: nay further, that it was PURPOSELY OMITTED by the great lawgiver. This is proved from several passages in the book of *Genesis* and the *law*.

And here, more fully to evince, that Moses, who, it is seen, *studiously* omitted the mention of it, was *well apprised* of its importance, I show, that the PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN FOR THE SINS OF THEIR PARENTS was brought into this institution purposely to afford some advantages to government, which the doctrine of *a future state*, as it is found in all other societies, amply supplies. This, at the same time that it gives further strength to the position of *no future state in the Mosaic dispensation*, gives the author a fair occasion of vindicating the justice and equity of the law of *punishing children for the sins of their parents*; and of proving the perfect agreement between MOSES and the prophets EZEKIEL and JEREMIAH, concerning it; which hath been, in all ages, the stumbling-block of infidelity.

But we now advance a step further, and show, that as Moses did not teach, yea forbore to teach the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, so neither had the ancient Jews, that is to say, the body of the people, any knowledge of it. The proof is striking, and scarce to be resisted by any party or profession but that of the SYSTEM-MAKER. The Bible contains a very circumstantial account of this people, from the time of Moses to the great captivity; not only the history of public occurrences, but the lives of private persons of both sexes, and of all ages, conditions, characters, and complexions; in the adventures of virgins, matrons, kings, soldiers, scholars, parents, merchants, husbandmen. They are given too in every circumstance of life; captive, victorious, in sickness and in health; in full security, and amidst impending dangers, plunged in civil business, or retired and sequestered in the service of religion. Together with their story we have their compositions likewise: in one place we hear their triumphal, in another their penitential strains. Here we have their exultations for blessings received; there, their deprecations of evil apprehended: here they urge their moral precepts to their *contemporaries*; and there again, they treasure up their prophecies and predictions for the use of *posterity*; and on each,

denounce the threatenings and promises of Heaven. Yet in none of these different circumstances of life, in none of these various casts of composition, do we ever find them acting on the motives, or influenced by the prospect, of a **FUTURE STATE**: or indeed, expressing the least hopes or fears, or even common curiosity, concerning it: but every thing they do or say respects the present life only; the good and ill of which are the sole objects of their pursuits and aversions.

The strength of this argument is still further supported by a view of the *general history* of mankind; and particularly of those nations most resembling the *Jewish* in their genius and circumstances: in which we find the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, was always pushing on its influence. It was their constant viaticum through life; it stimulated them to war, and spirited their songs of triumph; it made them insensible of pain, immovable in danger, and superior to the approach of death.

This is not all: we observe, that even in the *Jewish* annals, when this doctrine was become national, it made as considerable a figure in their history, as in that of any other nation.

It is still further urged, that this conclusion does not rest merely on the *negative silence* of the Bible history; it is supported on the *positive* declarations contained in it; by which the sacred writers plainly discover that there was no popular expectation of a *future state* or *resurrection*.

From the *Old Testament* we come to the *New*. By the writers of which it appears, that the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments **DID NOT MAKE PART** of the Mosaic dispensation.

Their evidence is divided into two parts; the *first*, proving that **TEMPORAL** rewards and punishments *were the sanction* of the Jewish dispensation; the *second* that it had *no other*. And thus with the most direct and unexceptionable proof of the two **MINOR** propositions, the fifth book concludes.

VI. But to remove, as far as possible, all the supports of prejudice against this important truth, the sixth and last book of this volume is employed in examining all those texts of the *Old* and *New* Testament, which had been commonly urged to prove, that the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments **DID MAKE PART** of the Mosaic dispensation.

And amongst those of the *Old Testament*, the famous passage of the sixth chapter of Job, concerning a *resurrection* (as it has been commonly understood) holding a principal place, it was judged expedient, for the reasons there given, to examine that matter to the bottom. This necessarily brought on an inquiry into the **NATURE** and **GENIUS** of that book; **WHEN WRITTEN**, and to **WHAT PURPOSE**. By the aid of which inquiry, a fair account is given of the sense of that famous text, consistent with our general proposition.

But the whole *discourse on the book of Job* hath this further use: it

provides a strong support and illustration of what will be hereafter delivered concerning the *GRADUAL DECAY of the extraordinary providence* from the time of *Saul*, to the return from the great *captivity*.

Yet this is not all. The *discourse* hath yet a further use, with regard to *revelation in general*. For the explaining, how the principles of the *gospel doctrine* were opened by degrees, fully obviates the calumnies of those two leaders in infidelity, TINDAL and COLLINS; who pretend, that the heads and governors of the Jews refined their old doctrines concerning the Deity, and invented new ones, just as the *priests* improved in knowledge, or the *people* advanced in curiosity; or as *both* were better taught by the instructions they received from their masters in the country whither they were led away captive.

The *discourse of Job* being of this importance, we were led to support all the parts of it, from the attacks of various writers, who had attempted to confute it.

The rest of the Old Testament texts are gone through with greater dispatch, being divided into two parts. 1. Such as are supposed to teach the separate existence, or, as it is called, the *immortality* of the soul. And, 2. Such as are supposed to teach a *future state of rewards and punishments*, together with a *resurrection of the body*. In the course of which examination, much light, it is hoped, has been thrown both on the *particular texts* and on the *general question*.

From the texts of the *Old Testament*, the argument proceeds to examine those of the *New*: amongst which, the famous *eleventh chapter of the epistle to the Hebrews* is not forgotten; the sense of which is cleared up, to oppose to the inveterate mistakes of *systematical divines*: and here, occasion is taken to explain the *nature of St Paul's reasoning against the errors of the Jewish converts*; a matter of highest moment for a right understanding of this apostle's letters to the several churches; and for the further illustration of the general argument.

As in all this, nothing is taught or insinuated which opposes the doctrine of our excellent church, common decency required that this *conformity* should be fully shown and largely insisted on.

Having therefore, all along, gone upon this principle, "that though a future state of rewards and punishments made no part of the MOSAIC dispensation, yet that the LAW had a SPIRITUAL meaning; though not seen or understood till the fulness of time was come. Hence the ritual law received the nature, and afforded the efficacy of PROPHECY: in the interim (as is shown) *the mystery of the gospel is occasionally revealed*, by God, to his chosen servants, the fathers and leaders of the Jewish nation; and the *dawnings* of it gradually opened by the prophets, to the people." Having, I say, gone, all the way, upon this principle, I show, from the SEVENTH ARTICLE of religion, that it is the very doctrine of our excellent church.

And in explaining that part of the ARTICLE which says, *that they are not to be heard which feign that the old fathers did look only for transitory*

*promises*, I support this doctrine by the case of ABRAHAM, *who*, our blessed Master tells us, *rejoiced to see his day, and saw it and was glad*.

Here, I attempt to prove, in illustration of this text, that the *command to Abraham to offer Isaac* was merely an information given, at Abraham's earnest request, in a *representative action*, instead of *words*, of the REDEMPTION OF MANKIND by the great sacrifice of Christ on the cross. Which interpretation, if it be the true one, is, I think, the noblest proof that ever was given, of the HARMONY between the Old and New Testament.

From this long dissertation, besides the immediate purpose of vindicating the doctrine of our national church, in its *seventh article*, we gain these two advantages; 1. The first of which is, supporting a real and essential *connexion* between the Mosaic and the Christian religions. 2. The other is, disposing the deists to think more favourably of revelation, when they see, in this interpretation of the COMMAND, all their objections to this part of Abraham's story overthrown.

The matter being of this high importance, it was proper to fix my interpretation on such principles as would leave no room for reasonable doubt or objection: and this was to be done by explaining the nature of those *various modes of information* in use amongst the ancients; for which explanation, a proper ground had been laid in the discourse on the *hieroglyphics* in the fourth book. To all this (for the reason here given) is subjoined a continued refutation of all that Dr Stebbing has been able to urge against this idea of the *command*.

Nor is this all. This *dissertation*, which affords so many new openings into the truths of *revelation* in general, and so many additional supports to the argument of the *divine legation* in particular, hath another very important use. It is a necessary introduction to the long discourse which follows, concerning PROPHECY.

In this (which is the last of the present volume\*) I have attempted to clear up and vindicate the logical truth and propriety of *types in action*, and *secondary senses in speech*: for on the truth and propriety of these depends the divine original of the ancient JEWISH PROPHECIES concerning Christ. A matter much needing a support: for though the greater part of these prophecies confessedly relate to Jesus only in a *secondary sense*, yet had some men of name, and in the interests of religion, through ignorance of the true origin and nature of *such senses*, rashly concurred with modern Judaism and infidelity, to give them all up as *illogical* and *enthusiastic*, to the imminent hazard of the very foundation of CHRISTIANITY.

In the progress of this inquiry, I had occasion to examine, and was enabled, on the principles here laid down, to confute Mr Collins's famous work of *the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion*, one of the most able and plausible books ever written amongst us, against our holy faith; he having borrowed the argument, and stolen all the

\* Volume ii. of the first edition ended with the present book, book vi.



reasoning upon it, from the most sagacious of the modern rabbins; who pretend that none of the prophecies can relate to Jesus in any other sense than a *secondary*; and that a *secondary sense is illogical and fanatical*.—Had I done no more, in this long work, than explain and clear up, as I have done, this much embarrassed and most important question of the Jewish prophecies which relate to Christ, and to the Christian dispensation, I should have thought my time and labour well employed; so necessary to the very being of our holy faith, is the setting this matter on its true foundation. Thus much may be said in favour of this large dissertation considered in itself alone: but, as part of the argument of the *divine legation* of Moses, it has these more immediate uses:

1. To show, that those who contend, that the Christian doctrine of a future state was revealed to the early Jews, destroy all *use and reason of a secondary sense of prophecies*; for how shall it be certainly known from the prophecies themselves, that they contain *double senses*, but from this *acknowledged* truth, that the *old law* was preparatory to, and the rudiments of, the *new*? Or how shall this relation between these *two laws* be certainly known, but from the evidence of this *contested* truth, *that the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is not to be found in the Mosaic dispensation*? So close a dependence have all these capital principles on one another.

2. The other more immediate reason for this dissertation on *types and secondary senses* was this: as I had shown, that a future state of rewards and punishments was not revealed under any part of the Jewish economy, otherwise than by *those modes* of information; it was necessary, in order to show the *real connexion* between Judaism and Christianity (the truth of the latter religion depending on that *real connexion*) to prove *those modes* to be logical and rational. For, as on the one hand, had the doctrine of life and immortality been *revealed* under the Mosaic economy, Judaism had been *more* than a rudiment of, and preparation to, Christianity: so on the other, had no *covert* intimations, at all, been given of the doctrine, it had been *less*: that is, the dependency and connexion between the two religions had not been sufficiently marked out and ascertained. With this dissertation therefore, so important in its use and application, the sixth and last book of the second volume concludes.

Thus the READER, at length, may see how regularly, and intently, these two volumes have been carried on: \* for though the AUTHOR (whose passion is not so much a fondness for his *own conceived argument*, as for the honour and support of religion itself) hath neglected no fair occasion of enforcing every collateral circumstance, which might serve to illustrate the truth of *revelation in general*; yet he never loses sight of his end, but as the precept for conducting the most regular works directs,

*Semper ad eventum festinat.*

This volume too, like the first, I thought fit to publish alone, not

\* That is, books i, ii, iii, iv, v, vi.

*merely* for the same reason, that it was a complete and entire work of itself, which *explained the nature and genius of the Jewish constitution*; but for this additional one, that it *fairly ended and completed the argument*.

For the first volume having proved the MAJOR, and the second volume, the MINOR propositions of the TWO SYLLOGISMS; my logic teaches me to think, that the CONCLUSION follows of course, viz. THAT THE JEWISH RELIGION AND SOCIETY WERE SUPPORTED BY AN EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE.

Or put it in another light;—Having proved my three principal propositions,

I. “That the inculcating the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, is necessary to the well-being of civil society;

II. “That all mankind, especially the most wise and learned nations of antiquity, have concurred in believing, and teaching, that this doctrine was of such use to civil society;

III. “That the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is not to be found in, nor did make part of, the *Mosaic dispensation*;

The conclusion is, that therefore THE LAW OF MOSES IS OF DIVINE ORIGINAL.

A CONCLUSION which necessarily follows the premises contained in these three propositions. Notwithstanding all this, the evidence of their truth proving so various, extending so wide, and having been drawn out to so great a length; what between *inattention* and *prejudice*, the argument, here brought to its final issue, hath been generally understood to be left imperfect; and the conclusion of it reserved for another volume. Yet a very moderate share of reflection might have led the candid reader to understand, that I had here effectually performed what I had promised, namely, TO DEMONSTRATE THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES. For if it be indeed proved, That the doctrine of a future state is necessary to the well-being of civil society, under the ordinary government of providence—That all mankind have ever so conceived of the matter—That the Mosaic institution was without this support, and that yet it did not want it,—What follows but that the Jewish affairs were administered by an extraordinary providence, distributing reward and punishment with an equal hand; and consequently that the MISSION OF MOSES WAS DIVINE?

However the complaint against the AUTHOR, for not having performed his convention with the public, became pretty general. To which a great deal might be said, and perhaps to little purpose. The following tale will put it in the fairest light. In a solemn treaty lately concluded between the governor of one of our American provinces and the neighbouring savages, it had, it seems, been stipulated, that the settlement should supply those warrior-tribes with a certain number of good and serviceable muskets. Which engagement was so ill performed, that at their next general meeting, the chiefs of the barbarians complained, that, though indeed the colony had sent them the number of muskets agreed upon, yet, on examination, they were all found to be *without locks*.

This mischance (occasioned by the muskets and the locks being put into two different cargoes) the governor promised should be redressed. It was redressed accordingly; and the locks sought out, and sent. He now flattered himself that all cause of umbrage was effectually removed; when, at their next meeting, he was entertained with a fresh complaint, that the colony had fraudulently sent them *locks without muskets*. The truth was, this brave people, of unimpeached morals, were only defective in their military logic; they had not the dexterity, till they were first shown the way, to put the *major* of the musket and the *minor* of the musket-lock together; and from thence to draw the *concluding* trigger.

But then it will be said, "If, as is here pretended, the PREMISES have been indeed proved, in these two volumes, with all the detail which their importance required, and with all the evidence which a moral subject can supply; and the CONCLUSION, therefore, established with all the conviction which the laws of logic are able to enforce; why was another volume promised? for no other end, as would seem, than to mislead a well-meaning reader, in the vain pursuit of an argument already ended."

It was promised for a better purpose—to *remove all conceivable objections against the CONCLUSION, and to throw in every collateral light upon the PREMISES*. For it is one thing to satisfy truth; and another, to silence her pretended friends. He who defends *revelation* has many prejudices to encounter; but he who defends it by *reason* only, has many more.

[III.] THE THIRD and last volume, therefore, is destined to SUPPORT what hath been already proved: not, as has been absurdly suggested, to continue and conclude an unfinished argument.

It consists of three books, like each of the preceding volumes.

1. The seventh book\* therefore is employed in supporting the MAJOR and the MINOR propositions of the first syllogism: in a continued history of the RELIGIOUS OPINIONS of the Jews, from the time of the earlier *prophets*, who first gave some dark intimations of a different dispensation, to the time of the *Maccabees*, when the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments was become national.

2. The eighth book is employed in supporting the MAJOR and MINOR propositions of the second syllogism, in which is considered the PERSONAL CHARACTER of Moses and the GENIUS OF THE LAW, as far as it concerns or has a relation to the character of the lawgiver. Under this latter head, is contained a full and satisfactory answer to those who may object, "That a revealed religion with a future state of rewards and punishments is unworthy the divine author to whom it is ascribed."

3. The ninth and last book explains at large the nature and genius of the CHRISTIAN DISPENSATION:† for having, towards the end of the eighth book, examined the PRETENDED REASONS (offered both by believers and unbelievers to evade my conclusion) for omitting the doctrine of a future

\* The viith and viiith books, according to the plan here drawn out by the author, were never composed.

† This book is the viith of this edition.

state of rewards and punishments in the Mosaic dispensation, I was naturally and necessarily led to inquire into the **TRUE**. For now, it might be finally objected, "That though, under an extraordinary providence, there might be *no occasion* for the doctrine of a future state, in support of religion, or for the ends of government; yet as that doctrine is a *truth*, and consequently, under every regimen of providence, *useful*, it seems hard to conceive, that the religious leader of the Jews, because as a *law-giver* he could do without it, that therefore, as a *divine*, he would omit it." The objection is of weight in itself, and receives additional moment from what hath been observed in the fifth book, concerning *the reason of the law of punishing children for the crimes of their parents*. I held it therefore insufficient barely to reply, "Moses omitted it, that his law might thereby stand, throughout all ages, an invincible monument of the truth of his pretences:" but proceeded to explain the **GREAT AND PRINCIPAL** reason of the *omission*. And now, *ventum ad VERUM est*.

The whole concludes with one general but distinct view of the entire course of God's universal economy from Adam to Christ. In which it is shown, that if Moses were, in truth, sent from God, *he could not teach* a future state; that doctrine being out of his commission, and reserved for him who was at the head of another dispensation, by which *life and immortality was to be brought to life*.

This discourse, besides the immediate purpose of supporting and illustrating the **ARGUMENT** here completed, serves another end, which I had in view, as to the general disposition of the whole work: which was to explain and discriminate the distinct and various natures of the **PAGAN**, the **JEWISH** and the **CHRISTIAN** religions: the *pagan* having been considered in the first volume, and the *Jewish* in the second; the *Christian* is reserved for the third and last. Let me conclude therefore, in an address to my reverend brethren, with the words of an ancient apologist:\* *Quid nobis invidemus, si veritas Divinitatis, nostri temporis ætate maturuit? Fruamur bono nostro, et recti sententiam temperemus: cohibeatur SUPERSTITIO, IMPIETAS expietur, VERA RELIGIO reservetur.*

\* Minucius Felix.

END OF THE SIXTH BOOK.

## APPENDIX.

### ON THE BOOK OF JOB.

AN excellent writer having *freely and candidly examined* the late Bishop of London's collection of sermons, and in page 165 of his *Examination*, asked this question; *Where was idolatry ever punished by the magistrate but under the Jewish economy?* The Oxford professor, in the second edition of his *Prelections, concerning the sacred poetry of the Hebrews*, thinks fit to give the following answer:—"It was punished under the economy of the patriarchs, in the families and under the DOMINION of Abraham, Melchisedec and Job. Idolatry spreading wider and wider, Abraham was called by God from Chaldea, for this end, to be the father of a people, which, divided from all others, might continue to worship the true God; to be set up for an exemplar of true religion, and to be ready to give testimony against the worship of vain deities. Was not Abraham, therefore, (exercising the SOVEREIGNTY in his own family) to punish idolatry? Were not Melchisedec and Job, and all the SOVEREIGNS of tribes of that time, who still retained the knowledge and worship of the true God, amidst the general defection of all the surrounding people, to take care that their own did not backslide? To curb offenders, and to inflict punishment on the obstinate, the REBELLIOUS, and on all those who spread abroad the contagion of this vice."—Ad questionem respondetur: Sub economia patriarcharum; in familiis, et sub DOMINATU Abrahami, Melchizedechi, Jobi, cæterorumque. Ingruente idololatria divinitus evocabatur ex Chaldæa Abrahamus: eum in finem, ut fieret pater gentis, quæ ab aliis omnibus divisa, verum Deum coleret, publicum proponeret exemplum puræ religionis, contraque cultum vanorum numinum testimonium perhiberet. Nonne erat igitur Abrahami, in sua familia PRINCIPATUM exercentis proprium officium et munus, in idololatriam animadvertere? Nonne Melchizedechi, Jobi, omniumque tunc temporis in suis tribubus PRINCIPUM, qui veri Dei cognitionem et cultum in communi fere gentium circumvicinarum defectione adhuc retinebant, cavere, ne sui deficerent; coercere delinquentes; obstinatos et REBELLES, et sceleris contagionem propagantes, supplicio afficere?—*Supplementum ad primam Prælectionum Editionem: Addit. Editionis secundæ, 312.*

This is so pleasant an answer, and so little needing the masterly hand of the *examiner*, to correct, that a few strictures, in a cursory note, will be more than sufficient to do the business.

1. The *examiner*, to prove, I suppose, that the book of Job was a dramatic work, written long after the time of the patriarch, asks; *Where was idolatry ever punished by the MAGISTRATE, but under the Jewish economy?* The *professor* answers, *It was punished under the JOBEAN ECONOMY.* And he advances nothing without proof. Does not Job himself say, that idolatry was *an iniquity to be punished by the judge?* The *examiner* replies, that the Job who says this, is an airy phantom, raised for other purposes than to lay down the law for the patriarchal times. The *professor* maintains that they are all asses, with ears as long as *father Harduin's*, who cannot see that this is the true and genuine old Job.—In good time. *Sub judice lis est:* and while it is so, I am afraid the learned *professor* BEGS THE QUESTION; when, to prove that idolatry was punished by the magistrate, out of the land of Judea, he affirms that KING JOB punished it. If he say, he does not rest his assertion on this passage of the book of Job alone, but on the sacred records, from whence he concludes that those CIVIL MAGISTRATES, Abraham and Melchisedec, punished idolatry: I shall own he acts fairly, in putting them all upon the same footing; and on what ground that stands, we shall now see.

2. The *examiner* says; *Where was idolatry ever punished by the magistrate, but under the Jewish economy?* A question equivalent to this,—"Where was idolatry punished by the civil magistrate on the established laws of the state, but in Judea?" To which the *professor* replies,—"*It was punished by all the patriarchal monarchs, by king Job, king Abraham, and king Melchisedec.*"

*Of a noble race was Shenkin.*

But here, not one, save the last, had so much as a nominal title to civil magistracy: and

this last drops, as it were, from the clouds, without lineage or parentage; so that, though of *divine*, yet certainly not a monarch of the true stamp, by *hereditary right*. The critic therefore fails in his first point, which is, finding out civil magistrates to do his hierarchical drudgery.

3. But let us admit our *professor's* right of investiture, to confer this high office, and then see how he proves, that these his lieges punished the crime of idolatry by civil punishment. ABRAHAM, and the patriarchs his descendants, come first under consideration. *What!* says he, *was not Abraham, exercising the SOVEREIGNTY in his own family, to punish idolatry?* Hobbes is, I believe, the only one (save our professor) who holds that "Abraham had a right to prescribe to his family what religion they should be of, to tell them what was the word of God, and to punish those who countenanced any doctrine which he had forbidden."—*Leviath.* chap. 40.—But God speaking of Abraham, says, *I know that he will command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord, &c.* Gen. xviii. 19. And Hobbes and our professor, I suppose, regard this declaration as a clear proof of the divine doctrine of RESTRAINT in matters of religion; especially when interpreted by their darling text of—*force them to enter in*. On the contrary, those who have been bred up in the principles of *toleration*, hold it to be a mere testimony (a glorious one indeed) of Abraham's pious and parental care to INSTRUCT his family in the law of God. And it is well it can go for no more, or I should fear the learned professor would have brought in Isaac as a backslider to idolatry; and his father's laying him on the sacrificial pile, as a kind of *auto da fe*. Now, except in these two places of Abraham's history, of such wonderful force to support *intolerant* principles, the patriarch appears in all others so averse to this inquisitorial spirit, that where God comes down to destroy Sodom, the *father of the faithful* intercedes, with the utmost importunity, for that *idolstreous* as well as incestuous city. The truth is this: The usurped right of punishing for opinions was first assumed and long engrossed by idolaters. And, if tradition may be believed, Abraham himself narrowly escaped the *fire* for preaching against its divinity. But this is not all. From his own conduct, and from the conduct of his posterity, he seems to have made one part of that fidelity in *keeping the way of the Lord* (for which he is so nobly distinguished by God himself) to consist in inculcating the divine doctrine of *toleration*. When JACOB and his family, without leave-taking, had departed from Laban, Rachel stole away her father's gods. The old man followed and overtook them; and complaining of the theft, Jacob frankly answered: *With whomsoever thou findest thy gods, let him not live*. Now, I would ask, was this condemnation on the offender denounced for *idolatry*, or for the *theft*? The words of the patriarch, which immediately follow, determine this—*Before our brethren discern thou what is thine, with me, and take it to thee*. Well, Rachel, by a female stratagem, contrived to keep her father's gods, for no better purpose, we may be sure, than that for which the good man employed so much pains to recover them. The *theft*, indeed, had it been discovered, would have been *punished by the judge*: but as for the *idolatry*, which, from its nature, could not be long hid, the silence of scripture shows it to have been *coram non judice*. And so far was Rachel from being doomed to the fire, that we do not find, even her gods underwent this punishment.

After the affair of the Shechemites, Jacob, by God's command, goes to Bethel: and there, in pious emulation of his grandfather's care to *keep the way of the Lord*, the text tells us, he commanded *his household and all that were with him, to put away the strange gods from amongst them*. They obeyed, all was well; and not a word of *punishing by the judge*.

Indeed, these *patriarchal judges* were much better employed, and more suitably to their office, in punishing civil crimes and immoralities, as appears from the adventure of Judah and his daughter-in-law Tamar.

MELCHISEDEC's story is a short one; he is just brought into the scene to *bless* Abraham in his return from conquest. This promises but ill. Had this *king and priest of Salem* been brought in *cursing*, it had had a better appearance: for, I think, punishment for opinions, which generally ends in a *fagot*, always begins with a *curse*. But we may be misled perhaps by a wrong translation. The Hebrew word to *bless*, signifies likewise to *curse*, and, under the management of an intolerant priest, good things easily run into their contraries. What follows, is his taking *tithes* from Abraham. Nor will this serve our purpose, unless we interpret these *tithes* into *finer for nonconformity*; and then, by the *blearing*, we can easily understand *absolution*. We have seen much stranger things done with the *Hebrew verity*. If this be not allowed, I do not see how we can elicit fire and fagot from this adventure; for I think there is no inseparable connexion between *tithes* and *persecution*, but in the ideas of a Quaker.—And so much for *king Melchisedec*.

But the learned professor, who has been hardily brought up in the keen atmosphere of WHOLESOME SEVERITIES, and early taught to distinguish between *de facto* and *de jure*, thought it needless to inquire into *facts*, when he was secure of the *right*. And, therefore, only slightly and superciliously asks; "What! was not Abraham, by his very princely office, to *punish idolatry*? Were not Melchisedec and Job, and all the heads of tribes, to



de the same?" Why, no: and it is well for religion that they were not. It is for its honour that such a set of persecuting patriarchs is no where to be found, but in a *poetical prelection*.

4. For in the last place, let it be observed, that as these patriarchs *did not de facto* (which appears from their history), so they *could not de jure* (which appears from the laws of nature and nations) *punish idolatry by the judge*. Because, as hath been shown, idolatry is not amenable to civil justice, but where it becomes *crimen læsæ majestatis*. It could not become the crime of lese-majesty under the patriarchs, unless they had been GODS as well as KINGS. Indeed, they were as much one as the other. However, it is not pretended that their government, though *regal*, was *theocratical* likewise. The patriarchs, therefore, could not *punish idolatry by the judge*.

From the *examiner*, the professor (without the least provocation given him) proceeds to the author of the *Divine Legation*; who, he will show, is as ignorant, absurd, and mad-brained, as father Harduin himself.

The author of the *Divine Legation* had said, that the writer of the book of Job *observed decorum*, in imitating the manners of the early scene which he had proposed to adorn. To this, the professor objects,—“I can never bring myself to allow to a SEMI-BARBAROUS POET, writing after the Babylonish captivity, such a piece of subtilty and refinement.”—A mighty piece of refinement truly, for a writer, who lays his scene in an early age, to paint, the best he could, the manners of that age.—“Besides (says the *professor*), which is the principal point, the style savours wonderfully of antiquity, and its peculiar character is a certain primitive and noble simplicity. So that they who degrade this book to the times posterior to the Babylonish captivity, seem to judge almost as insanely of *Hebrew* literature as father Harduin did of the *Roman*, who ascribed the golden poems of Virgil, Horace, and the rest, to the iron ages of the monks.”—*Verum poetæ semibarbaro post captivitatem scribenti tantam subtilitatem ut concedam, impetrare a me non possum. Porro vero stylus poematis, quod vel maximum est, præcipue vetustatem sapit; est ejus peculiaris character ἀρχαῖος. Adeo ut qui id infra captivitatem Babylonicam deprimunt, non multo sanius in Hebraicis judicare videantur, quam in Latinis Harduinus; qui aurea Virgilii, Horatii, cæterorumque poemata, ferreis monachorum sæculis adscripsit.—Idem ib.*

The learned *professor* is a little unlucky in his comparison. The age of Job, as fixed by him, and the age of the writer of his history, as fixed by me, run exactly parallel, not with the times of Virgil and Frederic Barbarossa, as he would insinuate, but with those of Ennius and Virgil. Job, the hero of the poem, lived in an *age* when civil society was but beginning to show itself, and what is more, in a *country* where it never yet was formed: and Ezra (whom I suppose to be the author of the poem) was an eminent citizen in the most perfect civil government in the world, which he was sent home to restore, laden with the literary treasures of the east; treasures that had been long accumulating under the warm influence of a large and powerful empire. From this second transplantation of the republic, science got footing in Judea; and true religion took deeper root in the hearts of its inhabitants. Henceforward, we hear no more of their absurd idolatries. A strict *adherence* to the LAW now as much distinguished them from others, as did the *singularity* of the LAW itself. And a studious cultivation of the LANGUAGE, in which that law was written, as naturally followed, as it did amongst the Saracens, who cultivated the Arabic on the same principle. And to understand how great this was in both, we need only consider, that each had the same aversion to a translation of their law into a foreign language. It is true, that in course of time, when the Jewish policy was abolished, and the nation was become vagabond upon earth, while the Arabs, on the contrary, had erected a great empire, a manifest difference arose between them, as to the cultivation of the two languages.—Yet for all this, the professor calls Ezra a SEMI-BARBARIAN; though we agree that he wrote by the inspiration of the Most High; amidst the last blaze indeed, yet in the full lustre of expiring prophecy.

But the learned professor has an internal argument from taste,\* full as good as the other from *chronology*. “The book of Job savours of antiquity, and those who cannot relish it, have as depraved a taste as father Harduin, who could not distinguish partridge from horse-flesh.”

The truth is, the Greek and Latin languages having, for many ages, been the mother-tongues of two of the greatest people upon earth (who had shared between them the empires of *eloquence* and of *arms*) became daily more and more copious by the cultivation of arts; and less and less pure by the extension of commerce. In these two languages there yet remains a vast number of writings on all sorts of subjects. So that modern critics (in the foremost rank of whom will always stand the incomparable BENTLEY) had by long application to them, through their various and progressive refinements and depravations from age to age, acquired a certain sagacity, in passing a tolerable judgment concerning the time of the writer, by his style and manner. Now pedantry, which is the ape of criticism, would

\* See what hath been said on this head in the preceding volume, book vi. sec. 2.

mimic the same talent of discernment, in the narrowest and most barren of all languages; little subject to change, both from the common genius of the east, and from the peculiar situation of a sequestered people. Of this language, long since become a dead one, the only remains are in one small volume; the contents of which, had not providence been mercifully pleased to secure, while the tongue was yet living, by a translation into Greek, the HEBREW VERITY, transmitted to us in the manner it was found in the most ancient MSS. where no vowel-points are used, nor space left to distinguish one word from another, and where a great number of terms occur only once, would at this day be a mere arbitrary CIPHER, which every rabbinical or cabalistic juggler might make the key of his unrevealed mysteries.—“Idem accidit etiam Mahometanis (says Abraham Ekeell) ante inventa ab Ali Abnadiralebo puncta vocalia: tanta enim legentium erat dissentio, ut nisi Othomanni coercita fuisset auctoritate, et determinata lectio punctis, quæ Ali excogitaverat, *JAM DE ALCORANO ACTUM ESSET.*” And if this had been the case of the Arabic of the Alcoran, a copious and living language, what had become of the Hebrew of the Bible? a very narrow and a dead one. Of which an ancient Jewish grammarian gives this character: “Lingua ista [Arabica] elegans est, et longe lateque scriptis dilatata, et qui eam loquitur nulla dictione deficit: lingua vero sancta pauca est præ illa, cum illius nihil extet nisi quod in libris scripturæ reperitur, *nec suppeditet omnes dictiones loquendi necessarias.*” Yet this is the language whose peculiarities of style and composition, correspondent to every age and time, the professor seems to think, may be as easily distinguished as those of the Greek or Latin classics. So much for the author of the *Divine Legation*: and indeed too much, had not Mr LOCKE’s defence been involved in his: that excellent person having declared (speaking of the words of Job, *that idolatry was an iniquity to be punished by the judge*) “THEM PLACES ALONE, WHERE THERE NO OTHER, is sufficient to confirm their opinion who conclude that book to be writ by a JEW.”

From the *Divine Legation*, the learned professor turns again to the examiner, who seems to sit heavy on his stomach.—This excellent writer desired to know of the learned, *Where they could find a civil or religious constitution out of Judea, which declared that the children should suffer for the crime of their parents.* To which the professor replies in those very words—In præsens Horatiano illo versiculo contentus abito examinatorum omnium CANDIDISSIMUS—*For the present, let this MOST CANDID of all examiners go about his business, and be thankful for this scrap of Horace,*

Delicta majorum immeritus lues,  
Romane.

This is true poetical payment: he is called upon for his reckoning, and he discharges it with an old song. But the examiner is not a man to take rhyme for reason. He asked for an *old system of laws*; and the contemptuous professor gives him an *old ballad*: but a little more civility at parting had not been amiss; for he, who did not spare the bishop, would certainly demolish the professor, should he take it into his head to examine the *prælections* as he hath done the *sermons*.

## NOTES ON BOOK VI.

---

P. 377, A. To give an example only in Bishop BULL, whose words in a *Latin* tract, for a future state's not being in the Mosaic dispensation, I have quoted in the fourth section of this sixth book; yet in an *English* posthumous sermon, he seems to speak in a very different manner.—I should not have illustrated this censure by the example of so respectable a person, but for the indiscretion of my answerers, who, to support their own *ill logic*, have exposed his *morals*.

P. 382, B. Job's *life*, by means of the devil and his false friends, was an exercise of his patience; and his *history*, by means of criticism and his commentators, has since been an exercise of ours. I am far from thinking myself unconcerned in this mischief; for by a foolish attempt to support his name and character, I have been the occasion of bringing down whole bands of hostile critics upon him, who, like the *Sabeans* and *Chaldeans* of old, soon reduced him back to his dunghill. Some came armed in Latin, some in English, and some in the language of Billingsgate. Most of them were professedly written against me; but all, in reality, bear hardest on the good old patriarch.

However, though I am, as I said, to be reckoned, along with these, amongst Job's persecutors; yet I have this to say for myself, that the vexation I gave him was soon over. If I scribbled ten pages on his back, my adversaries and his have *made long furrows* and scribbled ten thousand. Now, though amongst all these Job found no favour, yet by ill-hap my system did: but to whom I am most obliged, whether to those who attacked it, or to those who espoused it, is not easy to say; for, by a singular event, the assailants have left me in possession of all its supports, and the defenders have taken them all away: \* the better, I presume, to fit it to their own use. Learned naturalists tell us of a certain animal in the watery waste, which, for I know not what conceit, they call *Bernard the hermit*; and which, in courtesy, they rank with the testaceous tribe, though nature (so bountiful to the rest of its kind) hath given this no habitation of its own; but sent it naked and unhoused into the world. In recompence, she has enabled it to figure amongst the best of its tribe: for, by a noble endowment of instinct, it is taught to make its way into the best accommodated, and best ornamented shells of its brethren; which it either finds empty, or soon makes so, to fit them up for its own ease and convenience.

P. 382, C. But if the reader would see the absurdity of supposing the book of Job to be written thus early, and at the same time, to teach the resurrection and a future state, exposed at large, he may read the third chapter of 'The free and candid Examination of the Bishop of London's Principles.'

P. 383, D. Calmet makes the following observation, in his comment on the 1st verse of chap. xxxviii. L'écrivain de cet ouvrage a observé de ne point employer ce nom de *Jehovah* dans les discours directs, qu'il fait tenir à Job et à ses amis: mais dans les recits, qui sont au commencement, et à la fin du livre, il use de ce terme, comme font d'ordinaire les écrivains Hebreux. Ce qui *démontre* que l'ouvrage a été écrit par un Juif, et depuis Moÿse; puisque ce nom incommunicable ne fut connu que depuis l'apparition du buisson ardent.

P. 385, E. The Cornish critic thinks otherwise. "These false friends," says he, "are described as having so much fellow-feeling of Job's sufferings, that they sit with him seven days and nights upon the ground without being able to speak to him. If this be the dramatic way of representing false friends, how shall we know the false from the true?"—P. 19. Sempronius, in the play of Cato, is all along warmer than even Cato himself in the cause of liberty and Rome. *If this be the dramatic way of representing a false patriot* (may our critic say) *how shall we know the false from the true?* I answer, by observing him with his mask off. And do not Job's false friends unmask themselves, when they so cruelly load their suffering acquaintance with the most injurious reflections? Indeed the critic deserves our pity, who cannot see that the formal circumstance of *sitting silent seven days*

---

\* See Mr. G.'s discourses on the book of Job.

was a dramatic embellishment in the eastern manner: the not knowing that the number *seven* was a sacred number amongst the Jews, may indeed be more excusable.—But he goes on, “I have been often struck with surprise to see him [the author of the Divine Legation] very earnestly endeavouring to support his allegorical interpretation of the book of Job by arguments drawn from the contradictions, which he fancies he has there copied, to the truth of the history or tradition upon which his allegory is built. Than which, in my apprehension, there can scarce be a greater absurdity. I would desire him to consider attentively the allegorical ode in Horace, *O navis, referent, &c.*, that though every thing therein may be accommodated to a republic, yet it is true in the literal or primary sense only of a ship, and that there is not one single stroke in it that can be understood of a republic and not of a ship; and this might show him his mistake in applying passages in the book of Job to the Jewish people, MERELY because they cannot be understood of Job: which is directly annihilating the allegory he would establish. For it is as plain that in an allegory two things or persons *must be concerned*, as that two and two must go to make four.”—Pp. 99, 100. The insolence, the fraud, the nonsense of this passage, is as much without example as it was without provocation.—I desire to understand, by what other means, except by revelation, an *allegorical* writing can be known to be *allegorical*, but by circumstances in it which cannot be reconciled to the story or fable which serves both for a cover and vehicle to the moral? And yet this man tells us that to attempt to prove the nature of a writing to be allegorical from this circumstance is one of the *greatest absurdities*. When the allegory is of some length, and takes in the life and adventures of a certain person, it can scarce be otherwise but that some circumstances in it must be varied from the fact, to adapt it to the moral. In a shorter, where the object is more simple, there may be no need for any variation. And shows the disingenuity of this man, in bringing the ode of Horace into comparison. For which too, the little he knows, he is indebted to the author of the Divine Legation. And how little that is, we shall now see.

In the first place, I have shown this ode not to be of the nature of an *allegory*, where the story is only the cover and vehicle to the moral: but of the nature of a relation containing a *double sense*, primarily and secondarily: in which an information is conveyed in both senses: consequently there ought not to be a *single stroke in it that can be understood of a republic and not of a ship*: but this is a species of writing entirely distinct from the allegory in question; so that the urging it was impertinent: and the following observation is made with his usual insolence:—“this might show him his mistake in applying passages of the book of Job to the Jewish people MERELY because they cannot be understood of Job!” but not with insolence only, but with fraud; for I do not apply passages in the book of Job, MERELY for this reason; no nor principally; but only as one of many reasons.

However, contending for such discordant circumstances in the vehicle story, he says, is *directly annihilating the allegory*. Now I understood it was the establishing it; as it is the only means of getting to the knowledge of its being an allegory. He goes on,—“For it is as plain that in an allegory two things or persons must be concerned, as that two and two must go to make four.” What he means by this jargon of *two's being concerned*, I know not. If he means that the *fable* and the *moral* must go to the making up the *allegory*, nobody will dispute it with him. But if he means, that all the personages in the *fable* must have all the qualities, attributes, and adventures of the personages in the *moral*, all Æsop's fables will confute this profound reasoner on allegories. However, something, to be sure, he did mean: he had a notion, I suppose, that there was a right and a wrong in every thing: he only wanted to know where they lie: therefore, to make these cursory notes as useful as I can, I will endeavour to explain his meaning. It is certain then, that though the justice of allegoric writing does not require that the facts in the fable do in reality correspond exactly with the facts in the moral, yet the truth of things requires the *possibility* of their so corresponding. Thus, though the ass perhaps never actually covered himself with a lion's skin, and was betrayed by his long ears, as Æsop relates; yet we have an example before us, sufficient to convince us that he might have done so, without much expense of instinct. But when *Dryden* made his *Hind and Panther* dispute about the doctrine and discipline of particular churches; as they never possibly could have done so, “this (to take his own words, instead of better) is directly annihilating the allegory he would establish; for it is as plain that in an allegory two things or persons must be concerned, as that two and two must go to make four.” But I fancy I ascribe more to his sagacity than it deserves, in supposing, that he understood, what kind of allegory the book of Job must needs be, if it be any allegory at all. I now begin to suspect he took it to be of the same kind with the ode of Horace, not indeed because he compares it to that ode; for such kind of writers are accustomed to make, as the poet says, *comparisons unlike*; but because this suspicion may give some light to his cloudy observation, “that two things or persons must be concerned:” for in that sort of allegory which is of the nature of a relation containing a *double sense* primarily and secondarily, every thing said must agree exactly both to the primary and to the secondary subject. Which perhaps is what this man means by his clumsy precept, of

*two things or persons concerned.* The reason of this distinction, in these two sorts of allegory, is this,—in that sort of allegory, which is of the nature of the book of Job, or of the *APOLOGUE*, the cover *has no moral import*: but in that sort which is of the nature of a *NARRATIVE WITH A DOUBLE SENSE*, the cover *has a moral import*.

P. 385, F. To this, the Cornish critic—"What a happy way is here of reconciling contradictions! It seems truth may become falsehood, if it be necessary to support the allegory. The moral and the fable may disagree as widely as you please, and the conclusion by a new sort of logic have something in it very different from the premises."—P. 19.—If his kind reader knows what to make of this jargon of "truth becoming falsehood, and the conclusion having more in it than the premises," he may take it for his pains. All that the author of the *Divine Legation* asserts to be here done, and which may be done according to nature and good sense, is no more than this, that a dramatic writer, when he fetches his subject from history, may alter certain of the circumstances, to fit it to his plot: which all dramatic writers, ancient and modern, have done. Much more reasonable is this liberty, where the work is not only *dramatic* but *allegorical*. Now I will suppose, that, together with Job's patience under the hand of God, tradition had brought down an account of his further sufferings under the uncharitable censure of three friends: was not the maker of this allegoric work at liberty, for the better carrying on his purpose, to represent them as *false* ones. Yet, this liberty, our wonderful critic calls *reconciling contradictions, making truth become falsehood*, and I can't tell what nonsense besides of *premises and conclusions*.

P. 386, G. *Maimonides* having given a summary of the dispute, draws this inference from it: "Vide et perpende, quâ ratione hoc negotium confusus reddiderit homines, et ad sententias illas de providentiâ Dei erga creaturas quas exposuimus permoverit." Yet, when he comes to speak of the solution of these difficulties, he could find none. But not to say nothing (the thing most dreaded by commentators,) he pretends to discover, from the obscurity in which things are left, the true scope of the book of Job: "Hic fuit scopus totius libri Jobi, ut scilicet constituatur hic articulus fidei, et doceatur, à rebus naturalibus discendam esse, ut non erremus, aut cogitemus scientiam ejus [Dei sc.] ita se habere ut scientiam nostram; intentionem, providentiam, et gubernationem ejus, sicut intentionem, providentiam, et gubernationem nostram."—*Mor. Nev.* p. 8. c. xxiii.

P. 386, H. Here Dr Grey exclaims—"How, Sir, *no wiser?* Is God introduced to *unfold* the mysterious ways of his providence, and yet the knot is left untied, because the writer, though speaking in the person of God, and by his inspiration, was not *wise enough* to untie it? Is that a speech to the purpose, which in a controversy, as you will have it, where the disputants have much perplexed the question, and a superior wisdom *was wanted to determine it*, clears up no difficulties? Or is it language fit to be made use of, when speaking of a book dictated by the Spirit of God, that the writer of it has recourse to the common expedient of dramatic writers to help him out of his straits?"—*Answer to Remarks*, p. 125. Softly, good Doctor! In determining a dispute concerning the ways of providence, though God himself had indeed interposed, we can conceive but two ways of doing it: the one to *SATISFY* us, by explaining the end and means of that providence, where the explanation is useful to us, and adequate to our capacities: the other, to *SILENCE* us, by an argument to our modesty, drawn from the incomprehensible nature and government of the Deity, where an explanation is not useful to us, and inadequate to our capacities. Both these determinations, the one by *explanation*, the other by *authority*, attended by their respective circumstances, are equally reasonable: and the last is here employed for the reason hinted at, to put an end to this embarrassed dispute. Let this serve in answer to the Doctor's question, "Is that a speech to the purpose, which in a controversy where the disputants have much perplexed the question, and a superior wisdom was wanted to determine it, clears up no difficulties?"

Indeed, though there was no *untying the knot*, there was a way to *cut it*, which would have done full as well; and that was by revealing the doctrine of a future state. Why it was not done, I leave the learned critic and all in his sentiments, to give us some good account, since they are not disposed to receive that which the author of the *Divine Legation* has given. For this doctor tells us, "it is but small comfort that arises from resolving all into submission to the almighty power of God."—P. 107. St Paul indeed tells us, it is the greatest *comfort*, as well as wisdom, to *resolve all into submission to the almighty power of God*.—But doctors differ.

From the *MATTER* of the *Divine Legation* the Doctor proceeds (as we see) to the *LANGUAGE*.—"Is it language fit to be made use of when speaking of a book dictated by the Spirit of God?"—The language hinted at, I suppose, is what he had quoted above, that "the sacred writer was no wiser when he spoke poetically in the person of God," &c. I think it *not unfit*, and for these reasons; a prophet speaking or writing by inspiration is just so far and no further enlightened than suits the purpose of his mission. Now the clearing up the mysterious ways of providence being reserved amongst the arcana of the Deity, a prophet (though employed to end the foolish and hurtful disputes about it, amongst men,



by an appeal to the incomprehensible nature of the Deity) was certainly, when he made this appeal *in the person of God, no wiser in the knowledge of this arcanum, than when he spoke in the person of Job or his friends.*

P. 387, I. This writer endeavouring to prove the high age of *Job* or of the *book of Job*, (for these two things, after better reasoners, he all along confounds,) closes his arguments in this manner, “Denique post formatam rempublicam Judaicam, secretamque à cæteris gentibus, per instituta propria et legem à Deo datam: non facile, credo, hanc sanctam gentem, ejusdem temporis et sæculi alienigenam, vel hominem gentilem, in exemplum pietatis proposituram, aut ipsius acta et historiam in sacros eorum codices relaturam.”—Archæol. Philos. p. 266, ed. 8vo, 1728. The reader sees, all the strength of the argument rests on this false supposition, that the book must needs be as old as its subject. For if *Job* were of the patriarchal times, he was a fit example of piety, let his history be written when it would: and, if written by a sacred author, it was worthy to be inserted into the canon of scripture: and was likely to be so inserted, if composed (as we shall see it was) by a Jewish prophet.

P. 387, K. Vell. Paterc. Hist. lib. i. cap. 3. Had Dr R. Grey known but just so much of the nature of these compositions, he had never fallen into the ridiculous mistake I am going to take notice of. This learned critic, to confute the system I advance, that the subject of the argumentative part of the book of *Job* was, *Whether, and why, the good are sometimes unhappy and the bad prosperous*; and that the question was debated for the sake of the Israelites in the time of *Ezra*; observes as follows: “Zopher says, chap. xx. ver. 4, 5. ‘Knowest thou not this of old, since man was placed upon earth, that the triumphing of the wicked is short, and the joy of the hypocrite but for a moment?’ Now lay your hand upon your heart, Sir, and ask yourself seriously, whether this can relate to an extraordinary providence over the Jews only.”—p. 111. He is so pleased with the force of this observation, that he repeats it, p. 116. To which I need only reply, Lay your hand, Sir, on your head, and reflect upon this rule of good writing, “Nihil enim ex persona poetæ, sed omnia sub eorum, qui illo tempore vixerunt, dixerunt.”

P. 387, L. From amongst many instances which might be given of these slips, take the following of Euripides, in his *Iphigenia in Aulis*, Act. 3, where he makes the Chorus say, “Troy perishes. And for whom? For you, cruel Helen, who, as they say, are the daughter of Jupiter, who, under the form of a swan, had commerce with Leda.”—So far is well: because we may suppose the chorus alluded to the popular tale concerning Helen’s birth, spread abroad in her lifetime. But when the chorus goes on and says,—“If at least the writings of the poets be not fabulous,” the author had forgot himself; for the poets who embellished her story, lived long afterwards.

P. 388, M. Here the Cornish answerer affirms, “that this method of punishment was not peculiar to the Jewish polity, but was observed, in some degrees at least, with respect to all mankind.” For which he quotes Isaiah’s threatenings on the children of the king of Babylon, chap. xiv. ver. 20, et seq. That is, in order to prove that God punished the crimes of the fathers on the children in some degree at least, with respect to all mankind, he quotes an instance, not of the *general* providence of God to all mankind, but a *particular* dispensation to the Babylonians: and not a *particular* punishment, which selects out the children of transgressing parents, but a *general* one, which in the nature of things necessarily attends the total overthrow of a state or community.

P. 388, N. Mr LOCKE thought this so decisive a proof that the book of *Job* was written after the giving of the law, that he says, “THIS PLACE ALONE, WERE THERE NO OTHER, is sufficient to confirm their opinion who conclude that book to be written by a Jew.”—*Third Letter for Toleration*, pp. 81, 82. Let those critics reflect upon this, who think there is no footstep nor shadow of allusion to any thing relating to the people of Israel.

P. 390, O. Ver. 21, evidently taken from these words of the psalmist, “Thou shalt keep them secretly in a pavilion from the strife of tongues.”—Ps. xxxi. 20. For which was the copy and which the original can here admit no doubt, since the image was an obvious one in the psalmist, who lived in a great city, less natural in *Job* who lived in a desert, as we have observed above.

P. 396, P. The best and ablest critics are generally agreed, and have as generally taken it for granted, that this *question* is the subject of debate between the several disputants in the book of *Job*. It would be abusing the reader’s patience to produce a long train of authorities. Though it may not be improper to give the sentiments of the last, though not the least able of them, on this head.—Operæ pretium est admonere te, amice lector, quid nobis de tota hujus libri materia cogitandum esse videatur. Primum quidem amici *Job* sic statuunt, quandoquidem tot tantisque cladibus Deus amicum ipsorum *Job* afflixit, ei Deum esse iratum, eum igitur pœnas tales aliquo scelere, vel aperto, vel occulto commensurata. Cujus suæ sententiæ testes adhibent generationes hominum priores, in quibus inauditum est, inquiunt, *Deum vel integros viros aspernatum, vel impios manu apprehendisse*. Si quis nostræ ætatis homo sic disputaret, nemo esset quin ejus temeritatem atque audaciam miraretur, qui rem aperte falsam sumeret, cum suppositissimè eveniat et summas miseries ex-



periri hac in mortali vita viros bonos, et florentissimam fortunam, flagitiosos. Tamen Job, *id quod est maxime considerandum*, redargutione tali non utitur. Non id negat, quod sui amici, Patrum memoria teste confirmabant; quod tamen Job, si falsum id sibi videretur, uno verbo, *Mentiris*, poterat confutare. Atque etiam idem Job alterum negans, tales se miseras crimine aliquo suo fuisse commeritum, alterum tamen non dissimulat, Deum sibi adversari; in qua ipsa sancti viri confessione adversariorum causa ex parte vincebat, cum suas chades Job sic acciperet, ut iræ divinæ consueta signa, cumque inde non parum animo sustineret. Quæ cum ita sint, nos sic existimamus, non falsos fuisse memoriæ testes Job amicos; atque adeo, PRIMIS MUNDI TEMPORIBUS, homines impios fuisse, præter solitum naturæ cursum, divinâ irâ percussos, iisque acceptos plagis, quarum sancti homines essent immunes; Deo Opt. Max. humanas res ita moderante, ut religionem in terris tueretur, et ut homines, cum talia exempla paterentur, cogitarent esse in cœlo Deum justum, a quo mortales ut recte factorum præmium sperare deberent, sic scelerum ultionem timere.—HOUSGANT in *librum Job, lectori*.

But, since the writing of my dissertation, the language of the rabbinical men has been greatly changed. And, partly to keep up the antiquity of the book, but principally to guard against an *extraordinary providence*, several of them, in defiance of their senses, have denied that this, which this honest priest of the Oratory makes to be the subject of the book of Job, has indeed any thing at all to do with it. Amongst the foremost of these is Dr Richard Grey, the epitomiser of Albert Schultens' comment on this book. In the preface to his Abstract, amongst other things, he has criticised my opinion of the scope of the book in the following manner.—Nam quod dicit vir clariss. id præcipue in hoc libro disceptari, nempe an bonis semper bona, malisque mala, an utrisque utraque promiscue obtingent; hanc autem questionem (a nobis quidem alienam, minus ideo perpensam) nusquam alibi gentium præterquam in Judæa nec apud ipsos Judæos alio quovis tempore, quam quod assignat, moveri potuisse, id omne ex veritate sum hypotheseos pendet, et mea quidem sententia, longe aliter se habet.—Pref. p. 10—15. “For as to what this writer [the author of the Divine Legation] says, that the main question handled in the book of Job is whether good happens to the good, and evil to evil men, or whether both happen not promiscuously to both: and that this question (a very foreign one to us, and therefore the less attended to) could never be the subject of disputation any where but in the land of Judea, nor there neither at any other time than that which he assigns; all this, I say, depends on the truth of his hypothesis, and is, in my opinion, far otherwise.” That which *depends on the truth of an hypothesis* has, indeed, generally speaking, a very slender foundation: and I am partly of opinion it was the common prejudice against this support which disposed the learned prefacer to give my notions no better a name. But what I have shown to be the subject of the book is so far from depending on the truth of my hypothesis, that the truth of my hypothesis depends on what I have shown to be the subject of the book: and very fitly so, as every reasonable *hypothesis* should be supported on a *fact*. Now I might appeal to the learned world, whether it be not as clear a fact that the subject of the book of Job is *whether good happens to the good, and evil to evil men, or whether both happen not promiscuously to both*; as that the subject of the first book of Tusculan Disputations is *de contemnenda morte*. On this I founded my hypothesis, that the book of Job must have been written about the time of Esdras, because no other assignable time could at all suit the subject—But it is possible I may mistake in what he calls *my hypothesis*: for aught I know, he may understand not that of the book of Job, but that of the *Divine Legation*. And then, by *my hypothesis*, he must mean the great religious principle I endeavoured to evince, THAT THE JEWS WERE IN REALITY UNDER AN EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE. But it will be paying me a very unusual compliment to call that my hypothesis which the Bible was not only divinely written, but was likewise divinely preserved, to testify: which all believers profess to believe; and which none but unbelievers and answerers to the Divine Legation directly deny. However, if this be the *hypothesis* he means, I need desire no better a support. But the truth is, my interpretation of the book of Job seeks support from nothing but those common rules of grammar and logic on which the sense of all kind of writings are or ought to be interpreted.

He goes on in this manner. Nempe id unum voluisse mihi videtur sacer scriptor, ut iis omnibus, utrumque afflictis, humilitatis et patientiæ perpetuum extaret documentum ex contemplatione gemina, hinc infinitæ Dei perfectionis, sapientiæ et potentiæ; illinc humanæ, quæ in sanctissimis quoque viris inest, corruptionis, imbecillitatis et ignorantie. “For this sole purpose of the sacred writer seems to me to be this, to compose a work that should remain a perpetual document of humility and patience to all good men in affliction from this twofold consideration, as on the one hand of the infinite perfection, power, and wisdom of God; so on the other, of human corruption, imbecility, and ignorance, discoverable even in the best of men.” Such talk in a popular discourse, for the sake of a moral application, might not be amiss: but to speak thus to the learned world, is surely out of season. The critic will be apt to tell him, he hath mistaken the *actor for the subject*; and that he might on the same principle as well conclude that the purpose of Virgil's poem is not the establish-

ment of an empire in Italy, but the personal piety of Æneas. But to be a little more explicit. The book of Job consists of two distinct parts; the *narrative*, contained in the prologue and epilogue; and the *argumentative*, which composes the body of the work. Now when the question is of the subject of a book, who means any other than the body of it? yet the learned Doctor mistaking the *narrative* part for the *argumentative*, gives us the subject of the introduction and conclusion for that of the work itself. And it is very true that the beginning and the end do exhibit *a perpetual document of humility and patience to all good men in affliction*. But it is as true that the body of the work neither does nor could exhibit any such document. First it does not: for, that humility and patience, which Job manifests before his entering into dispute, is succeeded by rage and ostentation when he becomes heated with unreasonable opposition. Secondly, it could not; because it is altogether argumentative; the subject of which must needs be a proposition debated, and not a document exemplified. A precept may be conveyed in history; but a disputation can exhibit only a debated question. I have shown what that question is; and he, instead of proving that I have assigned a wrong one, goes about to persuade the reader, that there is no question at all.

He proceeds. *Quamvis enim in sermonibus, qui in eo habentur, de religione, de virtute, de providentia, Deique in mundo gubernando sapientia, justitia, sanctitate, de uno rerum omnium principio, aliisque gravissimis veritatibus dissertatur, hunc tamen quem dixi unicum esse libri scopum, tam ex initio et fine, quam ex universâ ejus œconomia cuius epimer manifestum erit. Ea enim, ut rem omnem summam complectar, Jobum exhibet, primo quidem querentem, expostulantem, effræno luctui indulgentem; mox (quum ut sacri dramatis natura postulabat, amicorum contradictione, sinistrisque suspicionibus magis magisque irritatus et lacessitus esset) imprudentius Deum provocantem, atque in justitia sua gloriantem; ad debitam tandem submissionem suique cognitionem revocatum, tum demum, nec antea, integritatis suæ tam præmium, quam testimonium a Deo reportantem.* “For although in the speeches that occur, there be much talk of religion, virtue, and providence, of God’s wisdom, justice, and holiness in the government of the world, of one principle of all things, and other most important truths, yet that this which I have assigned is the only scope of the book will appear manifest to every one, as well from the beginning and the end as from the economy of the whole. For to say all in a word, it first presents Job complaining, expostulating, and indulging himself in an ungovernable grief; but soon after (when, as the nature of the sacred drama required, by the contradiction of his friends, and their sinister suspicions, he became more and more teased and irritated) rashly challenging God, and glorying in his own integrity: yet at length brought back to a due submission and knowledge of himself.” The reader sees that all this is just as pertinent as if I should say, Mr CHILLINGWORTH’S famous book against Knot the jesuit, was not to prove *the religion of protestants a safe way to salvation*, but to give the picture of an artful caviller and a candid disputer. “For, although, in the arguments that occur, there be much talk of protestantism, popery, infallibility, a judge of controversies, fundamentals of faith, and other most important matters, yet that this which I have assigned is the only scope of the book, will appear manifest to every one, as well from the beginning and the end, as from the economy of the whole. For it first of all presents the sophist quibbling, chicaning, and indulging himself in all the imaginable methods of false reasoning: and soon after, as the course of disputation required, resting on his own authority, and loading his adversary with personal calumnies; yet at length, by the force of truth and good logic, brought back to the point; confuted, exposed, and put to silence.” Now if I should say this of the book of Chillingworth, would it not be as true, and as much to the purpose, as what our author hath said of the book of Job? The matters in the discourse of *the Religion of Protestants* could not be treated as they are without exhibiting the two characters of a sophist and a true logician. Nor could the matters in the book of Job be treated as they are without exhibiting a good man in afflictions, complaining and expostulating; impatient under the contradiction of his friends, yet at length brought back to a due submission, and knowledge of himself. But therefore, to make this the *sole or chief scope* of the book, (for in this he varies,) is perverting all the rules of interpretation. But what misled him we have taken notice of above. And he himself points to it, where he says,—“The subject I have assigned to the book of Job appears the true both from the *BEGINNING* and the *END*.” It is true, he adds, and *from the economy of the whole* likewise.

Which he endeavours to prove in this manner: “For it first presents Job complaining, expostulating, and indulging himself in an ungovernable grief: but soon after (when, as the nature of the sacred drama required, by the contradiction of his friends, and their sinister suspicions, he became more and more teased and irritated) rashly challenging God, and glorying in his own integrity: yet at length brought back to a due submission and knowledge of himself; and then at last, and not before, receiving from God both the reward and testimony of his uprightness.” This is indeed a fair account of the *CONDUCT* of the drama. And from this it appears, first, that that which he assigns for the *SOLE SCOPE* of the book cannot be the true. For if its design were to give *a perpetual document of humility and*

*patience*, how comes it to pass, that the author, in the execution of this design, represents *Job complaining, expostulating, and indulging himself in an ungovernable grief, rashly challenging God, and glorying in his own integrity?* Could a painter, think you, in order to represent the ease and safety of navigation, draw a vessel getting with much pains and difficulty into harbour, after having lost all her lading and been miserably torn and shattered by a tempest? And yet you think a writer, in order to give a *document of humility and patience*, had sufficiently discharged his plan, if he made Job conclude *resigned and submissive*, though he had drawn him turbulent, impatient, and almost blasphemous throughout the whole piece. Secondly, it appears from the learned author's account of the *conduct* of the drama, that that which I have assigned for the *sole scope* of the book is the true. For if, in Job's distressful circumstances, the question concerning an equal or unequal providence were to be debated: his friends, if they held their former part, must needs doubt of his integrity; this doubt would naturally provoke Job's indignation; and, when it was persisted in, cause him to fly out into the intemperate excesses so well described by the learned doctor: yet conscious innocence would at length enable patience to do its office, and the conclusive argument for his integrity would be his resignation and submission.

The learned writer sums up the argument thus: *Ex his, inquam, apparet, non primario agi in hoc libro de providentia, sive inæquali, sed de personali Jobi integritate.* "From all this, I say, it appears, that the personal integrity of Job, and not the question concerning an equal or unequal providence, is the principal subject of the book." He had before only told us his *opinion*; and now, from his opinion, he says it *appears*. But the appearances, we see, are deceitful; and so they will always be, when they arise only out of the fancy or inclination of the critic, and not from the nature of things.

But he proceeds. *Hanc enim (quod omnino observandum est) in dubium vocaverant amici, non ideo tantum quod afflictus esset, sed quod afflictus impatientius se gereret, Delique justitiæ obmurmuraret: et quis strenuus videlicet aliorum hortator fuerat ad fortitudinem et constantiam, quum ipse tentaretur, victus labasceret.* "For that [i. e. his personal integrity] it was which his friends doubted of, not so much on account of his affliction, as for the not bearing his affliction with patience, but murmuring at the justice of God. And that he who was a strenuous adviser of others to fortitude and constancy, should, when his own trial came, sink under the trial of his disasters." But why not *on account of his afflictions?* Do not we find that even now, under this unequal distribution of things, censorious men (and such doubtless he will confess Job's comforters to have been) are but too apt to suspect great afflictions for the punishment of secret sins. How much more prone to the same suspicion would such men be in the time of Job, when the ways of providence were more equal? As to his *impatience in bearing affliction*, that symptom was altogether ambiguous; and might as likely denote want of fortitude as want of innocence; and proceed as well from the pain of an ulcerated body, as the anguish of a distracted conscience.

Well, our author has brought the patriarch thus far on his way, to expose his *bad temper*. From hence he accompanies him to his place of rest; which, as many an innocent man's is, he makes to be in a *bad argument*. *Quam accesserat sanctissimi viri malis hæc gravissima omnium tentatio, ut tanquam improbus et hypocrita ab amicis damnaretur, et quod unicuique ei supererat, conscientie suæ testimonio ac solatio, quantum ipsi potuerunt, privandus foret, quid misero faciendum erat?* Amicos perfidiæ crudelitatis arguit: Deum integritatis suæ testem vindicemque appellat: quum autem nec Deus interveniret, ad innocentiam ejus vindicandam, nec remitterent quicquam amici de acerbis suis censuris, injustisque criminationibus, ad SUPREMUM ILLUD JUDICIUM provocat, in quo REDEMPTOREM sibi affuturum, Deumque a suis partibus staturum, summa cum fiducia se novisse affirmat. "Now when," says the learned writer, "the most grievous trial of all was added to the other evils of this holy person; to be condemned by his friends as a profligate, and an hypocrite, and to be deprived, as much as in them lay, of his only remaining support, the testimony of a good conscience, what was left for the unhappy man to do? He accuses his friends of perfidy and cruelty; he calls upon God as the witness and avenger of his integrity: but when neither God interposed to vindicate his innocence, nor his friends forebore to urge their harsh censures and unjust accusations, he appeals to that LAST JUDGMENT, in which with the utmost confidence he affirms that he knew that his REDEEMER would be present to him, and that God would declare in his favour." To understand the force of this representation, we must have in mind this unquestionable truth; "that, be the subject of the book what it will, yet if the sacred writer bring in the persons of the drama disputing, he will take care that they talk with *decorum*, and to the purpose." Now we both agree that Job's friends had pretended at least to suspect his integrity. This suspicion it was Job's business to remove; and if the doctor's account of the subject be right, his only business. To this end he offers various arguments, which failing of their effect, he at last (as the doctor will have it) appeals to the SECOND COMING OF THE REDEEMER OF MANKIND. But was this likely to satisfy them? They demand a present solution of their doubts, and

he sends them to a future judgment. Nor can our author say (though he would insinuate) that this was such a sort of appeal as disputants are sometimes forced to have recourse to, when they are run aground and have nothing more to offer: for Job, after this, proceeds in the dispute; and urges many other arguments with the utmost propriety. Indeed there is one way, and but one, to make the appeal pertinent: and that is, to suppose our author mistaken, when he said that "the personal integrity of Job, and not the question concerning an equal or unequal providence, was the main subject of the book:" and we may venture to suppose so, without much danger of doing him wrong: for, the doctrine of a *future judgment* affords a principle whereon to determine the *question of an equal or unequal providence*; but it leaves the *personal integrity of Job* just as it found it. But the learned author is so little solicitous for the *pertinency* of the argument, that he makes, as we shall now see, its *impertinence* to be one of the great supports of his system. For thus he concludes his argument. Jam vero si cardo controversiæ fuisset, utrum, salva Dei justitia, sancti in hac vita adfligi possent, hæc ipsa declarata litem finire debuerat. Sin autem de personali Jobi innocentia disceptetur, nil mirum quod veterem canere cantilenam, Jobumque ut fecerant, condemnare pergerent socii, quum Dei solius erat, qui corda hominum explorat, pro certo scire; an jure merito sibi Jobus hoc solamen attribueret, an falsam sibi fiduciam vana arrogaret. "But now if the hinge of the controversy had turned on this, whether or no, consistently with God's justice, good men could be afflicted in this life, this declaration ought to have finished the debate: but if the question were concerning the personal innocence of Job, it was no wonder that they still sung their old song, and went on as they had begun, to condemn their much-afflicted friend; since it was in the power of God alone to explore the hearts of men, and to know for certain whether it was Job's piety that rightly applied a consolation, or whether it was his vanity that arrogated a false confidence to himself." This is a very pleasant way of coming to the sense of a disputed passage: not, as of old, by showing it supports the *writer's argument*, but by showing it supports the *critic's hypothesis*. I had taken it for granted that Job reasoned to the purpose, and therefore urged this argument against understanding him as speaking of the *resurrection* in the 19th chapter. "The disputants," say I, "are all equally embarrassed in adjusting the ways of providence. Job affirms that the good man is sometimes unhappy; the three friends pretend that he never can be so; because such a situation would reflect upon God's justice. Now the doctrine of a *resurrection* supposed to be urged by Job, cleared up all this embarrassment. If therefore his friends thought it true, it ended the dispute; if false, it lay upon them to confute it. Yet they do neither: they neither call it into question, nor allow it to be decisive. But without the least notice that any such thing had been urged, they go on as they began, to enforce their former arguments, and to confute that which they seem to understand was the only one Job had urged against them; viz. the consciousness of his own innocence."—Now what says our learned critic to this? Why, he says, that if I be mistaken, and he be right in his account of the book of Job, the reason is plain why the three friends took no notice of Job's appeal to a resurrection; namely, because it deserved none. As to his being in the right, the reader, I suppose, will not be greatly solicitous, if it be one of the consequences that the sacred reasoner is in the wrong. However, before we allow him to be right, it will be expected he should answer the following questions. If, as he says, the point in the book of Job was *only his personal innocence*, and this not, as I say, upon the PRINCIPLE of *no innocent person being miserable*; I would ask how it was possible that Job's friends and intimates should be so obstinately bent on pronouncing him guilty, the purity of whose former life and conversation they were so well acquainted with? If he will say, the disputants went upon that PRINCIPLE, I then ask how came Job's appeal to a resurrection not to silence his opposers? as it accounted for the justice of God in the present unequal distribution of things.

P. 396, Q. "This is one thing," says Job, "therefore I said it, HE DESTROYETH THE PERFECT WITH THE WICKED," chap. ix. 22: as much as to say, this is the point or general question between us, and I stick to the affirmative, and insist upon its truth. The words which follow are remarkable. It had been objected, that when the good man suffered, it was for a trial; to this Job replies: "If the scourge slay suddenly, he will laugh at the trial of the innocent, ver. 23, suddenly, or indiscriminately," as Schultens rightly understands it; as much as to say, when the sword devours the innocent and the wicked man without distinction, if the innocent will distinguish his ill hap from the wicked man's, and call it a *trial*, the wicked man will mock at him; and indeed not without some show of reason.

P. 396, R. "Supposing," says the Cornish answerer, "we should allow such an *equal providence* to have been administered in *Judea*; yet, since he himself reckons it the utmost extravagance to suppose it any where else; what an idea does he give us of the talents of *Ezra*! who, according to him, has introduced persons who were no Jews debating a question so palpably absurd as that it NEVER entered into the head of any one man living to make a question of it out of the land of *Judea*! consequently could not with the least probability or propriety be handled by any but Jews. Is this like one who, he would make us to believe,



was a careful observer of decorum? certainly the rule of decorum would have obliged him reddere personæ, &c. as Horace speaks—either to look out for proper persons to debate his questions, or to fit his question to the persons.” I should have reason to complain of this incidence of language, so habitual to these answerers, did it not always carry its own punishment along with it. For, look, in proportion to their rudeness, is generally their folly, or ill faith.—“Supposing,” says this man, “we should allow such an equal providence,” &c. Now, when the reader considers I am only contending for the *actual* administration of such a providence as the Bible, in almost every page, represents to have been administered, will he not naturally suppose this to be some infidel writer making a gracious concession even at the expense of his own cause? But when he is told that the writer is a minister of the gospel, will he not conclude that his head is turned with the rage of *answering*?

He tells his reader that I say, “That the debated question in the book of Job could NEVER enter into the head of any man living out of the land of Judea.” Now, the very words from whence he pretends to deduce this proposition, convict him of imposture.—“This,” say I, “could never have been made matter of dispute, FROM THE MOST EARLY SUPPOSED TIME OF JOB’S EXISTENCE EVEN TO OURS, in any place out of the land of Judea.” Which surely implies it might have been a question *then*; or why did I restrain the case to the times *since* Job’s existence? Was it for nothing? In fact I was well apprised (and saw the advantages I could derive from it) that the question might as reasonably have been debated at the time when Job lived, as at the time when, I supposed, the book of Job was written. But as this was a matter reserved for another place, I contented myself with the hint conveyed in this limitation, which just served to lay in my claim to the use I should hereafter have for it. The truth is, the state of God’s providence *in the most early supposed time of Job’s existence* is a subject I shall have occasion to consider at large in the last volume of this work,\* where I employ it, amongst other proofs, to illustrate and confirm the conclusion of my general argument by one entire view of the harmony which reigns through all the various parts of the divine government as administered over man. Of this, my answerers have no conception. Their talents are only fitted to consider *parts*, and such talents best suit their business, which is to find fault.—They will say, they were not obliged to wait. But who obliged them to write? And if they should wait longer, they will have no reason to complain: for the cloudy and imperfect conception they have of my argument as it now stands, is the most commodious situation for the carrying on their trade. However, whether they prefer the light of common sense to this darkness occasioned by the absence of it, or the friendly twilight of polemics to both, I shall not go out of my way to gratify their humour. I have said enough to expose this silly cavil of our Cornish critic, and to vindicate the knowledge of the writer of the book of Job, and his observance of *decorum*, in opening a beauty in the contrivance of this work, which these answerers were not aware of.

P. 397, 8. *The Use and Intent of Prophecy*, &c. p. 208, 3d edit.—Grotius thinks the book was written for the consolation of the descendants of Esau, carried away in the Babylonish captivity; apparently, as the same writer observes, to avoid the absurdity arising from the supposition confuted above; and yet, as he farther observes, Grotius, in endeavouring to avoid one difficulty, has fallen into another. “For, suppose it writ,” says the author of the *Use and Intent of Prophecy*, &c., “for the children of Esau: they were idolaters; and yet is there no allusion to their idolatry in all this book. And what ground is there to think they were so righteous as to deserve such an interpretation to be put upon their sufferings, as the book of Job puts on them, if so be it was written for their sakes? Or can it be imagined, that a book writ about the time supposed, for the use of an idolatrous nation, and odious to the Jews, could ever have been received into the Jewish canon?”—P. 208. These are strong objections, and will oblige us to place this opinion amongst the singularities of the excellent Grotius.

P. 567, T. “Here,” says the Cornish critic, “take the poem in the other light, as an *allegoric* fiction, and what could it possibly afford besides a very *odd amusement*? for the truth of history is destroyed: and we have nothing in the room of it but a monstrous jumble of times and persons brought together, that were in reality separated from each other by the distance of a thousand or twelve hundred years. Had the author been able to produce but one precedent of this sort amongst the writings of the ancients, it might have afforded some countenance to this opinion: but, I believe, it would be difficult to find it.”—P. 47. What then, I beseech you, becomes of *Solomon’s Song*, if you will not allow it to be a *precedent of this sort*? Here, in the opinion of the church, as appears by the insertion of it into the canon, or at least in the opinion of such churchmen as our critic, Solomon, under the cover of a love-tale, or amorous intrigue between him and an Egyptian lady, has represented Christ’s union and marriage with the church. Surely, the patience or impatience of Job had a nearer relation *in nature* to the patience or impatience of the Jewish people, than Solomon’s love intrigue had, *in grace*, to the salvation obtained by Jesus Christ. Yet this we are to deem no odd amusement for the WISE MAN. But for a prophet, to employ the

---

\* That is, in book vii according to the author’s plan.—It never saw the light.

story of Job, to reprove the errors of the people committed to his care, and to inform them of an approaching change in their dispensation, is by no means to be endured. What! has this great critic never heard that amongst the *writings of the ancients*, there was a certain allegoric piece known by the name of *The Judgment of Hercules*, written by a Grecian SAGE, to excite the youth of his time to the pursuit of virtue, and to withstand the allurements of pleasure? HERCULES was as well known by history and tradition to the Greeks, as JOB was to the Jews. Did that polite people think this an *odd amusement*? Did they think the *truth of history destroyed by it*; and nothing left in its room but a monstrous jumble of times and persons, brought together, that were in reality separated from each other by the distance of a thousand or twelve hundred years? for so many at least there were between the age of Hercules and the young men of the time of Prodicus. Or does this Cornish critic imagine, that the sages of Greece took the allegory for history: or believed any more of a real rencontre between virtue, pleasure, and young Hercules, than Maimonides did of that solemn meeting of the devil and the sons of God before the throne of the Almighty?

But that curious remark of *destroying the truth of history* deserves a little farther canvassing. I suppose, when Jesus transferred the story of the prodigal and his sober brother to the gentiles and the Jews, and when St John transferred Babylon to Rome, in allegory, that they *destroyed the truth of history*. When ancient and modern dramatic writers take their subject from history, and make free with facts to adapt their plot to the nature of their poem, do they *destroy the truth of history*? Yet in their case there is only one barrier to this imaginary mischief, namely the *drama*: in the book of Job there are two, both the *drama* and the *allegory*. But after all, some hurt it may do, amongst readers of the size of this answerer, when they mistake the book of Job for a piece of biography, like the men *Ben Jonson* laughs at, who, for greater exactness, chose to read the history of England in Shakspeare's tragedies.

P. 400, U. But the Cornish critic, who has no conception that even a patient man may, on some occasions, break out into impatient heats, insists on the *impropriety* of Job's representing the Israelites of Ezra's time. "To represent the murmuring and impatient Jews," says he, "it seems that Ezra takes a person who was exemplary for the contrary quality—and then, to adapt him to his purpose, makes him break out into such excesses of impatience as border on blasphemy."—P. 50. I doubt there is a small matter amiss in this fine observation. The author of the *Divine Legation* did not write the book of Job: therefore whatever discordancy there be between the tradition of his patience and the written history of him in this book, it is just the same, whether JOB or whether EZRA wrote it. After so illustrious a specimen of his critical acumen, he may lie in bed, and cry out with the old athlete,

Cæstum artemque repono.

However, he meant well, and intended that this supposed absurdity should fall upon the author of the *Divine Legation*, and not upon the canon of Scripture. In the mean time the truth is, there is no absurdity at all, but what lies in his own cloudy pericranium. Whether the traditionary Job represented the Israelites or not, it is certain, he might with much decorum represent them. And this the following words of the *Divine Legation* might have taught our critic, had he had but so much candour as to do justice to a stranger, whom he would needs make his enemy.—"It is remarkable that Job, from the beginning of his misfortunes to the coming of his three comforters, though greatly provoked by his wife, *sinned not with his lips*; but, persecuted by the malice and bitterness of his false friends, he began to lay so much stress on his innocence as even to accuse God of injustice. This was the very state of the Jews of this time; so exactly has the sacred writer conducted his allegory; they bore their straits and difficulties with temper till their enemies Sanballat, Tobiah, and the Arabians, gave them so much disturbance; and then they fell into indecent murmurs against God." But lest our answerer should again mistake this, for a defence of the author of the *Divine Legation*, and not of Ezra, let him try, if he can reconcile the traditional patience of Job with the several strokes of impatience in the written book, upon any other principle than this, that the most patient man alive may be provoked into starts of impatience by a miserable caviller, who, being set upon *answering* what he does not understand, represents falsely, interprets perversely, and, when he is unable to make the *doctrine* odious, endeavours to make the *person* so, who holds it. In conclusion, however, thus much is fit to be observed, that if the sole or main intention of the writer of the book of Job (be he whom he will) were to exhibit an example of patience, he has executed his design very ill: certainly in so perverse a manner that, from this book, the fame of Job's exemplary patience could never have arisen. Hence I conclude in favour of an hypothesis which solves this difficulty, by distinguishing between Job's traditional and written story. But now comes a Cornish critic, and makes this very *circumstance*, which I urged for the support of my hypothesis, an objection to it. Yet he had grounds for his observation, such as they were: he dreamed, for he could not be awake, that I had *invented* the *circumstance*, whereas I only *found* it.

P. 406, X. The different situations in which this folly operated in *ancient* and *modern*



times, is very observable. In the simplicity of the early ages, while men were at their ease, that general opinion, so congenial to the human mind, of *a God and his moral government*, was too strong ever to be brought in question. It was when they found themselves miserable and in distress, that they began to complain; to question the justice, or to deny the existence of a Deity: on the contrary, amongst us, disastrous times are the season of reflection, repentance, and reliance on providence. It is affluence and abundance which now give birth to a wanton sufficiency, never thoroughly gratified till it have thrown off all the restraints of religion.

I imagine it may not be difficult to account for so strange a contrariety in the manners of men.

In the ancient world, the belief of a moral providence was amongst their most incontestable principles. But concerning the nature and extent of this providence they had indeed very inadequate conceptions; being misled by the *extraordinary* manner in which the first exertions of it were manifested, to expect more instant and immediate protection than the nature of the *dispensation* afforded. So that these men being, in their own opinion, the most worthy object of providence's concern, whenever they became pressed by civil or domestic distresses, supposed all to be lost, and the world without a governor.

But in these modern ages of vice and refinement, when every blessing is abused, and, amongst the first, that greatest of all, LIBERTY, each improvement of the mind, as well as each accommodation of the body, is perverted into a species of *luxury*; exercised and employed for amusement, to gratify the fancy or the appetites, as each, in their turn, happens to influence the will. Hence even the *FIRST PHILOSOPHY*, the science of nature itself, bows to this general abuse. It is made to act against its own ordinances, and to support those impieties it was authorized to suppress.—But now, when calamity, distress, and all the evils of those abused blessings have, by their severe but wholesome discipline, restored recollection and vigour to the relaxed and dissipated mind, the dictates of nature are again attended to: the impious principles of false science, and the false conclusions of the true, are shaken off as a hideous dream; and the abused victim of his vanity and his pleasure flies for refuge to that only asylum of humanity, RELIGION.

P. 406, Y. Thus both *Sacro* and *Sacer* have, in Latin, contrary significations. The reason is evident. Some things were *consecrated* and some *devoted* to the gods: those were *holy*; these *execrable*. So God being invoked sometimes to *bless*, and sometimes to *curse*, the invocation was expressed by one word, which had contrary senses. And this agreeable to the genius of language in general.

P. 408, Z. The Cornish critic says—"Above all, and to support the allegory in its most concerning circumstances, as the Jews were obliged to put away their idolatrous wives, so Job should have put away his, in the upshot of the fable. This would *CERTAINLY* have been done, had such an allegory been intended as Mr W. supposes." P. 66. Let this man alone for his distributive justice. I thought, when, in the conclusion of the book, we have a detailed account of Job's whole family, his sons, his daughters, and his cattle, and that we hear nothing of his wife (and, I ween, she would have been heard of had she been there), the writer plainly enough insinuated that Job had some how or other got rid of this affliction, with the rest. But nothing else will serve our righter of wrongs but a formal bill of divorce.—Indeed I suspect, a light expression I chanced to make use of, gave birth to this ingenious objection.—See above, p. 405.

P. 415, A A. Divine wisdom procures many *ends* by one and the same *mean*; so here, besides this use, of throwing the reader's attention entirely on the *serpent*, it had another, viz. to make the *serpent*, which was of the most sacred and venerable regard in the mysterious religion of Egypt, the object of the Israelites' utter abhorrence and detestation.

P. 420, B B. To this Dr Grey says, that the three friends likewise accuse Job of his *present* faults. Well, and what then? Does this acquit them of injustice for falsely charging him with *preceding* ones?

P. 423, C C. Indeed, had the book of Job the high antiquity which the common system supposes, the contending at the same time for the *spiritual* sense of this text, would be followed with insuperable difficulties: but these, let the supporters of that system look to. The very learned author of *the argument of the Divine Legation fairly stated*, &c. hath set these difficulties in a light which, I think, shows them to be insuperable; "those men," says this excellent writer, "who maintain this system, [of the *high antiquity* of the book, and the *spiritual* sense of the text] must needs regard the text to be *direct and literal*, not *typical or figurative*, but then this difficulty occurs, how came MOSES (if he was the author) to be so clear in the *book of Job*, and so obscure in the *Pentateuch*? Plain expression and typical adumbration are the contrary of one another. They could not *both* be fit for the same people, at the same time. If they were a spiritualized people, they had no need of carnal covers, such as types; and if they were a carnal-minded people, the light of spiritual things would only serve to dazzle, not to aid their sight.

"Nor is the matter mended, but made worse, by supposing the book to be written by Jon

himself, or any other patriarch earlier than Moses: that would be only transferring the charge from *Moses*, to the *God of Moses*: for while the *book of Job* was designed by providence, for part of the *Jewish Canon*, it is the same unaccountable conduct though removed thither. The RESURRECTION is open and exposed to all in the *book of Job*; and it is hid and covered under types and figures in the *Pentateuch*. From whence arises this noble truth worthy of its inventors—That the same doctrine may, at one and the same time, be the proper object both of clear and manifest, and of dark and uncertain contemplation, to the same persons.”—P. 134.

P. 426. D D. Here the Cornish critic observes, “That it does not appear that Job had any particular revelation of it, (i. e. his future felicity;) and therefore his confidence, if he had any such, must proceed upon some such principle as this, that God would at length infallibly deliver the good man out of trouble. And again, this principle must be founded on that other of an equal providence; from whence otherwise could it arise but from a persuasion that God will most certainly do what is equal and exact in this life? And yet the ingenious author, as if fond of reconciling contradictions, makes Job’s thesis to be this, *that providence is not equally administered*, at the same time, that he ascribes to him a confidence which could NOT POSSIBLY arise but from the persuasion of an *equal providence*.—P. 156.

I make Job hold *that providence was not equally administered*. I make him to hold likewise, *that he himself should be restored to his former felicity*: and this, our critic calls a CONTRADICTION. His reason is, that this latter opinion could arise only from his *persuasion of an equal providence*. This may be true, if there be no medium between an equal providence and no providence at all. But I suspect there is such a medium, from observing that it is not uncommon, even in these times, for good men in affliction, to have this very confidence of Job, without ever dreaming of an *equal providence*.

The truth is (and so I have said in the words which gave occasion to this notable observation) that Job had through the distemperature of passion advanced some tidings which on cooler thoughts he retracted. His argument against an *equal providence* was sometimes pushed so far as to have the appearance of concluding against any providence at all. But he, at length, corrects himself for this extravagance of expression; and deliberately concludes, that though the ways of God were somehow or other become unequal, yet that providence had not deserted the case of mankind, but would at length bring the good man out of trouble. Yet *this is the confidence, which*, this most confident of all critics says, could NOT POSSIBLY arise but from the persuasion of an *equal providence*: and for this it is that he charges me with a *fondness for reconciling contradictions*. Here I shall take my leave of this discourser on the book of Job, with declaring, that a more contemptuous, disingenuous, and ignorant writer, never assumed the *honourable* name of ANSWERER; yet I would not deny him his station amongst the learned. I think the same apology may be made for him, that a namesake of his, in his history of the Carthusians, made for their general Bruno,—“that doubtless he could have wrote well if he would, for he printed a Missal in an exceeding fair letter, and *delicate fine writing paper*.”—PETREI Bib. Carth. fol. 35.

P. 433, F F. This wicked fancy some early *Christian* writers seem to have gone far into; particularly ORIGEN; who, because Celsus had supposed, absurdly enough, that the propagators of the gospel had borrowed the doctrine of a *future state* from the pagan philosophers, was resolved not to be outdone, and therefore tells his adversary, “that where GOD says in the book of Moses, which was older than all the pagan writings, ‘I am come down to deliver them out of the hand of Egyptians, and to bring them up out of that land, unto a good land and a large; unto a land flowing with milk and honey; unto the place of the Canaanites, and the Hittites, and the Amorites, and the Perizzites, and the Hivites, and the Jebusites,’ [Exod. iii. 8.] he did not mean, as ignorant men imagine, the country of *Judea*, but the *kingdom of heaven*; for that how good a land soever *Judea* might be, it was yet part of that earth which had been put under the curse, and therefore,” &c.—ὅχι ὄρων ὅτι Μωϋσῆς, ὁ πολλῶν καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν γραμμάτων ἀρχαιότερος, ἐισήγαγε τὸν θεὸν ἐπαγγελλόμενον τὴν ἀγίαν γῆν, καὶ ἀγαθὴν καὶ πολλὰν ῥέουσαν γάλα καὶ μέλι, τοῖς κατὰ τὸν νόμον αὐτοῦ βιώσασιν· οὐδ’ ὡς αἰονταί τινες τὴν ἀγαθὴν, τὴν κάτω νομιζομένην Ἰουδαίαν, κυρίως καὶ αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ κατηραμένη ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις τῆς παραβάσεως τοῦ Ἀδὰμ γῆ.—Cont. Cels. p. 350. He that can rave at this strange rate must needs consider the whole sanction of *temporal* reward and punishment as a mere figurative representation of *future*. But is not the hearkening to such interpreters exposing divine revelation to the contempt and scorn of infidels and freethinkers? And yet perhaps we must be obliged to hearken to them, if the endeavours of these answerers become successful in proving the NON-EXISTENCE of the *extraordinary providence*, as promised by Moses, against the reasoning of the Divine Legation, that it was ACTUALLY administered, in pursuance of that promise. For, by Origen’s Commentaries, published by Huetius, it appears, that he was led into this strange opinion by taking it for granted, as Sykes, Rutherford, Stelbing, and such like writers have since done, that under the law the best and most pious men were frequently miserable, and the wicked prosperous and happy.

P. 447, G G. One of these answerers of this work employs much pains to prove that these words could not mean, *That it was to be well with them that fear God IN THE PRESENT LIFE*—Rutherford, p. 363: i. e. he will prove, the words could not bear a sense to which they are limited and tied down by the words immediately following,—*But it shall not be well with the wicked, NEITHER SHALL HE PROLONG HIS DAYS.*—What is to be done with such a man?

P. 450, H H. Which (to observe it by the way) unanswerably confutes that semi-pagan dream of the *soul's sleeping till the resurrection of the body*. And yet, what is strange to tell, this very text, in the course of disputation, which, like the course of time, *brings things*, as the poet says,

— to their confounding contraries,

hath been urged to prove *that sleep, or no separate life*; and this, by no less considerable a man than Mr Hales of Eaton. “Christ,” saith he, “proveth the future resurrection of the dead from thence, that God is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, but is not the God of the dead, but of the living.” Whence he concludeth, that “they live to God, that is, SHALL BE recalled to life by God, that he may manifest himself to be their God or benefactor. This argument would be altogether fallacious, if before the resurrection they felt heavenly joy; for then God would be their God or benefactor, namely, according to their souls, although their bodies should never rise again.”\* All which is a mere complication of mistakes: as is, indeed, his whole reasoning from scripture, throughout that chapter.—But they who hold the soul to be only a quality, and yet talk of its *sleep* between death and the resurrection, use a jargon which confounds all languages as well as all reason. For such a *sleep* is an annihilation: and the *waking* again, a new creation.

P. 451, I I. “Though this argument was a *new one*,” says Dr Rutherford, “though the Pharisees had never made this inference, and that therefore it does not appear from hence, that Moses *inculcated* the doctrine of a future state; yet as it was a conclusive argument, as it was an inference which *might have been made*, it will prove to us that Moses was not *studious to conceal* this doctrine, nor purposely omitted every thing that might bring his reader acquainted with those notices of redemption and of another life, which the patriarchs were favoured with.”—P. 318. This is a coup de la maître, indeed: as wittily urged as it was wisely meditated.—“If Moses bring a conclusive argument for a doctrine, it is plain he could not be studious to conceal that doctrine,” says our ingenious professor.—If Roger Bacon, say I, have given, in his writings, a true receipt to make gunpowder, he *could not be studious to conceal* the composition. And yet we know he was studious to conceal it. What reasons he had for so doing, and how consistent it was with his giving the receipt, I leave to this profound philosopher; and shall content myself with showing how consistent Moses was in the conduct I have ascribed to him.—If both Moses’s pretensions and those of Jesus likewise were true, the former must needs observe this conduct, in his institute; that is to say, he would *omit* the doctrine of another life, and, at the same time, interweave into the law such a secret mark of its truth, that, when the other institution came, it might be clear to all, that he both knew and believed the doctrine.—If Moses had not *omitted* it, he had intruded on the province of Jesus: if he had not *laid the grounds* on which it rises, he had neglected to provide for the proof of that connexion between the two dispensations, necessary to show the harmony between their respective authors. Moses had done both: and from both I gather that he was *studious to conceal the doctrine*. The omission will be allowed to be one proof of it; and I should think, this use of a term, *The God of Abraham, &c.* is another proof. For, the Jews, who, from the ceasing of the extraordinary providence, continued for many ages with incessant labour to ransack their Bibles for a proof of a future state, could never draw the inference from this text till Jesus had taught them the way. “No,” says the Doctor, “how should an argument used by Moses, for a future state, be a proof that Moses was studious to conceal it?” This argument going, as we now see, upon our Professor’s utter ignorance of the nature and genius of the Mosaic dispensation (which required as much that the grounds of a *future state* should be laid, as that the structure itself should be kept out of sight), I shall leave it in possession of that admiration which it so well deserves.

P. 452, K K. Here, the groundless conceit of the learned Mosheim [de Reb. Christ. ante Const. p. 49], is sufficiently refuted. He supposes a *Sadducee* to be represented under the person of the *rich man*. But the authority of the PROPHETS, to which Abraham refers his household, was not acknowledged by the Sadducees, as of weight to decide, in this point. And yet the very words of Abraham suppose that their not *hearing the prophets* did not proceed from their not *believing*, but from their not *regarding*.

P. 465, L L. But all are not *Arnaulds*, in the Gallican church. Mr *Freret*, speaking of the history of Saul and a passage in Isaiah, concerning the invocation of the dead, says—

---

\* A Brief Inquiry, chap. viii.

“Ce qui augmente ma surprise, c’est de voir, que la plus part de ces commentateurs se plaignent, de ne trouver dans l’écriture aucune preuve claire que les Juifs, au temps de Moÿse crussent l’immortalité de l’ame. La pratique, interdite aux Juifs, suppose que l’existence des ames, séparées du corps, par la mort, étoit alors un opinion générale et populaire.”—Memoires de l’Acad. Royale des Inscript. &c. v. 23, p. 185.—The gentleman’s *surprise* arises from his being unable to distinguish between the *separate existence of the soul* considered physically, and its *immortality* considered in a religious sense: it is under this latter consideration that a *future state of reward and punishment* is included. Had he not confounded these two things so different in themselves, he had never ventured to condemn the *commentators*; who do indeed say, they cannot find this latter doctrine in the Pentateuch. But then, they do not *lament or complain* of this want; because they saw, though this academician does not, that the absence of the doctrine of a *future state of reward and punishment* in the MOSAIC LAW evinces its imperfection, and verifies the *councilation of the gospel*, that LIFE AND IMMORTALITY were brought to light by JESUS CHRIST.

P. 468, M M. DR STEBBING, in what he calls *Considerations on the Command to offer up Isaac*, hath attempted to discredit the account here given of the *command*: and previously assures his reader, that *if any thing can hinder the ill effects which my interpretation must have upon religion, it must be his exposing the absurdity of the conceit*. This is confidently said. But what then? He can prove it. So it is to be hoped. If not . . . However, let us give him a fair hearing. He criticises this observation on the word DAY, in the following manner:—“Really, Sir, I see no manner of consequence in this reasoning. That Christ’s day had reference to his office as Redeemer, I grant. The day of Christ denotes the *time* when Christ should come, *i. e.* when *he* should come who was to be such by office and employment. But why it must import also that when Christ came he should be offered up a sacrifice, I do not in the least apprehend: because I can very easily understand that Abraham might have been informed that Christ was to come, without being informed that he was to lay down his life as a sacrifice. If Abraham saw that a time would come when one of his sons should take away the curse, he saw Christ’s day.”—*Consid.* p. 139. At first setting out (for I reckon for nothing this blundering, before he knew where he was, into a Socinian comment, the thing he most abhors) the reader sees he grants the point I contend for—*That Christ’s DAY* (says he) *has reference to his office as Redeemer, I grant*. Yet the very next words employed to explain his meaning, contradict it;—*The day of Christ denotes the TIME when Christ should come*. All the sense therefore, I can make of his concession, when joined to his explanation of it amounts to this—*Christ’s day has reference to his OFFICE*:—*No, not to his office, but to his TIME*. He sets off well: but he improves as he goes along—*But why it must import ALSO that when Christ came he should be offered up as a sacrifice, I do not in the least apprehend*. Nor I, neither, I assure him. Had I said, that the word *day*, in the text imported the *time*, I could as little apprehend as he does, how that which imports *time*, imports ALSO the *thing done in time*. Let him take this nonsense therefore to himself. I argued in a plain manner thus,—When the word *day* is used to express, in general, the period of any one’s existence, then it denotes *time*; when, to express his peculiar office and employment, then it denotes *not the time*, but that circumstance of life characteristic of such office or employment: or the *things done in time*. DAY, in the text is used to express Christ’s peculiar office and employment. Therefore—But what follows is still better. His want of apprehension, it seems, is founded in this, that he “can easily understand, that Abraham might have been informed that Christ was to come; without being informed that he was to lay down his life as a sacrifice.” Yes, and so could I likewise; or I had never been at the pains of making the criticism on the word *day*: which takes its force from this very truth, that Abraham might have been informed of one without the other. And, therefore, to prove he was informed of that *other*, I produced the text in question, which afforded the occasion of the criticism. He goes on,—“If Abraham saw, that a time would come when one of his seed should take away the curse, he saw Christ’s DAY.” Without doubt he did. Because it is agreed, that *day* may signify either time, or circumstance of action. But what is this to the purpose? The question is not whether the word may not, when used indefinitely, signify *time*; but whether it signifies *time* in this text. I have shown it does not. And what has been said to prove it does? Why that it may do so in another place. In a word, all he here says, proceeds on a total inapprehension of the drift and purpose of the argument.

P. 469, N N. Daubuz on the *Revelations*, p. 251; printed in the year 1720. To this reasoning, Dr Stebbing replies as follows:—“You are not more successful in your next point, *Abraham rejoiced to see my day, and he saw it and was glad*, ἵνα ἴΔῃς τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ εἰδῇς—This, say you, evidently shows it [the revelation] to have been made not by relation in words, but by representation in actions.” How so? The reason follows. The verb ἴδω is frequently used in the New Testament in its proper signification, to see sensibly. In the New Testament, do you say? Yes, Sir, and in every Greek book you ever read in your life. What you SHOULD have said is, that it is so used here; and I

suppose you would have said so, if you had known how to have proved it."—Consid. pp. 139, 140.

*The reason follows*, says he. Where? In my book indeed, but not in his imperfect quotation from it; which breaks off before he comes to my reason. One who knew him not so well as I do, would suspect this was done to serve a purpose. No such matter; it was pure hap-hazard. He mistook the introduction of my argument for the argument itself. 'The argument itself, which he omits in the quotation, (and which was all I wanted, for the proof of my point,) was, *that the verb ὡραῖν, whether used literally or figuratively, always denotes a full intuition*. And this argument, I introduced in the following manner, *The verb ὡραῖν is frequently used in the New Testament in its proper signification to see sensibly*. Unluckily, as I say, he took this for the argument itself, and thus corrects me for it: "What you **SHOULD** have said, is, that it is so used here; and I suppose you would have said so, if you had known how to have proved it." See, here, the true origin both of dogmatizing and divining! His *ignorance* of what I did say, leads him to tell me what I should have said, and to divine what I would have said. But, what I have said, I think I may stand to; *That the verb ὡραῖν always denotes a full intuition*. This was all I wanted from the text; and on this foundation, I proceeded in the sequel of the discourse, to prove that Abraham *saw sensibly*. Therefore, when my examiner takes it (as he does) for granted, that because, in this place, I had not proved that the word implied to *see sensibly*, I had not proved it at all; he is a second time mistaken.

"But, *he owns*, that, if this was all, perhaps *I should tell him*, that it was a very strange answer of the Jews, *thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast thou seen Abraham?*"—Consid. p. 140. He is very right. He might be sure I would. In answer therefore to this difficulty, he goes on and says, "No doubt, Sir, the Jews answer our Saviour, as if he had said, that *Abraham and he were contemporaries*; in which, they answered very foolishly, as they did on many other occasions; and the answer will as little agree with your interpretation as it does with mine. For does your interpretation suppose that *Abraham saw Christ in person*? No; you say it was by representation only."—Consid. pp. 140—141.

*The Jews answered our Saviour as if he had said that Abraham and he were contemporaries*.—Do they so? Why then it is plain *the expression was as strong in the Syrian language, used by Jesus, as in the Greek of his historian*, which was all I aimed to prove by it. But in this, says he, *they answered very foolishly*. What then? Did I quote them for their wisdom? A little common sense is all I want of those with whom I have to deal: and rarely as my fortune hath been to meet with it, yet it is plain these Jews did not want it. For the *folly* of their answer arises therefrom. They heard Jesus use a word in their vulgar idiom, which signified to see *corporeally*; and common sense led them to conclude that he used it in the vulgar meaning: in this they were not mistaken. But from thence, they inferred that he meant it in the sense of *seeing personally*; and in this, they were. And now let the reader judge whether the *folly* of their answer shews the *folly* of my argument, or of my examiner's. Nay further, he tells us, they answered *as foolishly on many other occasions*. They did so; and I will remind him of one. Jesus says to Nicodemus; *except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God,\* &c.* Suppose now, from these words, I should attempt to prove that *regeneration* and *divine grace* were realities, and not mere metaphors: for that Jesus, in declaring the necessity of them, used such strong expressions that Nicodemus understood him to mean the being physically *born again, and entering the second time into the womb*: would it be sufficient, let me ask my examiner, to reply in this manner: "No doubt, Sir, Nicodemus answered our Saviour as if he had said, that a follower of the gospel must *enter a second time into his mother's womb and be born*: in which he answered very foolishly; and the answer will as little agree with your interpretation as it does with mine. For does your interpretation suppose he should so enter? No; but that he *should be born of water and of the Spirit*."—Would this, I say, be deemed, even by our examiner himself, a sufficient answer? When he has resolved me this, I shall, perhaps, have something farther to say to him. In the mean time I go on. And, in returning him his last words restored to their subject, help him forward in the solution of what I expect from him. *The answer*, says he, *will as little agree with your interpretation as it does with mine*. For does your interpretation suppose that *Abraham saw Christ in person*? No; you say, it was by representation only. Very well. Let me ask then, in the first place, whether he supposes that what I said on this occasion was to prove that Abraham saw Christ from the reverend authority of his Jewish adversaries: or to prove that the verb ὡραῖν signified to see *literally*, from their mistaken answer? He thought me here, it seems, in the way of those writers, who are quoting *authorities*, when they should be giving *reasons*. Hence he calls the answer the Jews here gave a *foolish one*: as if I had undertaken for its orthodoxy. But our examiner is still farther mistaken. The point I was upon, in support of which I urged the answer of the Jews, was not the seeing *this*,

---

\* St John iii. 3.



or *that person* : but the seeing *corporeally*, and not *mentally*. Now, if the Jews understood Jesus, as saying that Abraham saw *corporeally*, I concluded that the expression, used by Jesus, had that import: and this was all I was concerned to prove. Difference, therefore, between their answer as I quoted it, and my interpretation, there was none. Their answer implied that Abraham was said to see *corporeally* ; and my interpretation supposes that the words employed had that import. But to make a distinction where there was no difference, *seeing in person*, and *seeing by representation*, are brought into a question where they have nothing to do.

P. 472, O O. Ver. 10. et seq. By the account here given, of God's dispensations to Abraham, may be seen the folly of that objection, brought with such insinuations of importance, against the divine appointment of *circumcision*, from the time of its institution. Sir John Marsham observes, that *Abraham when he went into Egypt, was not circumcised, nor for twenty years after his return*. Abramus, quando Ægyptum ingressus est, nondum circumcisisus erat, neque per annos amplius viginti post reditum.—P. 73 Franeq. ed. 4ta. And further, that “circumcision was a most ancient rite amongst the Egyptians, that they had it from the beginning, and that it was a principle with them not to make use of the customs of other people.” Apud Ægyptios circumcidendi ritus vetustissimus fuit et æ’ æg’ institutis. Illi nullorum aliorum hominum institutis uti volunt, p. 74.—The noble author of the CHARACTERISTICS, who never loses an opportunity of expressing his good-will to a prophet or a patriarch, takes up this pitiful suspicion after Marsham:—“Before the time that Israel was constrained to go down to Egypt, and sue for maintenance, the holy patriarch Abraham himself had been necessitated to this compliance on the same account. It is certain that if this holy patriarch, who first instituted the sacred rite of circumcision within his own family or tribe, had no regard to any policy or religion of the Egyptians, yet he had formerly been a guest and inhabitant of Egypt (where historians mention this to have been a national rite) long ere he had received any divine notice or revelation concerning this affair.”—Vol. iii. pp. 52, 53. These great men, we see, appeal to scripture, for the support of their insinuation; which scripture had they but considered with common attention, they might have found, that it gives us a chronological account of God's gradual revelations to the holy patriarch; and therefore that, according to the order God was pleased to observe in his several dispensations towards him, the rite of circumcision could not have been enjoined before the time Abraham happened to go into Egypt; nor, indeed, at any other time than that in which we find it to be given; consequently that his journey into Egypt had not the least concern or connexion with this affair: nay, had these learned critics but attended to their own observation, that the rite of circumcision was instituted twenty years after Abraham's return from Egypt, they must have seen the weakness of so partial a suspicion. For had this been after the model of an Egyptian rite, Abraham, in all likelihood, had been circumcised in Egypt, or at least very soon after his return: for in Egypt, it was a personal, not a family rite. And we learn from profane history, that those who went from other countries to Egypt, with a design to copy their manners, or to be initiated into their wisdom, were, as a previous ceremony, commonly circumcised by the Egyptian priests themselves.

P. 474, P P. To this Dr Stebbing answers, “You lay it down here as the common interpretation, that the command to Abraham to offer up his son was given as a trial only; WHICH IS NOT TRUE.” Why not? because “the common opinion is, that God's intention in this command was not only to TRY Abraham, but also to PREFIGURE the sacrifice of Christ.”—Consid. p. 150. Excellent! I speak of the command's being given: but to whom? To all the faithful for whose sake it was recorded? or to Abraham only, for whose sake it was revealed? Does not the very subject confine my meaning to this latter sense? Now, to Abraham, I say, (according to the common opinion) it was given as a trial only. To the faithful, if you will, as a prefiguration. If, to extricate himself from this blunder or sophism, call it which you will, he will say it prefigured to Abraham likewise; he then gives up all he has been contending for; and establishes my interpretation, which is, that Abraham knew this to be a representation of the great sacrifice of Christ: I leave it undetermined whether he mistakes or cavils: see now, if he be not obliged to me. Where I speak of the common opinion, I say the command is supposed to be GIVEN as a trial only. He thinks fit to tell me, *I say not true*. But when he comes to prove it, he changes the terms of the question thus, “For the common opinion is, that GOD'S INTENTION in this command was,” &c. Now God's intention of giving a command to Abraham, for Abraham's sake, might be one thing; and God's general intention of giving that command, as it concerned the whole of his dispensation, another. But to prove further that I said not true, when I said that, according to the common interpretation, the command was given for a trial only; he observes, that I myself had owned that the resemblance to Christ's sacrifice was so strong that interpreters could never overlook it. What then? If the interpreters who lived after Christ, could not overlook it, does it follow that Abraham who lived before, could not overlook it neither? But the impertinence of this has been shown already. Nor



does the learned *considerer* appear to be unconscious of it. Therefore, instead of attempting to enforce it to the purpose for which he *quotes* it, he turns all on a sudden to show that it makes nothing to the purpose for which *I employed* it. But let us follow this Protean sophister through all his windings.—“The resemblance,” says he, “no doubt, is very strong; but how this corroborates your sense of the command, I do not see. Your sense is, that it was an actual information given to Abraham of the sacrifice of Christ. But to *prefigure*, and to *inform*, are different things. This transaction might prefigure, and does prefigure the sacrifice of Christ; whether Abraham knew any thing of the sacrifice of Christ or no. For it does not follow, that, because a thing is prefigured, therefore it must be seen and understood, at the time when it is prefigured.”—Consid. pp. 150, 151. Could it be believed that these words should immediately follow an argument, whose force (the little it has) is founded on the principle, *that to PREFIGURE and to INFORM are NOT different things?*

P. 475, Q Q. To this reasoning, Dr Stebbing replies, “But how can you prove that, according to the common interpretation, there was no reward subsequent to the trial?”—Consid. p. 151. How shall I be able to please him?—Before, he was offended that I thought the author of the book of Genesis might omit relating the *modes* of a fact, when he had good reason so to do. Here, where I suppose *no fact*, because there was none recorded when no reason hindered, he is as captious on this side likewise. “How will you prove it?” says he. From the silence of the historian, say I, when nothing hindered him from speaking. Well, but he will show it to be fairly recorded in scripture, that there were rewards subsequent to the trial. This, indeed, is to the purpose: “Abraham,” says he, “lived a great many years after that transaction happened. He lived to dispose of his son Isaac in marriage, and to see his seed. He lived to be married himself to another wife, and to have several children by her: he had not THEN received all God’s mercies, nor were all God’s dispensations towards him at an end; and it is to be remembered that it is expressly said of Abraham, Gen. xxiv. 1, (a long time after the transaction in question), *that God had blessed him in all things.*”—Consid. pp. 151, 152. The question here is of the extraordinary and peculiar rewards bestowed by God on Abraham; and he decides upon it, by an enumeration of the ordinary and common. And, to fill up the measure of these blessings, he makes the burying of his first wife and the marrying of a second to be one. Though unluckily, this second proves at last to be a concubine; as appears plainly from the place where she is mentioned. But let me ask him seriously; could he, indeed, suppose me to mean (though he attended not to the drift of the argument) that God immediately withdrew all the common blessings of his providence from the father of the faithful, after the last extraordinary reward bestowed upon him, when he lived many years after? I can hardly, I own, account for this perversity, any otherwise than from a certain temper of mind which I am not at present disposed to give a name to: but which, the habit of *ensnaring* has made so common, that nobody either mistakes it, or is now indeed, much scandalized at it. Though for my part, I should esteem a total ignorance of letters a much happier lot than such a learned depravity.—“But this is not all,” says he—No, is it not? I am sorry for it!—“What surprises me most is, that you should argue so *WEAKLY*, as if the reward of good men had respect to this life only. Be it, that Abraham had received all God’s mercies; and that all God’s dispensations towards him, in this world, were at an end; was there not a life yet to come, with respect to which the whole period of our existence here is to be considered as a state of trial; and where we are all of us to look for that reward of our virtues which we very often fail of in this?”—Consid. p. 152. Well, if it was *not all*, we find, at least, it is all of a piece. For, as before, he would sophistically obtrude upon us *common* for *extraordinary* REWARDS; so here (true to the mystery of his trade) he puts *common* for *extraordinary* TRIALS. *Our present existence*, says he, *is to be considered as a state of trial.* The case, to which I applied my argument, was this;—“God, determining to select a chosen people from the loins of Abraham, would manifest to the world that this patriarch was worthy of the distinction shown unto him, by having his faith found superior to the hardest trials.” Now, in speaking of these trials, I said, that the command to offer Isaac was the last. No, says the examiner, *that cannot be, for, with respect to a life to come, the whole period of our existence here, is to be considered as a state of TRIAL.*” And so again (says he) with regard to the REWARD; which you pretend, in the order of God’s dispensation, should follow the trial: why, we are to look for it in another world. Holy scripture records the history of one, to whom God only promised (in the clear and obvious sense) *temporal* blessings. It tells us that these temporal blessings were dispensed. One species of which were extraordinary rewards after extraordinary trials. In the most extraordinary of all, no reward followed: this was my difficulty. See here, how he has cleared it up. Hardly indeed to his own satisfaction: for he tries to save all by another fetch; the weakest men being ever most fruitful in expedients, as the slowest animals have commonly the most feet. “And what,” says he, “if after all this, the wisdom of God should have thought fit, that this very man, whom he had singled out to be an eminent example of piety to all generations; should, at the very close

of his life, give evidence of it, by an instance that exceeded all that had gone before; that he might be a pattern of patient suffering even unto the end? Would there not be *some* in such a supposition?"—*Consid.* p. 153. In truth, I doubt not, as he hath put it: And I will tell him why. Abraham was not a mere instrument to stand for an example only; but a moral agent likewise; and to be dealt with as such. Now, though, as he stands for an *example*, we may admit of as many *trials of patient suffering* as this good-natured divine thinks fitting to impose: yet, as a *moral agent*, it is required (if we can conclude any thing from the method of God's dealing with his servants, recorded in sacred history) that each trial be attended with some work done, or some reward conferred. But these two parts in Abraham's character, our *considerer* perpetually confounds. He supposes nothing to be done for Abraham's own sake; but every thing for the example's sake. Yet did the good old cause of *answering* require, he could as easily suppose the contrary. And to show I do him no wrong, I will here give the reader an instance of his dexterity, in the counter-exercise of his arms. In p. 150 of these *Considerations* he says, "IT DOES NOT FOLLOW, that, because a thing is prefigured, therefore it must be seen and understood AT THE TIME when it is prefigured." Yet in the body of the pamphlet, at pp. 112, 113, having another point to puzzle; he says (on my observing that a future state and resurrection were not national doctrines till the time of the Maccabees) "he knows I will say they had these doctrines from the prophets—yet the prophets were dead two hundred years before." But if the prophets were dead, their writings were extant—"And what then? Is it LIKELY that the sons should have learnt from the dead prophets what the fathers could not learn from the living?—Why could not the Jews learn this doctrine from THE VERY FIRST, as well as their posterity at the distance of ages afterwards?" In the first case we find he expressly says, it *does not* follow; in the second, he as plainly supposes, that it *does*.

P. 476, R R. And yet an ingenious man, one M. Bouiller, in a late Latin dissertation, accuses me of concealing, that Chrysostom, Erasmus, and others, were of *my opinion*, viz. that Abraham in the command to sacrifice his son was informed, of what he earnestly desired to know, that the redemption of mankind was to be obtained by the sacrifice of the Son of God. The reader now sees, whether the author of the Divine Legation was guilty of a concealed theft, or his accuser of an open blunder, under which he covers his orthodox malignity. Yet he thinks he atones for all, by calling the *Divine Legation egregium opus: ubi ingenium acerrimum cum eximia eruditione certat*.—*Dissertationum Sacrum Sylloge*, p. 194.

P. 477, S S. To this, the great professor replies; That "there are but few gestures of the body more apt of *themselves* to signify the sentiment of the mind than articulate sound: The force of which arises not from the nature of things; but from the arbitrary will of man: and common use and custom imposes this signification on articulate sounds, not on motions and gestures—*Pauci sunt motus corporis, qui ipsi per se aptiores esse videntur ad motus animi significandos, quam sonus, qui ore et lingua in vocem formatur. Vis ipsa non est in natura rerum posita, sed arbitrio hominum constituta; eamque mos et usus communis non gestibus corporis tribuit, sed verhis et voci*."—RUTHERFORTH, *Determ.*

The purpose of this fine observation, though so cloudily expressed, is to show that *motion and gesture* can have no signification at all: not from *nature*, since few gestures of the body are more apt of themselves to express the mind than articulate sound; and yet articulate sound is of arbitrary signification: not from *institution*, since it is not to gesture, but to articulate sound, that men have agreed to affix a meaning. The consequence is, that *gesture can have no meaning at all*; and so there is an end of all Abraham's SIGNIFICATIVE ACTION. The divine would make a great figure, were it not for his Bible; but the Bible is perpetually disorienting the philosopher. His general thesis is, "That *actions* can never become significative but by the aid of *words*." Now I desire to know what he thinks of all the TYPICAL rites of the *Law*, significative of the sacrifice of Christ? Were not these *actions*? Had they no meaning which extended to the *gospel*? or were there any *words* to accompany them, which explained that meaning? Yet has this man asserted in what he calls a *determination*, that in the instances of expressive gesture, recorded in scripture, *words were always used in conjunction with them*. But to come a little closer to him. As a philosopher he should have given his reasons for those two assertions; or as an historian he should have verified his facts. He hath attempted neither; and I commend his prudence; for both are against him: His fact, that gestures have no meaning by *nature*, is false: and his reasoning, that they have none by *institution*, is mistaken. The Spartans might instruct him that *gestures alone have a natural meaning*. That sage people (as we are told by Herodotus) were so persuaded of this truth, that they preferred converse by *action*, to converse by *speech*; as action had all the clearness of speech, and was free from the abuses of it. This historian in his *Thalia*, informs us, that when the Samians sent to Lacedemon for succours in distress, their orators made a long and laboured speech. When it was ended, the Spartans told them, that *the former part of it they had*

*forgotten, and could not comprehend the latter.* Whereupon the Samian orators produced their empty bread-baskets, and *said*, they wanted bread. *What need of words*, replied the Spartans, *do not your empty bread-baskets sufficiently declare your meaning?* Thus we see the Spartans thought not only that *gestures were apt of themselves* (or by nature) *to signify the sentiment of the mind*, but even *more apt than articulate sounds*. Their relations, the Jews, were in the same sentiments and practice; and full as sparing of their words; and (the two languages considered) for a somewhat better reason. The sacred historian, speaking of public days of humiliation, tells his story in this manner—*And they gathered together to Mizpeh, AND DREW WATER AND POURED IT OUT BEFORE THE LORD, and fasted on that day*, 1 Sam. chap. vii. ver. 6. The historian does not explain in *words* the meaning of this *drawing of water, &c.*, nor needed he. It sufficiently expressed, that *a deluge of tears was due for their offences*. The professor, perhaps, will say that words accompanied the action, at least preceded it. But what will he say to the action of Tarquin, when he struck off the heads of the higher popples which overtopped their fellows? Here we are expressly told, that all was done in profound silence, and yet the action was well understood. But further, I will tell our professor what he least suspected, that gestures, besides their *natural*, have often an *arbitrary* signification. “A certain Asiatic prince, entertained at Rome by Augustus, was, amongst other shows and festivities, amused with a famous pantomime; whose actions were so expressive, that the barbarian begged him of the emperor for his interpreter between him and several neighbouring nations, whose languages were unknown to one another.” Pantomimic gesture was amongst the Romans one way of exhibiting a dramatic story. But before such gestures could be formed into a continued series of information, we cannot but suppose much previous pains and habit of invention to be exerted by the actors. Amongst which, one expedient must needs be (in order to make the expression of the actors convey an entire connected sense) to intermix with the gestures *naturally* significative, gestures made significative by *institution*; that is, brought, by *arbitrary* use, to have as determined a meaning as the others.

To illustrate this by that more lasting information, the *hieroglyphics* of the Egyptians, and the *real characters* of the Chinese; which, as we have shown, run parallel with the more fleeting conveyance of expressive gesture, just as alphabetic writing does with speech. Now, though the earlier hieroglyphics were composed almost altogether of marks *naturally* significative, yet when the Egyptians came to convey continued and more precise discourses by this mode of writing, they found a necessity of inventing arbitrary significations, to intermix and connect with the other marks which had a *natural*. See pp. 27, 28, 29, of this vol.

Now, to show that these arbitrary hieroglyphic marks were real characters like the other, let us turn to the characters of the Chinese, which though (in their present way of use) most of them be of *arbitrary* signification, yet the missionaries assure us they are understood by all the neighbouring nations of different languages. This shows that the Augustan pantomime, so coveted by the barbarian for his interpreter, might be very able to discharge his function, though several of his gestures had an arbitrary signification. And we easily conceive how it might come to pass, since the gesture of *arbitrary* signification only served to connect the active discourse, by standing between others of a *natural* signification, directing to their sense.

Thus (to conclude with our determiner) it appears that GESTURES ALONE are so far from having no meaning at all, as he has ventured to affirm, that they have all the meaning which human expression can possibly convey: all which is properly their own, namely, *natural* information; and even much of that which is more peculiar to speech, namely, *arbitrary*.

To illustrate the whole by a domestic instance; the solemn gesture of a professor in his chair: which sometimes may *naturally* happen, to signify folly; though, by *institution*, it always signifies wisdom; and yet again, it must be owned, in justice to our professor's scheme, that sometimes it means nothing at all.

P. 479, T T. Would the reader now believe it possible, when these words lay before Dr Stebbing, while he was answering my book, that he should venture to ask me, or be capable of asking these insulting questions—*Was there any good use that Abraham could make of this knowledge which the rest of the people of God might not have made of it as well as he? Or if it was not unfit for every body else, was it not unfit for Abraham too?*

P. 479, U U. But all I can say, or all an apostle can say, if I chance to say it after him, will not satisfy Dr Stebbing. He yet sticks to his point, “That if any information of the death and sacrifice of Christ had been intended, it is NATURAL TO THINK that the explanation would have been recorded with the transaction, as it is in all other SUCH LIKE CASES.” Now if this orthodox gentleman will show me *a such like case*, i. e. a case where a revelation of the gospel dispensation is made by an expressive action, and the explanation is recorded along with it, I shall be ready to confess, he has made a pertinent objection. In the mean time, I have something more to say to him. He supposes, that this commanded

sacrifice of Isaac was a TYPE of the sacrifice of Christ. To this a deist replies, in the Doctor's own words, "If any type had been here intended, it is natural to think that the explanation would have been recorded with the transaction." Now, when the Doctor has satisfied the objection, which he has lent the deists against a TYPE, I suppose it may serve to satisfy himself, when he urges it against my idea of the command, as an INFORMATION BY ACTION. Again, our answerer himself affirms that the doctrine of redemption was delivered under *types* in the law; and that the doctrine thus delivered was designedly secreted and concealed from the ancient Jews. Now is it *natural to think* (to use his own words) that Moses would openly and plainly record a doctrine in one book which he had determined to secrete in another, when both were for the use of the same people and the same age?

P. 480, X X. "You must give me leave to observe," says Dr Stebbing, "that the transaction in question will have the same efficacy to show *the dependency between the two dispensations*, whether Abraham had thereby any information of the sacrifice of Christ or not."—Consid. p. 156. This, indeed, is saying something. And, could he prove what he says, it would be depriving my interpretation of one of its principal advantages. Let us see then how he goes about it,—"for this does not arise from Abraham's KNOWLEDGE, or any body's KNOWLEDGE, at the time when the transaction happened, but from the similitude and correspondency between the event and the transaction, by which it was prefigured; which is exactly the same upon either supposition."—Consid. pp. 156, 157. To this I reply, 1. That I never supposed that the dependency between the two dispensations did *arise from Abraham's knowledge, or any body's knowledge*, at that, or at any other time; but from God's INTENTION that this commanded action should import or represent the sacrifice of Christ: and then indeed comes in the question, Whether that *intention* be best discovered from God's *declaration* of it to Abraham, or from a *similitude and correspondency* between this commanded action and the sacrifice of Christ. Therefore, 2. I make bold to tell him, that a *similitude and correspondency between the event and the transaction which prefigured it*, is NOT ENOUGH to show this *dependency*, to the satisfaction of unbelievers; who say, that a likeness between two things of the same nature, such as offering up two men to death, in different ways and transacted in two distant periods, is not sufficient alone to show that they had any relation to one another. With the same reason, they will say, we might pretend that Jephtha's daughter, or the king of Moab's son whom the father sacrificed on the wall, 2 Kings iii. 27, were the types of Christ sacrifice. Give us, they exult, a proof from scripture that God declared or revealed his INTENTION of prefiguring the death of Jesus; or some better authority at least than a modern typifier, who deals only in *similitudes* and *correspondences*, and has all the wildness, without the wit, of a poet, and all the weakness, without the ingenuity, of an analogist! Now, whether it be our examiner, or the author of the *Divine Legation*, who has given them this satisfaction, or whether they have any reason to require it of either of us, is left to the impartial reader to consider.

P. 481, Y Y. Let us see now what Dr Stebbing has to say to this reasoning.—"By your leave, Sir," says he, (which, by the way, he never asks, but to abuse me; nor ever takes, but to misrepresent me) "if the apostle had meant by this expression, to signify that Isaac stood as the representative of Christ, and that his being taken from the mount alive, was the figure of Christ's resurrection; it SHOULD have been said, that Abraham received CHRIST from the dead in a figure." Should it so? What? where the discourse was not concerning *Christ*, but *Isaac*? Had, indeed, the sacred writer been speaking of Abraham's *knowledge of Christ*, something might have been said; but he is speaking of a very different thing, his *faith in God*; and only intimates, by a strong expression, what he understood that action to be, which he gives, as an instance of the most illustrious act of *faith*. I say, had this been the case, something might have been said; something, I mean, just to keep him in countenance; yet still, nothing to the purpose, as I shall now show. The transaction of the sacrifice of Christ related to God. The *figure* of that transaction, in the command to offer Isaac, related (according to my interpretation) to ABRAHAM. Now, it was God who received Christ; as it was Abraham who received the type or figure of Christ, in Isaac. To tell us then, that (according to my interpretation) it SHOULD have been said, that *Abraham received CHRIST from the dead in a figure*, is, in effect, telling us that he knows no more of logical expression than of theological reasoning. It is true, could he show the expression improper, in the sense which I give to the transaction, he would then speak a little to the purpose; and this, to do him justice, is what he would fain be at.—"For, Christ it was, according to your interpretation," says he, "that was received from the dead in a figure, by Isaac his representative, who really came alive from the mount. If the reading had been, not *is παραβλήν*, but *eis παραβλήν*, it would have suited your notion; for it might properly have been said, that Isaac came alive from the mount as a figure or that he might be a figure of the resurrection of Christ."—Consid. p. 147. Miserable chicanery! As, on the one hand, I might say with propriety, that CHRIST was received from the dead in a figure, i. e. BY a representative: so on the other, I might say that ISAAC was received from the dead in a figure, i. e. AS a representative: for Isaac sustaining the person of Christ, who



was raised from the dead, might *in a figure*, i. e. as that person, he said to be received: yet this our examiner denies, and tells us, the apostle SHOULD *have said that Abraham received CHRIST*, and not ISAAC.—“But,” adds he, “if the reading had been not *ἐν παραβολῇ*, but *ὡς παραβολὴν*, it would have suited your notion.” And the reason he gives is this: “For it might properly have been said that Isaac came alive from the mount as a figure, or THAT HE MIGHT BE a figure of the resurrection of Christ.” Strange! He says, this would have suited *my* notion; and the reason he gives, shows it suits only *his own*; which is that the exactness of the resemblance between the two actions, not the declaration of the Giver of the command, made it a figure. This is the more extraordinary, as I myself have here shown that the old Latin translator had turned the words into IN PARABOLAM instead of IN PARABOLA, for this very reason, because he understood the command in the sense our examiner contends for; viz., that Isaac, by the *resemblance* of the actions, MIGHT BE, or might become a figure.

However, he owns at last that “a reason will still be wanting, why, instead of speaking the fact as it really was, that Isaac came alive from the mount; the apostle chose rather to say, what was not really the case, that Abraham received him *from the dead*.”—Consid. pp. 147, 148. Well; and have not I given a reason? No matter for that: Dr Stebbing is turned examiner, and has engrossed the market. His reason follows thus, “If Isaac did not die (as it is certain he did not) Abraham could not receive him from the dead. And yet the apostle says, he received him *from the dead*. The clearing up this difficulty will show the true sense of the passage.”—Consid. pp. 147, 148. What! will the clearing up a difficulty of his own making discover the true sense of another man’s writing? This is one of his new improvements in logic; in which, as in arithmetic, he has invented a *rule of false*, to discover an unknown truth. For there is none of this difficulty in the sacred text; it is not there (as in our examiner simply said) that *Abraham received Isaac from the dead*, but that he *received him from the dead* IN A FIGURE, or under the assumed personage of *Christ*. Now if *Christ* died, then he, who assumed his personage, in order to represent his passion and resurrection, might surely be said to be *received from the dead in a figure*. A wonderful *difficulty* truly! and we shall see, as wonderfully solved;—by a conundrum! But with propriety enough. For as a real difficulty requires sense and criticism to resolve it, an imaginary one may be well enough managed by a quibble.—Because the translators of St Mark’s gospel have rendered *ἐν ὥσπερ παραβολῇ* by, *with what comparison shall we compare it*, therefore, *ἐν παραβολῇ*, in the text in question, signifies COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING. But no words can show him off like his own—“The apostle does not say *simply and absolutely*, that Abraham received Isaac from the dead; but that he received him from the dead *ἐν παραβολῇ*, in a parable.” See here now! Did not I tell you so? There was no difficulty all this while: the sentence only opened to the right and left to let in a blustering objection, which is no sooner evaporated than it closes again as before. *It was not simply said*. No. “But that he received him—*ἐν παραβολῇ*, in a parable, that is, in a comparison, or by comparison. Thus the word is used, Mark iv. 30. *Wherunto shall we liken the kingdom of God, or with what COMPARISON [ἐν ὥσπερ παραβολῇ] shall we compare it*. The meaning then may be, that Abraham’s receiving Isaac alive (after his death was denounced) by the revocation of the command; was AS IF HE HAD received him from the dead. Thus several interpreters understand the place. Or it may be, as others will have it, that the apostle here refers to the birth of Isaac; which was [*ἐν παραβολῇ*] COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING, a receiving him from the dead; his father being old, and his mother past the age of child-bearing, on which account the apostle styles them both *dead*. Which interpretation, I the rather approve, because it suggests the proper grounds of Abraham’s faith.”—Consid. pp. 148, 149.

He says, *ἐν παραβολῇ* signifies *in or by comparison*; and that the word is so used in St Mark; to prove which, he quotes the English translation. Now I must take the liberty to tell him that the translators were mistaken; and he with them. *Παραβολῇ*, in St Mark, is not used in the sense of a *similitude* or *comparison*, but of a *parable*. The ancients had two ways of illustrating the things they enforced; the one was by a *parable*, the other by a simple *comparison* or *simile*: how the latter of these arose out of the former I have shown in the fourth volume.\* Here, both these modes of illustration are referred to; which should have been translated thus, “*To what shall we COMPARE the kingdom of God, or with what PARABLE shall we illustrate or parabolize it.*—*ὁμοιάσωμεν—παραβάλωμεν*—which words express two different and well known modes of illustration.

But now suppose *ἐν ὥσπερ παραβολῇ* had signified *with what comparison*: how comes it to pass that *ἐν παραβολῇ* should signify *by comparison*, or *as it were*, or COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING? In plain truth, his critical analogy has ended in a pleasant blunder. How so? you will ask. Nay, it is true there is no denying but that *speaking by comparison* is *comparatively speaking*; and, if men will put another sense upon it, who can help that? they

\* I. e. in book vii. of this edition.

say, *comparatively speaking* signifies the speaking loosely, inaccurately, and incorrectly. But was it for our doctor to put his reader in mind of such kind of speakers? But the charge of a blunder, an innocent mishap, I am ready to retract; for I observe him to go into it with much artful preparation; a circumstance which by no means marks that genuine turn of mind, which is quick and sudden, and over head and ears in an instant: He begins with explaining—in a comparison, by, *by comparison*: where you just get the first glimpse, as it were, of an enascent equivocation; and his *by comparison* is presently afterwards turned into *as it were*, or *as if he had*; and then, *comparatively speaking* brings up the rear, and closes the criticism three deep.

P. 482, Z Z. Dr Stebbing goes on as usual—"In short, Sir, I do not understand this doctrine, with which your whole work much abounds, of revealing things clearly to patriarchs, and prophets, and leaders, as a special favour to themselves; but to be kept as a secret from the rest of mankind." It is but too plain *he does not understand it*: for which I can give no better reason than that, it is the scripture doctrine, and not the doctrine of *sums and systems*. "I have been *used*," says he "to consider persons under this character, as appointed, not for themselves, but for others; and therefore to conclude that **WHATEVER** was clearly revealed to them concerning God's dispensations, was so revealed in order to be communicated to others."\* This is the old sophism; "That because persons act and are employed for others; therefore, they do nothing, and have nothing done for themselves." When God said, *Shall I hide from Abraham that thing which I do?* was not this said to, and for himself?—But he has another to match it, "That whatever was clearly revealed to the prophets, was so revealed, in order to be communicated to others." Here, then, a little scripture doctrine will do him no harm. Did Moses communicate all he knew to the Jews, concerning the *Christian dispensation*; which the author of the epistle to the Hebrews tells us was clearly revealed to him in the mount?—"Priests," says he, "that offer gifts according to the law, who serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was admonished of God when he was about to make the tabernacle."† Again, we find that Ezekiel, on his being called out, upon his mission, saw, what the author of Ecclesiasticus calls the *glorious vision*; and had, as appears from the allegory of the roll of a book, a full interpretation thereof. Yet, notwithstanding all his illumination, he was directed by God to speak so obscurely to the people, that he found cause to complain—*Ah, Lord, they say of me, Doth he not speak parables?*‡ And now let him ask the prophets in the same magisterial language he is accustomed to examine me, *Was there any good use you could make of your knowledge, that the people of God might not have made of it as well as you?*—But this very dispensation is alluded to, and continued, under the kingdom of Christ. "And his disciples asked him saying, What might this parable be? And he said, Unto you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God: but to others, in parables; that seeing they might not see, and hearing they might not understand."§ Again, St John in his visions tells us—"And when the seven thunders had uttered their voices, I was about to write. And I heard a voice from heaven saying unto me, **SEAL UP** those things which the seven thunders uttered, and **WRITE THEM NOT**."—Rev. x. 4. And now, reader, I shall try his gratitude!—"If you can show," says he, "that I am mistaken in this, pray do it, and I shall be obliged to you."—P. 156. You see, I have taken him at his word. And it was well I did; for it was no sooner out of his mouth, than, as if he had repented, not of his candour, but his confidence, he immediately cries, hold—and tells me, "I might have spared myself in asking another question, *Why, if revelations cannot be clearly recorded, are they recorded at all?*"—P. 156. But, great *Defender of the Faith!*—of the ancient Jewish church, I mean, I asked that question, because the answer to it shows how much you are mistaken; as the intelligent reader, by this time, easily perceives. But why does he say I might have *spared that question?*—Because, "if a revelation is not clearly given, it cannot be clearly recorded."—P. 156. Did I say it could? Or will he say, that there are no reasons why a revelation that is clearly given, should be obscurely recorded? To what purpose, then, was the observation made? Made? why to introduce another: for, with our equivocal examiner, the corruption of argument is the generation of cavil.—"And yet," says he, "as **YOU INTIMATE**, there may be reasons why an **OBSCURE REVELATION** should be recorded, to wit, for the instruction of future ages, when, the obscurity being cleared up by the event, it shall appear that it was foreseen and fore-ordained in the knowledge and appointment of God."—P. 156. If thou wilt believe me, reader, I never *intimated* any thing so absurd.

What I *intimated* was not concerning an *obscure revelation*, but a *revelation obscurely recorded*. These are very different things, as appears from hence, that the latter may be a *clear revelation*; the word being relative to him to whom the revelation was made. But

\* Consid. pp. 155, 156.

† Heb. viii. 4, 5.

‡ Ezek. xx. 49.

§ Luke viii. 9, 10.



this is a peccadillo only. However he approves the reason of *recording*: for that, thereby, "it shall appear, that it was foreseen and fore-ordained by God." It,—What? The *obscure revelation*, according to grammatical construction: but, in his English, I suppose, it stands for the *fact revealed*. Well then; from the recording of an obscure revelation, he says it will appear, when the foretold fact happens, that it was foreseen and pre-ordained by God. This too he tells the reader I *intimated*; but sure, the reader can never think me so silly: for every fact, whether prefigured and foretold, or not prefigured and foretold, must needs have been foreseen and pre-ordained by God. Now, whether we are to ascribe this to exactness, or to inaccuracy of expression, is hard to say. For I find him a great master in that species of composition which a celebrated French writer, in his encomium on the *revelation*, calls *en clarté noire*. However, think what we will of his head, his heart lies too open to be misjudged of.

P. 483, A A A. This infidel objection, the reader sees, consists of two parts: the one, that Abraham must needs doubt of the Author of the command: the other, that he would be misled, by conceiving amiss of his attributes, to believe *human sacrifices* were grateful to him. Dr Stebbing, who will leave nothing *unanswered*, will needs answer this.—Consid. pp. 158, 160. To the first part he replies, partly by the assistance I myself had given him, (where I took notice of what might be urged by believers, as of *great weight and validity*) and partly from what he had picked up elsewhere. But here I shall avoid imitating his example, who, in spite to the author, of arguments professedly brought in support of religion, strives, with all his might, to show their invalidity; an employment, one would think, little becoming a Christian divine. If the common arguments against the objection, here urged by him with great pomp, have any weak parts, I shall leave them to unbelievers to find out—I have the more reason likewise to trust them to their own *weight*, both because they are none of his, and because I have acknowledged their validity. For which acknowledgment, all I get is this—*Whether you had owned this or not*, says he, *I should have taken upon myself the proof*. Whereas, all that he has *taken* is the property of other writers; made his own, indeed, by a weak and an imperfect representation.—But his answer to the second part of the infidel objection must not be passed over so slightly. "As to the latter part of the objection," says he, "that *from this command, Abraham and his family must needs have thought human sacrifices acceptable to God*; the revoking the command at last was a sufficient guard against any such construction. To this you make the unbeliever answer; *No, because the action having been commanded, ought to have been condemned; and a simple revocation was no condemnation*. But why was not the revocation of the command, in this case, a condemnation of the action? If I should tempt you to go and kill your next neighbour, and afterwards come and desire you not to do it; would not this after-declaration be as good an evidence of my dislike to the action, as the first was of my approbation of it? Yes, and a much better, as it may be presumed to have been the result of maturer deliberation. Now, though deliberation and after-thought are not incident to God; yet as God in this case condescended (as you say, and very truly) to act after the manner of men; the same construction should be put upon his actions, as are usually put upon the actions of men in like cases."—Consid. pp. 160, 161. Now, though, as was said above, I would pay all decent regard becoming a friend of revelation, to the common arguments of others in its defence, yet I must not betray my own. I confessed they had *great weight and validity*; yet, at the same time, I asserted, they were attended with *insuperable difficulties*. And while I so think, I must beg leave to enforce my reasons for this opinion; and, I hope, without offence; as the arguments, I am now about to examine, are purely this writer's own. And the reader, by this time, has seen too much of him to be apprehensive, that the lessening his authority will be attended with any great disservice to religion.

I had observed, that the reasonings of unbelievers on this case, as it is commonly explained, were not devoid of all plausibility, when they proceeded thus,—"That as Abraham lived amongst heathens, whose highest act of divine worship was *human sacrifices*; if God had commanded that act, and, on the point of performance, only remitted it as a favour, (and so it is represented;) without declaring the iniquity of the practice, when addressed to idols; or his abhorrence of it, when directed to himself; the family must have been misled in their ideas concerning the moral rectitude of that species of religious worship: therefore, God, in these circumstances, had he commanded the action as a *trial only*, would have explicitly condemned that mode of worship, as immoral. But he is not represented as condemning, but as remitting it for a *favour*: consequently, say the unbelievers, God did not command the action at all."—To this our examiner replies,—"But why? Was not the revocation of the command, a condemnation of the action? If I should tempt you to go and kill your next neighbour, and afterwards come and DESIRE you not to do it, would not this after-declaration be as good an evidence of my dislike to the action, as the first was of my approbation of it?" To this I reply; that the cases are by no means parallel, either in themselves, or in their circumstances: not *in themselves*; the murder of our next neighbour was, amongst all the gentiles of that time, esteemed a high immorality; while on the con-

trary, human sacrifice was a very holy and acceptable part of divine worship: not in *their circumstances*; the *desire* to forbear the murder tempted to, is (in the case he puts) represented as *repentance*; whereas the stop put to the sacrifice of Isaac (in the case Moses puts) is represented as *favour*.

But what follows, I could wish (for the honour of modern theology) that the method I have observed would permit me to pass over in silence.—“Now though deliberation and after-thought,” says he, “are not incident to God, yet, as God, in this case, condescended (as you say, and very truly) to act after the manner of men; the same construction should be put upon his actions, as is usually put upon the actions of men in like cases.—*Consid.* pp. 155, 156. That is, though *deliberation* and *after-thought* are not incident to God; yet you are to understand his actions, as if they were incident. A horrid interpretation! And yet his representation of the command, and his decent illustration of it, by a *murderer in intention*, will not suffer us to understand it in any other manner: for God, as if in haste, and before due deliberation, is represented as commanding an immoral action: yet again, as it were by an *after-thought*, ordering it to be forborn, by reason of its immorality. And in what is all this impious jargon founded? If you will believe him, in the principle I lay down, *that God condescends to act after the manner of men*. I have all along had occasion to complain of his misrepresenting my principles: but then they were principles he disliked: and this, the modern management of controversy has sanctified. But here, though the principle be approved, yet he cannot for his life forbear to misrepresent it: so bad a thing is an evil habit. Let me tell him, then, that by the principle of *God's condescending to act after the manner of men*, is not meant, that he ever acts in compliance to those vices and superstitions, which arise from the depravity of human will; but in conformity only to men's indifferent manners and customs; and to those usages which result only from the finite imperfections of their nature. Thus though, as in the case before us, God was pleased, in conformity to their mode of information, to use their custom of revoking a command; yet he never condescended to imitate (as our examiner supposes) the irresolution, the repentance, and horrors of conscience of a *murderer in intention*. Which (horrible to think!) is the parallel this orthodox divine brings to illustrate the command to Abraham. But he had read that God is sometimes said to *repent*; and he thought, I suppose, it answered to that repentance which the stings of conscience sometimes produce in bad men. Whereas it is said, in conformity to a good magistrate's or parent's correction of vice; first, to threaten punishment; and then, on the offender's amendment, to remit it.

But he goes on without any signs of remorse.—“Nor will the *pagan fable of Diana's substituting a hind in the place of Iphigenia* at all help your unbeliever. *This did not, say they, OR YOU FOR THEM, make idolaters believe that she therefore abhorred human sacrifices.* But do not they themselves, or have not you assigned a very proper and sufficient reason why it did not, viz., that they had been *before persuaded of the contrary*? Where human sacrifices make a part of the settled standing religion, the refusal to accept a human sacrifice in one instance may, indeed, be rather looked upon as a particular indulgence, than as a declaration against the thing in gross. But where the thing was commanded but in one single instance, and the command revoked in that very instance, (which is our present case) such revocation, in all reasonable construction, is as effectual a condemnation of the thing, as if God had told Abraham, in so many words, that he delighted not in human sacrifices.”—*Consid.* p. 161. To come to our examiner's half-buried sense, we are often obliged to remove, or, what is still a more disagreeable labour, to sift well, the rubbish of his words. He says, the *revocation* was an *effectual condemnation*. This may either signify, that men, now free from the prejudices of pagan superstition, may see that human sacrifices were condemned by the revocation of the command; or, that Abraham's family could see this. In the first sense, I have nothing to do with his proposition; and in the second, I shall take the liberty to say it is not true. I deny that the *revocation* was an *effectual condemnation*. With how good reason, let the reader now judge.

Abraham, for the great ends of God's providence, was called out of an idolatrous city, infected, as all such cities then were, with this horrid superstition. He was himself an idolater, as appears from the words of Joshua,—“Your fathers dwelt on the other side of the flood in old time, even Terah the father of Abraham, and the father of Nahor: and **THEY** served other gods. And I took your father Abraham,”\* &c. God, in the act of calling him, instructed him in the unity of his nature, and the error of polytheism; as the great principle, for the sake of which (and to preserve it in one family amidst an universal overflow of idolatry) he was called out.—That he must be prejudiced in favour of his country superstitions, is not to be doubted; because it is of human nature to be so: and yet we find no particular instruction given him, concerning the superstition in question. The noble author of the *Characteristics* observes, that “it appears that he was under no extreme surprise on this trying revelation; nor did he think of expostulating in the least on this

\* Josh. xxiv. 2.

occasion; when at another time he could be so importunate for the pardon of an inhospitable, murderous, impious, and incestuous city:" insinuating, that this kind of sacrifice was a thing he had been accustomed to. Now the noble author observes this, upon the examiner's, that is, the common, interpretation. And I believe, on that footing, he, or a better writer, would find it difficult to take out the malicious sting of the observation. But I have shown that it falls together with the common interpretation.

Well; Abraham is now in the land of Canaan; and again surrounded with the same idolatrous and inhuman sacrificers. Here he receives the *command*: and, on the point of execution, has the performance remitted to him as a FAVOUR; a circumstance, in the revocation of the *command*, which I must beg the examiner's leave to remind him of, especially when I see him, at every turn, much disposed to forget it, that is, to pass it over in silence, without either owning, or denying. And, indeed, the little support his reasoning has on any occasion, is only by keeping truth out of sight. But further, the *favour* was unaccompanied with any instruction concerning the moral nature of this kind of sacrifice; a practice never positively forbidden but by the law of Moses. Now, in this case, I would ask any candid reader, the least acquainted with human nature, whether Abraham and his family, prejudiced as they were, in favour of human sacrifices (the one, by his education in his country-religion; the other, by their communication with their pagan neighbours, and, as appears by scripture, but too apt of themselves, to fall into idolatry) would not be easily tempted to think as favourably of human sacrifices as those pagans were, who understood that Diana required Iphigenia, though she accepted a hind in her stead. And with such readers, I finally leave it.

P. 484, B B B. "Where are your authorities for all this?" says Dr Stebbing. "You produce none. Wherever you had your Greek, I am very sure you had it not from the *New Testament*, where these words are used indiscriminately."—Consid. pp. 142, 143. *Where are your authorities? you produce none.* This is to insinuate, I had none to produce. He dares not; indeed, say so; and in this I commend his prudence. However, thus far he is positive, that *wherever I had my Greek, I had it not from the New Testament.* The gentleman is hard to please: here he is offended that I *had it not*; and before that I *had it* from the New Testament. Here I impose upon him; there I trifled with him. But, in all this diversity of acceptance, it is still the same spirit: the spirit of *answering*.

I had said, the two Greek words, *in their exact use*, signify so and so. Which surely implied an acknowledgment, that this exactness was not always observed; especially by the writers of the New Testament; who, whatever some may have dreamed, did not pique themselves upon what we call, classical elegance. Now this implication, our examiner fairly confirms, though by way of confutation. *In the New Testament*, says he, *these words are used indiscriminately.* I had plainly insinuated as much; and he had better have let it rest on my acknowledgment; for the instances he brings, to prove the words used indiscriminately in the New Testament, are full enough to persuade the reader that they are not so used. His first instance is 1 Pet. iv. 13. "Rejoice, *χαίριτε*, inasmuch as ye are partakers of Christ's sufferings; that when his glory shall be revealed, *χαρῆτι ἀγαλλιάμενοι*, ye may be glad with exceeding joy." See you not here, says he, the direct reverse of what you say; that *χαίρω* signifies the joy which arises upon prospect, and *ἀγαλλιάμαι* that which arises from possession?"—Consid. p. 143. No indeed; I see nothing like it. The followers of Christ are bid to rejoice, *χαίριτε*. For what? *For being partakers of Christ's sufferings.* And was not this a blessing in possession? But it seems our Doctor has but small conception how suffering for a good conscience can be a blessing. Yet at other times he must have thought highly of it, when in excess of charity, he bespoke the magistrate's application of it on his neighbours, under the name of WHOLESOME SEVERITIES. He is just as wide of truth when he tells us, that *ἀγαλλιάμαι* signifies *the joy which arises on possession.* They are bid to *rejoice* now in sufferings, that they might *be glad with exceeding joy* at Christ's second coming. And is this the being glad for a good in possession? Is it not for a good in prospect? The reward they were then going to receive. For I suppose the appearance of *Christ's glory* will precede the reward of his followers. So that the reader now sees he has himself fairly proved for me, the truth of my observation, that "in the exact use of the words, *ἀγαλλιάμαι* signifies that tumultuous pleasure which the certain expectation of an approaching blessing occasions; and *χαίρω* that calm and settled joy that arises from our knowledge, in the possession of it."

He goes on. "Rev. xix. 7. Let us be glad and rejoice *χαίρωμεν καὶ ἀγαλλιώμεθα* for the marriage of the Lamb is come." Where both words, says he, refer to blessings in possession. Again, Matt. v. 12. "Rejoice and be exceeding glad, *χαίριτε καὶ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε*, for great is your reward in heaven;" where both refer to blessings in prospect."—Consid. pp. 143, 144. His old fortune still pursues him. The first text from the Revelation, "Be glad and rejoice, FOR the marriage of the Lamb is come;" bids the followers of Christ now do that which they were bid to prepare for, in the words of St Peter, "that when his glory shall be revealed, ye may be glad with exceeding joy." If therefore, where they are bid to

prepare for their rejoicing, the joy is for a good in prospect (as we have shown it was) then, certainly, where they are told that this time of rejoicing is come, the joy must still be for a good in prospect. And yet he says, *the words refer to blessings in possession*. Again the text from St Matthew—"Rejoice and be exceeding glad, FOR great is your reward in heaven," has the same relation to the former part of St Peter's words, "Rejoice inasmuch as ye are partakers of Christ's sufferings," as the text in Revelation has to the latter. "Blessed are ye" says Jesus in this gospel, "when men shall revile you and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely for my sake. Rejoice, and be exceeding glad, FOR great is your reward in heaven." Rejoice! for what? Is it not for the persecutions they suffer for his sake? A *present blessing* sure; though not perhaps to our author's taste. The reason why they should rejoice, follows, *for great is your reward in heaven*. And yet here, he says, the words *refer to blessings in prospect*. In truth, what led him into all this inverted reasoning, was a pleasant mistake. The one text says—*be glad and rejoice, FOR ὅτι*—the other; *rejoice and be exceeding glad, FOR ὅτι*—now he took the particle, in both places, to signify *propter, for the sake of*; whereas it signifies *quoniam, quia*, and is in proof of something going before. So that he read the text—*rejoice for the marriage of the Lamb is come*; as if it had been—"rejoice for the marriage of the Lamb, WHICH is come:" and—*rejoice, for great is your reward in heaven*; as if it had been,—*"rejoice for your great reward in heaven."*

But now let us consider these texts in another view, in order to do justice to his delicacy of judgment. I had said that, in the *exact use* of the two Greek words, they signify so and so; and applied that observation to a FACT; where a person was said to have rejoiced, &c. In order to disprove this criticism, he brings three passages, in which those Greek words are used, where NO FACT is related; but where men are, in a rhetorical manner, called upon, and bid to rejoice, &c. In which latter case, the use of one word for another, is an elegant conversion. Those, in possession of a blessing, are bid to rejoice with that exceeding joy, which men generally have in the certain expectation of one approaching; and those in expectation, with that calm and settled joy, which attends full possession. And who but our examiner could not see, that the use of words is one thing, in an historical assertion; and quite another, in a rhetorical invocation?

Having thus ably acquitted himself in one criticism, he falls upon another. "What shall we do with ὅρα?"—What indeed? But no sooner said than done. "ὅρα," says he, "is often put for ὅτι or ὅτι, positive as you are, that it always refers to a future time."—Consid. p. 144. Now, so far from being *positive* of this, I am positive of the contrary, that there is not one word of truth in all he says. I observed indeed, that ὅρα ὅτι, in the text *refers only to a future time*. And this I say still, though our translators have rendered it, equivocally, *to see*. Yet he affirms, that I say, "ὅρα (standing alone) always refers to a future time:" that I am positive of it, nay very positive. "Positive as you are," says he; and to shame me of this evil habit, he proceeds to show, from several texts that ὅρα is often put for ὅτι or ὅτι. Thus John xvi. 2. 'The time cometh THAT ὅρα whosoever killeth you will think he doeth God service.' Again: 1 Cor. iv. 3. 'With me it is a small thing THAT ὅρα I should be judged of you.' And nearer to the point yet, 3 John 4. 'I have no greater joy ὅρα ἀκούω than THAT I hear, or, than TO hear that my children walk in the truth.' And why not here, Sir; 'Abraham rejoiced ὅρα ὅτι WHEN he saw, or THAT he saw, or (which is equivalent) TO SEE my day?'—Consid. p. 144. For all this kindness, the best acknowledgment I can make is to return him back his own criticism; only the *Greek* words put into *Latia*. The *Vulgate* has rendered ὅρα ὅτι by *ut videret*, which words I will suppose the translator to say (as without doubt he would) *refer only to a future time*. On which, I will be very learned and critical:—"Positive as you are, Sir, that *ut* always refers to a future time, I will show you that it is sometimes put for *postquam*, the past.

*Ut vidi, ut perii, ut me malus abstulit error!*

and sometimes (which is yet nearer to the point) for *quanto*—*Ut quisque optime Græci sciret, ita esse nequissimum*. And why not here, Sir, *Abraham* rejoiced [*ut videret*] WHEN HE SAW, or THAT he saw, or which is equivalent, TO SEE my day?"—And now he says, *there is but one difficulty that stands in his way*. And what is this, I pray you? Why, that according to his (Dr Stebbing's) interpretation, "the latter part of the sentence is a repetition of the former. *Abraham* rejoiced to see my day, and he saw it and was glad; i. e. *Abraham* rejoiced to see, and then saw and rejoiced. But such kind of repetitions are frequent in the sacred dialect; and, in my humble opinion, it has an elegance here. *Abraham* rejoiced to see, καὶ ὤδῃ, καὶ ἠγάπη. HE BOTH SAW AND WAS GLAD."—Consid. pp. 144, 145. Before he talked of *repetitions in the sacred dialect*, and pronounced upon their qualities, he should have known how to distinguish between a *pleonasm* and a *tautology*; the first of which, indeed, is often an *elegance*; the latter, always a *blemish* in expression: and in the number of the latter, is this *elegant repetition* of the Doctor's own making. Where a repetition of the same thing is given in different words, it is called a *pleonasm*;



when in the same words (as in the Doctor's translation of the text in question) it is a *tautology*, which being, without reason, has neither grace nor *elegance*. Nay the very pretence it has to common sense arises from our being able to understand the equivocal phrase, *to see*, in my meaning, of, *that he might see*. Confine it to the Doctor's, of—*Abraham rejoiced when he had seen my day; and he saw it and was glad*, and the *absurdity* becomes apparent. For the latter part of the sentence beginning with the conjunction copulative *and*, it implies a further predication. Yet in his translation there is none; though he makes an effort towards it, in dropping the sense of *and* in the sound of BOTH.

P. 484, C C C. Dr Stebbing tells me, "There is not one word, in the history of the Old Testament, to justify this threefold distinction:" and that I myself CONFESS as much. It is true, I confess that what is not in the Old Testament is not to be found there. And had he been as modest, he would have been content to find a *future state* in the New Testament only. But where is it, I would ask, that "I confess there is not one word, in the history of the Old Testament, to justify this threefold distinction?" I was so far from any such thought, that I gave a large epitome\* of Abraham's whole history, to show that it justified this *threefold distinction*, in every part of it. His manner of proving my confession will clearly detect the fraud and falsehood of his charge. For, instead of doing it from my own words, he would argue me into it, from his own inferences. "You confess it," says he, "FOR you say, that Moses's history begins with the second period, and that the first was wisely omitted by the historian." Let us apply this reasoning to a parallel case. I will suppose him to tell me, for, after this, he may tell me any thing, "that I myself confess there is not one word in the Iliad of Homer, to justify me in saying that there were three periods in the destruction of Troy—the first, the robbery of Helen; the second, the combats before the walls; and the third, the storming of the town by the Greeks: FOR that I say, that Homer's poem begins at the second period; wisely omitting the first and the last." Now, will any one conclude, from this reasoning, that I had made any such confession?

P. 485, D D D. This shows why GOD might say to *Hosea*, *Go take unto thee a wife of whoredoms*, &c. ch. i. ver. 2. Though all actions which have no *moral import* are indifferent; yet some of this kind, which would even be indifferent, had they a moral import, may, on the very account of their having no *moral import*, be the object of pleasure or displeasure. Thus, in the adventure between Elisha and Joash, we are told, that the prophet said unto the king, "Take bow and arrows; and he took unto him bow and arrows. And he said to the king of Israel, Put thine hand upon the bow; and he put his hand upon it; and Elisha put his hands upon the king's hands. And he said; Open the window eastward; and he opened it. Then Elisha said; Shoot; and he shot. And he said, The arrow of the Lord's deliverance from Syria: for thou shalt smite the Syrians in Aphek, till thou have consumed them. And he said, Take the arrows: and he took them. And he said unto the king of Israel; Smite upon the ground; and he smote thrice, and stayed. And the man of God *was wroth with him*, and said; Thou shouldest have smitten five or six times, then hadst thou smitten Syria, till thou hadst consumed it: whereas now thou shalt smite Syria but thrice."—2 Kings xiii. 15—19. Here it is not difficult to apprehend, that the prophet, by God's command, directed the king to perform a significative action, whose meaning God had beforehand explained to his messenger: and, amongst the particulars of it, had told him this, that the Syrians should be smitten as often as the king smote upon the ground, when the prophet should order him, only in general words, *to smite* it. Hence the prophet's anger, occasioned by his love to his country, on the king's stopping when he had *smote thrice*.

P. 485, E E E. To this Dr Stebbing answers, "I can easily understand, Sir, how the matter stood with Abraham; and that HE was in no danger of being misled, as to the nature of human sacrifices, who knew the secret of the whole affair: and that it was nothing else but scenery. But how this answer will serve for *his family*, who are to be presumed to have known nothing of this scenical representation, is utterly past my comprehension—because you have told us from the very first, that the information to be conveyed by it was intended for Abraham's SOLE USE; and I do not see how Abraham could open to his family the scenery of the transaction, without explaining the *mystery*.—But is not your putting the *family* of Abraham in possession of this consequence, a very plain declaration, that they knew the mystery of Christ's sacrifice? Now, therefore, Sir, take your choice, and give up one part of your hypothesis, or the other, as best pleases you; for to hold both is impossible. If you say that the family of Abraham were acquainted with the mystery of Christ's sacrifice; it will overturn all you have said concerning their ignorance of a future state: it likewise overturns the single reason you have given why the explanation, usual in all such cases, to show the import of the transaction was not added, viz. that it was a point *not fit for common knowledge*. But if you shall choose to say, that the revelation of this mystery

\* From pp. 471 to 474 of this volume.

was for the **SOLE** information of Abraham, and that his family knew nothing of it, the objection will lie full against you, unanswered."—Consid. p. 166.

I had said, that the command was for *Abraham's sole use*; and "therefore," says the Doctor, "the family of Abraham must be presumed to know nothing of this scenical representation:" Notwithstanding this, *I presume*, he says, *that they did know it*. Here he takes me in a flagrant contradiction. But did he indeed not apprehend that where I spoke of its being given for *Abraham's sole use*, I was opposing it, as the course of my argument required, not to the single family which **THEN** lived under his tents, but to the Jewish people, **WHEN** the history of the transaction was recorded?—And now having shown his wrong conclusion from **MY** words, let us consider next the wrong conclusion he draws from his **OWN**.—"I do not see," says he, "how Abraham could open to his family the scenery of the transaction, without explaining the mystery." What does he mean by, *opening the scenery of the transaction*? There are two senses of this ambiguous expression; it may signify, either, *explaining the moral of the scenery*; or simply, *telling his family that the transaction was a scenical representation*. He could not use the phrase in the former sense, because he makes *explaining the mystery* a thing different from *opening the scenery*. He must mean it then in the latter. But could not Abraham tell his family, that this was a *scenical representation*, without *explaining the mystery*? I do not know what should hinder him, unless it was the sudden loss of speech. If he had the free use of his tongue, I think, he might, in the transports of his joy, on his return home, tell his wife, "That God had ordered him to sacrifice his son, and that he had carried this son to mount Moriah, in obedience to the divine command, where a ram was accepted in his stead; but that the whole was a mere scenical representation, to figure a mysterious transaction which God had ordained to come to pass in the latter ages of the world." And I suppose when he had once told his wife, the family would soon hear of it. Now, could they not understand, what was meant by a *scenical representation*, as well when he told them it was to prefigure a mystery, as if he had told them it was to prefigure the *crucifixion of Jesus*? Had I no other way of avoiding his dilemma, (for if I escape his *contradiction*, he has set his *dilemma-trap*, which he says it is impossible I should escape,) had I nothing else, I say, it is very likely I should have insisted upon this explanation: but there are more safe ways than one of taking him by his horns. "Now, therefore," says he, "take your choice, and give up one part of your hypothesis or the other, as best pleases you: **FOR TO HOLD BOTH IS IMPOSSIBLE**. If you say that the family of Abraham were acquainted with the mystery, it will overturn all you said concerning their ignorance of a future state—But if you shall choose to say that the revelation of the mystery was for the sole information of Abraham, and that his family knew nothing of it, then—the construction in favour of human sacrifices must have been the very same as if no such representation, as you speak of, had been intended." I desire to know where it is that I have spoken **ANY THING** of *the ignorance of Abraham's family concerning a future state*. But I am afraid something is wrong here again: and that, by *Abraham's family*, he means the *Israelites under Moses's policy*: for, with regard to them, I did indeed say that the gross body of the people were ignorant of a future state. But then I supposed them equally ignorant of the true import of the command to Abraham. But if by *Abraham's family* he means, as every man does, who means honestly, those few of his household, I suppose them indeed acquainted with the true import of the command: but then, at the same time, not ignorant of a future state. Thus it appears that what our examiner had pronounced **IMPOSSIBLE**, was all the while very possible. And in spite of this terrible dilemma, both parts of the hypothesis are at peace. I can hardly think him so immoral as to have put a designed trick upon his reader: I rather suppose it to be some confused notion concerning the popish virtue of **TRADITION**, that trusty guardian of truth, which led him into all this absurdity: and made him conclude, that what Abraham's household once knew, the posterity of Abraham could never forget. Though the **WRITTEN WORD** tells us, that when Moses was sent to redeem this posterity from bondage, they remembered so little of God's revelations to their forefathers, that they knew nothing even of his **NATURE**, and therefore did, as men commonly do in the like case, enquire after his **NAME**.

P. 487, F F F. "To me," says the noble writer, "it plainly appears, that in the early times of *all* religions, when nations were yet barbarous and savage, there was ever an aptness or tendency towards the dark part of superstition, which, amongst many other horrors, produced that of *human sacrifice*. Something of this nature might possibly be deduced even from holy writ."—To this a note refers in the following words—"Gen. xxii. 1. and Judg. xi. 30. These places relating to Abraham and Jephthah are cited only with respect to the notion which these primitive warriors may be said to have entertained concerning this horrid enormity, so common amongst the inhabitants of Palestine and the other neighbouring nations. It appears that even the elder of these Hebrew princes was under no extreme surprise on this trying revelation. Nor did he think of expostulating, in the least, on this occasion: when at another time he could be so importunate for the pardon of an inhospitable, murderous, impious, and incestuous city, Gen. xviii. 23, &c." Charact. vol. iii. p. 124.



Dr Stébbling will needs try his strength with the noble author of the *Characteristics*. For, whether I quote for approbation or condemnation, it is all one; this active watchman of the church militant will let nothing escape him, that he finds in my service; nor leave any thing unpurified that has once passed through my hands. To this passage of the noble Lord he replies, "The cases widely differ. God did not open *precisely* what he intended to do with these wicked cities; he only said, judgment was passed. But what has this to do with Isaac, who did not stand as a sinner before God; but as a sacrifice, acknowledging God's sovereign dominion. For Abraham to intercede here would have inferred a reluctance to do homage, which would have destroyed the perfection of his resignation."—Hist. of Abr. pp. 41, 42. So, Isaac's innocence, and his *not standing a sinner before God* when he was doomed to death, makes him a less proper object of Abraham's intercession and compassion, than a devoted city, *inhospitable, murderous, impious, and incestuous*. This is our Doctor's HUMANITY; and a modest petition of the father of the faithful, like that of the Saviour of the world, "If it be possible, let this cup pass from me, nevertheless, not as I will but as thou wilt," would have *destroyed all the perfection of his resignation*. And this is our Doctor's DIVINITY! Strange! that this father of orthodoxy could not see, that what might be done by the divine *antitype* himself, without *destroying his perfection of resignation*, might likewise be done, without that loss, in behalf of the *type*. After so fine a specimen of what great things he is able to do against this formidable enemy of revelation; what pity is it, he was never set on work by his superiors, *in a more avowed and open manner!*

P. 491, G G G. This man, not long since, wrote against the Divine Legation under the name of a *society of freethinkers*: by the same kind of figure, I suppose, that he in the gospel called himself *legion*, who was only the forwardest devil of the crew.

P. 491, H H H. But I mistake. Unbelievers, I think, are not yet quite so shameless. The objection, in form, comes from another quarter. It is Dr Stebbing, who, for the honour of the church, makes it for them. He will not allow that the words of Jesus are of any validity to support my interpretation of the *command* to Abraham, because unbelievers will not admit the inspiration of the New Testament. But what then? they have not yet disputed with me my interpretation of the *command*. Nobody hath done this but Dr Stebbing. And I hope the authority of Jesus will stand good against him. He was in haste to do their business for them: and, it must be confessed, by an argument that does equal credit to his logic and his piety.

Fair reasoners of all parties will see, though Dr Stebbing will not, that the question is *not particular*, concerning the *inspiration* of the Old and New Testament; but *general*, of the *connexion* between them; and those will not be so unreasonable to expect I should prove this connexion, of which they ask a proof, any otherwise than by applying each reciprocally to explain and to support the other. If the two Testaments be shown to do this; while on the other hand, when singly considered, and without each other's mutual assistance, they are inexplicable, the connexion between them is fairly made out. The objection of unbelievers stands thus, "You pretend," say they, "that these two dispensations are two constituent *parts* of God's great moral economy: if this be true, they must needs have a strong connexion and real relation to one another. Show us this connexion and relation: and amuse us no longer with proving the divinity of this or that dispensation separately, as if each were independent on the other." I comply with their demand: and now Dr Stebbing tells me, I take this or that revelation for granted which I should have proved. Whereas in truth I take nothing for granted but what unbelievers are ready to prove against me, if I did not: namely, that between two dispensations, the one pretended to be preparatory to the other, there must needs be a strong and near connexion and relation. And if, in the course of evincing this connexion, I urge some circumstances in the Jewish to support the Christian, and others in the Christian to support the Jewish; this, I suppose, is *not taking for granted* the truth either of one or the other, but *proving* the divinity of both.

P. 495, I I I. Hence we see the vanity of Mr Whiston's distinction, who is for retaining *types* (necessitated thereunto by the express declarations of holy writ), and for rejecting *double senses*. "Mr Whiston," says the author of the *Grounds*, &c., "justifies *typical* arguing from the ritual laws of Moses, and from passages of history in the Old Testament.—Indeed he pretends *this* last to be quite another thing from the *odd* (typical) application of prophecies. For, says he, the ancient ceremonial institutions were, as to their principal branches, at least in their own nature, types and shadows of future good things.—But the case of the ancient prophecies to be alleged from the old scriptures for the confirmation of Christianity is quite of another nature, and of a more nice and exact consideration." Pp. 227, 228. It appears, indeed, they are of a more nice and exact consideration, even from Mr Whiston's so much mistaking them, as to suppose they are of a nature quite different from types. But instead of telling us honestly that he knew not what to make of them, he plays the courtier, and dismisses them, for a more nice and exact consideration.

P. 496, K K K. The bishop of London, in his *Discourses on the Use and Intent of Prophecy*, seemed to have but a slender idea of this use when he wrote as follows:—"There was no occasion," says he, "to lay in so long beforehand the evidence of prophecy, to convince men of things that were to happen in their own times: and it gives us a low idea of the administration of providence in sending prophets one after another in every age from Adam to Christ, to imagine that all this apparatus was for their sakes who lived in or AFTER the times of Christ." P. 37. But such is the way of these writers who have a favourite doctrine to enforce. The truth of that doctrine (if it happen to be a truth) is supported at the expense of all others. Thus his Lordship, setting himself to prove that *prophecy was given principally to support the faith and religion of the world*, thought he could not sufficiently secure his point without weakening and discrediting another of, at least, equal importance,—*That it was given to afford testimony to the mission of Jesus*.

P. 499, L L L. This account of types and secondary senses, which supposes they were intended to conceal the doctrines delivered under them, is so very natural, and, as would seem, reasonable, that Dr Stebbing himself subscribes to it. And hence occasion has been taken by a most acute and able writer to expose his prevarication, in maintaining that the Jews had the revealed doctrine of a future state: for the Doctor not only confesses that the doctrine was revealed under types, but that doctrines, thus conveyed, were purposely secreted from the knowledge of the ancient Jews. See the "Argument of the Divine Legation fairly stated," p. 125. And the "Free and candid Examination of Bishop Sherlock's Sermons," &c., chap. ii., where the controversy on this point is fairly determined, as far as truth and reason can determine any thing.

P. 508, M M M. Hear what a very judicious critic observes of the line in question "The comment of SERVIVS on this line is remarkable. 'Hunc versum notant critici, quasi superfluum et inutiliter additum, nec convenientem gravitati ejus, namque est magis neotericus.' Mr ADDISON conceived of it in the same manner when he said, *this was the only witty line in the Æneis*; meaning such a line as Ovid would have written. We see they esteemed it a wanton play of fancy, unbecoming the dignity of the writer's work, and the gravity of his character. They took it, in short, for a more *modern* flourish, totally different from the pure unaffected manner of genuine antiquity. And thus far they unquestionably judged right. Their defect was in not seeing that the use of it, as here employed by the poet, was an exception to the *general rule*. But to have seen this was not, perhaps, to be expected even from these critics. However, from this want of penetration arose a difficulty in determining whether to read, *facta* or *fata* nepotum. And as we now understand that Servius and his critics were utter strangers to Virgil's noble idea, it is no wonder they could not resolve it. But the *litter* is the poet's own word. He considered this shield of celestial make as a kind of *palladium*, like the ANCILE which fell from heaven, and used to be carried in procession on the *shoulders* of the SALII, 'Quid de scutis,' says Lactantius, 'jam vetustate putridis dicam? Quæ cum portant, Deos ipsos se gestare humeris suis arbitrantur.'—Div. Inst. lib. i. c. 21. Virgil, in a fine flight of imagination, alludes to this venerable ceremony, comparing, as it were, the shield of his hero to the sacred ANCILE; and, in conformity to the practice in that sacred procession, represents his hero in the priestly office of religion.

*Attollens HUMERO fumumque et FATA nepotum.*

This idea then, of the sacred shield, the guard and glory of Rome, and on which, in this *advanced* situation, depended the fame and fortune of his country, the poet with extreme elegance and sublimity transfers to the shield which guarded their great progenitor, while he was laying the first foundations of the Roman empire."—Mr HURD—notes on the epistle to Augustus, pp. 68, 69. 3d ed.

P. 512, N N N. The reader sees, however, by this, that he at length takes ALLEGORIES and SECONDARY SENSES *not to be the same*: in which, I must crave leave to tell him, he is mistaken; *religious allegories* (the only allegories in question) being no other than a species of *secondary senses*. This may be news to our critic, though he has written and printed so much about ALLEGORIES, that is, about *secondary senses*; as Monsieur Jordan was surprised to find he had talked prose all his lifetime, without knowing it.

P. 512, O O O. Dr Stebbing, of this SOME (by one of his arts of controversy) has made ALL. And charges me\* with giving this as the character of *double prophecies* in general, that "without miracles in their confirmation they could hardly have the sense contended for well ascertained." On the contrary, he assures his reader that no prophecy can have its sense supported by miracles.—That part which relates to the morality of the Doctor's conduct in this matter, I shall leave to himself: with his logic I have something more to say. The *miracles*, which the reader plainly sees I meant, were those worked by Jesus; and the prophecies, some of those which Jesus quoted, as relating to himself. But the

\* See Hist. of Abraham, pp. 61, 62, 63, &c.

Doctor tells us, "that miracles are not to be taken for granted in our disputes with unbelievers." In some of our disputes with unbelievers, they are not to be taken for granted; in some they are. When the dispute is, whether the truth of Jesus' *mission* appear from miracles, it would be absurd to take miracles for granted: but when the dispute is, whether the truth of his *Messiah-character* appear from prophecies, there is no absurdity in taking his miracles for granted; because an unbeliever may deny his *Messiah-character*, which arises from prophecies, and yet acknowledge this *mission* which is proved by miracles; but he cannot deny the truth of his *mission*, which is proved by miracles, and yet acknowledge his miracles. But more than this—An unbeliever not only *may allow* us to suppose the truth of miracles when the question is about the proof of the *Messiah-character* from prophecies; but the unbeliever, with whom I had here to do, Mr Collins, does *actually allow* us, in our dispute with him, to suppose the truth of miracles: for thus he argues, "Jesus, you say, has proved his mission by miracles. In good time. But he had another character to support, that of a *promised Messiah*, for which he appeals to the prophecies: now, 1st, these prophecies relate not to him, but to another. And 2dly, miracles never can make that relate to him which relate to another." In answer to this, I proposed to show, that the first proposition was absolutely false, and that the second very much wanted to be qualified. In the course of this dispute, I had occasion to urge the evidence of miracles; and Mr Collins, while denying the *Messiah-character*, had permitted me to suppose their truth. Unluckily, the Doctor, who saw nothing of all this, takes what logicians call the *point assumed*, and the *point to be proved*, for one and the same thing. That Jesus was a *divine messenger*, and worked miracles, is the point *assumed* by me; and Mr Collins, over confident of his cause, permitted me to assume it. That Jesus was the *Messiah* foretold, is the point *to be proved*; and I did not expect that any other than a follower of Mr Collins would deny I had proved it. But I will be fair even with so unfair an adversary as Dr Stebbing, and urge *his cause* with an advantage with which I will suppose he would have urged it himself had he known how. It may be questioned whether it be strictly logical to employ this topic (which Mr Collins allows us to assume) of Jesus' *divine mission*, in order to prove his *Messiahship*? Now all that can be here objected is, that we *assume* one character, in order to *prove* another, in the same divine person. And what is there illogical in this? Who ever objected to the force of that reasoning against Lord Bolingbroke, which from the attributes of God's *power and wisdom* which his Lordship allowed the author of the *View of his Philosophy* to assume, inferred and proved God's *justice and goodness*, which his Lordship denied?

But to satisfy, not the Doctor, but any more reasonable man, I will suppose, it may be asked, "Of what use are prophecies thus circumstanced, that is to say, such as require the evidence of miracles to ascertain their sense?" I reply, of very important use; as they open and reveal more clearly the mutual dependency and connexion of the two dispensations on one another, in many particulars which would otherwise have escaped our notice: and, by this means, strengthen several additional proofs of the *Messiahship* of Jesus, on which the gospel doctrine of *redemption* depends. But was there no more in it than this, the rescuing *some* prophecies quoted in the New Testament, as relating to Jesus, out of the hands of unbelievers, who have taken an occasion from their generality or obscurity, to persuade the people that they relate entirely to another matter; this, I say, would be no less than clearing the truth of the *Messiahship* from inextricable difficulties. I will now take a final leave of this *answerer by profession*; an answerer of such eminence, that he may indeed be called,

"Knight of the shire, who represents them all."

But as he displays at parting all the effrontery of his miserable trade, I will just stop to new-barnish his complexion.

I had called my argument a *demonstration*, which one would think no one who could distinguish *morals* from *physics* could mistake, or would venture to misrepresent. Yet hear Dr Stebbing's last words,—“That Moses was the legislator of the Jews, and that the Jews were ignorant of a future state: these facts must be known by history, which spoils you for a demonstrator at once: for historical evidence goes no further than *probability*; and if this must concur to make up the evidence, it cannot be a *demonstration*: for demonstration cannot stand upon probability. The evidence may be good and sufficient, but *demonstration* it cannot be; which is always founded upon self-evident truths, and is carried on by a chain or series of the most simple ideas hanging upon each other by a necessary connexion.”—Letter to the Dean of Bristol, pp. 9, 10. And was it for this, that this wonderful man hath written half a score pamphlets against the *Divine Legation*, that he could not find in it the same sort of *demonstration* which he hath been told may be seen in Euclid?

P. 519, P P P. Nothing can be more simple than the principle here enforced, or more agreeable to the rules of just interpretation, than to suppose, that the *language of the law*,

in the terms ALTAR, SACRIFICE, &c., is employed to convey these prophetic intimations of the gospel. The ancient fathers of the church very imprudently continued the use of those terms, when speaking of the Christian rites— for though they used them, and professed to use them metaphorically, yet it gave countenance to strange extravagance of scripture interpretation amongst the Romanists. The ingenious author of the *Principes de la foi Chrétienne*, tom. i. p. 273, brings this prophecy of Malachi for a proof of the divine institution of the sacrifice of the mass.

P. 524, Q Q Q. It is wonderful to consider how little the writers on either side the question, have understood of the *logical propriety and moral fitness* of types, and secondary senses of prophecy.

Dr Middleton and Dr Sykes, who agreed with Mr Collins in laughing at these modes of information, agreed with him likewise, in laying down such principles, and inculcating such ideas of the Mosaic religion, as most effectually tended to evince this *logical propriety and moral fitness*.

On the other hand, Bishop Sherlock, Dr Stebbing, and other advocates for types and secondary senses of prophecy, lay down such principles, and inculcate such ideas of the Mosaic religion, as would totally supersede the use of these modes of information, and consequently destroy both the *logical propriety and moral fitness*.—See the Free and Candid Examination of Bishop Sherlock's Principles, &c., chap. ii.

P. 528, R R R. M. BOILLER, the ingenious author of the "*Contre Examen de la Thèse de M. L'Abbé de Prades, et Observations sur son Apologie*," having charged de Prades with taking his idea of the Mosaic economy from this work, without owning it, goes on in his own way, to show that the ARGUMENT of the *Divine Legation*, as delivered in these volumes, is CONCLUSIVE.

—"La loi Mosaique, considérée comme le fondement d'un établissement national et temporel, n'avait que des promesses et des menaces, ne proposait que des peines des récompenses temporelles— au lieu qu'à considérer les grandes vues de cet établissement par rapport à l'église même, la loi étoit une espèce de tableau emblématique, qui sous l'apparence des objets charnels, figurait les spirituels; ensorte que, en raisonnant selon les principes d'une juste analogie, la foi des Israélites éclairés et pieux, trouvoit dans les promesses de la loi, qui portoient uniquement sur les biens présents, un nouveau gage de la multitude des biens à venir. Mais comme on doit bien se souvenir, que dans cette nation, les fideles ne faisoient QUE LE PETIT NOMBRE, l'argument de WARBURTON tiré du silence de la loi sur une économie à venir, en faveur de la divinité de cette loi même, n'auroit toute sa force; car il demeure toujours vrai qu'il n'a pas fallu moins que la vertu des vices, et l'efficacité d'une impression surnaturelle, pour faire ployer le gros de la nation, c'est-à-dire les Juifs charnels, que ne pénétrèrent point ces vues mystérieuses, sous le joug pesant de la dispensation Mosaique"—Pp 94, 95. And again, "Ce double caractère de la dispensation Mosaique met sa divinité hors d'attente à tous les traits les plus essentiels du déisme qui l'attaque par deux batteries opposées. Quoi? disent nos libertins, une religion qui promet uniquement les biens de la terre, peut-elle être digne de Dieu? Et lorsque, pour leur répondre, ayant recours au sens mystique, on dit que les promesses légales qui prises à la lettre, n'offrent qu'un bonheur temporel, doivent s'entendre spirituellement, ces Messieurs se retournent aussitôt avec une merveilleuse adresse pour nous demander comment un oracle, qui trompe les hommes, et qui n'a point d'accomplissement dans le sens le plus clair, le plus propre, et le plus littéral de ce qu'il promet, peut être regardé comme un oracle divin? Question, qui dans l'hypothèse commune, me paraît plus difficile à résoudre d'une façon satisfaisante. Mais l'une et l'autre objection tombe, dès qu'on envisage l'ancienne économie telle qu'elle est, c'est-à-dire, tout à la fois comme alliance nationale et comme économie religieuse. En qualité d'alliance nationale, ses promesses sont toutes charnelles, et s'accomplissent à terre à l'égard des Juifs. Mais en qualité d'économie religieuse, essentiellement liée au plan de l'évangile, elle est pour les fidèles la figure et le gage des biens spirituels. Doublement digne du Dieu de vérité, et par l'accomplissement littéral de ses promesses, et par leur usage typique, la réunion de ces deux rapports y annonce l'ouvrage de son infinie sagesse.—Addition à l'Article iv. p. 104.

Thus far this ingenious writer. But now a difficulty well occurs. The same author of the *Divine Legation* hath made out his point, that the law of Moses is from God: he contends that the author's system is the *only one* that can support this revelation against the objections of deists and libertines: yet when he has done this, he has thought fit to call this very system, a paradox, though it goes upon his own principle, "That the Mosaic dispensation had a double character, that it was a national alliance, and was at the same time essentially united to the gospel plan; that this double character, though not apprehended by the body of the Jewish people, yet was well understood by those particularly favoured of God, their prophets, and leaders." This censure, if it be intended for one, I say, appears to me a little mysterious. However, the learned writer's words are these: "Quand M. de Prades a dit que l'économie Mosaique n'étoit fondée que sur les peines et les récom-



penses temporelles, et qu'il a soutenu que cela même fournit une bonne preuve de la divinité de cette économie, il n'a fait autre chose que suivre la trace du savant *Warburton*, qui avança ce PARADOXE, il y a déjà quelques années dans son fameux ouvrage *de la Divine Legation de Moïse*, et employa tour à tour pour le défendre, le raisonnement et l'érudition. Nôtre Bachelier, aussi-bien que *M. Hooke*, qu'il cite pour son garand, auroient bien dû faire honneur à l'illustre Docteur Anglois, d'une pensée que personne ne doutera qu'ils n'aient puisée chez lui."—P. 88. Now, I have so good an opinion of this learned writer's candour as to believe that either he used the word *paradox* in an indifferent sense, or that he was misled in his judgment of the *Divine Legation* by M. de Prades, and Mr Hooke: who although they borrowed what they have delivered concerning the nature of the Mosaic economy from that book, which they did not think fit to confess, yet it is as certain that what they borrowed they either did not understand, or at least have misrepresented. The learned Sorbonist has since published his course of theology, intitled *Religionis naturalis et revelatæ Principia*. In which, though he has consulted his ease and perhaps his reputation, in transcribing the reasonings of the *Divine Legation* on various points of theology, and generally without reference to the book or the author; yet his affairs with his body have taught him caution, and obliged him to declare against the PROPOSITION, in support of which, those reasonings were employed by their original author. For when he comes to the question concerning *the sanction of the Jewish law*, he introduces it in the following manner :—*Quæstionem inchoamus difficilem, in qua explicanda adhibenda est summa verborum proprietas, ne Pelagianis ex una parte non satis fœdus Mosaicum et Evangelicum discriminantibus, aut contrariis RECENTIORUM QUORUMDAM erroribus favere videamur.* And so, fortifies himself with Suarez and St Thomas. The consequence of which is, that the two large chapters in his second volume (the first, To prove that a future state was always a popular doctrine amongst the Jews; and the second, That temporal rewards and punishments were really and equally distributed amongst them under the theocracy) just serve to confute one another: Or, more properly, the second chapter, by aid of the arguments taken from the *Divine Legation*, effectually overturns all that he has advanced in the first.—See Mr Hooke's second volume of his course, intitled, *Religionis naturalis et revelatæ Principia*, from pp. 208 to 236. For the rest, this justice is due to the learned and ingenious writer, that these *principles of natural and revealed religion* compose the best reasoned work in defence of revelation which we have yet seen come from that quarter.

THE  
DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES  
DEMONSTRATED.

---

BOOK VII.—INTRODUCTION.

(BOOK IX. ON THE AUTHOR'S PLAN.\*)

TRUTH, the great object of all honest as well as rational inquiries, had been long sought for in vain; when, the search now become desperate, after the fruitless toil of the best qualified sages, and of the most improved times, she suddenly appeared in PERSON to put these benighted wanderers in their way. I AM THE TRUTH, says the Saviour of the world. This was his moral nature; of more concern for us to know, than his physical; and, on that account, explained more at large in his *eternal gospel*.

This last book, therefore, being an attempt to explain the true NATURE AND GENIUS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION; I shall,

I. First of all, previously examine those sceptical objections, which in the long absence of truth, the world had begun to entertain of her very being and existence; or at least of our capacity to discover, and get hold of her. And these being removed,

II. I shall, in the second place, lay down, under what laws, and with what disposition of mind, I have ventured to use the aids of REASON to explain the TRUTHS OF REVELATION.

III. And, lastly, I shall attempt to remove the prejudices which may arise against any new discoveries in support of REVELATION, which the method here employed to analyze that capital *truth* of all, THE FAITH, may possibly enable us to make.

[I.] THAT ancient remedy against error, a *Pyrrhonian*, or, if you like it better, an *academic* SCEPTICISM, only added one more disorder to the

\* This book embodies an attempt to explain the true nature and genius of the Christian religion. It was first published in the year 1788; and, according to the design of the author exhibited in the preceding book, was reckoned book ninth; but the discourses which were intended to form books seventh and eighth, as has been already stated, were never written. Even the present book, though printed, so far as it goes, by the author, was left unfinished. Lest this circumstance should operate to the prejudice of this division of the work, it may be proper to repeat here a few words from Bishop HURD's introductory *Discourse*:—"This ninth book is the noblest effort that has hitherto been made to give a RATIONALE OF CHRISTIANITY.——Very little is wanting to complete the author's design: only what he had proposed to say on the apocalyptic prophecies, and which may be supplied from his *Discourse on Antichrist*."—See vol. i. of this edit., p. 53.—Ed.



human mind; but being the last of its misbegotten issue, it became, as is usual, the favourite of its parent.

Our blessed MASTER himself was the first to encounter its attacks, and the insolence of that school has kept the church in breath ever since.

When Jesus was carried before Pilate as a criminal of state, for calling himself *king of the Jews*, he tried to shorten the intended process by pleading that *his kingdom was not of this world*. But Pilate, alarmed at the names of *king* and *kingdom*, asked, *Art thou a king then?* The other replied,—*For this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the TRUTH. Pilate saith unto him, WHAT IS TRUTH? And when he had said this, he went out again.\** For when he found that the *kingdom* claimed by the supposed criminal, was a *kingdom* merely *spiritual*, or, in the Roman governor's conceit, a *kingdom* only in idea, he considered the claim as no proper subject of the civil tribunal. So far he acted well, and suitably to his public character. But when he discovered his indifference to, or rather contempt of, TRUTH, when offered to be laid before him as a private man, by one who, he knew, had the repute of exercising every superior power proper to enforce it, he appears, to me, in a light much less excusable.

The negligent air of his insulting question will hardly admit of an apology.—“You tell me,” says he, “of TRUTH, a word in the mouth of every leader and follower of a SECT; who all agree (though in nothing else) to give that name to their own opinions: while TRUTH, if, indeed, we allow of its existence, still wanders at large, and in disguise. Nor does the detection seem worth the pains of the search, since those things which nature intended for general use she made plain and obvious, and within the reach of all men.”

Sentiments like these bespoke the ruler of an Asiatic province, who had heard so much of TRUTH in the schools of philosophy; and had heard of it to so little purpose. This corrupt governor, therefore, finding a Jewish sage talk of *bearing witness to the truth*, (the affected office of the Grecian sophists) was ready to conclude that Jesus was one of their mimic followers. For it was now become fashionable amongst the learned rabbins to enlist themselves into one or other of those celebrated schools. Thus the famous Philo was an outrageous PLATONIST: and Jesus calling himself a KING, together with the known purity and severity of his morals, probably made Pilate consider him as one of the STOICAL *wise men*, who alone was free, and happy, and a *king*.

Liber, honoratus, pulcher, REX denique Regum.

Now, as on the one hand, the character of the Greek philosophy, which was of an abstract nature, and sequestered from civil business, made Pilate conclude, that these claims of Jesus had nothing in them dangerous or alarming; so, on the other hand, its endless disputes and quarrels about TRUTH, and which of the sects had her in keeping, made

\* John xviii. 38.

men of the world, and especially those in public stations, whose practice declined the test of any moral system whatsoever, willing to be persuaded, and ready to conclude, that this boasted TRUTH, which pretended to be the sole directress of human conduct, was indeed no better than a shifting and fantastic vision.

This, I presume, was the light in which Pilate considered the SAVIOUR OF THE WORLD. Had he suspected Jesus of being the founder of a public and a popular religion, which aimed to be erected on the ruins of the established worship, the jealousies of the Roman court, since the loss of public liberty, had, doubtless, made this servile minister of power very attentive, and even officious, to suppress it in its birth.

But if the ill usage of TRUTH by the philosophers could so disgust the politician of old, as to indispose him to an acquaintance of this importance, what must we think will be her reception amongst modern statesmen, whose views are neither more pure nor more generous; and whose penetration, perhaps, does not go much beyond the busy men of antiquity; when they see her so freely handled by those, amongst us, who call themselves her ministers, and profess to consecrate her to the service of religion? Amongst such, I mean of the active no less than of the idle part of the fashionable world, Pilate's scornful question is become proverbial, when they would insinuate, that TRUTH, like *virtue*, is nothing but a *name*.

What is this TRUTH, say they, of which the world has heard so much, and has received so little satisfaction? But above all, what is that GOSPEL TRUTH, the pretended guide of life, which its ministers are wont so much to discredit in their very attempts to recommend? For while *objections* to religion lie level to the capacities of the vulgar, the *solution* of them requires the utmost stretch of parts and learning in the teacher to excogitate, and equal application and attention in the learner to comprehend. From which, say they, we are naturally led to conclude, that the *gospel doctrines* are no truths, or at least, truths of no general concern; since they are neither uniformly held by those who are employed to teach them, nor subject to the examination of such as are enjoined to receive them.

Something like this, I apprehend, may be the way of thinking and talking too, amongst those who have more decently discarded all care and concern about the things of religion.

And as our acquired passions and appetites have concurred with the constitutional weakness of our nature to form these conclusions against TRUTH, and especially against that best part of it, RELIGIOUS TRUTH, charity seems to call upon us to detect and lay open the general causes which have given birth to men's prejudices against it.

I. And first with regard to TRUTH in general;—of the various hindrances to its discovery, and of men's backwardness to acquiesce in it, when luckily found.

The first and surest means of acquiring the good we seek, is our love

and affection for the object. This quickens our industry, and sharpens our attention. On this account the LOVE OF TRUTH hath always been recommended by the masters of wisdom as the best means of succeeding in the pursuit of it. Hardly any one suspects that he wants this love: yet there are few whom their confidence does not deceive. We mistake the love of our *opinions* for the *love of truth*; because we suppose our own opinions, *true*: yet, for the most part, we received them upon trust; and consequently, they are much more likely to be false: so that our affections being now misplaced, they are a greater hinderance in the pursuit of TRUTH, than if we had no affections at all concerning it.

How then shall we know when we have this love? for still it is necessary we should have it, if we would search after TRUTH to any good purpose. It is difficult to describe what every man must feel for himself; and yet it is as dangerous to trust our own feelings, when the object is so easily mistaken. However, when we set out in pursuit of TRUTH as of a stranger; and not in search of arguments to support our acquaintance with preconceived opinions: when we possess ourselves in a perfect indifference for every thing but known and well-attested TRUTH; regardless of the place from whence it comes, or of that to which it seems to be going: when the mind, I say, is in this state, no one, I think, can fairly suspect the reality of its attachment.

1. But our APPETITES rarely suffer us to observe this strict and rigid conduct. We seek the gratification of our humour even in the laws which should correct it. Hence so many various SYSTEMS OF MORALITY to suit every man's bent of mind and frame of constitution. The indolent, the active, the sanguine, the phlegmatic, and the saturnine, have all their correspondent theories. And from thenceforth, the concern of each is not the *trial*, but the *support* of his opinions; which can be no otherwise provided for than by keeping the arguments in favour of them always in view, and by contriving to have those of a less benign aspect overlooked or forgotten.

2. PREJUDICES mislead the inquirer no less than his *passions*. He venerates the notions he received from his forefathers: he rests in them on the authority of those whose judgment he esteems; or, at least, wishes well to them for the sake of the honours or profits he sees attached to the profession of them. Nay, he can persuade himself to patronize what he hath once chosen, for reasons with which TRUTH has no manner of concern. He likes them because they are *old*; because they are *new*; for being *plain and simple*; for being *sublime and mysterious*; for being followed by the *few*; for being followed by the *many*: in a word, on a thousand other accounts still more remote from the conclusions of common sense.

But then, bad as this is, since it is, at the same time, apparent, that the impediments in pursuit of TRUTH are not *essential*, but only *accidental* to the inquiry, we may well account for our mistakes in setting out; for the slowness of our progress; and the rubs and oppositions we

meet in our passage, without having recourse to any *sceptical* conclusions in favour of the incomprehensible *nature* of TRUTH, or the inaccessible *situation* in which the author of all things hath been pleased to place her. For, is it any reason, that because some truths are so deep that our haste and impatience will not allow us time to sound them; others so disguised that our dissipation will not enable us to unmask their pretences; and others again, so unfriendly to our prejudices as to indispose us to examine them: that, because some errors wear so plausible a face as to look like TRUTH; others, so commodious an appearance as to be readily received for TRUTH; and others again, so fashionable as to claim all the privileges due to TRUTH; is, I say, all, or any thing of this, a reason for sober men to conclude, that either there is no difference between *truth* and *falsehood*; or that the *difference* is so insensible that it will not serve us for a *distinction*? Our senses, in many cases; our reason, in more; and our very hearts in almost all, will tell us the contrary.

II. Secondly, with regard to RELIGIOUS TRUTH.—1. Mistaken constancy, or more tenacious ZEAL, make some men prejudiced in favour of *less allowed* opinions: and the obliquer affections of avarice or ambition make others declare for such as are *established*. OPPOSITION likewise will too much dispose both, to support what they may even suspect to be false, and to secrete what they know to be true. This draws them still further from the road of TRUTH; while all they seek is to be at a distance from one another's parties and opinions.

2. Inveterate errors, long since sanctified by time and authority, concerning the nature and end of SCRIPTURE, are another occasion of the disgraces to which *revelation* is become subject.

GOD'S WRITTEN WORD is so commonly and so justly honoured with the name of THE TRUTH; and holy writ in general so frequently recommended for its virtue in *leading us into all truth*, that simple, well-meaning men have been apt to regard it as a treasury of science; and to apply to it for all the principles of human knowledge. How wretchedly, for instance, hath the Mosaic account of the Creation been dishonoured, by the wild and fanciful expositions of men besotted by this or that sect of heathen PHILOSOPHY, or of Christian MYSTICISM! Platonists, materialists, Cartesians, chymists, cabalists, and all the impure fry of physical, philological, and spiritual enthusiasts, have found each his own whimsies realized in the first and second chapters of the book of Genesis.

Again, how impiously have the JEWISH LAW and the GOSPEL OF JESUS been abused by slaves and sycophants, to find, in one, the DIVINE RIGHT of KINGS; and, in the other, the SUPREME DOMINION OF THE CHURCH.

But amidst all this folly and mischief, arising from a perversion of the BIBLE, to support human systems of philosophy and politics, had men only reflected, that though the Bible tells us, it was written to make

men wise—it addeth—*unto salvation*,\* they would have sought for the principles of *natural* and *civil* knowledge amongst their proper professors; and have studied scripture only to investigate that WISDOM *which is from above, and is first PURE, then PEACEABLE.*† A wisdom which, at the same time that it rectifies the understanding, purifies the heart; and so removes all ground of contention raised by a perplexed head or a heated temper.

The first propagators of our holy FAITH, under the immediate commission of their Master, were, in this, as in all other parts of their conduct, truly admirable. What they chiefly proposed to the people at large, was the BELIEF of a few clear and simple propositions, as *necessary to salvation*: when they addressed themselves to those chosen particulars, who were fitly qualified and rightly disposed, they as warmly recommend EXAMINATION:—to *search the scriptures,*‡ and to *try all things.*

Yet the only use a late writer§ could find in so sage and generous a conduct, was to abuse it, in a profane piece of drollery, under the form of a serious question, *Whether Christianity was founded in argument or in faith?* which, however designed for wit, was just as wise as, *whether St Paul's clock was constructed on MECHANISM or on MOTION?* Since, if the clock was seen to have *motion*, we could not but conclude that the *motion* arose from *mechanism*. So, if the vital principle of Christianity be FAITH, it can be no other than such a *faith* as stands upon *reason*, and is supported by *argument*. A wild Indian, perhaps, might fancy that St Paul's clock was animated, and put in motion by a spirit: and an enthusiast, still wilder than the savage, may say that *faith is but the seal of a supernatural impression*. Yet surely, none but a fool of the *old* stamp, or a fanatic of the *new*, would be willing to discard REASON, in pursuit of his *future* happiness, when he has already found IT so useful in procuring his *present*. For both present and future good are, alike, acquired by the proper adaption of *means* to *ends*. An operation which, all must confess, the aid of REASON only can effectually perform. Nor hath this faithful guide of life ever afforded cause of complaint or jealousy. When men, who profess to be under HER guidance, find themselves bewildered, they should suspect, not HER, but themselves. And, on a fair examination, I suppose, they will always find, that they have been *directing* REASON when they should have been *directed* by HER. But the wayward affections which occasion her discredit, go on in their illusions to excite our distrust.

[II.] Thus much for SCEPTICISM, that bane of human science, which, while it boasts to be the NERVES OF THE MIND,|| deprives it of all its force and vigour. I now proceed to consider the temper and disposition necessary to be acquired by us, before we can safely and profitably employ the AIDS OF REASON to explain the TRUTHS OF REVELATION.

\* 2 Tim. iii. 15.

† James iii. 17.

‡ John v. 39.

§ Dodwell.

|| ——— ἡθελον ταυτα τωι φεινωι.—Epicharmus.

The greatest impediment to men's advancement in the knowledge of the nature and genius of the **CHRISTIAN RELIGION**, hath ever been their adopting or espousing some favourite **HYPOTHESIS**, whereon to erect the *gospel system*. For every dispensation of true religion, consisting of *means* and *end*, the well-adapting these to each other, produceth what we call a **SYSTEM**.

Now this may be built either on an **HYPOTHESIS**, which is a *supposed* truth, or on a **FACT**, which is a *real* one. And the systems of theology have, for the most part, been unwarily framed on the former model; which, as we say, have much entangled and perplexed our searches after truth.

Into this mistake men easily fell by injudiciously applying, to the **SYSTEM OF GRACE**, the method which philosophers invented, when they set upon explaining the **SYSTEM OF NATURE**.

They did not consider that any plausible hypothesis in physics hath its use, as it serves to show from what laws the natural phenomena *may* arise. Nor is it destitute of more particular uses; thus the *Ptolemaic hypothesis* enables astronomers to predict eclipses as well as the *Copernican theory*.

But a mere hypothesis, to explain *the dispensation of grace*, is not only useless, but often, hurtful.

The reason is apparent. It is agreed by all sober and intelligent naturalists, that God is the author of the *material system*: but it is the great question in debate between religionists and unbelievers, whether God be indeed the author of the *system of grace*.

At worst, therefore, a false hypothesis in physics only keeps hid, or leaves unexplained, the chief beauties of the *material creation*: and the disgrace, to which this method is subject, falls only upon the unsuccessful inquirer; because every such false or fanciful hypothesis carries along with it, even in the very arguments for its support, the conviction of its falsehood. But a groundless hypothesis, in *religious* matters, by affording (and it can afford no other) an unfavourable representation of the moral attributes of God (his *goodness* and his *justice*) becomes a fatal discredit to the doctrine of *redemption*.

Yet, at the same time, it is but *just* to observe, that such is the fate and condition of sublunary things, that these sometimes exchange their proper qualities, and produce effects not correspondent to their respective natures.

Thus in the case as thus considered, we have shown how harmless a mere hypothesis in physics generally is, and, on the contrary, how one in religion is as generally pernicious. Yet sometimes we shall find the *physical* hypothesis to be hurtful, and the *religious* useful.

The *Ptolemaic* system, by destroying all that simplicity of *motion* to be expected in these works of God, hath, along with its civil and practical use, occasioned a speculative mischief; and inclined men to *atheism*; as appears in the case of Alphonsus, who impiously boasted, that, had



he been consulted about the solar system, he could have advised how it might have been better constructed. I call it an *impious* boast, because it plainly insinuated, that he (who had discovered the imperfections of the Ptolemaic construction, and was ignorant of the true) ascribed the whole to a *blind and unintelligent cause*. Again, the *Cartesian*, with his corpuscularian hypothesis, attempts to explain all the phenomena of nature by *matter and motion*; requiring only that God should at first create a sufficient quantity of each, just enough to set him on work, and then pretends to do the business without his further aid; that is, without the concurrence of any VITAL PRINCIPLE to help him onward, in an immaterial way; this *hypothesis*, I say, which, on the one hand, so much contributed to free philosophy from the nonsense and tyranny of the schools, yet, on the other, produced (while it was in vogue) many rank and irreligious *materialists*.

But once more turn the tables, and then, so shifting is this state of things, we shall see, although we have shown that, in the heights and purer regions of theology, a *mere hypothesis* is likely to disturb and perplex our views, yet there is an inferior station in that service, where the divine may employ this counterfeit of a true theory to very good purpose; in discrediting such objections to revelation as have gained credit by our imperfect ideas of the true system of the *intellectual world*. Here a probable hypothesis is of use, as it may serve to convince objectors, that what we find recorded in sacred scripture of the origin and progress of God's extraordinary dispensation to man, may be very consistent with what human reason teacheth of the divine essence and attributes. And the more we can frame of those probable solutions, the more support we give to *revelation*, though it be only by arguments *ad ignorantiam*.

Notwithstanding all this, it appears, upon the whole, that a successful search after religious truths can be then only expected when we erect our system upon FACT; acknowledged *facts*, as they are recorded in sacred scripture.

For if the dispensation, to which such facts belong, be indeed from God, all the parts of it will be seen to be the correspondent members of one entire WHOLE; which orderly disposition of things, essential to a religious SYSTEM, will assure us of the TRUE THEORY of the Christian faith.

But the *abuse of words*, confounding those of HYPOTHESIS and SYSTEM with one another (the word *system* being a common term, which may be applied equally to an *hypothesis* or a *true theory*) hath thrown a discredit on the latter, with which the former only is chargeable. Examples of this the attentive reader may find among the numberless cavils to the work of *The Divine Legation*.

Hitherto we have endeavoured to show in what way HUMAN REASON should be employed on religious matters.—But then, how far, when thus employed, she is to be *indulged*, is the next thing to be considered.

The three moral attributes of the Godhead, discoverable by natural light, on which men are accustomed to examine the pretensions of *revelation*, are his JUSTICE, his GOODNESS, and his WISDOM. But the reasoner on religion will transgress his bounds, unless he confine himself within the *two first*. The evidence of this assertion is convincing.

To form a right judgment of the divine attributes of JUSTICE and GOODNESS, the only *relations*, to be taken into consideration, are those of GOD and MAN. But to judge truly of the WISDOM of the Godhead, other *relations* besides those of God and man, namely, the whole order of intellectual beings, dispersed throughout the universe, are to be added to the account: of whom, further than of their mere existence, we know nothing.

From hence it is seen, that we may safely determine, whether any thing in REVELATION contradict God's JUSTICE and GOODNESS. If it doth, such revelation is to be rejected. Not so, with regard to his WISDOM, therein manifested in any particular instance; although our natural knowledge of the being and attributes of God assures us, that the GREAT ALL is conducted with the most consummate *wisdom*.

REVELATION therefore is not to be rejected on account of difficulties arising from our ignorance of *all the relations* necessary to be taken in, when we would attempt to form a complete judgment of the exertion of the *attribute of wisdom*.

Why this precise mode of REDEMPTION *by the death and sufferings of Christ* was preferred to all others, in the eternal purpose of the Godhead, exceeds the powers of human reason to discover; because his attribute of WISDOM, which is out of the reach of man to apply to this inquiry, is here concerned. But when it hath been proved by *fact*, that a religion was revealed in which *this mode of redemption* is employed, then reason may lend her modest aid to show (what a *rational religion* seems to expect should be shown) that *this precise mode* is conformable to all our ideas of divine *goodness* and *justice*: nay, that it best quadrates with, as it is seen to be the properest means of, a RESTORATION TO A FREE GIFT, WHEN BECOME FORFEITED.

This difference, in the application of reason to religious matters, MOSES hath not obscurely intimated to his people; where, in his last direction for their conduct, he says, *The SECRET THINGS belong unto the LORD our GOD; but those things which are REVEALED belong to us and to OUR CHILDREN, for ever*;\* and had I not observed this sage direction, but vainly endeavoured to explain mysteries which the gospel hath left unexplained, I should justly have incurred the censure of Jerome to his adversaries, "Why," says this father, "do you pretend, after so many ages are elapsed, to teach us what was never taught before! Why, attempt to EXPLAIN what neither PETER nor PAUL thought it necessary to be known?"†

1. The principles, here laid down, may be of use, first, to direct future

\* Deut. xxix. 29.

† — *Ad Pammachium et Oceanum de erroribus Origenis.*

inquirers in the **RIGHT WAY**; where, if, on other accounts, they make but slow advances, they are, at least, kept from wandering in the dark. For while the bounds of *reason* continue unsettled, and the use and abuse of this noble instrument of truth remain confounded with one another, the very ablest seeker will be embarrassed and misled.\* Hence it hath come to pass, that this first and necessary step in support of our holy faith, AN INQUIRY INTO THE TRUE NATURE AND GENIUS OF THE GOSPEL DISPENSATIONS, hath been so generally overlooked: instead of which a thousand metaphysical subtilties on the *terms* and *phrases* under which the doctrine of SAVING GRACE is conveyed, have engaged men's principal attention; while the thing itself, a matter of the utmost importance, hath been suffered to lie in all the obscurity in which old polemics had involved it. So true hath our perverse nature ever been to itself. "Hoc habet ingenium humanum," says the great philosopher, "ut cum ad SOLIDA non sufficiat, in SUPERVACANEIS se atterat."†

2. Another use of these principles is to convince unbelievers, that REVEALED RELIGION affords, and is productive of, all the evidence which the nature of the thing requires; and consequently, all which right reason can expect: and that the strongest of their objections to it arise from the abusive exercise of our faculties, employed on objects which those faculties can neither apprehend nor reach.

[III.] BUT now, all PARTIES, in support of their oblique interests, have concurred to decry *this method of inquiry*; whereby, from the various genius, the comparative excellence, the mutual dependence, the reciprocal illustration of the several parts of God's moral dispensation to mankind, and the gradual progress of the whole towards perfection, great discoveries have been made in these latter times, by men who dared to break the barrier, which bigotry and superstition had been so long forming, to obstruct our views both of NATURE and of GRACE.

These PARTIES ask, How it happened that *discoveries* so sublime and useful, as is pretended, were *now* to make; when the *light of the Spirit* was sent so early, and had illuminated the church so long?—How it happened, that these truths were denied to the best times, and, after lying hid for many ages, were reserved for the reward of the very worst? And then in their real or pretended reverence for *establishments*, concur in condemning all EXPERIMENTS IN RELIGION.

To these, under their sad suspicions of the issue, in forsaking the OLD POSTURE OF DEFENCE, it will be sufficient to reply,

1. That the promise and gift of the *Holy Spirit* may be considered, either as they referred to the first propagators of the faith, or as they concerned the teachers of it, ever since.

As to the first propagators, there is no doubt of their being abundantly enlightened for the work of their ministry; whether it was in making converts, in founding churches, or in composing those occasional instruc-

\* Limborch's *Amica collatio cum erudito Judæo*.

† Bacon.

tions, by which the faithful, in all ages, may improve the current benefits of the same Spirit. As to the succeeding teachers of the word, the assistance they receive from the HOLY SPIRIT, is the second point we are more particularly to consider.

Now the endowment of GRACE is, in this respect, pretty much the same with the endowment of NATURE; of little advantage to the receiver without his co-operation. God hath bestowed upon us hands and feet, to procure good, and to avert evil; but it is to the careful and habitual application of these members to their proper uses, that we owe all the benefits they are capable of producing. So it is with the free gift of the *Spirit*. It is bestowed upon us, to enlighten the understanding, and to redress the disorders of the will. But it does not work like a *charm*; for if either we *neglect to employ* these given powers, or *will divert* them to improper subjects, the use and efficacy of *grace* must certainly be defeated.

This ordinance in the economy of GRACE may receive credit from what is seen to have happened in the economy of NATURE. The power, wisdom, and goodness of the Almighty is so evident and convincing, from every obvious configuration of matter surrounding us, that these attributes cannot escape even the most inattentive, or lie concealed from the most short-sighted. Hence a GOD, the maker, the preserver, and governor of the world, is the universal voice of nature.

Now CREATION and GOVERNMENT, from whence the *morality* of human actions is deduced, are the foundation of NATURAL RELIGION: so that GOD cannot be said to have been wanting in the discovery of himself to the lowest of his rational creatures: yet, though the general and obvious marks of his *power*, *wisdom*, and *goodness*, obtrude themselves upon all men, it is nevertheless certain that a well directed study of the book of nature opens to us such stupendous wonders of his *power*, such awful scenes of his *wisdom*, and such enchanting prospects of his *goodness*, as far exceed all conception of the unlearned and uninstructed beholder. Some faint taste of these delights the more inquisitive enjoyed very early; but those who came after, by indulging too much to abstract SPECULATION, and trusting too little to EXPERIMENT, instead of discovering a *real world*, the archetype of its Maker, invented a variety of *imaginary* ones, all as dishonourable, as they were unrelated to him. At length, two of our own countrymen of superior genius chalked out a different road to the study of nature, in which vague conjecture was excluded; and *facts*, verified on *experiments*, were allowed to be the only inlet to physical knowledge. Henceforth, NATURE was set before us, unveiled; and her sacred mysteries held out to the knowledge and admiration of all men.

This was the progress in the ways of NATURE: the ways of GRACE ran the very same fortune.

The great principles of *revealed religion* are FAITH and OBEDIENCE. These, which are alone sufficient *to make men wise unto salvation*, are

clearly and fully taught in the *gospel*. But we should greatly derogate from God's *moral government*, did we not allow it to abound in the like sublime wonders with the *natural*. And to the study of the first, there are more important calls, and much greater advantages. The knowledge of God's *moral government*, as far as concerns his religious dispensations, is the duty of every man: and, indeed, the whole business of the ministers of his *revealed word*. So that partly, for the use and importance of the subject, partly, for the necessity of making head against the enemies of revelation, but chiefly in obedience to the command, TO STUDY THE SCRIPTURES, it hath, from the first ages of the church to the present times, been one of the principal occupations of the learned. Yet what, from unfavourable circumstances in the *civil* and *literary* world; what, from the varying bias of occasional prejudices; but, above all, from the sordid interests and blind passions of men occupied in these inquiries; the various schemes of religion, pretended to be found in *scripture*, but indeed, the workmanship of *divines*, had dishonoured the doctrine of REDEMPTION near as much as the hypothesis of *philosophers* had dishonoured the history of the CREATION. Till here again, as in the former case, the same caution and sobriety which directed men to the true method of treating *things material*, by a careful study of the volume of NATURE, led them into the right way of explaining *things spiritual*, by a careful study of the volume of GRACE. So that if, in these times, the advances in the knowledge of God's WILL should haply prove as considerable as those in the discovery of his WORKS, it will not be beside a reasonable expectation; as similar causes are wont to produce similar effects.

I have placed these correspondent accounts of the progress of the human faculties, in NATURE and in GRACE, in this neighbourly position, that the reader, by setting them together, and comparing them with one another, may see, whether there be any objections to NEW DISCOVERIES in *religion*, which do not equally hold against NEW DISCOVERIES in *nature*; of which, for their *newness* alone, no one ever yet entertained the least doubt or suspicion of their TRUTH.

For let us compare the Almighty's *display of his nature* in the great volume of his WORKS, with *the declaration of his will* in the lesser volume of his WORD, and we shall find the same marks of GOODNESS to be alike conspicuous in both cases.

In his *works*, a man need but open his eyes to see in every object, the God which claims his adoration: in his *word*, the man who *runs*, may read, the means and method of his own salvation. In neither case, is any thing wanting to instruct the most simple in their dependence and their duty; in which, consists their *happiness*.—For further information in the works and ways of providence, God wisely reserved it for the reward of the manly and virtuous improvement of the human faculties.

It is true in fact, as hath been already intimated, that throughout a

long series of ages, neither of these inquirers made any very considerable advances in REAL KNOWLEDGE. But it is as true, that what hindered both, proceeded not so much from difficulties in the things sought after, as from the wrong methods employed in the search. For, instead of addressing themselves to discover the *true constitution* of things from the frame of God's works, as objected to their senses; or the *true end* of revelation from sacred scripture, as it there lies open to their contemplation, they framed fanciful hypotheses, out of their own slender stock of ideas; and then, by distorting nature, and wresting the Bible awry, they forced both one and the other, to father their own blind and spurious issue.

But when once DIVINES and PHILOSOPHERS were become sensible of their wrong courses: and, in consequence of that conviction, had measured back their steps; and with more modesty and better sense had renounced their fancies, and erected theories on the real constitution of things; it is wonderful to conceive what discoveries were soon made in *natural* and *religious* truths.

THESE TWO IMPORTANT STUDIES, therefore, being alike circumstanced, and having run the same fortune, demand, in all reasonable allowance, the same judgment to be passed on their pretences.

But men are not accustomed to be thus equitable. One of the readiest, as well as most impudent exploits of prejudice, is to draw *unlike* conclusions from *similar* premises.

It is confessed, that the book of nature is so plain and clear, that every sentence reveals and proclaims its Almighty Author: that if its more sublime or more profound truths have lain concealed, or been kept out of sight, for ages, it was the fault of the inquirers, who adhered so long to a perverse method of studying nature: for that, as soon as ever they began to seek a better, and to prosecute it with care and sobriety, KNOWLEDGE suddenly opened and enlarged its empire; while the blaze of light which accompanied its progress, was so far from making Truth suspected for the newness of its splendour, that it dissipated all those doubts which had been entertained of its obscure nature, and equivocal claims and prerogatives.

But now, if we turn from the *physical* to the *moral* state of things, we shall find, men have drawn different inferences from similar cases.—Because, in their search after the higher truths of religion, they had been long unsuccessful, they not only took umbrage at these now found, and, like some jewels, found too by their own surrounding light, but conceived fresh doubts even of the most obvious principles which led to these late discoveries.

2. There is, yet, another sort of believers (and this brings me to the second part of the objection) who, from too great a reverence for things established, join with such as have too little, in decrying all NOVELTIES in religious matters. These men, in abhorrence of the vanity of being wiser than their fathers, have in express terms denounc-



ed their displeasure against MAKING what they call, EXPERIMENTS IN RELIGION.

This is strange language in a country of liberty ; and stranger still, in an age of reason. DIVINES, it is true, have long disputed *how experiments in religion should be made* ! Some would depend on *scripture* alone ; others were for taking in, *fathers and councils* ; a third sort, for adding *tradition* to the process ; and a fourth, for applying *raillery and ridicule* to quicken the operation. So that, ever since the fall of monkery, all were for *making some experiment or other*. For what is *making* *sober experiments*, but (as hath been shown) supporting and illustrating REVELATION by new arguments, furnished by new *discoveries* made in the order, fitness, and harmony of God's various dispensations of religion amongst themselves, and with one another ; just as PHILOSOPHERS (from whom the word is borrowed, and we see how unluckily) unfold nature by new discoveries, made from repeated trials on the obvious qualities and hidden contents of material substances.

No *experiments in religion* is indeed the civil cant of POLITICIANS ; for *bigotry* and *state-craft* often meet ; as extremes easily run into one another by the very attempt to keep them at a distance. This, as I say, is one of the fundamental articles of the statesman's creed. For religion being useful to society ; and yet, in his opinion, only a well invented fiction, all *experiments*, that is, all strict inquiries into its nature, cannot but tend to weaken, rather than support, this useful ally of civil government. But for a man, who believes religion to have come, and in an extraordinary manner, from God, to be alarmed with the danger of *experiments*, as if truth would not bear to be seen on all sides, is the most ridiculous of all panic terrors. Might we not reasonably ask such a one, how it comes to pass, that *experiments*, which are of so sovereign use in the knowledge of *nature*, should be calculated to make such havoc in the study of *religion* ? Are not nature and religion both the offspring of God ? Were not both given for human contemplation ? Have not both (as proceeding from the dark recesses of his throne) their depths and obscurities ? And doth not the unfolding the mysteries of his *moral government* tend equally, with the displaying the secrets of his *natural*, to the advancement of his glory, and the happiness of mankind ?

In a word, had *no experiments been made in nature*, we had still slept in the shade, or been kept entangled in the barren and thorny paths of SCHOOL PHILOSOPHY : and had *no experiments been made in religion*, we had still kept blundering on in the dark and rugged wilds of SCHOOL DIVINITY.

To conclude therefore, and in the words of our great philosopher—  
“ Let no man, *upon a weak conceit of sobriety*, or an ill applied *moderation*, think or maintain, that a man can search too far, or be too well studied in THE BOOK OF GOD'S WORD, or in the book of GOD'S WORKS ; but rather let men endeavour AN ENDLESS PROGRESS OR PROFICIENCE IN

**BOTH:** only let them beware that they apply both to CHARITY, and not to swelling; to USE, and not to ostentation; and again, that they do not UNWISELY MINGLE OR CONFOUND THESE LEARNINGS TOGETHER.\*

\* BACON, *Advancement of Learning*, lib. I.—Could we suppose the divinity of Bacon's genius to have been such as that he foresaw the miserable havoc which a late cabalistic crew have made both of the WORKS and WORD of God by this impure and unnatural mixture, we can hardly conceive words more expressive, or a warning more awakening, than what is here contained in this caution against all such blind workers in dirt and darkness.

THE  
DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES  
DEMONSTRATED.

---

BOOK VII.—CHAP. I.

I BEGAN this work by an ARGUMENT (long since completed) to prove that A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS was not taught by Moses; but that, in its stead, *an equal or extraordinary providence* was the sanction of the LAW. And I now conclude it, with a corroboration of that ARGUMENT, by showing, that *life and immortality was brought to light by the GOSPEL* alone.

From whence results this further truth, that were MOSES and the PROPHETS the commissioned servants of God, THEY COULD NOT, by their office, TEACH A FUTURE STATE; since it was ordained, and reserved for, the ministry of JESUS.

Besides, what the LAW promised was to be obtained by WORKS. What the GOSPEL *brought to light* under the name of *salvation*, is to be procured by FAITH in a crucified Saviour and Redeemer. From these truths will arise another proof of the *divinity*, both of the LAW and the GOSPEL.

But as all this can be shown no otherwise than by a distinct and collective view of the whole of God's moral dispensation to man, commencing with ADAM, and completed in JESUS CHRIST, I have made the NATURE AND GENIUS OF THE GOSPEL the subject of the ninth and last book of the DIVINE LEGATION.

Of the two immediately foregoing, namely, the seventh and the eighth books,\* the first of them is employed in supporting the MAJOR and the MINOR propositions of the first syllogism: by a continued history of the religious opinions of the Jewish people, on this matter, from the time of their earliest prophets (who gave some dark intimations of a different dispensation,) to the time of the *Maccabees*, when the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE of rewards and punishments was become national.

The other, namely, the eighth book, is employed in supporting the MAJOR and the MINOR propositions of the second syllogism; in which is considered the PERSONAL CHARACTER OF MOSES, and the GENIUS OF HIS LAW, so far forth as it concerns, or has a relation to *the character of the LAWGIVER*.

As the main argument of the former books, of the NATURE and GENIUS of

\* See p. 592 of this volume.

THE LAW, has been hitherto esteemed too paradoxical; the argument of this last, concerning THE NATURE AND GENIUS OF THE GOSPEL, it is more than probable, may be condemned, and by the same men, as being too *orthodoxical*: for I have, long since, observed, that a religious notion is apt to change its nature in the estimation of certain divines, when it changes its advocate.

Were I concerned with none but UNBELIEVERS, in this present discourse, my only task, and a short one too, would be to prove the *reasonableness* of these which I hold to be the essential doctrines of Christianity; for *unbelievers* confess they are to be found in the *gospel*, but deny them to be of divine original, on account of the supposed absurdities which attend them; in the same manner that they have allowed the doctrine of a *future state* not to be found in the LAW; and therefore denied that dispensation to be given by God, because such an omission, they pretend, makes it unworthy of him. This, I say, had been a labour both short and easy, had I not to do, likewise, with a sort of BELIEVERS, who, as they held that the doctrine of a *future state* made part of the MOSAIC RELIGION, because they think the honour of the LAW requires that it should be found there; so, with the same spirit, they deny that the doctrine of *salvation in a Redeemer, by faith alone*, makes a part of the CHRISTIAN RELIGION, because, they think, the honour of the GOSPEL requires that it should not be found there.

Enough hath been urged, in the course of the main argument, against the *first* of these perversities: the *second* will detain us longer than such plain truths seem to require: because the attempt to show the *reasonableness* of these which we call the essential doctrines of Christianity, will be deemed immature, till we have established very clear and circumstantial evidence of their real existence in the SYSTEM: for laboured discourses have been written to prove that FAITH ALONE includes WORKS; and that REDEMPTION, according to the *scripture doctrine* of it, excludes a REDEEMER.

I am therefore, first of all, to prove the EXISTENCE of these doctrines; and then, the REASONABLENESS of them. In doing which, I cannot but esteem it a *favourable circumstance*, if not a *happy omen*, that the very arguments employed to evince the *existence* of the doctrines, do at the same time, serve equally to show the *reasonableness* of them.

“A JOVE PRINCIPIUM” was the formulary of ancient piety and wisdom, which served to introduce what the sage had to deliver, of more than ordinary importance, for the instruction of mankind. But here, the very nature of our present argument will of necessity, lead us up to the FIRST CAUSE, the Author of all being.

For, without beginning at the CREATION, our view of these things would be narrow and obscure; and human judgment not sufficiently informed to enable it to conclude, with any degree of certainty, concerning a REVELATION, which is the completion of one great moral system, the principles of which were laid in the disobedience of our first parents.

In this inquiry, as in all that have gone before, *our desire is, not to be carried up and down with the waves of uncertain arguments* (to use the words of a great master of reason), *but rather positively to lead on the minds of the simpler sort, by plain and easy degrees, till THE VERY NATURE OF THE THING ITSELF DO MAKE MANIFEST WHAT IS TRUTH.\**

Moses, in the account he gives of the CREATION, expressly tells us, that MAN, or the human species, was the *work* of the SIXTH DAY.—“So God created man in his own image; in the image of God created he him; MALE AND FEMALE CREATED HE THEM. And God blessed THEM, and God said unto THEM, be fruitful and multiply and *replenish the earth*, and have dominion over—every living thing that moveth upon the earth. And God said, Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed which is upon the face of the earth, and *every tree*, in which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed, *to you it shall be for meat*.—And the evening and the morning were the SIXTH DAY.”† Yet, because the formation of WOMAN, from the side of MAN, was not *circumstantially* related till after the account of God’s placing man in PARADISE,‡ both Jews and Christians§ have generally concurred in one opinion, that EVE was not *created* till ADAM was put into possession of the garden of Eden; for they took it for granted, that Moses (though in a moral or religious history of the *Creation and Fall of Man*) had observed a chronologic order.

The very absurdity of this opinion renders the mistake so apparent, that the reader should not have been troubled with a formal confutation of it, did not the right stating of the fact (so inconsiderable, as on first sight it may be thought) serve to confirm a truth, which hath been generally overlooked, though of the utmost importance towards our obtaining a just idea of *revealed religion*; as will be seen in the course of this inquiry.

1. First, therefore, let it be observed, that *Eve* could not be created in the *garden*; since we are expressly told, that she was created along with Adam, some time before, namely, on the *sixth day*.—*Male and female created he them*.—A declaration so decisive, that the rabbins, who will needs have *Eve* completely formed in Paradise, gathered from the words—*male and female*, (used by the historian, where he speaks of the creation of the *sixth day*) that *Adam* was an *androgune*, a double animal, or *man-woman*, joined side to side;|| and that the oper-

\* Hooker’s Eccl. Polity. † Gen. i. 27—31. ‡ Gen. ii. 8—21, 22.

§ Le Clerc says—l’écriture nous apprend formellement qu’Adam donna les noms aux animaux, entre lesquels, il n’en trouvoit aucun pour l’assister; *après quoi Dieu CREA la femme* de l’une des côtés de l’homme.—*Sentimens de quelques Theol.* p. 423.—Dr Z. Pearce, in his notes on Milton against Bentley, p. 233. And Hooker, in his Eccl. Pol. book v. sect. 73. *Woman was even in her first estate framed by nature not only AFTER IN TIME, but inferior in excellencie.*

|| This Jewish interpretation of the text appears to have been very ancient: and to have come early to the knowledge of the heathen world. *Plato*, in his *Symposium*, brings in one *Aristophanes* saying, that the ancient nature of man was not as we find it at present, but very different. He was originally *ἀνδρόγυνος*, a *man-woman*.—This fancy affords occasion to a pretty fable, perhaps of the philosopher’s own invention, that these *ἀνδρόγυνος* were a kind of double animal, joined back to back. But that *Jupiter*, when he set them a-going

ation of disjoining them was performed in the *garden*; where indeed Jesus tells us, not a *separation*, but a *closer union* commenced.

2. When Moses gives us the book *of the generations of Adam*,\* he repeats what he had delivered before, that man was created male and female.—*Male and female created he them, AND CALLED THEIR NAME ADAM, IN THE DAY WHEN THEY WERE CREATED.*† Adam was the common name for man and woman; and that name was given them when the *male* was created; consequently the *female* was created with him.

3. On the other hand, the same kind of reasoning which concludes, that the *woman* was not created till after the *sixth day*, will conclude, that the *man* himself was not created till after that day; for, if we suppose the history of the creation observes a strict chronologic order, he was not created till after the *seventh day*: the sacred writer, immediately after recording the *WORK* of the *six days* and the *REST* of the *seventh*, proceeds thus: “And the Lord formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul.”‡ Then follows the story of his being put into Paradise—of his deep sleep—of the woman formed from his side. If, to this argument, so similar in all its parts, it be replied, that the direct assertion of man’s creation on the *sixth day* is alone sufficient to prove that the after-mention of his *formation from the dust of the ground* is but a repetition of, with an addition to, the first account; by which alone the *TIME* of man’s creation is to be determined: if, I say, this be replied, I shall take the benefit of the answer, in favour of what I have assigned for the *time* of *Eve’s* creation, where I consider the account of her *formation from the rib*, just in the same light that the objector sees Adam’s *formation from the dust of the ground*; that is to say, as a repetition only (with other circumstances added) of what the historian had before told us, of Eve’s creation on the *sixth day*, in these words—*MALE and FEMALE created he them.*§

4. But further, on the supposition of a chronological order in the relation, we shall be forced to conclude, not only that *Eve* was created in Paradise, but that she was not created till *AFTER the command was given not to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil*; for the *command* is found in the seventeenth verse of this chapter, and her *formation from the rib*, not till we come to the twenty-second verse: consequently, the prohibition did not bind or affect Eve. Yet she tells the serpent (and sure she did not pay him in his own coin) that this prohibition equally concerned both her and Adam.—“We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the

in the world, slit every one of them, and then shuffling the separated parts well together, committed them to their fortune: and the employment of each of them being to find out its partner, the business of life was an incessant search of every one for its *better half*, in order to be rejoined in a more commodious manner. This, says the philosopher, is the true origin of *love*.

\* Gen. v.

† Ver. 2.

‡ Gen. ii. 7. *Philo*, misled by the common error, that a chronological order was observed in the history of the *creation*, concluded that the *Adam*, created in the image of God, Gen. i. 27, was a different man from him who was *formed of the dust of the ground*, Gen. ii. 7.

§ Gen. i. 27.



garden; but of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said, *Ye shall not eat of it.*\* And accordingly, sentence is pronounced by God upon *her* transgression, as well as upon *is*.†

5. But lastly, to cut the matter short, the historian expressly tells us, that God “finished the work of creation in six days, and rested the seventh day from all his work which he had made.”‡ *Eve*, therefore, must needs have been created with *Adam* on the SIXTH DAY.

Two points then, only remain to be considered. 1. Why Moses thought it expedient to give so very particular a relation of *Eve's formation from the rib*? 2. And why he did not choose to relate this circumstance in the place where he mentions her *creation on the sixth day*?

1. The account of *Eve's formation from the rib* was, without doubt, given, to inform us, that the UNION of the two sexes, for the propagation of their kind, was of a nature more noble and sublime than the *consorting* of other animals, who were all equally bid, like *man*, to *increase and multiply*. For as the poet says:

“Not man alone, but all that roam the wood,  
Or wing the sky, or roll along the flood,  
Each loves itself, but not itself alone,  
Each sex desires alike.”——

Thus far the common appetite impels; and man and beasts are equally subject to this second law of earthly beings. But, from henceforth, it becomes, in MAN, a very superior passion.

——“The young dismiss'd, to wander earth or air;  
There stops the instinct, and there ends the care:  
A longer care MAN's helpless kind demands:  
That longer care contracts more lasting bands:  
REFLECTION, REASON still the ties improve;  
At once extend the interest and the love.”

Now, as REVELATION was given us (amongst other purposes more peculiar, indeed, and important) to support and strengthen the operations of *reflection* and the conclusions of *reason*, what could better serve the general design, while these were improving for the good of the offspring, than to instruct us in this closer relation between the parents, which arose from a personal union, prior to that of reciprocal fondness?

But the historian still more expressly instructs us in the end for which he recorded *Eve's formation from the rib*, where he makes *Adam* say, or rather says himself—“Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they shall be one flesh:” alluding to what they originally were, before the separation of the *rib*.

But the allusions of *inspired writers* go farther (of which I have given many instances) than just to ornament the discourse with the elegance of the conceit. Their chief end is to support the particular *truth* there inculcated. Thus it is in the text we are now considering; it contains an instruction partly declarative, and partly perceptive.—In mere *animals*, observant of the command to *increase and multiply*, the offspring, when

\* Gen. iii. 2, 3.

† Chap. iii. 13—16.

‡ Chap. ii. 2.

enabled to provide for itself, is dismissed from the parent's wing, by an instinctive provision, which equally disposeth both to a separation. But the REFLECTION and REASON bestowed upon *man*, which engaged the parent to a *longer care*, in protecting and providing for its offspring, impresseth on the offspring, in its turn, a tender sense of gratitude and love towards the parent, for the benefits received in that defenceless state; and naturally disposeth it to be attentive to the welfare of the parent, when flattered by the glorious duty of returning an obligation. This might somewhat impede or run counter to the first great command and blessing, which, in the infancy of the world, especially, required all possible encouragement: therefore, by the most divine address it is here directed, that we should suffer this tie to give place to one more important: *Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife.*

2. With regard to the second point—Why Moses did not choose to relate the story of the *rib*, where he mentions Eve's creation, on the *sixth day*—this may be easily understood. The story of the woman's formation from the *rib* is, as may be seen from the sequel of the story, of so much concern in domestic life, that we cannot conceive a fitter place for it than this, where we find it, in the entrance upon the fatal effects of our first parents' idle curiosity: from which posterity might draw a lesson of great importance, viz.—the mutual obligation incumbent on each sex, when united, to watch over the other's conduct, equally with its own; as nothing can affect the welfare of the one, in which the other will not be equally concerned; each being destined to bear, together with his own, the other's share, whether of good or evil. The account, therefore, of *Eve's formation* was, with much art and decorum, omitted in the place where the chronologist would expect to find it; and postponed, till it could be delivered with the advantage of being made an introduction to the history of the FALL.

The best historians have, in the same manner, created beauties from a well-contrived neglect of the order of time.

The next thing to be considered, after the Mosaic account of the CREATION of man, is, what we are told concerning his SPECIFIC NATURE.

That he was of a nobler kind than any other of the animals brought, at the same time, into *being*, abundantly appears from the LIKENESS in which he was *made*; and from the PRE-EMINENCE which was given to him over the rest. “And God said, Let us make *man* IN OUR IMAGE, after our likeness; and let him have DOMINION over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth.”\*

Now, in what did this *image* or *likeness* consist? Certainly not in man's having an IMMATERIAL PART, since he had *this*, as the best philosophy evinceth,† in common with the whole animal creation. And the historian makes the *image*, or *likeness*, to consist in something peculiar to man. Now, the only two things peculiar to him, are his

\* Gen. i. 26.

† See note A, at the end of this book.

SHAPE and his REASON. None but an anthropomorphite will say, that it was his *shape*, which reflected this image of his Creator. We must conclude therefore, that it was the faculty of REASON which made the resemblance.

But further, when God says, *let us make man in our image*, it is immediately subjoined—and *let him have dominion* over the whole brute creation. Now, nothing but the faculty of *reason* could invest man with this *dominion*, DE FACTO, which was bestowed upon him, DE JURE.

Still further, we see *dominion* was given him on account of this pre-eminence of being made in the image of God—“*Let us make man in our image, and let him have dominion.*”—But a *pre-eminence*, which qualified man for *dominion* over other animals, could be nothing but REASON, which he had, and which they wanted; whereas an immaterial principle, with which both were endowed, afforded no room for *pre-eminence*; especially such a pre-eminence as qualified man for dominion.

But now, the substance in which the faculty of *reason* resides, could not be a *material substance*, as this best philosophy, we say, hath shown.\* *Man*, therefore, must needs consist of an *immaterial substance*, joined to a *material*; or, in other words, he must be a compound of SOUL and BODY. And this seems to be intimated, and not obscurely neither; by the words of the text; when it comes, in the *second chapter*, to give a more distinct account of man's nature than hath been given in the preceding chapter, where he is placed, according to the order of time, in the new framed system of creation.—“The Lord God *formed* MAN of the DUST OF THE GROUND, and breathed into his nostrils THE BREATH OF LIFE, and *man became* A LIVING SOUL.”†

By the words—the *breath of life*, and a *living soul*, which discriminate LIFE in man from LIFE in brutes—we are not to understand *immateriality* simply; since all animals, as we say, have this in common; but the CONTINUANCE of *life* after the separation of the compound, in virtue of man's *rationality*; which making him responsible for his actions, may, according to the different parts in God's MORAL economy, require *that* separate existence.

But now, if it should be asked, why this complete exposition of man's nature was not given before, in the *first* mention of his creation, but reserved for the *second*, two very important reasons may be assigned.

1. Had the historian given it in the first account of man's creation, it would have had the appearance of distinguishing man, in his natural or physical capacity, from other animals; whereas, in this capacity, there is, in truth, no difference between them. Since the very argument which evinceth the *immateriality* of the *human* soul, evinceth the immateriality of the *brutal*. Yet, to have left no mark of distinction between them when there was one, had been a very faulty omission in

\* See Clarke and Baxter, as represented in the note A, above referred to.

† Gen. ii. 7.

the history of religion. Moses, therefore, with admirable address, hath pointed out the difference, when he tells us, that *man was created in the image of God*,\* i. e. endowed with the faculty of REASON.

2. Secondly, the place, which points out this difference, is made to serve for an introduction to the history of *the free gift of immortality*. And a better cannot be conceived than that which teacheth us, that the *subject* on whom this gift was bestowed, is, by the *immateriality* of his physical nature, capable of enjoying it; and, by the *freedom* of his reasonable nature, accountable for the abuse of it. So much is observed in honour of that exquisite knowledge with which the sacred writer was endowed.

Having thus explained *man's* PHYSICAL nature, we come to the consideration of his MORAL; which, hitherto, we have but just hinted at, in showing him to be responsible for his actions. Now, as this *responsibility* is the great principle on which all religion, or rather the sanction of religion, is founded; and as it is of the utmost use in our inquiry concerning the true nature of the GOSPEL, to understand what mode of religion it was to which Adam became subject, when he first rose from the forming hand of his Creator, we must recollect what hath been said concerning the TIME of his creation, which, we shall now see, will stand us in good stead to determine this important question.

1. For from thence it will appear, that the man and woman, the *male and female*, were not immediately, on their creation, put into Paradise; but had a state and condition upon earth preceding that supernatural establishment.

That this first state of man in the world at large was not only prior to, but different from, his state in Paradise, the sacred writer clearly intimates: "God," (says he,) on the creation of man (*male and female*,) "blessed them, and said unto them; Be fruitful and multiply, and REPLENISH THE EARTH, *and subdue it*." †

But when, after they were put in possession of PARADISE, and the *gift of immortality* was there bestowed upon them, they were not (immediately at least) to *replenish the earth* at large; but to *replenish Paradise* only: from whence, as they increased, their colonies, perhaps, might be sent out to inhabit for a time, the other parts of the earth (not, then, a vale of misery and *death*) before they *replenished* the regions of the blessed.

2. Again, at the creation of the first pair—"God said, Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed, which is UPON THE FACE OF THE EARTH; and EVERY TREE in which is the seed of a tree, yielding seed, TO YOU IT SHALL BE FOR MEAT." ‡ But when God put them into *Paradise*, he said; "Of every tree in the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the TREE of the knowledge of good and evil, THOU SHALT NOT EAT OF IT." §

Hence it appears that Adam and Eve had a MORAL STATE, or were

\* Gen. i. 27.

† Gen. i. 28.

‡ Gen. i. 29.

§ Gen. ii. 16, 17.

engaged to some religion, before their Paradisiacal life commenced, and different from it; for in the first, there was no restraint of food; in the second, there was. Whether the *religion*, to which they were first subject, was that we call NATURAL, as being the result and conclusion of that reason with which, at our creation, we were endowed; or whether it was that we call REVEALED, or supernaturally taught by God, we can only learn from scripture. And scripture teacheth, even by its silence, that it was NATURAL RELIGION to which the first pair were subject, from their creation to their entrance into Paradise.

For scripture hath this advantage over human compositions, that it teacheth as precisely by what it doth not say, as by what it doth. In what concerns religion, there is nothing, either in its silence or in its enunciation, that is ambiguous.

To give an instance, for the better illustration of the matter before us. SPEECH might be acquired *naturally*, as well as RELIGION. In this they agreed: in one thing they differed—human reason,—which was able to instruct in both, teacheth *religion*, or our duty to our Maker, and to each other, almost instantaneously: but *speech*, in the same school, is learned only by slow degrees. So that *man* must have continued long in that brutal state, to which the rest of the animal creation were, from their very nature, condemned. Yet it is hard to suppose, that the all-gracious Author of our being, would leave his favourite creature man, whom he had endowed with superior gifts and prerogatives above the rest, to struggle with this mute and distressful condition, from which, unaided reason could only, by slow degrees, in a length of time, set him free. But this uncertainty holy scripture removes; by the information it hath given us, that God himself, and not human reason, was our first schoolmaster in the rudiments of speech. The text says,—“And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air, and BROUGHT THEM UNTO ADAM, TO SEE WHAT HE WOULD CALL THEM; AND WHATSOEVER ADAM CALLED EVERY LIVING CREATURE, THAT WAS THE NAME THEREOF. AND ADAM GAVE NAMES TO ALL CATTLE ——.”\* Here we have the most natural and familiar image of a teacher and a learner; where the abilities of the scholar are *tried* before they are *assisted*. From this text, we likewise learn, that no more than the first rudiments of speech were thus, in an extraordinary manner, imparted to Adam for his present and immediate use. He was assisted in fixing *names to sensible things*, with which he was to be perpetually conversant. And this was sufficient to put his *reasonable nature* in a train to advance itself above the torpid silence of the *brutal*. Thus far was man *taught of God*. But the further extent and improvement of speech, particularly in its giving *names to more abstract ideas*, was left to man alone; which *names*, as his necessities required, he would invent, and treasure up for use.

\* Gen. ii. 19, 20.

This difference, in the two acquirements of *speech* and *religion*, both of which natural reason was able to teach, but not with equal facility or speed, shows why God interfered in the one case, and why he did not interfere in the other; and consequently, why the historian's *enunciation* was necessary in the first instance; and why his *SILENCE*, in the second, was sufficient to give equal evidence to what was the truth.

*This* (which indeed concerns the subject in hand) appears still clearer from the following considerations:

1. The PENTATEUCH is a professed history of God's communication with, and extraordinary dispensations to, man, from the placing him in PARADISE to the giving of the LAW. We have seen, that man was subject to a *religion*, prior to that *will of God revealed* to him when he entered Paradise. Now, were the state, under which he lived before the Paradisiacal, the state of *revealed religion*, the nature of the Mosaic history required that some account should have been given of it. But no account is given. We conclude, therefore, that man, on his creation, came under the law of NATURAL RELIGION, or was, as the apostle emphatically expresses it, *a law unto himself*.\* On this supposition, we can easily account for the *silence* of the historian. His theme was REVEALED RELIGION; and, to preserve the memory of such a dispensation, it was necessary that the various modes of it should be recorded. But the memory of *natural religion* was preserved by an earlier recorder, REASON: who wrote it, and continues to write it, in the minds of all men. Of this original record, Moses hath given sufficient intimation, where speaking of man's nature, he tells, that it was created in the LIKENESS OF GOD: meaning (as hath been shown) that man was endowed with REASON. Now, such a LIKENESS implies his knowledge of, and confessed subjection to, NATURAL LAW OR RELIGION.

2. But it is not only from the *silence* of the historian, as to what preceded man's migration into Paradise, but likewise from what he expressly *tells us* followed on man's situation there, that we conclude, he was from his creation to this time, under the guidance of the LAW OF NATURE only: for the REVEALED LAW OF GOD to man in Paradise, after bestowing upon him the *free gift* of immortality, consists but of one *positive command*, as the condition of this accumulated blessing: a condition very different from any of those which *natural religion* requires to entitle man to God's *favour*: this plainly implies, that Adam, by the light of reason, knew already the rest of God's will, with which, as moral governor of the world, he had irradiated the breasts of all men. Otherwise, had this light been so dim as to give no clear direction for his duty, we must conclude, that the all-gracious Creator would have expressly delivered to him a complete code or digest of *natural law*, at the time when he announced this *revealed command* in Paradise. And that he did not give any such, the *silence* of the historian, in a work whose nature would not dispense with such an omission, is a certain proof.

\* Rom. ii. 14.



To sum up all in a word—man's moral state, under the *revealed will* of God, began on his admission into Paradise. From which truth it follows, that, from his creation to that time, he was under the guidance of NATURAL RELIGION.

And here let me just make an observation, which it would be a fault to neglect, though it be but one of the numerous instances of divine art in this inspired writer, concerning the different terms employed by him in defining *man* as the subject of *natural religion*, from those he uses in defining him as the subject of the *revealed*. In the first case, man is characterized by that distinctive quality of his being made in the *likeness of God*,\* or being endowed with REASON; the faculty which denotes him the subject of *natural religion*; that religion which teacheth rewards and punishments of heaven INDEFINITELY. In the second case, he is distinguished as a compound being, made of *the dust of the earth and the breath of life*,† which marks him out for the adequate subject of that other religion, denouncing *death* and *immortality* DEFINITELY.

To proceed.—This *natural* state of man, antecedent to the *Paradisiacal*, can never be too carefully kept in mind, nor too precisely explained; since it is the very KEY, or CLEW, as we shall find in the progress of this work, which is to open to us, and to lead us through, all the recesses and intimacies of the *last, and completed, dispensation* of God to man; a dispensation long become intricate and perplexed, by men's neglecting to distinguish these two states or conditions; which, as we say, if not constantly kept in mind, the GOSPEL can neither be well understood nor reasonably supported.

So terribly mistaken have those good men been, who imagined, that the best way of serving the cause of *revelation* was to deny the very being and existence of *natural religion*.

But if some have allowed too little to *this religion*, there are others, and those no declared enemies of *revelation*, who have ascribed a great deal too much to it. Systems which, however different, are yet alike injurious to the great truth they profess to defend.

The one by annihilating *natural religion*, cuts away the *ground and foundation* of CHRISTIANITY; the other, by giving to *natural religion* certain doctrines of perfection, to which it doth not pretend, overturns the *superstructure*.

Having thus shown that man lived, at first, under the guidance of *natural religion*; let us now consider more precisely, but with all possible brevity, What this religion is, and what it teacheth.

If my ideas, whether innate or acquired, do not mislead me, the whole of it may be comprised in this—"That man, endowed with REASON and FREEDOM OF WILL, is a moral agent, and accountable for his conduct to his Maker; who hath given him, for his rule of life, a LAW, discoverable by the one faculty, and rendered practicable by the other.—That the faithful observers of this LAW God will reward, and the wil-

\* Gen. i. 26.

† Gen. ii. 7.

ful transgressors of it he will punish; but that, on repentance and amendment, he will pardon, and be reconciled to, offenders.

This **SANCTION** of *natural religion*, evident as it is, hath been brought into question, and disputed, not only by those who reject our idea of such a moral system, but by those who contend for it.

The *first* have said, that we know so little of God's government of the universe, that it is hazardous to affirm, that man hath any claim at all to reward. The *other*, that it is still more hazardous to affirm, that **REPENTANCE** will certainly restore bad men to the benefit of this claim, if, before their transgression, they had any such.

Yet the truths, thus boldly brought in question, are founded on this clear principle, "That, taking in the whole of a good man's existence, God will bestow upon him more of happiness than of misery." To deny this, will tend to confound our distinct ideas of a good and of an evil governor of the world. Nor are these truths, thus founded, at all shaken by *our ignorance* of God's government of the universe. I apprehend, that the supposed force of the objection ariseth from men's not rightly distinguishing between God's **PHYSICAL** and **MORAL** government; nor seeing how the consequences of that distinction direct our judgment to decide of the evidence in religious matters, and particularly of the force of this objection. I will not here repeat my reasoning on this subject, which the reader may find already delivered in pages 598 and 599 of the *Introduction*, and will see repeated, occasionally, hereafter. In behalf of these repetitions, had I added one more, on the present occasion, I should have no need to apologize: for as often as an old argument supports a truth, newly attacked, the use of that argument, on such an occasion, cannot be called a repetition of it, but a different application of it to a new question. And every different application will give additional credit to the solidity of the argument, when it is seen how many various purposes it may be made to serve, and how many various truths it is fitted to illustrate. This is one of those **FRUITFUL ARGUMENTS**, frequently to be met with in this work, which I have enforced again and again, in the support of *some new truth*; and which, I make no doubt, a less attentive reader has as often condemned for *a repetition of the same thing*.

From this argument, so referred to, as it lies in the *Introduction*, we may safely conclude, that *a good man hath a claim to reward*: and this, I think, religionists, consulting no more than their natural ideas, have generally agreed in; and yet have generally concurred to deny that other part of the proposition, though it stand upon the same principle, which teacheth, that God will re-establish the repentant sinner in his original claim to divine favour.

This may seem unaccountable; but there is a secret in it, which will deserve to be explained, for more reasons than one; but at present, principally for the sake of removing this difficulty.

The truth is, those divines, who doubted of this *re-establishment*,

laboured under a groundless apprehension, that to allow the doctrine of *reconciliation*, on *sincere repentance alone*, might tend to supersede the necessity of the *Christian revelation*; which they erroneously supposed taught nothing concerning a future state but what was discoverable, and had been actually discovered, by the *light of nature*: so that if natural religion taught ONE means of *reconciliation*, and *revelation* taught ANOTHER, both could not be true. They, therefore, rejected that as false, which *natural religion* was said to teach. And modern unbelievers being under the like delusion, viz., that *natural religion and revealed* taught the same doctrine concerning a future state, reject, as false, that *means of reconciliation* which *revelation* pretends to have discovered.

But we have bestowed our pains to little purpose, if, by this time, the attentive reader doth not perceive, that the *rewards*, taught by *natural religion*, are very different in *kind*, as well as in *degree*, from those taught by the *revealed*: however, if he hath not yet been sufficiently instructed in this important truth, the sequel of our discourse, to which we are now hastening, will, we hope, give him entire satisfaction.

I had said, and on the authority of St Paul himself, that *natural religion* taught, that *God is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him*.<sup>\*</sup> Now, from his being a *rewarder*, which springs from his nature and attributes, I have ventured to found man's *claim to reward*.

But it may be asked; WHERE are those rewards to be expected, and of WHAT quality do they consist?

To the first part of the question, I reply—that, at what time soever God's providence hath been dispensed EQUALLY to the sons of Adam, living under the direction of *natural law*, they could expect their reward only HERE. But, whenever they began to observe, that God's providence was grown UNEQUAL, and that rewards and punishments were not regularly dispensed *here*, they would look to have the disorder rectified HEREAFTER. But of this, more as we proceed.

To the second part of the question; Of WHAT quality these rewards consist? I reply, we are taught to believe, they shall be abundant, as suited to that better state of existence to which they are reserved; and as bestowed by an all-bountiful Master, to whose more intimate presence they shall be admitted: yet still bearing some adequate proportion to man's merit and desert.

If REASON, on the one hand, seems to revolt at the thoughts of *everlasting punishment*; for, as God is a rewarder of the good, we must conclude, the apostle would have us infer, that he is a *punisher* of the bad; since this exercise of his power over both good and bad, stands on the same attributes of *goodness* and *justice*: if REASON, I say, doth, on the one hand, seem to revolt at *everlasting punishment*, we must confess, that FANCY, on the other, even when full plumed by *vanity*, hath scarce force enough to rise to the idea of *infinite rewards*. How the heart of man came to conceive this to be an adequate retribution for his right

<sup>\*</sup> Heb. xl. 6.

conduct, during the short trial of his virtue here, would be hard to tell, did we not know what monsters PRIDE begot of old upon *pagan philosophy*; and how much greater still these latter ages have disclosed, by the long incubation of *school-divinity* upon *folly*.

What hath been urged from natural reason, in support of this extravagant presumption, is so very slender, that it recoils as you enforce it. 1. First, you say, "that the SOUL, the subject of these eternal rewards, being *immaterial*, and so therefore unaffected by the causes which bring material things to an end, is, by its nature, fitted for eternal rewards." This is an argument *ad ignorantiam*, and holds no farther—Because an *immaterial* being is not subject to that mode of dissolution which affects *material* substances, you conclude it to be eternal. This is going too fast. There may be, and probably are, many natural causes, (unknown, indeed, to us,) whereby immaterial beings come to an end. But if the nature of things cannot, yet certainly God can, put a period to such a being, when it hath served the purpose of its creation. Doth ANNIHILATION impeach that wisdom and goodness which was displayed when God brought it OUT OF NOTHING?

Other *immaterial* beings there are, as hath been observed, who have the same natural security with man for their own existence, of whose *eternity* we never dream; I mean the souls of brutes. But PRIDE, as the poet observes, *calls God unjust*:

If MAN alone engross not Heaven's high care;  
Alone made *perfect* here, IMMORTAL there.

Fanatics, indeed, both new and old, have well provided, for the proper eternity of the human soul, by making it a part or portion of the substance of God himself.\* But so blasphemous a fancy, all sober Christians, from the most early times to the present, have looked upon with horror.

However, let us, for argument's sake, allow the human soul to be unperishable by nature, and secured in its existence by the unchangeable will of God: and see what will follow from thence.—An *infinite* reward for virtue, during one moment of its existence, because reason discovers that, by the law of nature, some reward is due? By no means—When God hath amply repaid us for the performance of our duty, will he be at a loss how to dispose of us for the long remainder of ETERNITY? May he not find new and endless employment for reasonable creatures, to which, when properly discharged, new rewards, and in endless succession, will be assigned? Modest reason seems to dictate this to the followers of the *law of nature*. The flattering expedient of ETERNAL REWARDS, for virtue here, was invented in the simplicity of early speculation, after it had fairly brought men to conclude that the soul was *immaterial*.

2. A second argument, from the conviction it carries with it, I would recommend to the care and protection of its discoverers, the *Platonists*

\* See note B, at the end of this book.

and *poets*; namely, men's LONGINGS AFTER IMMORTALITY, even in the *state of nature*. These, say our poetical metaphysicians, and metaphysical poets, are a proof that we shall obtain what we long for; since natural appetites were not given in vain. The *foundation*, on which this argument stands, is not, it must be confessed, quite void of all plausibility. The general appetite for good was indeed given by nature, to aid us in the easier and speedier attainment of it. But in this consists the sophistry of the reasoning—Because the appetite for *good* is essential in the constitution of every sensitive being, it is concluded, that we shall obtain the GREATEST GOOD which the *imagination* can form, for the object of its wishes. And, to call this visionary operator, *nature*, and not *fancy*, will scarce mend the matter, if the noble philosopher\* did not vilify his species, when he said, that “she did not know how to keep a mean or measure.”† The phenomenon is easily explained. The PASSIONS were given to excite our activity in the pursuit of *good*: and the violence of such of them, as drive most impetuously to their end, will be apt to transgress the *mean*. But there is another part as essential to our frame, which is REASON; and her office is to keep the passions within due bounds; then most apt to fly out, when pursued by that frightful phantom, ANNIHILATION. And as the best security against this terror is the *pledge of immortality*, we are too much in haste to inquire of *reason*, whether, indeed, NATURAL RELIGION hath given us this security.

From all that hath been said, I would infer, that our appetites, or LONGINGS after good, were given us, not to lead the conclusions of *reason*, but to be led by them, lest these LONGINGS should become extravagant.

3. But the palmary argument is still behind. It is partly physical, and partly moral. “The merit of service,” say these men, “increases in proportion to the excellence of that Being to whom our service is directed and becomes acceptable. An infinite Being, therefore, can dispense no rewards but what are infinite. And thus the virtuous man becomes entitled to immortality.”

The misfortune is, that this reasoning holds equally on the side of the UNMERCIFUL DOCTORS, as they are called, who doom the wicked to EVERLASTING PUNISHMENT. Indeed, were this the only discredit under which it labours, the *merciless Doctors* would hold themselves little concerned. But the truth is, the argument from *infinity* proves just nothing. To make it of any force, both the parties should be *infinite*. This inferior emanation of God's *image*, MAN, should either be supremely good or supremely bad, a kind of Deity or devil. But these reasoners, in their attention to the *Divinity*, overlook the *humanity*, which makes the decrease keep pace with the accumulation, till the rule of logic, that *the conclusion follows the weaker part*, comes in, to end the dispute.

This view of things, which presents to us the reward, held out by the *law of nature*, clears up, at the same time, the more disputed question,

\* Baron.

† Modum tenere nescia est.

concerning *the efficacy of repentance alone*, to reinstate us in God's FAVOUR; and shows, that this doctrine of *natural religion* is very consistent with what *revealed* religion teacheth, concerning RECONCILIATION, on repentance: since the rewards, promised by each religion, being totally different, they may reasonably, when forfeited, have different means appointed for their recovery. Hence it is, that, by the *first*, simple repentance, we say, is deemed sufficient; and by the latter, some ATONEMENT may be reasonably required, together with repentance.

On the whole of what has been said concerning *natural religion*, we see, that REASON reclaims against the pride of such of its votaries, who expect *eternal rewards*, when that religion only promiseth very ample ones.

Come we now to the condition of man under REVEALED RELIGION. For God (as we must needs conclude) having tried Adam in the STATE OF NATURE, and approved of the good use he had made of his free-will under the direction of that light, advanced him to a superior station in *Paradise*. How LONG, before this remove, man had continued subject to *natural religion* alone, we can only guess. But of this we may be assured, that it was some considerable time before the garden of Eden could naturally be fit for his reception. Since Moses, when he had concluded his history of the creation, and of God's *rest* on, and *sanctification* of, the *seventh day*,\* proceeds to speak of the condition of this new world, in the following terms:—"And God created every living plant of the field, before it was in the earth, and every herb of the field before it grew; for the Lord God had not caused it to rain upon the earth."† Which seem plainly to intimate, that when the seeds of vegetables had been created on the *third day*, they were left to nature, in its ordinary operations, to mature by sun and showers. So that when, in course of time, Paradise was become capable of accommodating its inhabitants, they were transplanted thither.—"And the Lord took the man, and put him into the garden of Eden. And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die."‡ In this manner, was the first extraordinary revelation of God's will, or what we call REVEALED RELIGION, added to, or more properly built upon, the *religion of nature*: which continued to be the foundation of all God's extraordinary dispensations throughout the whole course of his moral government of man.

Well! Adam disobeyed the command. He ate, and became (as he was first created) MORTAL.—"And lest," as the historian says, "he should put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever,"§ he is driven out of Paradise, and sent back again to his former state; the subject of *natural religion*. And in this subjection he continued till the giving of the LAW.

From this account we learn, that, had Adam not disobeyed the com-

\* Gen. ii. 2, 3.

† Gen. ii. 4, 5.

‡ Gen. ii. 15.

§ Gen. iii. 22.



mand, he would have lived for ever, exempt from the present condition of *mortality*; since this return to it was the penalty of his transgression.

And lest we should make a wrong inference from what we read, that *immortal life* was man's *natural claim* from the time of his creation; and not a *free gift* bestowed upon him on his entrance into Paradise; the historian tells us of the means employed to exclude him from the **TREE OF LIFE**, which conferred *immortality* on the eater. The ideas which this language conveys are, indeed, *allegorical*; but they inform us of this, and of nothing but this, that *immortal life was a thing extraneous to our nature*; and not put into our paste or composition, when first fashioned by the forming hand of the Creator.\*

If it be asked, why Moses did not record this free gift of immortality, lost by the first Adam, in as open and clear terms as the second Adam proclaimed the *recovery* of it? the reason will be given, more at large, hereafter. At present, I shall just observe, (though, perhaps, a little prematurely) that the several **MESSENGERS** of God's several *revelations* had each his proper office to discharge. It was the office of **JESUS** to *bring life and immortality to light*, or to promulge the doctrine of it in open day. It was **MOSES's** office to record the *loss*, and to **SUPPLY THE WANT OF IT**,† in that dispensation which was committed to his charge. He could go no further than just to hint at a *recovery*, in covert and obscure expressions.

On these different and respective grounds then stood, and must for ever stand, **NATURAL** and **REVEALED** religion.

The first teacheth an abundant *reward* for *virtue*; the other promised a *blessed immortality* on the observance of a *positive command*.

This distinction, carefully kept in mind, will reflect great light upon both religions. As, by the neglect of it the *Mosaic* dispensation hath lain, for many ages, involved in obscurities; and the *Christian* is become subject to inexplicable difficulties. This will be seen as we proceed.

At present let it suffice to observe,—1. That this account of the *Paradisiacal* state supports our capital assertion, that *natural* religion neither teacheth nor promiseth *eternal rewards*. While it is supposed to do so, nothing can be conceived more discrediting of **REVELATION**; for it will force us to conclude, that God arbitrarily annexed *salvation*, or eternal life, to one condition by the *law of grace*, and to another condition by the *law of nature*. This observation will have its weight with those plain men, who allow, to the two connected laws, the common privilege of explaining one another.

2. It enables us to see clearly into another reason, why the *condition of immortality* was the observance of a *positive command*; and not the performance of moral duty at large. For *immortal life* being a *free-gift* to which no man had a claim by nature, it might be given on whatever *condition* best pleased the benefactor. And the observance of a

\* Gen. ii. 7. And the Lord formed man of the dust of the ground, &c., compared with Gen. iii. 19.

† See the subject of the **DIVINE LEGATION**.

*positive duty* was very fitly preferred to a *moral*; as it best marked out the nature of the benefit, which was of *grace* and not of *debt*.

3. But there is still another reason, (arising from the moral order of things,) why this *free-gift*, if it were fit or necessary to be bestowed on *condition*, should rather be annexed to a *positive* than a *moral* duty. No one, I suppose, was ever so wild as to imagine, that had Adam not eaten of the FORBIDDEN FRUIT, he would have been entitled to *immortality*, unless he had likewise observed the dictates of the MORAL LAW, which *natural religion* enjoins; the habitual violation of which, unrepented of, every reflecting man sees, must have deprived him of *immortality*, as inevitably as the transgression of the *positive command*. The reason is evident. Man living under the *law of nature*, when the *free gift of immortality* was bestowed on him, his previous qualification to fit him for the acceptance of the free-gift, must needs be *some reward*; or, in other words, his having a claim to *that REWARD* which *natural religion* bestows. Now nothing but the observance of *moral duties* could entitle him to *some reward*. The consequence is, that the observance of moral duties was a condition *annexed by nature*, and appropriated to that *reward* which follows the favour of God in general, and so could not be made the condition of a *different* thing; viz., *the free gift of immortality*, which was founded in a prior capacity of *reward*; and this capacity acquired by the performance of moral duties.

These things give the curious observer such exalted ideas of divine wisdom, in the order and course of God's dispensations to man, that (transported with the idea) I have anticipated a *truth*, which, though it be of present use to confirm what hath been already said concerning the separate states, and different genius of *natural* and *revealed* religion, yet belongs more properly to another place; where I shall employ it to remove a difficulty which hath so long *entangled*, that it hath at length *discredited* the most rational as well as essential principle of Christianity.

In the mean time, we see, to how little purpose divines have fatigued themselves, and others, to give a reason, why a *positive* and not a *moral* duty was made the condition of *immortal life*. In the course of which inquiry, some have been so extravagant as to assert, that the sequestered state of the first pair made the observance of a *moral duty* an improper condition to be annexed to this *free gift*; seeing, in that state, opportunities were wanting to exercise them. But, if we divide moral duty, as is commonly done, into the three separate branches, of *divine*, *personal*, and *social*, we shall find that Adam had an equal occasion to practise the two first, as if sent into a world filled with inhabitants; and the most meritorious part of the third, as soon as ever he was blessed with *a help meet for him*.\*

The truth is, the state of *natural religion*, under which Adam lived till he was put into *Paradise*, unobserved by divines; and the mistaken ideas entertained of it, by them, when they had observed it, and distin-

\* Gen. ii. 18.

ruished it from the *revealed*, betrayed them into these absurdities, and gave birth (as we shall see hereafter) to a thousand errors, which have obscured and deformed the glories of that last great and best work in God's moral government, THE REDEMPTION OF MANKIND BY THE SACRIFICE OF HIS SON.

From the account here given, God's JUSTICE, with regard to the effects of Adam's transgression upon his posterity, is fully declared. Adam fell, and forfeited the *free gift* of immortality—in the day that thou *eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die*.<sup>\*</sup> He returned to his former state in which he was created, subject to mortality; *that death* which follows the separation of soul and body. It is astonishing that any *other death* should have been understood by those words,† when the very *sentence of condemnation* itself confines us to the sense here given—*In the sweat of thy face, says God, shalt thou eat bread, till THOU RETURN UNTO THE GROUND: for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and UNTO DUST SHALT THOU RETURN.*‡

In this state, Adam begot a *posterity*, which naturally became sharers in his original condition of *mortality*.§ And, were they injured in not being made partakers of a gift never bestowed upon them? Absurd! They were left and continued in possession of all the rights inherent in their original nature; and would have had the benefit of the FREE GIFT, had not he, to whom it was given, and from whom they were descended, forfeited it before they came into being.|| What *physical* contagion they contracted at their birth, either of body or of mind, is of little use to inquire; since, however man came by his malady, his cure is one and the same.

So good reason had St Paul not to think he impeached the *justice* of God, when he said, that DEATH *reigned from Adam to Moses, even over those who had NOT SINNED AFTER THE SIMILITUDE of Adam's transgression*,¶ i. e. over those who died before they came to the knowledge of good and evil. Now, as the *death*, here mentioned, could be only physical, though total; the *death* spoken of, in the same sentence, as denounced on the rest of mankind, who had *sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression*, must, consequently, be physical likewise.

Thus both infants and adults falling under the very letter of the sentence denounced on Adam, we see how God's justice is made apparent.

Another important truth emerges from this account of the FALL, viz. that this part of the Mosaic history is NO ALLEGORY, as hath been commonly imagined. The root of which conceit, as indeed of many

\* Gen. ii. 17.

† See note M M, at the end of this book.

‡ Gen. iii. 19.

§ “By death,” says Mr Locke, “some men understand *endless torments in Hell fire*.—But it seems a strange way of understanding a law, (which requires the plainest and directest words), that by *death* should be meant, *eternal life in misery*. Can any one be supposed, by a law, which says, *for felony thou shalt surely die*—not that he should lose his life, but be kept alive in perpetual and exquisite torments? And would any one think himself fairly dealt with that was so used?”—Reasonableness of Christianity, vol. ii. p. 508.

|| See what is said concerning the difference between the forfeiture of natural and adventitious rights. Div. Leg. book v. sect. v.

¶ Rom. v. 14.—See also note N N, at the end of this book.

other extravagancies that have deformed the rational simplicity of the Christian faith, hath been the confounding the distinct and different sanctions of *natural* and *revealed* religion with one another. For divines, as we said, having mistaken these sanctions to be the same, namely, IMMORTALITY, they were led to conclude, though against the express words of the text, that Adam's transgression was a breach of some precept of the MORAL LAW, and, consequently, that the account which represented it as the violation of a *positive command*, was an ALLEGORY: and being once got upon this fairy ground, every man had it in his power to pursue, as he liked, the favourite vision which he himself had raised from an *allegory* left unexplained by the sacred writer. Numberless have been these monsters of the imagination. But a late allegorist of the history of the *fall* hath so discredited the trade, by his absurd and abominable fancies, fit only to be told by himself, \* that were it not for the account which both believers and unbelievers find in this commodious method of evading difficulties, we might hope at length to get free of the dishonour of having so long abused a rational mode of information.

We have shown what the last *believing* writer hath invented, to render the abuse *odious*; let us now see what the last *unbelieving* writer hath offered to render the abuse *ridiculous*. He assures us, that the scripture account of the FALL is a MERE ALLEGORY, *in the manner of the eastern fables, signifying that man was formed to a state of happiness and perfection, which he enjoyed as long as he continued innocent, but lost and forfeited it by following his lusts and passions, in opposition to the will of his Creator; and became miserable as soon as he became a wilful and habitual sinner.*†

Here we see the learned Doctor throws aside his usual reserve, and preaches up rank DEISM without disguise; while he makes the FALL from, and RESTORATION to, life, as taught in the *Old* and *New Testament*, to be nothing more than an *emblem* of the frail condition of man, to whom God had given the LAW OF NATURE for his only guide. On this principle he attacks Dr Waterland's and Bishop Sherlock's explanations of the story of the FALL. But the force of his reasoning (as hath been the good fortune of most deistical writers) springs not from the truth of his own notions, but from the futility of his adversary's.—“Pray tell us,” says the learned Doctor, with that vivacity which he never restrained, when he had his adversary at advantage, “What is it we Christians are obliged to believe of it? [the story of the *fall*.] Must we believe it to be all an *allegory*? No. It is the allegorical interpretation that has drawn all this clamour from me, of weakening the authority of Moses and favouring infidelity. Must we believe it to be all *literal*? No. We are not allowed to do that, since there is certainly much *mystery* in it. What then are we to do? Why we are to consider it as neither fact nor fable: neither literal nor allegorical; to interpret one sentence *literally*, the next *allegorically*; the third again *literally*; and so on to the end of the

\* See the *Memoirs of the Life of Mr W. Whiston*, vol. i. p. 339.

† Dr Middleton's *Works*, 4to. vol. ii. p. 131. and vol. iii. p. 99.

chapter; which, like the very serpent it treats of, is all over spotted and speckled; here with *letter*, there with *mystery*; and sometimes, with a dash of both.”\*

This, on a supposition (the truth of which, both the deist and the believer took for granted) that the Mosaic account of the FALL was an ALLEGORY, hath its weight. But none at all, on the supposition, whose truth I have endeavoured to evince, that the Mosaic account is a HISTORY OF FACT, and not, as the learned Doctor pretends, A MERE ALLEGORY; interlarded, indeed, as the ancient histories of greatest weight have always been, with strong figurative expressions, as well *allegorical* as *metaphorical*. In such a kind of composition, the best rules of interpretation not only justify the rational critic in understanding some expressions *literally*, and others *allegorically*, but necessarily require his observance of this rule. To do what the learned Doctor requires of him—To stick throughout, either to the *letter* or the *figure*, would betray much ignorance of the genius of ancient literature. When Adam is said to have *eaten of forbidden fruit*, and *Israel to have committed whoredom*, do these phrases (used by the same historian in his history of the *fall*, and afterwards in the history of the Jewish *defection*) make one more an ALLEGORY than the other? Are not both narratives of facts *figuratively* adorned? the first, to denote *Adam's transgression of a positive command*; and the other, to signify *the defection of the Israelites into idolatry*.

The cold raillery, therefore, of our learned Doctor, while he considers the Mosaic account of the FALL, *as neither fact nor fable, neither literal nor allegorical, but to be sometimes interpreted one way, sometimes another*—might, for his credit, have been spared; as informing us of nothing but his inattention to, or ignorance of, literary composition, as it was in its primeval state; early formed, and still continuing to exist, amongst people undisciplined by arts and polished manners.

The truth is, our critic in his censure, and those learned divines, in their defence, have equally confounded two distinct species of writing with one another; that is to say, an ALLEGORY with a real HISTORY ornamented with metaphorical and allegoric colouring. The divines, to serve their occasions, did it, either wittingly or inadvertently; and the learned Doctor, to serve his, either followed their example or imitated their practice. These divines had observed, that preceding commentators on the Bible had occasionally, in the narrative parts, *jumped from the literal to the allegoric sense, and so backward and forward to the end of the chapter*, because they found, that where the language was full of *figurative* terms, it was reasonable and necessary so to do. Their error was, in supposing they might do the same, in what they believed to be an ALLEGORY. On the other hand, our Doctor saw the absurdity of this practice in an *allegory*, but his error was, in supposing it to be equally absurd to do the same in a *figurative* narration of fact.

And what occasioned the common mistake of both parties was, their

\* See the Doctor's defence of his letter to Waterland.

having (as we say) confounded these two species of composition with one another; which they would never have done, had they but considered, that the end of an ALLEGORY is to *hide*, and the purpose of allegorical, that is figurative expressions, only to *ornament*.

But, as the history of the *fall* is, in Dr Middleton's sense, a MERE ALLEGORY, and as his MORAL of the *fable* tends to reduce the whole doctrine of the gospel to MERE DEISM; I shall now endeavour to show, from the *very genius of antiquity*, that *his moral* is not of the nature of those which the most early times loved to disguise under that cover.

It is, in the learned Doctor's opinion, "A MERE ALLEGORY, in the manner of the eastern fables, signifying, that man was formed to a state of happiness and perfection; which he enjoyed as long as he continued innocent, but lost and forfeited it by following his lusts and passions, and so became miserable."

The truth of his idea, of its being A MERE ALLEGORY, hath been examined already. But this is not the whole of his idea: it is, if you will believe him, *in the MANNER OF THE EASTERN FABLES*.

An observation that betrays his ignorance both of *eastern fables* and *eastern truths*. The *fables* of the ancients, whether of the east or west, were invented, as I have shown elsewhere, for this end, and for no other, namely, to hide from the people, under that cover, such *truths* as were above the people's capacity to comprehend; or were judged inexpedient, for the sake of public utility, that they should know. This veil, however, their wise men were able to penetrate; and so could benefit themselves of all the truth conveyed under it; and the public, of just so much as was judged expedient for them to be made acquainted with.

But what pretence is there to say, that either of these causes of concealment, had any place in the MORAL, which the Doctor is pleased to tell us is conveyed under the *fable of the fall*. The *moral* contains a truth of the utmost clearness, and most general use; whose publication could be of no possible disservice to society, or be abused by one single individual in it.

On the other hand, if, instead of this MORAL, of *a simple lapse from innocence to guilt*, we believe that Jesus and his apostles have rightly interpreted the Mosaic account of the FALL, where they inform us of the specific nature of the loss which Adam sustained thereby; and if, from the nature and course of God's dispensations, we see the fitness of its remaining a *mystery* for many ages, that *mystery* which (the apostle tells us) "was hid from ages and generations, but was at length made manifest to the saints;"\* if this, I say, were the case, then, indeed, though the Doctor's *moral* required none of this cover to his MERE ALLEGORY: yet such a cover very well suited the history of Moses; and justified the interpretation of the apostles.

Thus the POSITIVE COMMAND, whatever it specifically was, is contained in the words of *not eating of the fruit of the tree of good and evil*—the

\* Col. i. 26.



TEMPTER, THE EVIL BEING, is shadowed under the *serpent*—and the CONDEMNATION TO DEATH, by Adam's return to his first state of MORTALITY.

Having thus cleared the revealed doctrine of the FALL from the absurdity of this deistical interpretation, I now go on with my subject.

Man, having forfeited the *free gift of immortality*, is driven out of *Paradise*, and returned back to the state and condition in which he was created, a subject only of NATURAL RELIGION. With this difference, that, before his entrance into Paradise, he was altogether ignorant of the extent of his finite duration: on his expulsion from thence, he might learn, from the terms of his *sentence*, that the execution of it, by DEATH, was at no great distance.—“In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.”\*

But when we speak of the two religions, *natural* and *revealed*, we must distinguish (in our use of the term, REVELATION) between a *system* of revealed religion, and an occasional communication of the divine will to man, for his conduct on particular points, or for his comfort in general, when the course of God's moral government required that he should, from time to time, have intimations given to him, more or less obscurely, of the hidden purpose of providence in his favour; and this, through various dispensations, till, at the final completion of them, *life and immortality* should be again *brought to light* and restored. These occasional communications began with that contained in the sentence denounced on the *serpent*, or the EVIL ONE, that “the seed of the woman should bruise his head: and that he should bruise its heel:”† and ended with that given by the mouth of Jacob, “that the sceptre should not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver from between his feet, until SHILOH should come, to whom the gathering of the people should be.”‡

What followed these occasional communications was that SECOND SYSTEM of *revealed religion* delivered to the posterity of *Abraham*, by Moses, preparatory to the THIRD and last, under the reign or rule of *Shiloh*, or JESUS CHRIST, which took in and embraced the whole posterity of *Adam*.

So that, of *revelations*, in the sense of REVEALED SYSTEMS of RELIGION, there were but THREE: the *first*, given to *Adam* when placed in Paradise; the *second*, to the posterity of Abraham, when going (under the ministry of *Moses*) to possess the *promised land*; and the *third*, promulged to all mankind, by *Jesus the Messiah*.

Ignorance, of this matter, made the rabbins invent a fanciful *system of revealed religion*, as given to the *sons of Noah*, under the name of the SEVEN PRECEPTS.—So that it seemed proper just to hint at this *distinction*; which, for want of attending to, hath been the occasion of much error and mistake.

We have now seen MAN under the two first states of God's moral government, the *natural* and the *revealed*; and how, by his misconduct in the *second*, he was returned back again to the *first*; in which he re-

\* Gen. iii. 19.

† Gen. iii. 15.

‡ Gen. xlix. 10.

mained throughout the long interval from Adam to Moses; when, by this time, the **NATURAL LAW** was become so vitiated, and obscured, that all memory of the **LAWGIVER** was lost and forgotten. So that the knowledge of the one true God, on which all *natural* as well as *revealed* religion is founded, was, of necessity, to be **REPUBLISHED** to the world, by **MOSES**, when he entered on his mission; who not only rekindled its extinguished flame, but, by the *dispensation* committed to his care, in which the *first Cause* constantly and immediately directs all things, obviated the like misfortune for the future.

And as this dispensation, called the **LAW**, being the prelude and preparation to the **GOSPEL**, whose author was the promised **MESSIAH**, the restorer of what was lost in Adam, could be only made intelligible by the previous knowledge of the *cause* and *nature* of that loss, therefore hath Moses studiously recorded that previous knowledge.

And here it will be proper to observe, that had Jesus been only a **MESSENGER** sent from heaven, with no other purpose than to propagate a system of revealed morals, or to *republish* the law of nature, we can see no reason why **LIFE AND IMMORTALITY** might not have been promulged by **MOSES** for the sanction of the *law*, as well as by **JESUS CHRIST**, who hath made it the peculiar sanction of the *gospel*: and so both doctrines, that of the *true God*, and of *eternal life*, have come from heaven together. The **SOCINIANS**, and they who deny a **REDEMPTION** by the *atonement* of a **REAL SACRIFICE on the cross**, would do well to reconsider this matter. But more of it in a fitter place.

To proceed. By the penalty inflicted on Adam, he (with all his posterity) was again made *mortal*; that is, became **EXTINCT**, at the natural dissolution of the union between soul and body.

But that *distribution* of reward and punishment, which God, under every mode of his moral government, makes, with supreme justice, either here in this world, or hereafter in another, was (when the sentence of **DEATH** was denounced on man's transgression) at first made here in this world, so long as he continued to be favoured with the administration of an equal or extraordinary providence. Which, as we learn from the Mosaic history, continued from the **FALL** down to the time when polytheism universally prevailed. For, when the world, by reason of the vices and corruptions of its inhabitants, "did not like to retain God in their knowledge, but changed the glory of the incorruptible God, into an image made like to corruptible man,"\* that first dispensation of providence was withdrawn.

Yet, as soon as God had selected a *chosen race*, and had separated it from the rest of mankind, to *place his name there*, we see with astonishment, this *equal providence* revive in Judea; for man was still under the *curse* or *doom of death*. And this existed, till repeated idolatries, the crime which first caused the *equal providence* to be withdrawn from the nations at large, did at length deprive the *chosen people*, likewise of their share of this blessing.

\* Rom. i. 23—24.

And, by such time as they had invariably returned from their apostasy to the pure worship of the *God of their fathers*, the course of God's moral government required, that the nature and genius of the GOSPEL (the religion which completed all the foregoing, and which, by the recovery of what was lost in Adam, made an *equal providence* no longer necessary) was gradually revealed unto them. This, as we say, superseded the use, and prevented the return, of that *equal providence*; which, otherwise, on their adherence to the God of Israel, and perseverance in his worship, they might naturally have expected. Nay, the full conviction of their recent loss, joined to the scattered lights in the later prophets, together with other less legitimate helps, enabled them to gather and arrange their ideas in favour of a FUTURE STATE; as hath been shown at large in the foregoing books.

These *lights* divine providence, in its course, did indulge to them, till the *Sun of Righteousness* arose, lest the sudden splendour of his appearance should totally dazzle this blinded and devoted people; who, thus indulgently prepared and made fit to receive the gospel, were, by their rejection of it, rendered totally without excuse.

These observations, the reader sees, add further evidence to the truths advanced in the former books, concerning this EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE.

The course of my argument, in those books, led me to deduce an equal administration of providence in the Jewish state, from the nature of its THEOCRACY. My subject here leads me to show, from the general ORDER of God's moral government, that this *equal providence* was administered in the world at large, while it retained the memory of the true God: and was again administered in the land of Judea, when, by the mission of Moses, the true God had there regained his rights.

All this, when carefully considered, will, amongst a variety of other reasoning, be one incontestible proof of the truth of REVEALED RELIGION. Here, in the MOSAIC, we find it so contrived, by divine skill, that the peculiar nature of that economy, under a THEOCRACY, should coincide with, and concur to support, that very dispensation of providence which naturally arose from the punishment of the FALL. This also will add strength and light to all my former reasoning, for the extension of this *extraordinary providence* to PARTICULARS. For now it is seen, that this dispensation was not merely political and attendant on a *theocracy*, where civil considerations often overlook the care of individuals; but it was a general dispensation of religion, from the FALL to the time when idolatry overran the world; and was again administered when and where the knowledge and worship of the true God was restored.

"It is true," may an objector reply, "that this *different* administration of providence, between the faithful followers of the true God, and the careless apostates from his worship, did preserve the dignity due to God's moral government; yet still this difference appears to be so great, that it looks like an impeachment of the divine attributes, to confine this

benefit to such only, *who liked to retain God in their knowledge*, while the rest of mankind were left and abandoned to the evils consequent on an irregular and unequal administration of providence."

This objection would have weight, if those who were included under the sentence passed on Adam should be irremissibly doomed to the short existence of this mortal life. But a secret **REPRIEVE** (kept hid, indeed, from the early world) passed along with the *sentence of condemnation*. So that they who never received their due in *this* world, would still be kept in existence till they had received it in the *next*; such being, in no other sense, sufferers by the administration of an unequal providence, than in being ignorant of the reparation which attended them. For we learn, from sacred writ (what the principles of natural reason do not impeach) that the **DEATH** of Christ had a retrospect from the **FALL** of Adam; and that **REDEMPTION** was, from the first, amongst the principal ingredients in God's moral government of man.

Now, if the *goodness* of God thus provided for human *redemption*, that *goodness*, joined to his *justice*, would make the *redemption* as extensive as the forfeiture. But, in case a *retrospect* did not take place, it would not be thus extensive. More words would only obscure a truth, which the sacred text hath rendered so plain and clear.

*Ye were redeemed*, says St Peter, *with the precious blood of Christ, FOREORDAINED from the foundation of the world, but was MANIFEST in these last times for you.\** St John explains, from the words of Jesus himself, what is to be understood by his being *foreordained*, viz. That it was receiving the *glory* which accompanies the entrance on an high office—*And now, O Father, GLOBIFY me, with the GLOBY which I had with thee before the world was. I have MANIFESTED thy name unto the men which thou gavest me out of the world.†*

St Peter, in the words above, distinguisheth between the *advent* of our *Redeemer*, and the *efficacy* of his death, in teaching us, that, though his **MANIFESTATION** was late, yet the virtue of his **FOREORDAINED redemption** operated from the most early times. For it would be trifling to speak of a *pre-ordination*, which was not to be understood of a *pre-operation*; since those to whom the apostle wrote well understood, from the attributes of the Godhead, that all things *that were*, had been *pre-ordained*, in the simple sense of the word. The other sense, of a *pre-operation*, St John more forcibly expresses, *by the Lamb SLAIN from the foundation of the world.‡*

But if the course of God's various dispensations required, that this *act of grace*, the **REDEMPTION**, should be *kept hid for ages*, and never fully revealed till the *advent* of his Son, it could not be otherwise, than that, in the *intermediate dispensations*, mankind must be still represented as suffering under the forfeiture of Adam; in scripture language called, *lying under the curse*: nor had such of Adam's posterity any cause to

\* 1 Peter i. 20.

† John xvii. 5, 6.

‡ Rev. xlii. 8. See also note O O, at the end of this book.

complain that the REDEMPTION was kept hid from them, since it was an act of *grace*, and not of *debt*, of which they would finally, and in due time, have the benefit. In the interim, as hath been shown above, the moral government of God, revealed to us in scripture, was administered to them in such a manner, as, sooner or later, to proclaim its perfect equity.

## CHAP. II.

IN this manner did the FREE GIFT OF IMMORTALITY become forfeit, by man's violating the CONDITION on which it was bestowed. For a GIFT is not the less *free* by having a *condition* annexed unto it; the quality of a *free gift* not arising from its being without *condition*, but from its being without a *claim of right*.

It is true, that a *condition*, annexed to a *claim of right*, is of a different nature from *that* which the Governor of the world hath seen fit to annex to a *free gift*: the first ariseth out of the settled constitution of things: the second depends on arbitrary will and pleasure. Thus MORAL VIRTUE was the *condition* of that favour and protection which the *creature*, man, *claims* from his Maker; but the OBSERVANCE OF A POSITIVE COMMAND was the *condition* of the *free gift of immortality*.

Again, the *law of nature* informs us, that the *condition*, which accompanies a *claim*, is, when unperformed, still capable of recovering its efficacy: the same *law* likewise directs us to the *means*, namely REPENTANCE. But the violated condition, annexed to a *free gift*, is not thus recoverable.

The reason of this difference is apparent. God's creatures have a claim to his favour and protection, whenever, and as often as, the breach of the *condition* is repaired by sincere *repentance*; because the relation between the Creator and creature makes the *claim* indissolvable. But IMMORTALITY being a *free gift*, which gift that *relation* doth not naturally infer; when the condition, on which it was bestowed, is broken, the benefit is irrecoverably taken back. The consequence of which is, that if God, in his infinite goodness, shall be pleased to restore again that *free gift*, he may do it by what *means* he sees fit, as not being confined to *that* which his own establishment hath prescribed, for the recovery of his *favour* and *protection* simply.

The *means*, therefore, of regaining the *free gift of immortality*, when God had graciously decreed that it should be regained, can be only known by REVELATION.

Another specific difference between the *conditions* annexed to a *grace*, and to a *claim*, is this, that as the condition of the former is the observance of an *arbitrary command*, this command may not be the same (though still arbitrary, as annexed to a *free gift*) when that *grace* is *restored*, with what it was in the *first donation*. It was not the same; as we shall see when we come to speak of the *condition of life and immor-*

*ality* again *brought to light*. Where we shall, at the same time, be enabled to see God's gracious purpose in the *change*.

But here let us always keep in mind (which not to do will occasion much confusion in handling the subject of REDEMPTION,) that the MEANS of recovering a benefit lost, and the CONDITION annexed to that benefit, when recovered, are two very distinct and different things. Both of which, viz. of the MEANS and the CONDITION, we shall speak to in their order.

And first of the MEANS; and to whom intrusted.

The MEANS employed in this great work, the REDEMPTION OF MANKIND, human reason alone was not sufficient to discover.

It may, indeed, be collected from the principles of *natural religion*, (as we have more than once observed, and cannot do it too often) that God, on the sincere repentance of offenders, will receive them again into favour, and render them capable of those rewards *naturally* attendant on right behaviour. But the case before us is very different. The benefit lost by Adam's transgression was a *free gift*, a matter of *grace*. Our restoration, therefore, to that benefit must needs be of *grace* likewise; consequently, the *means* resided in the hidden counsels of the bestower, and so not to be found in the promulged digest of *natural law*.

He might have *restored* us, and certainly would, had he seen it best, on the common terms on which *natural religion* assureth us he will receive returning sinners to his favour: or he might, with equal justice, in perfecting the great work of *redemption*, require MORE; namely, a MEDIATION, enforced by some kind of SATISFACTION. But what his good pleasure was herein, it was impossible for human reason to discover; whatever fitness that reason may perceive in these MEANS, when revealed.

Indeed, had it been decent for falling man, aided only by the glimmering light of that indefinite promise, that he should some time or other be restored to his lost inheritance; had it been decent, I say, to indulge his conjectures concerning the counsels of the Most High, he would have been apt to think that a MEDIATOR might be employed amongst the *means* used in this *restoration*; since he is able to see the same fitness of such an interposition in matters of *grace*, as of *repentance alone* in matters of *right*. MEDIATION implying a confession, that the thing requested is merely of *grace*; to the obtaining of which, man doth no further co-operate than by his hopes and wishes.

How reasonable such a conclusion would have been, we find by this, that the very MEANS, here supposed, have been, as we have said, in *fact*. used, and accepted by the God of our salvation.—“For there is one God,” says St Paul, “and one MEDIATOR between God and man, the man Jesus Christ.”\*—“Jesus,” says the author of the epistle to the Hebrews, “is the MEDIATOR of a better covenant, which was established upon better promises.”†

The modesty of *reason* finds its account in conclusions thus confirm-

\* 1 Tim. ii. 5.

† Heb. viii. 6.



id; and the truth of *scripture* receives light and strength from conclusions thus made.

We are now to consider of the person of this *mediator*, and then inquire into the manner in which he discharged his *mediation*.

The eternal Son of God, Jesus, the Messiah, was the person appointed to this office.\* The time of his appearance was foretold by the Jewish prophets: and the nearer they lived to that time, the clearer and fuller were their intimations concerning the character and fortunes of him, who was sent to REDEEM Israel, and to bring again to light that life and immortality which was lost by the transgression of Adam.

The manner in which he was to discharge his MEDIATION, is our next inquiry: whether he did it simply by INTERCEDING for the remission of the forfeiture: or whether by SATISFYING, at the same time, for the debt? is the question. Now, as it rested in God's good pleasure, which of these he would accept, we must again have recourse to Scripture for information: where we find, that the *intercession* was by way of SATISFACTION for the debt.

This *satisfaction* is called in scripture, REDEMPTION: a term taken from civil transactions amongst men, where the things or persons *redeemed* were paid for, with a price. Hence St Paul, speaking of our redemption from the forfeiture of Adam, expresseth it by this periphrasis, "Ye are bought with a price."†

The price paid was the DEATH of the Son of God. *Christ died for the ungodly*, ‡ says he. And again, *Christ died for our sins* §—*he died for all* ||—to obtain salvation, our Lord Jesus Christ died for us.¶ On this account, and in allusion to the like transactions amongst men, the Redeemer is called the LORD of those whom he *redeemed*—"For to this end," says he, "Christ both died and rose and revived, that he might be the LORD both of the dead and living."\*\*\*

And now let us proceed to the nature of that DEATH which had the efficacy of REDEMPTION.

1. First, it must be VOLUNTARY—"Hereby we perceive the love of God, because he laid down his life for us," †† says St John.—"I lay down my life for the sheep," saith Jesus himself; "no man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down; and I have power to take it again. This COMMANDMENT have I received of my Father." †† Here he represents the *laying down his life* as a *power* bestowed, in consequence of a *command* received. And this will lead us to consider

2. The second requisite of a *voluntary* death efficacious of *redemption*; which is, that it must be OFFERED UP, in consequence of pre-ordained *acceptance*, called, in the text, a COMMAND. And what is a religious *offering up* to God, but a SACRIFICE?

\* See note P P, at the end of this book.

† 1 Cor. vi. 20.

‡ Rom. v. 6.

§ 1 Cor. xv. 3.

|| 2 Cor. v. 14.

¶ 1 Thess. v. 9, 10.

\*\*\* Rom. xiv. 9.

†† 1 John iii. 16.

‡‡ John x. 15—18.

In this sense (the proper sense of the word,) the holy scriptures expressly call the death of Christ a SACRIFICE. St Paul, speaking (as is his wont) in the language of the law, \* says, "Christ our passover is SACRIFICED for us."† The writer of the epistle to the Hebrews, who rarely speaks any other language, says, "Christ needeth not daily, as those high priests, to offer up SACRIFICE, first for his own sins, and then for the people's; for this he did once when he OFFERED UP HIMSELF."‡ Again—"Christ hath appeared to put away sin, by the SACRIFICE OF HIMSELF."§ And again—"He was once OFFERED to bear the sins of many."||

But the virtue of *expiatory sacrifices* consisted in procuring ATONEMENT, by some sort of SATISFACTION. And thus the expiatory sacrifice of Christ on the cross operated for our REDEMPTION.

One could hardly have thought it possible, that any man, who had read the *gospels*, with their best interpreters, the authors of the *epistles*, should ever have entertained a doubt, WHETHER THE DEATH OF CHRIST WAS A REAL SACRIFICE?

But mistaken notions, concerning the *origin* and *nature* of this sacred rite, have so obscured the *rationale* of it, that the SOCINIANS, who boast to have interpreted Scripture on the severest and justest laws of logic and criticism, have, in this instance, as well as in many others, deviated more from these laws than the most licentious of the *allegorists*, or the wildest of the *spiritualizers*. Here, in their care to avoid an imaginary absurdity, they have fallen into a real one, and of the grossest kind, while they consider the *death of Christ* as nothing more than THE SEAL OF HIS MISSION. For, were this all, so bloody an impression might have been well spared; since the *proper seal of his mission*, or the evidence of his being SENT, were MIRACLES performed and PROPHECIES fulfilled. His DYING, if it were only in support of what he taught, could be nothing more than the *seal of his integrity*.

But ignorance of the ORIGIN AND NATURE OF SACRIFICE hath misled these our *rationalists* into the gross and semi-pagan errors concerning the *rite* itself. And therefore it will be expedient to give (though it may prove a work of some length and labour) an enlarged history of this whole matter.

As SACRIFICE is almost coeval with the human race, its nature and supposed effects depend on the knowledge of its *original*; which is only to be found in the notions, habits, and customs of the first mortals.

The PRINCIPLE advanced in the fourth section of the fourth book of this work, together with the reasoning on that *principle* concerning the

\* To this an objector may reply,—If St Paul speaks in the language of the law, why is not the word *sacrifice* part of that language, as well as *passover*? And if so, says such a one, your argument from this text, in proof of a *real sacrifice*, is enervated. To this I answer, the *language of the law* may extend to *names* without extending to *things*. It plainly does so, here. The word *passover* is language peculiar to the law: the word SACRIFICE, though the language of the law, is not peculiar to it, but in use throughout the whole religious world to denote a *rite*, common, at that time, to all men.

† 1 Cor. v. 7.

‡ Heb. vii. 27.

§ Heb. ix. 26.

|| Heb. ix. 28.

ANCIENT MODE OF CONVERSE BY ACTION IN AID OF WORDS, will lead us (so prolific is that principle, in laying open the most secret treasures of antiquity) to the true *rationale* of this widely extended, and as widely mistaken, *rite of sacrifice*. This will show, how the common sentiments of our nature would draw the first men into this mode of worship, whether the SACRIFICE WAS EUCHARISTICAL, PROPITIATORY, OR EXPIATORY. Under one or other of these classes, I suppose, all sorts of *sacrifice* may be reasonably comprised. Though the Egyptians, we are told, extended the number to six hundred sixty and six. But their sacrifices, like their kings, were wantonly multiplied at pleasure, in defiance of time and truth, to fit the purpose of every fabling or designing priest. For, the sentiments which nature and reason excite in every pious breast towards the Author and Support of our being, are simply these, *gratitude* for good bestowed; *application* to him for good sought or wanted; and *repentance* for, and deprecation of, crimes committed.

1. Gratitude gave birth to *eucharistical sacrifice*. And this duty was, in the most early times, discharged in EXPRESSIVE ACTION; the least equivocal of which was, the offerer's bringing the first-fruits of pasturage or agriculture, to that sequestered place, where the Deity used to be more solemnly invoked, at the stated times of religious worship; and there, presenting them in homage, with a demeanour which spoke to this purpose—"I do hereby acknowledge thee, O my God! to be the author and giver of all good: and do now, with humble gratitude, return my warmest thanks for these thy blessings, particularly bestowed upon me."

Things, thus devoted, became, from thenceforth, sacred. And to prevent their *desecration*, the readiest way was to send them to the table of the priest, or to consume them in the fire of the altar.

2. The PROPITIATORY SACRIFICE was *precatory*, to implore success to their labours, in order to procure and improve to their use, these common blessings of providence; and *deprecatory*, to avert the evils due to the past abuse of such blessings. And in this species of sacrifice, likewise, the oblation was so contrived as to be an *action* equally expressive of an invocation for the continuance of God's favour; and for the remission of the offerer's transgressions.

3. But it is the third sort, the EXPIATORY SACRIFICE, which, by reason of the horrid abuses it early underwent, hath obscured the whole face of things: yet the luciferous principle, here applied, to illustrate this whole matter, shows EXPIATORY SACRIFICE to be, in its nature, as intelligible, and in practice as rational, as either of the other two. Here, instead of presenting the first-fruits of agriculture and pasturage, in corn, wine, oil, and wool, as in the *eucharistical*, or a portion of what was to be sown, or otherwise propagated, as in the *propitiatory*; some chosen animal, precious to the repenting criminal, who deprecates, or supposed to be obnoxious to the Deity, who is to be appeased, was offered up and slain at the altar, in an action, which, in all languages,

when translated into words, speaks to this purpose,—“I confess my transgressions at thy footstool, O my God! and, with the deepest contrition, implore thy pardon; confessing that I deserve death for these my offences.”—The latter part of the confession was more forcibly expressed by the *action* of striking the devoted animal, and depriving it of life; which, when put into words, concluded in this manner—“And I own that I myself deserve the death which I now inflict on this animal.”

But here it will be proper to observe, that as crimes of a lighter complexion were atoned for, as well as deprecated in the *propitiatory sacrifice*; so those of a deeper dye could be only blotted out by the *expiatory*. This frequently brought into both the slaughter, or at least, the consecration of a devoted animal, by an action which spoke alike in each; but louder in the *expiatory*; while, in all the *three*, the *action of sacrifice* still expressed a reasonable language.

But this system of sacrifice, so well supported by what we know of plain and simple nature, in its most early movements, is further realized by what historians tell us was pronounced by the mouth of the sacrificer himself; who frequently explained his own action by the words with which he accompanied it.

We learn from antiquity, that when friendly or adverse states had entered into an alliance for mutual defence, or ended a war on mutual conditions, the league was solemnized by the two parties with the additional sanction of a SACRIFICE, in its nature chiefly partaking of that species we call *propitiatory*; to implore a blessing on the transaction.

The historian, Livy, hath recorded the ceremonies in use, in these sorts of sacrifice; where, speaking of a treaty concluded between the Roman and Alban people, on certain conditions mutually agreed upon, he tells us, that the public person, on the part of Rome, whom we may call the *king at arms*, and who was the sacrificing priest, when about to strike the victim, thus invokes their common god, in an address to the Alban people, and their chief heralds—“*Legibus deinde recitatis; audi, inquit, Jupiter; audi pater patratus populi Albani; audi tu populus Albanus; ut illa palam prima postrema ex illis tabulis cerave recitata sunt, sine dolo malo, utique ea hic hodie rectissime intellecta sunt, illis legibus populus Romanus prior non deficiet. Si prior defexit publico consilio dolo malo, TU ILLO DIE, JUPITER, POPULUM ROMANUM SIC FERITO, UT EGO HUNC PORCUM HIC HODIE FERIAM TANTOQUE MAGIS FERITO quanto magis potes pollesque: id ubi dixit, porcum saxo silice percussit.*”\*

Another treaty concluded between Hannibal and his army of multifarious *adventurers* was, the same historian tells us, sanctified in the like manner. Just before the battle of Trebia, the general, encouraging his followers, by all the usual excitements, to do their duty, concludes with a promise of the most magnificent spoils, as the reward of their valour. And then offering one of those *propitiatory sacrifices* for him-

\* Liv. lib. i. c. 24.

self and his army; the better to induce the various nations, of which it was composed, to confide in his word, and rest assured of his good faith, he held out a lamb ready for the altar, and then proceeded in the following manner—"Eaque ut rata scirent fore, agnum læva manu, dextra silicem retinens, SI FALLERET JOVEM CÆTEROSQUE PRECATUS DEOS ITA SE MACTARENT QUEMADMODUM IPSE AGNUM MACTASSET. *Secundum precationem, caput pecudis saxo elisit.*"\*

We see the reason, why in these religious acts, when made the sanction of good faith, in public and civil conventions, the expressive *action* should be further ascertained by *words*. It was necessary, in an affair of public and general importance, to give the utmost precision to the act, by removing from it all doubtful or equivocal meaning.

Again, it is further worth our notice, that, although THE SPEAKING BY ACTION had (as we have shown) its original in the defects and imperfections of early language; yet, even when those impediments to fuller information were in a good measure removed, still, partly from habit and custom, but principally from some advantages which this mode of converse had above the other, of speech, it was (as has been observed elsewhere) long kept up amongst people of simpler manners, especially in the more solemn transactions of life; of which those relating to religion were the chief: by reason, that *significative actions* make a stronger and more durable impression than *words*; as the eye is a more certain and steady conveyance of intelligence than the ear.

On the whole, the reader now sees, that nothing could be more natural, intelligible, or rational, than *this mode of religious worship*, as here explained.

Ignorance of all this, and inattention to the state and condition of ancient times, have divided *believers* into two parties on this subject.

One of them holds, that the origin of sacrifices was by *command from heaven*; the other, that it sprung from *superstition*, together with many the like absurd practices. The first call this religious rite, *mysterious*; and so give to *heaven* what, in their opinion, *reason* disclaims. "As to the origin of sacrifices," says a learned divine, "it is extremely hard to conceive them to be a human institution; BECAUSE we cannot give any tolerable account of the REASONS of them."† A more than *tolerable*, even a plain and clear *reason*, the reader sees is now given. But men are always disposed to find in themselves a standard for the measure of all things. However, admit *sacrifice* to be devoid of *reason*; must things, thus circumstanced, needs come from heaven? As if nothing had ever entered into religion that was of the growth of superstition! What will be the consequence of thus accounting for what we do not understand, but the disposing men to think, that every religious rite, though palpably absurd, yet, if fancifully *mysterious*, had that original?

Another argument, which this more orthodox party urge for their opinion, that sacrifice must needs be heavenly derived, is, perhaps,

\* Liv. lib. xxi. c. 45.

† Shuckford.

something more plausible, but equally inconclusive: it is the *very early use of sacrifice*, which rises as high as the two sons of Adam. And, indeed, our account of this *significative action* shows, that we can conceive no time, after the *fall*, too early for its introduction amongst men, under the guidance and government of *natural religion*, as these two brothers certainly were: besides, the defects of language, while in its early rudiments, necessarily occasioned this *mode* of intercourse between man and his Maker. Yet, notwithstanding, primeval use can never prove *sacrifice* to have arisen from any other source than the light of *natural reason*. And if that be sufficient (as we have shown it is) we must needs conclude that it arose from thence, when scripture is silent concerning any other source. Especially since we find that this scripture hath carefully recorded what *God* immediately, and not *nature*, taught to Adam and his family. Now, concerning *sacrifice*, there is not a single word which implies any such instruction. On the contrary, the manner in which the story is told leads us to conclude, that the rite was first dictated by *natural reason*.—"Abel was a keeper of sheep, but Cain was a tiller of the ground. And in process of time it came to pass, that Cain brought of the fruit of the ground, an offering unto the Lord. And Abel he brought of the firstlings of his flock."\*—*And IN PROCESS OF TIME* (says the historian) *IT CAME TO PASS*, &c., words, which (in the sequel) not only acquaint us with the first sacrificers, but in these, here quoted, strongly intimate, that the *rite* was of human original. While, throughout the whole narrative, we find no mention of any prescribed mode of *patriarchal sacrifice*, though Moses is most minute in what concerns the prescribed sacrifices of the *LAW*. Doth not this show, that the first was a voluntary, uncommanded worship, where the *mode* was left to the discretion of the worshipper; and the latter a *prescribed* rite, where every circumstance, in the celebration, was to be scrupulously observed.

Nor is this reasoning to be evaded by the confessed brevity of the sacred historian. For had the original of sacrifice been prescribed, and directly commanded by the Deity, Moses could never have omitted the express mention of that circumstance. The two capital observances in the Jewish ritual were the *SABBATH* and *SACRIFICES*.—To impress the highest reverence and veneration on the *sabbath*, the historian is careful to record its divine original in these words—"Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the host of them. And on the seventh day God ended his work, which he had made: and he *RESTED ON THE SEVENTH DAY* from all his work which he had made: and *GOD BLESSED THE SEVENTH DAY, AND SANCTIFIED IT*: because that in it, he had rested from all his work, which God created and made."† Now, who can suppose that, had *SACRIFICE* been of divine original, Moses would have neglected to establish this truth, at the time that he recorded the other? since it was of equal use, and of equal importance, with the

\* Gen. iv. 2.

† Gen. ii. 2, 3.



other. I should have said of much greater: for the multifarious *sacrifices* of the LAW had not only a reference to the *forfeiture* of Adam, but likewise prefigured our *redemption* by Jesus Christ, as we shall show hereafter.

The other mistaken extreme, arising from the same cause, namely, ignorance of the nature of sacrifice, is amongst those believers, who hold, that although sacrifice became, at length, of *divine right*, yet, in its origin, it was but a capricious ordinance of human invention; concerning which, no rational or philosophic account can be given; yet, having spread wide, and struck its roots deep into the fat and lumpish soil of superstition, it was suffered, by God, to occupy a place in the Mosaic institution, in compliance with the prejudices of a perverse and barbarous people, to whom many other extraneous rites (perhaps irrational, but certainly harmless) were indulged.

And now, to go on with our history of sacrifice. This important rite, first dictated by natural reason, did not long continue in its original integrity.

Of all the customs in use amongst men, those respecting religion are most liable to abuse. For the passions of HOPE and FEAR become then most inordinate when the mind is taken up and occupied in the offices of divine worship. At this season, the sobriety of common sense is often forced to give way to the extravagance of the imagination. And this more especially must have been the case in those early ages, when undisciplined REASON was but just projecting how to curb the irregular sallies of enthusiasm.

Add to this, that SACRIFICE being a *scenical* rite, it was principally fitted to strike the fancy; which delighting in paradox and mystery, would riot in this enchanted ground, till it had lost sight of the simple meaning of a plain expressive action, first conceived for *use*, and continued out of *necessity*.

Under this state of delusion, *eucharistical* and *propitiatory* sacrifices were soon imagined to receive their chief value from the *costliness* of the offering; and HECATOMBS were supposed more acceptable to Heaven, than purity of mind, adorned with gratitude, and humble reliance on the Deity.

Amidst these disorders, *philosophers* and *moralists* might, from time to time, cry out, and ask, as they did, but without being heard,

Dicite, pontifices, in sacro quid facit aurum?  
Quin damus id superis, de magna quod dare lance  
Non possit magni Messalæ lippa propage:  
Compositum jus, fasque animi sanctosque recessus  
Mentis, et incoctum generoso pectus honesto?  
Hæc cedo, ut admoveam templis, et farre litabo.\*

The world went on its train; and *pomp of sacrifice* was every where preferred to the *piety of the offerer*.

But in *expiatory* sacrifices, matters went still worse. For, in these,

\* Pers. Sat. ii.

the passion of **FEAR** being predominant, strange enormities were soon superadded to the follies of the worshippers.

In these, the offering of the slain animal began, first of all, to be vainly considered as a **VICARIOUS ATONEMENT** for the crimes of the sacrificer.

Though, in the purity of the first institution of sacrifice, *striking* the devoted animal was an action naturally significative; which (as we said), when reduced to words, contained no more than this humble and contrite recognition—"I confess, O my God! that I deserve death for my transgressions."

Modern unbelievers, to get to their favourite point, which was to arraign the Mosaic ritual for its *vicarious atonements*, have been very large in exposing this abuse in the offices of *pagan* or of *natural* religion, corrupted. "Right reason," say they, "disclaims all such atonements; and teaches, that to secure pardon for our offences against God, no more is required than humble confession before the throne of grace, joined to a sincere purpose of amendment; so that all the *Mosaic*, as well as *pagan sacrifices*, which went on the idea of a *vicarious atonement*, were merely human inventions of fraud or superstition.

But this charge against the **LAW** is founded either in ignorance or in ill faith. For though it may be true, that, by the *law of nature*, all *vicarious atonement* by sacrifice is superfluous and absurd; yet, by the *law of Moses*, it was rendered just and rational; for though this *law* was founded, as all God's revelations are, on *natural religion*, yet the law, built thereupon, is conceived on the principle of a **FREE GIFT**, long since forfeited by the breach of the condition on which it was bestowed. This principle, together with the *loss*, intimates the *recovery*. And further, in the institution of the *rites of sacrifice*, it instructs us in the *means* employed for the recovery; *means* peculiar, and properly adapted, to the nature of a *free gift*.

We have already given, and shall further explain and justify, those *means* (namely, the **VICARIOUS ATONEMENT**, IN THE SACRIFICE ON THE CROSS, with its dependencies), on the grounds of natural reason and religion.

To free, therefore, the *vicarious atonements*, in the Mosaic sacrifices, from this objection of our **PHILOSOPHERS**, it will be sufficient to observe these two things:

1. First, that the Mosaic sacrifices were **TYPES** (and by both the dispensations of the *law* and *gospel* declared to be so) of the great vicarious sacrifice of the cross: so that the justification of their use depends on their prototype: whose conformity to right reason and equity will be shown.

2. But then, in the second place, as these *types* had a **MORAL IMPORT**,\* that is, bore a temporal sense likewise, having a relation to the peculiar benefits enjoyed under a **THEOCRACY**, and so, of consequence were not

\* See these terms explained in the sixth book, pp. 484, et seq. of this volume.

*types* merely and solely of things to come, and to be transacted in another system, it will be necessary, in order, to their full justification against the objections of our adversaries, to show, that the *peculiar* benefits given by the LAW were of the nature of a FREE GIFT, like that of *immortality*, which was first bestowed on, and soon after lost by Adam in *paradise*, and recovered by Jesus Christ in the *gospel*. Between which two dispensations the LAW *came in* (as an intermediate revelation), and the benefits *peculiar* to the LAW (namely, extraordinary *temporal blessings*) were so far of the nature of the FREE GIFT of immortality (their prototype), as to make the MEANS of reconciliation for the violated condition attendant on such a *gift*, different from what is required for the transgressions which natural religion condemns.

Thus have we put a fair end to this formidable objection, conceived in ignorance, and brought forth in iniquity.

But this is not all. The sacred volume, which contains the principles whereon *vicarious atonements* are justified, under the *Mosaic law*, at the same time instructs us, that, by the LAW OF NATURE, a *vicarious atonement by sacrifice* is superstitious and absurd.

Moses, in pity of his people (whose idolatry, during his short absence, had so incensed the God of Israel, as to make it apprehended, by their leader, that they would be totally abandoned, if not instantly destroyed), transported with the patriot passion, and misled by the principles he had brought from Egypt, concerning VICARIOUS DEVOTEMENTS, thus addresses the Lord:—"Yet now, if thou wilt, forgive their sins: and if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book which thou hast written." To this the God of Israel replies (but on the principles of his own prior *law*, the LAW OF NATURE; the *ritual law* being already planned, indeed, but not given and received),—"WHOEVER HATH SINNED AGAINST ME, HIM *will I blot out of my book.*"\* As much as to say, "The *law of nature* allows not of *vicarious atonements*; but ordains that the man who transgresseth shall himself bear the punishment of his iniquity; a punishment which no man deserves for the faults of another, unless he be partaker of the guilt, by joining in the transgression."

But self-love, aided by superstition, made men seek for pardon of their sins in the sufferings of others. When God gave the *law of nature*, he did not permit his creatures to change the means he had ordained for pardon and reconciliation. But when he ordained the *Mosaic law*, by which many benefits of *mere grace*, as well as others of *debt*, were bestowed, he might, for breaches in the condition annexed to those of *mere grace*, well and equitably make the terms of pardon *different* from those he had before established for breaches in the condition annexed to those of *debt*.

Thus we see how REVELATION triumphs; while every attack upon it produceth, in some new discovery of the amazing wisdom in the vari-

\* Exod. xxx. 32, 33.

ous parts of the dispensation, some further evidence of its truth and divinity. We have shown with what superior sagacity, as well as indulgence, many harmless practices of gentilism were introduced into the Mosaic ritual. But to manifest to the world what use divine wisdom can make even of the worst rubbish of paganism, VICARIOUS SACRIFICES condemned by the *law of nature*, as absurd and superstitious, it changed, when brought into the Mosaic ritual, their very nature; and, in that revealed system, made them provisional and reasonable.

And now, again, to proceed. A deep-rooted *superstition* is always spreading wide and more wide. When men, thus labouring under this evil, had (in order to give themselves ease) gone so far as to indulge the fancy of a *vicarious sacrifice*, it was natural for them, to think of enhancing so cheap an *atonement* by the cost and rarity of the *offering*. And, oppressed with their malady, they never rested till they had got to that which they conceived to be the most precious of all, A HUMAN SACRIFICE. Nay, to accumulate the merit of the service by bringing it still nearer home, the madness did not cease to rage till it terminated in INFANTICIDE, or in offering up to their grim idols (instead of themselves) the CHILDREN of their bowels. We learn from *Sanchoniathon*, in that inestimable fragment of antiquity, translated by *Philobiblius*, that what is here collected from the natural course of things, is realized by fact. *It was customary in ancient times, says the fragment, in great and public calamities, before things became incurable, for princes and magistrates to offer up in sacrifice to the avenging demons, the dearest of their offspring.\** Under the fanatic fury of the high efficacy of this *atonement*, we need not wonder that the strongest instincts of nature should be subdued, and even their very impressions effaced in this horrid sacrifice, when we reflect that mere *civil custom*, to avoid only a probable, nay, but a possible, inconvenience, was, in those early times, of force enough to erase, even out of the best cultivated minds, the innate *love of parents for their children*, and to introduce a general practice of *exposing* them, at their birth, to almost inevitable destruction. What power then must this magic of custom acquire, when joined to dire superstition, under the horror of approaching vengeance, to dispose the terrified suppliant to offer up his own kind to avert it; nay, to make all sure, his own offspring, not only with indifference, but with alacrity.

This seems to have been the true original of HUMAN SACRIFICE:† an infernal practice, which soon overspread the world, barbarous and civil. For that LOVE and FEAR of God, implanted in our nature to improve and perfect HUMANITY, do, when become degenerate by fanatic and servile passions, make as speedy a progress in dishonouring and debasing it.

\* Apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. iv. p. 154,—ἴθις ἦν τοῖς παλαιοῖς, ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς τῶν παιδύων, ἀντὶ τῆς πάντων φθορᾶς, τὸν ἡγαπημένον τῶν τέκνων τοὺς κρατῶντας ὁ πόλις ἢ ἱερεὺς, εἰς σφαγὴν ἰσχυρόναι λύτρον τοῖς τιμωροῖς δαίμοσι, κατισφάεσθαι δὲ αἱ πόλεις μυστικῶς.

† See note G, at the end of this book.

From this HISTORY of the origin, use, and abuse of SACRIFICE, thus delivered, on the principles of nature and reason, and verified by fact, I have deduced, and, with the fullest evidence, established the following truths.

1. First, That the mode of religious worship by SACRIFICE, is in itself, A REASONABLE SERVICE.

2. Secondly, That sacrifice for sin was a fit atonement, and reasonably required in the dispensations both of *natural* and *revealed religion*, as a proper means of reconciling sinful man to his offended Master.

3. Thirdly, That this species of it, which is most open to objection, the VICARIOUS SACRIFICE, is founded in reason, when directed to the *Mosaic* and *Christian* systems; how abusive and absurd soever, when practised in the offices of *paganism*.

Nothing but *this history of sacrifice* could lay open the way to these truths: and nothing but these truths could let us into the true system of GOSPEL REDEMPTION. For till it was shown that a VICARIOUS ATONEMENT, a thing of the essence of this system, is consonant to our most rational ideas of the divine attributes; it might be thought, by those who only saw the abuse, and were ignorant of the genuine use of *vicarious atonement*, that our proving the death of Christ to be a REAL SACRIFICE, was only adding one embarrassment more in the road of *revelation*, instead of removing (as was my intention) a great many that ignorance hath laid across it.

But having now obviated the SOCINIAN objection to this species of sacrifice, we may proceed without further impediment to establish this capital principle of the Christian faith, THE SACRIFICE OF CHRIST ON THE CROSS FOR THE REDEMPTION OF MANKIND.

I. Which will be done, first of all, by showing that the *precious death upon the cross* was, for many ages, *prefigured*, and, in a scenical manner, *foretold* by the SACRIFICES OF THE LAW; and more particularly and circumstantially by those *sacrifices* called PIACULAR and VICARIOUS.

II. And secondly, by showing that this DEATH was kept in perpetual memory under the Christian dispensation, by a SACRED RITE, instituted by the divine victim himself, on his going to be offered; this *rite* being (to speak properly) nothing but, nor other than, A FEAST UPON A SACRIFICE.

I. All Christian churches, even the *Socinian*, agree in this, that the sacrifices of the Jewish law served, amongst other uses, for TYPES of the *death of Christ*, particularly those sacrifices called *vicarious*, *piacular*, and *expiatory*. Of which, some prefigured one part of that tremendous transaction, and some another.—The victim burnt without the camp foretold his sufferings without the city.—The blood sprinkled in the *sanctum sanctorum* by the high priest, on the day of expiation, prefigured our entrance into heaven, whither Christ prepared the way for us by his blood.—The sacrifice of the paschal lamb, which was both *piacular* and *eucharistical*, proclaimed the innocence of our Redeemer, and the universal benefit of his blood to mankind.

To set this matter in the clearest light.—As to the simple rite of SACRIFICE, this was not peculiar to Judaism. It was in use, as we have shown, from the beginning. Nature dictated this symbol to all her children: it being nothing else than a species of worship, in *action* instead of *words*; so that *sacrifice* and *religious worship* were correlative and coeval ideas. The particular thing which Moses indulged to his people, for the *hardness of their hearts*, was that *multifarious ritual*, of which, indeed, sacrifice makes a capital part.

Amongst the various causes of the *Mosaic ritual*, the principal were these:

1. First, A necessity of complying with those inveterate prejudices (least liable to idolatrous abuse) which a long abode in Egypt had induced: amongst the chief was their attachment to SACRIFICE; a species of divine worship, which, at this time, made almost the whole of religion in the Egyptian world. These people (as hath been observed before) reckoning up six hundred and sixty-six sorts of *sacrifice*.

2. A second cause of the Mosaic ritual was to debar the people from their too ready entrance to idolatry, by keeping them continually occupied in the performance of their sacred rites to the GOD OF ISRAEL; whose NAME, when lost in all other places, was, by their SEPARATION, to be preserved in the land of Judea, till *the fulness of time should come*.

3. A third was to PREFIGURE, by these rites of sacrifice, the DEATH OF CHRIST UPON THE CROSS: for the *Mosaic religion* being the foundation of, and preparatory to, the *Christian*, it was fit and proper to connect these two parts of God's moral dispensation, in such a manner that their mutual relation might, in a proper time, become evident to all men. For in two religions related to each other, as the MEANS and the END, the FOUNDATION and the SUPERSTRUCTURE, nothing can be more conformable to our ideas of divine wisdom, than its contriving some ties which might establish the knowledge, and perpetuate the memory of that close relation, without immaturely explaining the particulars of it. Now what can be conceived more effectual for this purpose than to make the RITES of the *one* religion TYPICAL, that is, declarative and expressive of the general *nature* of the *other*.

These various uses of SACRIFICE in the Mosaic ritual cannot but raise our admiration of the divine wisdom, which hath so contrived, that the very worship indulged to the Israelites, in compassion to their childish prejudices, should not only prevent the abuses, the natural effect of those prejudices which led to idolatry, but, at the same time, should establish and proclaim, by means of their TYPICAL representations, a strong and lasting connexion between the two religions. *Representations* so apposite to this end and purpose, that all the sects and parties in Christianity, how widely soever they differ amongst themselves in other matters, agree in this, that *the sacrifices of the law*, besides the other uses in the Mosaic institution, are TYPICAL OF THE DEATH OF CHRIST.\* So far,

\* See what hath been said of the logical and natural propriety of *types* and *secondary senses*, book vi. sect. 6.



we say, all the Christian churches, even the SOCINIAN, agree with us. In this, they differ; they pretend, that though the *Jewish sacrifices* prefigured the death of Christ, as *types* of it, yet it does not follow that *his death* was a *real sacrifice*, like the Jewish. On the contrary, we affirm, that this alone is sufficient to show, that if the *type* was a *real sacrifice*, the antitype must be so likewise. For (to enter a little more particularly into this mode of representation) a TYPE differs from a SYMBOL in this, that the type represents something *future*; the *symbol*, something *past* or *present*.—The commanded sacrifice of Isaac was given for a *type*; the sacrifices of the *law* were *types*. The images of the cherubims over the propitiatory were *symbols*; the bread and wine in the last supper were *symbols*.

So far they agree in their *genus*, that they are equally REPRESENTATIONS; but in their *species*, they differ widely.

It is not required that the *symbol* should partake of the *nature* of the thing represented: the cherubims shadowed out the celerity of angels, but not by any physical celerity of their own; the bread and wine shadowed out the body and blood of Christ, but not by any change in the elements.

But *types* being, on the contrary, representations of *things future*, and so partaking of the nature of *prophecy*, were to convey information concerning the *nature* of the *antitypes*, or of the things represented; which they could not do, but by the exhibition of their own nature.

Hence we collect, that the command to offer Isaac, being the command to offer a *real sacrifice*, the death and sufferings of Christ, thereby represented, was a *real sacrifice*. And the piacular and vicarious sacrifices of the LAW being *real sacrifices*, the death on the cross was a *real sacrifice* likewise.

Were this otherwise, the *type*, as a *type*, would contain more than was contained in the *antitype*. An absurdity, which makes the *shadow* convey more than the *substance*; when, by its very nature, it should convey less. On this truth, the reasoning in the epistle to the Hebrews is founded—"Christ," says the apostolic writer, "was once *offered* to bear the sins of many. For the *law* having the SHADOW of good things to come, and not the VERY IMAGE of the things, can never with those *sacrifices*, which they offered, year by year, continually, make the comers thereunto perfect: for then would they not have ceased to be offered."\*

The Jewish sacrifices are here called SHADOWS, not in an absolute, but in a comparative sense. The *type* is inferior to the *antitype*, just as, in visible things, a natural *shadow* is to an artificial *image*. For the *typical* sacrifices of the *law*, having, besides their property of *types*, a MORAL IMPORT, (and not like the typical sacrifice commanded to be offered by Abraham, a *mere shadow without any moral import*) are called *shadows*, not in opposition to realities (for having a *moral import*, they are *realities*); but called *shadows*, only in comparison to the

\* Heb. ix. 28—x. 1, 2. See book vi. sect. 6.

vast disparity between the virtues of the *types* and the *antitype*, thus explained and enforced by the same inspired writer—"For if the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer, sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the *purifying of the flesh*, HOW MUCH MORE shall the blood of Christ, who *offered* himself without spot to God, *purge your conscience* from dead works to serve the living God? \*

Again; though, from hence, it appears that these *types* with the *antitype* are occupied in the elucidation of the same great subject, yet it will not follow, that every several *type* is equally expressive of the *antitype*. Some of them shall present a more perfect image of the *antitype* than others; yet they do not exclude the most imperfect from a share in the honour of so august a representation. For though the divine author of the system had ordained, that the whole of the Jewish ritual, concerning sacrifices, should *typify* or prefigure the great SACRIFICE OF CHRIST; yet as those *sacrifices*, at the same time, constituted an essential part of the Mosaic economy, which, on several occasions, I have expressed more generally by the terms of their bearing a MORAL IMPORT, it could not but be that some would carry *fainter* and others *stronger, shadows or images* of what as *types* they represented; just as the various Jewish service, in its moral nature, afforded more or less occasions of evidence. Thus, the *type* of the *paschal lamb* was a more perfect representation, than the *type* of the *victim burnt without the camp*.

It might, and probably would have been otherwise, had these types borne *no moral import*, like the command to offer Isaac, for then nothing could have hindered all the *types* from being as complete representations of the *antitype* as that *command to Abraham* was; and if nothing hindered, it is reasonable to suppose, it would have been done.

We have observed, that these *types*, in the Mosaic ritual, were a kind of *prophecy by action*; in which providence was pleased to manifest to the world, the real connexion between the Jewish and the Christian revelations. But this was not all. The other sort of prophecy was not wanting, which, by way of eminence, has commonly assumed the *name*. viz. the written predictions of the Jewish prophets. Where, in a detailed account of the PROMISED MESSIAH, the principal part relates to his death and sufferings on the cross, under the idea of a SACRIFICE. And if, as hath been pretended, these things relate to *Jesus* only in a *secondary sense*, and to the Jewish leaders in a *primary*; this would only make the analogy between these two kinds of prediction more complete, and the connexion between the two religions more strong and durable. For the Jewish sacrifices, though as *types* they refer *ultimately* to Christ. yet as a religious service not typical, they had, like prophecy, a prior reference to the LAW. So admirable is this coincidence between these two sorts of *prediction*. As to the logical and moral fitness of SECONDARY SENSES, I have explained that matter at large in the former parts of this work. †

\* Heb. ix. 13, 14.

† See book vi. sect. 6.

Hitherto in support of the doctrine of the GREAT SACRIFICE ON THE CROSS. And this alone seems abundantly sufficient to establish it.

But this is not the whole. It was not only FORETOLD by the types and other prophecies of the *old law*, but the remembrance of it was PERPETUATED by a divine institution in the *new*: and an explanation of this rite is the last step we shall take, to fix this fundamental article of our holy faith.

In those ages of the world, when victims made a principal part of the religion both of Jews and Gentiles, the *sacrifice* was commonly followed by a religious feast on the thing offered, called *a feast upon, or after, the sacrifice*; the partakers of which were supposed to become partakers of the BENEFITS of the sacrifice. In allusion to this custom, Jesus was pleased to institute a feast of the same kind.—In order of time, indeed, the *feast* naturally *followed* the *sacrifice*. But in this great atonement, where the VICTIM, the OFFERER, and the PRIEST, were all one and the same person, the *feast* was, of necessity, to *precede* the sacrifice.

The history of this institution is recorded, by the evangelists, in these words:—"And as they were eating, Jesus took bread, and blessed it, and gave it to his disciples, and said, Take, eat: THIS IS MY BODY. And he took the cup, and gave thanks, and gave it to them, saying, Drink ye all of it; for THIS IS MY BLOOD of the New Testament, which is shed for many, for the remission of sins."—Matt. xxvi. 26—28.

Now, to manifest that we are not mistaken in the idea here given of this rite, let us reflect on the precise time of its celebration.

As Jesus, with his disciples (says the text) was concluding the paschal supper, which was a Jewish *feast after the sacrifice*, his own approaching sacrifice naturally suggested to him the idea of this *customary feast*. But being himself both the *victim* and the *offerer*, the institution of this rite must of necessity, as we observed, *precede* the *sacrifice*.—The *sacrifice on the cross* was the *antitype* of the *paschal lamb*; and the *feast* on Christ's sacrifice was the *antitype* of the paschal feast. So that the properest season we can conceive for the institution of the *last supper*, was the instant of time between the celebration of the *type*, and the offering of the *antitype*. This time likewise corresponded with Christ's usual practice, who was wont to deliver his instructions by actions and expressions, bearing allusion to what passed before his eyes, or presented itself, in the natural course of things, to his observation.\* These considerations show, that the *action*, in the celebration of this rite, was so strongly declarative of its nature, that had Jesus only broken the bread and given the cup *in remembrance of himself*, without adding, *this is my body*, and *this is my blood*, no ingenuous hearer could entertain a doubt whether this was designed by him as a *feast upon the sacrifice*. But when to this we add the remaining part of the explanatory

\* See Sir Isaac Newton's *Observations on the Prophecies*, p. 148; where he takes notice how Jesus, from the approach of harvest—from the lilies in bloom—from the leaves of the fig-trees shot out—from the sheep kept in folds near the temple for sacrifice—was accustomed to take occasion of inculcating his spiritual doctrines and precepts.

words, in the consecration of the elements—**THIS IS MY BODY—THIS IS MY BLOOD**—what is here contended for becomes almost self-evident.

In these *feasts upon sacrifice*, the very *body* that had been offered was eaten for the repast. Now, as the *last supper* was to be instituted, and the rite first celebrated, *before* the great sacrifice was actually offered, (for the reason just now given) it was on that account (not to mention other reasons) necessary that some *symbolic elements* should be substituted in the place of the *very body and blood*. These elements were **BREAD AND WINE**: on this occasion naturally, properly, and elegantly called, **THE BODY AND BLOOD**.

For if the specific nature of the *last supper* was a *feast upon sacrifice*, we must needs conclude, that the divine institutor of the feast would give all possible evidence of so important a truth.

But if (as was in fact the case) this evidence must arise from, and out of, the occasion, and through the *words* of the institution, then the figurative terms of **BODY** and **BLOOD** became necessary, these only being fully declarative of the nature of the rite. And as this made the use of these *terms* to be necessary, so the necessity of them produced their ease and elegance. This is observed, because it has been usual amongst protestants, even while they were opposing the portentous doctrine of **TRANSUBSTANTIATION**,\* to acknowledge, either through ignorance of, or inattention to, the specific nature of the rite, that the figure of *body and blood* was extremely violent and forced.

It likewise removes another difficulty, which the advocates for a *real presence* throw in the way of common sense. They pretend that, if the words of the institution were only **FIGURATIVE**, the evangelist and St Paul might, and probably would, have changed the *figure*, in their narratives, five times repeated on different occasions; for that no reason can be given of the unvaried use of the same words, but because they are to be understood **LITERALLY**; and then as they were declarative of one of the greatest mysteries in religion, there was a necessity to record the *very terms* employed, whenever the history of the institution was related. To this, it is sufficient to reply, that, indeed, were the words used *figuratively*, and the *figure* only expressive of a death commemorated, and no more, as the Socinians suppose it to be, it would be but reasonable to think, the terms would have been varied by one or other of the sacred writers; because it is natural to believe, that writers of so different genius and acquirements in language would not all have the same opinion concerning the use of these *precise terms*, so as to esteem them preferable to any other; as, in fact, on this idea of the rite, they would not be. But we can by no means allow their consequence, that therefore, they are to be understood **LITERALLY**; since, if we admit the institution to be of the nature of a *feast upon sacrifice*, there will be the same necessity for the unvaried use of the terms, although they be *figurative*, as there would have been although they were *literal*. For

\* See note H, at the end of this book.

these precise terms are as necessary to denote *a feast upon sacrifice* (the rite we contend for) as to denote the sacrifice itself; the enormous idea of the church of Rome.

All this reasoning on the nature of the institution, from the words of the institutor, receives additional strength even from what hath been supposed to invalidate it, namely, the conclusion of them—DO THIS IN REMEMBRANCE OF ME—for although these words, when delivered alone, might enjoin no more than a *remembrance of a dead benefactor*, (which is the sense the Socinians put upon them) yet, when preceded by—THIS IS MY BODY—THIS IS MY BLOOD—they are certainly an injunction to keep in *remembrance* his death and passion for our REDEMPTION. And could there be a feast upon a sacrifice in which that *sacrifice* was not to be kept in mind?

It is true, that the disciples of Christ being commanded to do this *in remembrance of him*, the command shows that the celebration of this *feast* was continually to be *repeated*, which was not the practice in the pagan and Jewish *feasts after the sacrifice*. But, in this particular, the reason of the difference is apparent—the GREAT SACRIFICE itself (of which the Jewish were *types*) put an end to that mode of religious worship amongst the followers of Jesus.

Jewish and pagan oblations had, or were supposed to have, a passing and temporary virtue. “For the law having a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things, can never with those sacrifices, which they offered year by year continually, make the comers thereunto perfect: FOR THEN WOULD THEY NOT HAVE CEASED TO BE OFFERED.”\*

But the sacrifice on the CROSS is the very *image* or the thing itself; and therefore has more than *a passing and temporary effect*, it continues operating till the consummation of all things; because *it makes the comers thereunto perfect*: we being sanctified through the *offering of the body and blood of Christ*, ONCE FOR ALL:† *for where remission of sins is, there is NO MORE OFFERING FOR SIN.*‡ It seemed expedient, therefore, that the operating virtue of this sacrifice, *offered once for all*, should be continually set before our minds, in repeated celebrations of the *feast upon it*.

What hath been here reasoned, on the *institution of the last supper*, appeared so strong to a late eminent person, famous for his Socinian notions on this subject, that (as I have been told) he used to confess, that if the death of Christ could be proved to be a *real sacrifice*, the *last supper* was undoubtedly of the nature of the *feast after the sacrifice*. This was said with his usual address, to make his reader overlook, and so to neglect, one of the capital arguments for a *real sacrifice*; for it insinuates, that arguments for its *reality* are to be sought for elsewhere, and not in the institution of this *rite*: whereas it is our design to show, that this very rite of the *last supper* constitutes one of the capital argu-

\* Heb. x. 1, 2.

† Ver. 10.

‡ Ver. 18.

ments for the reality of the sacrifice itself. And, therefore, let us now go on with it.

We have seen what may be naturally, and, indeed, what must be necessarily, concluded from this part of the evangelic history of the institution of the **LAST SUPPER**, concerning Christ's design therein.

Let us see next what may be collected of St Paul's sense concerning the same; who, although occasionally, yet hath at large spoken of the nature of the **LAST SUPPER**.

And here we shall find, that from this very *sort of feast* (which the *words* of the institution of it plainly alluded to) St Paul expressly draws a comparison; and, at the same time, to explain the *efficacy* of the *rile*, informs us of the end and purpose of those *feasts upon sacrifice*.

It is in that place of his first epistle to the Corinthians, where he reproves the proselytes to Christianity for the idolatrous practice of sitting with the gentiles, in their *feasts upon sacrifice*, and eating of the meats that had been offered to idols.

His words are these—"I speak as to *wise men*; judge ye what I say. The *cup of blessing* which we bless, is it not the **COMMUNION OF THE BLOOD OF CHRIST**? The *bread which we break*, is it not the **COMMUNION OF THE BODY OF CHRIST**? For we being many are one bread, and one body: for we are all partakers of that one bread. Behold Israel after the flesh: are not they which eat of the sacrifices, partakers of the altar: What say I, then? *That an idol is any thing, or that that which is offered to idols is any thing?* But I say, that the things which the gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God: and I would not that you should have **FELLOWSHIP** with devils. Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord, and the cup of devils: ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table, and of the table of devils."\*

The apostle here professeth to write to these Corinthians, under their own assumed character of *wise men*. And, though, perhaps, he useth the term a little ironically—as *wise in their own conceit*,—to reprove the *divisions*, before objected to them, yet the logical inference, drawn from an appeal to men of such a character, is not at all weakened by the sarcasm under which it is conveyed. My meaning is, we may fairly conclude, that St Paul's reasoning is such as, in his opinion, *wise men* would not disdain to weigh; and so regularly conducted, that *wise men* would acknowledge to be of force. In a word, pursued with that science and exactness, which leaves no room for the pretence of its having a loose, popular, or inaccurate meaning.

Whence we may collect, in the first place, that the *cup of blessing* is not *merely a general commemoration of a dead benefactor*, but principally *a commemoration of the DEATH AND PASSION of that benefactor*. It is the *communion of the blood of Christ*; an expression, as we have shown, of the utmost elegance to denote *a feast upon sacrifice*.

The inference which the apostle draws from it, puts his meaning out

\* 1 Cor. x. 15—21.



of question—*For we being many*, says he, *are one bread, and one body; for we are all partakers of that one bread*; i. e. Our being *partakers of one bread*, in the communion, makes us, of MANY (which we are by nature), to become (by grace) ONE BODY in Christ. This inference is manifestly just, if the *rite* be of the nature of a *feast upon sacrifice*; for then *the communion of the body and blood of Christ* unites the *receivers* into one body, by an equal distribution of one common benefit. But if it be *merely the commemoration of a dead benefactor*, it leaves the *receivers* as it found them; *not one body, incorporated by a common benefit*, but many separate individuals, professing one common faith.

The apostle having thus represented the LAST SUPPER to be of the nature of a *feast upon sacrifice*, for the truth of which he appeals to their own conceptions of it—*the cup of blessing, is it not the communion? &c.—the bread which we break, is it not the communion? &c.* He then endeavours to convince them of the *impiety* of their behaviour, from the nature of *those feasts*, as it was understood both by Jews and gentiles; who alike held, that they WHO EAT OF THE SACRIFICES WERE PARTAKERS OF THE ALTAR: i. e. had the benefits of the sacrifice. But what had these *eaters of the things sacrificed*, in common with the partakers of the bread and wine in the LAST SUPPER, if this *supper* was not a *feast* of the same kind with the *sacrificial feasts*? If the three religious feasts, pagan, Jewish, and Christian, had not one common nature,\* how could the apostle have inferred that this intercommunity was absolutely inconsistent?—*Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord, and the cup of devils.* For though there might be *impiety* in the promiscuous use of pagan and Christian rites; yet the *inconsistency* arises from their having one common nature, which, springing from contrary originals, destroys one another's effects. The reasoning stands thus—*Those who eat of the sacrifice, are partakers of the altar*, that is, are partakers of the benefits of the sacrifice. These benefits, whether real or imaginary, were confirmed by a pact or convention between the sacrificer and his God. They who eat in *the feast on that sacrifice* are partakers of the supposed benefits of the sacrifice, and, consequently, are parties to the federal rites which confirmed those benefits: so that the same man could not, consistently with himself, be partaker of both *tables*, the Lord's table and that of *devils*.

This argument, St Paul urges on the *wise men*, whose practice he is here exposing. And we see, it turns altogether on the postulatam agreed on, "that the *last supper* is of the nature of a feast upon sacrifice."

Now, if, instead of this idea, we substitute that other of the *Socinians*, *That the last supper is a mere commemoration of a dead benefactor*, all the force of this reasoning disappears and vanishes. For, although a reasonable man cannot execute two federal conventions, which destroy one another (the inconsistency here charged upon the Corinthians), yet he might celebrate, without *absurdity*, though not without *impiety*, a

\* See note I, at the end of this book.

federal rite in one religion, and a bare remembrance of a deceased benefactor in another.

Further, the same apostle, in correcting another abuse in the celebration of the *Lord's supper*, takes occasion, once again, to declare the NATURE of this holy rite.—His Corinthians, as appears by the next chapter,\* had been guilty of eating the *bread* and *wine* in a very indecent manner, confounding it with the convivial doings in their ordinary repasts; where charity and sobriety had been too often violated. This faulty behaviour, by such an indiscriminate celebration, the apostle calls the being *guilty of the body and blood of Christ*: a charge immoderately exaggerated, were the last supper *a mere commemoration of a dead benefactor*. The Corinthians did not make a fit distinction between their more ordinary food and their eating and drinking *in memory of a deceased friend*. This, without doubt, was a high indecorum; yet, to rank such delinquents with the *murderers of the Lord of life*, is a severity in which we can see neither justice in the sentence, nor propriety in the terms of it. But let us only suppose (what we have indeed proved), that St Paul regarded the last supper as *a feast upon sacrifice*, that is, a rite in which the benefits of Christ's death and passion were, in a certain manner, conveyed, in a proper celebration, thus impiously abused; and then the charge is fairly and justly made out. The profanation of such a rite was, indeed, aiding and assisting in the crime of his murderers, as far forth as it rendered his death ineffectual to the participants; and therefore properly compared to the prodigious enormity of that impious act.

Such then, I presume, is the true nature of the LORD'S SUPPER. And were the adjusting an exact notion of it a matter of mere speculation, I should have been much shorter; and have left the discussion of it (under the simple idea of a religious custom of Christian antiquity) to the ecclesiastical historian.

But the institution abounds with important consequences, in support of the catholic doctrine, which I here pretend to illustrate and confirm. For, if *the last supper be a feast upon sacrifice*, the unavoidable consequence is, that *the death of Christ was a real sacrifice*. It being the highest absurdity to believe, that a rite was instituted on the supposition of *a real sacrifice*, and to keep such sacrifice in perpetual memory, and yet that *no real sacrifice*, thus commemorated, ever had existence; but only the *shadow* of one, under a figure of speech.

And now it is high time to call again upon the SOCINIANS to examine and review this whole matter.

The writers of the New Testament unanimously and invariably call the death of Christ on the cross, A SACRIFICE. To this the SOCINIANS reply, "We confess, indeed, that those writers do thus uniformly qualify the death of Christ. But their phraseology abounds with FIGURATIVE TERMS; and the word SACRIFICE is plainly and eminently of this number. . . . When the death of Christ, so highly beneficial to man-

\* 1 Cor. xi. 27.

kind, was the subject of their discourse, they could not enforce the value of those benefits so intelligibly and strongly amongst men, who had been taught to conceive that the highest benefits were conveyed by the tremendous rite of SACRIFICE. But that this was all which those writers meant, when they called Christ's death a SACRIFICE, appears from hence, that SACRIFICE, whatever original it had, soon became, in practice, a superstitious and an irrational rite; and gloried in an efficacy which right reason disavows, namely, a VICARIOUS ATONEMENT; brought indeed, by Moses, together with other pagan rites, into the law, on account of the hardness of heart amongst those with whom their leader had to deal." This, and a great deal more to the same purpose, hath had its effect, to the discredit of the doctrine of REDEMPTION, on those men, and on others, as ignorant of the true origin and nature of SACRIFICE as themselves.

To remove these objections to a doctrine so essential to our faith, is the reason why I have been so large in proving,

1. First, from the origin and nature of SACRIFICE, that it is A REASONABLE SERVICE.

2. Secondly, that a VICARIOUS ATONEMENT, how much soever disclaimed by *natural religion*, is, in the *Jewish sacrifices* and in the *sacrifice of Christ*, a proper *atonement*; and may be justified on the surest principles of reason.

3. Thirdly, that the sacrifices of the *law* were TYPICAL of the great sacrifice of *Christ*.

4. Fourthly, that were it the purpose of the sacred writers, in their history of Christ's death and passion, to represent it as a REAL SACRIFICE, it is not possible to conceive they could convey that meaning in more expressive terms than in those which they have employed.

5. And lastly, that Christ's death and passion was, by himself, ordained to be perpetually commemorated; by a rite which declares *that* death could be no other than a *real sacrifice*.

When the SOCINIANS, I say, have well considered all this, they may be asked, with propriety, and modesty, whether it can be believed by any reasonable man, that all this apparatus was provided for, and bestowed upon, a MERE FIGURE OF SPEECH? Or whether they deserve the title they give themselves, of being the only rational interpreters of scripture, who can suppose such a perversion of order, in the divine economy, as that it should dignify a MERE FIGURE OF SPEECH with preceding TYPES, and a following FESTIVE INSTITUTION; things, most improper for this service; and only fitted to mislead us in our notions and conceptions concerning this capital doctrine of our holy *religion*?

We have now, it is presumed, settled the true SPECIFIC NATURE of the death of Christ; and having before spoken largely of its END, we proceed to consider the *effects* of it.

They are comprised by the sacred writers in the words, REDEMPTION and JUSTIFICATION.

*Redemption* respects the price paid by JESUS for our restoration to eternal life; and *justification*, the acceptance of that price by GOD THE FATHER.

From these two terms school divines coined a third, namely, *SATISFACTION*; which carries in it the ideas of a debt *paid* and *accepted*.

The disputes amongst divines concerning the sense and propriety of the terms, *redemption* and *atonement*, *justification*, *satisfaction*, &c., have been endless, and the confusion attending them inexplicable; chiefly occasioned by all parties mistaking their ground, and arguing on the principles of NATURAL LAW, when they should have had recourse to the REVEALED, as now explained.

But here a difficulty occurs. LIFE AND IMMORTALITY is, throughout the New Testament, considered as a FREE GIFT; called so in express words by St Paul; "But not as the *offence*," says he, "so also is the FREE GIFT."\* Yet, we know, a large price was paid for it. And this, likewise, the same apostle agrees to,—"*We were BOUGHT*," says he, "with a price."† And St Peter, speaking of certain heretics, says, *they denied the Lord that BOUGHT them*.‡ And St Paul again calls, what he had just before entitled A FREE GIFT,—A PURCHASED POSSESSION.§

To clear up this matter, and to reconcile the apostle to himself, who certainly was neither defective in natural sense, nor in artificial logic, let us once again remind the reader, that *life and immortality*, bestowed on Adam in paradise, was a FREE GIFT, as appears from the history of his creation. As a *free gift*, it was taken back by the donor, when Adam fell; to which resumption, our original natural rights are not subject; since natural religion teacheth, that sincere repentance alone will reinstate us in the possession of those rights, which our crimes had suspended. So that when this free gift, forfeited by the *first* Adam, was recovered by the *second*, its nature continuing the same, it must still remain a *free gift*; a gift to which man, by and at his creation, had no claim; a gift which natural religion did not bestow.

But, if misled by measuring this *revealed mystery* of human redemption, by the scanty idea of human transactions, where a *free gift* and a *purchased benefit* are commonly opposed to one another, yet even here we may be able to set ourselves right; since, with regard to man, the character of a *free gift* remains to *immortality restored*. For the price paid for forfeited man, was not paid by him, but by a Redeemer of Divine extraction, who was pleased, by participating of man's nature, to stand in his stead. Hence the sacred writers seeing, in this case, the perfect agreement between a FREE GIFT and a PURCHASED POSSESSION, sometimes call it by the one, and sometimes by the other name.

### CHAP. III.

So much for the MEANS of recovering what was lost by *Adam's* transgression.

\* Rom. v. 15.

† 1 Cor. vi. 20—vii. 23.

‡ 2 Pet. ii. 1.

§ Eph. i. 14.

In the entrance on this subject, I cautioned the reader to keep in mind the distinction between the **MEANS** of recovering a lost benefit, and the **CONDITION** annexed to the enjoyment of that benefit, when recovered, as two different things, to be separately considered, and in their order.

With regard to the **MEANS** (already explained at large), it hath been shown, that they were of an *arbitrary* nature, at God's good pleasure to appoint; unrestrained by any thing he had established in the general system of his moral government of man.

These **MEANS**, had not our holy religion revealed them, could not, otherwise, have been known.

They were the **DEATH AND SACRIFICE** of his ever blessed Son, *mediating* for us.

And now, *man* being restored to his forfeited inheritance, the secure possession of it still depended, as it did in the original grant, on the performance of a **CONDITION**.

We have already shown, why that *first condition* was the observance of a **POSITIVE COMMAND**. Which reasoning, if it have any force, proves, that the *new condition*, annexed to the recovered blessing, must be the observance of a **POSITIVE COMMAND** likewise.

**IMMORTALITY**, as hath been shown, was a **FREE GIFT**, as well when *recovered*, as when *originally given*; which might be bestowed, or recovered when forfeited, on what *condition* the Divine Donor should be pleased to annex to it.

Nay, if we consider the nature of the whole economy, we shall find it could not well be given, or restored when lost, on any other condition than the observance of a *positive command*, since the performance of **MORAL DUTY** was the *condition* already appropriated, by *natural religion*, to the procurement of **GOD'S FAVOUR**.

It is true, had **IMMORTALITY** not been a *free gift*, but what man had a right to, on his creation, while under the government of *natural religion*, the condition annexed to immortality might have been the performance of *moral duty*.

And indeed, those who so far mistake *immortality* as to esteem it a **RIGHT**, inherent in our nature, contend strongly for the *condition's* being of a *moral kind*; and that the command—*not to eat of the tree of good and evil*, enjoined to man in Paradise, is so to be understood, though delivered under the cover of an allegory.

But besides the reason given to evince this mistake, another arises from the sacred writer's not *explaining* this pretended allegory: for where an *allegory* contains a precept respecting the whole of *moral duty*, it can never be too plainly nor fully delivered. There would be none of this necessity if both the first and second condition of *immortal life* were of a *positive nature*, though delivered in allegoric terms which spoke for themselves; for then the chief use of an interpretation had been little more than the gratification of our curiosity.

Allow, therefore, the reasoning here offered to explain the nature of

the *condition* annexed to the *free gift* (when first given, and when, after forfeiture, restored) to be solid and convincing, and it opens to us the abundant goodness of our Maker; who, that the possession of this recovered blessing might be no longer precarious (as it was when first bestowed, on the condition, *to do or to forbear doing*), was graciously pleased to change one positive command for another; and, instead of something *to be done*, hath now required of us something **TO BE BELIEVED**. From henceforth the *free gift* of immortality is become more permanent and certain: a **GRACE**, which the very nature of the *new dispensation* would lead us to hope for and expect: whereby **IMMORTAL LIFE** under the gospel, like the **FAVOUR OF THE DEITY** under *natural religion*, is now, when forfeited, to be regained by **REPENTANCE**.

So much reason, order, and beauty is seen in the various parts of God's moral government of man, when compared and explained by one another.

The new **CONDITION**, as we say, is **FAITH IN THE REDEEMER**; or our owning and receiving him as the promised Messiah, by whom alone we are to receive that salvation, procured for us by the sacrifice of himself on the cross.

And now, we begin to have some reasonable notion of that great and fundamental principle of Christianity, that **FAITH ALONE JUSTIFIETH**, or, in other words, is the *sole condition* of recovering the possession of what we lost by **ADAM**.

This great truth, though made the foundation of the gospel of Jesus, yet (its reason lying hid, or not carefully sought for, and the little of it that was seen being horribly abused) *believers*, as well as *unbelievers*, have, too generally, concurred in condemning, as absurd in speculation, and fanatical and hurtful in practice. But the *divine* who hath carefully studied the nature of God's moral or religious dispensations, throughout all their parts, will be easily disposed to rest the whole of the Christian cause on the *reasonableness*, the *propriety*, and even the *necessity* of this capital principle.

We have now shown, 1st, That **LIFE AND IMMORTALITY** is, in its nature, a **FREE GIFT**; and that holy scripture always represents it under this idea: 2dly, That the benefit, which *natural religion* informs us we have to expect from our great Master is, simply, a reward for well-doing: a reward, indeed, which will be abundant; for though we be *unprofitable servants*, yet is he a most bountiful Master. But **ABUNDANT** and **ETERNAL** belong to different systems.

Man, from his creation, to his entrance into Paradise, was, as hath been shown, subject to the *law of natural religion* only. From thenceforth, to his expulsion from paradise, *revealed religion*, superinduced to the *natural*, was to be his guide: whereby, to God's **FAVOUR** (the sanction of *natural religion*) was added **IMMORTALITY** (the sanction of the *revealed*;) not on condition of his observance of *moral duties*; for that was the condition of God's *favour* under natural religion; but on condition of his obedience to a *positive command*.



But who are they, who, on the *recovery* of the free gift of immortality, are qualified to claim it? Certainly none but those who are already entitled to *some reward* by the *religion of nature*; which religion accompanies the *revealed* throughout all its various dispensations: and on which, they are all founded.

But to make this great principle of JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ALONE still more clear, let us suppose that, at the publication of the gospel, all to whom the glad tidings of immortality were offered, on the condition of *faith in Jesus*, had been moral or virtuous men; and, on that account, *entitled* (as natural religion teacheth) to the *favour* of God, and an abundant reward; is it not self-evident, that FAITH ALONE, exclusive of the condition of good works, would, in that case, have been the very thing which *justified*, or entitled to life everlasting?

But are *good works*, therefore, of no use in the Christian system? So far from that impiety, *good works* are seen, by this explanation, to be of the greatest avail; as they render men the only capable subjects of this JUSTIFICATION which FAITH ALONE procures.

This is the true use and value of WORKS with regard to FAITH; and greater cannot be conceived. Hence it appears, that JUSTIFYING FAITH is so far from excluding GOOD WORKS, that it necessarily requires them. But how? Not as sharing in that JUSTIFICATION; but as procuring for us a title to God's *favour* in general, they become the *qualification* of that inestimable reward, revealed by the gospel, to be obtained by FAITH ALONE.

To illustrate this matter by a familiar instance: suppose a British monarch should bestow, in *free gift*, a certain portion of his own *domains*\* upon such of his subjects who should perform a certain service, to which they were not obliged by the stated laws of that society under which they lived; it is evident, that the performance of this *last engagement* ONLY would be the thing which entitled them to the *free gift*: although that which gave them a claim to protection, as subjects, in the enjoyment of THEIR OWN PROPERTY,† acquired by observing the terms of the contract between subjects and sovereign, was the necessary qualification to their claim of the *free gift*; since it would be absurd to suppose that this gift was intended for rebels and traitors, or for any but good and faithful servants of the king and community.

This, I presume, is the true, as it certainly is the only consistent explanation, which hath been hitherto given of JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ALONE. Well, therefore, might St Paul reprove the ignorance or license of certain of his converts at Rome, in his question (which, under his authority, we have asked before) *Do we then make void the LAW through FAITH? God forbid! Yea, we ESTABLISH THE LAW.*‡

“But how,” it may be asked, “is the *law of works* ESTABLISHED by the

\* To which *immortality* may be well compared.

† To which the reward offered by *natural religion* may be well compared.

‡ Rom. iii. 31.

Christian doctrine of *faith*? For by the *law of works*, the apostle could mean no other than the *law of nature*; he having again and again told us, the *law of Moses*, as distinguished from the *law of nature*, was abolished by the law of Christ." I answer, this *law of works* was indeed ESTABLISHED, and in the most substantial manner, by the doctrine of *faith*, as these *works* are the very foundation of *justifying faith*; the qualification of all who are entitled to the *fruits* of that *faith*, viz. LIFE AND IMMORTALITY.

But further, to prevent all mistakes on this important subject, (if the wisest provisions of heaven could have prevented the effects of human perversity, without violating freedom of will) God was pleased to send JOHN THE BAPTIST, as the forerunner of his blessed Son, to proclaim and REPUBLISH this great principle of *natural religion*, PARDON ON REPENTANCE—*Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.*\* A necessary CALL to procure subjects to this new kingdom, just ready to be erected, where LIFE AND IMMORTALITY was to be obtained by *faith*; but *such* a faith as is founded on those *works* which *natural religion* requires to be performed; or, when neglected, the omission or transgression to be atoned for by REPENTANCE.

This shows the extreme folly of what hath been asserted by certain of our unwary friends, and echoed back to us by the enemies of our holy faith, that the GOSPEL ITSELF is only A REPUBLICATION OF THE RELIGION OF NATURE; whereas, it now appears, that the whole of THIS REPUBLICATION amounts to no more than a *republication* of one great principle of natural religion, viz. *pardon on repentance*; and this, as the foundation of (and in order to introduce and render effectual) our FAITH IN CHRIST, the great principle of the *revealed*.

To proceed. It is with regard to *John's* character of a preacher of *moral righteousness*, on the principles of natural religion, that *Jesus* says of him,—“Amongst them that are born of women hath not risen a greater than John the Baptist: notwithstanding, he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he:”† *this least in the kingdom of heaven is greater*, he says, *than John*, i. e. *greater in office*. JOHN only proclaimed and republished that great principle of natural religion.—*the doing works meet for repentance.*‡ Whereas the disciples of *Jesus* were the promulgators of the efficacy of revealed religion—SAVING FAITH—*greater* in their spiritual gifts and graces. They worked *miracles*. John worked *no miracle*. The reason is obvious: MIRACLES are the necessary CREDENTIALS of men sent by God to promulge a *new revelation*. The preaching up of *natural religion* (which was John's office) needed none of these *credentials*: its truth having been engraved in the breasts of every one, when God created *man in his own image*.

But this is not all. The better to secure this natural foundation of SAVING FAITH, *Jesus* himself, in his entrance on his ministry, thought

\* Mat. ii. 2.

† Mat. xi. 11.

‡ Acts xxvi. 20.

fit to repeat and confirm the mission of *John*; and in the very words of his forerunner—**REPENT, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.**\* On this account, I suppose, it was that *Herod*, hearing that a new prophet was just arisen, who began his ministry like *John*, with preaching *repentance*, because *the kingdom of heaven was at hand*, mistook him for *John risen from the dead*; and being alarmed at the name of *kingdom*, joined to the report of *miracles*, now first performed by him, concluded, he was returned to life, with the accession of new powers: Herod, I say, in his fright, cries out,—“John the Baptist, whom I beheaded, is risen from the dead, and **THEREFORE** mighty works do show forth themselves in him.”† A natural sentiment on this occasion. For cruelty, in its suspicions, commonly adds terror to superstition.

Yea, further, when *Jesus* first sent out his disciples to give notice of his gospel, they, too, were directed to enforce this previous and necessary truth:—“And they went and preached that men should repent.”‡

And they whom he left behind him at his ascension were likewise directed to perform the same office. They began their work with the doctrine of **REPENTANCE**, only changing the baptism of *John* into that of *Jesus*. St Peter, in his first discourse to all the *dwellers at Jerusalem*, who inquired of him into the *way of salvation*, speaks in this manner:—“Repent, and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ.”§

St Paul tells Agrippa, that he began his mission with exhorting both Jews and Gentiles, “that they should repent, and turn to God, and do **WORKS** meet for repentance.”|| And as he *began* with *repentance*, so he *ends* with it, where, in his Epistle to the Hebrews, he expresseth himself in this manner, “Therefore leaving the **PRINCIPLES** of the doctrine of Christ, let us go on unto **PERFECTION**; not laying again the **FOUNDATION** of repentance from dead works, and of faith towards God.”—These are the great principles of *natural religion*, which Christ made the **FOUNDATION** of his gospel. Iniquity is called *dead works*—as by *faith towards God* is meant simple belief in him; and alludes to the same apostle’s definition of natural religion—where he says, “he that cometh to God must **BELIEVE** that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.” The sense of which is this,—“Sink not back again to, nor rest in that principle of *natural religion*, after you have made it (as your Master requires you should) the *foundation* of his gospel.”

But as there are not only *first principles* in natural religion, but likewise in the revealed, the apostle goes on with an account of these likewise—“The doctrines of baptisms, and of laying on of hands, and of the resurrection of the dead, and of eternal judgment.” Now these *first principles* of the GOSPEL we are likewise forbid to rest in, no less than in those *first principles* of **NATURAL RELIGION**, which the apostle began with—it follows (as we are directed) that we should **GO ON UNTO PERFECTION**. But if it be asked, *What was this doctrine of perfection?* I

\* Mat. iv. 17.    † Mat. xiv. 2.    ‡ Acts ii. 38.    § Acts xxvi.    || Ibid.

answer, it was that great MYSTERY, first revealed by the *gospel*, which explains our loss by the disobedience of Adam, and the punishment attending it, together with the recovery of that loss by Christ Jesus, who was graciously pleased to become our MEDIATOR; and more than that, by virtue of his death and sufferings on the cross, our REDEEMER likewise, together with all the circumstances attending this wonderful transaction of human redemption.

This *doctrine of perfection*, the apostle promises to explain to them, if God affords him leisure and a fitting opportunity—*if God*, says he, *permit*.\* This, for some wise ends of his providence, God did not *permit*. Nor have we any reason to complain, as he endowed his inspired servants, in general, both with leisure and abilities to enrich the world with the noblest treasures of divine knowledge, ordained to enlighten and accompany his church till the consummation of all things.

Thus, on the whole, it appears, even by the *principle* here explained, OF SALVATION BY FAITH ALONE, that NATURAL RELIGION IS THE GROUND AND FOUNDATION OF ALL THE REVEALED.

Here let us stop a moment, to deplore the condition of human blindness, always running into opposite extremes. While one sort of believers (as we have observed) can see no more in the *gospel* than a *republication of the religion of nature*; and another are so far from owning, that *natural religion* is the foundation of the revealed, that they are ready to deny that natural religion.

These, indeed, are portentous opinions; yet less so than that of our RATIONALISTS, who deny what scripture has, in so many words, so often repeated, SALVATION, OR JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ALONE.

But they had mistaken the gospel doctrine of *salvation* and *justification* for no more than God's *favour* indefinitely, as taught by *natural religion*; whereas the words signify ETERNAL LIFE, brought to light and defined by the *gospel*. What occasioned their confounding two things so different, was an unsuspected error, full as gross, namely, that *natural religion*, in teaching a reward for well-doing, taught an *eternal reward*. An error into which these men could scarce have fallen, had they distinguished the *religion of nature*, to which Adam became subject on his creation, from that religion which was revealed unto him when he entered paradise.

This hath been rectified at large towards the beginning of this discourse; and to what important purposes, the reader may now understand.

Indeed, had *natural religion* promised *life and immortality* or *well-doing*, then would God's two dispensations have contradicted one another; as giving *immortality* to WORKS by *natural religion*, and *immortality* to FAITH by the *revealed*.

But there are no contradictions in the economy of God's moral government. All such are the spawn of *human systems*, the mis-shapen

\* Heb. vi. 1—3.

issue of *artificial theology*. And if one thing, in sacred scripture, seems to look thus askew upon one another, we may be assured it arises from the vitiated organs of the observer.

To instance, in the famous case (so apposite to our present purpose) of the apostles, PAUL and JAMES; whom ignorant interpreters have set at variance.

ST PAUL says,\*—THEREFORE WE CONCLUDE, *that a man* IS JUSTIFIED BY FAITH WITHOUT THE DEEDS OF THE LAW.

But St James seems to speak another language†—YOU SEE THEN, *how that by* WORKS a man is JUSTIFIED, AND NOT BY FAITH ONLY.

The assertion of each apostle is (we see) a CONCLUSION from some preceding PREMISES. These are, first of all, to be considered, ere we can determine concerning the sense of either *conclusion*, where the same *capital word* is employed, by both writers, in common.

St Paul having explained (for that is his subject) the nature of the GOSPEL COVENANT, whereby we are restored to the inheritance which we lost by *Adam's* transgression, namely, *life and immortality*, ends his argument in this manner—*Therefore we conclude that a man is* JUSTIFIED BY FAITH [*i. e.* entitled to this recovered benefit by virtue of *faith*] WITHOUT THE DEEDS OF THE LAW [*which are works*]. We have shown how true this position is; WORKS being what *justifies* or entitles us to the *favour of God*, as taught by natural religion; the foundation, indeed, of the gospel covenant; which promiseth life and immortality to FAITH ALONE.

But St James, where he seems to talk so differently from Paul, was enforcing a very different thing, namely, the obligation of MORAL DUTY, as taught by *natural religion*, though not exclusive of the *revealed*; for he exemplifies it by the precepts of the DECALOGUE; which, though a moral part of the LAW, is supported equally on the two religions, natural and revealed. He, therefore, concludes his argument in this manner—*Thus we see, how that by* WORKS A MAN IS JUSTIFIED, *and not by faith only*.

Hence it appears, that the two apostles use the word JUSTIFICATION, in these places, in very different senses. St Paul means by it, a title to *eternal life*, on the terms of *revealed religion*; and St James, a title to *God's favour* indefinitely, on the terms of *natural religion*.

Neither can they be fairly charged with obscurity in using an undefined term in different significations, since, had their readers but attended to the different subjects each apostle was then treating, and both in an equally clear and obvious manner, the objectors would have seen, there was not the least need of a formal definition to ascertain the meaning of either.

On the whole, it appears, that the two apostles are perfectly consistent in their reasoning on this question. Whose words, when aptly put together, produce this complete and capital truth,—“WORKS entitle us

\* Rom. iii. 28.

† His General Epistle, chap. ii. 24.

to a *reward* indefinitely; FAITH to the reward of *eternal life*: but as he who deserves *no reward* at all, can never deserve the reward of *eternal life*, therefore the first step to the *greater* blessing must needs be a title to the *lesser*."

St PAUL's purpose was to vindicate the use and honour of the *gospel* from *judaizing Christians*, by showing, that the MORAL WORKS of the *Jewish law* (the same with those of *natural law*) did not entitle the observers to *eternal life*; this being the specific reward which the *gospel* bestows, and bestows it on FAITH alone. •

St JAMES's purpose was to vindicate the use and honour of *natural religion*, from the corrupt comments of those pretended Christians, who flattered themselves in their vices with the hopes of obtaining *eternal life* by FAITH, without being previously qualified for the FAVOUR of God, by the performance of those *good works* which natural religion enjoins: and so vitiating the integrity, and destroying the very nature of FAITH itself. A dreadful venom, which appeared early, and, like a leprosy, soon overspread the face of the church; at present known by the detested name of ANTINOMIANISM.

But to leave nothing unanswered on so important a question, I will suppose an objector may persist in his reply.—Be it granted that the two apostles are thus made consistent with one another; a stronger objection still remains to the doctrine of *salvation by FAITH ALONE*, and that is the declaration of Christ himself, who gives this *salvation or justification* to WORKS; where, in his account of his *second coming* to judge the world, he thus pronounces on the final doom of the nations assembled round his throne,—“To the RIGHTEOUS, he says, Come ye blessed of my Father, INHERIT THE KINGDOM PREPARED FOR YOU FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE WORLD. For I was an hungered, and ye gave me meat; I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink; I was a stranger, and ye took me in; I was naked, and ye clothed me; I was sick, and ye visited me; I was in prison, and ye came unto me. Then shall the RIGHTEOUS answer him, saying, Lord, when saw we thee an hungered and fed thee? or thirsty, and gave thee drink? When saw we thee a stranger, and took thee in? naked, and clothed thee? or when saw we thee sick, or in prison, and came unto thee? And the KING shall answer and say unto them, Verily, I say unto you, forasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me. Then shall he say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was an hungered, and ye gave me no meat; I was thirsty, and ye gave me no drink; I was a stranger, and ye took me not in; naked, and ye clothed me not; sick and in prison, and ye visited me not. Then shall they also answer him, saying, LORD, when saw we thee an hungered, or athirst, or a stranger or naked, or sick or in prison, and did not minister unto thee? Then shall he answer them, saying, Verily I say unto you,



inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the least of these, ye did it not unto me."\*

To explain this, which seems to bear so hard against us, we must first of all observe the great care and caution in the divine Founder of our faith, and of his apostles, to whom he committed the trust of proclaiming it to the world; the care, I say, that this capital doctrine of his religion, **JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ALONE**, should not be mistaken or abused, in making **FAITH** supersede those **WORKS** which natural religion requires as necessary to procure the *favour of God*. **WORKS**, which we have shown to be the only true foundation of that **FAITH WHICH ALONE JUSTIFIES**. And the world hath had full experience of the horrid **ABUSES** occasioned by men's placing **FAITH** on any other foundation.

So that were there *no more* in this *scenical representation* of the *last judgment* than the purpose to make **WORKS** bear so considerable a part in it, the representation had been still highly expedient. But there was *a great deal more*.—

—Hold, says an objector; let us first ask how this scene can at all stand with your system, which teacheth, "that **WORKS** only entitle to the *reward indefinitely*; and that it is **FAITH** which entitles to the reward of eternal life: for these **RIGHTEOUS**, in the text, are rewarded with that which is only due to the **FAITHFUL**, namely, *eternal life*."

—I was about to explain another important use of this *representation*, which you will now find is a full answer to your objection.

—Jesus, in the very *mode* of obviating the above-mentioned *abuses* (for they were those abuses which it was his purpose here to obviate), hath, with the most divine energy and address, instructed us in another important truth, namely; **THAT THE VIRTUE AND MERITS OF HIS DEATH HAD A RETROSPECT QUITE BACKWARD EVEN TO THE TIME OF THE FALL**. The *righteous*, or the performers of *good works*, are here told, that they shall **INHERIT the kingdom of Christ, PREPARED FOR THEM from the foundation of the world**. Who were these, here called *righteous*? Certainly such who had never heard of Christ, or been made acquainted with the terms of the gospel; such who had obeyed the dictates of natural religion; and not having the **LAW of revealed religion**, were (as the apostle says) *a law unto themselves*.† This will appear evident to those who consider the nature and purpose of this *representation* of the *last judgment*; when all nations, or the whole race of mankind, as well those who lived *before*, as those who came *after* the advent of the Son of God, are to appear at his judgment-seat.

The tremendous session, here represented, proceeds in order. They who lived *before* the coming of Christ, are the first who are set to the bar, whether for reward, or for condemnation. They who lived *after* were to come next. But, with the first, the scene closes.

For Jesus had already explained *the terms of salvation* to all the followers of the gospel. Concerning the condition of these there could be

\* Mat. xxv. 34—45.

† Rom. ii. 14.

no doubt. It might become a question amongst them, how those who had never heard of Christ were to be treated; and whether they were to be made partakers of the benefits of his death and passion; and likewise, upon what terms. To resolve those points, was the design of this moral picture.

These *righteous* are justified or saved. But how? surely not by FAITH. For, the apostle tells us, that “FAITH cometh by hearing; and hearing by the word of God.”\* That is, “The doctrine of *justifying faith* cannot be learned from *natural religion*; but is to be taught by the messengers of the *revealed*, speaking by the Spirit of God.” The *justification of these righteous*, therefore, must needs be by WORKS; the natural foundation on which all revealed FAITH is built.

But to show still more evidently, and sensibly, that the *righteous*, in the text, were those who had never heard of Christ, till they came to *judgment*, we must observe, that as soon as they had been told, what kind of WORKS they were which procured their salvation, namely, administering to this their *Lord when he was a stranger, naked, sick, and in prison*, they are made to reply—“Lord, when saw we thee a stranger, naked, sick, and in prison?” A question, which they, who, in this life, had heard of Christ, could never ask: since their *Lord* had often told his followers, that the men who did any of these *good works* to the least of their distressed brethren, did them unto him: that is, gained the same benefit by them, as if done to himself.

In a word, this important REPRESENTATION instructs us in these two points of doctrine: first, That the KINGDOM, whose blessings were produced by the death and passion of Christ, was secured to us *even from the foundation of the world*: and, secondly, That it was, *actual righteousness*, as well as *imputative*, which made those who had never heard explicitly of CHRIST, to become partakers of his merits.

#### CHAP. IV.

HAVING now, at length, gone through this GENERAL VIEW OF THE NATURE AND GENIUS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION; first, by explanation of the MEANS by which we are enabled to recover the benefits lost by Adam's transgression; and, secondly, by an explanation of the CONDITION annexed to the enjoyment of those benefits, when recovered: we proceed to what remains of our *general view*. This religion, as it was the LAST REVELATION of God's will to man, so it was the completion of all that preceded; and, therefore, when truly explained, must needs add the UTMOST FORCE AND LIGHT to every thing that, in the foregoing books of the DIVINE LEGATION, hath been advanced, concerning the NATURE OF THE JEWISH DISPENSATION.

We have already observed how graciously the divine goodness dis-

\* Rom. x. 17.

played itself, in the RESTORATION of our *lost inheritance*, by changing the *condition* annexed to eternal life, from something to be DONE, to something to be BELIEVED. And this was FAITH IN OUR REDEEMER. For by such a change, this important blessing became less subject to a new loss or danger.

But this was not all. The same bountiful Lord of life did, for its further security, impart to every true believer, the strength and light of his HOLY SPIRIT to support FAITH *in working out our salvation*.

*Natural reason*, indeed, contemplating the attributes of the Deity, discovered to us, that when human abilities alone are too weak to support us in the performance and discharge of moral duty, God will lend his helping hand to aid our sincere endeavours.

But to manifest to us with what more abundant measure this aid is dispensed, under the GOSPEL, our blessed *Redeemer* hath minutely explained all that relates to the PERSON and to the operations of the divine dispenser, called the HOLY SPIRIT; whom the FATHER and the SON have, for the further security of this recovered blessing, been pleased to associate with themselves in the administration of this economy. Which divine person bears his share, with the other two, in the actual REDEMPTION OF MANKIND.

Thus far as to his NATURE. By which it appears, that this species of divine assistance, which our holy religion calls GRACE, is to be understood as one of the *peculiar* blessings bestowed upon the FAITHFUL; and to be reckoned in that number. The words of St John make this truth still more apparent. *This, saith he, Jesus spake of the SPIRIT, which they that believe on him should receive. For THE HOLY GHOST WAS NOT YET GIVEN, BECAUSE THAT JESUS WAS NOT YET GLORIFIED.\**

The OFFICE and OPERATION of this *Holy Spirit*, is to support our *faith* and to perfect our *obedience*, by enlightening the *understanding* and by purifying the *will*.

This, the blessed Jesus declares where he professedly treats of the office of the *Holy Spirit*.—"I will pray the Father," says he "and he shall give you another COMFORTER, that he may abide with you for ever; even the SPIRIT OF TRUTH. He dwelleth with you; and shall be in you—which is the HOLY GHOST whom the Father shall send in my name: he shall TEACH YOU ALL THINGS."†

These are the two parts of his office: as the TEACHER, to impress upon the *understanding* all those practical and speculative truths, which constitute the sum and substance of our holy religion; and as the COMFORTER, by purifying and supporting the *will*, to enable us to persevere in the profession of those truths that constitute the body of *moral righteousness*; the foundation (as we have shown) of that JUSTIFYING FAITH, to which the gospel hath annexed salvation or eternal life.

And the economy of the gospel seemed to require, that when this dispenser of divine assistance, the HOLY SPIRIT, was to be clearly revealed,

\* John viii. 39.

† John xiv. 26.

and personally distinguished, as soon as Jesus was GLORIFIED,\* his first descent, amongst the *faithful*, should be attended with *signs* and *wonders*, to bear witness to the SANCTIFIED in the same way that they had borne witness to the REDEEMER. These signs were, in both cases, of the same nature, and performed for the same ends: first, for CREDENTIALS of their mission; and, secondly, INDICATIONS of their office.—“When the day of Pentecost was fully come, they [the apostles] were all, with one accord, in one place; and suddenly there came a sound from heaven as of a rushing mighty wind, and it filled all the house where they were sitting. And there appeared unto them cloven tongues, like as of fire, and it sat upon each of them: and they were all filled with the HOLY GHOST; and began to speak with other tongues, as the SPIRIT gave them utterance.”

This miracle manifested itself in the *gift of tongues*, to the astonished multitude, barbarous and civil, then casually assembled from every quarter of the habitable globe, who heard the APOSTLES, (all natives or inhabitants of Galilee,) speaking to each of these strangers, in his own mother tongue. And this being for the service and conviction of others, was, in its nature, TEMPORARY.† Other effusions of the Holy Spirit were PERMANENT; and these, instead of being conveyed *in a sound from heaven as of a RUSHING MIGHTY WIND*, were only conveyed and felt in the STILL, SMALL VOICE. For these were principally for the use and benefit of the favoured receiver; who, although he himself was fully assured by them of the divine presence, yet could he give no sufficient evidence of that presence to others.

Thus it appears, that this species of divine assistance, which our holy religion calls GRACE, is to be considered as one of the *peculiar* blessings bestowed upon the *faithful*. For, as hath been observed, the FATHER and the SON have been graciously pleased to associate, in the administration of this new economy, a *third divine person*, called in scripture the HOLY GHOST.

#### CHAP. V.

THIS MIRACULOUS appearance of the HOLY SPIRIT, on his first *descent*, naturally and happily leads us forward in this our *general view*; by bringing us to the consideration of the extraordinary manner in which it hath pleased providence to promulge and propagate the Christian faith.

Now, as it is apparent to common sense, that an immediate revelation from heaven can be firmly established no otherwise than by the intervention of MIRACLES; and, as we have found, by the sad experience of human corruption, that THIS SUPREME EVIDENCE of our holy religion hath been fatally discredited by the contagion of *lying wonders*, deforming almost every age of the church, it will be of the utmost importance to discover and fix the bounds of this *extraordinary interposition*.

\* John vii. 39.

† Acts ii. 1. et seq.

‡ See note K, at the end of this book.

But a **MIRACLE**, even when best supported by human testimony, needeth to be still further qualified, ere it can deserve credit of a rational believer: namely, that it be so connected with the system to which it claims relation, as that it be seen to make a part of it, or to be necessary to its completion.

It is otherwise, in facts, acknowledged to be within the verge of nature and human agency. Here all that is wanted to recommend them to our belief, is the testimony of knowing and honest witnesses.

While in pretended facts beyond the verge of nature and human agency, such as those we call **MIRACULOUS**, much more is required when offered to our belief. The control and arrest of the established laws of nature, by the God and Author of nature, either mediately or immediately, is a thing which **COMMON EXPERIENCE** hath rendered so extremely improbable, that it will at least balance the very best human testimony standing unsupported and alone. And why? Because ordinary facts carry their **CAUSES** openly and manifestly along with them: or if not so, yet none are required, as we are convinced their *causes* must be **INTRINSICALLY** there. But in facts pretended to be *miraculous*, the immediate efficient cause is *extrinsic*; and therefore leaves room for doubt and uncertainty: or rather, when, in this case, men perceive *no cause*, they are apt to conclude there is none; or, in other words, that the report is false and groundless. So that when the *whole evidence* of the fact, deemed *miraculous*, is solely comprised in human testimony, and is, in its nature, contrary to **UNIFORM EXPERIENCE**, the philosopher will, at least, suspend his belief.

But though in all **MIRACLES**, that is, in facts deemed miraculous, the **EFFICIENT CAUSE** continues unknown; yet, in those which our holy religion seems to recommend to our belief, the **FINAL CAUSE** always stands apparent. And if *that cause* be so important as to make the *miracle* necessary to the ends of the **DISPENSATION**, this is all that can be reasonably required to entitle it to our belief; when proposed to us with the same fulness of human testimony, which is sufficient to establish a common fact: since, in this case, we have the **MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY** to secure us from an error, so fatal to our welfare.\*

And the confining our belief of *miracles* within these bounds, wipes away (as I conceive) all the miserable sophistry of our modern pretenders to philosophy, both at home and abroad, against **MIRACLES**, on pretence of their being contrary to **GENERAL EXPERIENCE**, in the ordinary course of things. At least, the **TRUE PHILOSOPHER** so thought, when he made that strict inquiry into truth, towards the conclusion of his immortal work—"Though **COMMON EXPERIENCE**," says he, "**AND THE ORDINARY COURSE OF THINGS** have justly a mighty influence on the minds of men

\* Here, by the way, let me observe, that what is now said gives that **CRITERION**, which Dr Middleton and his opponents, in a late controversy, concerning **MIRACLES**, demanded of one another; and which yet, both parties, for some reasons or other, declined to give; namely, some certain mark to enable men to distinguish (for all the purposes of religion) between true and certain *miracles*, and those which were false or doubtful.

to make them give or refuse credit to any thing proposed to their belief; yet there is ONE CASE wherein the STRANGENESS of the facts LESSENS NOT THE ASSENT to a fair testimony given of it. For where SUPERNATURAL events are SUITABLE TO THE ENDS AIMED AT BY HIM who hath power to change the course of nature, *then*, under such circumstances, they may be FITTER to procure belief, by how much the more they are BEYOND OR CONTRARY TO ORDINARY OBSERVATION. This is the proper case of MIRACLES which, well attested, do not only find credit themselves, *but give it also to other truths which need such confirmation.*"\*

Now the MIRACLES which Christianity objects to our belief, and which, therefore, demand credit of every reasonable man, are, and I apprehend must be, qualified in one or other of these three ways:

I. They must either, in the first place, be such as Christ and his inspired servants and followers are recorded to have performed for the CREDENTIALS of their mission.

II. Or, secondly, such as make a necessary part in, or towards the completion of, the gospel system.

III. Or, thirdly and lastly, such as have been performed directly to manifest and VERIFY THE DIVINE PREDICTION, when impious men have set themselves on attempting to defeat them.

I. When a *miracle* is wrought (as in the first case) for the CREDENTIAL of a messenger coming with the revealed will of God, to man, we may safely confide in it. Because *such* a miracle is so far from being beneath the dignity of the occasion, that it is even necessary to answer the important purpose of it. Under this idea, it hath, I believe, been generally conceived in every age of our holy religion, till the *present*. Indeed, it seems to have been the constant expectation of believers, that these supernatural attestations should accompany every NEW MESSAGE from heaven; insomuch that all the *pretended revelations* in the pagan world, as well as the *real* in the Jewish and the Christian, were constructed on this principle of credit.

But now, in these times, some there are even amongst the ministers of the gospel, who tell us, they think, or at least are hardy enough to teach, that the REASONABLENESS of the doctrine is the best, and indeed the only true evidence of its divine original.

If in this they should not be mistaken, I may, however, boast, that I, myself, have, in this work, greatly strengthened this boasted plenitude of evidence.

But, in reverence to truth, I hold myself obliged to own, that, in my opinion, the REASONABLENESS of a doctrine pretended to come immediately from God, is, of itself alone, no PROOF, but a PRESUMPTION only

\* Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, vol. ii. Chap. of the Degrees of Assent, s. 13. p. 386.—This great man, we find, understood it to be apparent to common sense, that the belief of an immediate revelation from heaven could be firmly established no otherwise than by the aid of miracles.—But see this truth proved more at large as we go along.



of such its divine original; because, though the *excellence* of a doctrine (even allowing it to surpass all other moral teaching whatsoever) may show it to be worthy of God, yet, from that sole *excellence*, we cannot certainly conclude that it came immediately from him; since we know not to what heights of moral knowledge the human understanding, unassisted by inspiration, may arrive. Not even our full experience, that all the wisdom of Greece and Rome comes extremely short of the wisdom of the GOSPEL, can support us in concluding, with certainty, that this gospel was sent immediately from God. We can but very doubtfully guess, what excellence may be produced by a well-formed and well-cultivated mind, further blessed with a vigorous temperament, and a happy organization of the body. The amazement into which Sir Isaac Newton's discoveries in nature, threw the learned world, as soon as men became able to comprehend their truth and utility, sufficiently shows, what little conception it had, that the human faculties could ever rise so high or spread so wide.

On the whole, therefore, we conclude, that, strictly speaking, there is no ground of conviction solid and strong enough to bear the weight of so great an interest, but that which rises on MIRACLES, worked by the first messengers of a new religion, in support and confirmation of their MISSION.

That is, MIRACLES, and MIRACLES ONLY, demonstrate that the doctrine, which is seen to be *worthy* of God, did, indeed, COME IMMEDIATELY from him.

To be plain, there is a glaring absurdity in the novel fancy here exposed; of which we can find no instance in the affairs of civil life.—And civil and religious policies are conducted on the same principles of reason, while administered in their integrity. For what *public person* ever imagined, or expected to have it believed, that the true and proper CREDENTIAL of a minister of state was the fairness of his character, or the equity of his demands? Nothing but the BROAD SEAL of his master, he knows, will satisfy those to whom he is sent, that he has a right to the personage which he assumes. Doth not common sense tell us, that a messenger from God must come recommended to mankind in the same manner? Neither his personal accomplishments, nor the excellence of his doctrine, nor, in a word, any thing short of the BROAD SEAL of Heaven, exemplified in MIRACLES, will be sufficient to establish his assumed character.

But the Doctors of this *new school* seem to have fallen into the absurdity here exposed, by another as ridiculous; namely, that THE GOSPEL ITSELF IS NO MORE, NOR OTHER, THAN A REPUBLICATION OF THE RELIGION OF NATURE: (an extravagance, amongst the first of those, which, I presume, this work of the Divine Legation hath totally discredited.)

Now (say these men) if the light of reason hath instructed us in what NATURAL RELIGION teacheth, it seems most consonant to common sense, that the REPUBLICATION of this religion should be established in the same manner that it was first PUBLISHED to the world. Not so, I reply,

even on their false principle of a mere **REPUBLICATION**. For since it was found, by experience, that the first publication of God's will, by natural light alone, hath proved insufficient to perpetuate the knowledge of it; we shall think it most adequate to reason, that the **REPUBLICATION** should be better guarded; to secure it from the like mischance.

But the truth is, this idea of Christianity's being *merely such a RE-PUBLICATION* arose from the grossest ignorance of the **GOSPEL**; which reveals more, infinitely more important truths than **NATURAL LIGHT** did or could discover. It reveals the whole scheme of *human redemption*; which, till this *revelation* took place, was a **MYSTERY**, kept hid amongst the arcana of the Godhead.

However, the same men have another objection to the belief of these *miraculous credentials*. And the objection arises, it seems, from our **SOPHISTICAL** reasoning in support of them: for thus, they say, we argue—

“So little being known of the powers of created spirits, superior to ourselves, (some of which we are taught to believe are beneficent to man, and some averse) all that we can conclude of **MIRACLES**, considered only in themselves, is, that they are the work of agents, able, in some instances, to control nature, and divert her from her established course.—But whether this control be performed immediately by the God of nature, or by agents acting under his direction, (which amounts to the same thing) or, on the contrary, by malignant agents, at enmity with man, and, for a time, permitted to indulge their perverse and hurtful purposes, cannot be known but by the *nature of that doctrine*, in support of which, the pretended **MIRACLES** are performed. The conclusion from this is, that **THE MIRACLES ARE TO BE VERIFIED BY THE DOCTRINE**.

But then, say they again, since we know so little of the extent of the human understanding, we cannot determine of the *true original* of the doctrine, proposed to our belief, till it be supported by **MIRACLES**; now the conclusion from this is, that the **DOCTRINE IS TO BE VERIFIED BY MIRACLES**.

Such is the vicious circle (say our adversaries) round which we run, when we first **PROVE THE MIRACLES BY THE DOCTRINE, AND THEN PROVE THE DOCTRINE BY THE MIRACLES**.

This is, without doubt, a *paralogism*. But we deny that any such faulty reasoning is here employed. The term **DOCTRINE**, in the first proposition, is used to signify *a doctrine agreeable to the truth of things, and demonstrated to be so by natural light*. In the second proposition, the term, **DOCTRINE**, is used to signify *a doctrine immediately, and in an extraordinary manner, revealed by God*. So that these different significations, in the declared use of the word **DOCTRINE**, in the two propositions, sets the whole reasoning free from that *vicious circle* within which our philosophic conjurors would confine it. In this, there is no fruitless return of an unprogressive argument; but a regular procession of two distinct and different truths, till the whole reasoning becomes complete. In truth, they afford mutual assistance to one another; yet not by taking

back, after the turn has been served, what they had given; but by continuing to hold what each had imparted to the support of the other.

On the whole, we conclude, that if any messengers ever needed the CREDENTIALS OF MIRACLES, they were the first MESSENGERS OF GOD in the revealed mystery of the GOSPEL.

Indeed, divine providence hath so strictly appropriated MIRACLES *for these* CREDENTIALS, that JOHN THE BAPTIST, the precursor of those messengers, destined only to announce the approaching GOSPEL, worked NO MIRACLES; yet, had *miracles* been of no other use than what this newfangled doctrine assigns to them, namely, to make the hearers attentive to the excellence of the *morals* of the new religion, none had more need of them than JOHN and his penitents.—St CHRYSOSTOM seems to have understood the GOSPEL better than these modern divines, when he supposed that even JESUS himself worked no *miracle* till after his baptism, *i. e.* till the time of his addressing himself to his mission, when CREDENTIALS to his character were naturally required; which *credentials* had he not given, the unbelieving Jews, as he himself acknowledges, had been free from blame:—If I HAD NOT DONE AMONGST THEM, says he, THE WORKS WHICH NONE OTHER MAN DID, THEY HAD NOT HAD SIN.\*

II. We come next to that second species of *miracles*, mentioned above, whose subject makes so essential a part in the economy of the GOSPEL, that, without it, the whole would be vain and fruitless. The first and principal of the species is the MIRACLE of Christ's RESURRECTION from the dead—*If Christ be not RAISED*, saith St Paul, *your faith is vain; you are yet in your sins.*† And St Peter uses the same argument to show the NECESSITY of his Master's *resurrection*.—*God*, says he, *raised him up, having loosed the pains of death; BECAUSE IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE THAT HE SHOULD BE HOLDEN OF IT.*‡

Now from whence does the *impossibility* arise, if not from the force of St Paul's argument concerning the nature of Christ's *resurrection*?

So important a circumstance, therefore, required that the highest evidence should be given of its truth.

CHRISTIANITY reveals the restoration of lapsed and forfeited man to life and immortality from the power and dominion of the grave.

But the course of human nature continuing the same *after* this restoration which it held *before*, and the GRAVE still boasting its power, though foolishly, indeed, and in vain, *since death had lost its sting*;§ there seemed to be need of some extraordinary evidence of the *reality of this change* in the order of things, which being procured at the price of Christ's death on the cross, and then visibly paid, the nature of the compact required that the benefit obtained should be as visibly put into our possession; and both one and the other openly exemplified in the same person, the *Author of our salvation*. For, if he himself was not seen to enjoy the fruits of that redemption, which was of his own procuring, what hopes could be entertained for the rest of mankind? Would it

\* John xv. 24.

† 1 Cor. xv. 17.

‡ Acts ii. 24.

§ 1 Cor. xv. 55.

not have been too plausibly concluded, that this expedient of *redemption* had proved ineffectual by CHRIST's not *rising*? So necessarily connected (in the apostle's opinion) was the MIRACLE of our Saviour's visible *resurrection* with the very essence of the Christian faith. And this *resurrection being the first fruits of them that slept*, was the very thing which both assured and sanctified all the benefits that were to follow. For the *Jewish first fruits* (to which the expression alludes) were of the nature, and a security to the plenty, of the approaching harvest.

Thus, we see, the MIRACLE of the *resurrection* made a necessary part of the integrity of the gospel.

But it had other uses and expediencies besides; which, in concluding this head, I shall, in as few words as possible, endeavour to point out. The heathen world had, in general, some notion of another life. But a *resurrection* of this *material* body, after death, to accompany the soul in its future existence, never once entered into their imaginations; though some modern writers have been misled to think otherwise, partly by what they had learned of the *fables of the vulgar*, full of shadows of a bodily shape, inhabitants of the tombs, or attendants on the soul, in the sequestered abode of spirits; and partly of the more solemn dreams of the philosophers, particularly the famous STOICAL RENOVATION, which, however, is so far from bearing any resemblance, or yielding any credit to the CHRISTIAN resurrection, though mistaken for it, that it is absolutely inconsistent with it.

The sages of antiquity had discovered many qualities in the human *soul*, which disposed them to think that it might survive the *body*. But every property they knew of *matter* led them to conclude, that, at the separation and dissolution of the union between these two constituent parts of man, the *body* would be resolved into the elements from whence it arose. And that sect of philosophy which most favoured, and best cultivated the doctrine of the soul's immortality, considered the body only as its *prison*, into which it was thrust, by way of penance, for its pre-existent crimes; and from which, when it had undergone its destined purgation, it was to be totally set free. Nay, so little did the RESURRECTION OF THE BODY enter into their more studied conceptions, that when St Paul, at Athens, (the capital seat of science,) preached JESUS AND THE RESURRECTION,\* his auditors mistook the second term to be like the first, a revelation of some new deity, a certain goddess, called ANASTASIS.†

\* Acts xvii. 31.

† In this sense St CHRYSOSTOM understood the thoughts of the Athenians to be concerning St Paul's mention of the *Anastasis*. Dr BENTLEY thinks otherwise. But which of these two doctors was likely to be best acquainted with the genius and state of paganism, when St Paul preached at Athens, must be left to the judgment of the reader. This, at least, is certain, that the reason the modern doctor gives, why the *Athenians could not mistake ANASTASIS for a goddess, because they too well understood the notion of a resurrection*, is a very weak one, since they had no notion of a *resurrection* at all; unless they mistake (which is very unlikely) the STOICAL RENOVATION for that which the apostle preached. Dr Bentley, indeed, seems to have fallen into that error, or he could scarce have said, *the Athenians well understood the notion of a resurrection*. However, let the Athenians

With all these prejudices, so unfavourable to the **RESURRECTION OF THE BODY**, nothing less than the assurance of the best attested **MIRACLE**, in confirmation of it, could have reconciled the gentile world to the belief of so incredible a doctrine.

This we say with the greater confidence, since St Paul himself, on this occasion, appears to argue on the same idea. For when he had rectified this error of the Athenians, concerning *Jesus and the resurrection*, and had informed them that, by this *resurrection*, he meant the revival of the *dead bodies* of men, and restoration of them to life, he adds, “whereof God hath given **ASSURANCE** unto all men, in that he raised Jesus from the dead.—For, after his resurrection, he was seen,” says the same apostle, on another occasion, “of five hundred brethren at once; of whom the greater part remain unto this present.”—1 Cor. xv. 6.

2. Under this second division of *miracles*, whose subject makes an essential part in the economy of the Christian dispensation, let me recommend to your consideration and belief, the power of Jesus and his disciples to **CAST OUT DEVILS, OR EVIL SPIRITS**, from the bodies of men suffering by those inhospitable guests.\*

And under this division I the rather choose to place this species of miracles, since by occasion of a very general and infamous pretence of such a power, especially in these later times, the fact itself has been rendered doubtful; and even excluded from the number of those mental and bodily disorders, recorded by the evangelists, to have been relieved in the most extraordinary manner by Jesus and his disciples: “And they brought unto him all sick people,” says St Matthew, “that were taken with divers diseases and torments, and those which were **POSSESSED WITH DEVILS, AND LUNATICS**; and he healed them.”† Insomuch, that at length we have been told, that what is here called the being *possessed with devils*, was, indeed, no other than an atrabilaire lunacy, or one of those *occult distempers* for which physicians could not find a remedy, or, what was still harder, were at a loss for a *name*; and therefore, in complaisance to the imbecility of their patients, they agreed to suppose it *supernatural*, or (saving your presence) the *work of the devil*.

But this strange malady being delivered to us as a **REAL POSSESSION** by the evangelist last quoted, who, at the same time, distinguishes it from *natural* disorders, and particularly from **LUNACY**, with which these

understand this *stoical renovation* as they would, they were certainly liable to a folly as gross, and at that time much more general, which was, the turning a *moral entity* into an *object of worship*: most of which abstract notions, superstition had thus metamorphosed. Amongst the **Jews**, indeed, the **RESURRECTION** was become a national doctrine, some time before the advent of the **MESSIAH**; not collected (we may be sure) from natural reason, nor taught them by their *scriptures*, yet collected from the contemplation of their prophets misinterpreted; where the *restoration of the Mosaic republic* was predicted, in terms which were mistaken by the latter Jews, to signify the revival or resurrection of the bodies of their deceased ancestors; of which many instances might be given, besides Ezekiel’s *vision of the dry bones*.

\* Sermon on the Fall of Satan, vol. x. of author’s works, edition 1811. † Mat. iv. 24.

modern doctors are willing to confound it, we choose to adhere to the opinion of the sacred writer.

In support of which, and to form a right judgment of the matter in question, it may be proper to consider what adverse part the DEVIL bore in disturbing the economy of grace.

Now, in the history of the FALL, recorded by Moses, to which the writers of the New Testament perpetually allude, SATAN, or the *tempter*, *calumniator*, the old serpent, or the *evil one*, (for by these names he is characterized in scripture,) is represented as having instigated the *first man*, Adam, to disobedience; for which, by the *second Adam*, Jesus Christ, (who restored us to our lost inheritance,) is denounced his punishment in these figurative terms, *the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head* :\* explained in the New Testament, to be the final conquest and destruction of this enemy of mankind by our *Redeemer*. So that we may reasonably expect to find the *punishment* of the *tempter* recorded in the history of our REDEMPTION, as his *crime* was recorded in the history of the FALL. And, indeed, this circumstance, so necessary to the story of the whole transaction, we meet with in the gospel, on several occasions.

When the disciples, whom Jesus had sent out to renounce their mission, came back to their Master exulting in the power of their ministry, he receives them as conquerors, returning in triumph from their spiritual warfare—I beheld SATAN, says he, *as lightning fall from heaven*.† A strong and lively picture of the sudden precipitation of that *prince of the air* from the place where he had so long held his usurpation, hanging like a pestilential meteor over the sons of men.

The rise, therefore, of Christ's kingdom, and the fall of Satan's, being thus carried on together, it would be strange indeed, if, in the gospel, we should find no MARKS of the rage of Satan's expiring tyranny amidst all the salutary blessings of the rising empire of Christ. But we find them in abundance. We find this enemy of our salvation, mad with despair, invoking all the powers of darkness to blast that *peace and good will towards men*, proclaimed by angels on the birth night of the Son of God. For when he understood, by his baffled attempts on his Lord and Master, that the SOULS of men had escaped his usurped dominion, he turned his cruelty on their BODIES, in the most humiliating circumstances of pain and oppression that could dishonour or disgrace humanity: permitted, no doubt, to take a wider range at this decisive instant than at any other, either before or since, in order to illuminate the glories of his conqueror.

Had the *first Adam* stood in the rectitude of his creation, he had, on observing the command given to him in Paradise, gained IMMORTALITY, and been placed above and beyond the reach of NATURAL and MORAL evil. His relapse back to MORTALITY brought *both* into the world. The office of the *second Adam* was to restore us to our Paradisiacal

\* Gen. iii. 15.

† Luke x. 18.



state. But as the *immortality*, purchased for us by the Son of God, was unlike to that which became forfeit by the transgression of the *first man* in this particular, that it was not to commence immediately, but was reserved for the reward of a future state, it followed that both *physical* and *moral* evil were to endure for a season. Yet, to manifest that they were, in good time, to receive their final doom from the REDEEMER, it seems essential to his character that he should, in the course of his ministry, give a convincing specimen of his power over *both*.

One part, therefore, of his godlike labours was, we find, employed in curing all kinds of *natural* diseases. But had he stopped here amidst his conquests over *physical* evil, the full evidence of his dominion over *both worlds*, which, by his office, he was to restore to their primeval integrity, had remained defective.

Jesus, therefore, was to display his sovereignty over *moral evil* likewise; and this could not be seen in the manner it was manifested over *natural* evil, but by a sensible victory over SATAN; through whose machinations *moral evil* was brought into the world, and by whose temptations it was sustained and increased.

Hence it was that, amongst his amazing works of sanity and salvation, the CASTING OUT OF DEVILS is so much insisted on by the writers of his life and death; he himself having informed them, that it was essential to the erection of his spiritual kingdom—"If I," says he, "cast out devils by the Spirit of God, THEN the kingdom of God is come unto you."\*

Thus, from the very genius of the GOSPEL, from the nature and constitution of the system of GRACE, it appears that this was a real ejection of the *evil spirit*.

But, besides this, Jesus and his disciples, in their manner of working, and in the mode of recording what they worked, did every thing that might best display a real victory over SATAN.

Let the *Jews* of that time, let the *diseased* themselves, be as much in an error as you are pleased to conceive them, in the matter of *diabolical possession*, yet no believer will presume to think that JESUS was deceived in his own case; or was disposed to deceive others, when he informed his historians of his *being led by the Spirit into the wilderness, and of his being tempted there forty days of the DEVIL*.†—Whether any, or what part of this transaction passed in vision, is not material to determine, since the *reality of the agency* is the same on either supposition; as its truth depended not on the mode of sensation, but on the infallible assurance of that agency. For Jesus, in his amazing humiliation, when he assumed *our nature*, was yet, without doubt, superior to those infirmities of it which arise from the delusions of sense; as such delusions would have been incompatible with the exercise of his divine ministry. If, therefore, there was any mistake in this matter, it must be (I speak

\* Mat. xii. 28.

† Luke iv. 1, 2.

it with the most reverential horror) the designed contrivance of our blessed Master himself, who assures us, that *he was* not only *the way*, but **THE TRUTH**\* likewise.

So far, then, is clear, that the *evil spirit* was neither absent nor inactive when the gospel was first opened to mankind.

In **THIS TEMPTATION**, he was permitted to try whether he could traverse the great work of human redemption. *In his possession of men's bodies*, he seems to have been, in part, forced upon the attempt, that *the casting of him out*, by the power of Jesus, might evince to mankind that our restoration to **LIFE** was fully accomplished.

Thus, in the case of the man possessed in the country of the Gadarenes—The devils, oppressed by the mighty hand of God, and ready to be cast out and sent into a place of torment, confess the superiority of their conqueror, and proclaim him to be the promised **MESSIAH**, at a time when he concealed this part of his character, and was not certainly known by it even amongst his disciples.

If it be asked, why the devils proclaimed it? The answer is easy: it was to impede, or to cut off, the course of his appointed ministry. On this account Jesus checks, or enjoins silence to them. Indeed, had all the attestation given by our Saviour to *real possessions* been no stronger than that which he gave in answer to those who said, He cast out devils by Beelzebub, namely, that then, “Beelzebub’s kingdom being divided within itself, must be brought to destruction,”† the argument might be thought to labour a little; for if the power and operation of *Satan* or *Beelzebub* was a groundless fancy, as our philosophers pretend, Jesus may not unreasonably be thought to argue *ad hominem*; which a messenger from God might do without impeachment of his character, though the concession on which he reasons were not strictly conformable to the reality of things. But when such a messenger commands the devils, whom he pretends to have cast out, not to discover his office or character, this is going a length, if there was no devil in the case, which a messenger from the God of truth could never, surely, be authorized to engage in.

If we turn from Satan’s *temptation* of Jesus to his cruel treatment of the Jews, we shall still find the same strong marks of *real agency*.

Be it granted, that both the Jews and gentiles of that time were grown very fanciful and superstitious concerning *diabolic possessions*, and, consequently, that they often mistook *natural* for *supernatural* maladies; what follows, but that which we find provided against those false conclusions which weak or licentious men drew from thence?

The utmost care and attention has been given by the sacred writers to *mark* out those cases of real possession, which Jesus relieved, by some circumstance not equivocal, or what could not accompany an imaginary or natural disorder.

Thus, in the adventure recorded by three of the evangelists‡—when Jesus had eased the demoniac, and his tormentors had obtained leave to

\* John xiv. 6.

† Mat. xii. 24, et seq.

‡ Mat. viii.—Mark v.—Luke viii.

go into a *herd of swine*; what other reason can be given, or, indeed, what better can be conceived, of their extraordinary request on the one hand, or permission on the other, than that this circumstance was to afford a certain **MARK** to distinguish a **REAL** from an *imaginary* possession?

It is true, that the wild extravagance of human fancy may be able to form chimeras that shall affright the raiser of them to distraction. Yet brutes (we all know) have none of this dangerous faculty. Therefore, when we find great numbers of them stimulated, at once, to an instantaneous madness, we must needs conclude, that it was caused by some supernatural agent, operating on their organs.

So admirably has our indulgent Master been pleased to guard this important truth against the most plausible evasions of self-conceited men.

The strong impulse of a vitiated fancy, pushed forward by superstition, might be supposed able, without other agency, to produce these very extraordinary appearances.

To cut off, therefore, all escape from a forced concession of the mighty hand of God, compelling his most *averse* creatures to acknowledge his sovereignty, here are two cases obtruded on the most incredulous: the one is **SATAN**'s temptation of the Messiah; the other is, his *possession* of brute animals: in neither of which cases hath the *powers of imagination* any place. In the *first*, the divine patient was above their delusions; in the *other*, the brutal was as much below them.

If we turn from the **FACTS** which the evangelists have recorded, to the **EXPRESSIONS** which they have employed, we shall have further reason to rest satisfied with the ancient interpretation.

The text says,—“They brought unto him all sick people that were taken with divers diseases and torments, and **THOSE WHICH WERE POSSESSED WITH DEVILS**, and **LUNATICS**; and he healed them.”

Here we find, that the disorder of those who are said to be **POSSESSED WITH DEVILS**, is precisely distinguished, not only from natural diseases and torments in general, but likewise from **LUNACY** in particular; that very disorder which the antidemoniast is so willing to confound with supernatural agitations. Is it possible, therefore, to believe, that a writer of any meaning, at the very time he is distinguishing *lunacy* from *diabolical possessions*, should confound these two disorders with one another? Yet, this is what these licentious critics make him do, in compliance (they tell us) with an accustomed mode of speech. On the contrary, is it not certain, that the sacred writer was the more intent to represent them as two very different disorders, for this very reason, their having many symptoms in common? a circumstance which hath made these men solicitous to *confound* what the evangelist was careful to *distinguish*.

In a word, they who, after all these precautions taken by St Matthew, and the rest, can believe that *devils* and *demoniacs* were used only as terms of accommodation, may well believe (as some of them profess to do) that the terms *sacrifice*, *redemption*, and *satisfaction*, came of no better a house than one of the common figures of speech.\*

\* See note L, at the end of this book.

III. We now come to the third and last class of **MIRACLES**, which, we say, demand the assent of every reasonable man, when proposed to him with full evidence of the fact:

Of this kind are the *miracles* in which the Deity immediately interposes, to vindicate the credit of his own predictions, when impious men have publicly combined to defeat and dishonour them.

The most eminent of this class was the *miraculous* interposition of heaven, which defeated JULIAN's attempt to rebuild **THE JEWISH TEMPLE OF JERUSALEM**.

When God found it expedient or necessary, in order to preserve the memory and keep up the knowledge of himself amidst a corrupt world, running headlong into polytheism and idolatry, he chose a single family, which, when spread out into a nation or people, was to become the public repository of his holy name, till the fulness of time should come, when, as he *promised by himself*, "all the earth should be filled with the glory of the Lord."\*

This family was of the seed of Abraham; which, in compliance with the religious notions of those times, he was pleased to adopt for his peculiar people, under the idea of their *tutelar* Deity, or the *God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob*; and, the more effectually to secure the great end of their separation, assumed, likewise, the title and office of their KING or CIVIL GOVERNOR; having, first of all, communicated himself to them, as the Maker and Governor of the universe.

Hence, the **RELIGION** he gave unto this people came under the idea of a **LAW**; and the **LAW**, amongst them, was, in the strictest sense, **RELIGION**, as having all the sanctions of a divine command.

From this short account of the **JEWISH CONSTITUTION** it appears, that **RELIGION**, which, elsewhere, had properly and justly *particulars only* for its subjects, had here the nation or community. And what, elsewhere, (as far as concerns the divine origin of religion) is only a *private* matter, was here a public. For the Deity being both their *tutelary God* and *civil Governor*, the proper object of his care was in either capacity, the collective body.

Hence it follows, that the principal rites of the Hebrew *religion* and *law* were to be performed in some determined place. For the ideas of a *tutelary* God and *civil* Governor implied a local residence; and a *national act*, arising from the relations springing out of these qualities, required a fixed and certain habitation for its celebration: and both together seemed to mark out the capital of the country for that use.

Such a practice, which the nature and reason of things so evidently point out, the institutes of the Jewish law expressly direct and enjoin.

During the early and unsettled times of the republic, the sacrifices prescribed by its ritual were directed to be offered up at the door of an ambulatory *tabernacle*; but when the people had perfected the establishment ordained for them, and a magnificent **TEMPLE** was erected for religious

\* Num. xiv. 21.

worship, then their SACRIFICES were to be offered in that place at Jerusalem only.

Now, SACRIFICES constituting the essentials of their worship, their religion could not be said to exist longer than that celebration continued. But sacrifices were to be performed in no place out of the walls of their TEMPLE. So that when this *holy place* was finally destroyed, according to the prophetic predictions, the INSTITUTION itself became abolished. Nor was any thing more consonant to the genius of this religion, than the assigning such a celebration of its principal rites. The temple would exist while they remained a people, and continued sovereign. And when their sovereignty was lost, the temple-worship became precarious and subject to the arbitrary pleasure of their masters.—They destroyed this temple; but it was not till it had lost its use. For the rites, directed to be there celebrated, were relative to them only as a free-policed people.

So that this was, in reality, a total EXTINCTION of the Jewish worship. How wonderful are the ways of God! This came to pass at that very period when a *new revelation* from heaven concurred with the blind transactions of civil policy, to supersede the LAW by the introduction of the GOSPEL: the last great work which completed the scheme of HUMAN REDEMPTION.

To confound this admirable order of providence was what induced the EMPEROR JULIAN to attempt the REBUILDING the JEWISH TEMPLE OF JERUSALEM. The vanity of the attempt could be only equalled by its impiety; for it was designed TO GIVE THE LIE TO GOD, who, by the mouth of his prophets, had foretold that it should never be rebuilt. Here then was the most important occasion for a miraculous interposition, as it was to defeat this mad attempt. And thus in fact it was defeated, to the admiration of all mankind.

But as a large and full account of the whole affair hath been already given to the public, in a work entitled—JULIAN, or a *Discourse concerning the Earthquake and fiery eruption which defeated that emperor's attempt to rebuild the temple at Jerusalem*; thither I refer the learned reader, who will there meet with all the various evidence of the fact, abundantly sufficient to support and establish it; together with a full confutation of all the cavils opposed to its certainty and necessity.

To conclude this subject with a recapitulation of what I undertook to prove, namely, that the MIRACLES in the Christian dispensation, which exact credit of reasonable men, may be all comprised under one or other of these divisions, viz.

I. Under that SPECIES OF MIRACLES which serves for CREDENTIALS to the MISSION of Jesus Christ and his first disciples and followers.

II. Or under that which makes an essential part in the integrity or completion of the gospel-system.

III. Or, lastly, under that in which the Deity immediately interposes, to vindicate the credit of his own predictions, when impious men have entered into a combination to defeat and dishonour them.

Not that it is my purpose positively to brand, as **FALSE**, every pretended miracle recorded in ecclesiastical and civil history, which wants this favourable capacity of being reduced to one or other of the *species* explained above. All that I contend for is, that those miracles, still remaining unsupported by the nature of that evidence which I have shown ought to force conviction from every reasonable mind, should be at present excluded from the privilege of that conviction.

Indeed the greater part may be safely given up, for idle and knavish tales of monkish invention. Of the rest, which yet stand undiscredited by any considerable marks of imposture, we may safely suspend our belief, till time hath afforded further lights to direct our judgment.

Nor will the confining our assent to *miracles*, thus brought within the limits of an apparent **SUFFICIENT CAUSE**, be less beneficial to *religion* in general, than it is subversive of the vain *philosophy* in vogue, which attempts to discredit all extraordinary interpositions of providence whatsoever, as we shall now show.

1. The bringing **MIRACLES** within these bounds will afford a mark of distinction, never to be effaced, between those of the **GOSPEL**, and those which **PAGANISM** and its *advocates* object to us. For I may venture to affirm, that, amongst those pretended miracles in the pagan world, there cannot be found one that carries along with it any thing that bears the least resemblance to a **SUFFICIENT CAUSE**. And there is strong reason to believe, that the Deity, without such an occasion, would never interfere amongst the gentiles; because such an interposition would, besides the vanity of it, have a natural and direct tendency to rivet men in their idolatry.

But the principal use of confining **MIRACLES** within these bounds will be the giving an immediate check to **FRAUD** and **SUPERSTITION**, when in their full career, to abuse and enslave a foolish world. For that strange infirmity of the human mind, viz. *a fondness for the MARVELLOUS* (begot by a misconception of nature, and nursed by the pride of self-importance), always made the deluded multitude thankless and averse to those who would bring them to their senses.

— *Cui sic extorta voluptas.*

And if men be so fond of the *marvellous* for the mere pleasure of the **ADMIRATION** which it creates, what must be their zeal to propagate those *strange things*, in which religion is supposed to be concerned? Every disorderly passion now conspires to blot and deform the fair face of nature, with prodigies and portents.

Such frightful visions, even the earliest ages of Christianity raised up. *The prodigies of ANTICHRIST*, says the apostle, *have been after the working of Satan, with POWERS and SIGNS and LYING WONDERS.\**

This, it is true, should make **THEOLOGIANs** cautious; but it should not make our **PHILOSOPHERs** presumptuous or vain. For even these intimados of nature know no more of her than what lies just before

\* 2 Thess. ii. 9.



them, in common with those whom they most affect to despise: and all they know, if not a **MIRACLE**, is yet a **MYSTERY**.

Let these her closet-acquaintance *steal*, as they are able, to her inmost recesses, they *can bring nothing* from thence concerning God's natural and moral government, as the poet finely expresses it,

— BUT UNDECIPHERED CHARACTERS,

which only teach us the need we have of a better decipherer, than that **REASON** on which these men so proudly rely.

## CHAP. VI.

BUT now, besides these extraordinary gifts, properly called **MIRACLES**, with which the first preachers of the *gospel* were intrusted, for its more speedy propagation, they were endowed with another, and more complicated kind of supernatural power, namely, **PROPHECY**, in which a **MIRACULOUS** power was eminently included.

With **PROPHECY**, or with that simpler species of divine virtue, **MIRACLES**, was the church of Christ at that time supplied; as one or the other was best suited to the various uses of religion.

In explaining this matter, which the importance of the subject requires us to do more at large, it will be necessary just to repeat what has been observed before; that in the first propagation of a *new religion* from heaven, the will of God must be attested by **MIRACLES**; since nothing less than this instant evidence is sufficient to assure us of its divine original.

But when this hath been fully and largely afforded, the *power of miracles* (where *miracles* do not make a constant and essential part in the nature of the *dispensation*, as they did in the *Jewish*) is with good reason withdrawn from the servants and ministers of religion: and the **CHURCH** is from thenceforth left, at least for some time, to support itself on the **TRADITIONAL EXEMPLIFICATION** of this evidence; something less forcible than the **ORIGINAL RECORD**, of which the first and better ages of Christianity had been in possession.

But by the time this **MIRACULOUS** power began to fail, another was preparing to supply its place, of still greater efficacy; I mean, that of **PROPHECY**.

For the sovereign Master, who no less manifests his constant **PRESENCE** to the *moral* than to the *physical* government of the world, has been graciously pleased to give to the *later* ages of the church more than an equivalent for what he had bestowed upon the *earlier*, in beginning to shower down on his chosen servants of the **NEW COVENANT** the riches of **PROPHECY** as the power of working **MIRACLES** abated. So early, I say, was this preparation made for that stronger and more lasting support; a support not yet, indeed, improved into *evidence*; nor

was the *evidence* wanted, while *miracles*, in a sort, remained. Besides, it could not, in the nature of things, become *evidence*, till some time after its first enunciation: for till the more considerable events of a PROPHECY, which contained the future and later fortunes of the gospel, had arisen, and been brought, by degrees, into EXISTENCE, the *prophecy* could afford no conviction of its truth.

Yet, in this wonderful disposition of things, we see the *divine hand* by which they were conducted.

To proceed. PROPHECIES were now more clearly and simply, now more obscurely and enigmatically enounced, just as the nature of the subject or the circumstances of the time required.—Yet still we have ventured to call PROPHECY a stronger and more lasting evidence than MIRACLES. And this will deserve our attention. The evidence from MIRACLES seems, by its nature, to lessen somewhat by time; while that from PROPHECY gathers strength by it, and grows more and more convictive, till the gradual and full completion of all its parts makes the splendour of it irresistible.

Hence the wisdom of the divine Disposer is still further seen, in making PROPHECY not only the *strongest*, but the LAST and CONCLUDING evidence of a *religion*, which, as it was the completion of the whole scheme of REVELATION, so having (as it would seem) the largest portion of its course yet to run, that species of evidence which does not lose, but gains strength, by time, was best fitted to accompany it to its utmost period.

But to go on with our more general reflections on the whole.

This DOUBLE EVIDENCE, in support of *revealed religion*, hath always been the same throughout every mode of God's moral dispensations. The records of sacred history confirm this truth.

Under the Jewish economy, although MIRACLES, by reason of the peculiar form of the republic, were necessarily attendant on its administration, throughout a course of many ages (that is, during all the time in which the affairs of this people were conducted by an *extraordinary providence*), yet God's inspired servants were, together with the power of working MIRACLES, endowed with the gift of PROPHECY. For, although the *extraordinary providence*, and consequently MIRACLES, which made a part of it, continued much longer than would have been necessary, had MIRACLES, amongst the Jews, been of no other use than they were in the Christian church, viz., to evidence the divinity of the revelation; yet as *that providence*, and consequently this *miraculous* attendant on it, were to cease long before the abolition of the THEOCRACY; the other evidence of PROPHECY, in the absence of MIRACLES, was graciously bestowed on the Jewish church likewise.

Hence the inspired ministers of it, DANIEL in particular, foretold more circumstantially and minutely than the rest, the various fortunes of that church and republic, from its decay, in their own times, to the entire dissolution of it by the introduction of a better SYSTEM.

In the like manner St JOHN, under the NEW COVENANT, did, by the same divine Spirit, predict the fortunes of the *Christian church*, from the flourishing condition of it, in his own time, through all the disasters of the corrupt ages that followed, to the happy consummation of all things.

In both cases, for the reasons above given, PROPHECY could not be urged as instant evidence, at the time it was delivered, but was kept entire and reserved for the use of those ages when MIRACLES having long ceased in the *Christian church*, and were declining in the *Jewish*, seemed to need this other and further support.

From all these, and from many other considerations to be further urged, it will appear, that of this double evidence to the truth of revelation, viz., MIRACLES and PROPHECY, the latter, as we have said, is of superior force and efficacy.

We have already shown its superiority in gaining by *time* what the other loses. This advantage is further seen by its being less subject to the mistakes and fallacious impressions of *sense* than *miracles* are.

But as this is a matter of much importance, it may be proper to explain and verify the assertion.

Both MIRACLES and PROPHECIES are indeed appeals to the *senses*, but with this difference, that MIRACLES, however illustrious, such as those worked by the first propagators of our holy religion, are subject to the cavils of infidelity.

Of this Dr Middleton hath afforded a wonderful example; where he insinuates, and would seem to persuade us, that the *voice from heaven recognizing the Son of God*, was no other than a superstitious fancy of the later Jews called the BATH KOL; a fantastic kind of divination of their own invention.—As groundless and scandalous as this cavil is, yet it must be owned, that the frame of the animal economy, in which a heated imagination is able to work strange appearances in the body, has given some countenance to infidelity, in its sceptical conclusions against *miracles*. And though we have said enough to free those of the *gospel*, and some others, confined within the reasonable bounds before laid down, from every imputation of this sort, yet *miracles* being, by their very nature, open and liable to abusive interpretations, and *prophecy* well secured from them, for this, and for the more weighty reasons given above, we conclude (as the crown of all) with the unerring declaration of the holy apostle PETER; who, in his second general epistle to the churches, alluding to this *twofold evidence* for the truth of revelation, namely, MIRACLES and PROPHECY, after he had ended what he thought fit to say of the *first*, proceeds to the *other* in these words—WE HAVE ALSO A MORE SURE WORD OF PROPHECY—ἔχμεν ΒΕΒΑΙΟΤΕΡΟΝ τὸν ΠΡΟΦΗΤΙΚΟΝ λόγον—a word, that may be more firmly relied on, and whose existence is more durable. The word, βεβαιότερον, including both these senses. And we have shown that the nature of PROPHECY contains these two qualities.

And they being most eminently comprised in the CAPITAL PROPHECY here described and characterized; a more particular explanation of it may be naturally expected in this GENERAL VIEW of the Christian religion.—

“We have not followed *cunningly devised fables*,” says the apostle, ver. 16, “when we made known unto you the POWER AND COMING of our Lord Jesus Christ, but were eye-witnesses of his majesty.”

17. “For he received from God the Father honour and glory, when there was a VOICE to him from the exceeding glory—This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.”

18. “And this *voice* which came from heaven we have heard, when we were with him in the mount.”

19. “WE HAVE ALSO A MORE SURE WORD OF PROPHECY; whereunto ye do well that ye take heed, *as unto a light shining in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day-star arise in your hearts.*”

\* There are few places, in the scriptures of the New Testament, plainer than this before us; and yet there are none where interpreters have wandered further from the apostle’s meaning.†

This hath been principally owing to a mistake of the subject. These interpreters supposed that St PETER was here speaking of the PERSONAL CHARACTER OF JESUS; and thence concluded, that the MORE SURE WORD OF PROPHECY, whereby he strengthens his argument, respected the *prophecies* of the OLD TESTAMENT, which establish that PERSONAL CHARACTER.

But the apostle is treating of a different thing; namely, of the TRUTH OF THE GOSPEL IN GENERAL.

Which shows, that *the more sure word of prophecy* regards a prophecy of the NEW TESTAMENT.

One mistake produced, of course, another. For, on supposition, that the *personal character of Jesus* was the thing meant, it would follow, that *by the power and coming of our Lord*, we are to understand his FIRST COMING; and then, indeed, *the word of prophecy* must needs signify a prophecy ALREADY FULFILLED. But nothing is more certain than that the *character* here given of that *prophecy*, to which the church is admonished to *take heed*, or pay its attention, confines us to one, but now, just beginning to attest its divine original—it is *a light shining in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day-star arise in our hearts*; that is, till a long series of events (yet in the womb of time) shall arise, to give testimony by degrees, till the whole evidence concludes in one unclouded blaze of conviction. So that the *power and coming of our Lord* must needs mean his SECOND COMING.

Yet amongst the interpreters just before censured, there are some more

\* From this place to the end, abridged and altered from Discourse *On the Rise of Antichrist*.

† See the altercations between Bishop Sherlock and Dr Middleton, and their respective advocates.

eminently absurd\* than the rest. One of these is even desirous to have it believed, that by this *more sure word of prophecy* is to be understood the prophecy of ISAIAH, chap. xlii. ver. 1, although the apostle has characterized this to be *a light shining in a dark place*, &c. i. e. not as convictive evidence at present, yet being a LIGHT, though *shining in a dark place*, it deserved our attention, till greater *lights* should arise, which would afford full conviction.

Now, could this be the *character* of a prophecy of the *Old Testament*; especially one of ISAIAH's, most of whose predictions referred to, and had their completion in, JESUS, their great object? The *dawn* and *day-star*, here spoken of by the apostle, as of a very distant light, was, in the time of that prophet, already *risen* in the hearts of his countrymen, or it would never rise.

Let us, therefore, look out for some more reasonable paraphrase of the sacred text.—

—“That you may be assured,” says the apostle, “we have not *followed cunningly devised fables*, when we described to you the power of our Lord at his SECOND COMING, you should recollect what we have frequently told you, of his FIRST; having been eye-witnesses of the majesty and *miracles* attending it, *when there came a voice to him from the exceeding glory*, &c.—Now, the MIRACLES, which accompanied, and confirmed his mission, on his FIRST COMING, are surely sufficient to gain credit to what we have, as often, told you, of his SECOND. And, of this capital truth, God hath been graciously pleased to add still stronger evidence; by giving us A MORE SURE WORD OF PROPHECY.”

—But the *general* subject of the EPISTLE will further support the truth of this paraphrase.

—It is a farewell address to the CHURCHES, on his having received intimation, from the *Holy Spirit*, of his approaching martyrdom.

The apostle begins with repeating to them [from ver. 3d to the 15th] that elegant summary of Christian religion, as was his wont, on all occasions, to inculcate. But, at this juncture, CONSOLATION being what the afflicted church most needed, he takes his topic from the REWARDS, now supposed to be approaching, at the *second coming of our Lord* in the consummation of all things. PERSECUTION had soothed the sufferers into this flattering error, which was now become general, and not likely to be soon redressed, while they continued unable, as they yet were, to distinguish the *two parts* of which this PREDICTION, concerning the *second coming* of our Lord, was composed. Each part had its distinct completion, commencing at different periods. The *first* when our Lord came to judgment, on the JEWISH PEOPLE, in putting a complete period to their ECONOMY, by the destruction of their TEMPLE; the *other*, when he was to pass judgment on the whole race of mankind, and make a final end of the MUNDANE SYSTEM.

Or rather, to speak with more exactness, this prediction of the SECOND COMING was delivered in *two prophecies* joined together; and, in intima-

\* See Mr M.

tion of the Jewish mode, mixed and interwoven with one another ; generally as little understood, at the time of the delivery, as all those of a like import were, which had either a *secondary sense*, or included a *double subject*. But for a larger account of these, and particularly of the sort now in question, I beg leave to refer the reader to the *sixth section of the sixth book* of this Work.

Such was the *error*, which, as we say, gave birth to the *consolatory epistle* here explained. But as all *errors*, together with the accidental *good*, which, by the directing hand of providence, they are made to produce, are easily attended with much evil ; so it was here.

At first, the *error* produced sobriety, vigilance, and perseverance in the FAITH. But afterwards, it had a contrary effect. “There shall come in the last days,” says this apostle, “scoffers, walking after their own lusts, and saying, *WHERE IS THE PROMISE OF HIS COMING?* For since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation.”\*

After the censure of this impiety, the apostle proceeds to upbraid their ignorance of the natural constitution of the earth ; which is physically ordained to bring on its own destruction, by FIRE, in some future period, as heretofore, by the destruction of WATER : and that the *delay* of this dreadful catastrophe, which affords these scoffs of impiety, is not owing to the Lord’s *slackness* in the performance of his *promise*, but to *his long-suffering; that all might come to repentance.*† He then describes this final dissolution of all things, by *fire.*‡ Out of which, he tells them, shall arise, according to the promise of PROPHECY, *a new heaven and a new earth, wherein shall dwell righteousness.*§ And with this the FAREWELL EPISTLE concludes.

Such being the subject of it, who can doubt but that a true account of the reasoning in the latter part of the *first* chapter is here given ? and, consequently, that the apostle’s purpose is not to speak of indefinite *prophecies already fulfilled* IN, OR UNDER, the OLD TESTAMENT, but of some precise prophecy *to be fulfilled* under the NEW ; in order as the several parts of it, extending through a course of many ages, should come into existence.

To THIS the church of Christ is bid TO TAKE HEED, as to *a more sure word of prophecy*. But had the description ended here, it would have been much too vague to enjoin our attention in so earnest and particular a manner. The apostle, therefore, goes on to give it this characteristic mark—that it was A LIGHT SHINING IN A DARK PLACE. A *prophecy*, of which the principal parts were, at that time, surrounded and partly involved in obscurity and darkness ; but yet, emitting so many scattered rays, as to make a careful observer inclined to think some great scene was just beginning to open, which would amply reward our attention to this *light shining in a dark place*, by the change of its condition, first into a *dawn* ; and then, into still clearer *day-spring*.

\* Chap. iii. 3, et seq. † Ver. 9. ‡ Ver. 10, 11, 12. § Ver. 13.



The apostle having thus prepared our way to this **SUPER** WORD, or superior excellence of **PROPHECY**, proceeds to acquaint us with the very **IDENTICAL PROPHECY** he had in his eye; which will now appear to be no other than the predictions of *St Paul* and *St John* concerning **ANTI-CHRIST**, or the future fortunes of the *church*, under the usurpation of the **MAN OF SIN**; a prediction elegantly called, by way of eminence, **THE WORD OF PROPHECY**. For this *man of sin* began to *work* before the writing of this farewell epistle. So *St Paul* assures us—**THE MYSTERY OF INIQUITY**, says he, **DOETH ALREADY WORK**.\* *St Peter*, therefore, towards the conclusion of his epistle, recurring again, as his subject required, to God's long-suffering, in the delay of his *second coming* to judge the world, adds, "even as our beloved brother **PAUL** also, according to the **WISDOM** given unto him, hath written unto you: as also in all his epistles, **SPEAKING IN THEM OF THESE THINGS**; **IN WHICH ARE SOME THINGS HARD TO BE UNDERSTOOD**, which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other scriptures, unto their own destruction."† Now what are these **OBSCURE PARTS** in *St Paul's* epistles, here characterized, but the *prophecies* in *St John's* book of the **REVELATION** concerning **ANTICHRIST**,‡ abridged by *St Paul* in his epistles, and referred to by *St Peter*. . . . §

\* 2 Thess. ii. 7.

† Chap. iii. 15, 16.

‡ See Sir Isaac Newton's Observations upon the Apocalypse of *St John*, chap. i.§ See the remainder of this argument in Discourse *On the rise of Antichrist*, written by the Author of the Divine Legation.

END OF THE SEVENTH BOOK.

## NOTES ON BOOK VII.

---

P. 612, A. On this point it will be sufficient to refer the reader to those two excellent writers, Dr Samuel Clarke and Mr W. Baxter, for a full demonstration of the *immateriality* of that substance, in which the faculties of sense and reflection reside. (See Clarke's Tracts against Dodwell and Collins, and Baxter on the Nature of the Soul.) These writers have gone much further than Locke and others on the same subject; who contented themselves with showing *the possibility, nay, great probability, that the thinking substance in us is immaterial*. (See Locke's Second Reply to the Bishop of Worcester, p. 600, of his works.) But Clarke and Baxter have clearly proved, from the *discovered* qualities of a thinking being, that the soul cannot possibly be *material*, whatever *undiscovered* qualities it may be possessed of. And this conclusion was made (in my opinion) neither rashly nor at random. For, to unsettle our assurance in the truth of their opinion, their adversaries must show that such *undiscovered* qualities are contrary to the qualities *discovered*; yet contrary qualities can never subsist together in the same substance, without one destroying the other. Hence, we understand the futility of Mr Locke's *superinduction of the faculty of thinking to a system of matter*; conceived, by that excellent writer, in the modest fear of circumscribing omnipotence; but omnipotence is not circumscribed by denying its power of making qualities, destructive of one another, to reside in the same substance (for a power which produces nothing is no exercise of power); but by denying his power to change, together with consistent qualities, the *nature* of the substance in which those qualities reside. This power (supposing Mr Locke contended for no more) will be readily granted; but his argument will gain nothing by it. On the contrary, by changing *materiality* into *immateriality*, it ends the dispute with the bishop; but to Mr Locke's disadvantage, by proving, that the soul, or thinking substance in us, is *immaterial*.

P. 620, B. The impious notion of the human soul's being part or portion of the Divine substance, made the *theistical* philosophers give no credit to the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. (See the Divine Legation, book iii. sect. 4.) To avoid this impiety, certain Christian enthusiasts taught that *eternity* was the condition of the soul by *nature* as well as by *grace*. And so before they were aware, fell into the very error of the philosophers, which they were so anxious to avoid. For *eternity* being confessed by all to be one of the attributes of the Deity, it followed, that the human soul was indeed part or portion of the Divine substance. This execrable frenzy, of which religion could never get entirely free, (known by the name of SPINOZISM) hath of late appeared under its ugliest form in the writings of Mr W. Law, collected from the exploded ravings of Jacob Behmen. (See a book, entitled, An Appeal to all who doubt or disbelieve the Truths of the Gospel.) —But when learned men wake out of one delirium, it is not to recover their senses, but to fall back again into another; and that, generally, is its opposite. So it was here. The philosophic converts to the Christian faith, in the first ages of the church, were no sooner convinced of the folly of fancying that *the human soul was a part of the Godhead*, than, in their haste to be at a distance from that monstrous opinion, they ran suddenly into a contrary folly, and maintained, that the soul had not one spark of the divinity in her whole composition; but was MATERIAL as well as mortal: now degrading man to a brute, whom before they had exalted to a god. Nor hath this extravagance been destitute of (for what extravagance hath ever wanted) the patronage of modern divines. We have seen it lately employed in support of a fresh whimsy, viz., THE SLEEP OF THE SOUL. One thing however seems to be defective in the scheme; which is, the not rectifying the old error of a RESURRECTION. For, I apprehend, that when a MATERIAL soul is once gone to sleep, nothing but a RECREATION can awake it.

P. 625, C. Other *death* had been understood, viz., *eternal life in misery*. But, to see what ill use hath been made of this portentous comment, we need only attend to Collins in his *Discourse of Freethinking*. "We learn in the *Old Testament*," says he, "that Adam by eating the forbidden fruit subjected himself and all his posterity to death. But the *New Testament* TEACHES US TO UNDERSTAND, by death, *eternal life in misery*; and from thence,

we know that GOD HAD BUT ONE WAY to put mankind in a capacity of enjoying immortal happiness."—P. 153. Having given, in this buffoon manner, so absurd and monstrous a picture of REDEMPTION, (to the composition of which the school divines had greatly contributed) he, and his freethinking colleagues, hoped that their doctrine of *Christianity's being only a republication of the religion of nature* would go down the easier. And they well enough understood how to manage that unscriptural error to their advantage; as may be seen by Tindal's book, entitled, *Christianity as old as the Creation*; which combats the Christian revelation, under cover of the absurd concessions of certain latitudinarian divines of a later date. These concessions, Tindal miscalls the PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIANITY. Hence this formidable book became one continued thread of contemptible sophistry from beginning to end. Yet I remember the time when the false terror of it alarmed the whole body of the clergy, for the *danger* of the church, who were but just recovered from the *Sacheverel-crisis*.

P. 625, D. The REMONSTRANTS, fearing that this interpretation of the text might give countenance to the school doctrine of ORIGINAL SIN, deny that *infants* are here meant, by *those who had not sinned*, &c. But the fear is vain. It was *death*, and not *damnation*, which reigned from Adam to Moses. The expression—*Kai ixi tous mh amartountas*, &c.—implies it was a part only of the human species which was *free from sinning after the similitude of Adam's transgression*; or *the being without sin*. And what part could this be but the infantine?

P. 632, E. It is true, that notwithstanding the conformity of this language in the *revelation* to that of Peter and to the gospel of John, some critics, and particularly Grotius, would have the text in the *Apocalypse*, which says,—“all that dwell upon the earth shall worship him, whose names are not written in the book of life, of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world”—to be thus understood—*The book of life written from the foundation of the world*—and not as here translated—*Christ slain from the foundation of the world*. However, both the one and the other sense infers the same truth; for if *the book of life* [of the Lamb slain] *was written from the foundation of the world*, it is plain that the *Lamb slain*, or the *sacrifice* of his death, *was pre-ordained from the foundation of the world*.

P. 635, F. The reason why Jesus, at the first publication of the gospel, refers so little to the FALL, which concerned all mankind, and so much to his MESSIAHSHIP, which directly concerned only the Jews, is apparent; his mission was first directed to the *house of Israel*. He left his apostles to carry on their ministry of the gospel, to the *gentiles*. Hence St Paul, who was more eminently *the apostle of the gentiles*, is so explicit in his account of the RESTORATION FROM THE FALL. This furnished a handle to Lord Bolingbroke, to affirm, with equal ignorance and malice, that—*Paul preached a NEW GOSPEL, different from that of Jesus*.

P. 644, G. A learned and serious writer,\* in a late book, entitled, *Observations and Inquiries relating to the various parts of ancient History*,† hath a chapter concerning HUMAN SACRIFICES; which he thus introduces—“One would think it scarce possible that so unnatural a custom as that of HUMAN SACRIFICES should have existed in the world. But it is certain, that it did not only exist, but almost universally prevailed.”—P. 267. Our account of the origin of this *unnatural custom* will much abate the wonder. However, the learned writer solves the difficulty with much ease; by deriving it from the *command to Abraham*. And here, before I enter on the matter, permit me to repeat, what I have before observed, that it indicates an odd turn of mind (however general it may be), which disposes the learned to seek for the origin of the superstitious rites of antiquity, rather in the casual adventures of particular men, than in the uniform workings of our common nature.

But the learned writer fancies his solution is much strengthened by the general notion of antiquity, that the ANΘΡΩΠΟΘΥΣΙΑ was a *mystical sacrifice*. Let us examine his reasoning on this head. Mr Bryant having given us, from the fragment of Sanchoniatho, what relates to IL or KRONUS'S sacrifice of his only son (by which, indeed, it appears, that *human sacrifice* was not a conceit of yesterday; the author of that fragment plainly deriving his story from this part of the Abrahamic history), goes on in these words, “They [human sacrifices] were instituted probably in consequence of a *prophetic tradition*, which I imagine had been preserved in the family of *Esau*; and transmitted, through his posterity, to the people of Canaan.”—P. 291.

To this, let me, first of all, observe, that the supposition of a *prophetic tradition* rests entirely on the truth of *my peculiar idea* of the nature of the command to Abraham, viz. that it was a *mere scenical representation*, given at the patriarch's earnest request. For on this idea only could the command be considered as a *prophecy*. But this is doing too much honour to my hypothesis, still held, I suppose, by the more orthodox, to be a paradox; and, what is still worse, it greatly weakens the learned writer's reasoning; for a *scenical representation*, which must naturally end as this did, in a prohibition of the commanded sacrifice, could hardly induce any one, who went upon the grounds, or in consequence, of a *prophetic*

\* Mr Bryant.

† Printed in quarto, 1767.

tradition, to think that *human sacrifices* were acceptable to the Deity. But the truth is, *this prophetic tradition*, in the family of Abraham, is merely *gratis dictum*. We find not the least footsteps of it in the more circumstantial history of the other branch of Abraham's family, the patriarchal; which was most concerned to preserve it, had there been any such. Besides, how this *commanded sacrifice*, which was forbidden to be perpetrated, should encourage human sacrifices, before men had steeled themselves, by long use, in the practice of so unnatural a crime, is hard to conceive. It is true, that this argument will lose somewhat of its force, when we suppose the *command* was given to a family which were no strangers to *human sacrifices*. This is observed purely in reverence to truth; but, be this as it will, it subverts the fancy of the *Abrahamic original*. For the fact seems to be, that, at the time this *command* was given to the patriarch, the gentile world was deeply plunged into this diabolic barathrum: which, though the descendants of Esau possibly had not escaped, yet the line of Isaac certainly had.

The Mosaic account of the state of religion in the Abrahamic times, shows that it was extremely depraved. For though the iniquity of the *Amorites* was not yet full,\* yet that of their neighbours, in Sodom and Gomorrah, we know, was. These considerations reasonably induced *Philo the Jew*, in his *Discourse concerning Abraham*, to suppose that *human sacrifices* were in use before the time of Abraham. And Marsham, one of the best modern critics concerning ancient times, declares, without hesitation, in favour of this humiliating circumstance; and our admirable Spencer thinks, there is so little reason to ascribe the original of *infanticide* to the *command to Abraham*, that, unless the history of that command be told very lamely and imperfectly, it affords very strong arguments against that inhuman practice. But it is not generally the way of scripture to reprobate a bad practice before it has been conceived or committed.† Hence we may fairly collect, that *human sacrifices* were in use before the *command to Abraham*. But what need we more to prove the fact in question, than this, that, if the account, here given, of the origin and progress of *sacrifice* be the true, (as it hath the fairest claim of being so received, since the first use, and all the gradual abuses of it, till it sank into the horrid rite in question, may be understood, and understood only on this simple principle, the uniform workings of our common nature,) human sacrifices must needs have preceded that era.

What follows, in the learned writer, as a strong confirmation of his system, is this, that CHILD-SACRIFICE was a type or representation of SOMETHING TO COME. Now, if by *child-sacrifice* he means the *command to Abraham*, this we allow, and even contend for. But, if he means that the specific rite of child-sacrifice was understood by sacrificers, either Jewish or gentile, to be a type or representation of SOMETHING TO COME, I think he speaks without the least proof.—What he adds, one knows not what to make of.—“Child-sacrifice,” says he, “is the only instance of any sacrifice in the gentile world which is said to be MYSTICAL.”—For, if by *mystical* he means, a type of something to come, this has been answered already. But if by *mystical* we are to understand, what was so called by the gentiles in their sacrificial rites, almost all of them were *mystical*; that is, had a meaning subjoined, not obvious, nor intended to be obvious to the uninitiated, or the *profane*. All their secret rites, in which *sacrifice* bore a principal part, abounded so much in hidden meanings of this sort, that these rites were called MYSTERIES by way of eminence.

But if, after all, this TEKNOΘΡΥΙΑ or *child-sacrifice* had the plain meaning which I have given to it, and not the *mystical* of the learned writer, what becomes of his whole hypothesis?—That it had no other meaning, than the plain one, I appeal to the authority of an *inspired* writer. MICAH, without doubt, understood the true origin, and consequently, the right import of *child-sacrifice*; and he delivers my sense of it, in these words—“Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? SHALL I GIVE MY FIRST-BORN FOR MY TRANSGRESSION, THE FRUIT OF MY BODY FOR THE SIN OF MY SOUL?”‡ Here, we see, conformably to what I have delivered concerning *child-sacrifice*, that the idea the gentiles had of it (for, to the gentile, not to the Jewish sacrifices, the prophet here alludes, as will be shown hereafter), was simply, and solely, this, the very highest atonement that man could make for his transgressions, as it was the offering up what was most dear to the offender. The prophet, therefore, puts it in the number of *expiatory sacrifices*. But had that, which the learned writer contends for, been the true and ancient notion of the τεκνοθρυια, one can hardly think that, at a time when the prophets were gradu-

\* Gen. xv. 16.

† Probe novi quamplurimos alia omnia de ritus hujus nefarii fonte sentire, quasi ex Abrahami, filium suum offerentis historia corrupta et depravata profluxissent. Huic autem sententiæ fidem adhibere nescio, cum historia illa nisi planè mutilata, magne præbeat contra morem illum inhumanum argumenta; et verisimile sit multas gentes, liberos suos immolare solitas, de Abrahami exemplo ne vel fando quicquam audivisse.—De Leg. Hebræe, Ritualibus, lib. 11. cap. 13, sect. 3.

‡ Chap. vi. ver. 7.

ally opening the nature of the NEW DISPENSATION, *Micah* would have let slip so fair an occasion of considering it under that Christian idea.

We may now see, for what reason *child-sacrifice* came to be reckoned a MYSTERIOUS WORSHIP; it was done, to withdraw the observation of the people from so horrid a rite, when considered only in its simple use; for nature is rarely so far debauched, as to behold, with indifference, the violation of its most instinctive appetites. So that the enormity was to be covered by some far-fetched invention of superior excellence of virtue, which preferred the rights of the divinity to all human obligations. Thus, when the worshippers were apt to revolt at *sacrifices* extremely cruel or libidinous, the priests secured their own credit, and the honour of their God, by the intervention of a *spiritual meaning*. And *human sacrifices* became *mysterious* for the same reason that the impudent procession of the *phallus*, in the corrupted rites of Bacchus and Osiris, was taught to convey the high matters of REGENERATION, and a *new life*.

I have been the longer on this question, because, if human sacrifices should be thought to have had their original from the *command to Abraham*, it might seem to give some colour (which was far from the intention of this very learned and worthy man) to the calumny of the deists, who assert, that HUMAN SACRIFICES MADE A PART OF THE MOSAIC RITUAL. For if the *crucifixion* prefigured the *sacrifice on the cross*, or, as the learned writer expresseth it, *was a type or representation of something to come*, it softens a little this infidel paradox. The poet VOLTAIRE hath repeated the calumny over and over, as if the Bible was still shut up, not only from the people in general, but (what perhaps would have been attended with less injury to religion) from THESE POETS in particular.

And now, this more serious question (in the midst of one less important, viz. *the origin and progress of sacrifice in general*) will deserve a severe examination.

VOLTAIRE, in a thing he calls "An Essay on general History," accuses the LAW, in these words—"The Jewish law seems to permit these [human] sacrifices. It is said in Leviticus, that *none devoted, which shall be devoted of men, shall be redeemed; but shall surely be put to death.*"\* The Jewish books bear evidence, that when the Israelites overran the little country of Canaan, they massacred in most of the villages, men, women, and children, because they had been DEVOTED. On this law it was that *Jephthah* sacrificed his daughter."†

I. This whole calumny I shall clear away first of all, by the most express prohibitions of the LAW, together with the declarations of the PROPHETS; both of which execrate every species of *human sacrifice*.

II. And then examine and explain all those passages of scripture, which seem to have given a handle to this impious charge.

III. Concluding, in the third place, with a confutation of that censure of inhumanity towards the inhabitants of Canaan urged by Voltaire, to support his main accusation of HUMAN SACRIFICES, and urged as if it were itself in the number of such sacrifices.

I. In my entrance on the first head, let me previously observe, that the earliest direction for SANCTIFICATION, that is, (in the language of Moses) for SACRIFICE, is of the *first-born*, expressed in these words.‡ SANCTIFY unto me all the first-born, whatsoever openeth the womb amongst the children of Israel, both of man and beast; it is MINE. This is declared to be for a memorial of God's smiting Egypt in favour of his chosen people.—"All the first-born of the children of Israel are MINE, both man and beast: on the day that I smote the first-born in the land of Egypt, I SANCTIFIED them for myself."§

But from this *sanctification* or SACRIFICE, man and *unclean animals* were excepted, and *redeemed*. The *redemption* of the first-born of man is thus settled and explained—"I have taken," says the text, "the LEVITES for all the FIRST-BORN of the children of Israel: and I have given the Levites as a gift to Aaron and his sons, to do the service of the children of Israel, in the tabernacle of the congregation."|| The *redemption* of the first-born of *unclean animals*, with a repetition of the redemption of men, is thus expressed:—"Every firstling of an ass shalt thou redeem with a lamb—and all the first-born of man, amongst thy children shalt thou redeem."¶ The redemption-money, for both, is given to Aaron and his successors; \*\* to whom the whole tribe of Levi was assigned for a vicarious (and in lieu of a more general) *sanctification* of the first-born of man.

\* Chap. xxvii. ver. 29.

† La loi des Juifs semblait permettre ces sacrifices. Il est dit dans Levitique; *si une âme vivante a été promise à DIEU on ne pourra la racheter, il faut qu'elle meure*. Les livres des Juifs reportent que quand ils envahirent le petit pays des Cananéens, ils massacrèrent dans plusieurs villages, les hommes, les femmes, les enfans—parce qu'ils avoient été devoués. C'est sur cette loi qui furent fondés les serments de *Jephthé* qui sacrifia sa fille, &c., (Œuvres de M. de Voltaire, t. xiii. pp. 227, 228, ed. 1756, 8vo.

‡ Exod. xiii. 2.

§ Num. viii. 17.—and Exod. xiii. 14, 15.

|| Num. viii. 18, 19, and to the same purpose, chap. iii. 12, 13—45.

¶ Exod. xiii. 13.

\*\* Num. xviii. 15, 16.



This *redemption* was not on account of personal favour to a *chosen people*, but in abhorrence of HUMAN SACRIFICES, as appears plainly both from the LAW and the PROPHETS.

Moses, on his delivery of the LAW, thus solemnly forbids all curious inquiry concerning the pagan rites of worship, in the nations round about them; *Inquire not after their gods, saying, how did these nations serve their gods? EVEN SO WILL I DO LIKEWISE.* The reason of the prohibition follows, they practised the horrid enormity of *child sacrifice*—*For every abomination to the Lord, WHICH HE HATETH, have they done unto their gods; FOR EVEN THEIR SONS AND THEIR DAUGHTERS HAVE THEY BURNT IN THE FIRE TO THEIR GODS\** The dangerous curiosity here restrained, was not on account of the number and nature of the gods of Canaan. For the striking absurdity of their *theogony* or original, and the impiety of their *mythology* or history, would have served to attach the Israelites more firmly to the LAW. The prohibition only respected an inquiry into the Canaanitish *modes of worship*, or, as it is better expressed in the text,—*HOW these nations served their gods.* And though this inquiry might, at first, arise from nothing else than a wanton curiosity, yet the legislator intimates that it would end in apostasy from the LORD OF HOSTS—*even so will we do likewise*; that is, we will use those pagan rites in the service of the God of Israel; for they were little in danger, so early, to use Canaanitish rites in the service of the gods of Canaan. Besides, the caution here is not against IDOLATRY but INFANTICIDE. Nor could they be much disposed to forsake the God of Israel for the gods of Canaan, at the very time they were so successfully marching, under the auspices of Moses, to exterminate that devoted people. He therefore could scarce conceive that, at this time, they needed such a caution. For, the reason he gives for restraining this hurtful inquiry is, lest they should worship their own God with pagan rites; especially this most abominable of all, INFANTICIDE. And there was the more need of this caution, since the *first-born of man and beast*, in Israel, were to be *sanctified to the Lord*; and though the first-born of man was redeemed, while the first-born of the *clean beasts* were sacrificed, yet the love of corrupt and idolatrous rites might give some propensity to a fatal mistake, and to slip in *sacrifice* instead of *sanctification*.

Afterwards when the Israelites became polluted with the infernal stains of *infanticide*, the PROPHETS never ceased to proclaim aloud God's abhorrence of this impiety. For, in order to impress upon the paganized or apostate Israelites a due sense of their frequent defections, it was found necessary for these his messengers thoroughly to probe the consciences of such hardened wretches, which had been seared with the *fires of Molech*.

Sacred history informs us how severely *Ahas* was punished for his multiplied idolatries; but principally for his "burning his children in the fire, after the abominations of the heathen [the Canaanites] whom the Lord had cast out before the children of Israel." †—"They sacrificed," says the Psalmist, "their sons and their daughters unto devils—the idols of Canaan—and the land was polluted with blood—insomuch that he abhorred his own inheritance." ‡—"They have built the high places of Baal," says Jeremiah, "to burn their sons with fire, for burnt-offerings to Baal." § And again—"They caused their sons and their daughters to pass through the fire, to Molech." || Ezekiel, likewise, accuseth them of having caused their *sons to pass through the fire, to DEVOUR them.* ¶ But further, it would seem, by the following words of Jeremiah, that these impious sacrifices were offered, by the unnatural Jews, to the God of Israel himself—"The children of Judah have done evil in my sight, saith the Lord; they have set their abominations in the house which is called by my name, to pollute it, and they have built the high places of Tophet, which is in the valley of the son of Hinnom, to burn their sons and their daughters in the fire, which I commanded them not, neither came it into my mind." \*\*\* The concluding words seem to intimate that these apostates pretended to have received such a command; or with what propriety was it so formally denied? Possibly they might pervert the famous passage in Leviticus; †† of which more hereafter. However, the whole of the text informs us clearly, that *child sacrifice* sometimes polluted the altars of the temple. Ezekiel seems to confirm the same thing; "Moreover, this they have done unto me; they have defiled my sanctuary, in the same day, and have profaned my sabbaths. For when they had slain their children unto their idols, then they came, the same day, into my sanctuary to profane it, and lo! thus have they done in the midst of mine house." ‡‡—i. e. "When they had slain children to their idols, they, on the same day, offered the like horrid sacrifice to me."—And we know, it was their usual practice, amidst their defections, to join *idol worship* to the worship of the God of Israel.

The sacred historian is still more express to this purpose: when he thus speaks of the wicked king Manasseh—"He built altars in the house of the Lord—and he built altars for

\* Deut. xii. 30.

† 2 Chron. xxviii. 3.

‡ Ps. cvi. 37, 38, 40.

§ Chap. xix. ver. 5. || Chap. xxxii. 35. ¶ Chap. xxiii. 37. \*\* Chap. vii. 30, 31.

†† Chap. xxvii. 28, 29.

‡‡ Chap. xxiii. 38, 39.



all the host of heaven, in the two courts of the house of the Lord, and HE MADE HIS SONS TO PASS THROUGH THE FIRE; and observed times, and used enchantments," &c.\*

On the whole, the gross IMMORALITY of this horrid rite, was that to which the abhorrence of God was principally, and often solely directed. This truth would appear certain (did scripture afford no other evidence) from the warning given by Moses to his people, on their going to take possession of the promised land.

But a decisive passage in Isaiah cuts off the subterfuge of our philosophers, who are ready to suppose that the declared abhorrence of *human sacrifices*, so often repeated in scripture, is confined to such as were directed to an IDOLATROUS OBJECT; for the prophet, in the very place referred to, speaking in the name of God, declares the utmost detestation of *human sacrifices* when offered to himself: for, speaking to those immoral Israelites, who imagined they could atone for their vices by ritual observances, he tells them, that even *legal sacrifices*, when offered to him with corrupt dispositions, were as displeasing to him, as those abominable *human sacrifices* would be, which the law of nature condemns. "He that killeth an ox, is as if he had slain a MAN; he that sacrificeth a lamb, as if he cut off a DOG'S NECK."† Here, we see the ritual worship, commanded by God, is opposed to the *sacrifice of man*, abominated by the law of nature; and to the sacrifice of a dog, the thing most abhorred by the law of Moses; in whose ritual this animal was held so totally unclean, that *the hire of a whore* and the *price of a dog*, are put together as equally unfit to be brought into *the house of the Lord*.‡

II. We now come to those two capital passages, on which the enemies of religion found their impious charge. The one, they consider as an indispensable COMMAND; the other as an EXAMPLE, adapted to enforce the execution of it.

The pretended *command* is in *Leviticus*, and contained in these words:—NONE DEVOTED, WHICH SHALL BE DEVOTED OF MEN, SHALL BE REDEEMED; BUT SHALL SURELY BE PUT TO DEATH.§

Here is a *law*, which our philosophers, in their great sagacity, conceived did enjoin something. But being strangers to the subject, and ignorant of the phraseology, with heads likewise full of mischief, they discovered HUMAN SACRIFICES in a place where Moses was speaking of quite another thing.

The chapter, in which this *law* is found, contains directions for the making, and for the performance of vows; a mode of obligation which had a natural place in a government THEOCRATICAL; where *civil* matters of obedience were intimately connected with *religious*.

Now, that capital command given to the chosen people, TO EXTERMINATE THE CANAANITES, a command so necessary to be observed, for the preservation both of their *civil* and *religious* systems, needed, above all things, frequent repetitions of the sacred tie of vows for its more exact performance; some of the softer as well as stronger passions of our nature pushed forward by the delusions of self-interest, being always at hand to defeat or retard the divine sentence denounced against an INCORRIGIBLE people (of which more hereafter). The repetition of *vows*, therefore, for the speedier accomplishment of this great and laborious event (just like the repetition of oaths of allegiance in common states for the better security of the establishment) was enjoined, or at least encouraged, by the leaders of the Jewish people.

Sometimes the vow was made by the people, in a body; like that we find in the book of *Numbers*—"And Israel vowed a *vow* unto the Lord, and said, If thou wilt, indeed, deliver this people [the Canaanites] into my hand, then *I will utterly destroy their cities*. And the Lord hearkened unto the *voice* of Israel; and delivered up the Canaanites: and *they utterly destroyed them and their cities*."|| Sometimes again, the vow was made by particulars; by such whose power or situation best qualified them for the execution of this primary COMMAND: and to these, and for this sole purpose, was this strangely mistaken text directed.—"NONE DEVOTED, WHICH SHALL BE DEVOTED OF MEN," (or, as it is explained in the immediately preceding verse,—*no devoted thing, which a man shall devote unto the Lord*)—"shall be redeemed, but shall be surely put to death."¶ These *vows* were called the SANCTIFYING or DEVOTING *men* or *things*. In which, indeed, the language of religion is employed; and very *naturally*, for the reason given above. But to prevent the abusive interpretation of such *vows*, in the manner of our PHILOSOPHERS, by suffering more of *religion* than the mere language to enter into the idea of them, the people are forbidden to extend their *vows* to what God himself had *sanctified*, such as the *first fruits*.—*Only the firstling of the beasts, which* (says Moses) *should be the Lord's firstling, no man shall sanctify it.*\*\* But if *man* was, for this reason, not to sanctify the first fruits of *beasts*, much more was *he* restrained from sanctifying the first fruits of *man*; since the *first fruits of man* were not to be put to death (like those whom human vows had devoted), but to be *redeemed*.

\* 2 Kings xxi. 4, 5, 6. † Chap. lxvi. 3. ‡ Deut. xxiii. 18. § Lev. xxvii. 29.  
|| Num. xxi. 2, 3. ¶ Lev. xxvii. 29. \*\* Ver. 26.

In a word, *the men here devoted by men, and not to be redeemed*, were NO SACRIFICES AT ALL, as the first fruits of the children of Israel WERE, and, therefore, to be redeemed; but enemies taken in battle, to whom no quarter had been given; and whose lives, by the law of arms, were at the disposal of the conqueror. M. Voltaire's ignorance of the law of Moses, which occasions him to mistake a MILITARY EXECUTION for a RELIGIOUS SACRIFICE, might have been well excused, had he forbore to abuse what he did not understand. But to know his Virgil no better is a disgrace indeed.

Quis ILLAUDATI nescit Busiridis aras?

says the great poet, in plain detestation of *human sacrifices*. Yet in the funeral rites of *Pallas*, directed by the hero of the poem, (the model of religious piety and civil wisdom) the captives taken in war are slain at the lighted pile, without the least mark of the poet's censure or disapprobation.

Vinxerat, et post terga manus quos mitteret umbris  
Inferias, caeco sparsuros sanguine flammam.

For their lives were forfeited by the law of arms, and only taken with a little more ceremony than is, at present, in use: the military execution being often performed at tombs and altars: for in the pagan world *superstition* had occasioned a confused mixture of things, sacred and profane. But in the Jewish republic, where the church and state were incorporated, this commixture made no other confusion than what arises from the mistakes of men, ignorant of the nature of that sacred economy.—Their God was their *king*; and their government in consequence was *theocratical*. So that every act of state was in a certain sense, though not in the common one, an act of religion. Obedience to the LAW was enforced by a vow; and slaughter in and after battle, a DEVOTEMENT to the *Lord of hosts*; in support of the civil command to exterminate the Canaanites.

But besides the singular form of the Jewish republic, which brought in the use of this language, the very genius of the people, modeled, indeed, on a *theocratic* administration, disposed them to improve that mode of speech; so that matters merely civil and domestic are conveyed to us in the style of religion.

Thus highly coloured, both in the *camp*, and in the *temple* of the *Lord of hosts*, was the language of the Jewish people. Which gave a pretence to the detestable Spinoza, to insinuate, that the whole of the Mosaic religion consisted only in a SACRED PHRASEOLOGY. Though what he insinuates proves only, yet proves fully, that the DEVOTEMENT in question was a civil, not a sacrificial *rite*. “Judæi,” says he, “nunquam causarum mediarum sive particularium faciunt mentionem, nec eas curant, sed religionis ac pietatis, sive ut vulgo dici solet, devotionis causa, ad Deum semper recurrunt. Si enim, ex. gr. pecuniam mercatura lucrati sunt, eam a Deo oblatam aiunt; si aliquid, ut fit, cupiunt, dicunt, Deum eorum cor disposuisse; si aliquid etiam cogitant, Deum id iis dixisse aiunt,” &c.\*

Having now examined the pretended PRECEPT or command; and shown that it has no relation to HUMAN SACRIFICE, but to quite another thing; we proceed to the EXAMPLE, the case of JEPHTHAH: for, *on the law of human sacrifices*, says the poet Voltaire, *it was, that Jephthah, who sacrificed his daughter, founded his oath of devotement*.—As this EXAMPLE hath given more alarm to the friends of religion than it deserves, and drawn them into forced and unnatural constructions of his rash and foolish vow, it may be proper to consider the man and his manners, fairly and at large.

JEPHTHAH,† a bastard son of *Gilead*, by a harlot, being cast out from a share of his paternal inheritance, by the legitimate issue, took refuge in a strange land. What effects this expulsion must have on his religious sentiments, we may learn from the case of DAVID; who thus expostulates with Saul, on his exile—“If,” says he, “they be your counsellors, who have advised you to this unjust usage of me,—*cursed be they before the Lord; for they have driven me out this day from abiding in the inheritance of the Lord*, saying, GO, SERVE OTHER GODS.”‡ Now, if David, so learned and zealous in the LAW, was exposed at least to this inevitable temptation, by his exile in a foreign land, what must we think of *Jephthah* in similar circumstances? who had nothing of David's knowledge of the *law*, and consequently none of his *zeal* for its support. In this foreign land, *Jephthah* associated himself to a dissolute band of outlaws, who lived upon rapine and violence: not, it is confessed, the

\* Tract. Theol. C. I. This was said by Spinoza in order to decry the MIRACLES recorded in scripture. But with the usual luck of every attempt of the same kind. For were this very exaggerated account a true one, a stronger proof, of the reality and frequency of miracles, could hardly be conceived in the nature of things. Since no people but such who had lived under a real THEOCRACY, could have contracted a turn of mind productive of so singular a phraseology.

† Judges xi.

‡ 1 Sam. xxvi. 19.

most discreditable profession, in those early ages of barbarous manners. Amongst these men, he soon got to be the leader, and a distinguished chief in all their lawless expeditions. So that his fame for military achievements filled all the regions round about.

At this time, the Israelites in punishment for one of their defections from their God and King, were labouring under the oppression of the idolatrous borderers. And the *Amorites* making an excursion into *Gilead*; the Israelites of this place, as most immediately concerned, sought to provide for themselves, as well as for their brethren (now become repentant), some leader of superior power and distinguished capacity. And the reputation of their kinsman, *Jephthah*, made them first apply to him.

But *Jephthah*, with the frank roughness of a soldier of fortune, naturally upbraided them, on this occasion, with their former neglect and injustice, in permitting his father's house so cruelly to cast him out, to want and misery; and now, as meanly, without redressing his injuries, to fly to him in their distress.

They reply, they were now come to make him that amends, by their choice of him for head over all the inhabitants of *Gilead*.

*Jephthah* accepts this satisfaction: and an act is made of their proceedings according to the religious customs of those times.

All this while, the *republic*, the THEOCRACY itself, seems to have been little thought of, by this future *judge of Israel*. Indeed the honour of so sacred a station had small charms for our licentious outlaw.

However, in consequence of the reconciliation, and in pursuance of the choice which the *Gileadites* had made of him, for their head and leader, he enters on his office. And now, perhaps, for the first time, he observed, towards his enemies, all the punctilios of the law of arms.

He sent to know of the children of *Ammon*, why they committed hostilities against his countrymen. They answered, that the Israelites had unjustly dispossessed them of their lands; and that they were now assembled in arms to recover the inheritance of their fathers. To this, the *bastard of Gilead*, like an able advocate, as well as a determined chieftain, replied, that when Israel, under the conduct of Moses, had left Egypt, to take possession of the land, promised to their forefathers, and now given to them by their God, they had craved leave of the intermediate people, and particularly of the *children of Ammon*, for a free passage through their country, according to the law of nations, which being denied unto them, they forced their way; and when hostilely opposed, and their enemies overcome in battle, they took possession, as, by the laws of war, they might do, of the lands of the conquered. So far was well; and suitable to the dignity of a *Judge of Israel*.

But, by what follows, it appears that our famous adventurer was, as yet, more than half a pagan; for thus he proceeds—"So now the Lord God of Israel hath dispossessed the Amorites from before his people Israel; and shouldest thou possess it? WILT NOT THOU POSSESS THAT WHICH CHEMOSH, THY GOD, GIVETH THEE TO POSSESS? So whomsoever the LORD, OUR GOD, shall drive out from before us, them will we possess."\* This was said, on the gentile principle of *local tutelary deities*, in all the grossness of that notion; not yet refined and rationalized by our adventurer, on the ideas of the law. But when he resumes the *civil argument*, he again reasons better: and very solidly pleads the general law of PRESCRIPTION, in defence of his people—"While Israel," says he, "dwelt in Heshbon and her towns, and in Aroer and her towns, and in all the cities that be along, by the coasts of Arnon, THREE HUNDRED YEARS; why therefore did ye not recover them WITHIN THAT TIME?"† But the force of this argument making no impression, the negotiation ended in an appeal to arms. *Jephthah* leads out his troops against *Ammon*. And, in the forefront, without doubt, were those faithful bands, which he had collected and disciplined in the land of *Tob*.

The first step he takes to invite success, was the making an absurd pagan vow, that, if he returned with victory, he would sacrifice, for a burnt-offering to God, whatsoever came first out of the doors of his house‡ to welcome his return. He came back a conqueror; and his daughter, impatient to celebrate his triumph, being the first who met him, was, for his oath's sake, (though with extreme regret, because *besides her, he had neither son nor daughter*,§) sacrificed for her pains, according to the then established custom of idolatry; which, on such occasions, required a sacrifice of what was most dear or precious to the offerer. For, I hardly believe that *Jephthah* was, at this time, so learned in the LAW, as even the poet Voltaire; or that he had proceeded, like him, so far in the sacred text, as to misunderstand or misinterpret this famous *twenty-seventh chapter of Leviticus*, in support of so impious an action. The unhappy father appears, at this time, to understand so little of the LAW, as not to be able to distinguish what it had in common with paganism, (namely, the custom of offering eucharistical sacrifices on every great and fortunate event) from what it had in direct opposition to it (viz. that dire impiety of *human sacrifice*).

\* Judges xi. 23, 24.\*

† Ver. 26.

‡ Ver. 31.

§ Ver. 34.

The account here given appears to be the natural explanation of a plain story. But commentators, full of the ideas of *papal*, rather than of the *Mosaic* times; and paying a blind reverence to the character of a *Judge of Israel*, make the daughter, to save her father's honour, return *vow* for *vow*, and so consecrate herself to a virgin state. Solutions like these expose sacred scripture to the scorn and derision of unbelievers.

But against our account of JEPHTHAH's vow, which makes the whole to be conceived and perpetrated on pagan principles and practices, our adversaries,

1. Bid us observe, that the action is not condemned. A censure, they think, it could not have escaped, had the sacred historian deemed it an impiety.

2. That the text tells us further, that *Jephthah went out in the Spirit of the Lord*,\* and therefore they conclude, that he returned in the same *Spirit*.

3. Lastly, that Jephthah is extolled by the author of the *epistle to the Hebrews*,† and numbered in the class of sacred heroes.

To these objections, in their order.

First, They who lay so much stress on the action's having passed uncensured, consider neither the nature of the composition, nor the genius of the historian. The narrative itself is a brief compendium, or rather extract from the *Records of State*, entered as things passed, and then laid up in the archives of their scribes. In this species of composition it is not the wont to dwell either on the causes, the qualities, or the consequences of actions, but simply to tell the naked facts.

Nor had the writers of those times improved history into an art. They transcribed or abridged, merely for the sake of the people's information in facts, of what they found recorded in their venerable archives. This was the case in the story of the *lying prophet*, in the affair of the *altar of Bethel*.‡ His crime is neither condemned, nor is his punishment recorded. Had the *history* been a *romance*, forged at pleasure, both these particulars had assuredly been dwelt upon at large.

Besides, as the nature and quality of actions are best seen by the *laws* and *customs* of the people concerned; and the action in question was well understood, both by the writer, and his readers, to be condemned by the *Mosaic ritual*, it less needed a censure. The faithful followers of the *LAW*, for whose service this adventure was recorded, wanted no historian of prophetic authority to tell them, after they had seen *human sacrifices* execrated in almost every page of their history) that *Jephthah's sacrifice of his daughter* was either an impious imitation of pagan practices, or an ignorant presumption in the half-paganized votary, that he was here complying with the famous precept of the law in *Leviticus*,§ when indeed (as we have shown at large) it related to quite another thing.

But further, it is not peculiar to this story, to furnish an objection (such as it is) from the sacred writer's not interposing with his own judgment, concerning the *moral quality* of the action related. Scripture abounds with instances of this sort; a silence occasioned by one or other of the causes here explained.

2. But *Jephthah* (which is the second objection) *went out in the spirit of the Lord*, and therefore (they conclude) he must needs return *in the same spirit*.

Now, though on a less important occasion, I should be tempted to acquiesce in the *criticism*, though not in the *spirit*, of Spinoza, that this expression was to be put to the account of the *sacred phraseology* of the Jews; and to mean no more than the strength, the courage, and the address of a consummate leader; yet the language being here applied to a *judge of Israel*, and in the actual exercise of his office, I can readily allow that it signifies some *supernatural assistance*.

But what then? when the work committed to him, and for which he was thus qualified, was well over, we have no reason to suppose that the same spirit constantly rested on him, but very much to conclude the contrary. One of his most illustrious successors, SAMSON, had still a larger share of this *divine Spirit* imparted to him; yet nobody imagines that it rested with him; when, contrary to the *LAW*, he chose a wife from among the Philistines, or revealed the secret intrusted with him to Delilah; delinquencies much less criminal than the sacrifice of a daughter.

3.—But then, “the author of the *epistle to the Hebrews* extols him; and lifts him into the number of the most distinguished of the Jewish heroes.”—But for what is he thus extolled?—For his rash *vow*? No surely. David is extolled in the same place, and in the same manner. Is it for the murder of Uriah, and adultery with his wife? Surely neither of the heroes are extolled for these exploits; but for their *FAITH* in God, and their zeal for the advancement of the *THEOCRACY*. So says the writer himself; where, recapitulating the works and achievements of *FAITH*, he goes on, in these words—“And what shall I more say, For the time would fail me to tell of Gideon and Barak, and of Samson and of JEPHTHAH, of David also and Samuel, &c.”||—This *FAITH* was so active and eminent in DAVID, that,

\* Judges xi. 29. † Chap. xi. ver. 32. ‡ 1 Kings xiii. § Chap. xxvii. ver. 29.  
|| Heb. xi. 32.

notwithstanding his two gross immoralities, he is called by God himself, *A MAN AFTER HIS OWN HEART*. For, as this illustrious title neither covered, nor atoned, for his crimes, so neither did his crimes hinder its being bestowed upon him, when the question only concerned his zeal for the *LAW* and the *THEOCRACY*; as I have shown to these philosophers, on another occasion.

To conclude with *JEPHTHAH*.—We know, though only in general, that he lived long enough in the exercise of his ministry, and, consequently, under the occasional guidance of God's Holy Spirit, to wipe out all the pagan impressions of his ill education. *DAVID*, with a much better in his early youth, kept on improving in the knowledge of the *LAW*. He was at first somewhat scandalized at the *prosperity of the wicked*: but when he came into the *sanctuary*, i. e. when he had gained a more exact and perfect knowledge of the dispensation, then, as he tells us, *he understood the end of those men*.—In these respects, indeed, we are left more to our conjectures concerning *JEPHTHAH*. His history tells us, *he judged Israel for six years*.<sup>\*</sup> We are further informed (and this is all) that he defeated the Ephraimites;† who had picked a groundless quarrel with him; which ended as it is fit all such quarrels should end.

But, though we have now done with the personal character of *Jephthah*, and his rash vow; we have something more to say of the general character of a *judge of Israel*, as it holds in common with that of many other of God's *chosen servants*: whose faults and imperfections the malice of unbelievers have carefully drawn out, and objected to us, as matter of scandal; tending to impeach the veracity of sacred history, and the evidence that God thus interposed in support of his revealed will.

To clear up this matter, it may be sufficient to observe, that when God sees fit, in an extraordinary way, to give a new revelation of his *WILL* to man, we may conclude, from the very nature of things, that he will not disgrace his own *DISPENSATION*, by the use of unworthy instruments.

Both the *dignity* and *interests* of revelation require, that the *first bearers* of these glad tidings to mankind should be fully possessed of that *power* of virtue which true religion only can bestow.

The *dignity* of revelation requires that so bright an emanation from the very source of light and purity should not be conveyed to us through a polluted medium. The *interests* of it, likewise, reclaim against such an unworthy service.

A sanctity of manners, which is so necessary to support the mission, is the natural and inseparable attendant on the office. For, in the promulgation of a new religion, besides those marks of truth arising from the purity and reasonableness of the doctrine, which show it to be *WORTHY* of the Author to whom it is ascribed, there is need, in order to prove that it *ACTUALLY CAME FROM HIM*, of certain *MIRACULOUS* powers, declarative of the nature of the *dispensation*; and attendant on the sanctification of the heart of the messenger.

But the *character* of God's instruments, and the *conduct* of providence in the use of them, may be very different from those who are only raised up, and employed for the *support* of an established *dispensation*; as in the Jewish economy; or for the *reformation* of it, as in the Christian: though in the Jewish, administered by an extraordinary providence, these instruments may have had *extraordinary powers* intrusted to them, which those of the Christian had not. Here [*i. e.* for the support or reformation of things received and established] the same conclusion, for the necessity of sanctity of manners, will not hold. It being sufficient, for this purpose, that God, in the settled course of his providence, is incessantly producing *GOOD OUT OF EVIL*. And the *irregular* instrument is frequently made to serve, without his knowledge, and even against his will, the great ends of piety and truth.

Of the evidence of this, the History of the Church affords us many examples.

When God had gradually prepared, and, at length, fitted his *chosen people* for the reception of the *LAW*, his early instruments were selected from the most virtuous amongst men, *NOAH*, *ABRAHAM*, and *MOSES*:

And, again, when he first prepared the world for the promulgation of the *GOSPEL* (which was the completion of the *LAW*) he committed the care of it to men of the most unblemished and exemplary characters; such as John the Baptist, and the blessed apostles.

But, in the *establishment*, in the *support*, and in the *reformation* of religion (the second and inferior operation of divine love to man) God did not disdain to employ less perfect instruments, in either dispensation. He served himself of *DAVID* for the *LAW*, and of *CONSTANTINE* for the *GOSPEL*. And under the former of these dispensations, both before and after the period here referred to, when he had decreed, either to execute vengeance on the oppressors of an offending people, or to clear the holy land of idolaters, he frequently availed himself of the agency of wicked kings and licentious rulers. The same gracious providence was displayed in the preservation of religion under the latter dispensation. For, when the time was come that the Christian church was to be cleansed and purified from the long

\* Judges xii. 7.

† Chap. xii. ver. 1.



pollutions of an antichristian usurpation, God was pleased to make use of instruments, who had neither motives nor manners that could do honour to the *reformation* they were appointed to bring to pass.

UNBELIEVERS did not sufficiently consider this, when they made it an objection to *revealed religion*; nor PAPISTS, when they made the same objection to the *protestant reformation*. To the *first* we have already said enough on this head; and, to the other, shall only add at present, that we are far from being ashamed of receiving spiritual benefit from men, who supply these circumstances of reproach against themselves; while we find reason to adore that hand which turned the avarice (if such was the case) of a furious friar, and the luxury of a debauched monarch, from their natural mischiefs, to become productive of the greatest blessings; the restoration of LETTERS and RELIGION.

But it is now time to go on with *M. Voltaire*, whose *philosophy*, being grafted on his *poetry*, produces fruit worthy of the stock it comes from, viz. *fable* and *fiction*. So that the next instance he produces of the encouragement which the LAW gives to *human sacrifices*, is Saul's *abortive vow*.—The wonder is, that he did not go on with the cases of Achan—the five kings of the Amorites—Sisera—Agag—Adonijah—the five sons of Saul, hung up in Gibeah—and in short, all the civil and military executions recorded in the Old Testament. But in his rage to run down religion, he has out-shot himself, and forgot his subject.—To bring him to himself, I will, in charity, direct him to a text, which, if he knows how to pervert with proper dexterity, may appear more to his purpose than any of this senseless prate. It is in the prophet *Micah*: who addressing himself to his corrupt and idolatrous countrymen, amongst his other exprobrations, ridicules, and, at the same time, instructs them, in this manner,—“Wherewith shall I come before the Lord? and bow myself before the high God? Shall I come before him with burnt-offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or ten thousands of rivers of oil? SHALL I GIVE MY FIRST-BORN FOR MY TRANSGRESSION; THE FRUIT OF MY BODY FOR THE SIN OF MY SOUL? He hath showed thee, O man! what is good. And what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?”\*

Reasoners, like our poet, may fancy, that the prophet is here reckoning upon the most efficacious of the LEGAL SACRIFICES; and consequently, that INFANTICIDE and HOMICIDE are amongst the first of that number, since all are said to be offered up to *the Lord, the high God*.

To confute this groundless fancy, let me previously repeat these two observations; First, that the law of Moses is so far from requiring or directing *human sacrifices*, that it ever treats them with the utmost abhorrence; and therefore was very unlikely to speak of them as *legal sacrifices*: secondly, it hath been shown that the idolatrous Jews of those times, were accustomed to bring into the TEMPLE-SERVICE the most detested rites of paganism.

This being premised, let us consider the season in which these prophecies, sent to Micah, were delivered;—to whom they were addressed—and to what end, directed. They were sent, the prophet tells us, *in the days of Jotham, Ahaz, and Hezekiah, Kings of Judah*.†

We find by the history of these kings, that, in their reign, the house of Judah was sunk into all kinds of vice and iniquity. But still the leading crime, through the bad example of these monarchs, was IDOLATRY; which consisted, sometimes in worshipping the God of Israel in the pagan places of worship, called THE HIGH PLACES; at other times in worshipping idols in the very place of God's worship, THE TEMPLE. Jotham, indeed, is said to have done “that which was right in the sight of the Lord. Howbeit that the HIGH PLACES were not removed; the people sacrificed and burnt incense still in the high places.”‡ But his son, Ahaz, we are told, “did not that which was right in the sight of the Lord his God, like David, his father. But he walked in the way of the kings of Israel; yea, and made his sons to pass through the FIRE, according to the abominations of the heathen, whom the Lord cast out from before the children of Israel.”|| Hezekiah supplied what was wanting in the grandfather, and reformed what was amiss, during the wicked reign of his father.

Amongst a people so corrupt, while any sense of religion still remained, *rites and ceremonies* would always take the lead of *moral duties*. The prophet seems to have availed himself of the good reign of Hezekiah: and to aid the reformation, which that monarch had begun, attacks labouring superstition in its head-quarters, amidst the fires of *Moloch*.

But to strike at the root of the evil, which was substituting *ritual* modes of worship, in the place of *moral duties*, he informs them how unacceptable the external pomp and pageantry of religion was to the God of Israel, when not accompanied with purity of heart, and integrity of manners. This is the general sense of the text quoted above: which, without doubt, should be thus paraphrased—“Wherewith shall I come before the Lord,” says the prophet, personating an idolatrous and immoral Jew, “shall I bring a profusion of calves, and rams, and oil, AS THE LAW DIRECTS; or if these be insufficient, or unacceptable to the Deity, shall I seek, as is now the practice, for a more powerful atonement, AMONGST THE

\* Chap. vi. ver. 6, 7, 8.

† Chap. i. ver. 1.

‡ 2 Kings xv. 31, 35.

§ 2 Kings xvi. 3.



FOREIGN RITES OF OUR PAGAN NEIGHBOURS, who boast of something still more precious and worthy the altars of their gods—MY FIRST BORN TO BE OFFERED UP IN SACRIFICE? Vain man, subjoins the prophet, do not God and nature proclaim, that without VIRTUE, rites and ceremonies are of no avail, whether they be such as the LAW prescribes, or such as IDOLATERS (to whose practices thou art so enslaved) impiously fancy to be still more horribly efficacious."

And how, *human sacrifices* came to be so esteemed, we have shown, in the course of this dissertation, *concerning the rise and progress of sacrifice*.

III. From the *sacrifice of particular men*, charged by M. Voltaire, on the Jewish LAW, he rises in his impiety to accuse it of the SACRIFICE OF A WHOLE NATION. These are his words—"It is said in Leviticus that *none devoted, which shall be devoted of men, shall be redeemed, but shall surely be put to death*. The Jewish books bear evidence, that when the Israelites overran the little country of Canaan, they massacred, in most of the villages, men, women, and children—because they had been DEVOTED."

In these words are included two charges against the LAW.—1. That this *devoting* of the Canaanites was a *religious sacrifice*. 2. Or, at least, a commanded extermination of a whole people, by the ministry of the Israelites. So that if one of them should fail, the other yet may hold.

I have already acquitted it of the first, by an explanation of the famous mistaken text in the xxviii chapter of Leviticus. We come now to the second, the censure of extreme cruelty and inhumanity in executing the command. And this will bring us to the concluding head, on this subject.—

THE MORAL GOVERNOR OF THE UNIVERSE administers his sovereignty in two different ways: while moral governors amongst men can, in their several departments, administer theirs only in one.

God, the author of nature, and framer of its constitution, hath so ordered and combined moral entities, that VIRTUE generally, or for the most part, produceth HAPPINESS; while MISERY is as generally attendant upon VICE. On this disposition of things, the rewards and punishments of FREE AGENTS are first of all adjusted. But this makes it neither superfluous, nor inexpedient for the God of the universe to punish and reward in another manner, likewise. Not *superfluous*; since this constitution of nature does not always, by reason of certain traversies in *free agency*, produce its designed effects. Not *inexpedient*; since, in that other manner, the *power* of the divine administration is more sensibly manifested; as in the first way his *wisdom* may be better collected: while, both together serve more fully to convince us, that the FIRST CAUSE is a free agent; and that the constitution of nature is his ordinance; and not the effect of chance or destiny.

On these accounts, a reasonable analogy would lead us to conclude, from what passeth in the government of the NATURAL WORLD, that in the early ages of mankind, when an EQUAL PROVIDENCE prevailed (as it did while men retained the knowledge of their Governor and Creator; of which more in its proper place) God would frequently interpose, in an extraordinary manner, to prevent or redress those irregularities which would, from time to time, arise, and did actually arise in God's *moral government*, while *solely* administered by that relative order of things, which his *wisdom* had so beautifully connected, and so firmly established, as to be disordered by nothing but the traversies of *free agency* in his creatures.

That he did thus, in fact, interpose, holy scriptures bear full evidence. The first account we have of it, after the DELUGE (in which, this part of God's moral administration was so signally displayed) is in the fate of *Sodom and Gomorrah*: and afterwards, in the EXTERMINATION OF THE CANAANITES: both these nations having, by the same unnatural crimes, *filled up the measure of their iniquities*.

In the case of *Sodom and Gomorrah*, the enormity of their vices, and the total depravity of their manners, impose silence on the most profligate opposers of religion, however clamorous they may be in the patronage of the *Canaanites*. Their plea, in favour of these, arises from the choice God is said to have made of the INSTRUMENTS of his vengeance. *Fire and brimstone* they easily submit to: but *fire and sword* revolts their humanity.

They can never, they tell us, be brought to believe that the common Father of all would employ some of his reasonable creatures to execute his vengeance upon others of the same species, even though these others had been justly sentenced to perdition for their beastly and inhuman vices.

They pretend to say, "that God could not, consistently with his nature and attributes, put fallow-creatures on such an employment." They have offered no reasons for this bold assertion: and I can find none. In the mean time, we must needs be much edified with the modesty of these men; who deny that liberty to God, which they are not backward to allow to their earthly sovereigns: amongst whom, the right of employing *one* part of their subjects to execute their sentence on *another*, is every where practised, without censure or control.

But they say further, "that although God might, yet he certainly would not have re-

course to *human agency* in this matter, on account of the mischiefs which such agency was likely to produce.

First, as it is extremely liable to abuse. Every pretender to a divine command, whether feigned by an impostor, or fancied by an enthusiast, would, when supported by this example, never suffer their neighbours to live in peace. And Saracen armies and popish crusades would be always at hand to carry on desolation in the name of God."

Secondly, "this *instrumentality* must have an ill effect on the MANNERS of the Israelites, by making their hearts callous, and insensible to the calamities of their fellow-creatures." These are the objections of our PHILOSOPHERS. But before they give us time to reply, they kindly take the trouble off our hands, and will needs answer for us themselves. This is one of their usual tricks, to stop or cover the disgrace of a foolish sophism, by a show of candour. But, indeed, their aim is to draw the advocate of religion from solid ground which is fairly and steadily to confute infidelity, ON ITS OWN PRINCIPLES. Of this sleight of hand, the poet Voltaire has here given us an example most worthy of him.—*This [the extermination of the Canaanites] had been an enormous crime, had not God himself, THE SOVEREIGN ARBITER OF LIFE AND DEATH, of whose conduct we are not to ask a reason, so ordained, in the impenetrable depths of his justice.*—Indeed! but we will be bold to bring him back to the state of the question.—"God the MORAL GOVERNOR of the world could not or would not (say unbelievers) make use of *human instruments* for the destruction of the Canaanites." This is the objection. But to keep us from answering, they take the business into their own hands—*God (says this prince of philosophers) the CREATOR, the sovereign arbiter of life and death, of whose conduct we are not to ask, what does thou? hath foreclosed all reasoning, in the impenetrable depths of his justice.*"

Thus they raise their objection against a command of God, as MORAL GOVERNOR of the universe, (and such he is always represented in scripture) and then, to stop our mouths with a sham, answer the objection themselves, by putting a PHYSICAL CREATOR in his place.

Now, of the actions of a MORAL GOVERNOR, we may, with due modesty and humility, ask the reason;—*Shall not THE JUDGE OF ALL THE EARTH do right?* was asked\* in a similar case, by the *father of the faithful*. But, to the PHYSICAL CREATOR of the universe, who will venture to say, *what does thou?*†—Illustrious philosopher! permit us therefore to answer for ourselves. We say, that the *Moral Governor* of the world can never be debarred from carrying on his administration in such a way as may best suit the ends of divine wisdom, because human folly may encourage itself to raise, on that ground, an impious and abusive imitation. And, neither under *natural*, nor under *revealed religion*, hath God thought fit to exempt or secure his *laws* from such abuses.

God, under *natural religion*, in the ordinary course of his providence, hath, by annexing evil to vice, made that constitution of things the *instrument* of punishment; but how hath this dispensation been dishonoured, and even to the disturbance of society itself, when these punishments, interpreted by ignorant or uncharitable men, have been turned into EXTRAORDINARY JUDGMENTS? Again, *Peter* and *John* said, what every honest deist is ready to say—*We must obey God rather than man.*‡ Yet how perpetually has this truth been abused by rebels and fanatics.

Under *revealed religion*, MIRACLES, (the necessary credential of those intrusted with its promulgation,) by which power, both the physical and intellectual systems were controlled, have yet occasioned innumerable abuses, defiling every age of the church with fantastic prodigies, and lying wonders.

But why do I speak of these sanctions of revelation, (the credentials of God's messengers) when the very communication of his will to man, REVELATION itself, hath filled all ages and nations with impostors, pretending to a divine commission?

But our *philosophers* go on; and say, "That this office of destruction, imposed upon the Israelites, must have produced an ill effect on their *moral character*, by giving them wrong notions of the *divine nature*; and by vitiating *their own*; as it had a tendency to destroy or to weaken the social passions and affections."

Nay, further, they pretend to see the marks of these evils in the character of the *chosen people*: whom therefore instead of pitying, (and if the evils arose from the cause they assign, were most deserving of pity,) they have most mercilessly abused and misrepresented. But to answer to the FIRST PART of this infidel objection, which pretends that the Jews were brought, by this employment, to entertain *wrong ideas of the divine nature*, I reply,—The most adorable attribute of God, the *Moral Governor* of the world, is his LONG-SUFFERING, by which he bears with the crimes and follies of men, in order to bring them to repentance: now this attribute he hath made manifest to all: but more fully to his *chosen people*; even in the very case of these devoted Canaanites. For when their crimes were arrived at the height of human depravity, he still withheld his hand, and, by divers awak-

\* Gen. xviii. 25.

† Job ix. 12.

‡ Acts v. 29.

ening judgments, gave them time and invitation for repentance. But on their neglect and contempt of his repeated warnings, he, at length, was *forced*, as it were, to pour out his full vengeance upon them.

The author of the Apocryphal book, of *the Wisdom of Solomon*, thus graphically paints their case, in an address to the Almighty:—"Thou hast mercy upon all—thou winkest at the sins of men, because they should amend—thou sparest all; for they are thine, thou lover of souls!—therefore thou chastenest them, by little and little, that offend; and warnest them by putting them in remembrance wherein they have offended; that leaving their wickedness, they may believe in thee, O Lord! For IT WAS THY WILL TO DESTROY BY THE HANDS OF OUR FATHERS, THOSE OLD INHABITANTS OF THY HOLY LAND; whom thou hatest for doing most odious works of sorceries, and WICKED SACRIFICES—*merciless murderers of children, and devourers of man's flesh, and the feasts of blood*: nevertheless even those thou sparedst *as men*,\* and didst send *wasps*, forerunners of thine host, to destroy them by little and little—executing thy judgments upon them by little and little, THOU GAVEST THEM PLACE OF REPENTANCE; not being ignorant that they were a naughty generation—and their cogitations would never be changed."†

The canonical books of scripture authenticate what this sage writer of after-times, here delivers, concerning God's dealing with these *devoted nations*.

*Moses*, on the egression of the Israelites from Egypt, speaks thus to them, in the person of the Almighty—"I will send *hornets* before thee, which shall drive out the Hivite, the Canaanite, and the Hittite from before thee. I will not drive them out from before thee in one year, lest the land become desolate; by *little and little* will I drive them out from before thee."‡ And again in his last exhortation to his people,—“Behold the Lord, thy God, will send the *hornet* amongst them, until they that are left, and hide themselves from thee, be destroyed.”§ And Joshua, on the like occasion, tells the people that what *Moses* had promised, in the name of the God of Israel, God had fulfilled—I sent the HORNET before you, which drove them out from before you, even the two kings of the Amorites.”||

Here, the reader may observe that the *Apocryphal* writer gives *one* reason for the *temporary* plagues, which forerun the total destruction of the Canaanites; and the authentic text gives another; nor will the learned reader be at a loss to account for this difference.

The Israelites, under their leader, *Moses*, did not want to be told, that those *temporary* plagues were sent *in mercy*. They had, on the first opening of his commission, been instructed by him, in the attributes of the true God, *his long-suffering and bearing with the contradiction of sinners*; and his merciful acceptance even of a late-delayed repentance. They had experienced the unwearied exertion of this attribute, even in their own case, when their repeated perversities, which would have tired out every thing but *infinite goodness*, were as often pardoned as they were committed. So that *they* were not ignorant, though their degenerate posterity, in the time of this Apocryptical writer, might want to be informed of the gracious purpose, in those warnings to a devoted people.

And as there was another use in these probationary plagues, viz., the wasting the inhabitants of Canaan, this was the design which *Moses* and Joshua principally insist on, as it was the greatest encouragement to a dastardly people. *Moses*, in the name of his Master, promiseth to send HORNETS before them, which SHOULD DRIVE OUT the Hivite, &c. And Joshua reminds his people how the promise had been performed—God sent the HORNET before you, which drove them out from before you, &c.

This assurance was no more than needed. The cowardice contracted in a long state of slavery; (a state fairly recorded, and deeply lamented by their leader) required the assistance of all NATURE in their support.

O nimium dilecte Deo—cui militat æther,  
Et conjurati veniunt ad classica venti.

But though these *warning judgments*, these *chastisements of mercy*, were lost on those to whom they were sent, yet they were not cast away; for, in aggravating the crimes of the *Canaanites*, they served, at the same time to promote their speedier extermination. So admirably is the moral government of God administered, that its acts, directed to various purposes, are never issued in vain.—But what is said in holy writ, of the previous punishments on the Canaanites, in mercy, is given only as a specimen of them, and not for a complete list, as in the record of the *trying* plagues of Egypt. So that we are not to conclude, that the destructive animals, sent amongst those miscreants, were only wasps and hornets; or that, amongst the awakening punishments, DISEASE was not one. When God was pleased, in after-times, to punish their descendants, the *Philistines*, for their profana-

\* i. e. for the sake of their rational nature, though by their unnatural vices they had forfeited all the prerogatives of humanity.

† Chap. xi. 23 et seq.—Chap. xii. 2. et seq. ‡ Exod. xxiii. 28. § Deut. vii. 20.

|| Josh. xxiv. 12.

tion of the ARK; (which, for the sins of his people, he suffered to fall into their hands) the sacred writers tell us, that they, who so profaned it, *were smitten with emeralds in their secret parts.*\* This is the only punishment there mentioned. Yet, by the account of the atonement, or *trespass-offering*, it appears that there was *another*.—The Philistines sent back with the ark, which they restored, *the images of five emeralds, and FIVE MICE IN GOLD.*† Who can doubt, but that, in this addition to the atonement, another punishment was intimated, viz., the *devastation of their lands by mice?* But the sacred writer does not leave us to mere conjecture. In speaking of these mice, he thus qualifies them,—*mice that HAD THE LAND.* But this is not all. The text here acquaints us, though occasionally, with two punishments, inflicted on the *Canaanites*; which the history of their expulsion does not particularly mention.—We understand how fit instruments of general devastation *mice* must needs be: and we may guess how well suited the *other punishment* was for their unnatural crimes; nor would either one, or the other, cease to remind them of the vices or punishments of their ancestors, the *Canaanites*, so that, avoiding the manners of their ancestors, they might (if possible) escape their total destruction.

I shall conclude this point with an observation which naturally leads to the next, that is to say, to the SECOND PART of this infidel objection, viz., “the EFFECT which the destruction of the *Canaanites* must be supposed to have on the minds of the MORAL INSTRUMENTS of their punishment.” A matter most deserving our attention.

It cannot be doubted but that the Almighty displayed his mercy and long-suffering on *Sodom and Gomorrah*, in some way analogous to what he practised in the land of *Canaan*, (and how gracious he was in the extent of that mercy, we learn from Abraham’s intercession for those cities)‡ though the particulars of it be not recorded by the sacred historian: whose silence in the one case, and not in the other, may be clearly understood. These execrable cities were destroyed *immediately* by God’s own hand, in letting loose the elements (the treasures of his wrath) upon them.—In the deletion of the *Canaanites*, he was pleased to employ HUMAN INSTRUMENTS. These were to be used according to their nature; not as entities merely *physical*, but as *moral agents* likewise: beings not only endowed with *sense*, but *sentiment*. Now it seemed but fit that such *agents* should be instructed in the reason and occasion of their commission; especially as it was a matter of high importance; no less than to preserve them from judging perversely of the divine attributes. Accordingly Moses obviated this mischief by a detail of the abominable manners of this devoted people: together with a memorial of the ineffectual issue of their many chastisements in mercy to bring them to repentance, and to save them from utter deletion.

As the mischief was thus effectually obviated, the *Israelites* were, at the same time, secured from that other, (which is the second point objected to their commission) its tendency to vitiate the most amiable passion of our nature, by destroying or weakening the benign and social feelings for the miseries of our fellow creatures. For what could God’s gracious dealing with these incorrigible miscreants teach all, who (like the *Israelites*) were intimately informed of their crimes, and long delayed punishment, but, in imitation of God’s long forbearance, to show mercy and compassion to their offending brethren in distress. Nor, in fact, do we find that the *Jews* were more steeled to, or insensible of, the calamities of humanity (bating those of this devoted people) than other men, in the early ages of society, were wont to be. And if they were not much more humanized, by being *better taught, as well as fed*, than the rest of mankind, it must be ascribed, not to this *commission*, but to a certain *native perversity*, which (as strange as it may at first sight appear) might be one, amongst the very many reasons of God’s choice of them, for his PECULIAR, as it made them the properest subjects to work upon, for a fuller manifestation, of his infinite mercy towards the sons of men. Where it might be seen, in the *deviations* from right of two people thus connected and related, that the *one* was destroyed, after all means had been employed, without effect, to bring them to REPENTANCE; and the *other* pardoned and highly favoured when the same merciful forbearance had produced its fruit of a timely REPENTANCE, and return to GOD, after every transgression; and, at length, a determined perseverance in this their capital duty (adherence to the true God) for many ages, even to the present time.

But it may still be asked, though no mischief was derived towards the *Instruments* of this extraordinary commission, yet what good could such a *commission* produce? I answer, much, and constant; for besides a *political* benefit to an abject unwarlike people, in teaching them the use of arms; who were to make their destined way to empire, as well by their own power, as by the extraordinary aid of the Almighty; in order to avoid a lavish waste of miracles: besides this, (I say) there were *moral advantages*, great and lasting, derived to this instrumentality. Horror and aversion in the *Israelites* to those unnatural crimes which had occasioned the deletion of the *Canaanites*; whose punishment must be intimately impressed on the minds of the *chosen people*, by their being appointed the executioners of God’s vengeance. To confirm this, we may observe, that both *Moses* and *Joshua*, by in-

\* 1 Sam. v. 6.

† Chap. vi. 4, 5.

‡ Gen. xviii.

cessantly reminding them of the horrid depravity of that devoted people, had their eyes always intent upon this good effect.

P. 650, H. The eloquent *Bossuet* saith rightly, that *Protestants* have but lamely supported the FIGURE, of THIS IS MY BODY, &c. by those—*I am the vine—I am the door.*—And the reason he gives has its weight—*Jesus*, says he, in the institution of the *Lord's supper*, was neither propounding a parable, nor explaining an allegory\*—But when the learned writer would have us infer from this, that there could be no other occasion for the use of a FIGURE, he imposes his usual artifice upon us; which was always to keep out of sight what would have detected his sleight of hand. He knew there were other occasions, of employing *figurative* expressions, such as *fixing and declaring the NATURE OF A RITE*,—And this was the occasion here.—But then, says he, the words are detached and separated from all other discourse—there is no leading preparation.†—So say the *Socinians* likewise; in order to infer a contrary conclusion. But we have already shown, that they are both mistaken.

There was a *leading preparation*; and that, a plain one, namely, the celebration of the *paschal supper*. And we have shown, it was the custom of our Lord to be led by what passed before him, to regulate his language on ideas thus prepared.—Nor was the consecration of the elements in the SUPPER OF OUR LORD SEPARATE from all other discourse. It was preceded by, and connected with, a most affecting discourse on the death and sufferings of our Redeemer. Therefore the words of the consecration do not, as M. Bossuet pretends, carry their whole meaning within themselves; but refer to things preceding and exterior. So that the bishop's triumphant conclusion loses of its lustre, when he says, 'what I pretend to evince is, the embarrassment into which these words—THIS IS MY BODY, throws all the Protestant party—there was no reason for using these STRONG TERMS for the institution of the *eucharist* rather than for baptism. This place I foretell shall be the eternal and inevitable confusion of the defenders of the FIGURATIVE SENSE.‡—There was no more reason, on the Protestant principles, says he, for choosing these STRONG TERMS here, than in the rite of baptism. Surely, there was a very good one. For if it was the purpose of divine wisdom to explain the nature of the rite, only by the words of the consecration, which it is agreed it was, as well by him who holds it to be a *real sacrifice*, as by us who hold it is only a *feast upon sacrifice*, there was a necessity for the use of these terms. This was not the case in instituting the rite of baptism, whose nature is expressly defined. Besides, here the matter administered, was WATER, an element always at hand, and therefore fitly called by its proper name. But the FLESH and BLOOD of the sacrifice, of which the *Lord's supper* was a festive commemoration, not being then at hand, as Christ was not yet offered on the cross, the elements of bread and wine, substituted in their place, were, by an elegant and necessary conversion, called the body and blood, as these elements only were declarative of the nature of the rite, viz. a *feast upon sacrifice*.—To support this reasoning still further. Another sacred rite, that of the imposition of hands, in procuring the descent of the HOLY SPIRIT, is called the BAPTISM BY FIRE; in which both the terms are figurative, as, in the baptism by water, both are literal. And why this difference? Because the agent or instrument of this baptism by fire being spiritual, there was need of figurative terms, taken from material things, to aid the grossness of our conceptions, concerning the manner of the operation. So that all the mystery in this affair, (I mean, so far forth as concerns the terms of the institution) is no more than this; when the things communicated are of a spiritual nature, as the gifts of the Holy Spirit; or of a material nature not yet in esse, as the flesh of a sacrifice, not yet offered up, and therefore needing another body to be substituted in its place, there, the employing figurative terms becomes necessary. But when the thing communicated is a material substance, at hand, and actually capable of being employed, as water in baptism, it would rather confound, than aid our conceptions, to use improper, that is, figurative terms.

P. 653, I. They had one common nature so far as they really conveyed, or were foolishly imagined to convey, benefits to the participants. But St Paul joining to the Christian and the Jewish, the Gentile sacrificial feasts, he thought it logically necessary to make a distinction between the real and the imaginary benefits; which he does in this manner—"What say I then? that an IDOL is any thing, or that which is offered to idols is any thing? No," says he, "both are nothing," i. e. are equally incapable of conveying benefits. That this must be his meaning, appears from his predicating the same thing both of the idol and the offering. Now as the offering had a PHYSICAL existence, what hindered but that, in his

\* —quand les uns opposoient, *ceci est mon corps*, les autres repondoient, *Je suis le vigne—Je suis la porte—le pierre étoit Christ*—Il est vrai que ces exemples n'étoient pas semblables. Ce n'étoit ni en proposant une parabole, ni en expliquant une allegorie.

† Ces paroles [*ceci est mon corps*, &c.] détachées de tout autre discours, portent tout leur sens en elles-mêmes.

‡ Cet endroit sera l'éternelle et inevitable confusion des défenseurs du SENS FIGURE.—Hist. des Var. Tom. i. p. 477. 8vo.



opinion, the *idol* might have a METAPHYSICAL? Though in an efficacious and MORAL sense, both were *nothing*. This interpretation shows that the apostle was perfectly consistent, when just before he calls these *idols* NOTHING, and yet, presently after, says they were DEVILS, whom we know, in his opinion, were SOMETHING.

The calling these *idols*, *devils*, served to explain his meaning, when he said *idols* were *nothing*, to be this, that no *benefit* was to be expected from them. And to intimate yet further, that so far from receiving benefit from *idols*, their worshippers, by this intercourse with them, were subject to great harm and mischief. In order to insinuate this latter assertion, the apostle changes his *first* idea of an *idol*, which he used in common with the gentiles, to this *second*, which he, and all the Christians of that time, had of them.—The *idols*, to whom the gentiles intentionally sacrificed, were their national gods, the *celestial bodies*, their *dead ancestors*; their *kings and benefactors*; all of them, long ago, engrafted into the public worship. From such, the apostle owns, they could receive neither good nor harm: these being only IDOLS OF THE BRAIN.—But SATAN or the DEVIL, as the original author and still the fomentor of idolatry, makes him properly and peculiarly the IDOL OF THE ALTAR. From such an *idol*, they to whom the apostle writes, must readily confess, much harm would arise from communicating with him, in a *sacrificial* or sacramental feast.

Of this capital enemy of mankind the gentiles themselves had, somehow or other, received an obscure tradition; plentifully, indeed, contaminated with fable; which they still further polluted with new-invented superstitions. Yet these still preserving a few traces of resemblance to the *Mosaic history*, and occasioning some conformity between the languages of error and revelation, have drawn unwary men into some dangerous conclusions, as if the founders of our holy religion had taken the advantage of pagan follies to form a system of DEMONOLOGY, agreeable to the preconceived fancies of their CONVERTS.—But of this, more in its place. The present occasion rather leads us to admire the art by which the sacred writer has conducted his argument.

P. 668, K. It should seem most probable that the *miraculous powers* were, in general occasional and temporary. But a learned writer, who has declared himself of this opinion hath unwarily put the *gift of tongues* into the number—

“The gift of tongues upon the day of pentecost,” says he, “*was not lasting, but instantaneous and transitory*; not bestowed upon them for the constant work of the ministry, but as an *occasional sign only*, that a person endowed with it was a chosen minister of the gospel: which sign, as soon as it had served that particular purpose, seems to have ceased, and totally to have vanished.”\*

Would reason, or the truth of things, suffer us to be thus complaisant, we might concede to believers all which they fancy the learned writer hath procured for them, “that the power of tongues was temporary, and like the power of *healing*, possessed occasionally,” without being alarmed at any consequence they will be able to deduce from it. For let it be granted, that the gift of tongues returned as often as they had occasion for its use, and it is no great matter *where* it resided in the interim.

But neither reason, nor the truth of things, will suffer us to be thus complaisant. The power of *healing the diseased* (to which Dr M. compares the *gift of tongues*) is, during the whole course of its operation, one continued arrest or diversion of the general laws of matter and motion; it was therefore very fitting that this power should be imparted *occasionally*. But the *gift of tongues*, when once it was conferred, became from thenceforth, a natural power; just as the free and perfect use of the members of the body, after they had been restored, by miracle, to the exercise of their natural functions. Indeed the loss of this *gift of tongues*, after the temporary use of it, would imply *other* miracles, as often as there was occasion to restore what was lost by actual deprivation. Unless we can suppose that the apostles, in the exercise of this gift, were merely irrational organs, *automati*, through which certain sounds were conveyed. In a word, it was as much in the course of nature for an apostle, when the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost had enabled him to speak a strange language, ever afterwards to have the use of that language, as it was for the cripple, whom Jesus had restored to the use of his limbs on the sabbath day, ever afterwards to walk, to run, and perform all the functions of a man perfectly sound and entire.

In one thing, indeed, the power of *healing the diseased*, and of *speaking with strange tongues*, agreed.—As the disciples could not heal at all times, and when they would; so neither could they speak when they would, in an unknown tongue, when it was first enquired. Yet when the Holy Spirit had once enabled them to speak and understand a language till then unknown to them, I conceive they must retain the use of it with the same facility as if they had acquired it in the ordinary way of instruction.

But the confusion in this matter, and the embarrassment which follows it, in the doctor's stating the question, arise from not distinguishing between the *active power* and the *passive*

---

\* Dr Middleton's Essay on the Gift of Tongues, Vol. ii. of his Works, p. 79.



*gift*. In healing the diseased, the apostles are not to be considered as the *workers of a miracle*; in speaking in a strange tongue, as *subjects of a miracle performed*.\*

P. 679, L. The serious reader will be ready to ask, what learned discoveries they are which have encouraged these men to innovate from the common opinion concerning the gospel demoniacs? Have they found in the scripture history of the *demoniacs* any thing either *hurtful to morals*, or *false in physics*? Nothing of either. And yet whatever is found there, they are not the finders.

An excellent divine of the last age had, in his extensive researches into antiquity, collected, that both *Jews* and *gentiles*, at and before the time of *Christ*, were infected with one common superstition, that *demons* and the *souls of wicked men deceased* frequently seized upon the *bodies of the living*, and tormented them in various ways. Hence he too hastily, yet with his usual modesty, insinuated, that the *possessions* recorded in the gospel, and called *demoniacal*, might be of that imaginary sort; and no other in reality than OCCULT DISEASES; which being intractable by the art of medicine, were supposed to be *supernatural* (as if a good physician was a match for any thing but the *devil*).—To the unhappy wretches so afflicted, he supposed that Jesus might apply his salutary hands: and that to this malady, so relieved, the people gave the *fashionable* name, by which, at that time, it was commonly distinguished.

Without doubt this truly learned divine went the more readily into this bold opinion, as he had observed it to have been God's gracious method, in the course of his DISPENSATIONS, to take advantage of men's habitual prejudices, towards the support of his revelation, by keeping his servants attached to his ordinances.

But, here, the excellent person should have distinguished (as his followers† were not likely to do it for him) between RITES and DOCTRINES. As they were RITES only, of which God was pleased to avail himself, for the benefit of his people, in order to combat, or to elude, their fondness for pagan usages.—In matters of DOCTRINE, the like compliance was not, nor could be, safely indulged to them, without violating the truth of things; and therefore sacred scripture affords us no example of such a condescension. In things pertaining only to *rites* we have, indeed, many instances. Thus the use of *linen garments*, *lighted lamps*, *lustrations*, and a multitude of other usages, in themselves indifferent, were brought out of *false* religions into the *true*: and this, with high propriety and wisdom, while their new destination sanctified their use; and their use served to the easier introduction of the *new establishment*.—But to assert and support a groundless, superstitious *opinion* (if such it were) of *diabolical possessions*, would be the infecting and contaminating the Christian faith.

However, if the admirable author of this hurtful novelty did himself miss of so just and obvious a distinction, we have less reason to wonder that those of his followers, who only aimed at something, by a faint reflection from the other's learning, should not hit (as we have said) upon what their master had overlooked.

A late eminent physician, who hath borrowed this notion professedly from this great man, acted a more modest and becoming part. He might pretend, by virtue of his profession, and still more by his superior skill in it, to a profounder insight into *nature*: at the same time, *theology* being in another department, he was the more excusable, if he did not see all that this *divine* science opposed to the opinion; an opinion, which might be said to descend to him, by inheritance from his great namesake and relation: whose conciseness, strength, and modesty of reasoning, he hath so well copied, that to confute objections so borrowed, will be to overthrow the whole system of the *antidemoniac* party.‡

In his *Medica Sacra*, he hath a chapter *de dæmoniis*; in which he hath treated the evangelic history with all that decency and reverence which becomes a true scholar and a serious professor of the Christian faith.

The first observation I shall make, in the entrance on this argument, is general; and will serve to confute all who have written on the question. It is this—Our antidemoniacs reason upon the case, not as they find it recorded by the *evangelists*, but as they see it described only in a treatise of medicine, by Aretæus, Fernelius, or any other of the faculty, where it stands unconnected with all *moral* as well as *religious* inquiries. But it hath been shown at large, that these *demoniacal possessions* have a close relation to the doctrine

\* He who would see a more complete account of this whole affair and its dependencies, is recommended to the *FIRST BOOK of the Doctrine of Grace, or the Office and Operation of the Holy Spirit*, 3d edition, Lond. 1763.

† Dr Sykes—Dr Lardner, &c., &c.

‡ “ Ut redeam autem ad dæmoniacos; non mea est, profecto, sed aliorum ante me pietate et doctrinâ præstantium virorum sententia quam hic propono. Ex proximo quidem sæculo, inter nostrates etiam JOSEPHUS MEADUS, theologus, rerum sacrarum cognitione, nulli secundus, luculenta dissertatione eam propugnabit. Cum ex eadem, igitur ac ille, familia sim oriundus,” &c.—Præf. in Med. Sacr. p. ix. Auctore RICARDO MEAD.

of REDEMPTION; and were therefore reasonably to be expected at the first promulgation of the GOSPEL. This sets the matter on quite another footing: and that plausible reasoning, which attends the learned person's representation, entirely disappears, when we put the case as it was in fact.

1. This proper precaution, against so defective and foreign a representation of the case, being premised, I now proceed to the reasoning employed by our learned physician to discredit the common opinion of a *real possession*.

His first argument stands on the extent of the superstition, which gave birth to so many *imaginary possessions*.

"\*It hath not only infected the *Mosaic* religion in particular, but had overrun *paganism* in general."—"As to the Jews, who were wont to ascribe whatever there was of prodigious in *nature*, to the MINISTRY OF ANGELS, they were easily brought to believe, that those dire diseases, which infected the mind and body equally and at once, and whose causes were unknown, could be no other than the work of the DEVIL."†

Let us allow all this—Let us allow that the Jews, at the time of Christ, were very superstitious in this matter. But then the learned Doctor, in his turn, will allow, that the teachers of the gospel, in the fulness of their inspiration, must needs be secure from an error, which so dreadfully affected the religion they were entrusted to propagate, as *demonianism* did, if it were an error. And if so, they *knowingly* and *designedly* gave it countenance and support. But how that will agree with their character and office, we shall see, as we go along.

Our learned Doctor tells us further, "that the Jews not only gave credit to the works of the *devil*, but believed in the *ministry* of ANGELS likewise."—This seems to be one of those slips of the pen, to which truth sometimes betrays those who write most cautiously against her; especially when they act the part of believers; which, however, I will not suspect was the case here. For the *Old Testament*, which the learned Doctor reverences equally with the *New*, bears ample testimony to the *real ministry of angels*; and with such circumstances attending it, as will not permit a believing caviller to evade it, by having recourse to *vision*, *figure*, or *accommodation*. For if the *angel* who waylaid Balaam may be reduced to a dusky dream, those whom Abraham entertained in broad daylight were more substantial. When, therefore, the learned person puts the ministry and malice of good and bad angels on the same footing, he must confess that, if the *reality* of the former be proved, the *reality* of the latter will follow.

As to the abounding superstition, in this matter, both amongst *Jews* and *gentiles*, I do not see how that, in the least, alters the case. The *Jews*, of this time, by a more enlarged and unrestrained commerce with their pagan neighbours, had defiled the purity of their holy religion, by many opinions borrowed from the gentile *philosophers*. Thus they took, we may well suppose, the *doctrine of demons* from PLATO, and the pre-existence (if not a *future state*) from PYTHAGORAS. Notwithstanding, it was certain, that both *demoniacal possessions* and *future rewards and punishments* are equally supported by the acts and doctrines of Jesus and his disciples.

This too, let me observe—The doctrines of the FALL and of the REDEMPTION (the two principles on which our holy religion rises) are interwoven into the substance of the Christian faith. If therefore we can suppose *demonianism* to be only a threadbare fable, new-dressed, and offered, by way of *accommodation*, to amuse the followers of the *gospel*, I cannot see what hinders our supposing, with SYNESIUS, a *future state* itself to be no more.

Both opinions had the advantage of old prejudice in their favour. Yet if only one of them were true (namely, that of a *future state*), and the other of *demonianism*, taught but by way of *accommodation*, we see, it could hold its ground no otherwise than from the *difficulty* of erasing it from the popular belief: yet so uncomfortable a doctrine, one should think, might be removed with very little trouble.

Nay, Jesus was even invited to help forward, as it were, its discredit, had it been only a delusion. A father‡ mistook his son's disorder to be LUNACY, when, according to the historian, it was a DIABOLICAL POSSESSION. And as such, Jesus treats it. *He rebukes the DEVIL, who departed out of the child, and he was cured from that very hour.* And to prevent all mistake in this matter, when the father had told Jesus that his disciples could not

\* At non Judæi tantum, sed et aliis etiam gentibus in usu fuit insanos pro demoniacis habere, p. 76. A Chaldæis quidem ad Phœnices, postea ad Egyptios propagata, ad Græcos deinde, hinc ad Romanos aliasque demum gentes temporis progressu demoniaca ista religio pervenit.—P. 74.

† — Judæi autem, si quid faceret *natura*, ad ANGELORUM *supremi Dei ministrorum* operam referri soliti, facile in animum sibi inducere poterant, ut diras quasdam crederent ægitudines quæ mentem simul et corpus læderent, et quarum causas cognoscere nequissent, ab angelorum malorum *invasibus* exoriri.—P. 74.

‡ Mat. xvii. 15.

cure the *child*, our Lord, after upbraiding his followers for their *want of faith*, tells them, however, that this *miracle of dispossession*, the most difficult of all, required a more extraordinary preparation for the work, than any other, by acts of piety and humiliation. For which assertion an obvious reason may be assigned, this *victory over Satan* being a certain mark, that the *redemption* was completed and accomplished, this evidence of it was fitly reserved to be bestowed on the most perfect of the followers of Christ. Yet had the Satanic part been only a popular fancy, Jesus here might have decried it with advantage, while he had the father of the sufferer on his side; who considered his son's disease as a *lunacy* only.

It may be said, perhaps, that the doctrines of a *future state*, and that of *demoniacal possessions*, which I put upon the same footing of credibility (because the gospel hath so put them), differ in this, that a *future state* may be proved by natural reason, which *demoniacal possessions* cannot.—But what doth this objection infer more than this? That a *future state* makes part of NATURAL RELIGION; and *demoniacal possessions*, a part of the REVEALED.

2. The ingenuous discourser brings another objection to these *possessions*—Having collected together all the SYMPTOMS of this disorder, from *Matthew, Mark, and Luke*, he concludes thus—“All these are the *symptoms* of a natural disorder. They are more surprising, indeed, than those of other disorders, yet nothing supernatural.”\*—His learned fellow collegiate, Dr J. Freind, treating the same subject, after he hath given us, from *Ætius* and *Oribasius*, a description of the madness called *lycanthrophy*, of which, one of the most striking SYMPTOMS was a fondness to *wander amongst the sepulchres of the dead*, adds, “the demoniac in the scriptures, who was POSSESSED WITH A LIKE SORT OF MADNESS, is represented as having his dwelling amongst the tombs.”†

The opinion of these two learned naturalists is founded, we see, in this circumstance—“that the *symptoms* of a demoniacal possession are the same with those of some natural disorders.”

But now, if *evil spirits* were permitted to disturb the vital functions of the human frame, whether in the solids, the fluids, or in both together; can we have any conception how this could be effected without causing, or occasioning, in *supernatural disorders*, the very same SYMPTOMS which accompany *natural maladies*? These symptoms, in both cases, must arise from the disturbance of the material frame, and can arise no otherwise; and those disturbances, whether produced by a spiritual agent, or by material causes, must produce the same sensible effects. *Madness*, for instance, whether occasioned by the malignity of an intelligent agent *ab extra*, or by discordant humours *ab intra*, will be still *madness*, and accompanied with the same symptoms. That appearance, therefore, which must accompany *demoniacal possession*, IF REAL, can never by any rules of logic be converted into a reasonable argument for the falsehood of such a possession.

It is worth observation, that one of the *evangelists* being a physician, our learned critic, by a very becoming partiality, prefers him to the rest. “St Luke,” he tells us, “being superior to them for the purity and accuracy of his expression, when there is occasion to speak of distempers, or of the cure of them; and is more particular in reciting all the miracles of our Saviour in relation to healing, than the other evangelists are.”‡

All this is true; and yet St Luke speaks the very same language with the rest concerning *demoniacal possession*. Now if the *gospel demoniacs* were men only labouring under natural disorders, a physician, by his deeper insight into nature, with the assistance of inspiration to boot, was very likely to have discovered the mistake; and for the glory of his art as likely to have recorded it: especially as the detection of it was the overturning a hurtful superstition. And we know how ready these benevolent gentlemen have ever been to detect VULGAR ERRORS.—Not to insist, at present, that St Luke was guided, in so good a work, by a stronger passion than *honour for his profession*, as a physician, that is, a *love for truth*, as an evangelist.

This, as we say, must have been the case in *diabolic possession*, where the *body only* was thus supernaturally affected. Yet in those, where the *mind* alone, or equally with the *body*, suffered by these disorders, I confess, we might expect some extraordinary marks or symptoms of supernatural agency, when it was for the purpose of the EVIL SPIRIT to display his power. Here the *immaterial* principle within us affords larger room, and more conveniences to be acted upon, by an exterior agent: although the irregular efforts of the mind itself are so wonderful as to be frequently mistaken for a foreign agency.

Yet notwithstanding this, there are, in these mental disorders, powers exhibited, that can never be mistaken, by a careful observer, for *its own*.

Some of which are, in fact, recorded to have been exerted; in order, as it were, to con-

\* —Insanorum sunt hæc omnia; utrum vero a Dæmoniis, an vi morbi provenerint, disceptatur—neque enim alius quisquam inter omnes, qui humanum genus infestant, morbus tam naturæ vim excedere videtur. P. 66.

† Hist. of Physic, Part i. pp. 16—21.

‡ Ib. pp. 223—225.

fute these learned men, who seem to think we ought to reject all *diabolic possessions* but such as are ascertained by symptoms supernatural.

An instance of such we have in\* the *damself possessed with the spirit of DIVINATION*, who brought her master much gain by SOOTHSAYING. This woman, Paul dispossessed, and so spoiled her master's trade; who thereupon raised a fierce persecution against the apostle.

The *symptoms* of *divination* and *soothsaying*, that is, telling of things absent, and foretelling things future, were certainly supernatural; and, for such, must be acknowledged by the objectors; who I hope will not yet forget the personages, they have assumed, of believers; against whom only this reasoning on the *demoniacs* is directed and addressed.

Having now seen what these learned writers have to oppose to my system of the gospel demoniacs:

I crave leave, in the next place, to bespeak their attention to what I have to urge against *theirs*. Enough hath been said to show that this is no trifling or unimportant question.

The untoward consequences being these, which unavoidably follow the concession, that Jesus and his disciples did only *accommodate* themselves to the fanciful and superstitious opinions of the times, in placing natural distempers in the visionary class of *supernatural*.

1. Unbelievers may conclude (and by too many they will be supposed not to conclude amiss) that much advantage is hereby gained over the evidences of our faith.—While it is believed, from the testimony of the evangelists, that *Jesus cast out devils, and healed such as were possessed with them*, that plausible subterfuge against his miraculous cures, which pretends that the relief afforded † . . . . .

---

\* Acts xvi. 16, et seq.

† See Sermon *On the fall of Sutan*.

# INDEX.

## A

- ABIMELECH**, account of him . . . vol. ii. p. 3  
**Abraham**, a brief historical view of the call of God to him and his family . . . i. 600  
 — by some authors taken for Zoroaster . . . i. 196  
 — supposed by M. Fourmont to be Cronon . . i. 224  
 — the true meaning of the blessing pronounced on him, pointed out . . . ii. 436  
 — exposition of the history of the command to sacrifice his son Isaac . . . ii. 466-479  
 — explanation of "Our Father Abraham wished to see my day" . . . ii. 468  
 — summary of his history . . . ii. 471  
 — the import of God's revelation to him explained . . . ii. 473  
 — in what sense said by Christ to have seen his day . . . ii. 478, 484  
 — reply to objections against the historical truth of his relation . . . ii. 483  
 — three distinct periods of his history pointed out . . . ii. 484  
 — an advocate for toleration . . . ii. 546  
**Abraxas**, (Egyptian Amulet) described . . i. 63, 64  
**Academics and Pyrrhonians**, their principles compared, . . . i. 456  
**Academies**, Greek, their founders and various sects . . . ib.  
 — on what principles erected . . . i. 459  
**Academy Old and Peripatetica**, their conformity . . . i. 501  
**Academy, Old and New**, their conformity . . i. 502  
**Actions**, signal instance of divine instruction conveyed by them in the case of Abraham . . . ii. 466  
 — typical and significative distinguished . . ii. 492  
 — their eloquence illustrated by an anecdote from the Spartan history . . . ii. 576  
 — and by another from the Roman history . ii. 577  
**Adoption**, account of the practice of, in ancient and modern times . . . i. 259  
**Adoration**, Pridenux's account of the ancient form of, . . . ii. 80, 81  
**Æmilianus**, character of . . . i. 308  
**Æneas**, exposition of the story of his descent into hell, . . . i. 251  
 — inquiry into the nature of the poem of the *Æneid* . . . ib.  
 — the image of a perfect lawgiver conveyed in him, . . . i. 255  
 — personally alludes to Augustus . . . i. 263  
 — description of his shield . . . i. 300  
**Æsculapius**, observation on the ancient story and character of . . . i. 307  
**Africans**, deductions from their knowledge of a future state notwithstanding their barbarism . . . i. 328  
**Alcæus**, why confounded with Hercules . . ii. 100  
**Alexander the Great**, the probable motive of his communicating to his mother the secrets of the mysteries . . . i. 221  
 — the stories of the exploits of Bacchus and Hercules in the Indies designed to aggrandize him . . . ii. 90  
**Allegories**, often imputed when never intended . . . i. 327  
 — for what purpose introduced in the ancient Paganism . . . i. 574  
 — adopted by Christians in the interpretation of Scripture . . . i. 576

- Allegories**, controversial reflections on their nature with reference to Job, and the ode of Horace. "*O Navis referunt*," vol. ii. p. 560  
 — religious, distinguished . . . ii. 494  
 — argument deduced from the general passion for, . . . ii. 527  
**Alliance of Church and State**, mutual inducements to enter into . . . i. 366  
 — fundamental article in . . . i. 371  
**Alphabets**, origin of, accounted for . . . ii. 32-47  
 — political . . . ii. 48  
 — sacred . . . ii. 50  
 — reason for discrediting the notion of their invention by the Israelites . . . ii. 54  
 — invention of, prior to the time of Moses . ib.  
 — Hebrew, formed by Moses from an improvement on the Egyptian . . . ii. 54  
**America**, remarks on the religion of the natives of, . . . i. 176  
 — the forests of, a good nursery for philosophers and freethinkers . . . i. 400  
 — remarks on the language of . . . ii. 214  
**Amos**, a clear description of a particular providence quoted from the book of . . ii. 311  
**Anatomy**, practised and studied by the ancient Egyptians . . . ii. 14  
**Ancients**, inquiry into their opinions concerning the immortality of the soul . . i. 506  
**Animal food**, Sir Isaac Newton's opinion of the introduction of it into Egypt refuted . . . ii. 127  
**Animal worship**, origin of, accounted for . . i. 569  
 — true origin of, amongst the Egyptians . ii. 69-87  
 — images of animals first worshipped . . . ii. 70  
 — afterwards the animals themselves . . . ii. 72  
 — various opinions of the ancients of its origin . . . ii. 75  
**Anscharius, St.** anecdote of . . . i. 426  
**Antoninus**, emperor, motives on which he was desirous of initiation in the Eleusinian mysteries . . . i. 211  
 — observations on his reflections on the Christians, . . . i. 390  
 — his reflections on death . . . i. 484  
 — his notion of the human soul . . . i. 515  
**Apis**, the symbol of the Egyptian god Osiris . ii. 71  
**Apollo**, explanation of those oracles of his which were quoted by Eusebius from Porphyry . . . i. 226  
**Apollo Pythian**, his oracles paralleled with the prophecies of scripture, by Middleton . . . ii. 498  
 — Dr Middleton's opinion exposed . . . ib.  
**Apologue or Fable**, its use in oratory . . . ii. 36  
 — its analogy to hieroglyphic writing . . . ib.  
 — its improvement and contraction in simile and metaphor . . . ii. 37  
 — its change to parable . . . ii. 58  
**Apotheosis**, civil, the origin of . . . i. 177  
 — when bestowed on deceased heroes among the Egyptians . . . ii. 86  
**Apuleius**, general intention of his metamorphosis . . . i. 302  
 — his personal character . . . i. 306  
 — inquiry into his prejudices against Christianity . . . i. 308  
 — his motives for defending paganism and mysteries, . . . i. 311  
 — foundation of his allegory of the Golden Ass . . . i. 312

- Apuleius**, story of his allegory of the golden ass . . . . . vol. i. p. 312  
 — moral of his story . . . . . i. 321  
 — the corrupt state of the mysteries in his time . . . . . i. 323  
**Arbitrary will**, Zeno the patron of . . . . . i. 140  
**Areopagus**, practice of that court . . . . . i. 83  
 — remarks on the nature of that jurisdiction i. 268  
 — conjectures on the first founding of that court . . . . . i. 293  
**Argument internal**, defined . . . . . ii. 322  
**Aristophanes**, review of the dispute between him and Socrates . . . . . i. 87  
**Aristotle**, character of him and his philosophy i. 482  
 — his opinion of the human soul . . . . . i. 513  
 — his distinction between mind and intellect ib.  
**Ark**, the fatal effects of amongst the Philistines . . . . . ii. 270  
**Arthur**, King, and William the Conqueror, the similar outlines of their characters ii. 95  
**Article VII.** of the Church of England, an exposition of, . . . . . ii. 465  
 — directed against the Manichean error ii. 466  
**Arts**, the inventors of, where placed in elysium, by Virgil . . . . . i. 293  
**Ass** carries mysteries, origin of that proverb i. 264  
**Astronomy Jewish**, observations on . . . . . ii. 418  
**Atheism**, examination of Bayle's arguments for . . . . . i. 135  
 — an examination of Plutarch's account of the origin of, . . . . . i. 545  
 — Plutarch's parallel between it and superstition, . . . . . ib.  
 — Lord Bacon's parallel between it and superstition, . . . . . i. 556  
**Atheists**, whether capable of distinguishing the moral difference of good and evil i. 135  
 — whether deserving punishment from the hand of God . . . . . i. 146  
 — the effect of his principles on his conduct compared with the fatalist . . . . . i. 155  
 — their moral conduct accounted for . . . . . i. 156  
 — summary of their dispute with the divines i. 170  
 — their opinion of the human soul . . . . . i. 506  
**Athenians**, the most religious people of Greece . . . . . i. 209-213  
 — copy of their test oath . . . . . i. 377  
 — law relating to the introduction of foreign worship . . . . . i. 393  
 — their behaviour in prosperity and adversity . . . . . ii. 408  
**Atomic theory**, a Greek invention . . . . . i. 520, 537  
**Atossa**, her invention of letters fabulous ii. 213  
**Attributes divine**, examination of Lord Bolingbroke's notions of . . . . . i. 337  
**Augury of safety**, Dion Cassius's account of i. 619  
**Aurelius**, emperor, his opinion of the firmness of the Christians . . . . . i. 634  
**Austin**, St, his ingenious definition of language and letters . . . . . ii. 34  
**Author**, the proper objects of his writings i. 96  
 — on the knowledge of old ones from the phrases they make use of . . . . . ii. 389  
 — from the scenery introduced . . . . . ib.
- B**
- Bacchanalian rites**, origin of the impleties committed in them . . . . . i. 241  
 — representation of their vigils . . . . . i. 302  
 — Plutarch's account of their vigils . . . . . i. 303  
 — the Romans in their edicts against them careful not to violate the rights of toleration . . . . . i. 295  
**Bacchus**, oath of the priestesses of . . . . . i. 378  
 — his exploits in the Indies invented to aggrandize the glory of Alexander ii. 99  
**Bacchus**, his identity confounded with Osiris . . . . . ii. 103  
 — reasons for proving him to be Noah ii. 222  
**Bacon**, Lord Chancellor, examination of his parallel between atheism and superstition . . . . . i. 556  
**Balaam**, his prophecy, Numb. xxiv. 17, expounded . . . . . ii. 61  
 — observation on the story of his ass . . . . . ii. 207  
 — his wish to die the death of the righteous explained . . . . . ii. 439
- Banishment**, how far a punishment for offences committed against society vol. i. p. 123  
**Baptism**, the importance of, established ii. 378  
**Baucis and Philemon**, whence that fable derived . . . . . i. 465  
**Bayle**, his character as a writer . . . . . i. 134  
 — examination of his arguments to prove atheism not destructive to society i. 135  
 — his reflections on toleration . . . . . ii. 247  
**Bembo**, table, a description of it, contained in Ezekiel's visions . . . . . ii. 147  
**Bennet**, secretary, how brought into disgrace . . . . . i. 48  
**Bentley**, the real existence of Zaleucus, and the authenticity of his remains defended against him . . . . . i. 167  
**Bible**, how differently represented by free-thinkers . . . . . i. 99  
 — summary view of . . . . . ii. 233  
 — see Scriptures.  
**Bolingbroke**, Lord, vindication of divines from his charge of confederating with atheists . . . . . i. 108  
 — examination of some of the principles of his first philosophy . . . . . i. 330  
 — Montesquieu's letter respecting him . . . . . i. 607  
 — his observation on the insufficiency of the Mosaic law to restrain the people, answered . . . . . ii. 271  
 — consequences of a law upon his principles . . . . . ii. 272  
 — examination of his notion concerning the omission of the doctrine of a future state in the Mosaic dispensation ii. 348  
**Bond**, humorous anecdote of a forged one i. 526  
**Brute worship**, its symbolical nature explained . . . . . ii. 69  
 — opinions of the ancients on the origin of it in Egypt . . . . . ii. 75  
**Bryant**, his opinion of the origin of human sacrifices exploded . . . . . ii. 671  
**Buffonery**, observation on the tendency of it, illustrated in the instance of Socrates and Lord Chancellor Hyde i. 87-88  
**Butler**, ill effects resulting from his satire against fanaticism . . . . . i. 87
- C**
- Cadmus**, whence he obtained his alphabet ii. 54  
**Cæsar**, Julius, his disavowal of the belief of a future state in the senate . . . . . i. 453  
 — his account of the religion of ancient Gaul . . . . . ii. 227  
 — of ancient Germany . . . . . ii. 221  
**Calf**, golden, what divinity represented by it . . . . . ii. 143  
**Calves of Dan and Bethel**, why the Jews were so invincibly attached to them ii. 145  
 — why two of them erected by Jeroboam ii. 148  
**Canaanites**, why ordered to be exterminated . . . . . ii. 129  
**Canadians**, remarks on their religion . . . . . i. 176  
**Cardan**, his argument to prove the doctrine of the immortality of the soul destructive to society . . . . . i. 133  
**Casaubon**, his account of the translation of the pagan mysteries into the Christian religion . . . . . ii. 249  
**Cato**, mentioned in the *Æneis*, inquiry whether the Censor or of Utica . . . . . i. 301  
 — his reply to Cæsar's disavowal of the belief of a future state, in the senate i. 454  
**Cavalry**, the situation, proper and improper for the use of . . . . . ii. 124  
**Caylus**, count, his opinions relating to the Egyptian characters . . . . . ii. 204  
**Celsus**, his character compared with that of Origen . . . . . i. 208  
 — his remark on Plato's doctrine of a future state . . . . . i. 441  
**Cerberus**, in the *Æneis*, explained . . . . . i. 275  
**Ceres**, Eleusinian, her temple described i. 258  
 — her story . . . . . i. 299  
**Cervantes**, ill consequence resulting from his satire against Knight Errantry . . . . . i. 87  
**Chaos**, a description of, from Berosus . . . . . i. 273  
**Charlevoix**, F. his sentiments respecting the



- civilization of the North American Indians . . . . . vol. i. p. 433
- Charon, exposition of the character of, in the *Æneis* . . . . . i. 277
- Cheops king of Egypt, how he raised money for the erection of his pyramids explained . . . . . ii. 222
- Children, the punishment of, for the crimes of their parents, on what principle only to be vindicated . . . . . i. 642
- Chinese language, an improvement of the ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics . . . . . ii. 27
- improvement of, to its present state . . . . . ii. 28
- its opposite progress from that of the Egyptian hieroglyphical writing; to what owing . . . . . ii. 30
- to what the different accounts we have received of it is owing . . . . . ii. 31
- account of, by M. Freret . . . . . ib.
- — by P. Parennin . . . . . ib.
- — by M. Gaubil . . . . . ib.
- — by P. Magallians . . . . . ii. 32
- why not further improved . . . . . ii. 33
- hieroglyphical marks not for words but things . . . . . ii. 42
- Du Halde's observations on . . . . . ii. 62
- the reverence of the natives for their ancient characters . . . . . ii. 66
- the ancient characters of, greatly venerated by the natives . . . . . ii. 202
- Chinese printing, Voltaire's account of . . . . . ii. 205
- Christ, remarks on the use he made of his twofold credentials, scripture and miracles . . . . . ii. 470
- made no use of traditions . . . . . ib.
- important argument drawn from his conversation with two disciples in their journey to Emmaus after his resurrection . . . . . ii. 488
- an exposition of his prophecy of his first and second coming . . . . . ii. 501
- the use to be made of miracles and prophecies in proof of his being the Messiah . . . . . ii. 589
- the light in which he was held by Pilate . . . . . ii. 594
- redemption by, had a retrospect from the fall . . . . . ii. 632
- an act of grace, not of debt . . . . . ii. 633
- the means employed in that great work inquired into . . . . . ii. 634
- his sacrifice on the cross considered . . . . . ii. 645
- the Socinian's opinion of the death of Christ examined . . . . . ii. 654
- his account of the last judgment examined . . . . . ii. 664
- the miracle of his resurrection considered . . . . . ii. 673
- his miracles of casting out devils or evil spirits, considered . . . . . ii. 675
- his miracles of healing natural diseases considered . . . . . ii. 677
- his temptation considered . . . . . ii. ib.
- Christian religion, how esteemed by the ancient pagans . . . . . i. 309
- how the evils of persecution arose in it . . . . . i. 387
- first received, with complacency by the pagans . . . . . i. 389
- first incurred hatred by claiming to be the only true religion . . . . . ib.
- occasion of its being persecuted . . . . . i. 390
- character of by Tacitus . . . . . ib.
- persecuted both by good and bad princes . . . . . i. 427
- the views and consequences of bringing in pagan antiquity to assist in defending it . . . . . i. 536
- their nocturnal assemblies vindicated from the misrepresentations of Dr Taylor, chancellor of Lincoln . . . . . i. 652
- first occasion of the nocturnal assemblies of Christians . . . . . ib.
- Pliny's doubts of the manner of proceeding against Christians . . . . . i. 653
- an inquiry into the methods taken by providence to propagate it . . . . . ii. 160
- the ignorance of the propagators, the means of advancing it . . . . . ib.
- its doctrine shadowed under the rites of the Mosaic law . . . . . ii. 380
- Christian religion, its evidences why not all disclosed by Providence . . . . . vol. ii. p. 489
- and Judaism inseparable . . . . . ii. 490
- the ultimate end of Judaism . . . . . ii. 495
- its nature and genius explained . . . . . ii. 598
- Chronology, Egyptian, a mistake of Sir Isaac Newton illustrated by a case stated in similar circumstances . . . . . ii. 95
- Church, its inducements for accepting an alliance with the state . . . . . i. 369
- what it receives from the state . . . . . i. 372
- what it communicates to the state . . . . . i. 373
- Cicero, his opinion of the end of the law . . . . . i. 198
- his exposition of the pagan theology . . . . . i. 222
- his testimony in favour of the Eleusinian mysteries . . . . . i. 338
- his reply to Caesar's disavowment of a belief of a future state, in the senate . . . . . i. 453
- his opinion of academics . . . . . i. 457
- his remark on the *Phædo* of Plato . . . . . i. 477
- the difficulties in coming to the knowledge of his real sentiments of a future state of rewards and punishment . . . . . i. 486
- the various characters he sustained in his life and writings . . . . . i. 487
- where his true sentiments are to be expected . . . . . i. 489
- his idea of the human soul . . . . . ib.
- his opinion of the obligation of an oath, under the belief of the immutability of the divine nature . . . . . i. 496
- his account of the first advancer of the notion of *eternity* . . . . . i. 521
- accused by Lactantius of duplicity . . . . . i. 619
- remarks on Middleton's life of . . . . . i. 617
- his account of the origin of brute worship controverted . . . . . ii. 76
- Circumcision, a patriarchal institution . . . . . ii. 158
- why appointed . . . . . ii. 172
- when first enjoined . . . . . ii. 472
- Citizen, how man ought to be educated to make a good one . . . . . i. 401
- Claim of right and free gift, the difference . . . . . ii. 633
- Clemens Alexandrinus, his account of a remarkable symbolical message sent to Darius . . . . . ii. 26
- his account of the Egyptian characters and writing compared with that of Porphyry . . . . . ii. 39
- Cleric le, his notions of the Pythagorean metempsychosis proved erroneous . . . . . i. 473
- his opinion of the theocratic government of the Jews confuted . . . . . ii. 282
- Clergy, abused by the freethinkers . . . . . i. 90
- the abuse of, an insult upon civil society . . . . . i. 92
- the abuse of, an evidence of a weak cause . . . . . i. 98
- vindicated against Lord Bolingbroke . . . . . i. 167
- their hard luck amongst modern freethinkers . . . . . i. 233
- Collins, his ill treatment of his friend Locke . . . . . i. 91
- inconsistencies in his writings . . . . . i. 97, 98
- the validity of his assertions, that new religions are always grafted on old ones, &c., examined into . . . . . ii. 255
- characterized as a writer . . . . . ii. 498
- an examination of his discourse on the grounds and reasons of the Christian religion . . . . . ib.
- his observations on the allegorical writings of the ancients . . . . . ii. 523
- these observations shown to refute his objections against Christianity . . . . . ii. 524
- Comets, their theory known by the ancient Egyptians . . . . . i. 519
- Commentators on scripture, points recommended to their attention . . . . . ii. 447
- Condamine, his remarks on the Indians of America . . . . . i. 401
- Controversy, the arts of freethinkers in . . . . . i. 82
- the mischief arising from carrying it on under assumed characters . . . . . i. 98
- when this practice may be justifiable . . . . . i. 97
- Cretans, celebrate their mysteries openly . . . . . i. 286
- boast of Jupiter and other gods being born amongst them . . . . . ib.
- the custom of adopting youth among . . . . . i. 289
- Critias of Athens, some account of, and a translation of his lambics . . . . . i. 540

- Crocodile, why worshipped by the Egyptians . . . . . vol. ii. p. 71  
 Cromwell, his character contrasted with those of his associates, Fleetwood, Lambert, and Vane . . . . . i. 561  
 Cudworth, his testimony as to the ancient opinion of the soul's immortality . . . . . i. 508  
 — corrected as to his observation on Plutarch . . . . . i. 516  
 — the history of his Intellectual System . . . . . i. 650  
 Cupid and Psyche, exposition of the fable of . . . . . i. 323  
 Custom, remarkable instance from antiquity, of its power to erase the strongest impressions of nature . . . . . i. 149  
 Customs, a similarity of, observable among distant nations, no argument of an actual communication between them . . . . . ii. 203  
 — traductive, an inquiry into . . . . . ii. 194

## D

- Dacier, his notion of the Pythagorean metempsychosis erroneous . . . . . i. 473  
 Darius, Cyrus's dream respecting him . . . . . ii. 67  
 Dark sayings, what that expression imports in scripture . . . . . ii. 58  
 David, why appointed to succeed Saul . . . . . ii. 168  
 — his title of 'man after God's own heart' explained . . . . . ib.  
 — the chronology of facts relating to his introduction to Saul rectified . . . . . ii. 227  
 Dead men, origin of the worship of, traced . . . . . i. 564  
 Death, citations from the stoics, showing their notions concerning it . . . . . i. 483  
 Debtors, ancient and modern treatment of, compared . . . . . i. 276  
 — funeral rites denied to the ancient; whilst the modern are buried alive . . . . . i. 276  
 Dedication, of the second edition of Books I. II. III. of the Divine Legation, to the Earl of Hardwicke . . . . . i. 77  
 — to the freethinkers . . . . . i. 79  
 — of Books IV. V. VI. to Lord Mansfield . . . . . i. 629  
 — of Books IV. V. VI. to the Jews . . . . . i. 647  
 Dedications, absurdity of addressing them unsuitably . . . . . i. 79  
 Deification, when bestowed on any hero of the Egyptians . . . . . ii. 83  
 Deities, pagan, whence derived . . . . . i. 571  
 — form of the ancient statues of, accounted for . . . . . i. 572  
 — their spurious offspring accounted for . . . . . ii. 116  
 — local and tutelary, their worship always maintained even by sojourners and conquerors . . . . . ii. 261  
 Democritus and Epicurus, their doctrine of matter compared . . . . . i. 620  
 Demoniacs, the miracles of casting out devils or evil spirits considered . . . . . ii. 675  
 — various opinions concerning them examined . . . . . ii. 707  
 Demons, whence the doctrine of the Pythagoreans and Platonists so full of . . . . . i. 503  
 — Apuleius's account of . . . . . ib.  
 Des Cartes, not the inventor of the atomic philosophy . . . . . i. 520—537  
 Devoted, the command that 'none devoted shall be redeemed,' examined . . . . . ii. 695  
 Diagoras, consequence of his revealing the Orpheic and Eleusinian mysteries . . . . . i. 234  
 Dido, remarks on her character in the *Æneis* . . . . . i. 256  
 Dionysius Halicarnassus, his distinction between established and tolerated religions among the ancients . . . . . i. 395  
 Drama, its obligation to conform to nature in the delineation of characters . . . . . i. 626  
 Dramatic writing, remarks on, with reference to the book of Job . . . . . ii. 385—388  
 Dreams, Artemidorus's division of, into speculative and allegorical . . . . . ii. 66  
 — superstitious interpretation of . . . . . ib.  
 — grounds of this species of divination . . . . . ii. 67

## E

- Earthquakes, said by Pythagoras to be occasioned by a synod of ghosts . . . . . i. 450

- Earthquakes, predicted by the taste of well water . . . . . vol. i. p. 451  
 — on the predicting of . . . . . i. 610  
 Egypt, the mysteries first instituted there . . . . . i. 246  
 — by whom carried abroad . . . . . i. 247  
 — a religious war in, and the occasion of it . . . . . i. 364  
 — original of animal worship in . . . . . i. 385  
 — the place whence the Grecian legislators, naturalists, and philosophers, derived their knowledge . . . . . i. 449  
 — an inquiry into the state of the learning and superstition of, in the time of Moses . . . . . i. 683  
 — why entitled to priority among civilized nations . . . . . ii. 2  
 — scripture account of . . . . . ii. 3  
 — the antiquity and power of, as delivered in the Grecian writers, confirmed by scripture . . . . . ii. 4  
 — civil arts of . . . . . ii. 8  
 — a critical inquiry into the military usages of, at the time of the Trojan war . . . . . ii. 121  
 — abounding in horses before the conquest of Libya . . . . . ib.  
 — why the Israelites were prohibited carrying horses from . . . . . ii. 123  
 — the laws of Moses why accommodated to the prejudices of the Jews, in favour of . . . . . ii. 149  
 — the ancient school of legislation . . . . . ii. 168  
 — fundamental maxims in the religious policy of . . . . . ib.  
 — hereditary despotism preferred there . . . . . ii. 169  
 — the government not rendered despotic by Joseph . . . . . ii. 198  
 Egyptian characters, Kircher and Count Caylus, their opinions concerning . . . . . ii. 44, 203  
 Egyptian heroes, the reason why the later obtained the names of their earlier gods, explained . . . . . ii. 96  
 Egyptian hieroglyphics, how they came to be, and to conceal their learning . . . . . ii. 39  
 — curiological and tropical . . . . . ii. 42  
 — symbolic . . . . . ii. 44  
 — their change of their style effected by this latter application of them . . . . . ib.  
 Egyptian husbandry, anecdote of . . . . . i. 161  
 Egyptian idolatry, described in Ezekiel's visions . . . . . ii. 116  
 Egyptian learning, that mentioned in scripture, and that mentioned in a corresponding manner by the Greek writers, the same . . . . . ii. 1  
 — no distinct division of the sciences in . . . . . ii. 16  
 — how preserved from the knowledge of the people by the priests . . . . . ii. 57  
 — summary of . . . . . ii. 65  
 Egyptian physicians, confined to distinct branches of the medical art . . . . . ii. 8  
 — their preventive method of practice . . . . . ii. 9  
 — their number accounted for . . . . . ii. 10  
 — confined to distinct branches of the medical art . . . . . ii. 12  
 — proved to compose an order of the priesthood . . . . . ii. 14  
 Egyptian priesthood, account of, from Diodorus Siculus . . . . . ii. 5  
 — confirmed by Moses . . . . . ii. 6  
 — their rites . . . . . ii. 7  
 Egyptian writing, the four kinds of . . . . . ii. 39  
 Egyptians, a people most celebrated for the cultivation of religion . . . . . i. 175  
 — celebrated for religion in the most early times; their priests also their judges and magistrates . . . . . i. 447  
 — examination into the degree of their scientific knowledge . . . . . i. 519  
 — in what their wisdom more especially consisted . . . . . ib.  
 — among the first who taught the immortality of the soul . . . . . i. 523  
 — why subject to incurable diseases . . . . . ii. 11  
 — their funeral rites . . . . . ii. 20  
 — their sacred dialect . . . . . ii. 56  
 — origin of animal worship among . . . . . ii. 69  
 — worshippers of plants . . . . . ib.  
 — of chimerical beings . . . . . ii. 70  
 — local animal deities, among . . . . . ib.  
 — their charge against the Grecians of steal-

- ing their gods; with their mutual re-  
criminations . . . . . vol. ii. p. 115
- Eleusinian mysteries, the general purpose of  
their institution . . . . . i. 210
- requisites for initiation into them . . . . . i. 211
- initiation into, deemed as necessary  
among the pagans, as baptism among  
Christians . . . . . i. 213
- why kept secret . . . . . i. 214
- the greater and the less: . . . . . i. 215
- inquiry into the doctrines taught in the  
greater . . . . . i. 216
- negatively . . . . . ib.
- positively . . . . . i. 217
- why aspired to, by considerable person-  
ages . . . . . i. 219
- a detection of polytheism . . . . . i. 220
- why the unity of deity concealed in them . . . . . ib.
- the history narrated in them, what . . . . . i. 231
- the hymn sung at . . . . . ib.
- how they became corrupted . . . . . i. 240
- why abused by the fathers . . . . . i. 244
- under the inspection of the civil magis-  
trate . . . . . ib.
- transferred into the Christian religion . . . . . i. 245
- of the Egyptians and Grecians, the same . . . . . i. 246
- where invented . . . . . i. 247
- by whom . . . . . ib.
- offices in the celebration of . . . . . ib.
- taught a future state of rewards and pun-  
ishments . . . . . i. 250
- initiation into, represented by poets al-  
legorically, by descent into hell . . . . . i. 261
- initiation into, compared with death . . . . . i. 295
- alluded to by Solomon in Ecclus. chap. iv.  
17, 18 . . . . . i. 296
- the celebration of, a drama of the history  
of Ceres . . . . . i. 299
- the rites of, contained in the golden ass of  
Apuleius . . . . . i. 318
- magic rites in the corrupt state of . . . . . i. 323
- Elias, the sense in which he was predicted  
to come before the day of the Messiah  
ascertained . . . . . ii. 512
- Elihu, why distinguished from the other  
friends of Job . . . . . ii. 418
- his character . . . . . ii. 421
- Elijah, the difference of the account of his  
translation and Enoch's accounted for . . . . . ii. 325
- Elisha, exposition of the adventure between  
him and Joash . . . . . ii. 585
- Eloquence, defined by Milton . . . . . i. 629
- Elysium, the description of in Virgil, prefer-  
red to that in Homer . . . . . i. 291
- the several stations allotted to the happy  
by Virgil . . . . . i. 292
- Embalming, the Egyptian method of . . . . . ii. 12, 21
- this operation performed by the physicians,  
and the reason . . . . . ii. 13
- the antiquity of the general practice of,  
proved . . . . . ii. 21
- Enigmas, required in the nature of God's  
dispensation to the Jews . . . . . ii. 58
- Enoch, the difference between the account  
of his translation and that of Elijah  
accounted for . . . . . ii. 325
- Enthusiasm and fraud, the union of, account-  
ed for . . . . . i. 560
- Epic poetry, Homer, Virgil, and Milton,  
the triumvirate of . . . . . i. 261
- Epictetus, his notion of death . . . . . i. 483
- Epicurus, his doctrine of matter compared  
with that of Democritus . . . . . i. 622
- Epistolic writing, account of the origin of . . . . . ii. 48
- Error, ridicule the proper means of detect-  
ing . . . . . i. 105
- Essential differences, Aristotle the patron of . . . . . i. 140
- Establishments in religion, advantages of . . . . . i. 633
- Eucharistical sacrifice, origin and nature of,  
explained, . . . . . ii. 637
- Euhemerus, how subjected to the imputa-  
tion of atheism . . . . . i. 235
- examination of his conduct in disclosing  
the secrets of the mysteries . . . . . i. 573
- Evander, observation on Virgil's account of  
his court . . . . . i. 258
- Eve, the creation of inquired into . . . . . ii. 609
- Evremond, St, examination of his remarks  
on the characters in the *Æneis* . . . . . i. 255
- Exodus, iii. 14, & vi. 3, expounded . . . . . vol. ii. p. 140
- Expiatory sacrifice, origin and nature of it  
explained . . . . . ii. 637
- Ezekiel, and Jeremiah, the actions recorded  
to be performed by them to illustrate  
their prophecies accounted for . . . . . ii. 34
- his famous visions, chap. viii. relating to  
the Jewish idolatry expounded . . . . . ii. 146
- God's reproaches to the Jews for their  
perverseness and disobedience, deliv-  
ered by him . . . . . ii. 172
- the celebrated prophecy in his 20th chap-  
ter explained . . . . . ii. 175
- his representation of the Jewish idola-  
try . . . . . ii. 266-268
- quotations from, in confirmation of a par-  
ticular providence . . . . . ii. 311
- a passage in, predictive of the new dis-  
pensation . . . . . ii. 327
- his vision of the dry bones explained . . . . . ii. 429
- Ezra, his writings pointed out . . . . . ii. 423
- supposed to be the writer of the book of  
Job . . . . . ib.
- also the books of Chronicles and  
Esther . . . . . ib.
- by tradition among the Jews, the same  
person as Malachi . . . . . ib.
- inquiry who he was . . . . . ii. 557
- supposed to be the writer of the book of  
Job . . . . . ib.
- F
- Fables, ancient, an inquiry into the origin  
of . . . . . i. 464
- Faith, summary view of the disputes con-  
cerning it and morality . . . . . i. 622
- defined from St Paul . . . . . ii. 456
- the condition of the new covenant con-  
sidered . . . . . ii. 658
- St Paul and St James's accounts recon-  
ciled . . . . . ii. 663
- Fall, inquired into . . . . . ii. 623
- Falsely condemned, their being assigned to  
purgatory accounted for . . . . . i. 282
- Fanaticism, ill effect resulting from Butler's  
satire against it . . . . . i. 87
- Fatalists, the influence of the principles on  
the conduct of, compared with that of  
the atheists . . . . . i. 156
- Fathers, Christian, inquiry into their senti-  
ments of the human soul . . . . . i. 510
- Fiction, from what motive employed by the  
ancient lawgivers . . . . . ii. 231
- Figurative expressions, origin of . . . . . ii. 59-61
- First philosophy, according to Lord Bol-  
ingbroke . . . . . i. 330
- according to Sancho Panca . . . . . i. 332
- Fleetwood, Gen., his character . . . . . i. 561
- Foot, its import in the Old Testament lan-  
guage . . . . . ii. 406
- Forfeitures, remarks on the laws of, in cases  
of high treason . . . . . ii. 329
- Forgery, marks of, in ancient writings . . . . . i. 190
- opposed to forgery by the primitive apolo-  
gists for Christianity . . . . . i. 526
- Foster, his notions of the Jewish theocracy  
examined . . . . . ii. 251
- Fourmont, M., his mistake of the identity of  
Abraham with Cronos corrected . . . . . ii. 224
- Fraud, opposed to fraud by the primitive  
apologists . . . . . i. 526
- and enthusiasm, the union of accounted  
for . . . . . i. 560
- Free gift and claim of right, the difference  
between . . . . . ii. 633
- Freethinkers, proper estimation of that char-  
acter . . . . . i. 79
- their complaints of the want of liberty ill-  
founded . . . . . i. 80
- their principal abuses of liberty pointed  
out . . . . . i. 82
- in classic times would have been styled  
enemies to their country . . . . . i. 89
- their abuse of the clergy . . . . . i. 90
- this abuse the evidence of a weak cause . . . . . i. 93
- their professions and their practice com-  
pared . . . . . i. 94
- the multifarious characters they assume . . . . . i. 96

- Freethinkers both dogmatists and sceptics . . . . . vol. i. p. 98
- Funeral rites, the great attention paid to them by the ancients . . . . . i. 275
- of the Egyptians, described from Herodotus . . . . . ii. 20
- Future state of rewards and punishments, the doctrine of, necessary to the wellbeing of civil society . . . . . i. 117-129
- the importance of the doctrine of, to the wellbeing of civil society, believed by all the wisest part of mankind . . . . . i. 172
- how taught in the mysteries . . . . . i. 210
- the ancient legislators unanimous in the propagating the belief of . . . . . i. 398
- the sages as unanimous in propagating the belief of . . . . . ib.
- the sages as unanimous in thinking the doctrine of, necessary to the wellbeing of society . . . . . i. 434
- Lord Shaftesbury's opinion of . . . . . i. 438
- sentiments of theistical philosophers on . . . . . i. 439
- sentiments of antiquity on the use of to society . . . . . i. 440
- Caesar's disbelief of, with Cato and Cicero's answers to him . . . . . i. 453
- of all the ancient Greek philosophers only believed by Socrates . . . . . i. 456
- from what causes disbelieved by the ancient Greek philosophers . . . . . i. 494
- considered as a moral designation, as necessarily implying punishments as rewards . . . . . i. 499
- its being disbelieved by the wisest of the ancients, no discredit to the Christian doctrine of . . . . . i. 535
- not of the number of those doctrines taught by natural religion . . . . . ib.
- the benefits of that doctrine to the Gentile world, . . . . . i. 592
- supplied to the Jews by an extraordinary providence . . . . . ib.
- no part of the Mosaic dispensation . . . . . ii. 323
- purposely omitted in the Mosaic dispensation . . . . . ii. 325
- the want of, how supplied . . . . . ii. 326
- strongly inculcated by the Suevi and Arabs . . . . . ii. 334
- positive declarations against the expectation of, instanced from the Jewish writers . . . . . ib.
- corroborated by the New Testament writers . . . . . ii. 339
- examination of Lord Bolingbroke's notion on the omission of that doctrine in the Mosaic dispensation . . . . . ii. 348
- the doctrine of, deducible by natural reasons . . . . . ii. 365
- a review of the prejudices which have induced to the belief that it was taught in the Mosaic dispensation . . . . . ii. 377
- that taught by natural religion to be distinguished from that taught by the Christian revelation . . . . . ii. 378
- its mention by Moses and by succeeding writers to be distinguished . . . . . ii. 381
- a review of those passages in scripture urged to prove that it was taught in the Mosaic dispensation . . . . . ii. 431
- a list of texts urged by the rabbins in proof of its being taught under the Mosaic law . . . . . ii. 418
- an examination of the arguments founded on the 11th chapter of the Hebrews to show that it was taught by Moses . . . . . ii. 456
- that it was not taught in the Mosaic law, confirmed by the authorities of Grotius, Episcopius, Arnaud, and Bishop Bull . . . . . ii. 463
- Dr Rutherford's opinion, of Moses not being studious to conceal this doctrine, examined . . . . . ii. 571
- not contained in the Mosaic dispensation . . . . . ii. 530
- this omission a proof of its divine origin . . . . . ii. 531
- brought to light by the gospel alone . . . . . ii. 607
- the origin and progress of that opinion inquired into . . . . . ii. 619
- a free gift, not a claim of right . . . . . ii. 633
- Gathered to the people, that phrase explained . . . . . vol. ii. p. 438
- Gaul, ancient, inquiry into the deities of . . . . . ii. 105
- Geometry, on the origin of . . . . . ii. 129
- Germany, ancient, Caesar's account of the gods of . . . . . ii. 221
- Glycho, account of the mysteries of . . . . . i. 229
- God, note on the various opinions of the human nature of . . . . . i. 202
- examination of Lord Bolingbroke's notions of the divine attributes . . . . . i. 331
- the disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments founded by the Greek philosophers on his immutability . . . . . i. 495
- whether endowed with human passions . . . . . i. 498
- the distinction made by philosophers between the good and the just . . . . . ib.
- a censure of those who estimate his decrees by the standard of their own ideas . . . . . i. 591
- the only means of preserving the doctrine of his unity . . . . . ii. 236
- God of Israel, why he gave himself a name to the Jews . . . . . ii. 139
- the relation in which he stood to the Jewish people . . . . . ii. 248
- why represented with human affections . . . . . ii. 251
- not less benign to man under the law, than under the gospel . . . . . ib.
- how considered by the neighbouring nations . . . . . ii. 254
- his character as the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, explained, and the mistakes concerning this text pointed out . . . . . ii. 449
- Gods of the pagans, bad consequences of the vicious examples of . . . . . i. 218
- who they were, explained . . . . . i. 219
- three systems concerning . . . . . i. 220
- the fear of, amongst the Romans . . . . . i. 445
- the necessity of a fear of, to society . . . . . i. 438
- how so many immoralities came to be recorded of them . . . . . ii. 64
- account of the origin of local tutelary ones in Greece, from Plato . . . . . ii. 104
- Golden ass of Apuleius, the moral of . . . . . i. 268
- the foundation of that allegory . . . . . i. 212
- story of . . . . . i. 213
- Golden bough, in the *Aeneis*, meaning of . . . . . i. 268
- Golden calf, account of it omitted by Josephus . . . . . ii. 365
- Good, natural, requires human industry to prepare and apply it . . . . . i. 362
- Gospel, the moral precepts of, the same with those of natural religion . . . . . i. 163
- no justification by works under . . . . . ii. 460
- its nature and genius considered . . . . . ii. 638
- Grace, inquiry into the system of . . . . . ii. 508
- Greece, when dead men first began to be deified there, . . . . . i. 178
- the learning of, derived from Egypt . . . . . i. 449
- much given to speculative legislation . . . . . i. 450
- remarks on the species of philosophy cultivated there . . . . . ib.
- the religion of, traced down to its original . . . . . ii. 103
- what it borrowed from Egypt . . . . . ii. 105
- the three distinguished periods in the religion of . . . . . ii. 113
- charged by the Egyptians with stealing their gods, . . . . . ii. 115
- ignorant of the use of cavalry at the time of the Trojan war . . . . . ii. 121
- Grecian history, their accounts no otherwise to be credited than as corroborated by scripture . . . . . ii. 1
- an inquiry into the validity of their testimony concerning the antiquity of the Egyptian monarchy . . . . . ib.
- the confused chronology of the early part of, remarked . . . . . ii. 93
- Greek philosophy, a twofold doctrine taught in, external and internal . . . . . i. 443
- account of, from Macrobius . . . . . i. 466
- progress of . . . . . i. 489

Greenland women, their language a refinement on that of the men . . . vol. ii. p. 212  
 Grey, Dr, his notions concerning the book of Job controverted . . . ii. 395  
 — examination of his objections to the author of the Divine Legation's account of the book of Job . . . ii. 563  
 Grotius, his fatal misinterpretations of the Jewish prophecies shown . . . ii. 522

H

Hades, its different senses in the Old and New Testaments pointed out . . . ii. 373  
 Hagar, why she named the angel who appeared to her Elroi . . . ii. 139  
 Halde au, his remarks on the style of the Chinese language . . . ii. 62  
 Happiness, the pursuit of, not the obligation to morality, . . . i. 145  
 Hare, Bishop, his tract on the difficulties and discouragements which attend the study of the scriptures misunderstood . . . i. 81  
 — character of him . . . i. 651  
 — his censure of Josephus . . . ii. 307  
 Hebrew, the uncertainty of that language . . . ii. 558  
 Hebrew alphabet, whence derived . . . ii. 54  
 — when the points were added to it . . . ii. 55  
 Hebrews, the argument of St Paul's epistle to, stated, . . . ii. 456  
 Hecate of the Greeks, account of . . . i. 275  
 Heliopolis, the most famous college of the ancient Egyptian priests . . . ii. 5  
 — the worship established there . . . ii. 7  
 Hell, its different meanings in the Old and in the New Testament . . . ii. 443  
 Hercules, story of his interview with Jupiter . . . ii. 74  
 — the ancient Egyptian, account why there were so many of that name . . . ii. 97  
 Heresies, Tertullian's account of the origin of . . . i. 530  
 Hermes Trismegistus, history of the books forged in the name of . . . i. 525  
 Hero worship, the origin of, traced . . . i. 568  
 — complicated in its rites . . . i. 569  
 — source of the low date of . . . ii. 113  
 Herod, the cause of his supposing Jesus to be John the Baptist risen from the dead, explained . . . ii. 661  
 Herodotus, his opinion of the origin of geometry, . . . ii. 129  
 Heroes, lives of, compared . . . ii. 95  
 Heroes of antiquity, their characters compounded of enthusiasm and craft . . . i. 599  
 Heterism, (assemblies of the primitive Christians) the nature of, explained; when and by whom suppressed, . . . i. 673  
 Hezekiah, the name he gave to the brazen serpent accounted for . . . ii. 224  
 — detail of God's dealing with him . . . ii. 392  
 Hieroglyphics, the first essay towards the art of writing . . . ii. 23  
 — found in use amongst the Mexicans by the Spaniards . . . ii. 25  
 — found in Siberia . . . ii. 25  
 — this picturesque method of expression abridged by the Egyptians . . . ii. 26  
 — brief view of their types and allusions . . . ii. 26  
 — mythologic account of the origin of . . . ii. 27  
 — improved in the Chinese language . . . ii. 27  
 — source of the different genius of, from the Chinese characters . . . ii. 30  
 — stood for things, and not for sounds . . . ii. 32, 71  
 — used by all nations . . . ii. 32  
 — how they came to be applied by the Egyptians to conceal their learning . . . ii. 39  
 — their influence on language . . . ii. 62  
 — the origin of brute-worship . . . ii. 69, 70  
 — on the origin and progress of . . . ii. 577  
 Hierophant of the mysteries, his office . . . ii. 75  
 Hippocrates, his opinion of the Cnidian sentences . . . ii. 17  
 — deductions from, as to the ancient practice of physic . . . ii. 19  
 — author of the dietetic part of medicine . . . ii. 19  
 Holy Spirit, inquiry into the nature, office, and operations of the . . . ii. 667

Homer, excelled by Virgil in the description of Elysium . . . vol. i. p. 291  
 — his representations of the ancient Greek physicians ascertained and accounted for . . . ii. 15  
 — whence he collected his materials . . . ii. 222  
 Hooker, his sentiments of the practical use of religion . . . i. 524  
 — his censure of those who estimate the dispensations of providence by the test of their own conceptions . . . i. 594  
 Horace, the double sense in his famous ode, "*O navis referent*," &c., pointed out . . . ii. 509  
 Horeb, consequences of the contract there between God and the Jewish people . . . ii. 249  
 Horses not in use at the Trojan war . . . ii. 121  
 — Egypt abounded with, before the conquest of Libya, . . . ii. 122  
 — Israelites forbid to fetch horses from Egypt . . . ii. 123  
 — motives for the prohibition . . . ii. 123  
 — Solomon's violation of the law punished . . . ii. 123  
 — Judea not a proper country for the use or breeding of . . . ii. 124  
 Hosea, his representation of the Jewish idolatry . . . ii. 267  
 Huet, his conjectures of the corruption of sacred history into pagan fables . . . i. 465  
 Human sacrifices, the origin of, inquired into . . . ii. 644  
 — Bryant's opinion of the origin of, exploded . . . ii. 694  
 — Voltaire's opinion confuted . . . ii. 695  
 — the command that "none devoted shall be redeemed," examined . . . ii. 697  
 Hyde, Lord Chancellor, how brought into disgrace, . . . i. 88  
 Hymn, that sung by the hierophants at the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, pointed out . . . i. 231

I

Jablonski, notes on a passage in contending that the Egyptian gods were not dead men deified . . . i. 403  
 Jacob, his expressions to Pharaoh, Gen. xlvii. ver. 9, explained . . . ii. 438  
 — his ejaculation to his sons, Gen. xlix. 18, explained . . . ii. 439  
 — his wrestling with an angel, what intended by . . . ii. 480  
 — shown to be of a tolerating disposition . . . ii. 556  
 Jamblichus, note on a passage of . . . i. 203  
 — his opinion of the ancient mysteries . . . i. 327  
 — his account of the origin of brute worship controverted . . . ii. 78  
 James, his and St Paul's account of justification by faith reconciled . . . ii. 663  
 Iaphs, his character in Virgil not designed for Antonius Musa . . . i. 304  
 Idolaters, the first intolerants . . . ii. 556  
 Idolatry, account of the rise of the three species of, from Sanchoniatho . . . i. 226  
 — the progress of traced . . . i. 565  
 — inquiry where idolatry was punished, except under the Jewish economy . . . ii. 555  
 Idolatry of the Assyrians, transplanted into the Holy Land in the room of the captive Jews, how punished . . . ii. 263  
 — view of the early spread of, by Calmet . . . ii. 362  
 Idolatry, Jewish, under what figures represented in the prophecies . . . ii. 224  
 — the extent of that crime, and how legally punishable under the Jewish theocracy . . . ii. 250  
 — never proceeding from matters of conscience . . . ii. 261  
 — the sources of, pointed out . . . ii. 261  
 — in what it consisted . . . ii. 263-268  
 Jehovah, explanation of that name . . . ii. 140  
 Jephthah, the story of his vow considered . . . ii. 646  
 Jeremiah and Ezekiel, the signs added by them to illustrate their prophecies, accounted for . . . ii. 34  
 — his representation of the Jewish idolatry . . . ii. 265  
 — a passage in, predictive of the new dispensation . . . ii. 327



- Jeremiah, passages quoted from, predictive of the new dispensation vol. ii. p. 520
- Jerusalem, the destruction of, as prophesied by Christ figuratively, in a literal sense importing the destruction of the world ii. 501
- Jews, how differently represented by free-thinkers i. 99
- their religion, dogmatic theology i. 387
- why they became hated by their neighbours i. 388
- character of, by Tacitus i. 390
- how long they continued ignorant of a future state i. 594
- their religion syllogistically proved to be supported by an extraordinary providence i. 595
- a summary view of their religious history i. 600
- observations on their ritual or ceremonial law i. 601
- on the change of dispensation, prophesied by Jeremiah and other prophets ib.
- dedication of books IV. V. VI. to them i. 637
- an examination into the motives which withhold them from receiving Christianity i. 639
- arguments adapted to invalidate them ib.
- the subject of their naturalization argued i. 644
- the repeal of the naturalization bill justified i. 646
- the folly of deriving all arts, laws, and religion from them, or denying them the production of any i. 685
- fond of Egyptian manners and superstitions ii. 128
- their obstinate attachment to the Egyptian customs and superstitions historically traced ii. 141
- their expulsion from Egypt by Pharaoh denied ii. 144
- reproached in a signal manner for their perverseness and disobedience, Ezekiel chap. xx. ii. 172
- explanation of this celebrated chapter ii. 173
- their propensity to idolatry accounted for ii. 188
- under what figures their idolatry was represented ii. 224
- what their policy was seldom understood ii. 235
- in what light their separation from the rest of mankind, is to be considered ii. 236
- summary view of deliverance from Egypt in order to be separated ii. 245
- their theocracy established ii. 246
- their idolatry, not a rejection of the God of Israel ii. 264
- how long their theocratic form of government subsisted ii. 281
- their first kings the viceroys of God ib.
- when their theocratic government was abolished ii. 288
- at the coming of the Messiah ii. 289
- their ignorance of a future state under the Mosaic dispensation illustrated by the New Testament writers ii. 339
- whether subject to punishment in a future state under the Mosaic dispensation ii. 355
- how long they continued ignorant of a future state ii. 374
- whence their obstinate adherence to their abolished rites proceeds ii. 379
- their history supposed to be contained in the history of Job ii. 396
- a summary view of their history ii. 397
- the bad consequence of their propensity toward marrying idolatrous women ii. 406
- reflections on the moral dispensations of God toward them ii. 415
- totally ignorant of a future state under the Mosaic dispensation ii. 539. 547
- Ignatius Loyola, remarks on his character i. 562
- Increase and multiply, that command considered ii. 611
- Infanticide, remarks on the custom of, among the ancients, &c. i. 280
- on the practice of i. 420
- Infanticide, the origin and practice of, examined vol. ii. p. 644
- the origin and progress of, considered ii. 644
- Infants, and men falsely condemned, why consigned by Virgil to purgatory i. 280
- Infernal regions, a comment of Virgil's topography of i. 279
- Infidelity, propensity of the present age to i. 80
- an indiscriminate aversion to all the principles advanced by i. 684
- prejudicial to the defence of true religion ib.
- the proper method of disputing with ib.
- Instinct in mankind, how different from that quality in brutes i. 146
- Invocation of the dead, inquiry concerning ii. 572
- Job, book of, a critical inquiry into ii. 383
- a dramatic composition ii. 383
- when written ii. 387, 396, 397
- observations on the imagery of ii. 369
- a continual allusion to the Mosaic law throughout ii. 384
- supposed to contain the history of the Jews ii. 396
- the language of, compared to that of the American Indians ii. 395
- the purpose of its composition pointed out ii. 399
- examination of the characters in the piece ii. 400, 409, 418
- allegory of the story explained ii. 400
- reflections on the character of Satan ii. 413
- inquiry concerning the author ii. 413
- supposed to have been written by Ezra ib.
- inquiry whether "I know that my redeemer liveth," &c., refers to a resurrection, or temporal deliverance only ib.
- examination of Grey's objections to the author of the Divine Legation account of the ii. 563
- inquiry into the antiquity of ii. 569
- appendix concerning the ii. 555
- Job, his real existence asserted ii. 386
- his exemplary patience not founded on his written story ii. 400
- reflections on the character of his wife ii. 405
- reflections on the character of his friends ii. 409, 415
- his persecution renewed by modern critics ii. 569
- inquiry whether he put away his wife ii. 569
- his opinion of providence inquired into ii. 570
- Joel, the double senses in his prophecy pointed out ii. 499, 502
- John the Baptist, his mission and character explained ii. 601
- Joseph, prime minister of Egypt, married to a daughter of the priest of On ii. 6
- vindicated from the charge of rendering the government of Egypt despotic ii. 72
- inference drawn from his entertainment of his brethren, concerning the use of animal food in Egypt ii. 127
- procures the property of all the land for Pharaoh ii. 128
- did not make the government of Egypt despotic ii. 198
- an eminent instance of the strength of natural affection ii. 184
- Josephus, his character of the Jewish religion, with a reference to the pagan mysteries i. 223
- defended from the charge of disbelieving the miracles he relates ii. 304
- the circumstances under which he wrote his history ib.
- his deviations from scripture accounted for ii. 315
- Joshua, clear state of the debate between him and the Jewish people on the article of worship ii. 264
- Jotham's parables, an instance of instruction by apologue or fable ii. 36
- observations on the story of ii. 217
- Irony, ill consequences of the indiscriminate use of it i. 94
- Isaiah, his denunciations against the Israelites for bringing horses from Egypt in violation of the Mosaic prohibition ii. 124



- Isaiah, his representation of the Jewish idolatry . . . . . vol. ii. p. 265, 267  
 — double senses, in his prophecies, explained . . . . . ii. 513  
 — his figurative prediction of the gospel dispensation . . . . . ii. 519  
 Isiac Table. See Bembine Table.  
 Isis, who . . . . . i. 317  
 — and Osiris, under what similitudes worshipped . . . . . ii. 9  
 — why adopted by the Athenians as the patroness of their mysteries . . . . . ii. 110  
 — the several attributes and characters ascribed to her . . . . . ii. 111  
 — and Osiris, the patrons of the primitive arts . . . . . ii. 120  
 — and Osiris, their mysteries described in Ezekiel's visions . . . . . ii. 147  
 — the cause of her being worshipped under the figure of a galley . . . . . ii. 199  
 Israelites, why subject to few natural diseases . . . . . ii. 11  
 — forbid by their law to fetch horses from Egypt . . . . . ii. 122  
 — this law violated by Solomon, and punished . . . . . ii. 123  
 — treated by God as moral agents . . . . . ii. 163  
 — Fleury's account of the state of the arts among, in the time of Moses . . . . . ii. 214  
 Judaism, its characteristic distinction from all other religions . . . . . i. 679  
 Judea, not a proper country for the use of cavalry in . . . . . ii. 124  
 — Voltaire's account of, examined . . . . . ii. 242  
 Judgment, Christ's account of it examined . . . . . ii. 664  
 Judgment of Hercules, an allegoric piece to excite the youth of Greece to virtue . . . . . ii. 568  
 Julian, emperor, his observations on the double doctrines of the Greek philosophers . . . . . i. 481  
 — The miracle of his being defeated in his attempt to rebuild the temple considered . . . . . ii. 680  
 Jupiter, only one deity though known by many local tutelar appellations . . . . . i. 421  
 — a local deity . . . . . i. 681  
 — the stories of his adulteries founded in truth . . . . . ii. 84  
 Jupiter Ammon, moral of the Egyptian fable concerning . . . . . i. 207  
 Justice, the pure stream of, in England, . . . . . i. 637  
 Justification by faith, explained . . . . . ii. 658  
 — St Paul's and St James's accounts reconciled . . . . . ii. 663

## K

- Kings of the Jews, the viceroys of God . . . . . ii. 281  
 Kircher, characterized as a writer . . . . . ii. 88  
 — his opinion concerning the Egyptian characters . . . . . ii. 44, 204, 215

## L

- Lactantius, an examination of the argument of his treatise de Ira Dei . . . . . i. 497  
 Lamb, paschal, a type of the future sacrifice of Christ . . . . . ii. 492—494  
 Lambert, his character . . . . . i. 561  
 Language, a deduction of the origin of . . . . . ii. 34  
 — upheld at first by a mixture of words and signs . . . . . ib.  
 — its improvement by apologue or fable . . . . . ii. 37  
 — its advance to elegance by the metaphor . . . . . ii. 38  
 — the revolutions of, traced . . . . . ii. 58  
 — Diodorus Siculus's account of the origin of . . . . . ii. 205  
 — first taught by God . . . . . ii. 206  
 Law, the two great sanctions of . . . . . i. 122  
 Lawgiver, heroic, displayed in the character of Æneas . . . . . i. 255  
 — from what motive induced to have recourse to fiction . . . . . ii. 231  
 Lawgivers, summary view of their conduct in the propagation of religion . . . . . ii. 534  
 Law, Mosaic, the objections brought against

- the sufficiency of it, in obtaining its end, equally valid against the law of nature . . . . . vol. ii. p. 271  
 — its provision against idolatry . . . . . ii. 273  
 — cause of its inefficacy . . . . . ii. 274  
 — its divine institution manifest in the dispensations of providence toward the Jewish people . . . . . ii. 278  
 — the primary intention of . . . . . ib.  
 — the temporal sanctions of, not transferred into the gospel . . . . . ii. 317  
 — illustrations from the prophets of the temporal nature of its sanctions . . . . . ii. 323  
 — the Christian doctrine shadowed under the rites of . . . . . ii. 280  
 — in what sense typical or spiritual . . . . . ii. 433  
 — not supposed by St Paul to offer a future state to its followers . . . . . ii. 461  
 Laws penal, to enforce opinions only equitable under a theocracy . . . . . ii. 247  
 Lazarus, passages in the parable of, explained, with reference to arguments founded on them of a future state being taught by Moses . . . . . ii. 451  
 Legislation, ancient, a divine interposition the very spirit of . . . . . i. 252  
 Legislators, and their pretended missions, an enumeration of . . . . . i. 182  
 — an inquiry into their motives . . . . . i. 183  
 — placed by Virgil in elysium . . . . . i. 292  
 — however different from each other in other points, unanimous in propagating the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments . . . . . i. 398  
 — compared with modern missionaries . . . . . i. 401  
 — always enthusiasts . . . . . i. 569  
 — never found a people without religion . . . . . i. 583  
 Letters, whether entitled to patronage of the great . . . . . i. 111  
 — the history of . . . . . ii. 23  
 — the antiquity of among the Egyptians, inferred from their mythologic derivation of them . . . . . ii. 54  
 — the invention of, by Atossa, fabulous . . . . . ii. 213  
 Lex sacra, what . . . . . i. 416  
 Liberty, civil, too great an attention to the security of, subversive of religion . . . . . i. 629  
 Life, the promises of, under the Mosaic law, how to be understood . . . . . ii. 440-445  
 Livy, his character of Scipio Africanus . . . . . i. 627  
 Locke, Mr, his memory injured by his friend Collins . . . . . i. 91  
 — his last word to Collins . . . . . ib.  
 — his observations on the Jewish theocracy . . . . . ii. 548  
 Lord's supper, the antitype of the paschal lamb . . . . . ii. 649  
 — the institution of, examined from St Paul's sense of it . . . . . ii. 652  
 — Bossuet's objections to the protestants' opinion of the figure of 'This is my body,' by those of 'I am the vine, I am the door,' examined . . . . . ii. 705  
 Lot, his story supposed to be allegorized by Ovid in Baucis and Philemon . . . . . i. 465  
 Love, Plato's account of the origin of . . . . . ii. 609  
 Lucian, his opinion of death . . . . . i. 484  
 — his account of the origin of brute-worship controverted . . . . . ii. 77  
 Lucius, story of his transformation, from the golden ass of Apuleius . . . . . i. 313  
 Luxury, observations on the vague meaning of that word . . . . . i. 164  
 — true definition of . . . . . i. 166  
 Lycanthropy, a Grecian disorder, account of . . . . . i. 467  
 Lycurgus, his chief aim in the laws of Sparta . . . . . ii. 190  
 Lyte, anecdote relating to his conjectural notes touching the origin of the university of Oxon, &c. . . . . i. 622

## M

- Macrobin, his account of the doctrines of Greek philosophers . . . . . i. 445  
 Magistrates, civil, their inducement to an alliance with the church . . . . . i. 368  
 — two conclusions drawn by believers and unbelievers, from his large share in

- the establishment of ancient national religions . . . . . vol. i. p. 541
- Mahomet, the absurdity of his imitating Moses in the distinction of meats, pointed out . . . . . ii. 165
- his imitation of Moses in the union of civil and religious policy . . . . . ii. 249
- the plan on which his religion was framed . . . . . ii. 260, 280
- to what his successes were chiefly owing . . . . . ii. 322
- Mahometan writers, a character of . . . . . ii. 257
- Man, how determined to action . . . . . i. 155
- Man, in society described . . . . . i. 160
- an inquiry into the moral constitution of, as an individual, and in society . . . . . i. 336
- Man and woman, examination of the Mosaic account of . . . . . ii. 609
- examination of the command to increase and multiply . . . . . ii. 611
- Mosaic account of their specific nature examined . . . . . i. 612
- their admission into paradise . . . . . ii. 614
- their first religion acquired naturally . . . . . ii. 615
- their early acquisition of speech . . . . . ib.
- religion revealed to them in paradise . . . . . ii. 616
- their condition under natural religion inquired into . . . . . ii. 618
- their condition under revealed religion inquired into . . . . . ii. 622
- Manasseh, detail of God's dealings with him . . . . . ii. 393
- Mandeville, examination of his principle of private vices being public benefits . . . . . i. 162
- his arguments reduced to an absurdity . . . . . i. 166
- Manicheans, Art. VII. of the Church of England directed against them . . . . . ii. 465
- Mansfield, Lord, dedication of books . . . . . iv. v. vi. to him . . . . . i. 629
- Mead, Dr, his opinion of demoniacs examined . . . . . ii. 557
- Medicine, the parts of, and when each obtained in use . . . . . ii. 18
- indication of the great antiquity of . . . . . ii. 19
- Melchizedec, observations on the story of . . . . . ii. 556
- Metempsychosis, why taught in the mysteries . . . . . i. 294
- the doctrine of, how employed by the ancients . . . . . i. 466
- and metamorphosis, difference between . . . . . ib.
- Pythagorean, notion of . . . . . i. 471
- came originally from Egypt, and believed by all mankind . . . . . i. 472
- Plato's notion of . . . . . i. 478
- the doctrine of, not the origin of bruteworship . . . . . ii. 76
- Mexicans, remarks on the religion of . . . . . i. 176
- their use of hieroglyphic writing illustrated by their manner of painting their prayers . . . . . ii. 23
- account of a Mexican history in the hieroglyphic style . . . . . ii. 24
- Mihokek, the proper signification of that word pointed out . . . . . ii. 289
- Middleton, remarks on his life of Cicero . . . . . i. 617
- his arguments of the derivation of popish from pagan rites examined . . . . . ii. 233
- his opinion of the gift of tongues exposed . . . . . ii. 70
- Milesian fables, what . . . . . i. 312
- Milton, remarks on the species of poetry in his *Paradise Lost* . . . . . i. 261
- Mind and intellect, the Aristotelian distinction . . . . . i. 513
- Minerva, exposition of a famous hieroglyphical inscription on her temple at Sais . . . . . ii. 43
- Miracles, evidences of an extraordinary providence over the Jewish nation . . . . . ii. 303, 510
- a necessary confirmation of the secondary senses of the Jewish prophecies . . . . . ii. 511
- the use to be made of them in disputes . . . . . i. 588
- the testimony required for the belief of . . . . . ii. 609-682
- what to be accounted miracles . . . . . ii. 670
- the only proof of a doctrine proceeding from God . . . . . ii. 671
- of the resurrection of Christ considered . . . . . ii. 673
- of casting out devils, or evil spirits, considered . . . . . ii. 676
- of healing natural diseases considered . . . . . ii. 677
- Miracles, designed to defeat the designs of impious men, considered . . . . . vol. ii. p. 687
- Mirth, an enemy to chastity . . . . . i. 344
- Missionaries, catholic and protestant, reasons of the ill success of their missions . . . . . i. 94
- compared with ancient lawgivers . . . . . i. 91
- Missions, pretended by ancient legislators, list of . . . . . i. 102
- Molech, the meaning of giving seed to him . . . . . ii. 448
- Montesquieu, extract of a letter from, to the author . . . . . i. 67
- Moon, its various symbols and attributes as represented in the pagan mythology from the golden age of Apuleius . . . . . i. 316
- Moral sense, the foundation of . . . . . i. 135
- Plato the patron of . . . . . i. 110
- Morality and faith, summary view of the disputes concerning . . . . . i. 622
- Moses, a list of pagan gods and heroes supposed by Huet to have arisen from the corruption of his history . . . . . i. 665
- his account of the Egyptian priesthood, a confirmation of those of the ancient Greek historians . . . . . ii. 6
- corroborates their account of the religious rites of Egypt . . . . . ii. 7
- of the funeral rites of Egypt . . . . . ii. 21
- of the division of the lands of Egypt . . . . . ib.
- the former of the Hebrew alphabet, by an improvement of the Egyptian characters . . . . . ii. 54
- the difference between contradicting the astronomy and the history written by him . . . . . ii. 91
- characters in the pagan mythology supposed by some to be intended for him . . . . . ii. 97
- one intention of his law, to prohibit all intercourse between the Hebrews and the Egyptians . . . . . ii. 122
- his motives explained . . . . . ib.
- the reason of his unwillingness to undertake his mission . . . . . ii. 141
- his laws accommodated to the prejudices of the Jews, in favour of the Egyptian customs . . . . . ii. 149
- this no objection to the divinity of his mission . . . . . ii. 153
- his knowledge in the Egyptian learning, and the laws by him instituted, a confirmation of the divinity of his mission . . . . . ii. 154
- answers to deistical objections against the divinity of his mission . . . . . ii. 169
- vindicated from the supposition of having had recourse to action in certain cases . . . . . ii. 231
- his injunctions to the Jews against the local idolatry of the Cutheans . . . . . ii. 262
- his injunctions to the Jews against the local idolatry of Canaan . . . . . ii. 267
- the omission of a future state in his law, intended . . . . . ii. 225
- two periods observable in his history . . . . . ib.
- the sense of his expressions relating the creation of man ascertained . . . . . ii. 431
- the veil over his face explained . . . . . ii. 479
- Mosaic dispensation, not a complete religion . . . . . i. 593
- logically proved to be supported by an extraordinary providence . . . . . i. 555
- on what principles the proof of it conducted . . . . . i. 556
- its limitation to a particular people an impeachment of the impartiality of God towards mankind in general . . . . . i. 559
- summary estimate of . . . . . i. 601
- its divinity logically proved . . . . . ii. 531, 544
- Mosaic ritual, the cause of the admission of sacrifices into it considered . . . . . ii. 614
- Mosaic sacrifices, had types and also a moral import . . . . . ii. 642
- Moses, divine legation of, demonstrated, the medium employed to establish his divine legation . . . . . i. 115
- propositions on which this demonstration depends . . . . . i. 117
- summary view of the opposition this performance met with . . . . . i. 647
- recapitulation of the argument proving his divine legation . . . . . ii. 559
- the length of it accounted for . . . . . ii. 580

- Moses, argument designed for the subject of books vii. viii. ix. of the Divine Legislation . . . . . vol. ii. p. 553-607
- Musa Antonius, not depicted by Virgil under the character of Iapis . . . . . i. 304
- Muskets, humorous story of a parcel of, with a logical inference . . . . . ii. 552
- Mysteries, of the pagan religion, for what purpose instituted . . . . . i. 206
- what the original ones . . . . . i. 207
- the Eleusinian . . . . . i. 209
- arguments in favour of . . . . . i. 213
- who the first institutors of . . . . . i. 247
- the abuse of them in the Christian religion . . . . . i. 418
- explanation of that term . . . . . i. 413
- pagan, marks of their Egyptian original . . . . . ii. 7
- summary view of . . . . . ii. 534
- Mythology, ancient, explanation of . . . . . i. 566
- the testimony not to be trusted, in ascertaining times and facts . . . . . ii. 112
- sources of the confusion in . . . . . ii. 113
- Mythras, priests of, explanation of their names . . . . . i. 221
- probationary trials previous to initiation into the mysteries of . . . . . i. 272
- N
- Nature, state of, and civil society, difference between . . . . . i. 122
- inquiry into the systems of . . . . . ii. 602
- Nebuchadnezzar, inquiry into his disorder . . . . . i. 467
- Nero, emperor, how deterred from attempting to intrude upon the Eleusinian mysteries . . . . . i. 211
- Newton, Sir Isaac, his account of the origin of idolatry . . . . . i. 178
- his system of idolatry controverted . . . . . i. 565
- his character as a natural philosopher . . . . . ii. 90
- misled by Greek mythologists . . . . . ii. 91
- the argument of his Egyptian chronology . . . . . ib.
- his reasons for the identity of Osiris and Sesostris . . . . . ii. 92
- his mistake in this illustrated by a case stated in similar terms . . . . . ii. 95
- the source of his mistake . . . . . ii. 99
- his hypothesis supported principally by two mythologic fables . . . . . ii. 114
- mistakes the times of the pagan deities, compared with the era of the Trojan war . . . . . ii. 116
- his system of chronology contradictory to scripture . . . . . ii. 119
- his chronology refuted by deduction, . . . . . ib.
- his account of Vulcan, compared with that of Homer . . . . . ii. 121
- his assertion of the conquest of Libya furnishing Egypt with horses, invalidated . . . . . ib.
- his opinion of the time when the Egyptians introduced animal food, refuted . . . . . ii. 127
- his period of the division of the lands of Egypt, disproved . . . . . ii. 128
- his account of the first introduction of letters into Egypt, rejected . . . . . ii. 129
- his observations relating to the populousness of Egypt, examined . . . . . ii. 130
- makes Sesostris to be Hercules . . . . . ii. 131
- quotes Æsculapius as the first who built with square stones . . . . . ii. 132
- summary view of the dispute concerning the identity of Osiris with Sesostris . . . . . ib.
- Nile, the happy effects of its annual overflowings . . . . . ii. 2
- Nisus, and Euryalus, remarks on the episode of, in the Æneis . . . . . i. 259
- Noah, his character found to answer that of the Indian Bacchus . . . . . ii. 232
- Nocturnal assemblies, of the primitive Christians, first occasion of . . . . . i. 655
- their antiquity among pagans . . . . . i. 672
- orden, capt. his mistaken conclusion, from a view of the pyramids, concerning the antiquity of the Egyptian hieroglyphics, corrected . . . . . ii. 211

## O

- Oaths, of the citizens of Athens . . . . . i. 377
- of the priestesses of Bacchus . . . . . i. 378
- solemnly regarded by the Romans . . . . . i. 436
- Cicero's opinion of the obligation to fulfil, under the belief of the immutability of the Deity . . . . . i. 496
- Obelisks, of the ancient Egyptians, the public records of the times . . . . . ii. 42
- Obligation, duties of perfect and imperfect, how distinguished . . . . . i. 121
- Ombites and Teutyrites, occasion of the intolerant proceedings of . . . . . i. 386
- Omens, their admission into ancient history, accounted for . . . . . i. 180
- two kinds of . . . . . i. 253
- On, some account of the priests of . . . . . ii. 7
- Oneirocritic art, explained . . . . . ii. 66
- whence the art of deciphering borrowed . . . . . ii. 68
- Oracles, the original motive of consulting them . . . . . ii. 106
- Origen and Celsus, comparative characters of . . . . . i. 308
- his account of the stoical renovation . . . . . i. 485
- his misunderstandings of the promises of the Jewish law pointed out . . . . . ii. 570
- Osiris and Sesostris, their identity controverted against Sir Isaac Newton . . . . . ii. 92
- who . . . . . ii. 98
- and Sesostris distinguished . . . . . ii. 98, 101
- account of, and his cortege, from Diodorus Siculus . . . . . ii. 99
- his symbols . . . . . ii. 103
- proof of his antiquity equal to Moses . . . . . ib.
- his superior antiquity to Sesostris ascertained . . . . . ib.
- his various characters at different places, as expressed in an epigram of Ausonius . . . . . ii. 111
- represented in the golden calf of the Egyptians . . . . . ii. 143
- Orpheus, said to have been struck dead by lightning . . . . . i. 243
- where placed in elysium by Virgil . . . . . i. 292
- Ovid, remarks on his Metamorphosis . . . . . i. 463
- Ovid's Metamorphosis, a popular history of providence . . . . . i. 464
- key to his poem . . . . . i. 470
- Metamorphosis founded on the metempsychosis . . . . . i. 471
- his account of Typhon's war with the gods . . . . . ii. 73
- Oxyrychites and Cynopolites, Plutarch's account of the religious contest between . . . . . i. 306

## P

- Paganism, chiefly founded in the deification of dead men . . . . . i. 177
- ancient, the religion of the civil magistrate . . . . . i. 179
- favourer of mysteries . . . . . i. 230
- the genius of, considered as opposed to the true religion . . . . . i. 383
- intercommunity of worship general in . . . . . ib.
- Pan, how painted by the Egyptians . . . . . ii. 74
- Pantomime, historical anecdote of the great expression of one . . . . . ii. 4-6
- story of a famous one at Rome . . . . . ii. 577
- Parable, the origin and nature of . . . . . ii. 57
- Parmenides, the philosopher, his public and private doctrines . . . . . i. 443
- Passover, Jewish, its typical meaning pointed out . . . . . ii. 499
- Patriarchs, Jewish, shown to be no punishers for opinions . . . . . ii. 556
- Patriots, where placed in elysium by Virgil . . . . . i. 293
- Paul, St. why brought before the court of Areopagus at Athens . . . . . i. 393
- why supposed not to be brought before that court in a criminal view . . . . . i. 403
- the sense of his words in Heb. xi. 6, ascertained . . . . . i. 690
- for what purpose called to the apostleship . . . . . ii. 161
- citations from, in proof that the doctrine

- of a future state was not known under the Mosaic dispensation . . . vol. ii. p. 339
- Paul, St., that its sanctions were all temporal . . . ii. 342
- his sentiments of persecution before and after conversion . . . ii. 363
- his definition of faith . . . ii. 456
- a seeming contradiction in, between Acts xiii. 32, and Heb. xi. 39, reconciled . . . ii. 459
- an important passage in his epistle to the Romans, chap. viii. ver. 3, 4, expounded . . . ii. 460
- his account of the institution of the Lord's supper, examined . . . ii. 652
- his account of justification by faith reconciled to that of James . . . ii. 663
- Pelasgians, account of their adoption of the names of the Egyptian gods, and application of them to their own deities, from Herodotus . . . ii. 107
- communicate the names of the Egyptian gods to the Greeks . . . ii. 108
- Perfection, the doctrine of, inquiry concerning it . . . ii. 662
- Peripatetics, their notions of providence . . . i. 501
- Peripatetics and old academy, their conformity . . . i. 612
- Persecution for religious opinions, the true origin of, traced . . . i. 652—ii. 556
- inquiry into the nativity of . . . i. 663
- frequently an engine of state . . . i. 667
- discountenanced by the gospel dispensation . . . ii. 363
- Persians, why they had no statues of their gods . . . i. 178
- their superstition described in Ezekiel's visions . . . ii. 148
- Peruvians, remarks on the religion of . . . i. 176
- Peter, his vision of the clean and unclean beasts explained . . . ii. 164
- his double sense pointed out . . . ii. 508
- Pharmacy, general division of . . . ii. 19
- Pharaoh, king of Egypt, the scripture account of . . . ii. 3
- promotes Joseph . . . ii. 6
- an illustration of the oneirocritic art, drawn from Joseph's interpretation of his two dreams . . . ii. 68
- his chariots and cavalry in the pursuit of the Israelites . . . ii. 122
- Pherecydes Cyrus, the first advancer of the notion of the gods . . . i. 521
- Phenician superstition, described in Ezekiel's visions . . . ii. 148
- Philosophy, the study of, not the only business for which man is sent into the world . . . i. 401
- Philosophers, Greek, legislative, always professed belief in a future state; mere philosophers the contrary . . . i. 451
- the causes which induced them to disbelieve a future state of rewards and punishments . . . i. 494
- their conceptions of the soul . . . i. 505
- Physic, critical inquiry into the state of, in ancient Egypt . . . ii. 8
- Pirithous, account of the fable of his design to steal Proserpine from hell . . . i. 287
- Planet worship, the earliest species of idolatry . . . i. 566
- the first religion of Greece . . . ii. 104
- Plants, worshipped by the Egyptians . . . ii. 69
- Plato, the proem to his laws . . . i. 198
- his definition of sacrilege . . . i. 199
- the first of his laws . . . i. 200
- his public writing shown to differ from his private sentiments . . . i. 444
- a character of his politics and philosophy . . . i. 475
- Cicero's remarks on his Phædo . . . i. 477
- in what sense an advocate for the immortality of the soul . . . i. 478
- his sentiments concerning the soul . . . i. 512
- Platonists, their notions of providence . . . i. 502
- Pleasure, allegorical view of the dangers attending an indulgence in . . . i. 313
- Pliny, the reason of his persecuting the Christians . . . i. 652, 659
- his doubts respecting the manner of proceeding against Christians . . . i. 659
- Plutarch, his opinion of two principles . . . i. 195
- Plutarch, his derivation of superstition vol. i. p. 200
- his notion of death . . . i. 694
- observations on his recital of the opinion of the philosophers, concerning the soul . . . i. 516
- an examination of his comparison between superstition and atheism . . . i. 545
- his famous exclamation to his countrymen . . . i. 549
- accuses the Jews of worshipping swine . . . ii. 213
- Pococke, his account of the Egyptian hieroglyphics . . . ii. 200
- objections to his account . . . ii. 205
- Poisons, the virtue of . . . i. 186
- Policy, human, Critias of Athens, his history of . . . i. 340
- Political romances, the common errors they have all fallen into . . . i. 125
- Polybius, his testimony in favour of the piety of the Romans . . . i. 435
- his opinion as to the means by which states are brought to ruin . . . i. 436
- remarks on his character . . . ii. 16
- Polytheism, in what it consisted, explained . . . i. 315
- Pomponatius, some account of . . . i. 120
- his opinion of a future state defended against Bayle . . . i. 130
- Pope, Mr., his observations on Lord Balingbroke . . . i. 360
- Puppy, why the juice of u-ded in the ceremonial of the shows in the Eleusinian mysteries . . . i. 278
- Porphyry and Clemens Alexandrinus, their accounts of the Egyptian characters and writing . . . ii. 39
- his account of the origin of brute worship, controverted . . . ii. 71
- Posterity, why the punishments of the Mosaic law extended to them . . . ii. 336
- the case argued . . . ii. 338
- Posthumus, extract from his speech on the introduction of foreign worship to Rome . . . i. 373
- his intention only to prevent the exercise of unlicensed religion . . . i. 394
- Pre-existence of the soul, inquiry into the sentiments of the ancients concerning . . . i. 504
- Press, liberty of the, propensity of the present age to licentiousness, not to be ascribed to . . . i. 60
- the complaints of its being restricted disingenuous . . . ii. 16
- Prideaux, his account of the deification of heroes, controverted . . . ii. 63
- Priests, pious and virtuous, where placed in elysium by Virgil . . . i. 293
- Principles, good and evil, the belief of, how guarded against by the writer of the book of Job . . . ii. 416
- Priscilian, the first sufferer for opinion . . . i. 666
- Prodigies, &c., their admission into ancient history accounted for . . . i. 190
- Prophecies, scripture, defended from the insinuations of Dr Middleton . . . ii. 497
- their primary and secondary senses distinguished . . . ii. 512
- misunderstood by the Jews, and why so ordained . . . ii. 521
- the use to be made of them in disputes . . . ii. 529
- Prophecy, what a necessary confirmation of their reference to the Messiah . . . ii. 518
- an evidence of a doctrine proceeding from God . . . ii. 623
- considerations on . . . ii. 624
- Prophets, reason of the institution of a school for . . . ii. 136
- Prophets, Jewish, an inquiry into the nature of the divine commission to . . . i. 601
- rational account of their illustrating their prophecies by signs . . . ii. 34
- Propitiatory sacrifice, origin and nature of it, explained . . . ii. 657
- Providence, the doctrine of, the great sanction of ancient laws . . . i. 147
- the spirit of legislation depends on the doctrine of a . . . i. 232
- the inequalities of, how rectified by the ancients . . . i. 676

- Providence, what kind of, believed by the ancient theistic philosophers vol. i. p. 502
- administration of, at various times, considered . . . . . ii. 175
  - extraordinary, a necessary consequence of the Jewish theocracy . . . . . ii. 300
  - — illustrated from Solomon's prayer at the dedication of the temple . . . . . ii. 310
  - — from Ezekiel . . . . . ii. 311
  - — from Amos . . . . . ib.
  - — evidences of its ceasing . . . . . ii. 314
  - — the ease with which the pretension to it might have been carried on . . . . . ib.
  - — the mention of the inequalities of, by the sacred writers, accounted for . . . . . ii. 315
  - remarks on the different reception of its adverse dispensations, in ancient and modern times . . . . . ii. 569
  - Job's opinion of the equality and inequality of . . . . . ii. 570
  - revival of an equal, to the chosen race . . . . . ii. 631
  - considerations on God's using human instruments in the dispensations of . . . . . ii. 699
  - considerations on God's using temporary plagues in the dispensations of . . . . . ii. 703
- Psammitichus, his scheme to establish an intercourse between Egypt and the Grecian states . . . . . ii. 53
- Psyche, the ancient story of, explained . . . . . i. 323
- Punishments, how applied in civil society . . . . . i. 124
- of the crimes of parents on their children, on what principle only to be vindicated . . . . . i. 641
- Purgatory, remarks on Virgil's account of . . . . . i. 279
- the inhabitants of . . . . . i. 280
- Pyramids of Egypt, probable reasons why they exhibit no hieroglyphic inscriptions . . . . . ii. 210
- the Egyptian architecture formed on the idea of . . . . . ii. 211
  - not temples, but sepulchres . . . . . ib.
  - alluded to in the book of Job . . . . . ii. 390
- Pyrrhonians, and academics, their principles compared . . . . . i. 451
- their origin . . . . . i. 458
- Pythagoras, his knowledge in physics established in late experience concerning earthquakes . . . . . i. 451, 610
- an inquiry into the principles of his philosophy . . . . . i. 461
  - his legislative fame . . . . . i. 462
  - taught several doctrines which he did not believe . . . . . i. 471
- Pythagoreans, their notions of providence . . . . . i. 502
- their tenets concerning the human soul . . . . . i. 512
- Q**
- Quakers, their motives for rejecting the institution of baptism examined into . . . . . ii. 378
- Quaternion, philosophic, their opinion of the soul . . . . . i. 511
- R**
- Rachel, the story of her stealing her father's gods, examined . . . . . ii. 556
- Rainbow, first creation and reason of . . . . . ii. 226
- Reason, the only test of truth . . . . . i. 89
- the use of in the discovery of truth . . . . . i. 104
  - why discredited in religious controversy . . . . . i. 498
- Redemption by Christ, had a retrospect from the fall . . . . . ii. 632
- an act of grace, not of debt . . . . . ii. 633
  - the means employed in that great work inquired into . . . . . ii. 634
- Regulus, Cicero's inquiry into his obligation to return to Carthage . . . . . i. 496
- Religion, the protection of, necessary in all governments . . . . . i. 111
- reply to Bayle's opinion, that a man devoid of religion may be sensible of honour . . . . . i. 152
  - always the peculiar care of the magistrate . . . . . i. 174
  - the necessity of uniting it to the state . . . . . i. 361
  - brief view of the state of, in the ancient world . . . . . i. 379
  - supposed by the sages to be calculated only for the service of the state . . . . . i. 442
- Religion, the double doctrine of the ancients considered . . . . . vol. ii. p. 444
- its truth manifested by its use to society . . . . . i. 539
  - if admitted to have been invented by statesmen, not therefore false . . . . . i. 542
  - an inquiry into the first origin of . . . . . i. 564
  - no people ever found without one . . . . . i. 583
  - Hooker's sentiments on the political use of . . . . . i. 584
  - too great an attention to civil liberty subversive of . . . . . i. 629
  - a comparison of the many religions that have existed in the world, the clew to the true one . . . . . i. 679
  - the absurdity of any human legislature enforcing it by penal laws . . . . . ii. 251
  - Christian and Mosaic, necessarily dependent on some preceding religion . . . . . ii. 259
  - the care of legislators in the propagation . . . . . ii. 536
  - acquired naturally by Adam and Eve . . . . . ii. 615
  - first revealed in paradise . . . . . ii. 616
  - reasonableness of a doctrine, no *proof*, but a *presumption* of its divine original . . . . . ii. 670
  - miracles, the only proof of a doctrine being from God . . . . . ii. 671
  - prophecy an additional evidence . . . . . ii. 683
  - established, the voice of nature . . . . . i. 361
  - the nature of . . . . . i. 362
  - necessary to society . . . . . i. 363
  - danger from its deviating from the truth . . . . . i. 366
  - necessity of its alliance with the state . . . . . i. 367
  - advantages to the magistrate from such an alliance . . . . . ib.
  - what it receives from the state . . . . . i. 378
  - what it communicates to the state . . . . . i. 378
  - with a test law, the universal voice of nature . . . . . i. 377
  - speech of Posthumius on the introduction of foreign worship at Rome . . . . . i. 378
  - causes which facilitated it . . . . . i. 379
  - good purposes of . . . . . i. 380
  - distinction between established and tolerated, according to Dionysius Halicarnassus . . . . . i. 395
  - advantages of establishments . . . . . i. 633
  - Jewish, of names, an ancient superstition . . . . . ii. 139
  - not adopted by any of the neighbouring nations, and why . . . . . ii. 269
  - natural, true definition of . . . . . i. 604
  - — the Mosaic a republication of . . . . . ib.
  - — teaches God to be the rewarder of them that diligently seek him . . . . . ii. 619
  - — of what those rewards consist . . . . . ib.
  - — the distinction between natural and revealed . . . . . ii. 629
- Religions, pagan, not interfering with each other . . . . . ii. 258
- Religion revealed, its internal and external evidence . . . . . i. 113
- the necessary qualifications for treating of them . . . . . i. 114
  - only able to enforce the sanction of reward . . . . . i. 126
  - condition of man under it, inquired into . . . . . ii. 622
  - the three systems of . . . . . ii. 629
- Religion, toleration of, motives for toleration . . . . . i. 381
- danger of enforcing conformity . . . . . ib.
  - the sense in which it was understood by the pagan world . . . . . i. 382
- Religious truth, inquiry into what it is . . . . . ii. 596
- Religious war, one in ancient Egypt, and the occasion of it . . . . . i. 385
- Repentance, the nature and efficacy of, considered . . . . . ii. 660
- Resurrection, allegorized by the Greek philosophers . . . . . i. 529
- Revelation, particular objections against, answered . . . . . i. 599
- some one embraced by all mankind . . . . . i. 676
  - natural inferences from this general propensity . . . . . i. 677
  - the use and necessity of it . . . . . i. 679
- Revelations pagan, one circumstance common to all . . . . . i. 680
- attributed by the primitive fathers to the devil . . . . . ib.
- Reward, the sanction of, explained . . . . . i. 122



- Reward, enforced only by religion vol. i. p. 126  
 Rhea, observations on the fable of ii. 81  
 Rhetoric, use of, disallowed at the court of Areopagus, i. 83  
 Riddles, propounded by the Hebrew sages, as mutual trials of sagacity ii. 58  
 Ridicule, the favourite figure of speech among freethinkers i. 83  
 — Shaftesbury's justification of, examined i. 84  
 — not the test of truth i. 88  
 — how far it may be safely made use of ib.  
 — the defence of, by Dr Akenside, examined i. 102  
 — not the test of truth i. 103  
 — the proper detector of error i. 104  
 Rites, legal and patriarchal, not to be confounded ii. 151  
 Ritual law of the Jews, made in reference to the Egyptian superstition ii. 149  
 — this no objection to the divinity of it ii. 162  
 — characterized in Ezekiel ii. 173  
 — explained ii. 174  
 Romans, to what their ruin was owing i. 166  
 — their law respecting tolerated religions i. 394  
 — excellence of their constitution i. 435  
 — their fear of the gods ib.  
 — their regard for an oath i. 436  
 — their use of sacrifice at concluding treaties of peace ii. 638  
 Rome, Christian, whether its superstitions borrowed from the pagan city, examined ii. 194  
 Rose, what the emblem of among the ancients i. 320  
 — origin of the proverb, "under the rose," ib.  
 Runic alphabet, when and why changed for the Roman ii. 85  
 Rutherford, Dr, his notion of the effect the withdrawing the sanctions of the Jewish law had on the obligatory force of that law, examined ii. 301  
 — his notions of the temporal sanctions of the Jewish law being continued under the gospel, examined ii. 317  
 — his notions of inefficacy of action without speech examined ii. 576
- S
- Sabbath, a positive institution ii. 152  
 — the Jews' breach of by circumcision considered ii. 225  
 — its origin ii. 226  
 Sacred band of Thebans, Plutarch's remarks on the death of i. 260  
 Sacrifice, origin and nature of, explained ii. 636  
 — made use of by the Romans at the ratification of peace ii. 638  
 — Mosaic examined ii. 643  
 — the origin and progress of human ii. 644  
 — of Christ on the cross, considered ii. 645  
 — the admission of it into the Mosaic ritual considered ii. 646  
 — feast upon the sacrifice, a type of the Lord's supper ii. 649  
 Sacrifices, human, the command to Abraham to offer up his son Isaac vindicated from the objection of giving a divine sanction to ii. 483, 486  
 — Bryant's opinion of their origin, exploded ii. 691  
 — Voltaire's opinion confuted ii. 693  
 — the command that "none devoted shall be redeemed," examined ii. 695  
 Sages, ancient, unanimous in thinking the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments necessary to the well-being of society i. 434  
 — did not believe in a future state i. 441  
 — held it lawful for the public good, to say one thing when they thought another ib.  
 Sallust, his opinion of the divine nature i. 504  
 Samuel, his conduct in establishing the royal form of government in Judea ii. 283  
 Sanchoniatho, arguments proving that this is the history narrated in the Eleusinian mysteries i. 231  
 — extract from his history i. 232  
 Sanhedrim, why instituted ii. 156  
 — when established ii. 159  
 Sanhedrim, motives of Jesus Christ's evasive reply to their interrogations vol. ii. p. 139  
 Satan, reflections on his character as represented by Job ii. 413  
 Saul, the phrase of his being among the prophets, explained ii. 177  
 — characterized ib.  
 Savages, American, why averse to the arts of civil society i. 400  
 Scarron, his artifice in ridiculing the sentiment of Sulpicius i. 86  
 Scenical representations, in what respect without moral import ii. 445  
 Scepticism, characterized ii. 383  
 Sceptre of Judah, the common notions of that phrase, examined ii. 290  
 — true sense of, pointed out ii. 294  
 Scriptures sacred, a summary view of their contents ii. 372  
 — general rule for the interpretation of ii. 430  
 — three points recommended to the attention of commentators ii. 447  
 — much abused in the search after truth ii. 496  
 Self-love, the operation of, in mankind, traced i. 150  
 Sempiternus, the true import of that word ascertained i. 521  
 Seneca, his consolation against the fear of death i. 464  
 — accused by St Austin of duplicity i. 610  
 Serpent, in the fall of man, the true meaning of ascertained ii. 323  
 — how the sentence passed on it, is to be understood ii. 433  
 Serpent, crooked, in Job and Isaiah, the meaning of, explained ii. 417  
 Sesostria, account of, from Diodorus Siculus ii. 4  
 — and Osiris, arguments against the identity of, in opposition to Sir Isaac Newton ii. 93  
 — and Osiris distinguished ii. 98, 103  
 — who ii. 98  
 — divides Egypt by transverse canals ii. 99  
 — his motives for ii. 129  
 Shaftesbury, Lord, remarks on his character i. 51  
 — his unfair treatment of Mr Locke ib.  
 Sherlock, Bishop, his notion of the tribal sceptre of Judah, examined ii. 291  
 Shuckford, Dr, his remarks on the ancient ritual law, examined ii. 174, 224  
 Sibyl, how that character in the *Æneis* to be understood i. 266  
 Signs, memorable instance of divine instruction communicated by, in the case of Abraham ii. 466  
 Silenus, whence Ovid derived his idea of i. 464  
 Sleeping scheme, the principles of, examined ii. 345  
 Society, civil, the first invention of, and the motives to i. 120  
 — no preservative against moral disorders i. 121  
 — unable to enforce the sanction of reward i. 123  
 — which is only to be supplied by religion i. 125  
 — mutual stipulations between magistrate and people on entering into i. 123  
 — the purpose of its institution i. 263  
 — the extent of its care i. 261  
 — invented for intractable spirits i. 434  
 Society, religious, the end of its institution i. 264  
 — sovereign and independent on the civil ib.  
 — not possessed of any civil coactive power ib.  
 — the object of its care i. 265  
 Socinians, examination of their opinion concerning the death of Christ ii. 64  
 Socrates, review of the dispute between him and Aristophanes i. 67  
 — why he declined initiation into the mysteries i. 225  
 — remarks on the latter part of his conduct i. 441  
 — the first who called off philosophy from the contemplation of nature to morals i. 435  
 — the only Greek philosopher who really believed a future state of rewards and punishments i. 436  
 — the method of his philosophy i. 434  
 — note on the effect of the poison i. 434  
 Socratic method of disputing, what is called i. 439



- Solomon, alludes to the mysteries in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chap. iv. ver. 17, 18. . . . . vol. i. p. 296
- his violations of the Mosaic law remarked . . . . . ii. 123
- his prayer at the dedication of the temple illustrative of the particular providence over the Jewish nation . . . . . ii. 310
- in his prayer at the dedication of the temple, requests only a continuance of temporal rewards and punishments . . . . . ii. 323
- how perverted to idolatry . . . . . ii. 408
- Solomon's Song, a representation of Christ's union and marriage with the church . . . . . ii. 567
- Sophists, Greek, some account of . . . . . i. 459
- Soul, the several senses in which the ancients conceived the permanency of it . . . . . i. 440
- its future existence in a state of rewards and punishments taught, but disbelieved by the philosophers . . . . . i. 441
- Cicero's idea of . . . . . i. 489
- an inquiry into our conceptions of . . . . . i. 505
- three species of, admitted by the ancients . . . . . i. 506
- opinions of various philosophers . . . . . i. 515
- the opinions of the philosophers on the immortality of . . . . . i. 620
- the sentiments of the Jews concerning, under the law . . . . . ii. 344
- examination of the notion of the sleep of . . . . . ii. 345
- the mention of its future existence by Moses, and by following writers, to be distinguished . . . . . ii. 381
- immaterial, common to the whole animal creation . . . . . ii. 431
- living, in what sense to be understood as used in the history of the creation of man . . . . . ib.
- inquiry into the nature of . . . . . ii. 620
- different opinions on the . . . . . ii. 690
- Speech, the origin and history of . . . . . ii. 34
- the early acquisition of, by Adam and Eve . . . . . ii. 615
- Spenser, an examination of the argument of his treatise, de Theocratia Judaica . . . . . ii. 286
- examination of Sykes's defence of his argument . . . . . ii. 364
- Spinozists, their opinion of the human soul . . . . . i. 506
- Spiritual courts, the end and use of . . . . . i. 369
- State, its inducements to seek an alliance with the church . . . . . i. 360
- what it communicates to the church . . . . . i. 372
- what it receives from the church . . . . . i. 373
- its conduct where it includes more than one religion . . . . . i. 374
- Statues, the first rise of worshipping, in human form . . . . . ii. 105
- Stebbing, Dr, an examination of his objection to the argument of the divine legation of Moses . . . . . i. 588
- his arguments of Moses' divine legation, equally applicable to Mahomet . . . . . ii. 321
- his exposition of Lev. xviii. 5, examined . . . . . ii. 440
- an examination of his Considerations on the command to Abraham to offer up Isaac — ii. 479, 572, 574, 575, 577, 578, 580, 581, 583, 585, 587
- Stillingleet, his opinion of the Egyptian hieroglyphics . . . . . ii. 43
- Stoics, their practice contrary to their principles . . . . . i. 154
- their notions of death . . . . . i. 483
- their opinions of the soul . . . . . i. 514
- Stoical renovation, what . . . . . i. 485
- Strabo, his opinion concerning the institution of the mysteries . . . . . i. 224
- his opinion as to the necessary religious doctrines by which to govern and restrain the multitude . . . . . i. 438
- his account of the Mosaic doctrine of the Deity . . . . . i. 617
- Stratonicean, whether the principles of, capable of distinguishing the moral difference between virtue and vice . . . . . i. 140
- Suicide, why consigned by Virgil to purgatory . . . . . i. 280
- condemned in the Eleusinian mysteries, and by Virgil . . . . . i. 303
- authors who have written against it . . . . . i. 419
- Sulpicius, his reflections on the sight of Grecian ruins . . . . . vol. i. p. 66
- Sun, the various names under which it was worshipped . . . . . i. 571
- Superstition, in ancient history accounted for . . . . . i. 180
- whence derived, and the cure of it . . . . . i. 358
- whether preferable to atheism . . . . . i. 543
- examination of Plutarch's parallel between . . . . . i. 545
- of Lord Bacon's parallel between it and atheism . . . . . i. 557
- Swift, his observations on Toland and Asgill . . . . . i. 360
- Sykes, his answer to a censure passed on Spencer's opinion of the Jewish theocracy considered . . . . . ii. 364, 366
- his notion concerning the double senses of the scripture prophecies, examined . . . . . ii. 505
- Symbols, and allegories of ancient paganism, for what purpose introduced . . . . . i. 574
- their revolution from being employed for contrary purposes to their primitive designation, pointed out . . . . . ii. 66
- and type, their difference explained . . . . . ii. 647
- Synesius, bishop of Ptolemais, some account of . . . . . i. 529
- allegorizes the resurrection . . . . . ib.
- System and hypothesis, the human mind naturally inclined to . . . . . i. 685
- T
- Tacitus, his character of the Jews and Christians . . . . . i. 390
- his opinion of the Jewish religion . . . . . i. 654
- his account of the ancient Theban monuments . . . . . ii. 43
- Tages, the Etruscan god, how found . . . . . ii. 89
- Talismans, greatly venerated by the Mahometans . . . . . ii. 64
- what they were . . . . . ii. 215
- Tartarus, observations on Virgil's account of . . . . . i. 279
- who consigned to . . . . . i. 286
- Taylor, Dr, examination of his account of the origin of persecution . . . . . i. 652
- Telemachus, why he refused the horses of Menelaus . . . . . ii. 124
- Tertullian, his account of the origin of heresies . . . . . i. 530
- Test law, whence it took its birth . . . . . i. 375
- copy of the test oath of Athens . . . . . i. 377
- Thebans, account of the sacred band . . . . . i. 260
- Theistical opinion, concerning the human soul . . . . . i. 506
- Theseus, exposition of his descent into hell . . . . . i. 263-287
- Theocratic government of the Jews, the reasons and conveniences of the . . . . . ii. 236-250
- every subject a priest under the . . . . . ii. 246
- particular inquiry into the circumstances of the . . . . . ii. 246-276
- why willingly received by them . . . . . ii. 254
- how long subsisting . . . . . ii. 281
- when abolished . . . . . ii. 288
- necessarily including an extraordinary providence . . . . . ii. 300
- illustrated from Solomon's prayer at the dedication of the temple . . . . . ii. 311
- from Ezekiel . . . . . ib.
- from Amos . . . . . ib.
- Dr Sykes's answer to the censure passed on Spencer, considered . . . . . ii. 364
- Theology, natural, the obligations flowing from, as given by Lord Bolingbroke . . . . . i. 354
- Theology, pagan, three systems of . . . . . i. 220
- Theopompus, the common source from which both Ovid and Virgil borrowed, and wherein they erred in deviation from him . . . . . i. 469
- Timæus, his exposition of the ancient metempsychosis . . . . . i. 471
- Ti ti, not an Egyptian notion . . . . . i. 518
- derived from Pherecydes Syrus . . . . . i. 521
- Toland, character of his pantheisticon . . . . . i. 564
- Toleration, juster notions of it entertained by the ancients than by the moderns . . . . . i. 381

- Toleration, two principal causes inducing a large and full allowance of by the ancient lawgivers . . . vol. i. p. 381
- the Romans careful not to infringe it, in their edict against the bacchanalian rites . . . i. 395
- universal, among all the ancient nations, and why . . . i. 669
- Toyman, at Bath, pertinent story of . . . ii. 530
- Traditions, mistaken presumption to strengthen the authority of, by the church of Rome . . . ii. 337
- never made use of by Christ in support of his character . . . ii. 470
- Treason, high, observations on the laws of forfeitures in cases of . . . ii. 329
- Triemegistus, history of the books forged in the name of . . . i. 524
- Truth, whether possible to be made ridiculous . . . i. 86
- reason the best test of . . . i. 89
- reason and ridicule considered in the trial of . . . i. 104
- reasons for veiling it in mysteries . . . i. 214
- and utility, their coincidence, and the mutual proof they afford of each other . . . i. 530
- inquiry into what it is . . . ii. 592
- Turnus, remarks on the character of, in the *Æneis* . . . i. 286
- Types, the meaning of ascertained . . . ii. 492
- derivation of . . . ii. 494
- argument deduced from the general passion for . . . ii. 527
- retained by Mr Whiston's opinion, whilst he rejects double senses . . . ii. 588
- Type and symbol, their difference explained . . . ii. 646
- Typhon, the fable of, explained . . . ii. 73, 98
- Tyrants, ancient, great encouragers of religion, and from what motives . . . i. 184
- U V
- Vane, Sir Harry, his character . . . i. 561
- Vedam, the antiquity of it . . . i. 196
- Vine-tree, Ezekiel's prophecy of it, explained . . . ii. 237
- Vigils, supposed to have originated from the Eleusinian mysteries . . . i. 240
- suppressed on the same account . . . ib.
- Virgil, an exposition of his allegory of the descent of *Æneas* to the shades . . . i. 251
- an inquiry into the nature of the *Æneid* . . . ib.
- remarks on his destroying the myrtle which dropped blood . . . i. 253
- remarks on his making ships become deities of the sea . . . i. 254
- remarks on the character of Turnus . . . i. 255
- remarks on the character of Dido . . . i. 256
- remarks on Voltaire's criticism on this story . . . i. 257
- remarks on his account of the court of Evander . . . i. 258
- remarks on the episode of Nisus and Euryalus . . . i. 259
- recommends adoption . . . ib.
- explanation of the golden bough . . . i. 267
- his account of the mysteries of *Mythras* . . . i. 272
- exposition of his character of *Charon* . . . i. 277
- explanation of the dog *Cerberus* . . . i. 278
- comment on his topography of the infernal regions . . . i. 279
- remarks on the episodes of Dido and Deiphobus . . . i. 285
- his description of *elysium* compared with that of *Homer* . . . i. 291
- infected with *Spinosism* . . . i. 294
- remarks on his description of the shield of *Æneas* . . . i. 300
- Virtue, three different excitements to . . . i. 137
- natural and moral obligations to, distinguished . . . i. 145
- an inquiry into the nature of, under a dispensation of rewards and punishments . . . ii. 339
- Unity of the Deity taught in the Eleusinian mysteries . . . vol. i. p. 293, 295
- Universality, the want of, no objection against the truth of the Mosaic dispensation . . . i. 559
- Voltaire, remarks on his criticism on the *Dido* of Virgil . . . i. 257
- examination of his method of accounting for the persecuting spirit among Christians . . . i. 424
- examination of his objections to the argument of the divine legation of Moses . . . i. 547
- his account of the Chinese method of printing . . . ii. 205
- his account of the Mosaic dispensation, examined . . . ii. 239
- his misrepresentation of *Judea* refuted . . . ii. 242
- some mistakes in his treatise on toleration, noted . . . ii. 372
- his opinion of the origin of human sacrifices, confuted . . . ii. 603
- his accusation of the Jews sacrificing a whole nation, examined . . . ii. 701
- Voice of the sign, origin of . . . ii. 34
- Vossius, his account of the origin of idolatry, refuted . . . ii. 79
- Vows, the origin and obligation of considered . . . ii. 695
- the command that "none devoted shall be redeemed," examined . . . ib.
- *Jephthah's* rash vow considered . . . ii. 697
- Utility, indicative of truth . . . i. 539
- Vulcan, Sir Isaac's Newton's account of . . . ii. 121
- compared with that of *Homer* . . . ib.
- W
- Wants of mankind, real and fantastic, inquiry into, and the effects of . . . i. 140
- War, the different situations of countries for the use of infantry and cavalry . . . ii. 124
- Warburton, answer to the objections of the chancellor of Gottingen . . . i. 528
- motives for writing "the alliance between church and state," . . . i. 632
- Will, the foundation of morality . . . i. 144
- William the Conqueror and king Arthur, the similarity of the outlines of their characters . . . ii. 56
- William of Newbourg, his character of Pope Gregory VIII. . . . ii. 532
- Witsius, his arguments for the Egyptian ritual being borrowed from the Jews, examined . . . ii. 151
- critique on his *Egyptiaca* . . . ii. 166
- Wives, strange or idolatrous, bad consequences of the fondness the Jews had for them, shown . . . ii. 406
- Wollaston, his mistake in establishing the principles of morality, explained . . . i. 147
- Words, mischief attending the improper use of them . . . ib.
- Works, no justification by, under the gospel . . . ii. 461
- Writing, history of the art of . . . ii. 73
- Writings, ancient, marks of forgery in . . . i. 190
- Y
- Youth, adopted; the strength of ancient states . . . i. 259
- Z
- Zalencus, his real existence, and the authenticity of his remains, defended against Bentley . . . i. 147
- extract from his preface . . . i. 156
- notes on a passage in . . . i. 204
- Zeno, his philosophic character . . . i. 422
- Zoroastes, the various opinions of the learned, who he was . . . ii. 175
- of Hyde and Prideaux discredited . . . ii. 207
- Zosimus, his relation how the Eleusinian mysteries came to be excepted in Valentinian's edict against nocturnal assemblies . . . i. 279

THE END.













3 2044 009 710 781

The borrower must return this item on or before the last date stamped below. If another user places a recall for this item, the borrower will be notified of the need for an earlier return.

*Non-receipt of overdue notices does **not** exempt the borrower from overdue fines.*

Harvard College Widener Library  
Cambridge, MA 02138 617-495-2413

WIDENER  
CARREL-STUDY  
APR 25 2003  
**CHARGE**  
CANCELLED

WIDENER  
WIDENER  
JUN 28 2004  
APR 26 2004  
**CANCELLED**  
BOOK OUT

Please handle with care.  
Thank you for helping to preserve  
library collections at Harvard.

